Military Balance 2019 - Chapter Six Asia
Military Balance 2019 - Chapter Six Asia
Military Balance 2019 - Chapter Six Asia
To cite this article: (2019) Chapter Six: Asia, The Military Balance, 119:1, 222-319, DOI:
10.1080/04597222.2018.1561032
Chapter Six
Asia
There is continuing concern in the West and regional Some of Asia’s top defence spenders drove the
countries over China’s military modernisation. regional increase in military expenditure. However, the
The PLAAF is moving ahead with the recapitalisation detailed picture showed some contrasts as defence
of its combat aircraft fleets, with obsolescent aircraft spending stagnated in Southeast Asia.
replaced with modern combat types. A successor to Defence-industry modernisation continues across
the H-6K medium-bomber is also in development. the region, albeit with varying degrees of success. In
China also continues to expand its military presence in particular, India’s progress remains hampered by slow
the South China Sea. and cumbersome bureaucratic processes.
Regional navies (Japan, South Korea, Australia) The unexpected North Korean moratorium on
continue to develop or renew their ability to generate missile testing led to renewed diplomatic contact
task-group-centred capabilities for enhanced blue- on the peninsula, and between Pyongyang and
water operations. Japan’s new defence programme Washington. However, while summits continued,
guidelines were expected to reinforce ‘cross-domain‘ there remained no progress on the issue of North
capabilities. Japan is buying Aegis Ashore and looking Korea’s denuclearisation.
into converting its Izumo-class vessels to carry the F-35B. I ndia reported that its Arihant nuclear-powered
Vietnam, meanwhile, continues to modernise its air and ballistic missile submarine completed its first
naval capabilities to complicate the deployment options operational patrol.
of potential adversaries in the country’s maritime littoral.
US$643.3bn China
2,035,000
India
Total Asian 1, 444,500
spending
US$411.0bn North
Korea
1,280,000
Pakistan
China 654,000
India South
Korea 625,000
Vietnam 482,000
Myanmar 406,000
57.9
168.2 Indonesia 395,500
Japan South Korea Australia
Thailand 360,850
Nepal
South Sudan (UNMISS)
– 1,758
Pakistan India
DRC (MONUSCO) DRC (MONUSCO)
– 2,776 – 2,647
India
South Sudan (UNMISS)
– 2,369 Bangladesh
DRC (MONUSCO)
– 1,715
Asia
Conventionally-powered attack China: principal surface Tanker/tanker-transport fleets,
submarines 2018 combatants, 2014–18 2018
50 48 100 30
27 (est)
87
82
75 76 25
40 80 72
20 18
30 60
15
20 20
20 40 10
16 15
10 8
6 6 5
10 20 4
6 6 5 5
4 4 1
0 0 0
US PACAF*
China
Singapore
Malaysia
India
Japan
Australia
Pakistan
Indonesia
2014
Asia
In late 2017 and early 2018, the crisis provoked by disarmament. Furthermore, analysts questioned
North Korea’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile the level of destruction at Punggye-ri, and satellite
programmes became the primary focus of attention imagery showed extensive continuing activity at the
in the region and beyond. The Trump administration Yongbyon nuclear-research facility. Furthermore,
increasingly viewed Pyongyang’s capabilities US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in late July
as posing a direct threat to the United States. Of told a Senate committee hearing that North Korea
particular concern were North Korea’s sixth nuclear was continuing to produce enriched uranium for
test in September 2017 (which Pyongyang claimed use in nuclear weapons. That same month, it was
involved a missile-ready, two-stage thermonuclear reported that Pyongyang appeared to be building
device) and the testing two months later of a new liquid-fuelled ICBMs at its Sanum-dong facility.
Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Nevertheless, both South Korea and the US continued
thought to be capable of reaching the continental their intensive diplomacy with North Korea. In late
US. For several months, there seemed a credible September, Pompeo said that a second Trump–Kim
prospect that the US would feel compelled to attack summit was likely, and there was speculation that the
North Korea with the aim of curtailing or eliminating US would reciprocate a commitment by Pyongyang
the perceived threat. It was widely thought that this on specific steps towards denuclearisation with a
risked the possibility of escalation, to involve not just formal agreement – to which China would be a party
the US and the two Koreas, but also China and Japan, – to end the Korean War.
with unpredictable strategic and economic effects on Concerns over North Korea and the potential
the wider Asia-Pacific region and globally. for conflict on the Korean Peninsula have exerted a
A diplomatic rapprochement between Seoul and significant influence on military developments in
Pyongyang in 2018 led the two countries’ leaders Northeast Asia. In late 2017, the US had deployed
to meet in April, May and September. As well as forces to the region on a scale that suggested to analysts
this surprising thaw in inter-Korean relations, the either that it was planning for a preventive war against
Singapore Summit in June 2018 between US President North Korea, or at the very least that the Pentagon
Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong- was keen to deliver a message that Pyongyang should
un, and bilateral negotiations over the following take its concerns seriously. B-52 and B-1 bombers and
months, removed the immediate prospect of war. F-22 and F-35 combat aircraft all flew close to the
However, these developments by no means resolved peninsula in 2016 and 2017. Displaying as well as
the protracted and acutely dangerous dispute. In deploying its advanced military capabilities seemed
exchange for unspecified ‘security guarantees’ from to be a key element of US strategy. For the first time in
the US, in Singapore Kim promised ‘unwavering more than a decade, by late October there were three
commitment to complete denuclearisation of the US Navy carrier strike groups in the 7th Fleet area of
Korean Peninsula’. This phrase reflected North operations in the western Pacific. In mid-November
Korea’s position that it would only agree to its own and early December, these forces engaged in major
denuclearisation if the supposed threat posed by the exercises with the Japanese and South Korean armed
United States’ extended nuclear guarantee to South forces. While the South Korean administration led
Korea was withdrawn. by Moon Jae-in, who became president in May 2017,
Three weeks before the Singapore Summit, has played a key role in facilitating the incipient
North Korea demolished tunnels at the Punggye-ri peace process between the US and North Korea, it
nuclear-test facility, and in July reportedly began has continued South Korea’s military-modernisation
dismantling facilities used to develop ballistic-missile initiatives. Seoul is developing a conventional
engines at the Sohae satellite-launching station. military deterrent based on the pre-emptive ‘Kill
However, these were apparently confidence-building Chain’ capability (aimed at North Korea’s missile
measures rather than substantive steps towards and nuclear infrastructure, mobile launchers, and
Asia 225
command, control and communications system); high-technology sector. In combination, these efforts
the Korean Air and Missile Defence system; and the are yielding new capabilities that, alongside other
Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) improvements, will significantly strengthen China’s
strike capability targeting North Korea’s political and maritime power-projection capabilities as well as the
military leadership. credibility of its nuclear deterrent.
Some analysts, however, consider that the Military capability is a complex phenomenon,
KMPR strategy, at least, may have been somewhat however, and the PLA still suffers from important
downgraded by Seoul following the diplomatic deficiencies, not least in vital areas such as anti-
activity in 2018. Although the Moon administration in submarine warfare; intelligence, surveillance and
September 2017 allowed the ‘temporary’ deployment reconnaissance; air-to-air refuelling; and joint-service
to South Korea of four additional US Army Terminal operations. Even more significantly, it lacks recent
High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile direct experience of high-intensity operations, and
launchers, and in early 2018 reportedly ordered the scale of the continuing purge of corrupt PLA
more Taurus KEPD-350 cruise missiles, an inter- officers may indicate problems with discipline and
Korean military agreement in September saw the two morale. The Chinese Communist Party’s expressed
countries agree measures intended to lower tensions goal of developing the PLA’s capability so that it will
around the demilitarised zone, including setting up be capable of ‘winning wars’ in three decades’ time
buffer zones, dismantling border posts and clearing inadvertently highlights its present shortcomings
landmines. And in October another South Korea–US and may be an ambitious target. The PLA’s growing
military exercise (Vigilant Ace) was suspended, on top military capabilities increasingly complicate the
Asia
of the suspension of exercises including Ulchi Freedom United States’ operational planning assumptions
Guardian announced shortly after the Singapore and could almost certainly inflict serious costs on
Summit. Nonetheless, South Korea’s defence minister the US armed forces if they were to have to force
reportedly said in November that there ‘shouldn’t be operational access to China’s maritime littoral in the
any wavering’ in South Korea’s military-readiness event of conflict. Nonetheless, the US remains the
posture. Japan has also made efforts to strengthen its most important military power in the region, despite
defences against the security challenge from North its need to project that power over considerable
Korea, notably through the Cabinet decision in distances.
December 2017 to purchase the Aegis Ashore missile- Some US allies and security partners worried
defence system. about China have been unnerved by the Trump
The North Korea crisis unfolded alongside administration’s unpredictability. However,
continuing concern in the West and regional countries substantial overall increases in US defence spending
– notably Japan – over China’s growing defence as well as the Department of Defense’s continuing
spending, its efforts to enhance the capabilities of focus on strengthening US military capability –
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and evidence including the capacity to operate more closely with
of its further militarisation of the features that it had the armed forces of allies and partners in what it now
occupied and had physically expanded since 2012 calls the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region – are both in large part
in the South China Sea. While the US still outspends intended to mitigate China’s military challenge. While
China, Beijing’s defence budget has continued to the Trump administration nominally abandoned its
increase and the PLA has directed much of its growing predecessor’s ‘rebalance’ to the Asia-Pacific, the US
budget towards efforts to improve its capabilities. National Defense Strategy published in January 2018
The most obvious evidence of this has been the gave pre-eminent attention to the Indo-Pacific and
new equipment that is being brought into service, explicitly identified China and Russia as the primary
including a second aircraft carrier, more-capable ‘strategic competitors’.
ballistic missiles, improved submarines and new The US has not been alone in strengthening its
combat aircraft. At the same time, the PLA has been military posture in the region in response to China’s
attempting to strengthen its capacity for warfare in growing power. In Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s
the cyber, space and electronic-warfare arenas, while government has continued gradually to increase
boosting the potential of China’s national defence defence spending, which has allowed the Japan
science, research and development, and industrial Self-Defense Forces to begin developing significant
base through closer cooperation with the civilian additional capabilities. While the immediate
226 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
motivation for some capability-related developments, response, the acquisition of platforms requiring fewer
such as the acquisition of Aegis Ashore, has been the personnel to operate is planned, including a new,
security challenge from North Korea, others – such as locally developed armoured fighting vehicle and a
the incipient strike capability from Japan’s growing next-generation howitzer.
force of F-35A combat aircraft – could potentially be
used to project military power for wider purposes, DEFENCE ECONOMICS
against China as well as North Korea.
Under increasing political pressure from Beijing, In 2018, Asia was the main engine of global growth,
and acutely aware that the cross-strait military according to the IMF, with GDP growth reaching
balance has been shifting increasingly in China’s 5.6%, thereby accounting for 60% of the global total.
favour, Taiwan’s government has continued its Within Asia, however, advanced economies slowed
efforts to strengthen the island’s defence posture. down between 2017 (2.4% GDP growth) and 2018
It has been led since January 2016 by President Tsai (2.1%), with the notable exception of Australia,
Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party, which where growth accelerated from 2.2% to 3.2%. The
favours a more distinct political identity for Taiwan. economies of Japan, Singapore, South Korea and
The Trump administration has supported Taipei’s Taiwan all decelerated. In contrast, the region’s
defence efforts, and in September 2018 announced the emerging markets and developing economies grew
sale of spare parts and logistic support for Taiwanese by 6.5%. The fastest-growing countries in 2018 were
military aircraft; this followed the agreement in June Bangladesh and India at 7.3%, followed by Cambodia
2017 of a major arms package for Taiwan, including (6.9%) and Laos (6.8%), then China and Vietnam both
AGM-88 HARM air-to-surface anti-radiation missiles, at 6.6%. India’s economy in particular rebounded
torpedoes and technical support for early-warning after important currency and tax reforms introduced
radars. since 2016, and after the implementation of policies
In Southeast Asia, Vietnam has displayed the regarding access to bank accounts, identity numbers
greatest resolution of any Association of Southeast and mobile phones.
Asian Nations (ASEAN) member in terms of As it is an export-oriented region, Asia largely
attempting to deter Chinese interference with its benefited from improved global trade. Regional
interests in the South China Sea. To this end, Hanoi growth was also helped by infrastructure projects.
continues to modernise its naval and air arms as part Besides the investments linked to China’s Belt
of an effort to establish capabilities to complicate the and Road Initiative projects, there are important
deployment options of potential adversaries in the developments in India and Indonesia, among others.
country’s maritime littoral. Vietnam’s state-controlled
media reported during 2017 that India had not only
agreed to supply, but had started delivering, BrahMos ▼ Figure 16 Asia defence spending by country and
anti-ship cruise missiles to Vietnam, though this was sub-region, 2017
denied by New Delhi in 2017 and 2018. Thailand, 1.6% Vietnam, 1.2%
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, more varied Indonesia, 1.8% Other Southeast
influences shape national-defence policies, strategies Singapore, 2.7% Asia, 2.4%
Asian country, and the city-state has continued to Other South Asia
1.8%
invest heavily in major acquisition programmes.
Pakistan, 2.8%
New equipment entering service in 2017–18 included
China
A330 MRTT in-flight refuelling aircraft, Aster 30 India, 14.1% 40.9%
SAMP/T medium-range ground-based air-defence
systems and locally built Independence-class Littoral
Mongolia, 0.03%
Mission Vessels, of which five of eight ships on
Taiwan, 2.7%
order are now in service. A serious challenge for the
country’s armed forces is the impact of a declining South Korea, 9.5% Japan, 11.5%
national birth rate on the size of the conscript cohort, Note: analysis excludes North Korea and Laos due to insufficient data.
Indonesia
Asia
2018 Defence Spending (US$ bn)
Estimate
57.87 Fiji
47.26
39.21 Australia
30.00
20
10
5
2
1
.25 New Zealand
.05
However, countries with growing debt will likely consequences for Asia. For instance, if the full range of
face future challenges. In 2018, East Asian countries measures so far mooted are implemented, according to
with high debt levels included China, Laos, Malaysia, the IMF the effect would be to lower Chinese GDP by
Mongolia and Thailand, while Cambodia, Laos, 1.6% over two years. The IMF also assessed that GDP
Mongolia and Vietnam all had large fiscal deficits. growth could fall by 0.9% in South Korea, by 0.7% in
This has led countries including China, Laos, Malaysia India, Indonesia and Japan, and by 0.6% in Australia,
and Vietnam to renew fiscal-consolidation efforts, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.
which might limit public spending and investments Running counter to protectionist trends, some
in the near term. regional states are instead looking to new multilateral
The trade showdown between the US and China will trade agreements. The Comprehensive and
have a wider effect. Simulations run by international Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,
financial institutions show that the hikes in trade or the TPP-11, replaces the Trans-Pacific Partnership;
tariffs could influence regional growth. At the time the US pulled out of the negotiations for this following
of writing, it was too early to fully assess the impact Donald Trump’s election as US president. Ratification
of these measures, but there are potential economic by at least six signatories is pending. In Southeast
228 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
2.0 Taiwan
Australia
1.40 1.44 1.45 1.46 1.44 1.43
1.5 South Korea
Southeast Asia
% of GDP
1.0 Japan
India
0.5 China
United States
0.0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
US$bn current
▲ Figure 17 Asia regional defence expenditure as % of Southeast Asia includes Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam. No data available for Laos
GDP
▲ Figure 18 Indo-Pacific defence spending, 2018
(US$bn, current)
Asia, the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA)
will reduce tariffs among its member states, with full
implementation expected in 2018. Among Southeast Asian countries, Singapore
spends the most on procurement and defence R&D,
Defence spending and procurement with the estimated US$2.18bn spent on these in 2018
Asian defence spending continues to increase. It comprising just below 20% of its total defence budget.
grew by 4.0% in real terms between 2017 and 2018, The city-state is making significant investments
picking up speed after a year of slower growth; the in its sophisticated air force. It is set to enhance its
rate had been 2.8% between 2016 and 2017. Some of rotary-wing fleet with additional H225M Caracal and
the region’s top spenders drove the increase. In real CH-47F Chinook helicopters, while the first of six A330
terms, Australia’s defence budget grew by 8.4%, MRTT tankers was delivered in August 2018. The
China’s by 5.7% and South Korea’s by 4.5%. Singaporean government is also expected to decide,
In contrast, defence spending stagnated in by the end of 2018, on whether to buy F-35 combat
Southeast Asia, with a regional decline of 0.6% aircraft as the replacement for its F-16s.
between 2017 and 2018, though there was a more Australia’s increased defence budget is also
pronounced drop in some states, notably Indonesia dedicated largely to improving aerospace capacities.
where real-terms spending fell by 9.7%. This complex Indeed, air platforms comprise four of the top five
picture is a reminder that strong economic growth acquisition projects for the Australian armed forces
does not necessarily translate into strong defence- in the coming year (see Table 12). The first is the
budget growth or high levels of defence expenditure. acquisition of F-35 combat aircraft; 72 will be bought
Governments in this sub-region are managing in total and the first two were due to arrive in Australia
competing policy priorities; in Malaysia, for instance, in December 2018.
there is a focus by the new government on healthcare. These procurement choices reflect Australia’s
Overall, Southeast Asian states’ defence budgets concerns over regional security developments,
remain modest when compared to the rest of Asia; including China’s military progress, and a desire to
combined, they reach only the level of South Korea’s acquire capabilities allowing it to act on its own as well
defence budget (see Figure 18). as with like-minded states. For instance, Australia’s
Consequently, procurement and defence research procurement of P-8 maritime-patrol aircraft mirrors
and development (R&D) spending for these countries that in India. South Korea, meanwhile, has selected
remains constrained, compared to larger spenders in the P-8 for its future maritime-patrol-aircraft
East Asia. For instance, Indonesia in 2018 dedicated requirement.
15.9% of its budget to these defence investments, Expenditures for naval programmes, such as the
which amounted to some US$1.16 billion, while in future submarines and frigates, will soon rise, with
Malaysia and Vietnam these expenditures totalled total programme costs projected at over A$50bn
US$804 million and US$821m respectively. (US$37bn) and A$30bn (US$22bn) respectively. So
Asia 229
far, total approved expenditure for Australia’s future to South Korea for its share of the expenses, which
submarine design and construction is A$2.24bn amounted to 20% of the development costs. Seoul
(US$1.66bn) under phase 1B of the Sea 1000 project maintained that this did not delay the project, and that
and A$395m (US$293m) for the future frigates under it was in discussions with Jakarta to reduce the latter’s
phase 1 of the Sea 5000 project. share in the programme. Indonesia was looking to the
KF-X project to boost technology transfer to its own
Defence industry and markets defence sector.
Contract negotiations were ongoing in late 2018 Developing a domestic defence-industrial base
Asia
between Canberra and Naval Group regarding would, in theory, avoid such complications. Many
Australia’s submarine programme. The French states in the region are looking to do so. Possessing a
company was selected in 2016 to design and build defence-industrial sector would help with sovereign
12 submarines based on the Shortfin Barracuda Block defence policymaking and would also – if they were
1A design. A series of contracts has been signed since to develop an export model – allow states to recoup
this announcement, but this situation illustrates the through foreign earnings some of the investments
lengthy processes and challenges associated with made in the sector.
implementing large equipment deals. Vietnam is looking to rationalise its state-owned
Even when it comes to long-established defence enterprises, notably through mergers. In
partnerships, arms transfers can be affected by mid-2018, a new regulation was intended to reduce
disputes. In 2018, Japan and the US discussed Tokyo’s the number of military-operated businesses from
concerns regarding the costs and processes of US 88 to 17, to focus military-owned enterprises on
Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Japan relies heavily defence tasks and to support economic development.
on FMS, and the value of FMS deliveries increased However, this process of rationalisation began a
from US$779m in 2010 to US$1.01bn in 2017. Japan’s decade ago, with little visible effect so far, though
Audit Board has expressed concerns in recent years Vietnam’s Military Telecommunications General
regarding the management of FMS, particularly Corporation changed its name to Viettel Military
over the F-35 programme. Japanese authorities, the Industry and Telecom Group in early 2018.
watchdog said, had no knowledge on why prices had In 2018, Australia took measures to support its
risen, that there were delays in the deliveries of parts defence-industrial base. The government launched
and that there was a lack of coordination with Japanese a defence-export strategy in 2018, with the aim
firms involved in the manufacturing process. In 2018, of Australia becoming one of the world’s top-ten
defence ministers from both countries discussed defence suppliers by 2028. The strategy created a new
‘improvements’ to the FMS process, relating to delays Australian Defence Export Office. The government
in implementing procurement programmes, as well also released A$20m (US$15m) of annual funding
as reimbursements of Japanese overpayments on to support arms exports and opened an export
FMS transactions. credit line of A$3.8bn (US$2.9bn) for customers of
Meanwhile, South Korea was reclaiming outlays Australian weapons systems. In April 2018, Canberra
from Indonesia, concerning the KF-X joint combat- also released its Defence Industrial Capability Plan,
aircraft programme. According to press reports, following a 2016 Defence Industry Policy Statement.
Indonesia failed to pay approximately US$200m It identified priority areas for support to the defence
230 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
industry, including on submarine capability, as well Administration (DAPA) aims to diversify local defence
as land-combat vehicles and related technology suppliers, and boosting the role of SMEs is a key plank
upgrades, and included A$17m (US$13m) per year of DAPA’s import-substitution policy. By raising
for grants to support small and medium-sized the profile of SMEs and better integrating them into
enterprises (SMEs) working in these areas. These new international defence supply chains, DAPA also hopes
policies are intended to develop and support local to enhance export results. In 2017, South Korea exported
manufacturers. Currently local companies are only weapons worth US$3.19bn but intends to raise that
dominant in shipbuilding, such as ASC and Austal. figure to US$5bn by 2022. New offset guidelines are
Other areas of Australia’s defence-industrial base are expected in early 2019 and may include requirements
dominated by foreign-owned prime contractors such for foreign arms manufacturers to integrate locally
as Raytheon Australia, BAE Systems Australia and made components into their weapons systems for
Thales Australia. South Korea’s armed forces. The ‘Defense Business
Reform initiatives were also announced in Innovation Plan’ launched in August 2018 focused on
South Korea in 2018, with a particular focus on reforming procurement processes, but also contained
developing SMEs. The Defense Acquisition Program initiatives to promote the domestic industrial base and
Table 13 India: procurements from Russia and the United States, 2000–18
Asia
Quantity: 1 Value: US$2.35bn Quantity: 11 Value: US$4.7bn
(RUS) Government surplus (US) Boeing
2004 MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum – FGA ac 2012 Su-30MKI Flanker H – FGA ac
Quantity: 16 Value: US$794.21m Quantity: 42 Value: US$2.97bn
(RUS) United Aircraft Corporation (RUS) United Aircraft Corporation
2004 T-90S – MBT 2012 Mi-17V-5 Hip H – MRH
Quantity: 300 Value: n.k. Quantity: 71 Value: n.k.
(IND) Ordnance Factory Board (RUS) Russian Helicopters
(RUS licensed production)
2013 T-90S – MBT
2005 9A52 Smerch – MRL Quantity: 236 Value: US$991.7m
Quantity: 28 Value: εUS$396.48m (IND) Ordnance Factory Board
(RUS) NPO Splav (RUS licensed production)
2006 Talwar II class (Pr. 11356) – FFGHM 2013 C-130J-30 Hercules – Med tpt ac
Quantity: 3 Value: US$1.13bn Quantity: 6 Value: US$1.01bn
(RUS) Yantar Shipyard (US) Lockheed Martin
2006 BMP-2K – IFV 2015 AH-64E Apache – Atk hel
Quantity: 123 Value: n.k. Quantity: 22 Combined
(RUS) Kurganmashzavod CH-47F Chinook Hvy tpt hel value:
Quantity: 15 US$3bn
2007 9A52 Smerch – MRL (US) Boeing
Quantity: 14 Value: εUS$217.75m
(RUS) NPO Splav 2016 P-8I Neptune – ASW ac
Quantity: 4 Value: US$1bn
2007 Su-30MKI Flanker H – FGA ac (US) Boeing
Quantity: 40 (of which 25 kits/semi-
assembled) Value: US$1.55bn 2017 M777A2 – 155mm Arty
(RUS) United Aircraft Corporation Quantity: 145 Value: US$542.1m
(US) BAE Land Systems and Armaments
2007 T-90S – MBT
Quantity: 347 (of which 223 semi-assembled) 2018 C-17A Globemaster III – Hvy tpt hel
Value: US$1.22bn Quantity: 1 Value: US$262m
(RUS) UralVagonZavod (US) Boeing
2008 C-130J-30 Hercules – Med tpt ac 2018 S-400 (SA-21 Growler) – SAM
Quantity: 6 Value: US$962.45m Quantity: 80 Value: US$5.4bn
(US) Lockheed Martin (RUS) Almaz-Antey
232 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
strengthen defence R&D. Plans included intellectual- The PLA has undergone further organisational
property reform and the creation of a new agency change in 2018. A key message has been that the
called Defense Science and Technology Planning and PLA serves the Party, not the other way round. As
Evaluation, to focus on emerging technologies. The part of this, Xi has extended his anti-graft campaign
plan also contained measures to support arms exports, – which previously only targeted high-level PLA
also via a new agency called the Defense Industry officials – to include lower-ranking officials. During
Promotion Association. Xi’s first term as president, more than 13,000 PLA
officers, including 100 generals, were targeted in
CHINA the anti-corruption campaign by the Party’s Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection and the
President Xi Jinping continues to reform Chinese State’s National Supervision Commission. This has
governance. This includes his ambitious plan to earned Xi both respect for ridding branches of the
modernise the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by armed forces of corrupt ‘tigers’ (high-level officials)
2035 and complete its transformation into ‘world- and ‘flies’ (rank-and-file cadres), but also criticism
class forces’ capable of winning wars by 2049. These for his use of the campaign to remove political
major policy projects have attracted significant opponents and promote his allies to positions of
attention in China and internationally, drawing power.
concern not only for the return of highly centralised However, control of the PLA by the Party and Xi
decision-making in Beijing in the hands of Xi, but also has not gone unchallenged. Years of insufficient care
for the expanding government-led military outreach have led to discontent among PLA veterans, and
that has led to an escalation of regional tensions. since 2016 – when there was a large-scale protest in
Beijing in front of the defence ministry – veterans
Centralised control have periodically staged public protests in Beijing
The primacy of the Communist Party of China over unpaid demobilisation benefits, healthcare and
(CCP), and its leadership role in government, the pensions. These protests have spread beyond Beijing
armed forces and society, was made clear at the 19th despite the CCP’s creation of the Ministry of Veterans
Party Congress in October 2017. Furthermore, the Affairs in March 2018 to deal with their concerns.
president’s theory – ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism For instance, a group of over 1,000 PLA veterans
with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ – was staged a protest in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu province,
written into the Party’s constitution, cementing Xi’s in June 2018. While the leadership of Xi regarding
power in the manner of the precedents set by his the PLA and political leadership may be publicly
predecessors Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. projected as strong, these protests nonetheless
Furthermore, at the 13th National People’s Congress raise questions. Indeed, following a speech to PLA
(NPC) in March 2018, a constitutional amendment chiefs at the 2018 Party leaders’ summer retreat at
was approved, abolishing term limits for the Beidaihe, Hebei province, Xi once again called for
presidency. Under Xi, the distinctions between party ‘absolute loyalty’ and ‘strengthening the party’s
and state have become increasingly blurred, moving leadership in the army’ in order to make China and
away from Deng’s vision whereby the two were the PLA powerful. At public appearances in 2018,
separate, and each had distinct powers. Xi’s consistent calls for unwavering PLA loyalty to
The 19th Party Congress visibly illustrated the the Party may in fact betray some concern over the
Party’s expanding control over the PLA, and the strength of this.
recentralisation of decision-making power into Xi While Xi tries to strengthen control of the PLA, he
and his allies’ hands within a slimmed-down Central is using what the 2015 defence white paper labelled
Military Commission (CMC). Before the 19th Party as China’s ‘strategic opportunity’ of a favourable
Congress, the CMC had a chairman (Xi), two vice- external environment to modernise the PLA and
chairmen and seven members. At its close, as well bolster the armed forces’ power-projection capability.
as Xi as chairman, the CMC comprised two vice- The PLA Navy and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) in
chairmen and four members. All are close allies of particular continue to modernise their equipment
Xi, with personal ties to him. The signal was that Xi inventories, and the armed forces have started to
would continue to strictly control military reform, to integrate new technologies, such as uninhabited
him a personal project. aerial vehicles (UAVs), while China continues to
Asia 233
develop its capabilities and innovation in the fields of other regional Spratly Island claimants (Malaysia,
cyber, space and electronic warfare. the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam). By 2016,
In 2017 and 2018, China demonstrated a more China had reclaimed approximately 12.95 square
assertive posture in relation to Taiwan and in the kilometres of land. Between 2016 and 2018, the PLA
East China Sea. In May 2018, the PLAAF flew H-6K instead intensified its efforts to fortify these features
bombers and Su-35 Flanker E combat aircraft around by building infrastructure and a range of military
Taiwan. These ‘training flights’, as the PLA put it, facilities.
were an attempt to discourage Taipei from making The three largest of the Spratly Islands (Fiery
any moves towards independence. In September Cross Reef, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef) now host
2018, Japan’s then defence minister Itsunori 3-km-long runways, hangars for combat aircraft,
Onodera warned of China’s unilateral escalation ammunition bunkers, barracks, large berthing
of military activities in the sea and airspace around facilities, anti-aircraft guns and close-in weapons
Japan. In the South China Sea, China’s militarisation systems. The seven Chinese-reclaimed Spratly
of the islands and features it occupies in the Spratlys Islands today house over 40 varying radar facilities
continues. that represent a significant enhancement of China’s
Further afield, China has expanded the reach of capabilities in the area relating not just to command
its international infrastructure-development project, and control but also intelligence, surveillance and
the Belt and Road Initiative. However, regional reconnaissance. In April 2018, reports emerged that
and international fears have yet to be realised over China had deployed jamming equipment to Mischief
dual-use ports along the ‘maritime silk route’ that Reef in the Spratlys.
Asia
China has built. In addition to its military-logistics While surface-to-air missiles and anti-ship cruise
base in Djibouti, China announced in August 2018 missiles (ASCMs) have not yet been installed in the
that it is fully funding and building a training camp Spratlys, further north, in the Paracel Islands group,
in Afghanistan that will be used to improve the China has deployed HQ-9 air-defence systems,
counter-terrorism capabilities of both Afghan troops probably YJ-62 ASCMs, as well as J-11B combat
and the PLA. Alongside numerous and increasingly aircraft on Woody Island, the latter two possibly
complex training exercises in China, the region and as short-term deployments. In May 2018, an H-6K
internationally – and continuing deployment on UN bomber landed on Woody Island, the first time that
operations – this Afghanistan mission will provide the one of these bombers had landed on one of China’s
PLA with valuable, albeit non-combat, operational South China Sea islands.
experience. While strategic and regional messaging might be
Beijing is simultaneously modernising its armed key to Beijing’s rationale, and the capability of the
forces, expanding its global reach and engaging in deployed equipment has yet to be tested in combat,
domestic reforms. Maintaining this pace and breadth Beijing has nonetheless changed the power balance
may prove a challenge, and if the veterans’ protests in the South China Sea. The calculus involved in
are indicative of morale and cohesion issues within any decision by the US or its allies on possible
the force and illustrate concerns over the extent of the military action in the South China Sea has become
Party’s influence over the PLA, they may influence more complex, and potentially with higher risk. So
Xi’s ability to deliver on the two deadlines he has set far, Washington has responded by continuing to
for China’s military progress. conduct freedom-of-navigation naval operations
and overflights. In May 2018, the US disinvited
South China Sea China from the 2018 RIMPAC exercise, citing as the
In 2015, Xi promised then US president Barack reason China’s militarisation of the South China Sea.
Obama that China would not militarise its reclaimed Meanwhile, the resurrected ‘Quad’ regional grouping
features in the Spratly Islands. Events since that date (which includes Australia, India, Japan and the US)
would seem to indicate otherwise. has yet to take shape, with New Delhi denying that
It is true that China’s large-scale dredging and the grouping has any military or defence function.
reclamation of land appears to have halted, at least While the US considers its options, China has
for now. However, between 2013 and 2015, China succeeded in dividing Association of Southeast Asian
reclaimed 17 times more land than the combined Nations (ASEAN) member states and promoting its
amount reclaimed over the past 40 years by the four strategy of bilateral multilateralism. Whether or not
234 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Pattle Island
Lincoln Island
x3
x6
CHINA Km 1,000
Paracel Islands
Money Island
Paracel Is.
H x3
China’s land reclamation in the Spratlys and Paracels seems now seem to be part of the permanent infrastructure,
to have stopped in recent years, and the focus has instead indicating the extent of Chinese command-and-control and
turned to building up permanent infrastructure. All the ISR capabilities in the South China Sea. The ports in the
Chinese-controlled features in the Spratlys have what Spratly Islands, including deep-water berths, could in the
appear to be permanent weapons emplacements but this is future support a wide range of naval vessels. Lastly, 3 km
not the case in the Paracels, though weapons have runways, aircraft hangars and weapons-storage facilities on
appeared there occasionally. This might be due to the Woody Island in the Paracels and Subi, Fiery Cross and
proximity of the Paracels to Hainan, making them less Mischief reefs in the Spratlys will enable greater reach for
vulnerable. In the Spratlys, a variety of radars and radomes Chinese airpower.
H x4 x14 x3
© IISS
Asia 235
the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific can agree on now in service with nine of the group armies, as well
how to counter China in the near future, it seems that as with units in Tibet and Shanghai. This gives the
Beijing will continue to slowly change the strategic PLAA its first widespread medium-range air-defence
environment of the South China Sea at sea, in the air capability.
and on reclaimed land.
PLA Rocket Force (PLARF)
PLA Army (PLAA) The PLARF remains organised in a series of corps-
The process of reorganisation and rebasing begun leader-grade ‘bases’, now numbering nine in total.
in 2017 is mostly complete, although some brigade Six of them (bases 61–66) command the force’s
moves may yet take place, largely in the Northern operational missile brigades, while the other three
and Western Theatre Commands. However, the handle warhead storage and transport (67 Base),
distinction between the areas of responsibility of the specialist engineering (68 Base) and test and training
Tibet Military Command and the Western Theatre (69 Base). The multiple new missile brigades formed
Command’s 77th Group Army now seems to have during 2017 are now beginning to take shape, with
become blurred, with the latter beginning to rebase some resultant relocation of units and changes to
part of its manoeuvre force within Tibet itself. equipment and missions. In 62 Base, a combination
The focus of the PLAA now appears to be on of rebasing of existing units and the formation of
internal restructuring within the new combined arms two new brigades is likely to result in an additional
brigades and training. The first reorganised light brigade of DF-21D medium-range ballistic missiles
combined arms infantry unit, formed in 2014 and (MRBMs) and a first brigade of DF-26 intermediate-
Asia
now part of the 78th Group Army in the Northern range ballistic missiles being formed in southern
Theatre Command, was unveiled publicly in 2018. China. Both of these missile types have anti-ship
Utilising 4×4 vehicles from the Dongfeng Mengshi capabilities and when the brigades reach operational
family as personnel carriers, and truck- and jeep- capability will add to the PLARF’s ability to hold at
mounted howitzers and mortars for fire support, this risk possible targets in the South China Sea and Indian
formation – a battalion of the 48th Combined Arms Ocean. In northern China, the new brigade in 65 Base
Brigade – is a template for the rest of the PLAA’s light will also most probably equip with the DF-21D, since
combined arms units. The two newly redesignated it is currently co-located in Dalian, Liaoning province,
air-assault brigades in the Eastern and Southern with an existing DF-21D formation. This would result
theatre commands, the 121st from the 75th Group in a doubling of the PLARF’s anti-ship ballistic-
Army and the 161st from the 83rd Group Army, missile brigades, when compared to its roster before
are also now working up their capabilities and have the reorganisation began.
begun exercising in their new role. The two new brigades formed in 64 and 66 bases are
For the heavy and medium combined arms both likely to work up as road-mobile intercontinental-
brigades, progress in modernising the PLAA’s ballistic-missile (ICBM) units; one is most probably
armoured-fighting-vehicle fleet is still only charged with bringing the still-developmental DF-41
incremental; a limiting factor is that the army is a (CH-SS-X-20) ICBM into service, while the other will
relatively low priority for re-equipment. The ZTZ-99 probably equip with either the DF-31A(G) ICBM or
main battle tank, although in production for nearly additional DF-41s. Both of these missiles are believed
two decades, continues to equip less than a quarter to be capable of deploying multiple independently
of the new heavy combined arms brigades. The targetable re-entry vehicles. The new brigades would
most advanced variant of the ZTZ-99, the ZTZ-99A, mark the first expansion of the PLARF’s road-mobile
appears to remain restricted to the two formations ICBM fleet in nearly a decade.
already equipped with it prior to the reorganisation In late 2017, media reports described two test
(the 112th Mechanised Division and 62nd Combined firings of a new developmental short-range ballistic
Arms Brigade). missile or MRBM, reportedly with a hypersonic
More progress seems to have been made with glide-vehicle payload. It is reported that this missile
the army’s combat-support equipment, including may have the PLA designation DF-17, but there is
artillery, engineering and air-defence systems. The limited further information available on the missile;
indigenous HQ-16 air-defence system, which analysts its connections, if any, to existing PLARF designs; and
consider to be roughly analogous to Russia’s Buk, is its intended mission.
236 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
PLA Navy (PLAN) and China Coast Guard Shipyards continue to build smaller surface
(CCG) combatants too, particularly Type-054A frigates and
In April 2018, China deployed to the South China Sea Type-056A corvettes, and in September the PLAN
its largest assembly of naval power in modern times. commissioned its fifth Type-071 large amphibious
Led by the aircraft carrier Liaoning, what amounted to landing ship. A first Type-075 amphibious assault
a fleet review consisted of nearly 50 vessels and sent vessel is under construction in Shanghai.
a significant message. It underscored the dramatic China is also transforming its marine corps.
progress in the capabilities of the PLAN, not least in From a force a few years ago of two brigades and
its potential for blue-water operations. approximately 10,000 personnel, the US Department
The PLAN has taken further steps in developing of Defense estimates that by 2020 it will consist of
its aircraft-carrier capability. In June 2018, China some seven brigades and 30,000 personnel, with a
announced that the Liaoning had reached initial much wider scope of missions.
operating capability, and three months later said The PLAN’s four Type-094 Jin-class ballistic-
that it had carried out night-flying operations. This missile submarines appear now to be operational.
provides further evidence that China may be on However, it remains unclear whether this means
the cusp of a real, if still limited, operational carrier that China is able to deliver an effective deterrent
capability. capability. Broader submarine-modernisation
In addition, a second aircraft carrier has begun sea efforts continue, and two Type-039B Yuan II-class
trials and could be accepted into service as early as conventionally powered submarines may have
2019. Built in China, this second ship is a modified commissioned in 2018.
version of the Liaoning. There were also increasing In July, administrative control of China’s
indicators that work is under way on a third, larger coastguard was transferred from the civilian State
vessel that may be fitted with some form of catapult Oceanic Administration to the armed forces under
and arrester gear. the People’s Armed Police. The potential impact of
Shipyard output seems to be focusing even this move remained uncertain, beyond clarifying and
more than before on high-capability large surface streamlining a chain of command widely assumed to
combatants, adding to the sense that Chinese naval- already exist.
capability development may be entering a new phase. China’s consolidation of its infrastructure on
In July 2018, there were simultaneous launches of the disputed features it has developed in the South
two of the new Type-055 cruisers. This meant that China Sea, plus the ongoing enhancement of its
four had been launched in just over a year, while at naval capabilities, continued to strengthen its ability
least four more are under construction. The first of the to exert influence and potentially exercise control
Type-055s began sea trials in August 2018. there. During 2018, the incremental progress of these
It has been estimated that the Type-055s displace developments reached the point at which the US took
between 10,000 and 13,000 tonnes and will enhance the decision to disinvite the PLAN from the US-led
the navy’s capabilities in task-group operations and Rim of the Pacific exercise. This and a number of other
independent blue-water deployments. They are seen friction points between the two navies during 2018,
as most analogous to the United States’ Ticonderoga- including a significantly close encounter between
class cruisers, albeit perhaps slightly larger. The the two nations’ warships during a US freedom-
Ticonderogas act as air-defence command ships for of-navigation operation in September, portended
US Navy carrier strike groups; they have a 122-cell challenges for both nations’ navies in 2019 and
vertical-launch system, compared to 112 cells for highlighted the limits of existing agreements on
the Type-055s. A stretched version of the Type- managing incidents at sea.
052D destroyer was observed with a modified flight
deck, possibly to accommodate the new Harbin Z-20 PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
helicopter, perhaps in an anti-submarine role. The capabilities and institutional influence of the
The PLAN still has areas of relative weakness, PLAAF have advanced significantly in recent years;
notably in anti-submarine warfare and amphibious the ground forces were traditionally the dominant
operations, which continue to constrain its blue-water service. General Xu Qiliang, as vice-chairman of the
aspirations. But it also continues to make strides in CMC, is now the most senior member of the PLA
addressing these deficiencies. armed services; a career air-force officer, he was
Asia 237
formerly the PLAAF commander. Another PLAAF for new aircraft, better pilots, improved training and
officer, General Yi Xiaoguang, is the commander of more interoperability.
the Central Theatre Command, responsible for the Nonetheless, significant challenges remain. One
security of Beijing and the surrounding area. These relates to the human side of military capability. More
appointments are emblematic of the air force’s progress needs to be made in ensuring that senior
progress; they would have been nearly unthinkable, and more conservative leaders trust new ideas and
say analysts, just a decade ago. Change has been younger troops. Recruiting, training and retaining
under way since the late 1990s, but a major push high-quality personnel is a challenge for any armed
came when the PLAAF received its first service- force, and one that the PLA is facing as it struggles
specific strategy in 2004, instructing it to ‘integrate to build an NCO corps and attract more college
air and space and be simultaneously prepared for graduates.
offensive and defensive operations’. For China, this Another challenge relates to ‘jointness’. One of
is not simply a matter of improving hardware and the core objectives of the PLA’s most recent round
weapons systems. There has been a simultaneous of reforms, this relates to the employment of forces
drive to remake the PLA as an organisation as from two or more service branches such that they
well as its people, their mindset, their training and can together conduct coordinated operations. This
their roles. This has affected not only the PLAAF, is a major change for the PLA, which has long been
but also the PLAN and its naval aviation branch ground-centric, with organisationally discrete
(PLANAF). institutions. Indeed, US analysts say both the
The training and exercise regimen of both the PLAAF and PLANAF have retained a full suite of
Asia
air force and naval aviation have seen considerable aviation capacities because they have not been able
change. The PLAAF now has a series of exercises, the to draw on the other’s capabilities. This prevents
‘Four Key Brands’, which enable it to test operational them from realising economies of scale that would
capability as well as assess progress towards its result from each maintaining a limited number of
modernisation goals. These exercises exemplify a distinct capabilities. Interaction among units was
move away from scripted drills toward a focus on traditionally limited in the absence of a common
what China terms ‘back to back’ exercises, where higher-echelon command: regiments within the same
neither side in the exercise has prior knowledge corps rarely trained or exercised together because
of the other’s plans. By doing this, the PLA is of strict command-and-control relationships. This is
attempting to learn from Western armed forces and slowly beginning to change and there is evidence,
focus on preparing its next generation of pilots for albeit limited in comparison to Western experiences,
more realistic – i.e., unscripted – combat in a complex that the PLAAF and PLANAF are looking to develop
electromagnetic environment. a level of jointness through common training.
The PLAAF has also started expanding the scope The PLA is also engaged in a concerted effort
and scale of its missions, and there is greater emphasis to produce strategically effective aviation forces.
on operations over water. Less than 30 years ago, Longer-duration missions, further from the mainland,
PLAAF training manuals included the warning that and increased integration among and between
these operations included challenges such as the PLAAF and PLAN aviation will in future become
‘weather changes rapidly’ and ‘the horizon is difficult more commonplace. This effort is taking place
to detect’. PLAAF aircraft first flew to the centre line during a time Beijing terms a ‘strategic opportunity’.
of the Taiwan Strait in 1998 and over the Miyako Strait This means that the Communist Party of China has
for the first time in May 2015. Since then, however, decided that the risks required to implement these
there have been multiple flights into the Pacific, changes are worth bearing now, because the risk of
some circumnavigating Taiwan, comprising many major conflict with a large power is relatively low.
aircraft types. As it sorties farther from the mainland Consequently, Beijing hopes that when this period
and conducts patrols more frequently, the PLAAF of strategic opportunity ends, its future force will be
is improving pilot training and experience, and ready to compete with peer competitors.
increasing its interaction with the PLAN’s surface
and aviation assets. At the same time, the PLANAF Equipment progress
is developing its capabilities in carrier operations. The Chengdu J-20 combat aircraft remains on track to
Overall, the trend for the PLA’s aviation forces is be introduced into front-line service with the PLAAF
238 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
around 2020. An operational test-and-evaluation unit UAVs are increasingly joining the inventory. These
is now flying with the type and initial production- will likely take on electronic-warfare roles alongside
standard J-20A aircraft are being delivered, so far at a other intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
modest rate. The J-20A will be the first Chinese combat tasks. The PLAAF continues to acquire UAVs with
aircraft designed from the outset with low-observable the potential to deliver capabilities from the tactical
characteristics to enter the PLAAF inventory. to theatre level.
The PLAAF has also stood up its first unit equipped
with the Sukhoi Su-35 Flanker E. All 24 Su-35s in the DEFENCE ECONOMICS
initial order were expected to be delivered by the end
of 2018 or early 2019. The deal included acquisition According to Beijing, China’s 2018 defence budget
of the export version of the Russian R-77-1 (AA-12B was RMB1.11 trillion (US$168 billion) – an increase
Adder) active-radar-guided medium-range air-to-air of 8.1% on the 2017 figure of RMB1.02trn (US$151bn).
missile, an upgrade of the basic R-77. Delivery of this Although this percentage increase was greater than
missile to the PLAAF has already begun. However, it in 2017, when the budget was 7% higher than that
is not clear whether the PLAAF will buy additional in 2016, growth is still in single digits. By contrast,
Su-35 aircraft, or if its operational experience with the between 2011 and 2016, the defence budget grew
type will lead it to favour its own defence industry’s by more than 10% each year. But 2017 and 2018
continuing development of a single-seat Flanker, the figures indicate that single-digit growth is the new
J-11D. normal, placed within the context of China’s overall
Development work on the successor to the H-6 slow economic growth. Nonetheless, despite this
medium bomber, the H-20, continues. State-owned slowdown, which it should be remembered is
media noted in October 2018 that the project was relative – China’s GDP still grew by 6.6% in 2018,
making ‘significant progress’. The H-20 is assumed down from an average of 10% growth annually
to be a low-observable – possibly tailless – design, between 2000 and 2009 – Chinese authorities have
which could enter service from the latter half of the also engaged in reforms intended to further develop
2020s. Xian, a subsidiary of the Aviation Industry defence-industrial capabilities.
Corporation of China (AVIC), continues to build Improving China’s defence sector is a priority for
upgraded variants of the H-6 and is involved with the Xi for two principal reasons: firstly, so it can develop
H-20 programme. advanced weapons systems for the PLA, and secondly,
The H-20 is a key element of the PLAAF’s to help transition China’s economic structure from
equipment recapitalisation and part of its goal to low-end processing to high-end manufacturing.
become a ‘strategic air force’. This likely includes These efforts have been focused in three areas: civil–
a nuclear role – the current bomber, the H-6K, is military integration (CMI); innovation; and industrial
assessed as not having a nuclear role – as well as other rationalisation. China’s defence industry has already
tasks. Indeed, the shift emphasises the PLAAF’s ability made significant strides. IISS assessments indicate
to conduct defensive and offensive air operations that in 2016, defence-related revenue for eight of the
beyond the Chinese mainland, as well as to carry out ten Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved
large-scale air operations in concert with ground or in defence production would place seven of these
maritime forces. Restructuring tactical aviation from in the top 20 of the world’s most profitable defence
a regimental- to a brigade-based organisation is a part firms. Three of these – China South Industries Group
of this ambition. Corporation (CSGC), China Aviation Industry
Production of Xian’s Y-20 heavy transport aircraft Corporation (AVIC) and China North Industries
continues, and the first regiment is forming with Group Corporation (NORINCO) – appear in the top
this type. The Y-20 will also likely be the basis for a ten.
tanker aircraft that will eventually replace the H-6
in this role. There are also increasing numbers of Civil–military integration
special-mission aircraft within the PLAAF inventory. Xi has often stressed the importance of CMI, also
For example, electronic-warfare versions of the JH-7 termed civil–military fusion. It was made a national
fighter/ground-attack aircraft appear to have been priority in 2015. On 2 March 2018, Xi chaired the
fielded at unit level, while an escort jammer variant of first plenary meeting (and third overall) of the
the J-16, the J-16D, is also in test. Central Commission for Integrated Civilian–Military
Asia 239
forces and achieving a modern socialist country (‘the Dalian, Liaoning Province
Chinese Dream and the dream of building a powerful Lanzhou, Gansu Province
military’, as Xi put it to the 19th Party Congress in Luoyang, Henan Province
October 2017). The meeting approved measures Ningbo, Zhoushan, Hangzhou and Shaoxing,
including strategic-development guidelines for CMI, Zhejiang Province
the 2018 plan of action for the CCIMCD, a programme Ningde, Fujian Province
to develop CMI pilot zones focused on innovation Qingdao West Coast New Area, Shandong
and a list of the prospective pilot zones. Province
The whole party–state system has been mobilised Shenzhen, Guangdong Province
to deliver Xi’s instructions. For instance, the Office Wuhan, Hubei Province
of CCIMCD, which is responsible for routine work, Xian, Shaanxi Province
has organised workshops to promote civil–military Zhongguancun, Beijing
fusion, review progress made so far in these areas
and fix any problems identified. As part of this,
central-government officials have been dispatched town is well known as a science and manufacturing
Asia
to different locations across China as part of their centre. Its achievements include the production of
investigations. All major state-owned enterprises intelligent munitions, digital manufacturing and
are required to select areas to take part in pilot CMI digital machine-tool production, among other areas;
reform programmes, and some military officials are its total assets reportedly amount to RMB1bn (about
supposed to work for periods in their relevant civil- US$154 million).
sector industries. Analysts think that the 58th Institute case is widely
reported so that its transformation can be a model for
Innovation others to follow. The goal was to similarly overhaul
The CMI policy is strongly connected to efforts the remaining 40 institutes by the end of 2018 and,
in China to boost defence-industrial innovation. by 2020, convert the majority of defence S&T research
Priorities for 2018 included the continued overhaul institutes into corporations. However, not all defence-
of China’s defence science-and-technology (S&T) research institutes and academies are going to be
research institutes and academies. Under way since overhauled. Institutes responsible for basic research
2017, this programme aims to change the ownership will reportedly remain unchanged but those for
structure of wholly state-owned defence S&T research technological development and engineering will be
institutes and academies (those manufacturing overhauled.
sub-systems or even final assembly) so that they can However, converting these organisations is a
be listed on the stock market. This effort started in the challenging task, involving changes to areas ranging
early 2000s, though the focus at that time was on those from salaries and employee welfare to tax incentives,
firms manufacturing spare parts; it is estimated that debt arrangement, asset liquidation, the CCP’s role
at least US$30bn was raised from the stock market. in management, labour unions, and price policies for
Now the focus is shifting to research institutes and weapons and equipment.
academies. The March 2018 CCIMCD meeting approved the
In the plan, 41 defence-research institutes were first batch of 15 CMI innovation pilot zones.
identified for ownership reform, covering ordnance, These zones can be classified as one of five types:
electronics, aerospace, shipbuilding, aviation and areas with traditional heavy defence industries,
the nuclear sector. In May 2018, the Southwest though with emerging numbers of private defence
Automation Institute (or 58th Institute) of China South subcontractors – Sichuan and Shaanxi provinces
Industries Group Company Ltd was approved as the being typical cases; areas with the potential to develop
first out of the 41 institutes to complete the change. disruptive technologies – such as Shenzhen, which is
Located in Mianyang City, Sichuan province, this emerging as a tech city; areas with good infrastructure,
240 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Asia
degree of autonomy to hedge against abandonment northern Japan in January 2018 and was allocated a
by the US. At the same time, Prime Minister Shinzo budget in March for investigating the procurement
Abe has faced domestic challenges to his leadership of air-launched cruise missiles. Japan’s apparent
and security policy, despite in October 2017 winning intent is to utilise its Aegis destroyers, Aegis Ashore,
for the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) a F-35As, cruise missiles and uninhabited aerial
fifth consecutive electoral victory since 2012. vehicles to create an integrated system with defensive
Japan’s principal new commitment to the US– and potentially offensive aspects to complement US
Japan alliance has been the formal decision in power projection, but also compensate for any US
December 2017 to strengthen its ballistic-missile- reluctance to defend Japan in the future. The budget
defence (BMD) capabilities with the purchase from also included a sum for research into hypersonic
the US of two Aegis Ashore units. These should systems and related propulsion.
bolster the JSDF’s ability to intercept ballistic missiles; The JMSDF launched its seventh Aegis destroyer
may enhance Japan’s defence against cruise missiles in July 2017. Onodera reported in March 2018 that
if it procures the SM-6 interceptor; and, just as the JMoD was actively studying the conversion
importantly, responds to Trump’s calls for Japan to of the Izumo-class vessels to enable the operation
procure more US equipment as a quid pro quo for of F-35Bs, confirming long-held speculation that
US security pledges. The Aegis Ashore procurement these were not only de facto helicopter carriers but
has provoked some controversy in Japan, with local designed to become eventually fully fledged fixed-
authorities voicing opposition. Furthermore, only wing aircraft carriers. Japan has long called these
one unit will likely deploy by 2023 and the estimated vessels ‘helicopter-carrying destroyers’. Though
cost has doubled to around US$3.6 billion. in the post-war period Japan has denied itself the
In the meantime, Japan is deepening cooperation procurement of carriers as an offensive capability,
with the US armed forces. The Japan Maritime Self- the conversion project was justified by referring to a
Defense Force (JMSDF) was revealed in April 2018 ‘defensive carrier’ that was focused on the protection
as having refuelled US destroyers on BMD duties of Japan’s outlying islands.
17 times in 2017. This was accomplished using the In March 2018, the Japan Ground Self-Defense
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and the Force (JGSDF) established the Amphibious Rapid
expanded definitions of Japanese support for the Deployment Brigade (ARDB). This proto-marine
US in contingencies under new security legislation force will focus on the defence of outlying islands
passed in 2015. Then defence minister Itsunori and be equipped with AAV7 amphibious vehicles
Onodera suggested in August 2017 that collective and Osprey aircraft. In addition, the JGSDF is
242 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Asia
3rd Infantry Division
C/D, Saab 340 Erieye, Saab 340B) 21
2nd Development Division*
24 Phang-nga
Air base – 1st Wing (F-16A/B)
1st Naval Area
Naval base
Command
10 Takhli, Nakhon Sawon 25 Songkhla
Air base – 4th Wing (L-39,
Naval base (coastal vessels)
T-50TH, F-16A/B)
26 Nakhon Si Thammarat
11 Khok Ka Thiem, Lopburi
4th Army HQ
22
Air base – 2nd Wing (Bell 412,
5th Infantry Division
S-92A, Bell 205/UH-1H) 23
4th Development Division*
12 Lopburi
27 Hat Yai, Songkhla 24 25
HQ Army Aviation
Air base – 56th Wing (JAS-39
Kanchanaburi Gripen forward operating base) 26 2nd Naval Area
13 9th Infantry Division Command
28 Phuket
Kamphang Saen, Nakhon Pathom Naval base
3rd Naval Area 27
Command 28
14
Air base – training squadrons 29
29 Pattani
15th Infantry Division
scheme for insurgents. Indeed, the annual death toll who operate closely with paramilitary Border Patrol
from the conflict of 235 in 2017 was the lowest since Police units. The headquarters of the multi-agency
2004. Internal Security Operations Command Area 4 at Fort
The RTA’s 4th Army Region is headquartered Sirindhorn in Yarang District, Patani province, directs
further north in the Kra peninsula at Nakhon Si operations by all security forces in the region.
Thammarat. It includes two infantry divisions and Though the main priority for the RTARF is to
a ‘development’ division, totalling around 35,000 ensure national unity and internal security, the
troops. Along with the navy-controlled Royal Thai armed forces are nevertheless well funded, equipped
Marine Corps, the 4th Army Region provides forces and trained to deter and defend Thailand against
for operations in the troubled provinces. However, state adversaries. Over the last 40 years, a series
many front-line duties are carried out by black- of threats have arisen from Thailand’s immediate
uniformed army auxiliaries known as Thahan Pran neighbours. Border security was a priority during
(‘hunter-soldiers’, often referred to as ‘rangers’), the 1980s, after the Soviet-supported Vietnamese
244 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
invasion of Cambodia forced Khmer Rouge and other established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
Cambodian forces opposed to Hanoi’s occupation (SEATO). SEATO dissolved in 1977, but the Manila
across the border, as well as the refugee populations Pact remains in force, as does the so-called Rusk–
they controlled. Thailand was one of the nations that Thanat communiqué of 1962, under which the US
supported Cambodian opposition groups and there promised to assist Thailand if it faced aggression
were frequent clashes between Thai and Vietnamese from neighbouring countries. Together with
troops, with protracted fighting in early 1987 Thailand’s post-2003 status as a Major Non-NATO
near Chong Bok, where the borders of Cambodia, Ally, these agreements provide the foundation for
Laos and Thailand intersect. In late 1987 and early US–Thai security relations. Building on support in
1988, there were border clashes between Thai- and earlier decades, Thailand allowed the US to use the
Vietnamese-supported Laotian forces over disputed naval air base at U-Tapao as a staging post for flights
territory. Sporadic security challenges to Thailand’s supporting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
borders continued after the end of the Cold War and Thailand’s armed forces have benefited from
the Cambodian peace settlement of 1991. There was substantial infusions of US defence equipment,
a major border clash with Myanmar in 2001, and in logistic and infrastructural support, and training,
2010–12 fighting between Myanmar government managed by the Bangkok-based Joint US Military
forces and ethnic-minority rebels spilled across Advisory Group Thailand. However, the coups of
the border into Thailand. In 2008–11, there were a 2006 and 2014 undermined bilateral security relations
series of confrontations and exchanges of fire with as well as political ties. Subsequent US restrictions on
Cambodian forces over disputed border territory the supply of military equipment notably provided an
around the Preah Vihear temple. important reason for Thailand to diversify its defence
Unlike some of its fellow members of the procurement. Nevertheless, US–Thai engagement
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), through military exercises has endured. Indeed, the
notably Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, annual Cobra Gold exercise organised in Thailand
Thailand is not a territorial claimant in the South by the US Pacific (now Indo-Pacific) Command and
China Sea and does not perceive a direct threat from RTARF remains the largest multilateral exercise
China’s growing power and maritime assertiveness. in the Asia-Pacific region. Other annual exercises
Indeed, Thailand’s relations with China have involving Thai and US forces are the CARAT Thailand
warmed during the current decade, influenced by (naval interoperability), Guardian Sea (anti-submarine
historical ties, current economic links and Thailand’s warfare), Hanuman Guardian (army) and Cope Tiger
foreign-policy recalibration following the adverse (air force) series.
Western reaction to the 2014 coup. Nevertheless, Thailand also maintains good defence relations
Thailand has substantial maritime interests due with several other regional US allies or security
to its long coastline, the economic importance of partners, including Australia, where exercise
marine resources (especially natural gas) within its cooperation includes the Chapel Gold (jungle warfare),
exclusive economic zone, its large fishing fleet, its AusThai (naval), Pitch Black (multinational air combat)
heavy economic dependence on international trade and Kakadu (multinational naval) exercise. Thailand
and its increasingly important coastal industrial cooperates with fellow ASEAN members through
development. These all provide important reasons the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)
for developing the country’s navy. and ADMM–Plus (also involving eight of ASEAN’s
Dialogue Partners), though its strongest bilateral
Foreign-defence relations defence cooperation in Southeast Asia is with
Since the 1950s, defence and security relations with Singapore. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have
the United States have strongly influenced Thailand’s conducted extensive training activities in Thailand
defence policy, doctrine and equipment procurement. since the 1970s, and the Republic of Singapore Air
The basis for the relationship lies in Thailand’s Force organises the Cope Tiger air-force exercise
importance as a relatively stable, pro-Western bastion with its Thai and US counterparts. In November
during the Cold War: at that time, it needed external 2017, Singapore’s Ministry of Defence said that
support in the face of both external and domestic bilateral defence cooperation with Thailand would
communist threats. Thailand was a signatory to be strengthened, with particular emphasis on closer
the 1954 Manila Pact, which, among other things, naval cooperation, counter-terrorism and cyber
Asia 245
security. Thailand’s defence relations with Japan have supporting the defence ministry and armed-forces
intensified since June 2016, when the two nations’ headquarters. It is thought that around two-thirds of
defence ministers agreed on a range of exchanges, the defence budget is used to meet routine personnel,
including bilateral army staff talks and the dispatch maintenance and operational costs, including the
of RTA observers to a disaster-relief exercise in Japan. substantial sums associated with internal-security
Thailand’s alliance with the US has not prevented operations in southern Thailand. The remainder
it from developing defence relations with China, of the defence budget is used for procurement and
which have deepened since 2014. In 2015, the navy infrastructural projects. The ‘Vision 2026’ defence-
selected China to supply submarines as the basis modernisation plan, approved by Thailand’s Defence
for re-establishing a sub-surface capability; in May Council in October 2017, outlines the armed forces’
2017, Thailand ordered one S26T boat (an export capability improvements over the next decade,
variant of China’s Yuan class), with delivery by recognising that the extent of modernisation will
2023 scheduled. The contract is reported to include depend on the country’s overall economic progress
some weapons systems, spare parts and technology and the allocation of resources to the defence sector.
transfer (understood to include developing the The plan also states the objective of increasing the
Royal Thai Navy’s Sattahip dockyard such that it defence budget to 2% of GDP within the next several
can support submarine operations and construction years.
of a similar facility on the southwest coast to support
submarine operations in the Andaman Sea). Orders Industry and procurement
for another two submarines are expected in 2021– In its Defence Industry Masterplan, the government
Asia
22. Thailand has also purchased Chinese-made emphasises the importance of expanding Thailand’s
armoured vehicles: 28 VT-4 (MBT-3000) main battle presently limited defence industry as an important
tanks (MBTs) were delivered by the end of 2017. Plans component of developing the country’s military
to purchase ten more VT-4s along with 34 VN-1 (ZBL- capability, while ensuring that defence spending
08) wheeled armoured personnel carriers (APCs) benefits the national economy. The Masterplan sees
were approved in April 2017. At this time, Deputy technology transfers from foreign defence-equipment
Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan confirmed that suppliers – possibly mandated in the future through
an order of a further 11 VT-4s was planned, so that a more explicit offset policy – as playing a central
they could equip a full battalion. In January 2018, role in defence-industrial development, which the
Army Commander-in-Chief General Chalermchai government intends to concentrate particularly in
Sitthisart confirmed plans to collaborate with China Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC). The
in establishing a military-vehicle maintenance, repair naval dockyard at Sattahip in Chonburi province
and overhaul facility in Thailand. Since 2015, the two and the nearby naval air base at U-Tapao are
countries have also organised Falcon Strike, a bilateral viewed respectively as future hubs for the naval
air-force exercise series in Thailand, which was held and military-aerospace industry. In November 2017,
for the third time in September 2018. the government identified the defence industry
as the 11th key industry targeted to expand in the
Defence economics EEC. Moreover, legislative changes will allow local
Thailand’s defence spending is the third largest in defence-industrial enterprises – which are mainly
Southeast Asia (after Singapore and Indonesia), owned and operated by the armed forces – to more
and the armed forces’ political role has helped to easily collaborate with foreign defence companies.
ensure that the defence sector not only continues Already, the Royal Thai Navy’s Bangkok Dock
to receive substantial funding but that there are company is building modified River-class offshore
significant annual increases in the military budget. patrol vessels (OPVs) with the United Kingdom’s
The defence budget for the 2019 fiscal year (starting BAE Systems, and the RTA’s Weapon Production
in October 2018) of US$7.06 billion represents a 4.2% Centre is assembling ATMOS 2000 self-propelled
increase over the previous year. It comprises 7.6% of howitzers in collaboration with Israel’s Elbit Systems.
government spending and approximately 1.4% of In the aerospace sector, the private Thai company
GDP. About half the budget is allocated to the army; Avia Satcom, in which Saab has a 37% equity stake,
the remainder is more or less evenly divided between has developed tactical data links for Gripen combat
the navy and air force, with a small proportion aircraft.
246 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
In the past, Thailand’s military capability has not acquisition of 12 JAS 39 Gripen multi-role combat
been helped by the diversity of equipment operated aircraft, two Saab 340 Erieye airborne early-warning
by the RTARF and by its uncoordinated procurement (AEW) aircraft and a national air command-and-
system, with each service having responsibility control system (ACCS), based on Saab’s 9AIR C4I
for its own equipment programmes. However, the product, together with data links. This effected a
present government is making serious efforts to step change in the potential combat-effectiveness of
reform defence procurement, particularly through the RTAF, by providing the basis for an integrated
an expanded role for the defence ministry’s Defence and potentially highly effective air-defence
Technology Institute. Under legislation that was capability. According to Saab, the company
expected to come into effect by early 2019, this will provided access to the source codes for the Gripen so
become the Defence Technology Agency (DTA). The that the RTAF could ‘develop, upgrade, modify or
DTA will act as a central procurement agency for the add equipment, sensors and weapon systems in the
armed forces, as well as overseeing the development future by themselves’. There is now a requirement
of Thailand’s defence industry. for an additional six Gripen aircraft. In September
Thailand’s armed forces have benefited from 2018, Saab announced that it had been contracted
limited re-equipment programmes during the to upgrade Thailand’s ACCS with ‘new hardware
present decade, but there are still major outstanding and software enhancements’. The next-most-
requirements. important air-force procurement has involved 12
T-50TH Golden Eagle armed lead-in training aircraft
Army from South Korea, with deliveries under way from
Following contracts with Ukraine’s Ukroboronprom, January 2018.
the army has taken delivery of more than 200 BTR-3E1
APCs and 49 T-84 Oplot MBTs. Delays in fulfilling that Navy
contract probably provide an additional reason for Much media coverage of Royal Thai Navy (RTN)
the RTA’s increased interest in China as a source of procurement has justifiably focused on its submarine
armoured vehicles. Given an overall requirement for programme, which is significant not just in terms
150 new MBTs to replace US-made M48s and M60s, of Thailand’s prospective acquisition of a new
further orders for Chinese tanks are possible. Since capability, but also because of its opportunity costs
2015, the army has been bringing into service 12 locally for the service. Nevertheless, a significant surface-
produced Elbit Systems ATMOS 2000 howitzers, with ship procurement programme is also under way,
the Marine Corps taking another six. Twenty-six more involving a DW 3000F frigate modelled on the South
may be ordered for the army, with possibly ten units Korean Gwanggaeto class. The ship began sea trials
for the Marine Corps. The army has also purchased in December 2017 and was scheduled for delivery
Oerlikon Skyguard 3 air-defence fire-control systems, during 2018. However, funding constraints seem at
as part of a package with eight 35 mm Oerlikon least temporarily to have stymied plans for a second
GDF-007 Twin Guns and ammunition. The already DW 3000F frigate. In addition, a second Krabi-class
diverse inventory of the army’s aviation component OPV (one of the modified River-class vessels) is
has received more helicopters from Russia (Mi-17V5s), under construction at Sattahip; the navy is expected
the US (UH-60Ms), Italy (AW139s) and the European to order more ships in the same class. While the
Airbus company (EC145s and UH-72As). Reports procurement of new vessels has been limited, during
suggest that the RTA may buy additional Mi-17V5s. the present decade the RTN has upgraded important
The army also reportedly has a requirement for surface units, notably its two Chinese-built Type-25T
additional fixed-wing transport aircraft. Naresuan-class frigates (commissioned in 1994–95),
which Saab equipped with new combat-management
Air Force systems, fire-control radars and data links allowing
The most important procurement by the Royal Thai direct communication with the RTAF’s Erieye AEW
Air Force (RTAF) over the last ten years involved the platforms.
Asia 247
FORCES BY ROLE
Afghanistan AFG SPECIAL FORCES
1 spec ops div (1 (National Mission) SF bde (1 SF gp; 1
New Afghan Afghani Afs 2017 2018 2019
mech inf bn (2 mech inf coy)); 2 cdo bde (1 mech inf coy,
GDP Afs 1.38tr 1.45tr 4 cdo bn); 1 (1st MSF) mech bde (2 mech inf bn); 1 (2nd
US$ 20.2bn 20.4bn MSF) mech bde (3 mech inf bn))
per capita US$ 570 565 MANOEUVRE
Growth % 2.7 2.3 Light
Inflation % 5.0 3.0 1 (201st) corps (3 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn,
1 CSS bn), 1 inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn, 1
Def bdgt [a] Afs 148bn 147bn
CSS bn), 1 engr bn, 1 int bn, 2 MP coy, 1 sigs bn)
US$ 2.17bn 2.06bn
1 (203rd) corps (2 inf bde (5 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn,
US$1=Afs 68.08 71.27 1 CSS bn), 2 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn, 1
[a] Security expenditure. Includes expenditure on Ministry of CSS bn), 1 engr bn, 1 int bn, 2 MP coy, 1 sigs bn)
Defence, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National
Security Council and the General Directorate of National Security.
1 (205th) corps (4 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn,
Also includes donor funding. 1 CSS bn), 1 engr bn, 1 int bn, 2 MP coy, 1 sigs bn)
1 (207th) corps (3 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn,
Population 34,940,837
1 CSS bn), 1 engr bn, 1 int bn, 2 MP coy, 1 sigs bn)
Ethnic groups: Pashtun 38%; Tajik 25%; Hazara 19%; Uzbek 12%;
1 (209th) corps (1 div HQ; 3 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1
Aimaq 4%; Baluchi 0.5%
cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn), 1 engr bn, 1 int bn, 2 MP coy, 1
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus sigs bn)
Male 20.8% 5.8% 5.3% 4.3% 13.3% 1.2% 1 (215th) corps (3 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn,
Asia
Female 20.1% 5.6% 5.2% 4.1% 12.9% 1.4% 1 CSS bn), 1 inf bde (2 inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn), 1
engr bn, 1 int bn, 2 MP coy, 1 sigs bn)
Capabilities 1 (111st Capital) div (1 inf bde (1 tk bn, 1 mech inf bn, 2
inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn), 1 inf bde (4 inf
The Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) are
bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn), 1 int bn)
optimised for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations
against the Taliban and other groups. Although ANDSF casualties EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
are no longer reported by the US and NATO, credible media reports ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
suggested that already high losses due to casualties and desertion MBT 20 T-55/T-62 (24 more in store†)
further increased in 2018. These losses have operational effect. APC 996
Overall, the ANDSF had a personnel shortage of 12%, struggling APC (T) 173 M113A2†
to retain key specialists including pilots, aircraft mechanics, techni-
APC (W) 623 MSFV (inc variants)
cal specialists and special-operations forces. Army and police SOF
are well regarded by NATO and bear the brunt of offensive opera- PPV 200 Maxxpro
tions and intelligence-led strike operations against insurgent net- ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
works. NATO advisers remain embedded in the defence and inte- ARV 20 Maxxpro ARV
rior ministries, although the ANDSF are now responsible for the MW Bozena
majority of training, albeit with NATO support. The additional US ARTILLERY 775
forces authorised to support the new US Afghan strategy reached TOWED 109: 122mm 85 D-30†; 155mm 24 M114A1†
full strength in the middle of 2018 and the UK announced a sig-
MOR 82mm 666: 521 2B14†; 105 M-69†; 40 M252†
nificant increase in its troop numbers. Indigenous logistic support
is slowly improving but remains a source of weakness. Efforts are
also under way to improve leadership, intelligence, logistics and Afghan Air Force (AAF) 7,300
coordination between different service arms. The ANDSF Road Including Special Mission Wing
Map contains ambitious plans to improve capability but depends EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
on continued international support. Air-force modernisation con-
AIRCRAFT 19 combat capable
tinues, but maintenance difficulties reduce aircraft availability.
Afghan forces’ logistics are optimised for internal deployments, but TPT 47: Medium 4 C-130H Hercules; Light 42: 24 Cessna
their effectiveness is limited by a shortage of sufficiently educated 208B; 18 PC-12 (Special Mission Wing); PAX 1 B-727 (2
and trained personnel. Afghan forces depend greatly on imported more in store)
military equipment. TRG 19 EMB-314 Super Tucano* (of which 7 in the US
for trg)
ACTIVE 174,300 (Army 167,000 Air Force 7,300)
HELICOPTERS
Paramilitary 148,700
ATK 4 Mi-35 Hind
MRH 101: 3 Cheetal; 25 MD-530F (11 armed); 73 Mi-17
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Hip H (incl 28 Special Mission Wing hel)
TPT • Medium 16 UH-60A+ Black Hawk
Afghan National Army (ANA) 167,00 BOMBS
5 regional comd Laser-guided GBU-58 Paveway II
248 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Asia
Aviation AMPHIBIOUS 15 LCM-8 (capacity either 1 MBT or 200
1 (16th) avn bde (1 regt (2 ISR hel sqn), 1 regt (3 tpt troops)
hel sqn), 1 regt (2 spec ops hel sqn, 1 avn sqn)) HELICOPTERS
COMBAT SUPPORT ATK 22 Tiger
1 (6th) cbt spt bde (1 STA regt (1 STA bty, 1 UAV bty, TPT 82: Heavy 10 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 72: 38 NH90
1 CSS bty), 1 AD/FAC regt (integrated), 1 engr regt TTH (MRH90 TTH); 34 S-70A Black Hawk
(2 construction sqn, 1 EOD sqn), 1 EW regt, 1 int UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
bn) ISR • Medium 15 RQ-7B Shadow 200
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence RBS-70
1 (17th) CSS bde (3 log bn, 3 med bn, 1 MP bn)
2014, the ACSC in July 2018 became part of the ASD, which tion plan is under way, called Forces 2030. Counter-terrorism oper-
became a statutory agency. Australian government cyber- ations increased following a July 2016 attack and it is mounting
security expertise from CERT Australia and the Digital coordinated patrols of the Bay of Bengal with India. In the recent
Transformation Agency also moved into the ACSC. past, Bangladesh has relied on Chinese and Russian aid and credit
to overcome its limited procurement funding. It has increased
defence collaboration with India. The country has a long record
DEPLOYMENT of UN peacekeeping deployments, with UN payments reportedly
providing an important income source. In Autumn 2017, the army
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • ISAF Operation Resolute Support deployed to the country’s eastern border to provide humanitarian
(Highroad) 270; 1 SF unit; 1 sy unit; 1 sigs unit assistance to Rohingya refugees fleeing Myanmar. A major naval-
ARABIAN SEA: Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-150 recapitalisation and -expansion programme is under way to better
(Operation Manitou) 1 FFGHM protect the country’s large EEZ, including procurement of Chinese
corvettes. A requirement for modern howitzers and light armoured
EGYPT: MFO (Operation Mazurka) 27 vehicles for peacekeeping missions has been announced. Substan-
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve (Okra) 380; 1 SF gp; 1 trg unit tial efforts have been made to strengthen the nascent shipbuilding
industry and work has begun on a new submarine-support facility.
MALAYSIA: 120; 1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours); 2 The armed forces reportedly retain extensive business interests, in
AP-3C Orion (on rotation) real estate, banks and other businesses.
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO (Operation Paladin) 12 obs
ACTIVE 157,050 (Army 126,150 Navy 16,900 Air
PHILIPPINES: Operation Augury 100 (trg team) 14,000) Paramilitary 63,900
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS (Operation Aslan) 23; 1 obs
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: Operation Accordion 500: 1 tpt det ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
with 2 C-130J-30 Hercules; Operation Inherent Resolve (Okra)
150; 1 B-737-700 Wedgetail (E-7A); 1 A330 MRTT (KC-30A)
Army 126,150
Asia
FORCES BY ROLE
FOREIGN FORCES COMMAND
9 inf div HQ
New Zealand 9 (air navigation trg) SPECIAL FORCES
Singapore 230: 1 trg sqn at Pearce with PC-21 trg ac; 1 trg 1 cdo bn
sqn at Oakey with 12 AS332 Super Puma; AS532 Cougar MANOEUVRE
United States US Pacific Command: 1,500; 1 SEWS at Pine Armoured
Gap; 1 comms facility at NW Cape; 1 SIGINT stn at Pine 1 armd bde
Gap • US Strategic Command: 1 detection and tracking 3 indep armd regt
radar at Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt Light
23 inf bde
1 (composite) bde
Bangladesh BGD COMBAT SUPPORT
9 arty bde
Bangladeshi Taka Tk 2017 2018 2019 1 engr bde
GDP Tk 21.1tr 23.9tr 1 sigs bde
US$ 262bn 286bn AVIATION
per capita US$ 1,603 1,736 1 avn regt (1 avn sqn; 1 hel sqn)
AIR DEFENCE
Growth % 7.4 7.3
1 AD bde
Inflation % 5.6 6.0
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Def bdgt Tk 236bn 264bn 291bn
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
US$ 2.93bn 3.16bn MBT 276: 174 Type-59; 58 Type-69/Type-69G; 44 Type-
FMA (US) US$ 2m 0m 90-II (MBT-2000)
US$1=Tk 80.63 83.62 LT TK 8 Type-62
RECCE 8+ BOV M11
Population 159,453,001
APC 481
Religious groups: Muslim 90%; Hindu 9%; Buddhist 1% APC (T) 134 MT-LB
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus APC (W) 347: 330 BTR-80; 17 Cobra
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Male 13.9% 5.0% 4.7% 4.1% 18.6% 3.0%
AEV MT-LB
Female 13.4% 4.8% 4.7% 4.4% 20.1% 3.4% ARV 3+: T-54/T-55; Type-84; 3 Type-654
VLB MTU
Capabilities ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Bangladesh has limited military capability that is optimised for MSL • MANPATS 9K115-2 Metis M1 (AT-13 Saxhorn-2)
border and domestic security. A wide-ranging defence modernisa- RCL 106mm 238 M40A1
252 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
ARTILLERY 853+ 1 Nirbhoy (ex-PRC Hainan) with 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor;
SP 155mm 12 NORA B-52 2 twin 57mm gun
TOWED 363+: 105mm 170 Model 56 pack howitzer; 5 Padma
122mm 131: 57 Type-54/54-1 (M-30); 20 Type-83; 54 PBFG 5 Durbar (PRC Hegu) with 2 single lnchr with
Type-96 (D-30), 130mm 62 Type-59-1 (M-46) SY-1 AShM
MRL 122mm 6 (PRC) PBFT 4 Huchuan (PRC) with 2 single 533mm TT each
MOR 472: 81mm 11 M29A1; 82mm 366 Type-53/type- with YU-1 Type-53 HWT
87/M-31 (M-1937); 120mm 95 AM-50/UBM 52 PBF 4 Titas (ROK Sea Dolphin)
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 3: 1 LCT; 2 LCVP PB 11: 1 Barkat (ex-PRC Shanghai III); 2 Karnaphuli; 1
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 7: 1 C295; 5 Cessna 152; 1 PA- Salam (ex-PRC Huangfen); 7 Shaheed Daulat (PRC
31T Cheyenne Shanghai II)
HELICOPTERS MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5
MRH 2 AS365N3 Dauphin MSO 5: 1 Sagar; 4 Shapla (ex-UK River)
TPT 6: Medium 3 Mi-171Sh Light 3 Bell 206L-4 Long AMPHIBIOUS
Ranger LANDING SHIPS • LSL 1
AIR DEFENCE LANDING CRAFT 14
SAM LCT 2
Short-range FM-90 LCU 4 (of which 2†)
Point-defence QW-2; HN-5A (being replaced by QW-2) LCVP 3†
GUNS • TOWED 166: 37mm 132 Type-65/74; 57mm 34 LCM 5 Darshak (Yuchin)
Type-59 (S-60) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9
AG 1
Navy 16,900 AGHS 2: 1 Agradoot; 1 Anushandhan
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AOR 2 (coastal)
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2 Nabajatra (ex-PRC AOT 1 Khan Jahangir Ali
Ming Type-035G) with 8 single 533mm TT AR 1†
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 4 ATF 1†
FFGHM 1 Bangabandhu (ROK modified Ulsan) with 2 AX 1 Shaheed Ruhul Amin
twin lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple HHQ-7
SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with A244 LWT, 1 76mm gun Naval Aviation
(capacity: 1 AW109E hel) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FFG 3: AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 Do-228NG (MP)
2 Abu Bakr (ex-PRC Jianghu III) with 2 twin lnchr with HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 AW109E Power
C-802A AShM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm
gun Special Warfare and Diving Command 300
1 Osman (ex-PRC Jianghu I) with 2 quad lnchr with
C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S Air Force 14,000
mor, 2 twin 100mm gun
FORCES BY ROLE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 52
FIGHTER
CORVETTES 8
1 sqn with MiG-29B/UB Fulcrum
FSGM 2 Shadhinota (PRC C13B) with 2 twin lnchr with
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 1 octuple FL-3000N
1 sqn with F-7MB/FT-7B Airguard
lnchr with HHQ-10 SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
1 sqn with F-7BG/FT-7BG Airguard
platform
1 sqn with F-7BGI/FT-7BGI Airguard
FSG 4:
GROUND ATTACK
2 Durjoy with 2 twin lnchr with C-704 AShM, 1 76mm
gun 1 sqn with Yak-130 Mitten*
2 Bijoy (ex-UK Castle) with 2 twin lnchr with C-704 TRANSPORT
AShM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 1 sqn with An-32 Cline
FS 2 Durjoy with 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun 1 sqn with C-130B Hercules
PSOH 2 Somudra Joy (ex-USCG Hero) with 1 76mm gun, 1 sqn with L-410UVP
hel landing platform TRAINING
PCFG 4 Durdarsha (ex-PRC Huangfeng) with 4 single 1 sqn with K-8W Karakorum*; L-39ZA Albatros*
lnchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 Safflower) AShM 1 sqn with PT-6
PCO 6: 1 Madhumati (Sea Dragon) with 1 57mm gun; 5 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Kapatakhaya (ex-UK Island) 1 sqn with AW139; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-17-1V Hip H; Mi-
PCC 8: 171Sh
2 Meghna with 1 57mm gun (fishery protection) 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-17-1V Hip H; Mi-171Sh
Asia 253
Asia
Security Guards Ethnic groups: Malay 65.7%; Chinese 10.3%; indigenous 3.4%;
other or unspecified 23.6%
Rapid Action Battalions 5,000
Ministry of Home Affairs Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Paramilitary 400–500
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Gurkha Reserve Unit 400–500
Army 4,900 FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE
MANOEUVRE Light
Light 2 inf bn(-)
3 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 cbt spt bn (1 armd recce sqn, 1 engr sqn) DEPLOYMENT
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 30
Reserves 700
FORCES BY ROLE PHILIPPINES: IMT 9
MANOEUVRE
Light FOREIGN FORCES
1 inf bn
Singapore 1 trg camp with infantry units on rotation; 1 trg
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE school; 1 hel det with AS332 Super Puma
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES United Kingdom 1,000; 1 Gurkha bn; 1 jungle trg centre; 1
LT TK 20 FV101 Scorpion (incl FV105 Sultan CP) hel flt with 3 Bell 212
APC • APC (W) 45 VAB
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ARV 2 Samson Cambodia CAM
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 24
Cambodian Riel r 2017 2018 2019
ment donations and second-hand procurements, including from Navy ε2,800 (incl 1,500 Naval Infantry)
China and South Korea. Cambodia has no domestic defence indus-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
try, with no ability to design and manufacture modern equipment
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14
for its armed forces.
PBF 3 Stenka
ACTIVE 124,300 (Army 75,000 Navy 2,800 Air 1,500 PB 9: 4 (PRC 46m); 3 (PRC 20m); 2 Shershen
Provincial Forces 45,000) Paramilitary 67,000 PBR 2 Kaoh Chhlam
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT
Conscript liability 18 months service authorised but not imple-
LCU 1
mented since 1993
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AFDL 1
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Naval Infantry 1,500
FORCES BY ROLE
Army ε75,000 MANOEUVRE
6 Military Regions (incl 1 special zone for capital) Light
FORCES BY ROLE 1 (31st) nav inf bde
SPECIAL FORCES COMBAT SUPPORT
1 (911th) AB/SF Bde 1 arty bn
MANOEUVRE
Light Air Force 1,500
2 (2nd & 3rd Intervention) inf div (3 inf bde) FORCES BY ROLE
5 (Intervention) indep inf bde ISR/TRAINING
8 indep inf bde 1 sqn with P-92 Echo (L-39 Albatros* in store)
Other TRANSPORT
Asia
1 VIP sqn (reporting to Council of Ministers) with An-
1 (70th) sy bde (4 sy bn)
24RV Coke; AS350 Ecureuil; AS355F2 Ecureuil II
17 (border) sy bn
1 sqn with BN-2 Islander; Y-12 (II)
COMBAT SUPPORT
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
2 arty bn 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-8 Hip; Z-9; (Mi-26 Halo in
4 fd engr regt store)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 (construction) engr regt
AIRCRAFT
2 tpt bde TPT • Light 12: 2 An-24RV Coke; 1 BN-2 Islander; 2 MA60;
AIR DEFENCE 5 P-92 Echo (pilot trg/recce); 2 Y-12 (II)
1 AD bn TRG (5 L-39 Albatros* in store)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
HELICOPTERS
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MRH 14: 3 Mi-17 Hip H; 11 Z-9
MBT 200+: 50 Type-59; 150+ T-54/T-55 TPT 8: Heavy (2 Mi-26 Halo in store); Medium 4 Mi-8
LT TK 20+: Type-62; 20 Type-63 Hip; Light 4: 2 AS350 Ecureuil; 2 AS355F2 Ecureuil II
RECCE 4+ BRDM-2
IFV 70 BMP-1 Provincial Forces 45,000+
APC 230+
Reports of at least 1 inf regt per province, with varying
APC (T) M113 numbers of inf bn (with lt wpn)
APC (W) 230: 200 BTR-60/BTR-152; 30 OT-64
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Paramilitary
ARV T-54/T-55 Police 67,000 (including gendarmerie)
MW Bozena; RA-140 DS
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
RCL 82mm B-10; 107mm B-11
DEPLOYMENT
ARTILLERY 433+ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 221; 6
TOWED 400+: 76mm ZIS-3 (M-1942)/122mm D-30/ obs; 1 engr coy
122mm M-30 (M-1938)/130mm Type-59-I
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 184; 1 engr coy
MRL 33+: 107mm Type-63; 122mm 13: 8 BM-21; 5 RM-
70; 132mm BM-13-16 (BM-13); 140mm 20 BM-14-16 (BM- MALI: UN • MINUSMA 303: 2 engr coy; 1 EOD coy
14) SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 79; 6 obs; 1 MP unit
MOR 82mm M-37; 120mm M-43; 160mm M-160 SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 1 obs
AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Point-defence FN-6; FN-16 (reported)
GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 37mm
M-1939; 57mm S-60
256 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Space TRAINING
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 4 hel trg regt
SATELLITES 103 AIR DEFENCE
COMMUNICATIONS 6 Zhongxing (dual-use telecom 15 AD bde
satellites for civ/mil comms)
Reserves
NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 33: 3 Beidou-
The People’s Liberation Army Reserve Force is being
2(M); 6 Beidou-2(G); 6 Beidou-2(IGSO); 1 Beidou-3(G); 16
restructured, and the army component reduced. As a
Beidou-3(M); 1 Beidou-3 (ISGO)
result some of the units below may have been re-roled
ISR 49: 2 Haiyang (remote sensing); 46 Yaogan Weixing
or disbanded
(remote sensing); 1 Ziyuan (ZY-2 – remote sensing)
ELINT/SIGINT 15: 8 Shijian 6 (4 pairs – reported ELINT/ FORCES BY ROLE
SIGINT role); 7 Shijian 11 (reported ELINT/SIGINT role) MANOEUVRE
Armoured
Ground Forces ε975,000 2 armd regt
In late 2015, a single, separate headquarters was established Light
for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ground forces, in 18 inf div
place of the four general departments 4 inf bde
3 indep inf regt
FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SUPPORT
COMMAND
3 arty div
13 (Group) army HQ
7 arty bde
SPECIAL FORCES
15 engr regt
15 spec ops bde
1 ptn br bde
MANOEUVRE
Asia
3 ptn br regt
Armoured
10 chem regt
27 (cbd arms) armd bde
10 sigs regt
1 hy mech inf div (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
regt, 1 AD regt)
9 log bde
Mechanised
1 log regt
1 (high alt) mech inf div (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1
AIR DEFENCE
arty regt, 1 AD regt)
17 AD div
23 (cbd arms) mech inf bde
8 AD bde
Light
8 AD regt
3 (high alt) mot inf div (1 armd regt, 2 mot inf regt, 1 arty
regt, 1 AD regt) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
24 (cbd arms) inf bde ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Air Manoeuvre MBT 5,800: 600 ZTZ-59; 650 ZTZ-59-II; 600 ZTZ-59D; 200
2 air aslt bde ZTZ-79; 300 ZTZ-88A/B; 1,000 ZTZ-96; 1,500 ZTZ-96A;
Amphibious 600 ZTZ-99; 250 ZTZ-99A; 100 ZTQ-15
6 amph aslt bde LT TK 450: 250 ZTD-05; 100 ZTQ-62; 100 ZTS-63A
Other ASLT 600 ZTL-11
1 (OPFOR) mech inf bde IFV 5,000: 400 ZBD-04; 1,000 ZBD-04A; 1,200 ZBL-08; 600
1 mech gd div (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt, ZBD-86; 650 ZBD-86A; 550 ZSL-92; 600 ZSL-92B
1 AD regt) APC 3,950
1 sy gd div (4 sy regt) APC (T) 2,700: 750 ZSD-63; 200 ZSD-63C; 1,750 ZSD-
16 (border) sy bde 89
15 (border) sy regt APC (W) 1,250: 700 ZSL-92A; 500 ZSL-10; 50 ZSL-93
1 (border) sy gp AAV 300+ ZBD-05
COMBAT SUPPORT AUV Dongfeng Mengshi; Tiger 4×4
15 arty bde ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
13 engr/NBC bde ARV Type-73; Type-84; Type-85; Type-97; Type-654
2 engr regt VLB KMM; MTU; TMM; Type-84A
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MW Type-74; Type-79; Type-81-II; Type-84
13 spt bde ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
COASTAL DEFENCE MSL
19 coastal arty/AShM bde SP 1,000: 450 HJ-8 (veh mounted); 100 HJ-10; 450 ZSL-
AVIATION 02B
1 mixed avn bde MANPATS HJ-73D; HJ-8A/C/E; HJ-11
HELICOPTER RCL 3,966: 75mm PF-56; 82mm PF-65 (B-10); PF-78;
12 hel bde 105mm PF-75; 120mm PF-98
258 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Sunburn) AShM, 2 Yezh (SA-N-12 Grizzly) SAM, 2 Luda IV (Type-051G) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-
2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3 A/S 83 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2
mor, 2 Kortik CIWS with 9M311E (SA-N-11 Grison) FQF 2500 A/S mor, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 twin
SAM, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28 100mm gun
Helix A hel) FFG 15:
1 Luhai (Type-051B) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-12A 6 Jianghu I (Type-053H1) with 2 twin lnchr with
AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with HHQ-16 SAM/Yu-8 A/S HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1
msl,2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 twin twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C hel)
100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C/Ka-28 Helix A hel) 1 Jianghu III (Type-053H2) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-
2 Luhu (Type-052) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 83 AShM, 2 RBU 1200, 2 twin 100mm gun
1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 triple 324mm 6 Jianghu I Upgrade (Type-053H1G) with 2 quad
ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 2500 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ- lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 2 RBU 1200, 2 twin 100mm
12 CIWS, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C hel) gun
2 Luyang (Type-052B) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83 2 Luda I (Type-051) with 2 triple lnchr with HY-2 (CH-
AShM, 2 single lnchr with Yezh (SA-N-12 Grizzly) SS-N-2) AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 FQF 2500
SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-12 A/S mor, 2 twin 130mm gun (minelaying capability)
CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS ε205
6 Luyang II (Type-052C) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-62 CORVETTES • FSGM 41:
AShM, 8 sextuple VLS with HHQ-9 SAM, 2 triple 21 Jiangdao I (Type-056) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-83
324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM, 2 triple
100mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 Helix A hel) 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel
10 Luyang III (Type-052D) with 8 octuple VLS with landing platform
YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/HHQ-9ER SAM/ 20 Jiangdao II (Type-056A) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-83
Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM,
Asia
AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM, 2 triple
2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-12 CIWS
324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel
(1 with H/PJ-11 CIWS), 1 130mm gun (capacity 2
landing platform
Ka-28 Helix A hel)
PCFG ε60 Houbei (Type-022) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-
DDGM 2:
83 AShM, 1 H/PJ-13 CIWS
2 Luzhou (Type-051C) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83
PCG 26
AShM; 6 sextuple VLS with S-300FM (SA-N-20
6 Houjian (Type-037-II) with 2 triple lnchr with YJ-8
Grumble) SAM, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 100mm gun, 1
(CH-SS-N-4) AShM, 1 76mm gun
hel landing platform
20 Houxin (Type-037-IG) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-8
FRIGATES 59
(CH-SS-N-4) AShM
FFGHM 40:
PCC 48
2 Jiangkai (Type-054) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83
2 Haijiu (Type-037-I) with 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin
AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 triple
324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 57mm gun
4 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 30 Hainan (Type-037) with ε4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2
Helix A/Z-9C hel) twin 57mm gun
16 Jiangkai II (Type-054A) with 2 quad lnchr with 16 Haiqing (Type-037-IS) with 2 FQF-3200 A/S mor
YJ-83 AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Yu-8 A/S msl/ PB ε30 Shanghai III (Type-062-1)
HHQ-16 SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, MINE WARFARE 42
2 FQF 2300 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 76mm gun MINE COUNTERMEASURES 50
(capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A/Z-9C hel) MCO 16: 4 Wochi (Type-081); 6 Wochi mod (Type-
12 Jiangkai II (Type-054A) with 2 quad lnchr with 081A); 6 Wozang (Type-082II)
YJ-83 AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Yu-8 A/S msl/ MSC 16: 4 Wosao I (Type-082); 12 Wosao II (Type-082-II)
HHQ-16 SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, MSD 18 Wonang (Type-529) (operated by Wozang
2 FQF 2300 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 76mm gun MCO)
(capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A/Z-9C hel) AMPHIBIOUS
7 Jiangwei II (Type-053H3) with 2 quad lnchr with PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 5 Yuzhao
YJ-83 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 (Type-071) with 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity
RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 4 Yuyi LCAC plus supporting vehicles; 800 troops; 60
2 Z-9C hel) armoured vehs; 4 hel)
3 Jiangwei II (Type-053H3) with 2 quad lnchr with LANDING SHIPS 49
YJ-83 AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM, LSM 21:
2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 Yudeng (Type-073-II) (capacity 5 tk or 500 troops)
2 Z-9C hel) 10 Yuhai (Type-074) (capacity 2 tk; 250 troops)
FFGM 4: 10 Yunshu (Type-073A) (capacity 6 tk)
2 Luda IV (Type-051DT) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83 LST 28:
AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 FQF 4 Yukan (Type-072-IIG) (capacity 2 LCVP; 10 tk; 200
2500 A/S mor, 2 130mm gun, 3 twin 57mm gun troops)
260 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Asia
MSL • MANPATS HJ-73; HJ-8 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
RCL 120mm Type-98 1 regt with AS332 Super Puma; H225 (VIP)
ARTILLERY 40+ ISR UAV
SP 122mm 40+: 20+ PLZ-07; 20+ PLZ-89 2 bde with GJ-1
MRL 107mm PH-63 AIR DEFENCE
MOR 82mm 1 SAM div
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence HN-5 21 SAM bde
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Air Force 395,000 AIRCRAFT 2,413 combat capable
FORCES BY ROLE BBR 172: ε12 H-6 (trg role); ε60 H-6H/M; ε100 H-6K
Fighter/ground-attack units adopted bde structure in 2017 FTR 759: 200 J-7 Fishcan; 192 J-7E Fishcan; 120 J-7G
BOMBER Fishcan; 50 J-8F Finback; 50 J-8H Finback; 95 J-11; 20 Su-
1 regt with H-6M 27SK Flanker; 32 Su-27UBK Flanker
2 regt with H-6H FGA 702+: 78 J-10 Firebird; 142 J-10A Firebird; 55+ J-10B
5 regt with H-6K Firebird; 80+ J-10C Firebird; 48 J-10S Firebird; 130 J-11B/
FIGHTER BS Flanker L; 60+ J-16 Flanker; 12+ J-20A (in test); 73 Su-
5 bde with J-7 Fishcan 30MKK Flanker; 24 Su-35 Flanker
5 bde with J-7E Fishcan ATK 140 JH-7A Flounder
3 bde with J-7G Fishcan EW 14: 4 Y-8CB High New 1; 6 Y-8G High New 3; 2 Y-8XZ
4 bde with J-8F/H Finback High New 7; 2 Y-9XZ
2 bde with J-11A/Su-27SK/Su-27UBK Flanker ELINT 4 Tu-154M/D Careless
4 bde with J-11A/J-11B/Su-27UBK Flanker ISR 51: 24 JZ-8 Finback*; 24 JZ-8F Finback*; 3 Y-8H1
3 bde with J-11B/BS Flanker L AEW&C 13: 4 KJ-200 Moth; 5 KJ-500; 4 KJ-2000
C2 5: 2 B-737; 3 Y-8T High New 4
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
TKR 13: 10 H-6U; 3 Il-78 Midas
8 bde with J-10A/J-10S Firebird
TPT 335+ Heavy 27: 20 Il-76MD/TD Candid; 7 Y-20;
2 bde with J-10B/S Firebird
Medium 42+: 30 Y-8C; 12+ Y-9; Light 239: 170 Y-5; 41
1 bde with J-10B/C/S Firebird
Y-7/Y-7H; 20 Y-11; 8 Y-12; PAX 27: 9 B-737 (VIP); 5 CRJ-
2 bde with J-10C/S Firebird 200; 5 CRJ-700; 8 Tu-154M Careless
1 bde with Su-35 Flanker; Su-30MKK Flanker TRG 1,004+: 400 CJ-6/-6A/-6B; 12+ HY-7; 50 JJ-7*; 150 JJ-
3 bde with J-16 Flanker 7A*; 350 JL-8*; 30 JL-9*; 12+ JL-10*
3 bde with Su-30MKK Flanker HELICOPTERS
GROUND ATTACK MRH 22: 20 Z-9; 2 Mi-17V-5 Hip H
6 bde with JH-7A Flounder TPT 31+: Heavy 18+ Z-8; Medium 13+: 6+ AS332 Super
ELECTRONIC WARFARE Puma (VIP); 3 H225 (VIP); 4+ Mi-171
2 regt with Y-8CB/G/XZ UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR CISR • Heavy 12+ GJ-1; GJ-2
1 regt with JZ-8F Finback* ISR • Heavy 7+ EA-03
262 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
AIR DEFENCE exercised by the PLA’s 3rd and 4th departments and
SAM 754+ other central functions. It reports to the Central Military
Long-range 356+: 180+ HQ-9/-9B; 32 S-300PMU Commission and is believed to be responsible for the PLA’s
(SA-10 Grumble); 64 S-300PMU1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); space and cyber capabilities
64 S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle); 16 S-400 (SA-21B
Growler) Theatre Commands
Medium-range 320+: 120+ HQ-2/-2A/-2B; 150 HQ-12
In early 2016, the previous seven military regions were
(KS-1A); 50+ HQ-22
consolidated into five new theatre commands
Short-range 78+: 24+ HQ-6A; 24 HQ-6D; ε30 HQ-7
GUNS 16,000 100mm/85mm
Eastern Theatre Command
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR PL-5B/C; PL-8; R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IIR PL- Eastern Theatre Ground Forces
10; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo); SARH PL-11; ARH 71st Group Army
PL-12; PL-15 (entering service); R-77 (AA-12A Adder);
(1 spec ops bde, 3 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde,
R-77-1 (RVV-SD) (AA-12B Adder)
1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde regt, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde,
ASM AKD-9; AKD-10; KD-88; Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-
1 AD bde)
59M (AS-18 Kazoo)
AShM Kh-31A (AS-17B Krypton) 72nd Group Army
ARM Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton); YJ-91 (Domestically (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde,
produced Kh-31P variant) 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1
ALCM • Conventional CJ-20; YJ(KD)-63 hel bde, 1 AD bde)
BOMBS 73rd Group Army
Laser-guided: LS-500J; LT-2 (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde,
TV-guided: KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1
hel bde, 1 AD bde)
Airborne Corps
FORCES BY ROLE Eastern Theatre Navy
SPECIAL FORCES Coastal defence from south of Lianyungang to
1 spec ops bde Dongshan (approx. 35°10´N to 23°30´N), and to
MANOEUVRE seaward; HQ at Ningbo; support bases at Fujian,
Air Manoeuvre
Zhoushan, Ningbo
6 AB bde
17 SSK; 10 DDGHM; 18 FFGHM; 6 FFG; 19 FSGM;
Aviation
ε30 PCFG/PCG; ε22 MCMV; 2 LPD; ε22 LST/M
1 hel regt
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Eastern Theatre Navy Aviation
1 spt bde
1st Naval Aviation Division
TRANSPORT
(1 bbr regt with H-6DU/G; 1 ASW regt with KQ-200; 1
1 bde with Y-7; Y-8
hel regt with Ka-27PS; Ka-28; Ka-31)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Other Forces
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
(1 FGA bde with JH-7; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MK2;
ABCV 180 ZBD-03
J-10A)
APC • APC (T) 4 ZZZ-03 (CP)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Eastern Theatre Air Force
SP some HJ-9
10th Bomber Division
ARTILLERY 162+
(1 bbr regt with H-6H; 1 bbr regt with H-6K; 1 bbr regt
TOWED 122mm ε54 PL-96 (D-30)
with H-6M)
MRL 107mm ε54 PH-63
26th Special Mission Division
MOR 54+: 82mm some; 100mm 54
(1 AEW&C regt with KJ-200/KJ-500/Y-8T; 1 AEW&C
AIRCRAFT • TPT 20: Medium 6 Y-8; Light 14: 2 Y-7;
12 Y-12D regt with KJ-2000/Y-8T)
HELICOPTERS Fuzhou Base
ATK 8 WZ-10K (1 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 1 FGA bde
CSAR 8 Z-8KA with J-16; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MKK; 2 SAM bde)
MRH 12 Z-9WZ Shanghai Base
AIR DEFENCE (1 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 ftr bde with J-8F; 1 ftr bde with
SAM • Point-defence QW-1 J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1
GUNS • TOWED 25mm 54 PG-87 FGA bde with Su-30MKK; 2 atk bde with JH-7A; 1 trg
bde with J-7/JJ-7A; 2 SAM bde)
Strategic Support Force ε175,000 Other Forces
At the end of 2015, a new Strategic Support Force was (1 ISR bde with JZ-8F; 1 CSAR bde; 1 Flight Instructor
established by drawing upon capabilities previously Training Base with CJ-6; JL-8; JL-9; JL-10)
Asia 263
Asia
2 FFGM; 7 FFG; 14 FSGM; ε38 PCFG/PCG; ε16 (1 SAM bde)
MCMV; 3 LPD; ε21 LST/M Xi’an Flying Academy
(1 trg bde with JJ-7A; 1 trg bde with JL-9; 2 trg bde with
Southern Theatre Navy Aviation JL-8; 1 trg bde with Y-7; Y-8)
3rd Naval Aviation Division Other Forces
(1 ASW/AEW&C regt with KJ-500; KQ-200; 1 bbr regt (1 surv regt with Y-8H1; 1 CSAR regt)
with H-6DU/G/J; 1 tpt/hel regt with Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J;
Z-8S; Z-9C/D) Northern Theatre Command
Other Forces
(1 FGA bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-11B; JH-7A; Northern Theatre Ground Forces
1 SAM bde) 78th Group Army
(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde,
Southern Theatre Air Force 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD
8th Bomber Division bde)
(2 bbr regt with H-6K) 79th Group Army
20th Special Mission Division (1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 3 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde,
(3 EW regt with Y-8CB/G/XZ)
1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD
Kunming Base
bde)
(1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 trg
80th Group Army
bde with JJ-7A; 1 SAM bde)
(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde; 1 mech inf bde, 4 inf bde,
Nanning Base
1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD
(2 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10B/C; 1 FGA
bde)
bde with Su-35; 1 FGA bde with J-7; 1 FGA bde with
Su-30MKK; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 2 trg bde with J-7/ Northern Theatre Navy
JJ-7A; 1 SAM bde) Coastal defence from the DPRK border (Yalu River)
Other Forces to south of Lianyungang (approx 35°10´N), and to
(1 tkr bde with H-6U; 1 CSAR bde)
seaward; HQ at Qingdao; support bases at Lushun,
Other Forces Qingdao.
Marines 4 SSN; 15 SSK; 1 CV; 5 DDGHM; 2 DDGM; 10
(2 mne bde) FFGHM; 2 FFGM; 4 FFG; 8 FSGM; ε18 PCFG/PCG;
ε12 MCMV; ε7 LST/M
Western Theatre Command
Northern Theatre Navy Aviation
Western Theatre Ground Forces 2nd Naval Air Division
76th Group Army (2 EW/ISR/AEW regt with Y-8J/JB/W/X; Y-9JZ; 1 MP/
(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 2 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 hel regt with SH-5; AS365N; Ka-28; SA321; Z-8J/JH;
engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) Z-9C/D)
264 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
PCC 103: 25+ Type-618B-II; 45 Hailin I/II; 1 Shuzao of a Central Commission for Integrated Military and
II; 14 Shuzao III; 9 Zhongeng; 2 Zhongmel; 7 Zhongsui Civilian Development, which seeks to integrate civilian
PB/PBF ε200 technologies, including in the fields of information and
AMPHIBIOUS • LST 2 Yuting I (Type-072-II) (Ex- communications technologies and artificial intelligence,
PLAN; used as hospital vessels and island supply) into the PLA. China is investing heavily in quantum
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 28 technology and announced in September 2017 that it would
AG 7: 5+ Kaobo; 2 Shutu build the largest quantum-research facility in the world
AGB 1 Yanbing (Type-071) (ex-PLAN) to support technology developments that can be used by
AGOR 9: 4 Haijian; 3 Shuguang 04 (ex-PLAN); 2 the armed forces, including codebreaking capabilities and
Xiang Yang Hong 9 covert navigational capacities for submarines.
ATF 11
AIRCRAFT
MP 1+ MA60H
DEPLOYMENT
TPT • Light Y-12 (MP role) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
HELICOPTERS MONUSCO 223; 9 obs; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital
TPT • Light Z-9 DJIBOUTI: 240; 1 mne coy(-); 1 med unit; 2 ZTL-11; 8 ZBL-
Maritime Militia 08; 1 LPD; 1 ESD
Made up of full- and part-time personnel. Reports to GULF OF ADEN: 1 DDGHM; 1 FFGHM; 1 AORH
PLA command and trains to assist PLAN and CCG in LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 418; 2 engr coy; 1 med coy
a variety of military roles. These include ISR, maritime
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 403; 1 sy coy; 1 engr coy; 1 fd
law enforcement, island supply, troop transport and
hospital
supporting sovereignty claims. The Maritime Militia
operates a variety of civilian vessels including fishing MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 5 obs
Asia
boats and oil tankers. SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,040; 5 obs; 1 inf bn; 1
engr coy; 1 fd hospital
Cyber SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 374; 1 engr coy
The PLA has devoted much attention to information warfare
over the past decade, in terms of both battlefield electronic WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 11 obs
warfare (EW) and wider cyber-warfare capabilities. The
main doctrine is the ‘Integrated Network Electronic Fiji FJI
Warfare’ (INEW) document, which guides PLA computer-
network operations. PLA thinking appears to have moved Fijian Dollar F$ 2017 2018 2019
beyond INEW, towards a new concept of ‘information GDP F$ 10.1bn 10.7bn
confrontation’ (xinxi duikang), which aims to integrate
US$ 4.89bn 5.22bn
both electronic and non-electronic aspects of information
per capita US$ 5,528 5,877
warfare within a single command authority. PLA thinking
sees warfare under informationised conditions as Growth % 3.0 3.2
characterised by opposing sides using complete systems of Inflation % 3.4 3.9
ground, naval, air, space and electromagnetic forces. Since Def bdgt F$ 105m 102m
2008, major PLA military exercises have had cyber and US$ 51.0m 49.7m
information-operations components that have been both
US$1=F$ 2.06 2.05
offensive and defensive in nature. The PLA reorganised
in 2015 and established three new support branches Population 926,276
including the Strategic Support Force (SSF). Although Ethnic groups: Fijian 51%; Indian 44%; European/other 5%
precise responsibilities remain unclear, the SSF reportedly
has three sections: the first dealing with intelligence Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
and military operations in cyberspace (defensive and Male 14.0% 4.0% 4.2% 4.0% 21.5% 3.1%
offensive); the second responsible for military space Female 13.4% 3.8% 4.0% 3.8% 20.5% 3.7%
operations (surveillance and satellite); and the third in
charge of defensive and offensive EW and electronic Capabilities
intelligence. In March 2017, China released an International
Strategy for Cooperation in Cyberspace, which stated that The Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) are an infantry-dom-
the PLA will play an ‘important role’ in cyberspace. The inated defence force with a small naval element. The RFMF has
intervened heavily in Fiji’s domestic politics, and between a third
strategy also stated that the country would ‘expedite the
coup in 2006 and 2014, democracy was effectively suspended.
development of a cyber force and enhance capabilities in
The RFMF is constructing a deployable force headquarters, which
terms of situational awareness, cyber defense, supporting will administer all peacekeeping and HADR forces. International
state activities and participating in international peacekeeping operations are an important revenue source for the
cooperation, to prevent major cyber crisis, safeguard government. Fiji’s principal allies are Australia and New Zealand,
cyber security and maintain national security and social with whom the RFMF regularly conducts training and maritime
stability’. In 2017, China also announced the establishment patrols. In 2016, the RFMF announced that it planned to recruit
266 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Asia
SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 1 Arihant with 4
1-cell VLS with K-15 Sagarika SLBM, 6 533mm TT
Territorial Army 160,000 reservists (only 40,000
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
regular establishment)
ALCM • Nuclear Nirbhay (likely nuclear capable; in FORCES BY ROLE
development) MANOEUVRE
Some Indian Air Force assets (such as Mirage 2000H or Su- Light
30MKI) may be tasked with a strategic role 42 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
Space 6 (Railway) engr regt
2 engr regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sigs regt
SATELLITES 12 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
NAVIGATION, POSITONING, TIMING: 7 IRNSS 6 ecological bn
COMMUNICATIONS: 2 GSAT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ISR 3: 1 Cartosat 2C; 2 RISAT
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 3,565+: 122 Arjun; 2,418 T-72M1; 1,025+ T-90S
Army 1,237,000 (ε1,100 various models in store)
6 Regional Comd HQ (Northern, Western, Central, South- RECCE Ferret (used for internal-security duties along
ern, Eastern, Southwestern), 1 Training Comd (ARTRAC) with some indigenously built armd cars)
FORCES BY ROLE IFV 3,100: 700 BMP-1; 2,400 BMP-2 Sarath (incl some
COMMAND BMP-2K CP)
4 (strike) corps HQ APC 336+
10 (holding) corps HQ APC (W) 157+ OT-64
SPECIAL FORCES PPV 179: 165 Casspir; 14+ Yukthirath MPV
8 SF bn ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
MANOEUVRE AEV BMP-2; FV180
Armoured ARV 730+: T-54/T-55; 156 VT-72B; 222 WZT-2; 352 WZT-
3 armd div (2–3 armd bde, 1 arty bde (2 arty regt)) 3
8 indep armd bde VLB AM-50; BLG-60; BLG T-72; Kartik; MTU-20; MT-55;
Mechanised Sarvatra
6 (RAPID) mech inf div (1 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 MW 24 910 MCV-2
arty bde) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
2 indep mech bde MSL
Light SP 110 9P148 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
15 inf div (2–5 inf bde, 1 arty bde) MANPATS 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); Milan 2
1 inf div (forming) RCL 3,000+: 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm 3,000+ M40A1
7 indep inf bde (10 per inf bn)
268 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Asia
PSOH 10: 4 Saryu with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun 2 sqn with MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum
(capacity 1 Dhruv); 6 Sukanya with 4 RBU 2500 A/S mor ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
(capacity 1 SA316 Alouette III (Chetak)) 1 sqn with Ka-28 Helix A
PCFGM 8 1 sqn with Sea King Mk42B
6 Veer (FSU Tarantul) with 4 single lnchr with MARITIME PATROL
P-15M Termit (SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 quad lnchr 2 sqn with BN-2 Islander; Do-228-101; Il-38SD
(manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (SA-N-5 May
Grail), 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
1 sqn with P-8I Neptune
2 Prabal (mod Veer) each with 4 quad lnchr with
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
3M24E Uran-E (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1
1 sqn with Ka-31 Helix B
quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-
SEARCH & RESCUE
2M (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm
1 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); Sea King
gun
Mk42C
PCMT 3 Abhay (FSU Pauk II) with 1 quad lnchr (manual
1 sqn with Dhruv
aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2
TRANSPORT
twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun
1 sqn with HS-748M (HAL-748M)
PCC 15: 4 Bangaram; 10 Car Nicobar; 1 Trinkat (SDB Mk5)
TRAINING
PCF 4 Tarmugli (Car Nicobar mod)
1 sqn with Do-228
PBF 58: 9 Immediate Support Vessel (Rodman 78);
1 sqn with HJT-16 Kiran MkI/II, Hawk Mk132
13 Immediate Support Vessel (Craftway); 15 Plascoa
1 hel sqn with Sea King Mk42B
1300 (SPB); 5 Super Dvora; 16 Solas Marine Interceptor
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
(additional vessels in build)
1 sqn with UH-3H Sea King
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1
MSO 1 Pondicherry (FSU Natya) with 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor ISR UAV
AMPHIBIOUS 1 sqn with Heron; Searcher MkII
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS 1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LPD 1 Jalashwa (ex-US Austin) with 1 Phalanx CIWS AIRCRAFT 75 combat capable
(capacity up to 6 med spt hel; either 9 LCM or 4 FTR 45 MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum
LCM and 2 LCAC; 4 LCVP; 930 troops) ASW 13: 5 Il-38SD May; 8 P-8I Neptune
LANDING SHIPS 8 MP 13 Do-228-101
LSM 3 Kumbhir (FSU Polnocny C) (capacity 5 MBT or 5 TPT 37:
APC; 160 troops) Light 27: 17 BN-2 Islander; 10 Do-228
LST 5: PAX 10 HS-748M (HAL-748M)
2 Magar (capacity 15 MBT or 8 APC or 10 trucks; TRG 29: 6 HJT-16 Kiran MkI; 6 HJT-16 Kiran MkII; 17
500 troops) Hawk Mk132*
3 Magar mod (capacity 11 MBT or 8 APC or 10 HELICOPTERS
trucks; 500 troops) ASW 30: 12 Ka-28 Helix A; 18 Sea King Mk42B
270 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
MRH 58: 10 Dhruv; 25 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); 23 Some units with An-32; Do-228; Hawk Mk 132*; HJT-16
SA319 Alouette III Kiran MkI/II; Jaguar IS/IM; MiG-21bis; MiG-21FL;
AEW 11 Ka-31 Helix B MiG-21M/MF; MiG-27ML; PC-7 Turbo Trainer MkII;
TPT • Medium 11: 5 Sea King Mk42C; up to 6 UH-3H SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)
Sea King ATTACK HELICOPTER
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 2 sqn with Mi-25 Hind; Mi-35 Hind
ISR 10: Heavy 4 Heron; Medium 6 Searcher Mk II TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES 5 sqn with Dhruv
AAM • IR R-550 Magic/Magic 2; R-73 (AA-11 Archer) IR/ 7 sqn with Mi-17/Mi-17-1V Hip H
SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo); ARH: R-77 (AA-12A Adder) 12 sqn with Mi-17V-5 Hip H
AShM AGM-84 Harpoon (on P-8I ac); Kh-35 (AS-20 2 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)
Kayak; on May ac); Sea Eagle (service status unclear) 1 flt with Mi-26 Halo
2 flt with SA315B Lama (Cheetah)
Marines ε1,200 (Additional 1,000 for SPB 2 flt with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)
duties) ISR UAV
After the Mumbai attacks, the Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB), 5 sqn with Heron; Searcher MkII
with 80 PBF, was established to protect critical maritime AIR DEFENCE
infrastructure 25 sqn with S-125 Pechora (SA-3B Goa)
FORCES BY ROLE 6 sqn with 9K33 Osa-AK (SA-8B Gecko)
SPECIAL FORCES 2 sqn with Akash
1 (marine) cdo force 10 flt with 9K38 Igla-1 (SA-18 Grouse)
MANOEUVRE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Amphibious AIRCRAFT 814 combat capable
1 amph bde FTR 62: 55 MiG-29 Fulcrum (incl 12+ MiG-29UPG); 7
MiG-29UB Fulcrum
Air Force 127,200 FGA 534: 114 MiG-21 Bison; 39 MiG-21U/UM Mongol;
5 regional air comds: Western (New Delhi), Southwestern 60 MiG-27ML Flogger; 20 MiG-23UB Flogger; 40 Mirage
(Gandhinagar), Eastern (Shillong), Central (Allahabad), 2000E/I (2000H); 10 Mirage 2000ED/IT (2000TH); 242 Su-
Southern (Trivandrum). 2 support comds: Maintenance 30MKI Flanker; 9 Tejas
(Nagpur) and Training (Bangalore) ATK 115: 28 Jaguar IB; 79 Jaguar IS; 8 Jaguar IM
FORCES BY ROLE ISR 3 Gulfstream IV SRA-4
FIGHTER AEW&C 4: 1 EMB-145AEW Netra (2 more in test); 3
3 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum Il-76TD Phalcon
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK TKR 6 Il-78 Midas
4 sqn with Jaguar IB/IS TPT 242: Heavy 27: 10 C-17A Globemaster III; 17 Il-76MD
6 sqn with MiG-21 Bison Candid; Medium 10 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 141: 57
3 sqn with MiG-27ML/MiG-23UB Flogger An-32; 45 An-32RE Cline; 35 Do-228; 4 EMB-135BJ; PAX
3 sqn with Mirage 2000E/ED/I/IT (2000H/TH – 64: 1 B-707; 4 B-737; 3 B-737BBJ; 56 HS-748
secondary ECM role) TRG 311: 103 Hawk Mk132*; 91 HJT-16 Kiran MkI/IA; 42
11 sqn with Su-30MKI Flanker HJT-16 Kiran MkII; 75 PC-7 Turbo Trainer MkII
ANTI SURFACE WARFARE HELICOPTERS
1 sqn with Jaguar IM ATK 19 Mi-25/Mi-35 Hind
ISR MRH 390: 60 Dhruv; 35 Mi-17 Hip H; 45 Mi-17-1V Hip
1 unit with Gulfstream IV SRA-4 H; 149 Mi-17V-5 Hip H; 59 SA315B Lama (Cheetah); 39
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); 3+ Rudra
1 sqn with Il-76TD Phalcon TPT • Heavy 1+ Mi-26 Halo
TANKER UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
1 sqn with Il-78 Midas ISR • Heavy 9 Heron; Medium some Searcher MkII
TRANSPORT AIR DEFENCE • SAM
1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules Medium-range Akash
1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3B Goa)
5 sqn with An-32/An-32RE Cline Point-defence 9K33 Osa-AK (SA-8B Gecko); 9K38 Igla
1 (comms) sqn with B-737; B-737BBJ; EMB-135BJ
(SA-18 Grouse)
4 sqn with Do-228; HS-748 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1 sqn with Il-76MD Candid AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
1 flt with HS-748 R-550 Magic; IIR Mica IR; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo);
TRAINING SARH Super 530D ARH R-77 (AA-12A Adder); Mica RF
1 OCU sqn with Su-30MKI Flanker AShM AGM-84 Harpoon; AM39 Exocet; Kh-31A (AS-17B
1 sqn (forming) with Tejas Krypton); Sea Eagle†
Asia 271
ASM Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-59 (AS-13 Kingbolt); Kh- Central Industrial Security Force 144,400
59M (AS-18 Kazoo); AS-30; Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry)‡; Popeye II (lightly armed security guards)
(Crystal Maze)
Ministry of Home Affairs. Guards public-sector locations
ARM Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton)
ALCM • Nuclear Nirbhay (likely nuclear capable; in Central Reserve Police Force 313,650
development)
Ministry of Home Affairs. Internal-security duties, only
BOMBS • Laser-guided Paveway II
lightly armed, deployable throughout the country
Coast Guard 12,600 FORCES BY ROLE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MANOEUVRE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 115 Other
PSOH 16: 2 Sankalp (capacity 1 Chetak/Dhruv hel); 4 236 paramilitary bn
Samar with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Chetak/Dhruv hel); 10 (rapid action force) paramilitary bn
6 Samarth; 1 Vikram (capacity 1 Dhruv hel); 3 Vishwast 10 (CoBRA) paramilitary bn
(capacity 1 Dhruv hel) 6 (Mahila) paramilitary bn (female)
PSO 3 Samudra Prahari with 1 hel landing platform 2 sy gp
PCO 1 Vikram with 1 hel landing platform COMBAT SUPPORT
PCC 40: 20 Aadesh; 8 Rajshree; 5 Rani Abbakka; 7 Sarojini 5 sigs bn
Naidu
PBF 55: 6 C-154; 2 C-141; 11 C-143; 39 C-401 Defence Security Corps 31,000
PB 1 Priyadarshini Provides security at Defence Ministry sites
AMPHIBIOUS
UCAC 18: 6 H-181 (Griffon 8000TD); 12 H-187 (Griffon Indo-Tibetan Border Police 89,450
8000TD) Ministry of Home Affairs. Tibetan border security SF/
Asia
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 23 Do-228
guerrilla-warfare and high-altitude-warfare specialists
HELICOPTERS • MRH 21: 4 Dhruv; 17 SA316B Alouette
III (Chetak) FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Paramilitary 1,585,950 Other
56 paramilitary bn
Rashtriya Rifles 65,000
Ministry of Defence. 15 sector HQ National Security Guards 12,000
FORCES BY ROLE Anti-terrorism contingency deployment force, compris-
MANOEUVRE ing elements of the armed forces, CRPF and Border
Other Security Force
65 paramilitary bn
Railway Protection Forces 70,000
Assam Rifles 63,750
Ministry of Home Affairs. Security within northeastern Sashastra Seema Bal 76,350
states, mainly army-officered; better trained than BSF Guards the borders with Nepal and Bhutan
FORCES BY ROLE
Equipped to roughly same standard as an army inf bn Special Frontier Force 10,000
COMMAND Mainly ethnic Tibetans
7 HQ
MANOEUVRE Special Protection Group 3,000
Other Protection of ministers and senior officials
46 paramilitary bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE State Armed Police 450,000
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 252 For duty primarily in home state only, but can be moved
to other states. Some bn with GPMG and army-standard
Border Security Force 257,350 infantry weapons and equipment
Ministry of Home Affairs
FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE
MANOEUVRE
Other
Other
144 (India Reserve Police) paramilitary bn
186 paramilitary bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Reserve Organisations
Small arms, lt arty, some anti-tank weapons
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 942+ Civil Defence 500,000 reservists
AIRCRAFT • TPT some (air spt) Operate in 225 categorised towns in 32 states. Some units
HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 Mi-17V-5 Hip for NBC defence
272 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 79: 42 Leopard 2A4; 37 Leopard 2RI
Army ε300,400 LT TK 350: 275 AMX-13 (partially upgraded); 15 PT-76;
Mil Area Commands (KODAM) 60 Scorpion 90
14 comd (I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, IX, XII, XVI, XVII, XVIII, RECCE 142: 55 Ferret (13 upgraded); 69 Saladin (16
Jaya & Iskandar Muda) upgraded); 18 VBL
FORCES BY ROLE IFV 64: 22 Black Fox; 42 Marder 1A3
MANOEUVRE APC 634+
Mechanised APC (T) 267: 75 AMX-VCI; 34 BTR-50PK; 15 FV4333
3 armd cav bn Stormer; 143 M113A1-B
5 cav bn APC (W) 367+: ε150 Anoa; some Barracuda; 40 BTR-
Light 40; 45 FV603 Saracen (14 upgraded); 100 LAV-150
1 inf bde (1 cav bn, 3 inf bn) Commando; 32 VAB-VTT
3 inf bde (2 cdo bn, 1 inf bn) PPV some Casspir
1 inf bde (1 cdo bn, 2 inf bn) AUV 39: 14 APR-1; 3 Bushmaster; 22 Commando Ranger;
3 inf bde (3 inf bn) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
32 indep inf bn AEV 4: 3 Leopard 2; 1 M113A1-B-GN
16 cdo bn ARV 15+: 2 AMX-13; 6 AMX-VCI; 3 BREM-2; 4 BPz-3
COMBAT SUPPORT Buffel; Stormer; T-54/T-55
12 fd arty bn
VLB 16: 10 AMX-13; 4 Leguan; 2 Stormer
7 cbt engr bn
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Asia
MSL • MANPATS SS.11; Milan; 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3
4 construction bn
AVIATION Sagger)
1 composite avn sqn RCL 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1
HELICOPTER RL 89mm LRAC
1 hel sqn with Bo-105; Bell 205A; Bell 412; AH-64E ARTILLERY 1,198+
Apache Guardian SP 74: 105mm 20 AMX Mk61; 155mm 54: 36 CAESAR;
1 hel sqn Mi-35P Hind; Mi-17V-5 Hip H 18 M109A4
AIR DEFENCE TOWED 133+: 105mm 110+: some KH-178; 60 M101; 50
1 AD regt (2 ADA bn, 1 SAM unit) M-56; 155mm 23: 5 FH-88; 18 KH-179
6 ADA bn MRL 127mm 36 ASTROS II Mk6
3 SAM unit MOR 955: 81mm 800; 120mm 155: 75 Brandt; 80 UBM 52
AMPHIBIOUS • LCU 17: 1 ADRI XXXII; 4 ADRI XXXIII;
Special Forces Command (KOPASSUS)
1 ADRI XXXIX; 1 ADRI XL; 3 ADRI XLI; 2 ADRI XLIV; 2
FORCES BY ROLE
ADRI XLVI; 2 ADRI XLVIII; 1 ADRI L
SPECIAL FORCES
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 9: 1 BN-2A Islander; 6 C-212
3 SF gp (total: 2 cdo/para unit, 1 CT unit, 1 int unit)
Aviocar (NC-212); 2 Turbo Commander 680
Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) HELICOPTERS
FORCES BY ROLE ATK 14: 6 Mi-35P Hind; 8 AH-64E Apache Guardian
COMMAND MRH 40: 6 H125M Fennec; 17 Bell 412 Twin Huey (NB-
3 div HQ 412); 17 Mi-17V-5 Hip H
MANOEUVRE TPT • Light 29: 7 Bell 205A; 20 Bo-105 (NBo-105); 2 H120
Armoured Colibri
2 armd bn TRG 12 Hughes 300C
Mechanised AIR DEFENCE
1 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn) SAM • Point-defence 95+: 2 Kobra (with 125 GROM-2
Light msl); TD-2000B (Giant Bow II); 51 Rapier; 42 RBS-70; QW-3
1 inf bde (3 cdo bn)
GUNS • TOWED 411: 20mm 121 Rh 202; 23mm Giant
1 inf bde (2 cdo bn)
Bow; 40mm 90 L/70; 57mm 200 S-60
1 inf bde (2 inf bn)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
Air Manoeuvre
ASM AGM-114 Hellfire
3 AB bde (3 AB bn)
COMBAT SUPPORT
2 fd arty regt (1 SP arty bn; 2 arty bn) Navy ε65,000 (including Marines and Aviation)
1 arty bn
2 cbt engr bn Three fleets: East (Sorong), Central (Surabaya) and West
AIR DEFENCE (Jakarta). Two Forward Operating Bases at Kupang (West
2 AD bn Timor) and Tahuna (North Sulawesi)
274 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Asia
TOWED 50: 105mm 22 LG1 MK II; 122mm 28 M-38
SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
MRL 122mm 21: 4 PHL-90B; 9 RM-70; 8 RM-70 Vampir
ARH R-77 (AA-12A Adder)
MOR 81mm
ASM AGM-65G Maverick
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • 40mm 5 L/60/L/70; 57mm S-60
ARM Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton)
Air Force 30,100 Special Forces (Paskhasau)
3 operational comd (East, Central and West) plus trg comd FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES
FIGHTER 3 (PASKHASAU) SF wg (total: 6 spec ops sqn)
1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II 4 indep SF coy
1 sqn with F-16A/B/C/D Fighting Falcon EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK AIR DEFENCE
1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon SAM • Point QW-3
1 sqn with Su-27SK/SKM Flanker; Su-30MK/MK2 Flanker GUNS • TOWED 35mm 6 Oerlikon Skyshield
2 sqn with Hawk Mk109*/Mk209*
1 sqn with T-50i Golden Eagle* Paramilitary 280,000+
GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with EMB-314 (A-29) Super Tucano* Police ε280,000 (including 14,000 police
MARITIME PATROL ‘mobile bde’ (BRIMOB) org in 56 coy, incl CT
1 sqn with B-737-200; CN235M-220 MPA unit (Gegana))
TANKER/TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with C-130B/KC-130B Hercules ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
TRANSPORT APC (W) 34 Tactica
1 VIP sqn with B-737-200; C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100- AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 5: 2 Beech 18; 2 C-212 Aviocar
30; F-27-400M Troopship; F-28-1000/3000; AS332L (NC-212); 1 Turbo Commander 680
Super Puma (NAS332L); SA330SM Puma (NAS300SM) HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 22: 3 Bell 206 Jet Ranger;
1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100-30 19 Bo-105 (NBo-105)
1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar (NC-212)
1 sqn with CN235M-110; C295M KPLP (Coast and Seaward Defence
TRAINING Command)
1 sqn with Grob 120TP Responsible to Military Sea Communications Agency
1 sqn with KT-1B EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with SF-260M; SF-260W Warrior PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 31
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER PCO 4: 2 Arda Dedali; 2 Trisula
2 sqn with H225M; AS332L Super Puma (NAS332L); PB 27: 4 Golok (SAR); 5 Kujang; 3 Rantos; 15 (various)
SA330J/L Puma (NAS330J/L); H120 Colibri LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ABU 1 Jadayat
276 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Bakamla (Maritime Security Agency) previously organised into five regional commands. An Amphibi-
ous Rapid Deployment Brigade was also created, tasked mainly
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE with the defence of remote islands. Japan’s alliance with the US
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 remains the cornerstone of its defence policy, reflected by the con-
PSO 1 Tanjung Datu with 1 hel landing platform tinued US basing, the widespread use of US equipment across all
PB 6 Bintang Laut (KCR-40 mod) three services and regular training with US forces. The JSDF trains
regularly, including in US-led international exercises. However,
Reserve Organisations personnel recruitment and retention are an issue in the context
of an ageing population. Due to their defensive mandate, JSDF
Kamra People’s Security ε40,000 deployments are mostly for peacekeeping purposes. The ongoing
Report for 3 weeks’ basic training each year; part-time military-procurement drive has focused for the first time on power
projection, mobility and ISR, with the first domestically produced
police auxiliary.
F-35 combat aircraft rolled out in mid-2017. Japan has expressed a
desire to boost its ballistic-missile-defence capability by purchas-
DEPLOYMENT ing the Aegis Ashore system. Budget documents also note research
on a hypersonic glide body and new anti-ship missiles. Japan has
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 208; 4 an advanced defence-industrial base, which produces modern
obs; 1 engr coy equipment for the JSDF.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
ACTIVE 247,150 (Ground Self-Defense Force
MONUSCO 180; 9 obs; 1 engr coy
150,850 Maritime Self-Defense Force 45,350 Air
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1,295; 1 inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 Self-Defense Force 46,950 Central Staff 4,000)
FSGHM
Paramilitary 14,000
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 9; 1 obs
RESERVE 56,000 (General Reserve Army (GSDF)
PHILIPPINES: IMT 9
46,000 Ready Reserve Army (GSDF) 8,100 Navy 1,100
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2; 3 obs Air 800)
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 800; 4 obs; 1 inf bn
UN • UNISFA 2 obs
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3 obs
Space
Japan JPN EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SATELLITES 11
Japanese Yen ¥ 2017 2018 2019
COMMUNICATIONS 2: 1 Kirameki-1; 1 Kirameki-2
GDP ¥ 547tr 557tr ISR 9 IGS
US$ 4.87tr 5.07tr
per capita US$ 38,449 40,106 Ground Self-Defense Force 150,850
Growth % 1.7 1.1 FORCES BY ROLE
Inflation % 0.5 1.2 COMMAND
5 army HQ (regional comd)
Def bdgt ¥ 5.13tr 5.19tr 5.29tr
SPECIAL FORCES
US$ 45.7bn 47.3bn
1 spec ops unit (bn)
US$1=¥ 112.17 109.85 MANOEUVRE
Population 126,168,156 Armoured
1 (7th) armd div (1 armd recce sqn, 3 tk regt, 1 armd inf
Ethnic groups: Korean <1%
regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 AD regt, 1 cbt engr bn,
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)
Male 6.5% 2.5% 2.6% 2.4% 22.0% 12.4% 1 indep tk bn
Mechanised
Female 6.2% 2.2% 2.3% 2.4% 22.4% 16.0%
1 (2nd) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk regt, 3 inf regt, 1 hel
sqn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 AT coy, 1 ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn,
Capabilities 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)
Japan’s concerns over its regional security environment have 1 (4th) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 inf coy, 1
heightened, as evidenced in its 2018 defence white paper. These hel sqn, 1 fd arty regt, 1 AT coy, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr
principally relate to an emerging security challenge from China bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)
and an established concern over North Korea. This has stimulated
1 (9th) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel
defence-budget increases and defence-policy and legislative
reforms to enable Japan to play a more active international secu-
sqn, 1 fd arty regt, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn,
rity role. While the offensive capacity of the Japan Self-Defense 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)
Force (JSDF) remains weak, the navy has strengths in anti-sub- 2 (5th & 11th) inf bde (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf
marine warfare and air defence. In 2018, a Ground Component regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy,
Command was created to oversee the Ground Self-Defense Force, 1 sigs coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 log bn)
Asia 277
Light ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
2 (1st & 3rd) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel MSL
sqn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 SP 37 Type-96 MPMS
NBC bn, 1 log regt) MANPATS Type-79 Jyu-MAT; Type-87 Chu-MAT;
2 (6th & 10th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel Type-01 LMAT
sqn, 1 fd arty regt, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 RCL • 84mm Carl Gustav
NBC bn, 1 log regt)
ARTILLERY 1,716
1 (8th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM bn, SP 172: 155mm 105 Type-99; 203mm 67 M110A2
1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) TOWED 155mm 340 FH-70
1 (13th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 tk coy, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, MRL 227mm 99 M270 MLRS
1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 MOR 1,105: 81mm 652 L16 120mm 429; SP 120mm 24
sigs coy, 1 log bn) Type-96
1 (14th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 lt armd coy, 2 inf regt, 1 COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 104: 22 Type-12; 82 Type-
hel sqn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs 88
coy, 1 log bn) AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 7 Beech 350 King Air (LR-2)
1 (15th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 AD HELICOPTERS
regt, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) ATK 103: 59 AH-1S Cobra; 11 AH-64D Apache; 33 OH-1
Air Manoeuvre ISR 44 OH-6D
1 (1st) AB bde (3 AB bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs TPT 272: Heavy 69: 24 CH-47D Chinook (CH-47J); 45
coy, 1 log bn) CH-47JA Chinook; Medium 42: 3 H225 Super Puma MkII+
1 (12th) air mob inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, (VIP); 39 UH-60L Black Hawk (UH-60JA); Light 161: 131
1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 Bell 205 (UH-1J); 30 Enstrom 480B (TH-480B)
sigs coy, 1 log bn) AIR DEFENCE
Amphibious SAM
Asia
1 amph bde(-) (1 amph regt) Medium-range 163: 43 Type-03 Chu-SAM; 120 MIM-
COMBAT SUPPORT 23B I-Hawk
1 arty bde (2 SP arty regt; 3 AShM regt) Short-range 5 Type-11 Tan-SAM
1 (Western Army) fd arty regt
Point-defence 159+: 46 Type-81 Tan-SAM; 113 Type-
2 arty unit (1 MRL bn; 1 AShM regt)
93 Kin-SAM; Type-91 Kei-SAM
1 (Central Army) fd arty bn
GUNS • SP 35mm 52 Type-87
4 engr bde
1 engr unit
1 EW bn
Maritime Self-Defense Force 45,350
5 int bn Surface units organised into 4 Escort Flotillas with a mix
1 MP bde of 8 warships each. Bases at Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo,
1 sigs bde Maizuru, Ominato. SSK organised into two flotillas with
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT bases at Kure and Yokosuka
5 log unit (bde) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
5 trg bde SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 20:
HELICOPTER 2 Oyashio (trg role) with 6 single 533mm TT with T-89
1 hel bde (5 tpt hel sqn; 1 VIP tpt hel bn) HWT/UGM-84C Harpoon AShM
5 hel gp (1 atk hel bn, 1 hel bn) 9 Oyashio with 6 single 533mm TT with T-89 HWT/UGM-
AIR DEFENCE 84C Harpoon AShM
2 SAM bde (2 SAM gp) 9 Soryu (AIP fitted) with 6 single 533mm TT with T-89
2 SAM gp HWT/UGM-84C Harpoon AShM
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 49
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVH 4:
MBT 667: 76 Type-10; 250 Type-74; 341 Type-90 2 Hyuga with 1 16-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC/RIM-
ASLT 36 Type-16 MCV 162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46/
RECCE 111 Type-87 Type-97 LWT, 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (normal ac
IFV 68 Type-89 capacity 3 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel; plus additional
APC 795 ac embarkation up to 7 SH-60 Seahawk or 7 MCH-
APC (T) 226 Type-73 101)
APC (W) 569: 204 Type-82; 365 Type-96 2 Izumo with 2 11-cell SeaRAM lnchr with RIM-
AAV 4 AAV-7 116 SAM, 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (normal
AUV 8 Bushmaster ac capacity 7 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel; plus
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES additional ac embarkation up to 5 SH-60 Seahawk/
ARV 70: 4 Type-11; 36 Type-78; 30 Type-90 MCH-101 hel)
VLB 22 Type-91 CRUISERS • CGHM 2:
NBC VEHICLES 57: 41 Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle; 1 Atago with Aegis Baseline 7 C2, 2 quad lnchr with
16 NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle SSM-1B AShM, 1 64-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC A/S
278 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
msl/SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA SAM, 1 FFG 6 Abukuma with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-
32-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC A/S msl/SM-2 Block 84C Harpoon AShM, 2 triple ASTT with Mk 46 LWT,
IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA SAM, 2 triple 324mm 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC, 1 Phalanx CIWS,
ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 1 76mm gun
127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6
1 Atago with Aegis Baseline 9 C2, 2 quad lnchr with PBFG 6 Hayabusa with 4 SSM-1B AShM, 1 76mm gun
SSM-1B AShM, 1 64-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC A/S MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 27
msl/SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA/IB SAM, MCCS 5:
1 32-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC A/S msl/SM-2 Block 1 Ieshima
IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA/IB SAM, 2 triple 324mm 1 Uraga with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (for
ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 MCH-101 hel)
127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) 1 Uraga with 1 hel landing platform (for MCH-101)
DESTROYERS 33 2 Uwajima
DDGHM 27: MSC 19: 3 Hirashima; 12 Sugashima; 1 Uwajima; 3 Enoshima
8 Asagiri with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C MSO 3: 2 Awaji; 1 Yaeyama
Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 lnchr with Sea AMPHIBIOUS
Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 3 Osumi
LWT, 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC, 2 with 2 Phalanx CIWS (capacity for 2 CH-47 hel) (capacity
Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 10 Type-90 MBT; 2 LCAC(L) ACV; 330 troops)
Seahawk ASW hel) LANDING CRAFT 8
4 Akizuki with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B AShM, 1 LCM 2 LCU-2001
32-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC/RIM-162B ESSM LCAC 6 LCAC(L) (capacity either 1 MBT or 60 troops)
SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Type-97 LWT, LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 21
2 Phalanx CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 AGBH 1 Shirase (capacity 2 AW101 Merlin hel)
Seahawk ASW hel) AGEH 1 Asuka with 1 8-cell VLS (wpn trials) (capacity 1
1 Asahi (Akizuki mod) with 2 quad lnchr with SSM- SH-60 Seahawk hel)
1B AShM, 8 4-cell Mk41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM AGOS 2 Hibiki with 1 hel landing platform
SAM/Type-07 A/S msl, 2 triple HOS-303 324mm AGS 3: 1 Futami; 1 Nichinan; 1 Shonan
ASTT with Type-12 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block AOE 5: 2 Mashu (capacity 1 med hel); 3 Towada with 1 hel
1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk landing platform
ASW hel) ARC 1 Muroto
9 Murasame with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B AShM, ASR 2: 1 Chihaya with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Chiyoda
1 16-cell Mk48 VLS with RIM-162C ESSM SAM, 2 II with 1 hel landing platform
triple 324mm TT with Mk46 LWT, 1 16-cell Mk41 AX 6:
VLS with ASROC, 2 Phalanx CIWS, 2 76mm gun 1 Kashima with 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1
(capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) hel landing platform
5 Takanami (improved Murasame) with 2 quad lnchr 1 Kurobe with 1 76mm gun (trg spt ship)
with SSM-1B AShM, 1 32-cell Mk41 VLS with 3 Shimayuki with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon
ASROC/RIM-7M/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 lnchr with RIM-7M Sea
324mm TT with Mk46 LWT, 2 Phalanx CIWS, 1 Sparrow SAM, 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC,
127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2 Phalanx
DDGM 6: CIWS, 1 76mm gun
2 Hatakaze with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM- 1 Tenryu (trg spt ship); with 1 76mm gun (capacity: 1
84C Harpoon AShM, 1 Mk13 GMLS with SM-1 med hel)
MR SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT,
1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC, 2 Phalanx Naval Aviation ε9,800
CIWS, 2 127mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 7 Air Groups
4 Kongou with Aegis Baseline 4/5 C2, 2 quad Mk141 FORCES BY ROLE
lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 29-cell ANTI SUBMARINE/SURFACE WARFARE
Mk41 VLS with SM-2/3 SAM/ASROC, 1 61-cell 5 sqn with SH-60B (SH-60J)/SH-60K Seahawk
Mk41 VLS with SM-2/3 SAM/ASROC, 2 triple MARITIME PATROL
324mm ASTT, 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm 1 sqn with P-1; P-3C Orion
gun 3 sqn with P-3C Orion
FRIGATES 10 ELECTRONIC WARFARE
FFGHM 4 Hatsuyuki with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with 1 sqn with EP-3 Orion
RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 lnchr MINE COUNTERMEASURES
with RIM-7F/M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple ASTT with 1 sqn with MCH-101
Mk46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC, SEARCH & RESCUE
2 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 1 sqn with Shin Meiwa US-1A/US-2
Seahawk ASW hel) (of which 2 in trg role) 2 sqn with UH-60J Black Hawk
Asia 279
Asia
H135 (TH-135)
1 AD gp with Type-81 Tan-SAM; M167 Vulcan
Air Self-Defense Force 46,950 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIR DEFENCE
7 cbt wg
SAM
FORCES BY ROLE Long-range 120 MIM-104D/F Patriot PAC-2 GEM/
FIGHTER PAC-3
7 sqn with F-15J Eagle Point-defence Type-81 Tan-SAM
2 sqn with F-4EJ (F-4E) Phantom II GUNS • TOWED 20mm M167 Vulcan
3 sqn with Mitsubishi F-2
1 sqn (forming) with F-35A Lightning II Paramilitary 14,000
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
2 sqn with Kawasaki EC-1; YS-11E Coast Guard 14,000
ISR Ministry of Land, Transport, Infrastructure and Tourism
1 sqn with RF-4EJ (RF-4E) Phantom II* (no cbt role)
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 367
1 sqn with E-767 PSOH 14: 2 Mizuho (capacity 2 hels); 2 Shikishima
SEARCH & RESCUE (capacity 2 hels); 1 Soya (capacity 1 hel) (icebreaking
1 wg with U-125A Peace Krypton; UH-60J Black Hawk capability); 9 Tsugaru (Soya mod) (capacity 1 hel)
TANKER PSO 43:
1 sqn with KC-767J 3 Hida with 1 hel landing platform
TRANSPORT 1 Izu with 1 hel landing platform
1 (VIP) sqn with B-747-400 9 Hateruma with 1 hel landing platform
2 sqn with C-1; C-2 6 Iwami
1 sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 Kojima (trg) with 1 hel landing platform
Some (liaison) sqn with Gulfstream IV (U-4); T-4* 2 Kunigami with 1 hel landing platform
TRAINING 1 Miura with 1 hel landing platform
1 (aggressor) sqn with F-15J Eagle 6 Ojika with 1 hel landing platform
TEST 14 Taketomi with 1 hel landing platform
1 wg with F-15J Eagle; T-4* PCO 16: 3 Aso; 6 Katori; 7 Teshio
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER PCC 26: 4 Amami; 22 Tokara
4 flt with CH-47JA Chinook PBF 47: 20 Hayagumo; 5 Mihashi; 14 Raizan; 2 Takatsuki;
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 6 Tsuruugi
AIRCRAFT 547 combat capable PB 54: 4 Asogiri; 4 Hamagumo; 11 Hayanami; 12 Katonami;
FTR 189: 147 F-15J Eagle; 42 F-15DJ Eagle 1 Matsunami; 4 Murakumo; 2 Natsugiri; 6 Shimoji; 10
FGA 148: 58 F-2A; 30 F-2B; 51 F-4E Phantom II (F-4EJ); 9 Yodo
F-35A Lightning II (in test) PBI 167: 2 Hakubai; 1 Hayagiku; 164 Himegiku
280 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 16 12 MH-60R Seahawk; 1 tpt hel sqn with MH-60S Knight
ABU 1 Teshio Hawk; 1 base at Sasebo; 1 base at Yokosuka
AGS 12: 6 Hamashio; 1 Jinbei; 2 Meiyo; 1 Shoyo; 1 Takuyo; USAF: 12,50; 1 HQ (5th Air Force) at Okinawa–Kadena
1 Tenyo AB; 1 ftr wg at Misawa AB (2 ftr sqn with 22 F-16C/D
AX 3 Fighting Falcon); 1 ftr wg at Okinawa–Kadena AB (2 ftr
AIRCRAFT sqn with 27 F-15C/D Eagle; 1 FGA sqn with 14 F-22A
MP 2 Falcon 900 MPAT Raptor; 1 tkr sqn with 15 KC-135R Stratotanker; 1 AEW
SAR 4 Saab 340B sqn with 2 E-3B Sentry; 1 CSAR sqn with 10 HH-60G Pave
TPT 25: Light 23: 5 Cessna 172; 9 Beech 350 King Air Hawk); 1 tpt wg at Yokota AB with 10 C-130J-30 Hercules;
(LR-2); 9 DHC Dash-7 (Bombardier 300) (MP); PAX 2 2 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 1 spec ops gp at Okinawa–Kadena
Gulfstream V (MP) AB with (1 sqn with 5 MC-130H Combat Talon; 1 sqn with
HELICOPTERS 5 MC-130J Commando II; 1 unit with 5 CV-22A Osprey);
MRH 5 Bell 412 Twin Huey 1 ISR sqn with RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR UAV flt with 5
SAR 11 S-76D RQ-4A Global Hawk
TPT 36: Medium 8: 3 AS332 Super Puma; 5 H225 Super USMC 18,800; 1 mne div; 1 mne regt HQ; 1 arty regt HQ;
Puma; Light 28: 18 AW139; 3 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; 4 1 recce bn; 1 mne bn; 1 amph aslt bn; 1 arty bn; 2 FGA sqn
Bell 505 Jet Ranger X; 3 S-76C at Iwakuni with 12 F/A-18D Hornet; 1 FGA sqn at Iwakuni
with 12 F-35B Lightning II; 1 tkr sqn at Iwakuni with 15
Cyber KC-130J Hercules; 2 tpt sqn at Futenma with 12 MV-22B
In 2014, an ‘Office of Cyber’ was established in the C4 Osprey
Systems Planning Division, Joint Staff Office (JSO) of the US Strategic Command: 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at
Japan Ministry of Defense to consolidate the cyber-plan- Shariki; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kyogamisaki
ning functions of the JSO and to create a more systematic
structure for responding to cyber attacks. The National
Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond stated
Korea, Democratic People’s
that ‘Japan will build up persistent ISR [intelligence, sur- Republic of DPRK
veillance and reconnaissance] capabilities to prevent any North Korean Won 2017 2018 2019
acts that could impede efficient action by the SDF’. The
GDP US$
2014 Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2014–18) said that the
Self-Defense Forces would develop specialist training for per capita US$
cyber personnel. The document also said that ‘through its Def exp won
efforts to secure response capabilities in cyberspace where US$
attackers have an overwhelming advantage, the SDF may US$1=won
consider the acquisition of capabilities to prevent them
*definitive economic data not available
from using cyberspace’. A Cyber Defense Group, which
integrates the cyber-warfare functions of the three armed Population 25,381,085
services, was launched in March 2014 to respond to cyber
threats. The group monitors defence-ministry and SDF net- Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
works and provides responses to cyber attacks. A revised Male 10.5% 3.8% 4.0% 4.1% 23.0% 3.3%
Cybersecurity Strategy was developed in mid-2018. Female 10.1% 3.7% 3.9% 3.9% 23.5% 6.2%
DEPLOYMENT Capabilities
ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN: Combined Maritime Renewed diplomacy reduced tensions on the Korean Peninsula
in 2018, though the prospect of limiting Pyongyang’s nuclear
Forces • CTF-151: 2 DDGHM
ambitions remains uncertain. Aware of the qualitative inferiority
DJIBOUTI: 170; 2 P-3C Orion of its conventional forces, North Korea has invested in asymmet-
ric capabilities, particularly the development of nuclear weapons
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4
and ballistic-missile delivery systems. Throughout 2017, several
new nuclear-capable road-mobile ballistic-missile designs were
FOREIGN FORCES revealed and successfully tested. North Korea remains diplomati-
cally isolated. While foreign defence cooperation is restricted by
United States international pressure and sanctions, Pyongyang has nonetheless
US Pacific Command: 53,900 often found ways to develop military ties. Official conscription for
Army 2,700; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 avn bn; 1 SAM both men and women is often extended, sometimes indefinitely.
bn Training is focused on fighting a short intensive war on the penin-
Navy 20,250; 1 CVN; 3 CGHM; 2 DDGHM; 8 DDGM (2 sula, but the armed forces’ overall effectiveness in a modern con-
flict against technologically superior opposition is unclear. Internal
non-op); 1 LCC; 4 MCO; 1 LHD; 1 LPD; 2 LSD; 3 FGA sqn
exercises are conducted regularly, but those shown are staged and
with 10 F/A-18E Super Hornet; 1 FGA sqn with 10 F/A-18F are not necessarily representative of wider operational capability.
Super Hornet; 2 ASW aqn with 6 P-8A Poseidon; 1 ASW flt North Korea’s conventional forces remain reliant on increasingly
with 2 P-3C Orion; 2 EW sqn with 5 EA-18G Growler; 1 obsolete equipment, with older Soviet-era and Chinese-origin
AEW&C sqn with 5 E-2D Hawkeye; 2 ASW hel sqn with equipment supplemented by a number of indigenous designs and
Asia 281
upgrades. Overall effectiveness and serviceability of some equip- Special Purpose Forces Command 88,000
ment remains in doubt but there is local maintenance, repair and
overhaul capacity. Local defence-industrial capacity includes the FORCES BY ROLE
manufacture of light arms, armoured vehicles, artillery and missile SPECIAL FORCES
systems. North Korea has exported arms in the past. It is unclear 8 (Reconnaissance General Bureau) SF bn
whether the country would have had the capability to indig- MANOEUVRE
enously develop some of the technical advances it has demon- Reconnaissance
strated, including in rocket propulsion. 17 recce bn
ACTIVE 1,280,000 (Army 1,100,000 Navy 60,000 Light
9 lt inf bde
Air 110,000 Strategic Forces 10,000) Paramilitary
6 sniper bde
189,000
Air Manoeuvre
Conscript liability Army 5–12 years, Navy 5–10 years, Air Force 3–4
years, followed by compulsory part-time service to age 40. There- 3 AB bde
after service in the Worker/Peasant Red Guard to age 60 1 AB bn
2 sniper bde
RESERVE ε600,000 (Armed Forces ε600,000), Amphibious
Paramilitary 5,700,000 2 sniper bde
Reservists are assigned to units (see also Paramilitary)
Reserves 600,000
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Light
Strategic Forces ε10,000
40 inf div
North Korea’s ballistic missiles and obsolete H-5 (Il-
18 inf bde
Asia
28) bombers could be used to deliver nuclear warheads
or bombs. At present, however, there is no conclusive EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (ε)
evidence to verify that North Korea has successfully ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
produced a warhead or bomb capable of being delivered MBT 3,500+ T-34/T-54/T-55/T-62/Type-59/Chonma/Pokpoong
by these systems LT TK 560+: 560 PT-76; M-1985
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (ε) IFV 32 BTR-80A
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS APC 2,500+
ICBM 6+: Hwasong-13/Hwasong-13 mod/Hwasong-14 (in APC (T) BTR-50; Type-531 (Type-63); VTT-323
test); Hwasong-15 (in test) APC (W) 2,500 BTR-40/BTR-60/M-1992/1/BTR-152/M-2010
IRBM Hwasong-12 (in test) (6×6)/M-2010 (8×8)
MRBM ε10 Nodong mod 1/mod 2 (ε90+ msl); some Scud- ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
ER; Bukkeukseong-2 (in test); Hwasong-10 (Musudan) (in MSL
test) SP 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); M-2010 ATGM
SBRM 30+ Hwasong-5 (SS-1C Scud-B)/Hwasong-6 (SS-1D MANPATS 2K15 Shmel (AT-1 Snapper); 9K111 Fagot
Scud-C) (ε200+ msl); some Scud (mod) (in test) (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
RCL 82mm 1,700 B-10
Army ε1,100,000 ARTILLERY 21,100+
FORCES BY ROLE SP/TOWED 8,500:
COMMAND SP 122mm M-1977; M-1981; M-1985; M-1991; 130mm
2 mech corps HQ M-1975; M-1981; M-1991; 152mm M-1974; M-1977;
10 inf corps HQ M-2018; 170mm M-1978; M-1989
1 (Capital Defence) corps HQ TOWED 122mm D-30; D-74; M-1931/37; 130mm M-46;
MANOEUVRE 152mm M-1937; M-1938; M-1943
Armoured GUN/MOR 120mm (reported)
1 armd div MRL 5,100: 107mm Type-63; VTT-323 107mm; 122mm
15 armd bde BM-11; M-1977 (BM-21); M-1985; M-1992; M-1993; VTT-
Mechanised 323 122mm; 200mm BMD-20; 240mm BM-24; M-1985;
4 mech div M-1989; M-1991; 300mm some
Light MOR 7,500: 82mm M-37; 120mm M-43; 160mm M-43
27 inf div SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
14 inf bde SBRM 24 FROG-3/5/7; some Toksa (SS-21B Scarab mod)
COMBAT SUPPORT AIR DEFENCE
1 arty div SAM • Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher);
21 arty bde 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
9 MRL bde GUNS 11,000
5–8 engr river crossing/amphibious regt SP 14.5mm M-1984; 23mm M-1992; 37mm M-1992;
1 engr river crossing bde 57mm M-1985
282 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Asia
Growth % 3.1 2.8
Medium-range 179+: some Pongae-5 (status unknown);
179+ S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) Inflation % 1.9 1.5
Short-range 133 S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa) Def bdgt won 40.6tr 43.2tr 46.7tr
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K36 US$ 35.9bn 39.2bn
Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet) US$1=won 1,130.42 1,100.67
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 Population 51,418,097
(AA-11 Archer); PL-5; PL-7; SARH R-23/24 (AA-7 Apex);
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
R-27R/ER (AA-10 A/C Alamo)
ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry)‡; Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen) Male 6.7% 2.8% 3.6% 3.6% 27.1% 6.2%
Female 6.3% 2.6% 3.2% 3.1% 26.3% 8.3%
Paramilitary 189,000 active
Capabilities
Security Troops 189,000 (incl border guards, South Korea’s defence policy remains focused on its difficult rela-
public-safety personnel) tionship with North Korea, notwithstanding recent diplomatic
Ministry of Public Security re-engagement. Seoul has looked to recapitalise conventional
military capabilities to ensure a qualitative edge over Pyongyang.
Worker/Peasant Red Guard ε5,700,000 It also has prioritised acquiring new capabilities for a three-axis
reservists approach of ‘Kill Chain’, ‘Korea Air and Missile Defence’ and ‘Korea
Org on a province/town/village basis; comd structure is Massive Punishment and Retaliation’. The Defence Reform 2.0
bde–bn–coy–pl; small arms with some mor and AD guns project announced in 2018 sets out ambitions to modernise and
(but many units unarmed) restructure the armed forces, placing emphasis on new technolo-
gies. The established alliance with the US is a major element of
defence strategy, though the planned transfer of wartime opera-
Cyber tional control of forces to Seoul is now ‘conditions based’ with no
Since the 1970s, the North Korean military (the Korean firm date set. A large number of US military personnel and equip-
People’s Army, KPA) maintained a modest electronic ment remained stationed in South Korea; the US THAAD missile-
warfare (EW) capability. As a result of strategic reviews defence system was deployed in 2017 in light of concerns over
following Operation Desert Storm, the KPA established North Korea’s missile capabilities. South Korea’s forces remain
an information-warfare capability under the concept of some of the best equipped and trained in the region. South Korea
‘electronic intelligence warfare’. The two key organisations has demonstrated the capacity to support small international
are the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), which deployments, including contributions to UN missions and counter-
piracy operations in the Arabian Sea. The inventory increasingly
conducts covert operations in peacetime, and the General
comprises modern systems. South Korea has developed a broad
Staff Department (GSD), which is responsible for cyber range of domestic defence industries, which are capable of sup-
operations in support of conventional military efforts. The plying the majority of military requirements. However, there is still
General Staff Department is responsible for operational reliance on the US in areas such as front-line combat aircraft. Local
command and oversees cyber, EW and psychological defence industries are finding growing export success, particularly
operations. This includes the Electronic Warfare Bureau, with the T-50 jet trainer and K-9 self-propelled howitzer.
284 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Navy 70,000 (incl marines) FFG 7 Ulsan with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C
Three separate fleet elements: 1st Fleet Donghae (East Sea/ Harpoon AShM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT with
Sea of Japan); 2nd Fleet Pyeongtaek (West Sea/Yellow Sea); Mk46 LWT, 2 76mm gun
3rd Fleet Busan (South Sea/Korea Strait); independent PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS ε101
CORVETTES • FSG 32:
submarine command; three additional flotillas (incl SF,
18 Gumdoksuri with 2 twin lnchr with Hae Sung I
mine warfare, amphibious and spt elements) and 1 Naval
AShM, 1 76mm gun
Air Wing (3 gp plus spt gp)
8 Po Hang (Flight IV) with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 22 LWT, 2 76mm gun
SSK 16: 6 Po Hang (Flight V) with 2 twin lnchr with Hae Sung
6 Chang Bogo I (GER Type-209/1200; KSS-1) with 8 I AShM, 2 KMk. 32 triple 324mm ASTT with K745
single 533mm TT with SUT HWT/K731 White Shark Blue Shark LWT, 2 76mm gun
HWT PCF 1 Chamsuri II with 1 12-cell 130mm MRL, 1 76mm gun
3 Chang Bogo I (GER Type-209/1200; KSS-1) with 8 PBF ε68 Sea Dolphin
single 533mm TT with SUT HWT/K731 White Shark MINE WARFARE 10
HWT/UGM-84 Harpoon AShM MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9
7 Chang Bogo II (GER Type-214; KSS-2; AIP fitted) with MHO 6 Kan Kyeong
8 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT/K731 White Shark MSO 3 Yang Yang
HWT/Hae Sung I AShM/Hae Sung III LACM MINELAYERS • ML 1 Won San with 2 triple Mk32
SSC 6 Cosmos 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 26 AMPHIBIOUS
CRUISERS • CGHM 3: PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 5
LHD
Asia
3 Sejong (KDD-III) with Aegis Baseline 7 C2, 6 8-cell K-VLS
with Hae Sung II LACM/Red Shark A/S msl, 4 quad 1 Dokdo with 1 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116 SAM, 2
lnchr with Hae Sung I AShM, 10 8-cell Mk41 VLS with Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity 2 LCAC; 10 tanks; 700
SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM (6 fwd, 4 aft), 1 21-cell Mk49 troops; 10 UH-60 hel)
GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm LPD 4:
ASTT with K745 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm 4 Cheonwangbong (LST-II) (capacity 3 LCM; 2 MBT; 8
gun (capacity 2 Lynx Mk99/AW159 Wildcat hels) AFV; 300 troops; 2 med hel)
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 6: LANDING SHIPS • LST 4 Go Jun Bong with 1 hel
6 Chungmugong Yi Sun-Sin (KDD-II) with 2 8-cell landing platform (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)
K-VLS with Hae Sung II LACM/Red Shark A/S msl, LANDING CRAFT 22
2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM/ LCAC 5: 3 Tsaplya (capacity 1 MBT; 130 troops); 2 LSF-II
(capacity 150 troops or 1 MBT & 24 troops)
Hae Sung I AShM, 4 8-cell Mk41 VLS with SM-2 Block
LCM 10 LCM-8
IIIA/B SAM, 1 21-cell Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116
LCT 3 Mulgae II
RAM SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT with Mk46
LCU 4 Mulgae I
LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7
Lynx Mk99/AW159 Wildcat hel)
AG 1 Sunjin (trials spt)
FRIGATES 17
AORH 3 Chun Jee
FFGHM 10:
ARS 1 Cheong Hae Jin
3 Gwanggaeto Daewang (KDD-I) with 2 quad Mk141
ASR 1 Tongyeong
lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 8-cell Mk48 AX 1 MTB
VLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple Mk32
324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2 Goalkeeper CIWS, Naval Aviation
1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk99/AW159 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Wildcat hel) AIRCRAFT 16 combat capable
6 Incheon with 2 quad lnchr with Hae Sung I AShM/ ASW 16: 8 P-3C Orion; 8 P-3CK Orion
TSLM LACM, 1 21-cell Mk49 lnchr with RIM-116 TPT • Light 5 Cessna F406 Caravan II
SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with K745 Blue Shark HELICOPTERS
LWT, 1 Mk15 1B Phalanx CIWS, 1 127 mm gun ASW 31: 11 Lynx Mk99; 12 Lynx Mk99A; 8 AW159 Wildcat
(capacity 1 Lynx Mk99/AW159 Wildcat hel) MRH 3 SA319B Alouette III
1 Daegu (Incheon Batch II) with 2 8-cell K-VLS with TPT 15: Medium 8 UH-60P Black Hawk Light 7 Bell 205
Hae Sung II LACM/TSLM LACM/K-SAAM SAM/ (UH-1H Iroquois)
Red Shark A/S msl, 2 quad lnchr with TSLM LACM/
Hae Sung I AShM, 2 KMk. 32 triple 324mm ASTT Marines 29,000
with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block FORCES BY ROLE
1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk99/ SPECIAL FORCES
AW159 Wildcat hel) 1 SF regt
286 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
HELICOPTERS
MRH 7: 5 AS565MB Panther; 1 AW139; 1 Bell 412SP Laos LAO
SAR 1 S-92
New Lao Kip 2017 2018 2019
TPT • Medium 8 Ka-32 Helix C
GDP kip 140tr 152tr
Cyber US$ 17.0bn 18.2bn
Defense Cyber Command was established in the Ministry per capita US$ 2,541 2,690
of National Defense in February 2015, but reports in 2018 Growth % 6.9 6.8
indicated that it would be renamed as the Cyber Operations
Inflation % 0.8 0.9
Command in light of the mid-2018 Defense Reform 2.0
initiative, and the findings of a Defense Cybersecurity Def exp kip n.k. n.k.
Development Plan. The group will no longer be concerned US$ n.k. n.k.
with ‘cyber psychological operations’, reports said. A US$1=kip 8245.79 8324.69
Korea–US National Cyber Defense Cooperation Working
Group shares information and enhances cooperation Population 7,234,171
including over policy, strategy, doctrine and training. Ethnic groups: Lao 55%; Khmou 11%; Hmong 8%
There are also trilateral meetings with Japan and the US
on cyber issues. In 2015, a unit responsible for overseeing
cyber operations was established within the Joint Chiefs Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
of Staff (JCS). The renamed Cyber Operations Command Male 16.3% 5.5% 4.9% 4.6% 16.5% 1.8%
will reportedly be under the control of the chairman of the Female 15.9% 5.5% 5.0% 4.7% 17.1% 2.2%
JCS, with the JCS in charge of ‘operational plans to cope
with cyberattacks’. The defence ministry is preparing a Capabilities
National Defense Cybersecurity Strategy, and announced
Asia
in April 2017 that it would allocate US$218 million for The Lao People’s Armed Forces (LAPF) have considerable military
cyber capabilities in 2018–22. experience from the Second Indo-China War and the 1988 border
war with Thailand. They are closely linked to the ruling Communist
Party and their primary role is internal security. A lack of financial
DEPLOYMENT resources has limited defence spending and military procurement
for two decades. Contacts continue with the Chinese and Viet-
ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN: Combined Maritime
namese armed forces, while there is strong defence cooperation
Forces • CTF-151: 1 DDGHM with Russia. Laos also participates in ADMM–Plus military exer-
INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 7 obs cises, and in 2014–15 was co-chair with Japan of the ADMM–Plus
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 335; 1 mech inf coy; 1 engr coy; expert working group on HADR. Training support is provided by
friendly countries such as Russia and Vietnam. The LAPF have par-
1 sigs coy; 1 maint coy
ticipated in regional exercises with neighbouring countries but
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 273; 2 obs; 1 engr coy have made no international deployments and have little capac-
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 2 ity for sustained operations. In 2017, Russia and Laos signed a
military-technical agreement to strengthen existing armaments
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 139 (trg activities at UAE Spec
cooperation. Laos still operates Soviet-era military equipment, and
Ops School) relies on Russian technical assistance. The country lacks a tradi-
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4 obs tional defence industrial base and maintenance capacity is limited,
reflected in a support contract for a Russian firm to maintain the air
force’s Mi-17 helicopters.
FOREIGN FORCES
Sweden NNSC: 5 obs ACTIVE 29,100 (Army 25,600 Air 3,500) Paramilitary
Switzerland NNSC: 5 obs 100,000
United States US Pacific Command: 28,500 Conscript liability 18 months minimum
Army 19,200; 1 HQ (8th Army) at Yongsan; 1 div HQ
at Ujieongbu; 1 armd bde with M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
M2A2/M3A3 Bradley; M109A6; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde with
AH-64 Apache; CH-47 Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk; 1
Space
MRL bde with M270A1 MLRS; 1 AD bde with MIM-104
Patriot/FIM-92A Avenger; 1 SAM bty with THAAD; 1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
(APS) armd bde eqpt set SATELLITES • ISR 1 LaoSat-1
Navy 250
USAF 8,800; 1 HQ (7th Air Force) at Osan AB; 1 ftr wg at Army 25,600
Kunsan AB (2 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon); FORCES BY ROLE
1 ftr wg at Osan AB (1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting 4 mil regions
Falcon, 1 atk sqn with 24 A-10C Thunderbolt II); 1 ISR sqn MANOEUVRE
at Osan AB with U-2S Armoured
USMC 250 1 armd bn
288 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Light
5 inf div Malaysia MYS
7 indep inf regt
Malaysian Ringgit RM 2017 2018 2019
65 indep inf coy
COMBAT SUPPORT GDP RM 1.35tr 1.42tr
5 arty bn US$ 312bn 347bn
1 engr regt per capita US$ 9,755 10,704
2 (construction) engr regt
Growth % 5.9 4.7
AIR DEFENCE
9 ADA bn Inflation % 3.8 1.0
Asia
Light
HELICOPTER 16 inf regt (3 inf bn)
1 hel sqn Other
1 tpt sqn with S-61A-4 Nuri (forming) 5 (highway) sy bn
AIR DEFENCE COMBAT SUPPORT
3 ADA regt 5 arty bty
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 2 fd engr regt
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 1 int unit
MBT 48 PT-91M Twardy 3 sigs sqn
LT TK 21 Scorpion-90 COMBAT SUPPORT
RECCE 214: 130 AML-60/90; 74 SIBMAS (some†); 10 VBL 4 med coy
IFV 136: 31 ACV300 Adnan (25mm Bushmaster); 13 5 tpt coy
ACV300 Adnan AGL; 46 AV8 Gempita IFV25; 46 AV8
Gempita IFV30 (incl 10 with Ingwe ATGM) Navy 18,000
APC 832 3 Regional Commands: Kuantan (East Coast), Kinabalu
APC (T) 265: 149 ACV300 Adnan (incl 69 variants); (Borneo) and Langkawi (West Coast)
13 FV4333 Stormer (upgraded); 63 K200A; 40 K200A1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC (W) 538: 32 Anoa; 26 AV8 Gempita APC (incl 13
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2 Tunku Abdul
CP; 3 sigs); 300 Condor (incl variants); 150 LAV-150
Rahman (FRA Scorpène) with 6 single 533mm TT with
Commando; 30 M3 Panhard
PPV 29: 9 IAG Guardian; 20 Lipanbara WASS Black Shark HWT/SM39 Exocet AShM
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10
AEV 3 MID-M FRIGATES 10
ARV 47+: Condor; 15 ACV300; 4 K288A1; 22 SIBMAS; 6 FFGHM 2:
WZT-4 2 Lekiu with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block
VLB 5+: Leguan; 5 PMCz-90 2 AShM, 1 16-cell VLS with Sea Wolf SAM, 2 B515
NBC VEHICLES K216A1 ILAS-3 triple 324mm ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
• MSL 57mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx hel)
SP 8 ACV300 Baktar Shikan FFG 2:
MANPATS 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115-2 2 Kasturi with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block
Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); Eryx; Baktar Shihan (HJ-8); 2 AShM, 2 B515 ILAS-3 triple 324mm ASTT with
SS.11 A244/S LWT, 1 100mm gun, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel
RCL 260: 84mm 236 Carl Gustav; 106mm 24 M40 landing platform
ARTILLERY 424 FF 6:
TOWED 134: 105mm 100 Model 56 pack howitzer; 6 Kedah (GER MEKO) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel
155mm 34: 12 FH-70; 22 G-5 landing platform (fitted for MM40 Exocet AShM
MRL 36 ASTROS II (equipped with 127mm SS-30) & RAM CIWS)
290 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Mongolia MNG
RECCE 192: ε100 S52 Shorland; 92 FV701 Ferret (60 mod)
Mongolian Tugrik t 2017 2018 2019
APC • APC (W) 140 AT105 Saxon
AUV ε30 SB-301 GDP t 27.2tr 31.2tr
US$ 11.1bn 12.7bn
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency per capita US$ 3,640 4,098
(MMEA) ε4,500 Growth % 5.1 6.2
Controls 5 Maritime Regions (Northern Peninsula; Inflation % 4.6 7.6
Southern Peninsula; Eastern Peninsula; Sarawak;
Def bdgt t 207bn 257bn 261bn
Sabah), subdivided into a further 18 Maritime Districts.
US$ 84.8m 105m
Supported by one provisional MMEA Air Unit
FMA (US) US$ 2.6m 0m
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$1=t 2439.79 2452.15
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 130
PSO 4: 1 Arau (ex-JPN Nojima) with 1 hel landing platform; Population 3,103,428
2 Langkawi with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform; 1 Ethnic groups: Khalkh 81.9%; Kazakh 3.8%; Dorvod 2.7%; other or
Pekan (ex-JPN Ojika) with 1 hel landing platform unspecified 11.6%
PCC 3 Bagan Datuk
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
PBF 57: 18 Penggalang 17 (TUR MRTP 16); 2 Penggalang
18; 6 Penyelamat 20; 16 Penggalang 16; 15 Tugau Male 13.8% 3.8% 4.1% 4.9% 20.5% 1.8%
PB 66: 15 Gagah; 4 Malawali; 2 Nusa; 3 Nusa 28; 1 Female 13.2% 3.7% 4.0% 5.0% 22.5% 2.6%
Peninjau; 7 Ramunia; 2 Rhu; 4 Semilang; 6 Sipadan (ex-
Capabilities
Asia
Kris/Sabah); 8 Icarus 1650; 10 Pengawal; 4 Penyelamat; 2
Perwira; 1 Sugut Mongolia’s latest defence-policy document, from 2015, stresses
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 Marlin the importance of peacekeeping and anti-terrorist capabili-
AIRCRAFT • MP 2 Bombardier 415MP ties. The country has no formal military alliances, but pursues
HELICOPTERS defence ties and bilateral training with multiple regional powers
SAR 3 AW139 and others including India, Turkey and the US. Mongolia is also
seeking to develop its security relationship with China. Mongo-
MRH 3 AS365 Dauphin
lia hosts the annual Khaan Quest multinational peacekeeping-
training exercises. The country’s main exercise partners are India
Area Security Units 3,500 reservists
and Russia, with each country running regular bilateral exercises.
(Auxiliary General Ops Force)
Mongolia’s most significant deployments are to the UN peace-
FORCES BY ROLE keeping mission in South Sudan and Afghanistan. The armed
MANOEUVRE forces remain reliant on Soviet-era equipment, although this
Other has been supplemented by deliveries of second-hand Russian
89 paramilitary unit weapons. Barring maintenance facilities, there is no significant
defence-industrial base, and Mongolia relies on imports from
Border Scouts 1,200 reservists Russia to equip its armed forces.
in Sabah, Sarawak ACTIVE 9,700 (Army 8,900 Air 800) Paramilitary
People’s Volunteer Corps 240,000 reservists 7,500
Conscript liability 12 months for males aged 18–25
(some 17,500 armed)
RELA RESERVE 137,000 (Army 137,000)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Myanmar MMR
MBT 420: 370 T-54/T-55; 50 T-72A
Myanmar Kyat K 2017 2018 2019
RECCE 120 BRDM-2
IFV 310 BMP-1 GDP K 91.3tr 97.7tr
APC • APC (W) 210: 150 BTR-60; 40 BTR-70M; 20 BTR- US$ 67.3bn 71.5bn
80 per capita US$ 1,278 1,354
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Growth % 6.8 6.4
ARV T-54/T-55
Inflation % 4.0 6.0
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Def bdgt K 2.92tr 2.66tr
GUNS • TOWED 200: 85mm D-44/D-48; 100mm
M-1944/MT-12 US$ 2.15bn 1.95bn
ARTILLERY 570 US$1=K 1356.68 1365.23
TOWED ε300: 122mm D-30/M-30 (M-1938); 130mm Population 55,622,506
M-46; 152mm ML-20 (M-1937)
Ethnic groups: Burman 68%; Shan 9%; Karen 7%; Rakhine 4%;
MRL 122mm 130 BM-21 Chinese 3+%; Other Chin, Kachin, Kayan, Lahu, Mon, Palaung, Pao,
MOR 140: 120mm; 160mm; 82mm Wa, 9%
AIR DEFENCE
SAM Medium-range 2+ S-125 Pechora-2M (SA-26) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2 Male 13.6% 4.4% 4.4% 4.0% 20.4% 2.5%
Female 13.0% 4.3% 4,4% 4.2% 21.6% 3.2%
Air Force 800
FORCES BY ROLE Capabilities
TRANSPORT Since the country’s independence struggle in the 1940s, Myan-
1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl mar’s large, army-dominated Tatmadaw (armed forces) has been
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER intimately involved in domestic politics. Even though the National
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-171 League for Democracy (NLD) won the November 2015 election,
AIR DEFENCE the armed forces remain politically powerful. A defence white
paper published in 2016 placed as a key priority ending conflicts
2 regt with S-60/ZPU-4/ZU-23
with domestic armed groups. It also gives a ‘state-building’ role to
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE the Tatmadaw, legitimising continued intervention in the coun-
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 2 An-24 Coke; 1 An-26 Curl try’s politics. In its counter-insurgency operations, the Tatmadaw
HELICOPTERS has been accused by international organisations of human-rights
TPT • Medium 12: 10 Mi-8 Hip; 2 Mi-171 abuses, and concerns have increased after military actions against
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 150: 14.5mm ZPU-4; the Rohingya minority in 2017. China and Russia are key defence-
23mm ZU-23; 57mm S-60 cooperation partners, including bilateral military exercises and
the provision of weapons. In 2016, Myanmar and Russia signed a
Paramilitary 7,500 active broad cooperation agreement including military training. Due to
long-running domestic conflicts, the Tatmadaw has experience
Border Guard 1,300; 4,700 conscript (total with counter-insurgency operations and jungle warfare. Although
there have been small deployments to UN missions, the Tatmadaw
6,000)
remains essentially an internally focused force. Since the 1990s, the
Internal Security Troops 400; 800 conscript armed forces have attempted to develop limited conventional-
warfare capabilities, and have brought into service new armoured
(total 1,200) vehicles, air-defence weapons, artillery, combat aircraft and ships
FORCES BY ROLE procured mainly from China and Russia. There is limited defence-
MANOEUVRE industrial capacity. The Aircraft Production and Maintenance Base
Other has assembled Chinese K-8 trainer aircraft and Myanmar allegedly
4 gd unit aims to negotiate license-production for the Chinese JF-17 combat
aircraft. Myanmar also has growing shipbuilding capabilities,
Construction Troops 300 notably through the Naval Dockyard in Yangon, which launched
patrol and utility vessels in 2018.
Asia
69-II Sardine) AShM; 1 FAC(M) mod with 2 twin lnchr with
LT TK 105 Type-63 (ε60 serviceable) C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS
ASLT 24 PTL-02 mod PCO 2 Indaw
RECCE 87+: 12+ EE-9 Cascavel; 45 Ferret; 30 Mazda; MAV- PCC 11: 2 Admirable (ex-US); 9 Hainan with 4 RBU 1200
1 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun
IFV 10+ BTR-3U PBG 4 Myanmar with 2 single lnchr with C-801 (CH-
APC 431+ SS-N-4 Sardine) AShM
APC (T) 331: 26 MT-LB; 250 Type-85; 55 Type-90 PBF 3: 1 Type-201; 2 Super Dvora Mk III
APC (W) 90+: 20 Hino; 40 Humber Pig; 30+ Type-92 PB 32: 3 PB-90; 6 PGM 401; 6 PGM 412; 14 Myanmar; 3 Swift
PPV 10 MPV PBR 14: 4 Sagu; 9 Y-301†; 1 Y-301 (Imp)
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 15
ARV Type-72 LCU 5; LCM 10
VLB MT-55A LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE ABU 1
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm M40A1 AGHS 2: 1 Innya; 1 (near shore)
GUNS • TOWED 60: 57mm 6-pdr; 76mm 17-pdr AGS 1
AH 2
ARTILLERY 422+
AK 1
SP 155mm 42: 30 NORA B-52; 12 SH-1
AKSL 5
TOWED 264+: 105mm 132: 36 M-56; 96 M101; 122mm
AP 1 Chindwin
100 D-30; 130mm 16 M-46; 140mm; 155mm 16 Soltam
M-845P Naval Infantry 800
MRL 36+: 107mm 30 Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad FORCES BY ROLE
(reported); Type-81; 240mm 6+ M-1985 mod MANOEUVRE
MOR 80+: 82mm Type-53 (M-37); 120mm 80+: 80 Soltam; Light
Type-53 (M-1943) 1 inf bn
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
SRBM • Conventional some Hwasong-6 (reported) Air Force ε15,000
AIR DEFENCE FORCES BY ROLE
SAM FIGHTER
Medium-range 4+: 4 KS-1A (HQ-12); S-125 Pechora-2M 4 sqn with F-7 Airguard; FT-7; MiG-29B Fulcrum; MiG-
(SA-26); 2K12 Kvadrat-M (SA-6 Gainful) 29SM Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum
Point-defence Some 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 Grison); GROUND ATTACK
HN-5 Hong Nu/Red Cherry (reported); 9K310 Igla-1 2 sqn with A-5M Fantan
(SA-16 Gimlet) TRANSPORT
GUNS 46
SP 57mm 12 Type-80 1 sqn with An-12 Cub; F-27 Friendship; FH-227; PC-6A/B
TOWED 34: 37mm 24 Type-74; 40mm 10 M1 Turbo Porter
294 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
TRAINING Capabilities
2 sqn with G-4 Super Galeb*; PC-7 Turbo Trainer*; PC-9*
1 (trg/liaison) sqn with Cessna 550 Citation II; Cessna The principal role of Nepal’s armed forces is maintaining territorial
integrity, but they have also traditionally focused on internal secu-
180 Skywagon; K-8 Karakorum*
rity and humanitarian relief. Nepal has a policy of providing con-
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER tingents to UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and
4 sqn with Bell 205; Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-35P Africa. Training support is provided by several countries, includ-
Hind; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; PZL W-3 Sokol; SA316 Alouette III ing China, India and the US. Following a 2006 peace accord with
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE the Maoist People’s Liberation Army, Maoist personnel underwent
AIRCRAFT 153 combat capable a process of demobilisation or integration into the armed forces.
Gurkhas continue to be recruited by the British and Indian armed
FTR 63: 21 F-7 Airguard; 10 FT-7; 11 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 6
forces and the Singaporean police. The small air wing provides a
MiG-29SE Fulcrum; 10 MiG-29SM Fulcrum; 5 MiG-29UB limited transport and support capacity but mobility remains a
Fulcrum challenge, in part because of the country’s topography. This deficit
FGA 6 JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Block 2) was highlighted by Nepal’s dependence on foreign-military logisti-
ATK 22 A-5M Fantan cal and medical assistance following the earthquake in April 2015.
TPT 20: Medium 5: 4 Y-8D; 1 Y-8F-200W Light 16: 3 Beech This dependence remains. Nepal’s logistic capability appears to
1900D; 4 Cessna 180 Skywagon; 1 Cessna 550 Citation II; 3 be sufficient for internal-security operations, including counter-
F-27 Friendship; 5 PC-6A/B Turbo Porter; PAX 1+ FH-227 ing IEDs, however its contingents on UN peacekeeping opera-
tions appear to largely depend on contracted logistic support.
TRG 82: 11 G-4 Super Galeb*; 20 Grob G120; 24+ K-8
Modernisation plans include a very limited increase in the size of
Karakorum*; 12 PC-7 Turbo Trainer*; 9 PC-9*; 6 Yak-130 its air force. Barring maintenance capacities there is no defence-
Mitten* industrial base, and Nepal is dependent on foreign suppliers for
HELICOPTERS modern equipment.
ATK 10 Mi-35P Hind
MRH 23: 3 AS365; 11 Mi-17 Hip H; 9 SA316 Alouette III ACTIVE 96,600 (Army 96,600) Paramilitary 15,000
TPT 45: Medium 10 PZL W-3 Sokol; Light 35: 12 Bell 205;
6 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 17 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
CISR • Heavy 4 CH-3 Army 96,600
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR PL-5; R-73 FORCES BY ROLE
(AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo) COMMAND
6 inf div HQ
Paramilitary 107,000 1 (valley) comd
SPECIAL FORCES
People’s Police Force 72,000 1 bde (1 SF bn, 1 AB bn, 1 cdo bn, 1 ranger bn, 1 mech
People’s Militia 35,000 inf bn)
MANOEUVRE
Light
DEPLOYMENT 16 inf bde (total: 62 inf bn; 32 indep inf coy)
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1; 1 obs COMBAT SUPPORT
4 arty regt
5 engr bn
Nepal NPL AIR DEFENCE
2 AD regt
Nepalese Rupee NR 2017 2018 2019
4 indep AD coy
GDP NR 2.64tr 3.01tr
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 24.9bn 28.8bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
per capita US$ 848 971 RECCE 40 Ferret
Growth % 7.9 6.3 APC 253
Inflation % 4.5 4.2
APC (W) 13: 8 OT-64C; 5 WZ-551
PPV 240: 90 Casspir; 150 MPV
Def bdgt NR 35.7bn 45.0bn 44.9bn
ARTILLERY 92+
US$ 336m 431m TOWED 105mm 22: 8 L118 Light Gun; 14 pack howitzer
FMA (US) US$ 1.7m 0m (6 non-operational)
US$1=NR 106.21 104.37 MOR 70+: 81mm; 120mm 70 M-43 (est 12 op)
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 32+: 14.5mm 30 Type-
Population 29,717,587 56 (ZPU-4); 37mm (PRC); 40mm 2 L/60
Religious groups: Hindu 90%; Buddhist 5%; Muslim 3%
Air Wing 320
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
Male 15.4% 5.5% 5.4% 4.2% 15.7% 2.6% AIRCRAFT • TPT 2: Light 2: 1 BN-2T Islander; 1 M-28
Female 14.1% 5.2% 5.4% 4.8% 18.9% 2.7% Skytruck
Asia 295
Asia
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 4 obs ACTIVE 9,000 (Army 4,500 Navy 2,050 Air 2,450)
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,745; 13 obs; 2 inf bn RESERVE 2,300 (Army 1,650 Navy 450 Air Force 200)
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 359; 7 obs; 2 inf coy; UN •
UNISFA 5; 1 obs ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 333; 2 mech inf coy
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 5 obs
Army 4,500
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
FOREIGN FORCES 1 SF regt
United Kingdom 60 (Gurkha trg org) MANOEUVRE
Light
New Zealand NZL 1 inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 2 lt inf bn, 1 arty regt (2 arty
bty), 1 engr regt(-), 1 MP coy, 1 sigs regt, 2 log bn, 1
New Zealand Dollar NZ$ 2017 2018 2019 med bn)
GDP NZ$ 283bn 296bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
US$ 201bn 206bn
IFV 93 NZLAV-25
per capita US$ 41,572 41,616
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Growth % 3.0 3.1 AEV 7 NZLAV
Inflation % 1.9 1.4 ARV 3 LAV-R
Def bdgt NZ$ 3.31bn 3.40bn 3.75bn ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
US$ 2.35bn 2.37bn MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav
US$1=NZ$ 1.41 1.44
ARTILLERY 60
Population 4,545,627 TOWED 105mm 24 L118 Light Gun
MOR 81mm 36
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 10.1% 3.3% 3.4% 3.4% 22.3% 7.2% Reserves
Female 9.6% 3.2% 3.2% 3.4% 22.5% 8.4% Territorial Force 1,650 reservists
Responsible for providing trained individuals for
Capabilities augmenting deployed forces
New Zealand has a strong military tradition. The New Zealand FORCES BY ROLE
Defence Force (NZDF) is well trained and has operational COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
experience. The June 2016 defence white paper foresaw a range 3 (Territorial Force Regional) trg regt
296 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Navy 2,050
Fleet based in Auckland. Fleet HQ at Wellington
Pakistan PAK
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Pakistani Rupee Rs 2017 2018 2019
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES • GDP Rs 32.0tr 34.4tr
FFHM 2: US$ 305bn 307bn
2 Anzac (GER MEKO 200) with 1 octuple Mk41 VLS per capita US$ 1,546 1,527
with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm Growth % 5.4 5.8
TT with Mk46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk15 Phalanx Block Inflation % 4.1 3.9
1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) Super
Def bdgt [a] Rs 1.02tr 1.26tr 1.36tr
Seasprite ASW hel)
US$ 9.75bn 11.2bn
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6
FMA (US) US$ 242m 100m
PSOH 2 Otago (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite ASW
US$1=Rs 104.81 112.08
hel) (ice-strengthened hull)
[a] Includes defence allocations to the Public Sector
PCC 4 Lake
Development Programme (PSDP), including funding to the
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 2 Defence Division and the Defence Production Division
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • 1
Population 207,862,518
AKRH 1 Canterbury (capacity 4 NH90 tpt hel; 1 SH-
Religious groups: Hindu less than 3%
2G(I) Super Seasprite ASW hel; 2 LCM; 16 NZLAV; 14
NZLAV; 20 trucks; 250 troops) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 15.8% 5.5% 5.3% 4.9% 17.7% 2.1%
Air Force 2,450 Female 15.0% 5.1% 5.0% 4.6% 16.6% 2.4%
FORCES BY ROLE
MARITIME PATROL Capabilities
1 sqn with P-3K2 Orion The armed forces have considerable domestic political influence,
TRANSPORT including a strong voice on security policy. Pakistan’s nuclear and
1 sqn with B-757-200 (upgraded); C-130H Hercules conventional forces have traditionally been oriented and struc-
(upgraded) tured against a prospective threat from India. Since 2008, however,
counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism have been of increasing
ANTI-SUBMARINE/SURFACE WARFARE importance and are now the forces’ main effort. While an army-
1 (RNZAF/RNZN) sqn with SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite led counter-terrorism operation has improved domestic security,
TRAINING terrorist attacks continue. The armed forces have a major role in
1 sqn with T-6C Texan II disaster relief and are well practised in such operations. China is
Pakistan’s main defence partner, with all three services employing
1 sqn with Beech 200 King Air (leased)
a large amount of Chinese equipment. Military cooperation with
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER the US is limited by sanctions aiming to improve cooperation on
1 sqn with AW109; NH90 counter-terrorism. Recruitment is good, retention is high and the
forces are well trained. The army and air force have considerable
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
operational experience from a decade of counter-insurgency
AIRCRAFT 6 combat capable operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Major investment in military
ASW 6 P-3K2 Orion nuclear programmes continue, including the commissioning of a
TPT 11: Medium 5 C-130H Hercules (upgraded); Light 4 VLF submarine-communications facility and the continued devel-
Beech 200 King Air (leased); PAX 2 B-757-200 (upgraded) opment of a submarine-launched cruise missile. The air force is
modernising its inventory while improving its precision-strike
TRG 11 T-6C Texan II
and ISR capabilities. Recent and likely future naval investment in
HELICOPTERS Chinese-supplied frigates, missile craft and submarines would
ASW 8 SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite improve sea-denial capabilities. The indigenous defence industry
TPT 13: Medium 8 NH90; Light 5 AW109 exports defence equipment, weapons and ammunition. There is
considerable defence-industrial collaboration with China, notably
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AGM-119 Penguin
through the co-development of the JF-17 combat aircraft.
Mk2 mod7
ACTIVE 653,800 (Army 560,000 Navy 23,800 Air
DEPLOYMENT 70,000) Paramilitary 282,000
The SPD also commands a reportedly 25,000-strong APC (W) 120 BTR-70/BTR-80
military security force responsible for guarding military PPV 225 Maxxpro
nuclear infrastructure AUV 10 Dingo 2
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE
VEHICLES
Army Strategic Forces Command 12,000– ARV 117+: 65 Type-653; Al-Hadeed; 52 M88A1; T-54/T-55
15,000 VLB M47M; M48/60
Commands all land-based strategic nuclear forces
MW Aardvark Mk II
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 60+ MSL
MRBM • Nuclear ε30 Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-5)/ SP M901 TOW
Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6 – in test); Shaheen-3 (in test)
MANPATS HJ-8; TOW
SRBM • Nuclear 30+: ε30 Ghaznavi (Hatf-3 – PRC
RCL 75mm Type-52; 106mm M40A1
RL 89mm M20
M-11)/Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4); some Abdali (Hatf-2); some
GUNS 85mm 200 Type-56 (D-44)
Nasr (Hatf-9)
GLCM • Nuclear Babur (Hatf-7); Ra’ad (Hatf-8 – in test) ARTILLERY 4,472+
SP 375: 155mm 315: 200 M109A2; ε115 M109A5 203mm
Air Force 60 M110/M110A2
1–2 sqn of F-16A/B or Mirage 5 may be assigned a TOWED 1,659: 105mm 329: 216 M101; 113 M-56; 122mm
nuclear-strike role 570: 80 D-30 (PRC); 490 Type-54 (M-1938); 130mm 410
Type-59-I; 155mm 322: 144 M114; 148 M198; ε30 Panter;
Army 560,000
203mm 28 M115
FORCES BY ROLE MRL 88+: 107mm Type-81; 122mm 52+: 52 Azar (Type-
COMMAND 83); some KRL-122; 300mm 36 A100
9 corps HQ MOR 2,350+: 81mm; 120mm AM-50
Asia
1 (area) comd SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
SPECIAL FORCES MRBM • Nuclear ε30 Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-5); some
2 SF gp (total: 4 SF bn)
Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6 – in test); Shaheen-3 (in test)
MANOEUVRE
SRBM 135+: Nuclear 30+: ε30 Ghaznavi (Hatf-3 – PRC
Armoured
M-11)/Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4); some Abdali (Hatf-2); some
2 armd div
Nasr (Hatf-9); Conventional 105 Hatf-1
7 indep armd bde
Mechanised GLCM • Nuclear some Babur (Hatf-7)
2 mech inf div AIRCRAFT
1 indep mech bde TPT • Light 14: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Beech 350 King
Light Air; 3 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna 421; 1 Cessna 550 Citation;
18 inf div 1 Cessna 560 Citation; 2 Turbo Commander 690; 4 Y-12(II)
5 indep inf bde TRG 87 MFI-17B Mushshak
Other HELICOPTERS
1 sy div (1 more div forming) ATK 42: 38 AH-1F/S Cobra with TOW; 4 Mi-35M Hind (1
COMBAT SUPPORT Mi-24 Hind in store)
1 arty div MRH 115+: 10 H125M Fennec; 7 AW139; 26 Bell 412EP
14 arty bde Twin Huey; 38+ Mi-17 Hip H; 2 Mi-171E Hip; 12 SA315B
7 engr bde Lama; 20 SA319 Alouette III
AVIATION TPT 76: Medium 36: 31 SA330 Puma; 4 Mi-171; 1 Mi-
1 VIP avn sqn 172; Light 40: 17 H125 Ecureuil (SAR); 5 Bell 205 (UH-
4 avn sqn
1H Iroquois); 5 Bell 205A-1 (AB-205A-1); 13 Bell 206B Jet
HELICOPTER
Ranger II
3 atk hel sqn
TRG 10 Hughes 300C
2 ISR hel sqn
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
2 SAR hel sqn
2 tpt hel sqn ISR • Light Bravo; Jasoos; Vector
1 spec ops hel sqn AIR DEFENCE
AIR DEFENCE SAM
1 AD comd (3 AD gp (total: 8 AD bn)) Medium-range LY-80
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Short-range FM-90
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Point-defence M113 with RBS-70; Anza Mk1/Mk2;
MBT 2,496+: 300 Al-Khalid (MBT 2000); ε50 Al-Khalid I; FIM-92 Stinger; HN-5A; Mistral; RBS-70
320 T-80UD; 51 T-54/T-55; 1,100 Type-59/Al-Zarrar; 400 GUNS • TOWED 1,933: 14.5mm 981; 35mm 248 GDF-
Type-69; 275+ Type-85 (270 M48A5 in store) 002/GDF-005 (with 134 Skyguard radar units); 37mm 310
APC 1,605 Type-55 (M-1939)/Type-65; 40mm 50 L/60; 57mm 144
APC (T) 1,260: 1,160 M113/Talha; ε100 Type-63 Type-59 (S-60); 85mm 200 Type-72 (M-1939) KS-12
298 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Asia
TPT 35: Medium 16: 5 C-130B Hercules; 10 C-130E
Hercules; 1 L-100-20; Light 14: 2 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna National Guard 185,000
560XL Citation Excel; 4 CN235M-220; 4 EMB-500 Phenom Incl Janbaz Force; Mujahid Force; National Cadet Corps;
100; 1 F-27-200 Friendship; 2 Y-12 (II); PAX 5: 1 B-707; 1 Women Guards
Falcon 20E; 2 Gulfstream IVSP; 1 Saab 2000
TRG 142: 38 K-8 Karakorum*; 80 MFI-17B Mushshak; 24 Pakistan Rangers 25,000
T-37C Tweet Ministry of Interior
HELICOPTERS
MRH 19: 15 SA316 Alouette III; 4 AW139 DEPLOYMENT
TPT • Medium 4 Mi-171Sh
ARABIAN SEA: Combined Maritime Forces • 1 FFGH
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
CISR • Heavy CH-3 (Burraq) CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1,259; 10
ISR • Medium Falco obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 hel sqn
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 190+ CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 1
Medium-range 6 HQ-2 (SA-2 Guideline) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
Short-range 184: 144 Crotale; ε40 SPADA 2000 MONUSCO 2,758; 18 obs; 4 inf bn; 1 hel sqn
Point-defence 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES MALI: UN • MINUSMA 3
AAM • IR AIM-9L/P Sidewinder; U-Darter; PL-5; SARH SOMALIA: UN • UNSOM 1 obs; UN • UNSOS 1 obs
Super 530; ARH PL-12; AIM-120C AMRAAM SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4; 2 obs
ASM AGM-65 Maverick; Raptor II
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 1,170; 6 obs; 1 inf bn, 1 engr pl;
AShM AM39 Exocet
1 med pl
ARM MAR-1
ALCM • Nuclear Ra’ad (in test) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 14 obs
BOMBS
INS/SAT-guided FT-6 (REK) FOREIGN FORCES
Laser-guided Paveway II Figures represent total numbers for UNMOGIP mission in
India and Pakistan
Paramilitary 282,000 active Chile 2 obs
Pakistan Coast Guards Croatia 9 obs
Ministry of Interior Italy 2 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Korea, Republic of 7 obs
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 Philippines 6 obs
PBF 4 Romania 2 obs
PB 1 Sweden 5 obs
300 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
ment in 2018 of an AFP Special Operations Command to command ARTILLERY 260+
TOWED 220: 105mm 204 M101/
all special-forces units. Military leaders said this resulted from M102/Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 16: 10 M114/M-68;
lessons learned in the Zamboanga City attack in 2013 and the 6 Soltam M-71
Marawi siege in 2017. Lessons learned after Marawi will also likely MOR 40+: 81mm M29; 107mm 40 M30
lead to renewed focus on the capabilities and tactics needed for AIRCRAFT
urban operations. Although President Duterte announced in 2016 TPT • Light 4: 1 Beech 80 Queen Air; 1 Cessna 170; 1
a ‘separation’ from the US and the pursuit of closer relations with
Cessna 172; 1 Cessna P206A
China, he described the US as an important security ally, especially
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium Blue
in support of counter-terrorism, in September 2017. The Philip-
pines is an ASEAN member. In 2017 it began trilateral joint mari- Horizon
time patrols and joint Sulu Sea patrols with Indonesia and Malaysia
to counter regional terrorist activity. The armed forces continue to Navy 23,750
be deployed on internal-security duties in the south, where Manila EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
faces continuing challenges from insurgent groups. The second PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 69
phase (2018–22) of the ‘second horizon’ AFP modernisation pro- PSOH 3 Gregorio del Pilar (ex-US Hamilton) with 1 76mm
gramme was approved in 2018. Plans include new artillery systems, gun (capacity 1 Bo 105)
multi-role fighters, radars, transport aircraft and frigates. Feasibility PCF 1 General Mariano Alvares (ex-US Cyclone)
studies are under way for the creation of a defence-industry zone
PCO 10:
in Limay, Bataan, to better enable technology transfer. The Philip-
3 Emilio Jacinto (ex-UK Peacock) with 1 76mm gun
pine Aerospace Development Corporation has assembled a variety
of small helicopters and aircraft for the AFP, as well as providing 5 Miguel Malvar (ex-US) with 1 76mm gun
maintenance, repair and overhaul services for military aircraft. 2 Rizal (ex-US Auk) with 2 76mm gun
PBFG 3 MPAC Mk3 with 1 Typhoon MLS-ER quad lnchr
ACTIVE 142,350 (Army 101,000 Navy 23,750 Air with Spike-ER SSM
17,600) Paramilitary 11,100 PBF 16: 2 Conrado Yap (ex-ROK Sea Hawk); 5 Tomas Batilo
(ex-ROK Chamsuri); 6 MPAC Mk1/2
Asia
RESERVE 131,000 (Army 100,000 Navy 15,000 Air PB 30: 22 Jose Andrada; 2 Kagitingan; 2 Point (ex-US); 4
16,000) Paramilitary 50,000 (to age 49) Swift Mk3 (ex-US)
PBR 6 Silver Ships
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE AMPHIBIOUS
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2
LPD 2 Tarlac (IDN Makassar) (capacity 2 LCU; 2 hels; 13
Army 101,000 tanks; 500 troops)
5 Area Unified Comd (joint service), 1 National Capital LANDING SHIPS • LST 4:
Region Comd 2 Bacolod City (US Besson) with 1 hel landing platform
FORCES BY ROLE (capacity 32 tanks; 150 troops)
SPECIAL FORCES 2 LST-1/542 (ex-US) (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops)
1 spec ops comd (1 ranger regt, 1 SF regt, 1 CT regt) LANDING CRAFT 11
MANOEUVRE LCM 2: 1 Manobo; 1 Tagbanua (capacity 100 tons; 200
Mechanised troops)
1 mech inf div (2 mech bde (total: 3 lt armd sqn; 7 armd LCT 5 Ivatan (ex-AUS Balikpapan)
cav tp; 4 mech inf bn; 1 cbt engr coy; 1 avn bn; 1 cbt engr LCU 4: 3 LCU Mk 6 (ex-US); 1 Mulgae I (ex-RoK)
coy, 1 sigs coy))
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 6
Light AGOR 1 Gregorio Velasquez (ex-US Melville)
1 div (4 inf bde; 1 arty bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) AOL 1
9 div (3 inf bde; 1 arty bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) AO 1 Lake Caliraya
Other AP 1
1 (Presidential) gd gp AWT 2
COMBAT SUPPORT
Naval Aviation
1 arty regt HQ
5 engr bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 11: 4 BN-2A Defender; 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Cessna 177 Cardinal; 5 Beech 90 King Air (TC-90) (leased)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES HELICOPTERS • TPT 13: Medium 4 Mi-171Sh; Light 9:
LT TK 7 FV101 Scorpion 3 AW109; 2 AW109E; 4 Bo-105
IFV 54: 2 YPR-765; 34 M113A1 FSV; 18 M113A2 FSV
APC 387 Marines 8,300
APC (T) 168: 6 ACV300; 42 M113A1; 120 M113A2 FORCES BY ROLE
APC (W) 219: 73 LAV-150 Commando; 146 Simba SPECIAL FORCES
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 (force recon) spec ops bn
ARV ACV-300; Samson; M578; 4 M113 ARV MANOEUVRE
ANTI-TANK-ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 75mm Amphibious
M20; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1 4 mne bde (total: 12 mne bn)
302 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Asia
The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) are the best equipped in South- 2 sy bn
east Asia. They are organised essentially along Israeli lines, with the
COMBAT SUPPORT
2 arty bn
air force and navy staffed mainly by professional personnel while,
1 STA bn
apart from a small core of regulars, the much larger army is based
2 engr bn
on conscripts and reservists. Although there are no publicly avail-
1 EOD bn
able defence-policy documents, it is widely presumed that the
1 ptn br bn
SAF’s primary role is to deter attacks on the city state or interfer-
1 int bn
ence with its vital interests – particularly its sea lines of commu-
2 ISR bn
nication – by potential regional adversaries. There is now an addi-
1 CBRN bn
tional focus on counter-terrorist operations. The defence budget
3 sigs bn
has increased to the extent that Singapore outspends all its South-
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
east Asian counterparts. With an ageing population and declin- 3 med bn
ing conscript cohort, there is a significant personnel challenge, 2 tpt bn
which the defence ministry is looking to address by lean staffing 3 spt bn
and increased use of technology. There is routine overseas train-
ing, and plans have been announced to further improve domestic Reserves
training areas. The SAF also engages extensively in bilateral and Activated units form part of divisions and brigades listed
multilateral exercises with regional and international partners. Sin- above; 1 op reserve div with additional inf bde; People’s
gaporean forces have gradually become more involved in multi- Defence Force Comd (homeland defence) with 12 inf bn
national operations, including the US-led air offensive against ISIS. FORCES BY ROLE
While such deployments have provided some operational experi- SPECIAL FORCES
ence, and training standards and operational readiness are high, 1 cdo bn
the army’s reliance on conscripts and reservists limits its capacity MANOEUVRE
for sustained operations abroad. Equipment modernisation con- Reconnaissance
tinues, with Littoral-Mission Vessels commissioned and progress 6 lt armd/recce bn
on the procurement of armoured vehicles and surface-to-air mis- Mechanised
siles. There is a small but sophisticated defence industry. ST Engi- 6 mech inf bn
neering group manufactures several types of armoured vehicles Light
and corvettes for the SAF. ε56 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
ACTIVE 72,500 (Army 50,000 Navy 9,000 Air 13,500) ε12 arty bn
Paramilitary 8,400 ε8 engr bn
Conscription liability 22–24 months EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RESERVE 312,500 (Army 300,000 Navy 5,000 Air MBT 96 Leopard 2SG (80–100 Tempest (upgraded
7,500) Centurion) reported in store)
Annual trg to age 40 for army other ranks, 50 for officers LT TK 372: 22 AMX-10 PAC 90; ε350 AMX-13 SM1
304 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
IFV 572+: 22 AMX-10P; 250 Bionix IFV-25; 250 Bionix IFV- Naval Diving Unit
40/50; 50+ M113A1/A2 (some with 40mm AGL, some
FORCES BY ROLE
with 25mm gun)
SPECIAL FORCES
APC 1,576+
1 SF gp
APC (T) 1,100+: 700+ M113A1/A2; 400+ ATTC Bronco
1 (diving) SF gp
APC (W) 415: 250 LAV-150 Commando/V-200
COMBAT SUPPORT
Commando; 135 Terrex ICV; 30 V-100 Commando
PPV 61+: 6+ Belrex; 15 MaxxPro Dash; 40 Peacekeeper 1 EOD gp
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Air Force 13,500 (incl 3,000 conscript)
AEV 94: 18 CET; 54 FV180; 14 Kodiak; 8 M728
5 comds
ARV Bionix; Büffel; LAV-150; LAV-300
VLB 72+: Bionix; LAB 30; Leguan; M2; 60 M3; 12 M60 FORCES BY ROLE
MW 910-MCV-2; Trailblazer FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 2 sqn with F-15SG Eagle
MSL • MANPATS Milan; Spike-SR; Spike-MR 3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (some used for ISR
RCL 90+: 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm 90 M40A1 with pods)
ARTILLERY 798+ ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
SP 155mm 54 SSPH-1 Primus 1 sqn with S-70B Seahawk
TOWED 88: 105mm (37 LG1 in store); 155mm 88: 18 MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT
FH-2000; ε18 Pegasus; 52 FH-88 1 sqn with F-50
MRL 227mm 18 M142 HIMARS AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
MOR 638+ 1 sqn with G550-AEW
SP 90+: 81mm; 120mm 90: 40 on Bronco; 50 on M113 TANKER
TOWED 548: 81mm 500 120mm 36 M-65; 160mm 12 1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker; A330 MRTT
M-58 Tampella TANKER/TRANSPORT
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light Skylark 1 sqn with KC-130B/H Hercules; C-130H Hercules
TRAINING
Navy 3,000; 1,000 conscript; ε5,000 active 1 (FRA-based) sqn with M-346 Master
reservists (total 9,000) 4 (US-based) units with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Chinook; F-15SG: F-16C/D
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4: 1 (AUS-based) sqn with PC-21
2 Challenger (ex-SWE Sjoormen) with 2 single 400mm TT, 1 hel sqn with H120 Colibri
4 single 533mm TT ATTACK HELICOPTER
2 Archer (ex-SWE Västergötland) (AIP fitted) with 3 single 1 sqn with AH-64D Apache
400mm TT, 6 single 533mm TT for WASS Black Shark TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
HWT 1 sqn with CH-47SD Super D Chinook
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6: 2 sqn with AS332M Super Puma; AS532UL Cougar
FRIGATES • FFGHM 6 Formidable with 2 quad lnchr ISR UAV
1 sqn with Hermes 450
with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 4 octuple VLS with Aster 2 sqn with Heron 1
15 SAM, 2 triple B515 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 AIR DEFENCE
76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B Sea Hawk hel) 1 AD bn with Mistral opcon Army
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 26 3 AD bn with RBS-70; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) opcon
CORVETTES 11 Army
FSGM 6 Victory with 2 quad Mk140 lnchr with RGM-84C 1 ADA sqn with Oerlikon
Harpoon AShM, 2 octuple lnchr with Barak SAM, 2 triple
1 AD sqn with MIM-23 Hawk; SAMP/T
B515 324mm ASTT with A244S LWT, 1 76mm gun
1 AD sqn with Spyder
FSM 5 Independence (Littoral Mission Vessel) with 1
1 radar sqn with radar (mobile)
12-cell CLA VLS with VL-MICA, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel
1 radar sqn with LORADS
landing platform
MANOEUVRE
PCO 7 Fearless with 1 76mm gun (can be fitted with 2
Other
sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM)
4 (field def) sy sqn
PBF 8: 2 SMC Type 1; 6 SMC Type 2
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MCC 4 Bedok AIRCRAFT 105 combat capable
AMPHIBIOUS FGA 100: 40 F-15SG Eagle; 20 F-16C Block 52 Fighting
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 4 Endurance Falcon; 20 F-16D Block 52 Fighting Falcon; 20 F-16D Block
with 2 twin lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 76mm gun 52+ Fighting Falcon (incl reserves)
(capacity 2 hel; 4 LCVP; 18 MBT; 350 troops) ATK (4 A-4SU Super Skyhawk; 10 TA-4SU Super Skyhawk
LANDING CRAFT 23 in store)
LCVP 23: ε17 FCEP; 6 FCU MP 5 F-50 Maritime Enforcer*
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 AEW&C 4 G550-AEW
ASR 1 Swift Rescue TKR 5: 1 KC-130H Hercules; 4 KC-135R Stratotanker
AX 1 TKR/TPT 5: 1 A330 MRTT; 4 KC-130B Hercules
Asia 305
TPT 9: Medium 5 C-130H Hercules (2 ELINT); PAX 4 F-50 networks. Meanwhile, under the DCO, the Cyber Security
TRG 31: 12 M-346 Master; 19 PC-21 Division is the first responder to cyber attacks; the Plans and
HELICOPTERS Policy Directorate oversees cyber capability development;
ATK 19 AH-64D Apache and the Cyber Security Inspectorate conducts vulnerability
ASW 8 S-70B Seahawk assessment. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Cyber
TPT 51: Heavy 16: 6 CH-47D Chinook; 10 CH-47SD Super Defence Group (CDG) was created under the SAF C4
D Chinook; Medium 30: 18 AS332M Super Puma (incl 5 Command (itself created in 2017) to provide round-the-clock
SAR); 12 AS532UL Cougar; Light 5 H120 Colibri (leased) cyber defence of SAF networks. According to MINDEF,
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES ‘The CDG consists of dedicated cyber defence units that are
ISR 17+: Heavy 8+ Heron 1; Medium 9+ Hermes 450 responsible for cybersecurity monitoring, incident response
AIR DEFENCE and audits of SAF networks.’ The SAF has created new
SAM cyber-defence positions for national servicemen (NSF) and
Long-range 4+ SAMP/T regular personnel. A Cyber NSF scheme was launched in
Medium-range MIM-23 Hawk February 2018 to help the armed forces benefit from cyber
Short-range Spyder-SR skills in the forces. When fully established, MINDEF says
Point-defence 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) (some on that the DCO will have about 2,600 personnel, supported by
V-200/M113); Mistral; RBS-70 specialists in the Defence Science and Technology Agency
GUNS 34 and the Defence Science Organisation.
SP 20mm GAI-C01
TOWED 34 20mm GAI-C01; 35mm 34 GDF (with 25
Super-Fledermaus fire control radar) DEPLOYMENT
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AUSTRALIA: 2 trg schools – 1 with 12 AS332 Super Puma/
AAM • IR AIM-9N/P Sidewinder; Python 4 (reported); AS532 Cougar (flying trg) located at Oakey; 1 with PC-21
IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7P Sparrow; ARH (flying trg) located at Pearce. Army: prepositioned AFVs
Asia
(AIM-120C5/7 AMRAAM in store in US) and heavy equipment at Shoalwater Bay training area
ASM: AGM-65B/G Maverick; AGM-114 Hellfire; AGM-
BRUNEI: 1 trg camp with inf units on rotation; 1 hel det
154A/C JSOW
with AS332 Super Puma
AShM AGM-84 Harpoon; AM39 Exocet
ARM AGM-45 Shrike FRANCE: 200: 1 trg sqn with 12 M-346 Master
BOMBS KUWAIT: Operation Inherent Resolve 11
INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM
TAIWAN: 3 trg camp (incl inf and arty)
Laser-guided Paveway II
THAILAND: 1 trg camp (arty, cbt engr)
Paramilitary 8,400 active UNITED STATES: Trg units with F-16C/D; 12 F-15SG; AH-
64D Apache; 6+ CH-47D Chinook
Civil Defence Force 5,600 (incl conscripts);
500 auxiliaries (total 6,100)
FOREIGN FORCES
Singapore Police Coast Guard 1,000 United States US Pacific Command: 200; 1 naval spt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE facility at Changi naval base; 1 USAF log spt sqn at Paya
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 102 Lebar air base
PBF 81: 25 Angler Ray; 2 Atlantic Ray; 1 Marlin; 11
Sailfish; 10 Shark; 32 other
PB 21: 19 Amberjack; 2 Manta Ray Sri Lanka LKA
Sri Lankan Rupee Rs 2017 2018 2019
Singapore Gurkha Contingent 1,800
Under the Police GDP Rs 13.3tr 14.5tr
Asia
Other New Taiwan Dollar NT$ 2017 2018 2019
1 (SLAF) sy regt
GDP NT$ 17.4tr 18.1tr
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 573bn 603bn
AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable
FTR 5: 3 F-7GS; 2 FT-7 (3 F-7BS; 1 F-7GS non-operational) per capita US$ 24,292 25,534
FGA 1 Kfir C-2 (2 Kfir C-2; 1 Kfir C-7; 2 Kfir TC-2; 6 MiG- Growth % 2.9 2.7
27M Flogger J2; 1 MiG-23UB Flogger C non-operational) Inflation % 1.1 1.5
TPT 21: Medium 2 C-130K Hercules; Light 19: 3 An-32B Def bdgt NT$ 319bn 332bn 346bn
Cline; 6 Cessna 150L; 1 Cessna 421C Golden Eagle; 7 Y-12
US$ 10.5bn 11.0bn
(II); 2 Y-12 (IV)
TRG 14: 7 K-8 Karakoram*; 7 PT-6 US$1=NT$ 30.44 30.05
HELICOPTERS Population 23,545,963
ATK 11: 6 Mi-24P Hind; 3 Mi-24V Hind E; 2 Mi-35V Hind
Ethnic groups: Taiwanese 84%; mainland Chinese 14%
MRH 18: 6 Bell 412 Twin Huey (VIP); 2 Bell 412EP (VIP);
10 Mi-17 Hip H Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
TPT 16: Medium 4 Mi-171Sh; Light 12: 2 Bell 206A Jet
Male 6.5% 2.9% 3.5% 3.5% 26.5% 6.6%
Ranger; 2 Bell 206B Jet Ranger; 8 Bell 212
Female 6.2% 2.8% 3.3% 3.4% 27.1% 7.8%
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Medium 2+: some Blue Horizon II; 2 Searcher MkII
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 27: 40mm 24 L/40; Capabilities
94mm 3 (3.7in) Taiwan’s relationship with China and its attempts to sustain a cred-
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ible military capability dominate its security policy. The latest Qua-
AAM • IR PL-5E drennial Defense Review, published in March 2017, highlighted
the continued challenge from Beijing. Taiwan’s current focus is
therefore on air defence and deterrence in coastal areas, on both
Paramilitary ε62,200 sides of the island. The armed forces are well trained and exercise
regularly. Demographic pressure has influenced plans for force
Home Guard 13,000
reductions and a shift towards an all-volunteer force. Taiwan’s main
National Guard ε15,000 alliance partnership is with the US. The Taiwan Relations Act from
1979 states that ‘the United States shall provide Taiwan with arms
Police Force 30,200; 1,000 (women) (total of a defensive character’. Despite persistent US refusal to sanc-
tion the transfer of new combat aircraft, Taiwan has obtained US
31,200) 30,400 reservists assistance to modernise its current fleet of F-16s to F-16V standard.
Nevertheless, Taipei maintains an interest in the F-35. Due to the
Ministry of Defence Special Task Force 3,000 lack of potential foreign equipment suppliers, Taiwan is modernis-
Anti-guerrilla unit ing its existing holdings and developing its domestic defence-
industry capabilities through increased funding and the develop-
Coast Guard n/k ment of new weapons programmes. Taiwan’s defence-industrial
Ministry of Defence base has strengths in aerospace, shipbuilding and missiles.
308 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
An indigenous-submarine programme was officially launched NBC VEHICLES 48+: BIDS; 48 K216A1; KM453
in 2017, with the aim to locally build eight boats. The National ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology is in charge of MSL
most defence R&D. SP TOW
ACTIVE 163,000 (Army 88,000 Navy 40,000 Air MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; TOW
RCL 500+: 90mm M67; 106mm 500+: 500 M40A1; Type-51
35,000) Paramilitary 11,450
ARTILLERY 2,200
Conscript liability
SP 488: 105mm 100 M108; 155mm 318: 225 M109A2/A5;
(19–40 years) 12 months for those born before 1993; four
48 M44T; 45 T-69; 203mm 70 M110
months for those born after 1994 (alternative service
TOWED 1,060+: 105mm 650 T-64 (M101); 155mm 340+:
available). Conscription officially ended in January 90 M59; 250 T-65 (M114); M44; XT-69; 203mm 70 M115
2018 and it was planned that the last conscripts would MRL 330: 117mm 120 Kung Feng VI; 126mm 210: 60 Kung
demobilise by the end of 2018 Feng III/Kung Feng IV; 150 RT 2000 Thunder (KF towed
RESERVE 1,657,000 (Army 1,500,000 Navy 67,000 and SP)
Air Force 90,000) MOR 322+
SP 162+: 81mm 72+: M29; 72 M125; 107mm 90 M106A2
Some obligation to age 30
TOWED 81mm 160 M29; T-75; 107mm M30; 120mm
K5; XT-86
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE COASTAL DEFENCE
ARTY 54: 127mm ε50 US Mk32 (reported); 240mm 4
Army 88,000 (incl ε5,000 MP) M1
FORCES BY ROLE AShM Ching Feng
COMMAND HELICOPTERS
3 corps HQ ATK 96: 67 AH-1W Cobra; 29 AH-64E Apache
5 defence comd HQ MRH 38 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior
SPECIAL FORCES/HELICOPTER TPT 110: Heavy 8 CH-47SD Super D Chinook; Medium 26
1 SF/hel comd (2 spec ops gp, 2 hel bde) UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 76 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
MANOEUVRE TRG 29 TH-67 Creek
Armoured UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
4 armd bde ISR • Light Mastiff III
Mechanised AIR DEFENCE
3 mech inf bde SAM • Point-defence 76: 74 M1097 Avenger; 2 M48
Light Chaparral; FIM-92 Stinger
6 inf bde GUNS 400
COMBAT SUPPORT SP 40mm M42
3 arty gp TOWED 20: 35mm 20 GDF-001 (30 systems with 20
3 engr gp guns) 40mm L/70
3 CBRN gp
3 sigs gp Navy 40,000
COASTAL DEFENCE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 AShM bn SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4:
2 Hai Lung with 6 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT/
Reserves UGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM
FORCES BY ROLE 2 Hai Shih† (ex-US Guppy II – trg role) with 10 single
MANOEUVRE 533mm TT (6 fwd, 4 aft) with SUT HWT
Light PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 26
21 inf bde CRUISERS • CGHM 4 Keelung (ex-US Kidd) with 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 2
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES twin Mk26 GMLS with RIM-66K-2 SM-2MR Block IIIA
MBT 565: 200 M60A3; 100 M48A5; 265 M48H Brave Tiger SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2
LT TK 625 M41/Type-64 (230 M24 Chaffee (90mm gun) Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 2 127mm gun (capacity
in store) 1 S-70 ASW hel)
IFV 225 CM-25 (M113 with 20–30mm cannon) FRIGATES 22
APC 1,220 FFGHM 21:
APC (T) 650 M113 8 Cheng Kung (US Oliver Hazard Perry mod) with 2
APC (W) 570: ε270 CM-32 Yunpao; 300 LAV-150 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng II/III AShM, 1 Mk13
Commando GMLS with SM-1MR SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS,
AEV 18 M9 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 S-70C ASW hel)
ARV CM-27/A1; 37 M88A1 2 Meng Chuan (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1
VLB 22 M3; M48A5 Mk13 GMLS with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM/SM-
Asia 309
Asia
PCG 11: EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 Jin Chiang with 1 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng II HELICOPTERS
AShM ASW 20 S-70C Seahawk (S-70C Defender)
4 Jin Chiang with 2 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng II MRH 10 MD-500 Defender
AShM, 1 76mm gun UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium
6 Jin Chiang with 1 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng III ε29 Chung Shyang II
AShM, 1 76mm gun
PCC 1 Jin Chiang (test platform)
Air Force 35,000
PBG 31 Kwang Hua with 2 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng FORCES BY ROLE
II AShM FIGHTER
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9 3 sqn with Mirage 2000-5E/D (2000-5EI/DI)
MHC 6: 4 Yung Feng; 2 Yung Jin (ex-US Osprey) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
MSO 3 Yung Yang (ex-US Aggressive) 3 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
6 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon
COMMAND SHIPS • LCC 1 Kao Hsiung
5 sqn with F-CK-1A/B/C/D Ching Kuo
AMPHIBIOUS
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LSD 1 Shiu Hai
1 sqn with P-3C Orion
(ex-US Anchorage) with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 hel
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
landing platform (capacity either 2 LCU or 18 LCM; 360
1 sqn with C-130HE Tien Gian
troops) ISR
LANDING SHIPS 1 sqn with RF-5E Tigereye
LST 8: AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
6 Chung Hai (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops) 1 sqn with E-2T Hawkeye
2 Chung Ho (ex-US Newport) with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx SEARCH & RESCUE
CIWS , 1 hel landing platform (capacity 3 LCVP, 23 1 sqn with H225; S-70C Black Hawk
AFVs, 400 troops) TRANSPORT
LANDING CRAFT 47 2 sqn with C-130H Hercules
LCM ε35 (various) 1 (VIP) sqn with B-727-100; B-737-800; Beech 1900; F-50;
LCU 12 LCU 1610 (capacity 2 M60A3 or 400 troops) S-70C Black Hawk
(minelaying capability) TRAINING
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12 1 sqn with AT-3A/B Tzu-Chung*
AGOR 1 Ta Kuan 1 sqn with Beech 1900
AOEH 1 Panshih with 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral 1 (basic) sqn with T-34C Turbo Mentor
SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 3 med hel) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AOE 1 Wu Yi with 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral SAM, AIRCRAFT 479 combat capable
1 hel landing platform FTR 285: 87 F-5E/F Tiger II (some in store); 143 F-16A/B
ARS 2: 1 Da Hu (ex-US Diver); 1 Da Juen (ex-US Bolster) Fighting Falcon; 9 Mirage 2000-5D (2000-5DI); 46 Mirage
ATF 7 Ta Tung (ex-US Cherokee) 2000-5E (2000-5EI)
310 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
FGA 127 F-CK-1C/D Ching Kuo cyber activity include the National Security Bureau, the
ASW 12 P-3C Orion defence ministry, and the Research, Development and
EW 1 C-130HE Tien Gian Evaluation Commission. In 2015, a Defense Policy Paper
ISR 7 RF-5E Tigereye recommended that an independent fourth service branch
AEW&C 6 E-2T Hawkeye combining cyber and electronic-warfare capabilities
TPT 33: Medium 19 C-130H Hercules; Light 10 Beech should be formed. The Information, Communications and
1900; PAX 4: 1 B-737-800; 3 F-50 Electronic Warfare Command was established in mid-2017
TRG 97: 55 AT-3A/B Tzu-Chung*; 42 T-34C Turbo Mentor and is responsible for coordinating cyber defence and
HELICOPTERS directing R&D efforts in cyber and EW.
TPT • Medium 19: 3 H225; 16 S-70C Black Hawk; 8 UH-
60M Black Hawk
AIR DEFENCE
FOREIGN FORCES
SAM • Point-defence Antelope Singapore 3 trg camp (incl inf and arty)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR AIM-9J/P Sidewinder; R-550 Magic 2; Shafrir;
Sky Sword I; IR/ARH Mica; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM;
Thailand THA
Sky Sword II Thai Baht b 2017 2018 2019
ASM AGM-65A Maverick
GDP b 15.5tr 16.4tr
AShM AGM-84 Harpoon
ARM Sky Sword IIA US$ 455bn 490bn
LACM Conventional Wan Chien per capita US$ 6,591 7,084
BOMBS • Laser-guided Paveway II Growth % 3.9 4.6
Inflation % 0.7 0.9
Air Defence and Missile Command
Def bdgt b 214bn 217bn 224bn
FORCES BY ROLE
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE US$ 6.29bn 6.51bn
3 SSM bty with Hsiung Feng IIE US$1=b 33.93 33.39
AIR DEFENCE
Population 68,615,858
2 AD/SAM gp (total: 13 bty with MIM-23 Hawk; 4 bty
Ethnic and religious groups: Thai 75%; Chinese 14%; Muslim 4%
with MIM-104F Patriot PAC-3; 6 bty with Tien Kung I
Sky Bow/Tien Kung II Sky Bow) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Male 8.6% 3.3% 3.8% 3.7% 24.9% 4.8%
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
Female 8.2% 3.1% 3.7% 3.6% 26.2% 6.2%
GLCM • Conventional ε12 Hsiung Feng IIE
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Medium-range 600+: 100 MIM-
23 Hawk; ε500 Tien Kung I Sky Bow/Tien Kung II Sky Bow Capabilities
MISSILE DEFENCE • Medium-range 24+ MIM-104F Thailand has large, well-funded armed forces and its air force is
Patriot PAC-3 one of the best equipped and trained in Southeast Asia, while
the introduction into service of Gripen combat aircraft and Saab
Paramilitary 11,450 340 airborne early-warning platforms has boosted Thai airpower.
The Vision 2026 defence-modernisation plan, approved by the
Coast Guard 11,450 defence council in October 2017, outlines the armed forces’ capa-
bility improvements over the next decade. Thailand is considered
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
a major non-NATO ally by the US, while the country has devel-
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 161
oped deeper defence ties with China since the military coup in
PSOH 4: 2 Tainan; 2 Yilan 2014. The armed forces regularly take part in international mili-
PSO 6: 4 Miaoli with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Ho Hsing tary exercises. A small number of personnel remain deployed on
PCO 13: 2 Kinmen; 2 Mou Hsing; 3 Shun Hu 7; 4 the UNAMID mission to Darfur, Sudan. The military-modernisation
Taichung; 2 Taipei effort includes the development of submarines, anti-submarine
PBF ε56 (various) warfare capabilities and a surface-ship procurement programme.
PB 82: 1 Shun Hu 6; ε81 (various) The armoured vehicle fleet has been recapitalised with deliveries
from Ukraine and China. The arrival of the Saab 340 AEW aircraft,
Cyber along with the Gripen combat aircraft and a command-and-con-
Although Taiwan has a highly developed civilian IT sector, trol system, has provided a step change in air capability. Under
the government has been relatively slow to exploit this its Defence Industry Masterplan, the government indicates that
expanding Thailand’s presently limited defence sector can be
advantage for national-defence purposes. However, for
an important way of developing military capability. The govern-
the past decade, Taipei has been working on its Po Sheng ment is making efforts to reform defence procurement and offsets
– Broad Victory – C4ISR programme, an all-hazards by expanding the role of its Defence Technology Institute. It is
system with a significant defence component. The main planned that this will change in 2019 to become the Defence Tech-
focus of the military component of this programme is nology Agency, acting as a central procurement agency for the
countering Chinese information-warfare and electronic- armed forces, as well as overseeing the development of Thailand’s
warfare (EW) attacks. The authorities responsible for defence industry.
Asia 311
ACTIVE 360,850 (Army 245,000 Navy 69,850 Air TOWED 617: 105mm 340: 24 LG1 MkII; 12 M-56; 200
46,000) Paramilitary 93,700 M101/M425; 12 M102; 32 M618A2; 60 L119 Light Gun;
Conscription liability 24 months 155mm 277: 90 GHN-45 A1; 48 M114; 118 M198; 21 M-71
MRL 68: 122mm 4 SR-4; 130mm 60 PHZ-85; 302mm 4: 1
RESERVE 200,000 Paramilitary 45,000 DTI-1 (WS-1B); 3 DTI-1G (WS-32)
MOR 1,926+: SP 81mm 39: 18 BTR-3M1; 21 M125A3; SP
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 107mm M106A3; SP 120mm 20: 8 BTR-3M2; 12 M1064A3;
1,867 81mm/107mm/120mm
AIRCRAFT
Army 130,000; ε115,000 conscript (total 245,000) TPT • Light 19: 2 Beech 200 King Air; 2 Beech 1900C; 1
FORCES BY ROLE C-212 Aviocar; 1 C295W; 9 Cessna A185E (U-17B); 2 ERJ-
COMMAND 135LR; 2 Jetstream 41
4 (regional) army HQ TRG 33: 11 MX-7-235 Star Rocket; 22 T-41B Mescalero
3 corps HQ HELICOPTERS
SPECIAL FORCES ATK 7 AH-1F Cobra
1 SF div MRH 15: 8 AS550 Fennec; 2 AW139; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip H
1 SF regt TPT 216: Heavy 5 CH-47D Chinook; Medium 12: 9 UH-
MANOEUVRE 60L Black Hawk; 3 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 199: 93 Bell
Armoured 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 27 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 52 Bell 212
3 cav div (1 recce bn; 3 tk regt (3 tk bn); 1 indep tk bn; 1 (AB-212); 16 Enstrom 480B; 6 H145M (VIP tpt); 5 UH-72A
sigs bn; 1 maint bn; 1 hel sqn) Lakota
Mechanised TRG 53 Hughes 300C
1 mech inf div (1 recce coy; 1 recce sqn; 1 tk bn; 1 inf UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
regt (4 inf bn); 3 inf regt; 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) ISR • Medium 4 Hermes 450; Searcher; Searcher II
Light
Asia
AIR DEFENCE
8 inf div (1 recce sqn; 3 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 engr bn; 1 SAM
sigs bn)
Short-range Aspide
COMBAT SUPPORT
Point-defence 8+: 8 Starstreak; 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24
1 arty div
Grinch)
1 engr div
GUNS 184
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
SP 54: 20mm 24 M163 Vulcan; 40mm 30 M1/M42 SP
4 economic development div
TOWED 138: 20mm 24 M167 Vulcan; 35mm 8 GDF-007
HELICOPTER
with Skyguard 3; 37mm 52 Type-74; 40mm 48 L/70;
Some hel flt
57mm ε6 Type-59 (S-60) (18+ more non-operational)
ISR UAV
1 UAV bn with Hermes 450; Searcher II Reserves
AIR DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE
1 ADA div (6 bn)
COMMAND
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 inf div HQ
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 360: 53 M60A1; 125 M60A3; 105 M48A5; 49 T-84 Navy 44,000 (incl Naval Aviation, Marines,
Oplot; 28 VT-4; (50 Type-69 in store)
Coastal Defence); 25,850 conscript (total
LT TK 194: 24 M41; 104 Scorpion (50 in store); 66 Stingray
RECCE 32 S52 Shorland
69,850)
IFV 168 BTR-3E1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC 1,140 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 9
APC (T) 880: Bronco; 430 M113A1/A3; 450 Type-85 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVH 1:
APC (W) 160: 9 BTR-3K (CP); 6 BTR-3C (amb); 18 1 Chakri Naruebet with 2 sextuple Sadral lnchr with
Condor; 142 LAV-150 Commando Mistral SAM (capacity 6 S-70B Seahawk ASW hel)
PPV 100 REVA FRIGATES 8
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES FFGHM 2:
ARV 58: 2 BREM-84 Atlet; 13 BTR-3BR; 22 M88A1; 6 2 Naresuan with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84
M88A2; 10 M113; 5 Type-653; WZT-4 Harpoon AShM, 1 8 cell Mk41 Mod 30 VLS with
VLB Type-84 RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm TT
MW Bozena; Giant Viper with Mk46 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Super
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Lynx 300 hel)
MSL FFG 4:
SP 30+: 18+ M901A5 (TOW); 12 BTR-3RK 2 Chao Phraya (trg role) with 4 twin lnchr with C-802A
MANPATS M47 Dragon AShM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun
RCL 180: 75mm 30 M20; 106mm 150 M40 2 Chao Phraya with 4 twin lnchr with C-802A AShM,
ARTILLERY 2,643 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun, 1 hel
SP 155mm 32: 6 ATMOS-2000; 6 CAESAR; 20 M109A5 landing platform
312 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Asia
INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 4 obs
TPT 42: Medium 14: 6 C-130H Hercules; 6 C-130H-30
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1; 2 obs
Hercules; 2 Saab 340B; Light 21: 3 ATR-72; 3 Beech 200
King Air; 8 BT-67; 1 Commander 690; 6 DA42M; PAX 7: SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 9; 1 obs
1 A319CJ; 1 A320CJ; 1 A340-500; 1 B-737-800; 3 SSJ-100-
95LR (1 A310-324 in store) FOREIGN FORCES
TRG 111: 16 Alpha Jet*; 13 CT-4A Airtrainer; 6 CT-4B United States US Pacific Command: 300
Airtrainer; 20 CT-4E Airtrainer; 26 L-39ZA Albatros*; 21
PC-9; 7 T-41D Mescalero; 2 T-50TH Golden Eagle*
HELICOPTERS Timor-Leste TLS
MRH 11: 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412SP Twin Huey; 1
US$ 2017 2018 2019
Bell 412HP Twin Huey; 6 Bell 412EP Twin Huey
CSAR 6 H225M Super Cougar GDP US$ 2.78bn 3.16bn
TPT 20: Medium 3 S-92A Super Hawk; Light 17 Bell 205 per capita US$ 2,237 2,486
(UH-1H Iroquois) Growth % -4.6 0.8
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES Inflation % 0.6 1.8
AAM • IR AIM-9P/S Sidewinder; Python 3; IIR IRIS-T; Def bdgt US$ 25.4m 26.5m
ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM
Population 1,321,929
ASM AGM-65 Maverick
AShM RBS15F Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
BOMBS • Laser-guided Paveway II
Male 20.8% 5.8% 4.6% 3.8% 13.2% 1.9%
Female 19.6% 5.6% 4.5% 4.0% 14.2% 2.1%
Paramilitary ε93,700
Border Patrol Police 20,000 Capabilities
The small Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) has been afflicted by
Marine Police 2,200 funding, personnel and morale challenges since it was established
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE in 2001. While the F-FDTL is responsible for external defence, its
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 98 parallel internal-security role has sometimes brought it into con-
PCO 1 Srinakrin flict with the national police force. The F-FDTL has been recon-
stituted but is still a long way from meeting the ambitious force-
PCC 2 Hameln
structure goals set out in the Force 2020 plan published in 2007.
PB 49: 2 Chasanyabadee; 3 Cutlass; 2 Ratayapibanbancha The origins of the F-FDTL in the Falintil national resistance force,
(Reef Ranger); 1 Sriyanont; 41 (various) and continuing training and doctrinal emphasis on low-intensity
PBR 46 infantry tactics, mean that the force provides a deterrent to inva-
sion. In 2017, Portugal and Timor-Leste signed a defence coop-
National Security Volunteer Corps 45,000 – eration agreement up to 2022. The F-FDTL sometimes receives
Reserves training from Australian and US personnel. Australia is donating
314 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
two Guardian-class patrol vessels as part of its Pacific Patrol Boat conflicting claims in the South China Sea. Vietnam adopted a
Replacement programme; these are due to arrive in 2023. Main- new Law on National Defence in 2018 that focused, among other
tenance capacity is unclear and the country has no traditional areas, on information warfare. Legislation is also being discussed
defence industry. that seeks to increase the role of the coastguard, including the
use of force to defend sovereignty. Vietnam is looking to diver-
ACTIVE 2,280 (Army 2,200 Naval Element 80) sify its security partnerships. Washington lifted its arms embargo
on Hanoi in 2016, while New Delhi and Seoul are understood to
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE be seeking inroads into Vietnam’s defence market. The forces are
conscript-based, and there is a plan to reduce their numbers in the
armed forces and other institutions, such as military colleges and
Army 2,200 hospitals, by 2022. Recapitalisation efforts have focused on the
Training began in January 2001 with the aim of deploying navy and air force, mainly with a view to disputes in the Spratly
1,500 full-time personnel and 1,500 reservists. Authorities Islands. While Hanoi cannot hope to balance China’s power on its
are engaged in developing security structures with own, the recent development of a submarine capability and the
international assistance procurement of additional Su-30MK2 combat aircraft and new air-
defence capabilities would complicate Beijing’s military options.
FORCES BY ROLE Vietnam may also be looking to procure assets that would increase
MANOEUVRE its surveillance capacities in the South China Sea, such as UAVs.
Light Vietnam has limited but expanding defence-industrial capacities,
2 inf bn dominated by the state-owned Viettel Military Industry and Tele-
COMBAT SUPPORT coms Group.
1 MP pl
ACTIVE 482,000 (Army 412,000 Navy 40,000 Air
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
30,000) Paramilitary 40,000
1 log spt coy
Conscript liability 2 years army and air defence, 3 years air force and
Naval Element 80 navy, specialists 3 years, some ethnic minorities 2 years
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE RESERVES Paramilitary 5,000,000
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7
PB 7: 2 Albatros; 2 Dili (ex-ROK); 2 Shanghai II; 1 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Kamenassa (ex-ROK Chamsuri)
Army ε412,000
Vietnam VNM 8 Mil Regions (incl capital)
Vietnamese Dong d 2017 2018 2019 FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
GDP d 5006tr 5506tr
4 corps HQ
US$ 220bn 241bn SPECIAL FORCES
per capita US$ 2,353 2,553 1 SF bde (1 AB bde, 1 demolition engr regt)
Growth % 6.8 6.6 MANOEUVRE
Inflation % 3.5 3.8 Armoured
6 armd bde
Def bdgt d ε9.93tr ε1.10tr ε1.23tr
3 armd regt
US$ ε4.37bn ε4.83bn Mechanised
FMA (US) US$ 12m 0m 2 mech inf div
US$1=d 22715.61 22807.26 Light
23 inf div
Population 97,040,334
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
Ethnic groups: Kinh 85.7%; Tay 1.9%; Thai 1.8%; Khome 1.4%; 1 SRBM bde
Hmong 1.3%; other or unspecified 7.1%
COMBAT SUPPORT
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
13 arty bde
1 arty regt
Male 12.2% 4.0% 4.2% 4.7% 22.5% 2.5% 10 engr bde
Female 11.0% 3.7% 4.0% 4.5% 22.9% 3.9% 1 engr regt
1 EW unit
Capabilities 3 sigs bde
Vietnam has a stronger military tradition and its armed forces 2 sigs regt
have more operational experience than any of its neighbours. Its COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
defence efforts and armed forces also benefit from broad popular 9 economic construction div
support, particularly in the context of tensions with China over 1 log regt
Asia 315
Asia
Strela-2M (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manually operated),
GUNS
2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
SP 100mm SU-100; 122mm SU-122
PCO 5: 1 Project FC264; 4 TT-400TP with 2 AK630 CIWS,
TOWED 100mm T-12 (arty); M-1944
1 76mm gun
ARTILLERY 3,040+
PCC 6 Svetlyak with 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
SP 30+: 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 30 2S3 Akatsiya;
175mm M107 PBFG 8 Osa II with 4 single lnchr with P-15 Termit AShM
TOWED 2,300: 105mm M101/M102; 122mm D-30/Type- PBFT 2 Shershen† (FSU) with 4 single 533mm TT
54 (M-1938)/Type-60 (D-74); 130mm M-46; 152mm D-20; PH 2 Turya† with 1 twin 57mm gun
155mm M114 PHT 3 Turya† with 4 single 533mm TT, 1 twin 57mm gun
MRL 710+: 107mm 360 Type-63; 122mm 350 BM-21 Grad; PB 20: 14 Zhuk†; 4 Zhuk (mod); 2 TP-01
140mm BM-14 PBR 4 Stolkraft
MOR 82mm; 120mm M-1943; 160mm M-1943 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 13
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS MSO 2 Yurka
SRBM • Coventional Scud-B/C MSC 4 Sonya
AIR DEFENCE MHI 2 Korund (Yevgenya) (Project 1258)
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 MSR 5 K-8
Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) AMPHIBIOUS
GUNS 12,000 LANDING SHIPS 7
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 LSM 5:
TOWED 14.5mm/30mm/37mm/57mm/85mm/100mm 1 Polnochny A (capacity 6 Lt Tk/APC; 200 troops)
2 Polnochny B (capacity 6 Lt Tk/APC; 200 troops)
Navy ε40,000 (incl ε27,000 Naval Infantry) 2 Nau Dinh
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LST 2 Tran Khanh Du (ex-US LST 542) with 1 hel
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 8 landing platform (capacity 16 Lt Tk/APC; 140 troops)
SSK 6 Hanoi (RUS Varshavyanka) with 6 533mm TT with LANDING CRAFT • LCM 12
3M14E Klub-S (SS-N-30) LACM/3M54E Klub-S (SS-N-27 8 LCM 6 (capacity 1 Lt Tk or 80 troops)
Sizzler) AShM/53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME HWT 4 LCM 8 (capacity 1 MBT or 200 troops)
SSI 2 Yugo (DPRK) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 27
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 4 AFD 2
FRIGATES • FFGM 4 AGS 1 Tran Dai Nia (Damen Research Vessel 6613)
2 Dinh Tien Hoang (RUS Gepard 3.9 (Project 11661E)) AGSH 1
with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (SS-N-25 AKSL 18
Switchblade) AShM, 1 Palma lnchr with Sosna-R SAM, AP 1 Truong Sa
2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform AT 2
2 Tran Huang Dao (RUS Gepard 3.9 (Project 11661E)) AWT 1
with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (SS-N-25 AXS 1 Le Quy Don
316 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
In May, Indonesian state-owned insurance company the armed forces will only control businesses focused
PT Askrindo and the National Association of on security and defence.
Private Defense Industries (Pinhantanas) signed an
agreement to allow the former to supply private China’s first indigenously built aircraft carrier, the
Indonesian defence SMEs with credit, guarantees and Type-002, began sea trials in May and could enter
insurance. The agreement was backed by the defence service in 2019. The first Type-055 (Renhai) cruiser
ministry, which is trying to expand the country’s began sea trials in August.
defence-industrial base.
As part of the Defense Reform 2.0 plan, announced
In June, Australia announced that it had selected in August, South Korea launched a Defense Business
BAE Systems’ Global Combat Ship design for its Innovation Plan, which aims to simplify and speed
Future Frigate programme. Nine Hunter-class up the process of meeting equipment requirements,
frigates, as they will be known in Australian service, as well as address the shrinking defence-industrial
will replace the Anzac class, starting in the late workforce.
2020s. The ships will be fitted with a locally designed
and built CEAFAR2 phased-array radar and will have Indonesia began negotiations with South Korea
Asia
the Aegis combat-management system. Design in October to reduce its share of the KF-X fighter
and construction is expected to cost AU$35bn programme due to economic constraints. Since
(US$27.64bn). joining the programme in 2016, Indonesia has
reportedly struggled to keep up with payments.
Vietnam passed an amendment in June strengthening Indonesia is currently committed to 20% of the
the government’s drive to further reduce the number KF-X development cost, which is expected to be
of army-owned businesses from 88 to 16. The defence approximately US$1.9bn. The first prototype is
ministry hopes that at the end of the reform process, expected to be completed in 2021.
Australasia
14 South Asia
Southeast Asia – Peninsular and Archipelagic
12 Southeast Asia – Continental
Number of Countries
East Asia
10
Purchasing
8
6
4
2
0
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*Data reflects the number of countries with equipment-procurement contracts either ongoing or completed in 2018. Data includes only procurement programmes for which a production contract
has been signed. The data does not include upgrade programmes.
**Armoured fighting vehicles not including main battle tanks ***Includes combat-capable training aircraft IISS
©
318 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Table 15 Japan FY2019 defence-budget request: top ten new equipment acquisition programmes by value
Equipment Type Quantity Value (JPY) Value (US$) Prime contractor(s)
Aegis Ashore BMD SAM system 2 systems 234.3bn 2.13bn Lockheed Martin (US)
30FF FFGHM 2 99.5bn 906m MHI and MES (JPN)
F-35A Lightning II FGA ac 6 91.6bn 834m Lockheed Martin (US)
MHI (JPN)
SM-3 Block IIA; Ship-launched SAM n.k. 81.8bn 745m Raytheon (US)
SM-3 Block IB
Soryu class SSK 1 71.1bn 647m MHI (JPN)
Asia
T-72, the company was spending significant sums importing
the parts directly from Russia. 40
The comptroller estimated that 62% of the total cost of the
225 T-90S tanks manufactured by March 2013 was spent on
importing parts. The defence ministry made up for the 20
shortfall in local production by ordering a batch of 347
complete and kit-form T-90s in 2007. Deliveries were 0
completed several years later. It is possible that India’s T-90
4*
5*
6*
7
3
production line will run into the 2020s, but production will
–0
–0
–0
–1
–1
–1
–1
–1
–1
–1
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
have to pick up pace, or be supplemented by more imports,
if plans remain to replace the approximately 1,900 T-72M1
*Estimate based on achieved production rate
Ajeya tanks.