Corporate Landlords and Pandemic and Prepandemic Evictions in Las Vegas

Housing Policy Debate
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rhpd20
Corporate Landlords and Pandemic and

Prepandemic Evictions in Las Vegas
Eric Seymour
To cite this article: Eric Seymour (2022): Corporate Landlords and Pandemic and Prepandemic
Evictions in Las Vegas, Housing Policy Debate, DOI: 10.1080/10511482.2022.2125335
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2022.2125335
Published online: 30 Sep 2022.
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HOUSING POLICY DEBATE
https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2022.2125335
Corporate Landlords and Pandemic and Prepandemic

Evictions in Las Vegas
Eric Seymour
Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA
ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Research on evictions has found that large landlords are associated Received 30 August 2021
with higher absolute and relative numbers of evictions, and pan- Accepted 12 September 2022
demic-period filings have brought additional scrutiny to large land-
KEYWORDS
lords and corporate landlords in particular. However, not all large
Evictions; pandemic;
landlords are equivalent, and some may be more likely to evict based corporate landlords;
on the submarkets in which they operate, and the pandemic has extended-stay
likely altered these relationships. This study examines trends in evic-
tions and filings associated with two particular submarkets, extended-
stay and single-family rentals, through an analysis of case-level data
covering the Las Vegas metropolitan area. Through a series of multi-
variate analyses, I find that extended-stay properties are associated
with higher eviction rates than other multifamily properties during
the 12-month period immediately preceding the pandemic. Extended-
stay landlords are even more likely to file and evict during the first
12-months of the pandemic. The results are mixed for single-family
rentals. Corporate and other large landlords are generally more likely
to file and evict prior to the pandemic, but several are no more likely
or even far less likely to evict compared to smaller landlords during
the pandemic. This study concludes with implications for policy
and research.
On July 19, 2021, Rep. James Clyburn, Chairman of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus
Crisis, sent letters to the chief executive officers of four large corporate landlords “with high evic-
tion rates throughout the coronavirus pandemic,” requesting documents and additional informa-
tion about their practices (U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Reform, 2021). These letters,
citing news reports and court records, allege these companies—Invitation Homes, Pretium
Partners, Ventron Management, and the Siegel Group—collectively filed for eviction more than
5,000 times during the pandemic, despite the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)’s
eviction moratorium and the availability of federal rental assistance. The Private Equity
Stakeholder Project (PESP) reports that corporate landlords, as a class, had filed for eviction more
than 63,000 times since the CDC moratorium took effect in September 2020 (Private Equity
Stakeholder Project, 2021). These charges represent the latest, and most serious, of the charges
leveled against large corporate landlords following the foreclosure crisis, when institutional
investors like Blackstone, the former owner of Invitation Homes, purchased tens of thousands of
foreclosed homes and converted them to rentals. These companies have been accused of sub-
standard property conditions and maintenance, escalating rents, poor management and payment
CONTACT Eric Seymour eric.seymour@rutgers.edu

ß 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 E. SEYMOUR
processing leading to erroneously applied late charges and other fees, and the automatic pursuit
of eviction despite these deficiencies (Semuels, 2019).
Large landlords, particularly those with holdings in multiple states, are by definition more
likely to have larger absolute numbers of filings, all else being equal. However, recent research
finds that large landlords file more on a per-unit basis also (Gomory, 2022; Immergluck et al.,
2019). Large landlords, due to the scale of their operations, have an incentive to standardize
their process for handling delinquency and automatically file for eviction. The primary objective
is to collect rent and filing for eviction is the strongest legal way a landlord can induce a tenant
to pay rent if they can do so—even if it comes at the expense of other necessities (Garboden &
Rosen, 2019; Leung et al., 2021). Certain types of large landlords may have even stronger associa-
tions with filing rates due to their specific business models and practices and the characteristics
of the housing submarkets in which they operate. Siegel Suites operates a chain of extended-
stay rental properties where tenants rent by the week or month. The number of these properties
has increased in recent years, targeting the increasing number of households pushed to the mar-
gins of the rental market (Frazier, 2021). Tenants’ financial circumstances might contribute to
higher eviction rates at these properties, but weekly rental arrangements also allow landlords to
move more swiftly to evict tenants. In short, the specific landlord–tenant relations characteristic
of this and certain other types of rental segments are likely associated with higher eviction rates
even compared to other large landlords.
This study examines differences in eviction and filing rates among different types of corpor-
ate/large landlords in the Las Vegas metropolitan area to test the basic proposition that not all
large/corporate landlords are equivalent. Although landlords, as a class, may be associated with
higher eviction rates compared to so-called “mom and pop” landlords, there are likely important
differences among large landlords driven by the submarkets in which they operate and their pro-
cedures for handling delinquency. Further, the pandemic has likely altered not only overall evic-
tion patterns (Hepburn et al., 2021), but also relative differences among large landlords. This
paper specifically focuses on the two rental-housing segments occupied by the landlords identi-
fied in Rep. Clyburn’s letter: extended-stay (e.g., Siegel Suites) and single-family rentals (SFRs;
e.g., Invitation Homes). In so doing, this paper addresses the questions of whether these entities
are evicting at higher rates than other large landlords and whether and how these differences
were altered by the pandemic. This study builds on the author’s prior research on these submar-
kets in Las Vegas during the decade preceding the pandemic (Seymour & Akers, 2021a).
In the following sections, I review the relevant literature on evictions and large landlords, fol-
lowed by a brief description of the study area context. I then discuss my use of case-level
records of eviction filings and ordered evictions and parcel-level property ownership data in
order to construct two, parallel data sets: one for multifamily properties including extended-stay
rentals and another for SFRs. I examine the two rental markets separately for two comparison
periods: (a) the pandemic period between April 1, 2020, and March 31, 2021; and (b) the identi-
cal, prepandemic span one year prior, from April 1, 2019, to March 31, 2020, to assess whether
baseline, “ordinary” differences exhibited during the prepandemic period were amplified or atte-
nuated during the pandemic in the presence of multiple policies and programs intended to
reduce housing insecurity and eviction. I follow with a discussion of the results and their implica-
tions for policy and further research.
Background
Eviction is a problem of crisis proportions in the U.S. and across the globe. The work of
Desmond, particularly his 2016 book Evicted, and the work of Desmond and others at Princeton’s
Eviction Lab, have brought necessary attention to this topic and provided a resource for begin-
ning to understand the scale of evictions and their spatial and temporal dimensions.
HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 3
According to Gromis et al. (2022), landlords filed for eviction more than 3.6 million times a year
in the U.S., on average, between 2000 and 2018, with roughly 7% of renter households facing
eviction each year. Although filings have trended up since 2000, there has been a parallel
decrease in the filing rate since it peaked during the Great Recession, due to the increasing num-
ber of higher-income renters as demand for rental housing expanded in the wake of the fore-
closure crisis (Gromis et al., 2022).
With growing concern for this eviction crisis, research on residential evictions has grown rap-
idly in recent years. This work collectively reframes evictions not just as a function of individual
households’ idiosyncratic financial circumstances, but as a central feature of U.S. rental markets,
particularly in communities of color, and an integral component of certain landlords’ business
practices (Desmond, 2016). This research has found that large landlords, those owning or manag-
ing multiple units and/or properties, are more likely to file for eviction, net of building and
neighborhood characteristics (Decker, 2021; Gomory, 2022; Immergluck et al., 2019; Leung et al.,
2021). Scholars attribute this difference to large landlords being more likely to routinize their
process for handling delinquency and automatically file for eviction. For example, large property
management companies’ policies leave little room for discretion (Leung et al., 2021). Small land-
lords have more to lose by rushing to eviction, particularly if they believe their tenants will be
able to catch up on rent. Some scholars attribute this to smaller landlords having smaller capital
reserves to cushion the blow of turnover and extended vacancy periods (Garboden & Newman,
2012). But small landlords are more likely to have insight into the personal circumstances of their
tenants, enabling them to make case-by-case determinations about how to handle delinquency
(Balzarini & Boyd, 2021). Small landlords typically interact directly with their tenants, not through
an intermediary management company. Large landlords, who have closer proximity to the legal
system for several reasons, are also more likely to be wary of charges of discrimination poten-
tially incurred by exercising case-by-case discretion in the event of delinquency (Leung et al.,
2021). Small landlords are therefore more likely to file for eviction when their intent is to remove
the tenant, whereas large landlords often file for eviction primarily to induce payment. This prop-
osition is supported by empirical research finding that filings by large landlords are far less likely
to end in an executed eviction compared to those filed by small landlords (Gomory, 2022).
In addition to landlord size, particular types of landlords may be associated with elevated
eviction filing rates. One form that has gained academic and popular attention in recent years is
the emergence of large corporations owning and renting single-family homes (Christophers,
2021; Fields, 2018; Pfeiffer et al., 2020). Although corporate landlords have long been active in
the multifamily sector, SFRs have historically been dominated by small landlords owning one or
just a few properties. Although small landlords still account for the majority of SFRs nationally,
institutional investors entered the SFR space in the wake of the mortgage foreclosure crisis
through bulk acquisition of bank-owned properties. The most widely known of these corporate
landlords is Invitation Homes, which was created by private-equity giant Blackstone in 2012 to
acquire and manage SFRs. Invitation Homes, like its peer companies, is a real estate investment
trust (REIT), a company that owns and operates real estate and sells shares to investors who
earn dividends based on revenues. Invitation Homes, through mergers and acquisitions,
remained the largest REIT SFR landlord in 2021 at about 80,000 homes (Dezember, 2020). In
2021 Pretium, who already controlled Progress Residential, moved into position as the second-
largest SFR landlord—and largest private SFR landlord—after acquiring Front Yard Residential,
giving Pretium a combined 55,000 properties (Pretium Partners, 2020). Other large, publicly
traded REIT SFR landlords include American Homes 4 Rent (AH4R) at about 50,000 homes and
Tricon American Homes with fewer than 20,000 (Charles, 2019).
Research and news reports before and during the pandemic suggest these corporate SFR
landlords frequently file for eviction, often more than other large landlords. Although these com-
panies’ tenants are typically more financially secure than those renting from extended-stay land-
lords (Invitation Homes, 2021), the specific landlord–tenant relationship characteristic of
4 E. SEYMOUR
arrangements involving large SFR landlords increases housing insecurity and the risk of delin-
quency and eviction. In contrast to individual owners of rental homes and even some locally
based landlords renting multiple SFRs, these companies regularly increase rent and add fees
while minimizing maintenance costs to secure and enhance revenues (Fields & Vergerio, 2022).
These companies’ business model adds additional pressure to maximize revenues, including
through the rapid eviction of delinquent tenants. Invitation Homes, as well as the other large
REITs that purchased homes in the wake of the foreclosure crisis, AH4R and Tricon Residential,
raised capital for expanding their rental businesses by securitizing the projected rental streams
from their portfolios, requiring these companies to service substantial debt loads including inter-
est payments to bondholders. Invitation Homes’ bond model assumes a 95% paying-occupancy
rate, creating pressure to remove nonpaying tenants at the earliest opportunity (Mari, 2020).
Further, these same SFR REITs have since become publicly traded companies, putting them
under pressure to generate ever-increasing yields to safeguard shareholder interests (Abood,
2018). Pressure to grow since going public in a context of increasing competition and home pri-
ces creates additional pressure to strictly safeguard and enhance revenues.
This business model and its concomitant pressures have led these landlords to regularly
increase rents, contributing to housing insecurity, delinquency, and likely more frequent eviction
filings. Invitation Homes raised rents by nearly 11% in 2021. Rents on new leases in Sunbelt mar-
kets grew even faster, at 30% for new leases in Las Vegas (Clark, 2021). Corporate SFR landlords
have also increased revenues by stacking fees, including those related to delinquency and evic-
tion filings, creating an additional incentive to file for eviction at the first opportunity (Raymond,
2018). For instance, Invitation Homes was named in a class-action lawsuit alleging excessive late
fees, including a charge of nearly $100 even when rent was paid just one hour late, contributing
to a substantial increase in corporate profits (Deva & Farha, 2019). The same logic applies to pri-
vately held private equity companies, among whom Pretium Partners, the owner of Progress
Residential, is the largest in the SFR space. Collectively, these types of landlords have a far stron-
ger incentive to pursue short-term growth strategies than other SFR landlords, even multiple
property-owning landlords.
Based on an analysis of eviction filings from 2015 in Fulton County, GA (Atlanta), Raymond
et al. (2018) found that several corporate SFR landlords were more likely to file for eviction com-
pared to small landlords (15 properties), even after adjusting for property value and neighbor-
hood socioeconomic status. Colony American Homes, which has since merged with Invitation,
was more than 3 times as likely to file for eviction. AH4R was 2.8 times as likely to file and
Progress was nearly twice as likely. Seymour and Akers (2021a) found similar relationships
between executed evictions and corporate SFR ownership in Las Vegas between 2013 and 2018.
During the pandemic, Invitation has filed for eviction more than 900 times across six states, while
posting record profits (Dezember, 2020; U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Reform, 2021).
According to the PESP, Pretium has filed for eviction more than 1,750 times, making it the single
largest actor filing for eviction (Sorensen, 2021; U.S. House Committee on Oversight and
Reform, 2021).
In contrast to large corporate SFR landlords specializing in newer suburban rental homes are
those that specialize in older distressed properties, including rental homes. Some landlords in
this space pursue a business model known as “milking,” whereby they charge relatively high
rents for distressed rentals while withholding maintenance (Mallach, 2013). These types of land-
lords target tenants locked out of conventional home purchase and rental markets, and they
have long been observed in places with weak housing markets like Detroit, MI (Mallach, 2013).
Past research has linked SFR milker landlords to elevated eviction rates (Seymour & Akers, 2021a,
2021b). These landlords target households with fragile finances, including credit deficiencies,
because these households face deeply constrained housing options and are therefore more likely
accept deficient property conditions. Although these households may be more likely to fall
behind on rent, they may withhold rent to pressure landlords to address habitability problems.
However, because the legal system in most states is tilted toward landlords, the mere fact of a
late rental payment frequently leads to eviction (Garboden & Rosen, 2019; Seymour &
Akers, 2021b).
Beyond the SFR space, certain types of multifamily landlords may also be more likely to file
for eviction, both before and during the pandemic. Among them, those operating extended-stay
apartments may be more likely to file for eviction. Units in extended-stay properties are essen-
tially motel rooms with minimal cooking appliances, much like the single-occupancy room (SRO)
rentals that were a central feature of downtown rental markets until their decline in the 1960s
(Groth, 1994). Although many SRO units in older urban areas have been lost since the 1960s
through demolition or conversion, a growing, although unknown, number of households have
taken up long-term residence in motels since the Great Recession, often in economically dis-
tressed Sunbelt cities (Eckholm, 2009; Frazier, 2021). The landlord–tenant relation characteristic
of extended-stay rentals suggests such landlords may be more likely to file, even compared to
other large landlords. These properties cater to tenants unable to access housing in the conven-
tional rental market (Allen et al., 2019), which in turn allows landlords to charge relatively high
rent. Over the course of a month, rent at an extended-stay apartment can exceed the compar-
able monthly cost for a standard rental (Borchard, 2005). Placing financially fragile households in
a high-cost living situation is unsustainable for many and likely to lead to frequent forced moves
and eviction.
During the pandemic, landlords are alleged to have taken advantage of the uncertainty con-
cerning the applicability of the CDC moratorium to weekly rentals by moving to evict delinquent
tenants, exacerbating tenants’ already severe housing insecurity (Davidson, 2021; Frazier, 2021;
Goldstein, 2020). The Siegel Group, a large extended-stay landlord based out of Las Vegas with
properties in nine states, has filed for eviction more than 500 times since the start of the CDC
moratorium (U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Reform, 2021). Landlords of all types of
rentals may also skirt the CDC moratorium by filing for eviction under the pretense that the rea-
son is something other than nonpayment. In some states, including Nevada, landlords can file
for a no-cause eviction at the expiration of their lease, which, in the case of a weekly rental
property, is extremely brief. In short, extended-stay landlords may be more likely than other
landlords to file in “ordinary” times and even more so during the pandemic, given the higher
probability their tenants lost work as well as their potentially broader repertoire for evading ten-
ant protections.
Research on evictions before and during the pandemic nationally and in states and local areas
with different policy environments governing eviction provide important context for the present
study. Within the aggregate national trends identified by researchers at the Eviction Lab, there is
substantial variation in eviction trends by state, driven in part by the policy environment, for
example, whether and how much notice a landlord is required to provide tenants before filing
for eviction, and the cost of filing (Gromis et al., 2022; Hatch, 2017, 2021; Merritt & Farnworth,
2021). Lower costs lower the barrier for filing, whereas longer notice periods give tenants more
time to pay rent. Requiring even just a few days of notice before filing for eviction is associated
with a substantial reduction in county-level filings (Gromis et al., 2022).
Overall, during the pandemic, there was an aggregate reduction in filings across diverse sites
where researchers collected data. According to Hepburn et al. (2021), there were about 65%
fewer eviction cases from March to December 2020 compared to the typical prepandemic year.
However, as the pandemic continued, tenant protections shifted from strict moratoria to those
where tenants unable to pay all or part of their rent were required to attest to the fact that they
experienced pandemic-related job or wage loss. By summer 2020, many state and local morato-
ria had been lifted and filings, although remaining below historical levels, began to climb. There
was substantial geographic variation in evictions and filings during the pandemic, reflecting the
presence and character of state and local moratoria and the local interpretation of the CDC’s
national moratorium. States with moratoria prohibiting the earliest stages of the eviction process,
6 E. SEYMOUR
including filing for eviction, exhibited the sharpest reductions in filing rates, whereas those that
suspended eviction hearings but not filings saw more modest reductions (Benfer et al., 2022).
The following section provides additional information about these national protections and the
specifics of local protections and the housing market context in Las Vegas.
Las Vegas Context

The Las Vegas–Henderson–Paradise metropolitan area (Las Vegas), which is coterminous with
Clark County, NV, is home to roughly 2.27 million people, the majority of Nevada’s roughly three
million residents (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2020). Employment is concentrated in public-facing
service-sector jobs vulnerable to loss due to pandemic-related economic shutdowns and stay-
at-home orders. Leisure and hospitality accounted for 28% of the annual average nonfarm work-
force in 2019 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). When the area’s numerous casinos, hotels, bars
and restaurants shut down, thousands were put out of work. On March 17, 2020, Governor
Sisolak ordered a statewide closure of all casinos, restaurants, bars, and other nonessential busi-
nesses (Sisolak, 2020a). In April 2020, unemployment reached 33.3%; by November 2020 it had
fallen below 10% and remained near that level through June 2021 (9.6%), although this
remained the highest unemployment rate among large metros (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2021).
The homeownership rate is 54%, about 10 percentage points lower than the national rate, with
the area’s precarious workforce concentrated among renters (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2020).
According to the Census Household Pulse Survey, during the week of March 17 to 29, 2021, 19%
(64%) of all Nevada renters were behind on rent and 27% (66%) of renters earning less than
$50,000 were behind. Among all renters, 23% (64%) had no or little confidence in paying next
month’s rent; among those earning less than $50,000, the share rises to 31% (67%). In that
same week, 54% (610%) of renters behind on rent indicated that it was either very or somewhat
likely that their household would need to leave their unit within the next two months due
to eviction.
Since March 2020, a series of prohibitions on evictions have been put in place at the federal
and state level in Nevada. On March 27, 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security (CARES) Act. Section 4024 of this act instituted a 120-day prohibition of land-
lords of certain “covered buildings,” principally those participating in federal assistance programs
or receiving federally backed financing, from filing for eviction. On March 29, 2020, Governor
Sisolak of Nevada issued Declaration of Emergency #008, stating:
No lockout, notice to vacate, notice to pay or quit, eviction, foreclosure action, or other proceeding
involving residential or commercial real estate based upon a tenant or mortgagee’s default of any
contractual obligations imposed by a rental agreement or mortgage may be initiated. (Sisolak, 2020b)
Governor Sisolak extended this moratorium several times, first through the end of August
2020 and then through October 15, 2020. On September 4, 2020, the CDC issued a temporary
halt in residential evictions, preventing landlords from removing tenants but not from filing for
eviction (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020). To be protected, tenants must attest
to meeting certain income and eligibility criteria, including having exhausted efforts to obtain
government assistance. The CDC’s initial order was set to expire December 31, 2020. It was
extended several times and remained in place for the duration of the study period, although it
was struck down by the Supreme Court in August 2021.
On October 15, 2020, Nevada’s eviction moratorium lapsed for more than one month until
Governor Sisolak renewed it on December 15, 2020. During this period, tenants were only cov-
ered by the CDC moratorium. After the lapse in the state eviction ban, Nevada courts opened
thousands of cases and resumed ordering evictions (Erickson, 2020). Not only does the CDC
moratorium require tenants to proactively invoke this protection and attest to their eligibility, it
permits eviction for reasons other than nonpayment. Nevada state law allows landlords to evict
Figure 1. Eviction filings by rental housing submarket, Clark County, NV. Notes. CDC ¼ Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. SFR ¼ single-family rental. All other filings includes an unknown number of commercial filings.
a tenant for “no cause” at any point after their lease has ended (Nevada, 2021). Tenants with
weekly leases must only be given seven days’ notice to vacate, compared to 30 days for tenants
with longer leases. Investigative reporting revealed Siegel Suites was associated with a substan-
tial number of evictions resulting from no-cause notices when the state moratorium lapsed, des-
pite few of the company’s evictions being the result of no-cause notices in the months
immediately prior to the pandemic (Davidson, 2021). This raises the possibility that Siegel and
other extended-stay landlords used no-cause evictions as a means of circumventing protections
for tenants unable to pay rent. When the governor reinstated the statewide moratorium, it was
revised to prohibit no-cause evictions for tenants who owed rent (Sisolak, 2020c). More recently,
the governor declared he would not extend the statewide moratorium beyond May 31, 2021, cit-
ing recent legislation linking the eviction process to rental assistance applications. Assembly Bill
486, passed in May, stays eviction cases until there has been a determination regarding a ten-
ant’s application for rental assistance; further, it bars eviction in instances where landlords have
refused to accept rental assistance. However, the onus remains on tenants to affirmatively invoke
this protection (Nevada State Legislature, 2021).
Figure 1 shows eviction filings in Clark County between January 2019 and March 2021. This
figure is broken out into SFR, extended-stay, and all other filings. It shows the precipitous decline
in the number of filings with the onset of the pandemic and Nevada’s institution of a statewide
moratorium at the end of March 2020. The mechanical nature of the state prohibition on filing
for eviction for nonpayment brough filings down to virtually zero across submarkets after it was
initially put in place. This figure also illustrates the surge across submarkets in filings when the
state eviction moratorium lapsed, despite the continued presence of the national CDC morator-
ium. There were nearly 5,000 filings total in November 2020, far above prepandemic levels, sug-
gesting landlords who would have filed in previous months for but the state prohibition on
filing for nonpayment filed for those evictions in November. The extended-stay submarket exhib-
ited the greatest increase in filings relative to prepandemic levels, increasing in November 2020
8 E. SEYMOUR
Table 1. Single-family rental filings and evictions by owner and pandemic period.
Filings Filings per 100 units
Prepandemic Pandemic Prepandemic Pandemic Units
American Homes 4 Rent 79 1 9.2 0.1 856
Amwest Properties 5 14 4.6 13 108
Invitation Homes 267 45 8.7 1.5 3,084
Cerberus 44 1 7.1 0.2 618
King Futt’s 79 106 18.7 25.1 423
Other large investors 386 190 7.2 3.6 5,349
Medium investors 335 260 3.8 2.9 8,859
Progress Residential 194 91 9.4 4.4 2,054
Saticoy Bay 41 25 20.3 12.4 202
SFR Investments Pool 42 22 8.3 4.4 506
Small investors 2,640 1,946 1.9 1.4 139,475
Tricon 9 9 1.6 1.6 581
Evictions Evictions per 100 units
American Homes 4 Rent 56 1 6.5 0.1 856
Amwest Properties 3 8 2.8 7.4 108
Invitation Homes 230 16 7.5 0.5 3,084
Cerberus 27 0 4.4 0 618
King Futt’s 52 39 12.3 9.2 423
Other large investors 278 81 5.2 1.5 5,349
Medium investors 237 127 2.7 1.4 8,859
Progress Residential 173 40 8.4 2 2,054
Saticoy Bay 27 4 13.4 2 202
SFR Investments Pool 22 2 4.4 0.4 506
Small investors 1,787 828 1.3 0.6 139,475
Tricon 7 1 1.2 0.2 581
Note. Other large investors are those either (a) owning 100 or more single-family properties and having one or more evic-
tions or (b) owning between 16 and 199 single-family properties regardless of evictions. Medium investors own 6–15 sin-
gle-family properties; small investors include all remaining likely single-family rentals.
to more than 175% compared to January 2019. In contrast, SFR filings in November reached
roughly 125% and all other filings reached about 130% relative to the same baseline. This figure
also illustrates the substantial contribution of SFR and extended-stay submarkets to total eviction
filings given their size relative to all other filings.
The character of the rental housing stock in Las Vegas is a crucial component of the research
context, particularly the prominence of SFRs and extended-stay motels. The Las Vegas metropol-
itan area was hit particularly hard during the foreclosure crisis, and investors purchased a sub-
stantial number of these properties and converted them to rentals (Mallach, 2013; Seymour &
Akers, 2021a). Between 2006 and 2015, Las Vegas experienced the largest growth in SFRs as a
share of single-family homes, with a 10.5% increase bringing the single-family rentership rate to
28%. Further, the metro also exhibited the greatest increase in rentership overall, rising 9% to
48.4% (Immergluck, 2018). According to the 2016–2020 American Community Survey (ACS), there
are roughly 365,779 renter-occupied housing units (±3,498) in Clark County. Of these, detached
SFRs account for 34%. Although large single-family landlords like Invitation Homes were not pre-
sent in the immediate aftermath of the foreclosure crisis (Mallach, 2013), they entered in force
after 2012 (Seymour & Akers, 2021a). By 2020, large investors owning 16 or more SFRs collect-
ively accounted for at least 13,781 single-family homes (see Table 1), equivalent to 11% of the
ACS’s estimate of SFRs.
Although Las Vegas is home to multiple extended-stay apartment properties, the precise size
of this stock is difficult to quantify. There is no national database and parcel data do not unam-
biguously identify extended-stay apartments. As discussed below, I attempted to identify the
largest possible number of extended-stay properties while excluding false positives (e.g., recre-
ational motels), although this almost certainly yields an undercount. I identified 43,082 units at
known extended-stay properties, equivalent to 27% of the ACS’s estimated number of renter-
occupied units in five-plus-unit structures and 12% of all renter-occupied units. However,
extended-stay units are likely undercounted by the ACS given the ambiguous status of many
extended-stay hotels as apartments. Relative to the number of units in properties I used to
examine multifamily properties including motels, extended-stay units account for 21% of those
201,855 units (see below for details).
Data and Methods

This paper draws on records of eviction filings obtained from the Las Vegas Justice Court, North
Las Vegas Justice Court, and Henderson Justice Court and records of ordered evictions sent to
the constables’ offices for the same three township jurisdictions, which collectively cover the
entirety of the Las Vegas Valley area.1 I include both eviction filings and ordered evictions to
capture as comprehensive a picture of the eviction process as possible. Filings represent the fre-
quency with which landlords marshal the legal system to threaten tenants to pay rent or quit,
whereas ordered evictions reflect actual forced moves. Although a filing is a necessary initial
step in the overall eviction process, not all filings lead to forced moves. I restrict my formal ana-
lysis to two comparison periods: (a) the pandemic period between April 1, 2020, and March 31,
2021; and (b) the identical, prepandemic span one year prior, from April 1, 2019, to March 31,
2020. March 31, 2021, is also the last date for which I possess records of ordered evictions.
Although Nevada ordered nonessential businesses closed on March 17, 2020, the state eviction
moratorium was not put in place until March 30. Dividing the data at April 1 facilitates compari-
son across periods based on the existence of eviction prevention policies. I retrieved parcel own-
ership and property information records from Clark County dated August 2020, along with a
parcel shapefile.
For this study, I constructed two, parallel data sets. To build my data set of multifamily prop-
erties, I identified all parcels with land-use codes identifying them as those with buildings con-
taining five or more units, all auxiliary multifamily parcels, motels, and condominium units with
apartment use in a multifamily building. To match evictions to multifamily parcels, I followed a
tiered strategy. First, I matched cases to parcels by comparing tenant addresses to property
addresses after stripping out unit numbers. Following this, I geocoded cases without matching
addresses in the parcel records using Google’s geocoding API, and for records where I was able
to geocode with “rooftop” accuracy, I assigned cases to parcels when they fell within their boun-
daries. In instances where this placed records within the boundaries of parcels enveloping a
multi-building complex, and not within the boundary of a parcel matching a record in the tax
assessor database (enveloping parcels do not have tax information), I assigned cases to the par-
cel contained by the enveloping parcel. To ensure I captured all cases associated with multifam-
ily parcels, I identified all cases yet to be assigned to a parcel within 90 feet of a multifamily
parcel and manually assigned them to multifamily parcels after comparing tenant address and
landlord fields in the eviction data with the parcel address and owner fields in the parcel data.
After having matched cases to parcels, I consolidated parcels into distinct properties. Many
apartment complexes sprawl across multiple parcels, so they must be combined to find the
actual number of evictions and units at a given property. This procedure is also required by the
fact that eviction cases sometimes match to auxiliary parcels lacking housing unit information.
These parcels therefore need to be combined to identify the denominator number of housing
units that I used for calculating property-specific eviction and filing rates. To this end, I grouped
all parcels with the same tax mailing address falling within the same census tabulation block. In
a few cases, this combined distinct complexes into a single super-complex, although the overall
rate remains superior to taking parcels as the unit of analysis. I determined this procedure to be
preferable to searching strictly for touching parcels because that procedure orphaned numerous
10 E. SEYMOUR
parcels belonging to apartment complexes. For condo-apartments, I grouped parcels contained

within the enveloping parcel for the entire complex that contains the disconnected parcels with
property information.
For my regression analysis involving multifamily properties, I restricted the data set to non-
profit and privately owned properties by removing those owned by the Southern Nevada
Regional Housing Authority (SNRHA), a public agency that provides subsidized housing to low-
and moderate-income households. SNRHA is the largest owner of multifamily properties and
units in the valley area. I further limited the analysis to multifamily parcels, condo-apartments,
and extended-stay properties, many of which are coded as motels. I removed all motels I did not
identify as weekly rentals from my data set given the fact that many motels do not offer weekly
leases. Removing these properties enables me to directly contrast large weekly rental properties
with the conventional multifamily rental stock. I identified other properties carrying a subsidy
but owned by a different entity by matching records in HUD’s Picture of Subsidized Households
and Low-Income Housing Tax Credit database with multifamily parcels. I matched these records
to tax parcels based on the mailing address; the coordinates provided in these data sets do not
always align with actual location.
To locate extended-stay properties, I identified parcels associated with extended-stay proper-
ties owned by multi-property owners 3D Investments (Emerald Suites, Harbor Island, Sienna
Suites, Shelter Island), Budget Suites, Extended Stay America, and Siegel Suites, as well as parcels
owned by Aviator Suites, Kensington Suites, Manor Suites, Sportsman’s Royal Manor, and Town &
Country Manor. I identified these specific actors through prior research examining the scale of
extended-stay landlords in Las Vegas (Seymour & Akers, 2021a). Although this set of properties is
not exhaustive of all extended-stay properties, it captures the largest and best-known rentals of
this type.
To build my dataset of SFRs, I restricted my analysis to single-family residential parcels where
the property address does not match the mailing address. Among those, I identified parcels
owned by a set of named actors including large SFR landlords like Invitation Homes and
Progress Residential. I used regular expressions to identify properties belonging to these entities
based on a combination of owner name and mailing address. I classified SFR rentals as being
owned by a “large landlord” based on one of two conditions: either the owner possessed at least
100 properties and was associated with at least one eviction, or the owner possessed between
16 and 99 SFR properties regardless of evictions. SFR rentals owned by entities holding more
than 100 rentals without a single eviction are typically homebuilders, not landlords. To that end,
I also excluded properties owned by government entities, housing authorities, banks, churches,
homebuilders (e.g., Pulte Homes), or listing platforms (e.g., Opendoor). I classified investors own-
ing 6–15 SFRs as medium investors and all remaining SFRs as owned by small investors. I also
excluded Clark County SFR properties located outside the three townships from which I received
eviction records. I matched evictions to SFRs based entirely on (cleaned) property address infor-
mation. SFRs have a higher match rate based on address information compared to multifamily
properties, which are associated with a range of addresses despite having only one address
recorded in the tax records.
To examine the association between evictions and extended-stay properties and how the
magnitude of this association changed during the pandemic, I employ a series of negative bino-
mial regression models predicting the number of either filings or ordered evictions separately for
the prepandemic and pandemic periods. I include a binary variable indicating whether the prop-
erty is an extended-stay property. I also control for whether there was a recent sale, which has
repeatedly been found to be an important predictor of eviction (Gomory, 2022; Raymond et al.,
2018), particularly nonserial evictions (Immergluck et al., 2019). The intuition here is that buyers
are increasingly corporate landlords who seek to replace existing tenants with higher-income
households. I also include portfolio size, measured as the number of units associated with a
given mailing address across the entire sample of multifamily properties. I include several
Table 2. Top 10 multifamily and motel owners for filings and evictions by pandemic period.
Filings Filings per 100 units
Siegel Suites 833 947 19.08 21.69 4,366
3D Investments 1,102 729 29.99 19.84 3,675
Olen Properties 435 637 7.98 11.68 5,454
Bridge Investment Group 566 485 16.97 14.54 3,335
Budget Suites 283 311 12.71 13.97 2,226
Oaktree Capital 292 285 13.89 13.56 2,102
Westland 1,504 284 17.08 3.22 8,807
Maxx Properties 133 198 6.73 10.02 1,977
Laguna Point 209 164 21.91 17.19 954
Fairfield 373 162 26.16 11.36 1,426
Evictions Evictions per 100 units
Siegel Suites 532 462 12.19 10.58 4,366
3D Investments 712 332 19.37 9.03 3,675
Olen Properties 349 295 6.40 5.41 5,454
Bridge Investment Group 354 194 10.61 5.82 3,335
Budget Suites 235 129 10.56 5.80 2,226
Oaktree Capital 167 124 7.94 5.90 2,102
Maxx Properties 92 97 4.65 4.91 1,977
LA Wilshire 231 61 17.85 4.71 1,294
Fairfield 258 57 18.09 4.00 1,426
SportsmansRoyalManor 66 56 9.92 8.42 665
property-level controls, including property age, total value divided by the number of units (in
thousands), and an indicator variable for whether a property is a condominium complex or
motel. Properties carrying subsidies may shield tenants from extreme rent burden and reduce
the number of evictions. I therefore control for whether a property carries a subsidy. Although
there is a burgeoning literature examining the specific relationship between different forms of
subsidy and eviction (Harrison et al., 2020; Preston & Reina, 2021), I seek only to remove the
overall effect of this subsidy. To account for the differences in tenant characteristics, I include
several block-group level variables derived from the 2019 5-year ACS. I also include the logged
number of housing units as an offset and calculate standard errors clustered by block group.
For the analysis of SFRs, I employ a series of logistic regression models predicting whether
there was at least one eviction or filing for each property in the sample, similar to the approach
used by Raymond et al. (2018) and Seymour and Akers (2021a). I include a series of indicator var-
iables for the named landlords and the residual category of large landlords, taking SFRs owned
by landlords owning 15 or fewer properties as the reference category. I control for total value
and home age at the property level, I again also control for recent sales and block-group demo-
graphic and housing characteristics employed in prior research.
Results
Multifamily Properties
Table 2 provides information about the top 10 multifamily landlords ranked by pandemic-period
filings. Siegel Suites tops the list with nearly 950 filings between April 1, 2020, and March 31,
2021. Normalized by the number of units Siegel operates, this translates to a filing rate of
roughly 22 filings per 100 units, the highest among the top 10. As with several landlords on this
list, this represents an increase from the preceding 12-month period. In second place is Joseph
Daneshgar, a Southern California-based investor who owns several companies, including 3D
Investments, and operates through a variety of LLCs. Daneshgar’s companies own and operate
12 E. SEYMOUR
several extended-stay properties. By cross-referencing owner names in tax records with the
Nevada corporations database, I identified Daneshgar as the managing partner for the compa-
nies owning Emerald Suites, Harbor Island, Shelter Island, and Sienna Suites. Daneshgar’s compa-
nies also operate a smaller number of conventional apartment complexes, including Sundance
Village and Wynn Palms. Olen Living, also based out of Southern California, operates conven-
tional apartment complexes in seven states including several in Nevada. Bridge Investment
Group, out of Utah, states on its website that it has $26 billion in assets under management and
owns nearly 50,000 housing units (Bridge Investment Group, n.d.). Budget Suites is another
extended-stay operation; it was started in Las Vegas in 1987 by Robert Bigelow and now has
locations in Arizona, Nevada, and Texas. The Westland Real Estate Group, another California-
based entity, started buying properties in Las Vegas in 2010 and currently owns nearly 9,000
units, making them the single-largest owner on the list. Although Westland is in the top 10 of
entities filing for eviction during the pandemic, on a per-unit basis it has a low filing rate.
Collectively, the landlords listed in Table 2 account for 17% of total prepandemic filings and
25% of multifamily prepandemic filings while accounting for just 9% of renter-occupied housing
units and 17% of multifamily units.2 Thus, these top multifamily landlords, which include several
large extended-stay operators, are overrepresented among filers. Further, they account for an
even larger share of filings during the pandemic, at 21% of total filings and 32% of multifamily
filings. As Table 2 indicates, however, there is substantial variation in the degree to which large
landlords adjusted their filing activity during the pandemic, both positively and negatively.
During the pandemic, Siegel’s count climbed 14% over the prior period, and they alone
accounted for 5% of total pandemic filings (but just 1% of renter-occupied units). Extended-stay
properties overall, including and beyond those included in Table 2, account for 7,166 prepan-
demic filings (21% of total filings) and 5,181 pandemic filings (26% of total), while accounting for
just 12% of renter-occupied housing units. Across the entire stock of multifamily properties and
motels, the filing rate declined from 11% during the prepandemic period down only to 7%, with
the November surge in filings closing the difference between the two periods.
In terms of executed evictions, Siegel, with more than 460 evictions ordered during the pan-
demic, again sits atop the list. Siegel alone accounts for 4% of all multifamily evictions in the
prepandemic period and 9% during the pandemic. 3D Investments, which accounts for 5% of
total evictions during the prepandemic period accounts for roughly 6% during the pandemic.
Sportsman’s Royal Manor, another extended-stay property, now appears in the top 10, although
it is also one of the top 10 individual properties in terms of filings as well. The top 10 evictors
account for 22% of all multifamily evictions during the prepandemic period and 35% of total
multifamily filings during the pandemic. With respect to total evictions, they account for 14%
and 21% of prepandemic and pandemic period orders, respectively. Across the entire stock of
multifamily properties and motels, the eviction rate declined from 6.9% during the prepandemic
period to 2.6%. Thus, within a context of overall decline, these top multifamily landlords
accounted for an increasing share of ordered evictions. Extended-stay properties overall, includ-
ing and beyond those included in Table 2, account for 4,558 prepandemic evictions (21% of
total) and 2,188 pandemic evictions (26% of total).
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics by extended-stay rental status for the sample of multi-
family properties used for regression analysis. Extended-stay rentals exhibit higher rates of filings
and evictions in both the prepandemic and pandemic periods, although the relative difference is
greater during the pandemic. For the prepandemic period, the average extended stay filing rate
was 20.8, 1.7 times greater than the comparable rate across all other multifamily properties in
the sample. During the pandemic, filings rates declined in both groups overall, but extended-
stay rentals had an average filing rate 2.8 times greater than other rentals. A similar pattern is
observed for ordered evictions. Extended-stay properties have eviction rates, on average, more
than twice as large as other rentals for the prepandemic period. This difference climbs to 3.2
times greater during the pandemic, again, despite lower rates for both groups. In terms of other
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the multifamily data set by extended-stay status.
Other multifamily (n ¼ 1,328) Extended stay (n ¼ 47)
Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max.
Prepandemic filings 14.65 24.88 0.00 235.00 58.34 76.37 0.00 338.00
Pandemic filings 8.25 16.83 0.00 256.00 47.74 51.87 0.00 277.00
Prepandemic evictions 8.79 15.37 0.00 169.00 40.62 55.36 0.00 260.00
Pandemic evictions 3.13 7.48 0.00 137.00 22.49 27.53 0.00 165.00
Prepandemic filings rate 12.03 16.42 0.00 150.00 20.84 19.99 0.00 112.67
Pandemic filing rate 6.83 9.77 0.00 75.00 18.69 14.21 0.00 64.84
Prepandemic eviction rate 7.43 10.79 0.00 150.00 15.08 15.90 0.00 86.67
Pandemic eviction rate 2.85 5.33 0.00 44.44 8.98 7.89 0.00 42.86
Portfolio size 731.61 1,449.01 5.00 6,941.00 3,033.87 1,824.72 90.00 4,734.00
Units in complex 134.08 144.12 5.00 984.00 261.72 221.66 59.00 1,126.00
Value per unit (in thousands of $) 20.20 14.25 3.52 141.47 12.88 5.96 4.25 38.87
Building age 38.65 19.61 1.00 119.00 28.81 10.99 2.00 57.00
Median gross rent 9.35 2.47 4.52 18.18 9.30 2.42 5.82 21.61
Assisted housing 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
No recent sale 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.49 0.00 1.00
Sale 2017–2020 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00
Sale 2010–2016 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
% severe rent burden 28.36 12.26 0.00 72.20 31.33 12.19 4.78 54.32
% poverty 27.30 15.60 0.00 80.53 27.92 14.78 5.05 69.96
% BA or higher 16.18 11.60 0.00 60.55 15.10 9.35 3.62 47.33
% Families with children 23.69 12.84 0.00 65.52 16.57 9.10 0.00 37.16
% Female-headed households 74.50 18.25 34.34 171.76 67.51 14.12 32.53 94.55
% Black alone (Non-Hispanic) 16.56 12.52 0.00 68.92 18.08 14.54 0.00 55.27
% Hispanic or Latino 39.33 20.80 0.00 96.46 32.08 17.72 4.39 70.89
Note. SD ¼ standard deviation.
key differences, both portfolio size and property size are larger, on average, for extended-stay
properties, which is expected given extended-stay specialists tend to operate larger properties
with many units. Extended-stay properties also have lower value on a per-unit basis compared
to other properties, which fits intuition about the place of these properties within the system of
local rental housing submarkets.
Table 4 shows the results of the regression models predicting counts of evictions and filings.
This table reports the coefficients as incident rate ratios (IRR), with values greater than 1 indicat-
ing an increase in an independent variable is associated with a higher eviction or filing rate.
Conversely, values lower than 1 indicate an increase in a variable or a particular value for a cat-
egorical variable is associated with a lower rate. Starting with the prepandemic model, extended-
stay properties are strongly associated with the number of filings, even after accounting for the
number of units in the property, the characteristics of residents in the surrounding block group,
select property characteristics, and the portfolio size of the property owner. Extended-stay com-
plexes are associated with prepandemic filing rates nearly 1.6 times higher than those for nonex-
tended-stay properties. Consistent with prior research, having a recent sale is also highly
statistically significant and positively associated with filings; properties with sales between 2017
and 2020 are associated with filing rates roughly 1.8 times those without a recent transaction,
whereas properties with sales between 2010 and 2016 have rates more than 50% higher than
those without a recent transaction. Portfolio size is also highly significant and positively associ-
ated with eviction filings, although the magnitude is very modest. Doubling the size of the port-
folio is associated with just a 2.5% increase in filings. Housing units carrying subsidies are
associated with filing rates, on average, more than 40% lower than those of nonsubsidized prop-
erties. In terms of housing characteristics, median rent is positive whereas its square is negative,
reflecting a nonlinear relationship between rent and eviction risk, likely reflecting the socioeco-
nomic position of tenants in high-rent properties. The poverty rate is highly statistically signifi-
cant and positively associated with filings. A one standard deviation increase in the poverty rate
is associated with a 19% increase in filings. The share of the non-Hispanic Black population is
14 E. SEYMOUR
Table 4. Negative binomial regression results predicting filings and evictions for multifamily properties.
Filings Evictions
(1) Prepandemic (2) Pandemic (3) Prepandemic (4) Pandemic
Extended stay 1.5783 (0.1570) 2.8916 (0.1201) 2.0476 (0.1658) 4.0561 (0.1391)
Sale 2017–2020 1.8098 (0.0802) 1.6873 (0.0839) 1.8439 (0.0746) 1.5921 (0.1015)
Sale 2010–2016 1.4587 (0.0917) 1.4034 (0.0880) 1.4880 (0.0836) 1.4117 (0.1078)
Building age 1.0036 (0.0028) 1.0070 (0.0029) 1.0036 (0.0026) 1.0110 (0.0034)
Log(portfolio size) 1.0359 (0.0182) 1.0126 (0.0211) 0.9976 (0.0177) 0.9723 (0.0257)
Value per units 0.9955 (0.0035) 0.9960 (0.0043) 0.9947 (0.0035) 0.9964 (0.0053)
Assisted 0.5710 (0.1257) 0.5873 (0.1546) 0.5609 (0.1224) 0.4859 (0.1933)
Block group variables
Median rent 1.2460 (0.0933) 1.1245 (0.1010) 1.2090 (0.0845) 1.0789 (0.1157)
Median rent squared 0.9909 (0.0040) 0.9949 (0.0045) 0.9927 (0.0035) 0.9959 (0.0051)
% severe rent burden 0.9992 (0.0031) 1.0035 (0.0038) 0.9985 (0.0032) 1.0029 (0.0048)
% poverty 1.0113 (0.0034) 1.0048 (0.0037) 1.0107 (0.0036) 1.0017 (0.0047)
% BA or higher 0.9938 (0.0043) 1.0001 (0.0052) 0.9936 (0.0038) 1.0028 (0.0058)
% households w/children 0.9987 (0.0040) 0.9961 (0.0034) 0.9979 (0.0036) 0.9941 (0.0043)
% female-headed households 0.9987 (0.0019) 1.0018 (0.0019) 0.9990 (0.0018) 1.0013 (0.0024)
% Black 1.0110 (0.0032) 1.0091 (0.0036) 1.0106 (0.0033) 1.0063 (0.0042)
% Hispanic 1.0032 (0.0027) 1.0032 (0.0028) 1.0026 (0.0026) 1.0027 (0.0033)
Township (ref. ¼ Henderson)
Las Vegas township 1.9280 (0.1302) 1.2328 (0.1429) 1.4521 (0.1294) 0.8100 (0.1554)
N. Las Vegas township 1.6973 (0.1801) 1.0950 (0.1996) 1.7119 (0.1847) 1.0842 (0.2364)
Constant 0.0076 (0.5887) 0.0099 (0.6121) 0.0086 (0.5528) 0.0100 (0.7629)
Theta 1.0956 (0.0553) 0.8812 (0.0467) 1.2566 (0.0694) 0.7274 (0.0462)
Observations 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375
Log likelihood –4,193.5290 –3,571.9190 –3,619.0350 –2,561.6670
Note. Shows incidence rate ratios (IRRs) and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
p < .01. p < .05. p < .01.
positively associated with filings, with a one standard deviation increase in percentage non-
Hispanic Black associated with an 15% increase. Lastly, the share of the population with a bache-
lor’s degree or higher is negatively associated with filings, with a one standard deviation increase
associated with a 9% reduction.
Turning to the second, pandemic-period model, the results show an even larger difference
between the expected eviction filing rate for extended-stay complexes compared to others, at
nearly 3 times the rate. To test whether the effect of extended-stay properties is statistically sig-
nificantly greater in the pandemic model compared to the prepandemic model, I estimated an
additional model appending the prepandemic data to the pandemic data and adding as a cova-
riate the interaction between extended-stay properties and a dummy variable indicating the
time period. This interaction term was significant (p < .05) and positive (IRR of 1.62). Recent sales
remain strongly associated with filings, whereas portfolio size is no longer significant. Assisted
properties remain associated with fewer filings. Unlike the prepandemic model, building age is
significantly and positively associated with filings, with a one standard deviation increase associ-
ated with a 15% increase in filings. In terms of block-group characteristics, only the share of the
population that identifies as Black alone remains significant, although with a slightly weaker
association.
Turning to the models predicting ordered evictions, the IRRs for the extended-stay indicators
are even larger. The prepandemic model shows that extended-stay properties are associated
with eviction rates more than twice those of other properties, holding all covariates constant.
The pandemic-period model indicates extended-stay properties have eviction rates roughly 4
times as large as those of other properties. I again estimated an additional model (not presented,
for reasons of space) pooling the prepandemic and pandemic data sets and regressing evictions
on the same covariates plus an additional interaction between time and extended-stay owner-
ship. This interaction is again positive (IRR of 1.69) and significant (p < .05). These differences are
equal to or greater than those observed by comparing average eviction rates in Table 3. In terms
of other covariates, the results for the prepandemic evictions model are largely similar to the
results for the prepandemic filings model. In the pandemic evictions model, none of these cova-
riates is significant at the 90% confidence level. Only property-level characteristics have a statis-
tically significant and practically meaningful relation to the eviction rate during the pandemic.
Single-Family Rentals
In terms of the SFR submarket’s share of overall evictions, I found 4,118 filings associated with
single-family properties during the prepandemic period, equivalent to 12% of total filings
(33,405). During the pandemic period, I found a total of 2,710 SFR filings, or 13% of total filings.
Table 1 shows the number of filings and the rate of filings per 100 rental units for select large
landlords and all other SFR landlords grouped based on corporate ownership or size of inven-
tory. Collectively, individually named SFR landlords (e.g., Invitation Homes) account for 18% of
total SFR filings in the prepandemic period and 12% during the pandemic, while accounting for
just 5% of total SFR units. Ordered evictions follow a similar pattern, with total SFR evictions
accounting for 13% and 14% of all evictions and individually named SFR landlords accounting
for 21% and 10% of total SFR evictions during the prepandemic and pandemic periods, respect-
ively. Thus, although these SFR landlords are overrepresented among both SFR filings and evic-
tions in both periods, as a group they account for a sharply declining share of total SFR
evictions in the pandemic period compared to the prior 12-month period.
Invitation Homes is the single largest SFR landlord in the Las Vegas Valley at more than 3,000
homes. Although Invitation had a prepandemic filings rate above several named SFR landlords
and all other large SFR landlords as a class, their filings fell 83% during the pandemic, when
they exhibit a filing rate near that of small landlords. Progress Residential owns roughly 2,000
homes in the Las Vegas area. Their prepandemic filing rate was slightly higher than Invitation’s.
Although their filings did not decline at the same rate during the pandemic, they did fall more
than 50%.
King Futt’s, a local entity that operates one of the largest extended-stay complexes in the
area, Sportsman’s Royal Manor, also operates more than 400 single-family homes that it pur-
chased in the wake of the foreclosure crisis. Futt’s exhibits a particularly high filing rate during
the pandemic. Filings at both Futt’s SFRs and at Sportsman’s increased during the pandemic,
from 19 to 25 filings per 100 units for Futt’s and from 22 to 29 per 100 for Sportsman’s. News
reports suggest that Futt’s is a classic “milker” landlord, whose business model consists of renting
distressed homes to financially fragile households locked out of the conventional market while
withholding maintenance and using eviction to coerce payment (Davidson, 2019; Davidson &
Flannery, 2019). Table 5 presents the results of a logistic regression model predicting the binary
outcome of any filings or evictions in both the prepandemic and pandemic periods. This table
presents odds ratios, which have a similar interpretation to IRRs: values above 1 indicate greater
odds of eviction relative to the reference category or no change in the variable, whereas values
below 1 indicate lower odds of eviction. Consistent with prior research, many of the corporate
landlords singled out for analysis are associated with higher filing rates during “ordinary” times
compared to small landlords, even after accounting for property and neighborhood characteris-
tics. Properties owned by AH4R and Invitation Homes are both roughly 3.8 times as likely to be
subject to an eviction filing compared to properties owned by investors owning 15 or fewer
properties during the prepandemic period. However, during the pandemic, Invitation is no more
likely to file for eviction and AH4R is far less likely to file compared to small investors. Cerberus,
like AH4R, is associated with greater odds of a filing before the pandemic, but substantially lower
odds during the pandemic. In contrast, Progress Residential, which is more than 4 times as likely
16 E. SEYMOUR
Table 5. Logit regression results predicting filings and evictions for single-family rentals.
Filings Evictions
(1) Prepandemic (2) Pandemic (3) Prepandemic (4) Pandemic
Owner: Ref. ¼ Landlords owning 15 homes
American Homes 4 Rent 3.765 (0.154) 0.109 (0.994) 4.076 (0.170) 0.207 (1.006)
Amwest 2.983 (0.407) 7.918 (0.351) 2.290 (0.532) 12.008 (0.393)
Invitation Homes 3.784 (0.089) 1.230 (0.159) 4.123 (0.094) 0.784 (0.286)
Cerberus 2.272 (0.227) 0.112 (1.001) 2.242 (0.261) 0.00000 (0.085)
King Futt’s 6.461 (0.164) 12.107 (0.136) 7.286 (0.173) 12.028 (0.184)
Large Investors 2.680 (0.100) 2.055 (0.105) 2.940 (0.097) 1.926 (0.123)
Progress Residential 4.078 (0.105) 3.517 (0.120) 4.928 (0.100) 3.207 (0.168)
Saticoy Bay 10.124 (0.221) 5.374 (0.317) 10.761 (0.224) 3.638 (0.511)
SFR Investments Pool 4.353 (0.205) 3.696 (0.243) 3.749 (0.222) 0.723 (0.691)
Tricon 0.801 (0.356) 1.047 (0.342) 0.743 (0.416) 0.242 (1.002)
Total value 0.998 (0.001) 0.999 (0.001) 0.999 (0.001) 0.998 (0.001)
Building age 1.011 (0.002) 1.011 (0.002) 1.011 (0.002) 1.011 (0.003)
Sale since 2017 1.197 (0.049) 1.176 (0.053) 1.303 (0.055) 1.256 (0.074)
Block group variables
Median rent 1.000 (0.0001) 1.000 (0.0001) 1.000 (0.0001) 1.000 (0.0001)
% severe rent burden 1.003 (0.002) 0.998 (0.002) 1.003 (0.002) 0.997 (0.002)
% poverty 1.003 (0.003) 1.003 (0.003) 1.002 (0.003) 1.003 (0.004)
% BA or higher 0.992 (0.003) 0.989 (0.003) 0.992 (0.003) 0.990 (0.005)
% households w/children 1.003 (0.002) 1.004 (0.003) 1.004 (0.002) 1.003 (0.003)
% female-headed households 1.001 (0.001) 1.000 (0.001) 1.001 (0.001) 0.999 (0.001)
% Black 1.011 (0.003) 1.013 (0.003) 1.011 (0.003) 1.009 (0.004)
% Hispanic 1.002 (0.002) 1.002 (0.002) 1.001 (0.002) 1.001 (0.003)
Township (ref. ¼ Henderson)
Las Vegas township 1.648 (0.082) 1.818 (0.105) 1.270 (0.082) 1.281 (0.112)
N. Las Vegas township 1.427 (0.113) 1.431 (0.136) 1.223 (0.116) 1.080 (0.153)
Constant 0.006 (0.223) 0.005 (0.258) 0.005 (0.237) 0.005 (0.325)
Observations 152,058 152,058 152,058 152,058
Log likelihood –13,505.410 –10,376.350 –11,363.720 –6,014.570
Akaike Information Criterion 27,058.820 20,800.700 22,775.430 12,077.140
Note. Shows odds ratios (ORs) and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
p < .01. p < .05. p < .01.
to file for eviction before the pandemic, remains roughly 3.5 times as likely to file during
the pandemic.
Two of the named local landlords are even more strongly associated with both filings and
evictions compared to the large nationally active corporate landlords. King Futt’s is more than 6
times as likely to file for eviction before the pandemic and more than 12 times as likely to file
during the pandemic compared to a small landlord. Saticoy Bay, in contrast, is more than 10
times as likely to file before the pandemic and 5 times as likely to file during the pandemic. SFR
Investments Pool, another local actor active since the foreclosure crisis, also exhibits higher odds
of filing for eviction both before and during the pandemic. These relationships largely carry over
to the models predicting ordered evictions.
Discussion
This paper has examined trends in eviction filings and ordered evictions during the first year of
the coronavirus pandemic and the immediately preceding 12-month period. This analysis has
focused on two specific segments of Las Vegas’s rental market: (a) extended-stay and other mul-
tifamily rentals and (b) single-family rentals. Regarding extended-stay rentals, the results conform
to the paper’s hypothesis these properties are more likely to have higher filing and eviction rates
compared to other multifamily properties, even after adjusting for neighborhood socioeconomic
status. Renters exhibiting a variety of characteristics marking them as “risky” in the eyes of prop-
erty managers are frequently barred from securing units in conventional rental properties, lead-
ing them to rent from landlords specializing in renting to, and extracting from, households with
fragile finances or other characteristics making it difficult for them to find other housing.
Although tenants with precarious income and related characteristics may be more likely to miss
rent, in “ordinary” times as well as during the pandemic, the landlord–tenant relationship charac-
terizing extended-stay rentals, including relatively high weekly rent and low barriers to eviction,
suggests these properties will exhibit higher filing and eviction rates independent of tenants’
income. During the pandemic, this dynamic is intensified as short-term leases allow extended-
stay landlords to circumvent eviction moratoria by filing for no-cause evictions after the expir-
ation of weekly contract periods. This paper shows that extended-stay properties are associated,
on average, with even higher relative filing and eviction rates during the pandemic, at nearly 3
times the rate of multifamily properties for filings and roughly 4 times the rate for
ordered evictions.
Regarding SFRs, the results are mixed. Prepandemic, most large corporate SFR landlords are
associated with higher filing and eviction rates after adjusting for crucial covariates. Invitation
Homes and Progress Residential, among others, are more than 3 times as likely to file for eviction
and more than 4 times as likely to remove a tenant through eviction compared to a smaller
landlord. During the pandemic, however, some corporate landlords, like Invitation and AH4R, are
no more likely to file, or are even substantially less likely to file for eviction and ultimately
remove a tenant. Other landlords, including Progress, remain associated with higher odds of fil-
ing for eviction and removing tenants during the pandemic. These results suggest possible dif-
ferences between the practices of publicly traded REITs and privately held entities in terms of
their adherence to legal requirements regarding eviction during the pandemic. The operations of
publicly traded entities are far more transparent than those of entities like Progress, which
remain intentionally obscured. For instance, Fannie Mae is a major creditor for Invitation Homes,
meaning Invitation is at least nominally accountable to financial institutions that are in turn
accountable to the federal government. However, Cerberus, another private-equity SFR landlord,
is associated with lower filing and eviction rates during the pandemic. Local SFR landlords spe-
cializing in renting lower-value properties while withholding maintenance (“milkers”)—King Futt’s
in particular—are even more likely to file for eviction during the pandemic. Amwest Properties,
although associated with higher rates, has low absolute numbers of filings and evictions, so I
refrain from categorizing them with Futt’s, although it is important to observe some SFR land-
lords were filing at even higher rates, despite policies intended to prevent that from happening.
These results suggest the need for both immediate and longer-term policy interventions to
reduce housing insecurity and displacement in these rental submarkets. Regarding extended-stay
apartments, moratoria must be crafted to countenance the variety of actually existing rental
arrangements. Despite landlords’ desire to represent occupants of weekly rentals as “guests,” ten-
ants consider these places their permanent address. Nevada’s December 2020 revision to its evic-
tion moratorium banning eviction from weekly rentals when tenants are behind on rent is an
important recognition of this fact and should be implemented in other settings where these
types of housing arrangements are present, particularly in Southern states such as Arizona,
Florida, Georgia, and Texas, where companies like Siegel Suites have expanded their operations.
Eviction filings associated with those properties classified as extended-stay rentals in this analysis
rose to 1,386 in November 2020 and fell to 525 in January 2021, a 62% reduction. However, in
June 2021, the month Nevada lifted its state moratorium, filings at these properties rose again,
as they did in Las Vegas as a whole, to 1,046, suggesting the need for additional measures to
protect tenants and the powerful effect of state moratoria beyond the protections afforded by
the CDC moratoria.
Although states have been slow to allocate billions in available federal rental assistance dol-
lars (DeParle, 2021), Clark County and the City of Las Vegas have distributed millions of dollars
to many of the large landlords studied in this paper. Siegel Suites has received more than $2
million in rental assistance and more than $3 million in federal Payment Protection Program
loans, yet it remains associated with extremely high filing and eviction rates. News reports
18 E. SEYMOUR
indicate tenants who received rental assistance clearing back rent were subsequently served
with eviction notices, although it is unclear whether this was due to subsequent arrears
(Davidson, 2021). Regardless, there should be clear and well-enforced provisions preventing ten-
ants from being removed shortly after receiving aid. At present, Clark County tenants are pro-
tected for eviction due to nonpayment for 60 days, although landlords may file for eviction for
other reasons at any point. Although some landlords have been reluctant to participate in the
program due to prohibitions on raising rent and immediately filing for eviction after receiving
assistance (although this is now mitigated in Nevada by AB 486), the availability of funds is
attractive to large landlords, including virtually all the named landlords in this study. Ensuring
that additional assistance would be available to tenants continuing to experience economic
difficulties related to the pandemic should also be considered in these programs; one-time or
otherwise short-term payments are not enough to guarantee getting through the pandemic (Yae
et al., 2020), let alone to ensure long-term housing security for vulnerable households one
eviction away from homelessness. It is also important to note that some landlords use filings as
a mechanism for bringing tenants to the table to negotiate payment plans or trigger the process
of receiving rental assistance. Although tenants may later seek to have these cases sealed, using
eviction in this manner risks negatively impacting tenants’ future housing searches. Assistance
needs to flow faster to reduce the likelihood of landlords using filings in this manner.
In the long term, the conditions making extended-stay rentals a growth industry require
change. The expansion of this industry is a predictable response to the growing number of
low-income households with precarious finances locked out of the conventional rental and
homebuying market due to enhanced tenant screening and other factors making it difficult for
households with blemishes on their credit history or previous evictions from securing main-
stream housing (Desmond, 2016; Frazier, 2021). These tenants are consigned to rent from opera-
tors who effectively run a monopoly on this particular renter population, allowing them to
charge relatively high rents and increase the odds of eviction (Borchard, 2005). Low-income
households, disproportionately people of color, are steered into situations virtually guaranteeing
a large share will have difficulty making full, timely payments for a variety of essentials, from
housing to education and medical care. These households face cascading consequences deeply
impacting their well-being, including the types of housing options that remain available to them.
Interventions at the point of landlord–tenant conflict, including right to counsel and case sealing
are important and consequential, but the conditions giving rise to these problems need to be
eradicated through large-scale policy interventions like Universal Basic Income and making
Housing Choice Vouchers an entitlement program.
Regarding SFRs, many of the same policy recommendations apply. Families with children who
would historically have purchased their home are increasingly priced out of the home-purchase
market, particularly in hot markets like Las Vegas. They are left to contract with SFR landlords
like Invitation Homes and Progress Residential. Although these landlords, or at least the ones
owned by publicly traded REITs, appear more professional and image-conscious than extended-
stay landlords, their practices, including regularly raising rents and mechanically applying late
fees and filing for eviction, suggest they are more likely to exacerbate housing insecurity and
evictions. The results of this analysis, although they do not address underlying mechanisms, indi-
cate these entities are associated with higher eviction rates in “ordinary” times. During the pan-
demic, however, there is important variation in the filing and eviction patterns of corporate SFR
landlords requiring additional study, particularly differences in the practices of REITs and private
equity firms, although all except Futt’s had fewer filings during the pandemic.
Although this paper began with a discussion of concern over corporate landlords filing for
eviction during the pandemic, the prepandemic findings are equally, if not more, important and
concerning, as they highlight the ongoing crisis of housing affordability and insecurity that was
intensifying even before the pandemic. As concern over the pandemic has receded with the
development of vaccines and social, political, and economic pressure to return to a prepandemic
state of affairs, institutional investors have continued to acquire single-family homes, out-com-
peting would-be homebuyers with cash purchases as home prices continue to rise out of reach
for households as they reach the stage of life where homeownership is typically expected
(Parker & Friedman, 2022). On June 28, 2022, the House Financial Services Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations convened a virtual panel titled, “Where Have All the Houses Gone?
Private Equity, Single Family Rentals, and America’s Neighborhoods,” to examine the impacts of
firms engaged in what subcommittee chair Rep. Al Green referred to as “predatory purchasing.”
Although institutional landlords may have been motivated to accept rental assistance and were
at least cognizant of tenant protections instituted during the pandemic, thereby lowering evic-
tion rates overall and relative to smaller landlords, as these protections fall away and tenants are
once again expected to pay rent in a context of skyrocketing rents, multiplying fees, and unfor-
giving property management concerning late or partial payments, the prepandemic normal of
elevated eviction rates may be expected to continue, if not worsen.
As discussed during the Housing Financial Services panel by housing and social justice advocates,
the growing prominence of corporate single-family landlords and the problems associated with
those actors’ practices, including rising and increasingly unaffordable rents and immediate eviction
filings, suggests the need to consider a variety of policy responses, from intervening upstream to
assist moderate-income homebuyers and nonprofits in competing with investors to applying or revi-
sing rent regulations to cover single-family properties, which are often exempted from rent regula-
tion in the few places where such regulations exist. Investor acquisitions remain concentrated
precisely in areas hostile to rent control and other forms of tenant protections, particularly
Southeastern and Sunbelt states. Homebuying has historically guaranteed consistent monthly pay-
ments for years, a situation that has been upturned in numerous metros across the U.S., including
in Las Vegas. Although industry advocates and conservative politicians chide housing advocates for
presenting corporate single-family landlords as a problem, these actors hold considerable and grow-
ing market power in the specific metros and submarkets in which they are concentrated and should
be seriously considered for regulation.
Notes
1. These filings exclude a small number of cases that were sealed by the courts, including in instances where the
case was denied or dismissed. Ordered evictions used in this study represent cases where, in addition to the
case being decided in favor of the landlord and being sent to the constables’ office for execution, the landlord
paid the fee required prior to carrying out the actual eviction. Some evictions sent to constables’ offices are
never executed.
2. The top 10 multifamily filer share of total renter-occupied housing units is based on taking the total estimated
number of renter-occupied housing units from the 2016 to 2020 ACS count for Clark County. These landlords’
share of multifamily units is derived from Clark County property tax assessor data, taking the total number of
units listed in this data set for the types of land uses listed under Data and Methods, including properties
owned by the SNHRA and all motels. SNHRA properties and nonextended-stay motels are excluded from the
regression analysis.
Acknowledgments
I thank Peter Hepburn for comments on this manuscript prior to submission, as well as the editor and the anonym-
ous reviewers for the valuable suggestions during the review process. All errors remain mine. I also thank Michael
Scott Davidson and Subrina Hudson of the Las Vegas Review-Journal for providing the data used in this paper.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
20 E. SEYMOUR
Notes on Contributor
Eric Seymour is an assistant professor in the program in urban planning and policy development at the Edward J.
Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy at Rutgers University. His research focuses on post-foreclosure-crisis
transformations in housing markets and their implications for the housing security.
ORCID
Eric Seymour http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1906-3701
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Housing Policy Debate

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rhpd20

Corporate Landlords and Pandemic and

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2022.2125335

Published online: 30 Sep 2022.

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Corporate Landlords and Pandemic and Prepandemic

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

CONTACT Eric Seymour eric.seymour@rutgers.edu

Las Vegas Context

Data and Methods

parcels belonging to apartment complexes. For condo-apartments, I grouped parcels contained

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