A Comparison of Ship Self

Defense Analysis Simulations

Tim Jahren Lee Schamp
Hank Embleton Mike Kamrowski
Shahrokh Hafizi

1
 Agenda
• Study Objectives
• Overview of Models
– SSD
– SADM
• Evaluation Process
• Evaluation Results
• System Life Cycle Utilization
• Next Steps
• Summary/Conclusions
2
 Study Objectives (1)
• Compare capability of SADM model with the
Raytheon Ship Self Defense (SSD) model
– Find out what it can do that we currently can’t do but
would if we could
– Compare model inputs/outputs/fidelity
– Establish common scenarios for “apples to apples”
comparison
– Create test cases that we can directly compare with
the same test case run in the Raytheon Ship Self
Defense model, to build confidence that we get the
results we expect to get
– Model features
• Identify missions which each model works best for, and why
• Identify discriminating features of each model
3
 Study Objectives (2)
• Investigate capability of SADM model for usage in
Raytheon
– Get to know how to set it up, exercise it, understand
what it can and can’t do for the types of analysis we
typically do
– Document what is immediately useful with the tool
– Document its naval weapons analysis issues
• Identify what is required to build new models for use in
SADM
• Identify additional features that are required
– Build some scenarios with multiple firing platforms
and related weapons coordination to understand what
capability is there

4
 SSD Overview
• Developed by Raytheon
• First-order effectiveness model of
short range air defense against
multiple antiship missiles by a single
firing ship
• Measures of Effectiveness
– Probability of killing all incoming
ASMs
– Number of Leakers
– Kill statistics
– Number of weapons expended
• Monte Carlo events
– Probability of kill at intercept
– ASM launch times and azimuth
spacing
– Sensor detection range
• User created/modified ship
configuration files, threat scenario
files, and weapon/sensor database 5
SSD Model Architecture
ASM A/C-LAUNCHED
THREAT RAID ASM's
WEAPON PARAMETERS - THREAT TYPE - NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
PARAMETERS - QUANTITY - START RANGE
- PROFILE - START RANGE - BEARING
- RCS - START TIME - ALTITUDE
- MAX RGE - VELOCITY - RAID INTERVAL - VELOCITY
- MIN RGE - ALTITUDE - AZIMUTH - RCS
- MAX INTERCEPT ALT - GUIDANCE TYPE - SHIP TARGETING - START/END TIMES
- GUIDANCE TYPE - SAFE KILL RANGE - NO. OF ASM's CARRIED
- ILLUMINATION TIME - ASM TYPE
- LOADOUT - WPN RELEASE LINE
- SALVO POLICY - LAUNCH INTERVAL
- LAUNCH RATE - SHIP TARGETING
- LAUNCH DELAY
- RE-ENGAGE DELAY
- RF/IR UNIQUE INPUTS
- PK FUNCTION OF RGE
- TIME OF FLIGHT GRAPHICAL
- GUN EXPECTED HITS
SSD OUTPUT

SENSOR
PARAMETERS OUTPUT
- MAX ELEVATION
SUMMARIES
ANGLE
SHIP
- DETECT TO TRK PARAMETERS - PROBABILITY OF NO LEAKERS
DELAY - ASMS KILLED BY WEAPON TYPE
- ANTENNA HEIGHT - WEAPON/SENSOR SUITES - AMMO EXPENDED
- KILL ASSESSMENT - NUMBER OF ILLUMINATORS - LEAKERS TO SHIPS
DELAY - ILLUMINATOR TIE-UP TIME - AVG KILL RANGE BY THREAT TYPE
- HANDOVER DELAY - NUMBER OF ESCORTED SHIPS - MIN/MAX KILL RANGE
- DETECTION VS. - RANGE - PROB. ALL KILLS BEYOND SAFE
ALTITUDE & RCS - BEARING RANGE
- PROB. FIRM TRACK - CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
VS. RANGE

6
SSD Video Clips

7
SSD Sample Measures of
Effectiveness Total Kills
Prob of No Leakers

Missiles Expended 8 Average Kill Range

7

0
AC1 AC2 AC3 AC4 M1 M2 M3 M4
8
 SADM Overview
• Developed by BAE Systems
• SADM is a software simulation tool
directed at the Maritime Self Defence
problem (air and surface threats)
• Simulates the defence of a task group
against other ships, aircraft, ASMs,
and background targets
• Includes littoral effects
• Consists of detailed models of
– Platforms (ships, aircraft, land-based
weapon sites etc)
– Sensors (many types of radars, IRST,
ESM)
– Trackers and track management
systems
– Command and control, weapons
control systems
– Weapons (hard kill and soft kill) © BAE Systems Australia Limited

– Anti-ship missiles (seekers, body and

electronic environment)
– Environment (atmosphere, terrain,
propagation)
– Interactions between subsystems
9
 SADM Model Architecture
• Composed of interacting objects
– Environment, propagation, and
signature models
– Sensors
– Trackers, track management,
data fusion, and hostility
classification models
– C2/WCS system(s)
– Hard-Kill Weapons
– Soft-Kill Weapons
• This architecture is
– Useful to the user (add-ins)
– Useful for code maintenance

© BAE Systems Australia Limited

10
SADM Video Clip

11
 Evaluation Process
Run Identify
Identify Develop Evaluate Unique
Scenarios Differences
Core Baseline Features/
in each and
Capabilities Scenarios Interoperability
Model Evaluate

Missile Scenario Start Firing

Type Description ASM Type Ranges Doctrines # Runs
1 and 2 Subsonic; 8 nmi;
Active ASMs; 300 m/sec 20 nmi SLS, SSLSS
Update
1 andP2k=1 8
inbound Supersonic; 12 nmi; SLS, SLSS, Model(s)
Active ASMs;
1 andP2k=1 800 m/sec 20 nmi SSLSS 12
inbound Subsonic; 8 nmi; SLS, SLSS,
Active ASMs;
1 andP2k=0 300 m/sec 20 nmi SSLSS 12
inbound Supersonic; 12 nmi; SLS, SLSS,
Active ASMs;
1 andP2k=0 800 m/sec 20 nmi SSLSS 12
inbound Subsonic; 8 nmi;
HAW ASMs;1 andP2k=1 300 m/sec 20 nmi SLS, SSLSS 8
inbound Supersonic; 12 nmi;
HAW ASMs;1 andP2k=1 800 m/sec 20 nmi SLS, SSLSS 8
inbound Subsonic; 8 nmi;
HAW ASMs;1 andP2k=1 300 m/sec 20 nmi SLS, SSLSS 8
inbound Supersonic; 12 nmi;
HAW ASMs;1 andP2k=1 800 m/sec 20 nmi SLS, SSLSS 8
inbound Subsonic; 8 nmi;
SATH ASMs;
1 andP2k=1 300 m/sec 20 nmi SLS, SSLSS 8
inbound Supersonic; 12 nmi;
SATH ASMs;
1 andP2k=1 800 m/sec 20 nmi SLS, SSLSS 8
inbound Subsonic; 8 nmi;
SATH ASMs;
1 andP2k=1 300 m/sec 20 nmi SLS, SSLSS 8
inbound Supersonic; 12 nmi;
SATH ASMs; Pk=1 800 m/sec 20 nmi SLS, SSLSS 8

12
 Subsonic Threat Performance
Active Missiles
• Results showed excellent
Blue Ship Threats Notes
agreement for subsonic Ship Ship SADM Data SSD Data

threats with active Test

#
Search
Radar
Firing
Doctrine
ASMs Initial Detect Launch Intercept Initial Detect Launch Intercept

missiles. R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) H/M? T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) H/M? T (s)

• Generally, times for 1

Phased
Array
SLS 1 SBS @ 20 nm Set PK = 1 14.8 31.0 12.8 43.0 7.8 HIT 73.0 16.3 22.3 13.0 41.7 8.0 HIT 71.7

intercept are within 2 2

Phased
Array
SLS 1 SBS @ 8 nm Set PK = 1 7.9 1.0 6.3 11.0 4.0 HIT 24.5 8.0 0.1 6.3 10.1 4.2 HIT 22.7
Phased Set Pk = 1.
seconds and intercept 3
Array
SSLSS 1 SBS @ 20 nm
SAM1
14.8 31.0 12.8 43.0 7.8 HIT 73.0 16.3 22.3 13.0 41.7 8.0 HIT 71.7

SAM2 12.4 45.0 Overki l l 43.7 Overki l l

ranges are within 0.2 4
Phased
SSLSS 1 SBS @ 8 nm
Set Pk = 1.
7.9 1.0 6.3 11.0 4.0 HIT 24.5 8.0 0.1 6.3 10.1 4.2 HIT 22.7
Array SAM1
nautical mile. SAM2 5.9 13.0 Overki l l 12.1 Overki l l

•
Phased 2 SBS @ 20 nm; Set Pk = 1.
Some of the initial 5
Array
SLS
1 second apart ASM1/SAM2
15.0 30.0 12.7 43.5 7.8 HIT 73.3 16.3 22.3 13.0 41.7 8.0 HIT 71.7
ASM2/SAM1 15.0 30.0 12.6 45.5 7.7 HIT 74.8 16.3 23.3 12.8 43.7 7.9 HIT 73.2
detection ranges were a 6
Phased
Array
SLS
2 SBS @ 8 nm; Set Pk = 1.
1 second apart ASM1/SAM1
7.9 1.0 6.3 11.0 4.0 HIT 24.5 8.0 0.1 6.3 10.1 4.2 HIT 22.7

little further out for SSD, 7

Phased
SSLSS
ASM2/SAM1
2 SBS @ 20 nm; Set Pk = 1.
8.1
14.8
1.0
31.0
6.1
13.0
13.0
42.5
3.9
7.8
HIT
HIT
26.2
73.0
8.0
16.3
1
22.3
6.1
13.0
12.1
41.7
4.1
8.0
HIT
HIT
24.3
71.7
Array 1 second apart ASM1/SAM1
but that difference can be ASM1/SAM2 12.6 44.5 Overki l l 43.7 Overki l l 73.7

attributed to the fact that ASM2/SAM1

ASM2/SAM2
15.0 31.0 12.4
12.0
46.5
48.5
7.6 HIT
Overki l l
75.3 16.3 23.3 12.5 45.7
47.7
7.7 HIT
Overki l l
74.3

SSD assumes “perfect” 8

Phased
Array
SSLSS
2 SBS @ 8 nm; Set Pk = 1.
1 second apart ASM1/SAM1
7.9 1.0 6.3 11.0 4.0 HIT 24.5 8.0 0.1 6.3 10.1 4.2 HIT 22.7

radar detection and SADM ASM1/SAM2 5.9 13.0 Overki l l 12.1 Overki l l 24.6
ASM2/SAM1 8.1 1.0 5.7 15.0 3.7 HIT 27.6 8.0 1 5.8 14.1 3.8 HIT 25.8
models actual radar ASM2/SAM2 5.4 17.0 Overki l l 16.1 Overki l l

performance.

13
 Supersonic Threat Performance
Active Missiles
Blue Ship Threats Notes
Ship Ship SADM Data SSD Data
Test Search Firing
ASMs Initial Detect Launch Intercept Initial Detect Launch Intercept
# Radar Doctrine

R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) H/M? T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) H/M? T (s)

Phased Set Pk = 1.
9 SLS 1 SSS @ 20 nm 19.1 2.0 14.0 14.0 5.7 HIT 33.0 19.1 2.1 14.7 12.1 6.1 HIT 32.0
Array SAM1
Phased
10 SLS 1 SSS @ 12 nm Set PK = 1 11.4 1.0 7.1 11.0 2.7 HIT 21.3 11.9 0.1 7.6 10.1 3.1 HIT 20.4
Array
Phased Set Pk = 1.
11 SLSS 1 SSS @ 20 nm 19.1 2.0 14.4 13.0 5.8 HIT 33.0 19.1 2.1 14.7 12.1 6.1 HIT 32.0
Array SAM1
SAM2 14.1 Overki l l

Phased Set Pk = 1.
12 SLSS 1 SSS @ 12 nm 11.4 1.0 7.1 11.0 2.7 HIT 21.3 11.9 0.1 7.6 10.1 3.1 HIT 20.4
Array SAM1
SAM2 12.1 Overki l l

Phased Set Pk = 1.
13 SSLSS 1 SSS @ 20 nm 18.7 3.0 14.4 13.0 5.8 HIT 33.0 19.1 2.1 14.7 12.1 6.1 HIT 32.0
Array SAM1
SAM2 13.5 15.0 Overki l l 14.1 Overki l l

Phased Set Pk = 1.
14 SSLSS 1 SSS @ 12 nm 11.4 1.0 7.1 11.0 2.7 HIT 21.3 11.9 0.1 7.6 10.1 3.1 HIT 20.4
Array SAM1
SAM2 6.3 13.0 Overki l l 12.1 Overki l l

• Results showed excellent agreement for supersonic threats

• Generally, times for intercept are within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges are within 0.5 nautical miles.

14
 Subsonic Threat Performance
Active Missiles, Pk=0
• In this case, the probability of kill Blue Ship
Ship Ship
Threats Notes
SADM Data SSD Data
(Pk) was set to 0 to compare Test
#
Search
Radar
Firing
Doctrine
ASMs Initial Detect Launch Intercept Initial Detect Launch Intercept

engagement ranges and R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) H/M? T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) H/M? T (s)

timelines, with a special focus on 21

Phased
SLS 1 SBS @ 20 nm
Set Pk = 0.
15.0 30.0 13.1 41.5 7.9 MISS 72.3 16.3 22.3 13.0 41.7 8.0 MISS 71.7

quantifying the “depth of fire” and

Array SAM1
SAM2 6.7 80.0 4.3 MISS 94.3 6.6 79.8 4.4 MISS 93.1
SAM3 3.0 102.0 1.7 MISS 110.1 3.1 101.2 1.9 MISS 108.4

reengagement timelines in both 22

Phased
Array
SLS 1 SBS @ 8 nm
Set Pk = 0.
SAM1
7.9 1.0 6.3 11.0 4.0 MISS 24.5 8.0 0.1 6.3 10.1 4.2 MISS 22.7
SAM2 2.8 32.0 1.5 MISS 39.8 2.8 30.7 1.7 MISS 37.6
models 23
Phased
Array
SLSS 1 SBS @ 20 nm
Set Pk = 0.
SAM1
16.2 23.0 13.0 42.0 7.9 MISS 72.6 16.3 22.3 13.0 41.7 8.0 MISS 71.7

•
SAM2 6.7 80.0 4.3 MISS 94.3 6.3 81.8 4.2 MISS 94.4
Initial results found significant SAM3
SAM4
6.3
2.8
82.0
103.0
4.1
1.5
MISS
MISS
95.7
110.9
2.5 104.5
106.5
1.4
1.2
MISS
MISS
110.9
112.4

differences in each model’s 24

Phased
SLSS 1 SBS @ 8 nm
SAM5
Set Pk = 0.
7.9 1.0
2.5
6.3
105.0
11.0
1.3
4.0
MISS
MISS
112.4
24.5 8.0 0.1 6.3 10.1 4.2 MISS 22.7
Array SAM1
reengagement timelines; with SAM2
SAM3
2.8
2.4
32.0
34.0
1.5
1.2
MISS
MISS
39.8
41.3
2.5 32.7
34.7
1.4
1.2
MISS
MISS
39.1
40.6
additional analysis of the 25
Phased
Array
SSLSS 1 SBS @ 20 nm
Set Pk = 0.
SAM1
16.2 23.0 12.8 43.0 7.8 MISS 73.0 16.3 22.3 13.0 41.7 8.0 MISS 71.7
SAM2 12.5 45.0 7.7 MISS 74.1 43.7 7.8 MISS 72.8
parameters used to model SAM3 6.3 82.0 4.1 MISS 95.7 6.5 80.9 4.3 MISS 93.8
SAM4 6.0 84.0 3.8 MISS 97.1 82.9 4.1 MISS 95.2
engagement timelines in both SAM5
SAM6
2.5
2.2
105.0
107.0
1.3
1.0
MISS
MISS
112.4
113.8
2.7 103.3
105.3
1.6
1.3
MISS
MISS
110.0
111.5
Phased Set Pk = 0.
models, we were able to 26
Array
SSLSS 1 SBS @ 8 nm
SAM1
7.9 1.0 6.3 11.0 4.0 MISS 24.5 8.0 0.1 6.3 10.1 4.2 MISS 22.7
SAM2 5.9 13.0 3.8 MISS 25.9 12.1 4.0 MISS 24.0
reconfigure each model to SAM3
SAM4
2.6
2.3
33.0
35.0
1.4
1.1
MISS
MISS
40.5
42.0
2.6 32
34
1.5
1.3
MISS
MISS
38.6
40.1

produce similar results.

• Generally, times for intercept are
within 2 seconds and intercept
ranges are within 0.2 nautical
mile. 15
 Supersonic Threat Performance
Active Missiles, Pk=0
• Both models were able to
Blue Ship Threats Notes
generate results with good Ship Ship SADM Data SSD Data

agreement after some Test

#
Search
Radar
Firing
Doctrine
ASMs Initial Detect Launch Intercept Initial Detect Launch Intercept

reconfiguration of their R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) H/M? T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) H/M? T (s)

reengagement parameters. 39
Phased
SLS
2 SSS @ 20 nm; Set Pk = 0.
18.7 3.0 14.4 13.0 5.8 MISS 32.9 19.1 2.1 14.7 12.1 6.1 HIT 32.0
Array 1 second apart ASM1/SAM1

• Generally, times for intercept ASM1/SAM2

ASM2/SAM1 19.6 2.0
2.8
13.9
40.0
15.0
0.4
5.7
MISS
MISS
45.5
34.2 19.1 3.1 14.3 14.1 6.0 HIT 33.3
ASM2/SAM2
were within 2 seconds and 40
Phased
SLS
2 SSS @ 12 nm; Set Pk = 0.
11.5 1.0 6.3 13.0 2.3 MISS 22.4 11.9 0.1 7.6 10.1 3.1 MISS 20.4
Array 1 second apart ASM1
intercept ranges within 0.5 Phased
ASM2
2 SSS @ 20 nm; Set Pk = 0.
11.9 1.1 7.6 11.0 2.9 MISS 21.9 12.0 1 7.2 12.1 2.9 MISS 21.9
41 SLSS 18.7 3.0 14.4 13.0 5.8 MISS 32.9 19.1 2.1 14.7 12.1 6.1 MISS 32.0
nautical mile. Array 1 second apart ASM1/SAM1
ASM1/SAM2 2.8 40.0 0.4 MISS 45.5 14.1 5.9 MISS 32.6
ASM2/SAM1 19.1 3.0 13.9 15.0 5.7 MISS 34.2 19.1 3.1 13.4 16.1 5.7 MISS 34.0
• The biggest finding in this set of Phased
ASM2/SAM2
2 SSS @ 12 nm; Set Pk = 0.
18.1 5.4 MISS 34.7
42 SLSS 11.5 1.0 6.3 13.0 2.3 MISS 22.4 11.9 0.1 7.6 10.1 3.1 MISS 20.4
data was that SADM had a Array 1 second apart ASM1/SAM1
ASM1/SAM3 12.1 2.7 MISS 21.4

different SLSS firing policy than ASM2/SAM1

ASM2/SAM2
11.9 1.1 7.6 11.0 2.9 MISS 21.8 12.0 1 6.3 14.1
16.1
2.5
2.1
MISS
MISS
22.9
23.8
Phased 2 SSS @ 20 nm; Set Pk = 0.
SSD. SADM would shoot one 43
Array
SSLSS
1 second apart ASM1/SAM1
ASM1/SAM2
18.7 3.0 12.7
11.8
17.0
19.0
5.2
4.8
MISS
MISS
34.3
35.2
19.1 2.1 14.7 12.1
14.1
6.1
5.9
MISS
MISS
32.0
32.6
shot the first engagement, and 2 ASM2/SAM1
ASM2/SAM2
19.1 3.0 14.8
13.9
13.0
15.0
6.0
5.7
MISS
MISS
33.5
34.2
19.1 3.1 13.4 16.1
18.1
5.7
5.4
MISS
MISS
34.0
34.7

shots for subsequent 44

Phased
Array
SSLSS
2 SSS @ 12 nm; Set Pk = 0.
1 second apart ASM1/SAM1
11.5 1.0 5.4 15.0 1.8 MISS 23.4 11.9 0.1 7.6 10.1 3.1 MISS 20.4
ASM1/SAM2 4.6 17.0 1.3 MISS 24.5 12.1 2.7 MISS 21.4
engagements. The SSD model ASM2/SAM1 11.9 1.1 7.6 11.0 2.9 MISS 21.9 12.0 1 6.3 14.1 2.5 MISS 22.9
ASM2/SAM2 6.7 13.0 2.5 MISS 22.8 16.1 2.1 MISS 23.8
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity. 16
 Threat Performance
“Home All the Way” Missiles, SLS Firing Doctrine
Blue Ship Threats Notes
Ship Ship SADM Data SSD Data
Test Search Firing
ASMs Initial Detect Launch Intercept Initial Detect Launch Intercept
# Radar Doctrine

R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) H/M? T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) H/M? T (s)

45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS @ 20 nm 12.5 44.8 9.5 63.1 6.1 HIT 83.4 12.5 44.8 10.8 54.9 6.8 HIT 78.6
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS @ 8 nm 7.9 1.5 6.1 12.0 3.9 HIT 25.2 8.0 0.1 6.3 10.1 4.2 HIT 22.7
2 SBS @ 20 nm;
47 Default_Radar SLS ASM1/SAM1 12.3 47.2 4.6 93.8 2.8 HIT 104.4 12.5 44.8 10.8 54.9 6.8 HIT 78.6
1 second apart
Default_Radar ASM2/SAM1 12.0 45.7 9.8 58.9 6.3 HIT 80.1 12.5 45.8 5.0 90.6 3.2 HIT 101.1
2 SBS @ 8 nm;
48 Default_Radar SLS ASM1/SAM1 7.9 1.0 6.1 12.0 3.9 HIT 25.2 8.0 0.1 6.3 10.1 4.2 HIT 22.7
1 second apart
Default_Radar ASM2/SAM1 8.1 1.0 1.9 38.0 0.9 HIT 44.5 8.0 1 2.3 34.7 1.3 HIT 40.9
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS @ 20 nm 16.1 8.9 10.8 21.4 4.4 HIT 36.2 16.0 9.2 11.7 19.2 5.1 HIT 34.5
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS @ 12 nm 11.8 0.2 7.1 11.1 2.7 HIT 21.4 11.9 0.1 7.6 10.1 3.1 HIT 20.4
2 SSS @ 20 nm;
51 Default_Radar SLS ASM1/SAM1 16.0 9.2 11.4 20.0 4.7 HIT 35.6 16.0 9.2 11.7 19.2 5.1 HIT 34.5
1 second apart
ASM2/SAM1 15.1 12.2 No launch - HIT SHIP 16.0 10.2 No launch - HIT SHIP
2 SSS @ 12 nm;
52 Default_Radar SLS ASM1/SAM1 11.6 0.8 6.4 12.8 2.3 HIT 22.2 11.9 0.1 7.6 10.1 3.1 HIT 20.4
1 second apart
ASM2/SAM1 11.3 2.3 No launch - HIT SHIP 12.0 1 No launch - HIT SHIP

• Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship, ship employs
“Home All the Way” (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine.
• Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement. Generally,
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 0.2 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 0.5 nautical mile for supersonic threats.
• Similarly, we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well.

17
 Threat Performance
Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles, SSLSS Firing
Doctrine
Blue Ship Threats Notes
• Results for cruise missiles Ship Ship SADM Data SSD Data

engaging the ship, ship Test

#
Search
Radar
Firing
Doctrine
ASMs Initial Detect Launch Intercept Initial Detect Launch Intercept

employs missiles with semi- R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) H/M? T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) H/M? T (s)

active terminal homing (SATH) 69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS @ 20 nm ASM1/SAM1 12.4 45.7 10.5 57.0 6.6 HIT 80.3 12.5 44.8 10.8 54.9 6.8 HIT 78.6

capability using a Shoot-Shoot- 70

Default_Radar

Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS @ 8 nm

ASM1/SAM2
ASM1/SAM1 8.0 0.4
10.2
6.3
59.0
11.0 4.0
Overki l l

HIT 24.5 8.0 0.1 6.3

56.9
10.1 4.2
Overki l l

HIT 22.7

Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS) Default_Radar

2 SBS @ 20 nm;
ASM1/SAM2 5.9 13.0 Overki l l 12.1 Overki l l

71 Default_Radar SSLSS ASM1/SAM1 12.2 46.6 9.3 64.0 6.0 HIT 84.2 12.5 44.8 10.8 54.9 6.8 HIT 78.6
firing doctrine. 1 second apart
ASM1/SAM2 9.0 66.0 Overki l l 56.9 Overki l l 80.5

• Both models were able to ASM2/SAM1

ASM2/SAM2
12.6 45.1 4.3
4.0
95.0
97.0
2.7 HIT
Overki l l
105.2 12.5 45.8 6.5 81.7
83.7
4.3 HIT
Overki l l
94.7

generate results with quite 72 Default_Radar SSLSS

2 SBS @ 8 nm;
1 second apart
ASM1/SAM1 7.9 1.3 6.1 12.0 3.9 HIT 25.2 8.0 0.1 6.3 10.1 4.2 HIT 22.7

good agreement. Generally, ASM1/SAM2 5.8 14.0 Overki l l 12.1 Overki l l 24.6
ASM2/SAM1 8.0 1.3 2.2 36.5 1.0 HIT 43.3 8.0 1 2.9 31.1 1.8 HIT 38.2
times for intercept are within 2 ASM2/SAM2 1.9 38.5 Overki l l 33.1 Overki l l

73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS @ 20 nm ASM1/SAM1 15.9 9.5 11.4 20.0 4.7 HIT 35.6 16.0 9.2 11.7 19.2 5.1 HIT 34.5
seconds and intercept ranges ASM1/SAM2 10.5 22.0 Overki l l 21.2 Overki l l

are within 0.2 nautical miles for 74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS @ 12 nm ASM1/SAM1
ASM1/SAM2
11.4 1.1 6.7
5.9
12.0
14.0
2.5 HIT
Overki l l
21.8 11.9 0.1 7.6 10.1
12.1
3.1 HIT
Overki l l
20.4

subsonic threats and 0.5 75 Default_Radar SSLSS

2 SSS @ 20 nm;
1 second apart
ASM1/SAM1 15.6 10.3 No launch - HIT SHIP 16.0 9.2 11.7 19.2 5.1 HIT 34.5

nautical mile for supersonic ASM1/SAM2

ASM2/SAM1 16.0 10.3 10.5 23.0 4.3 37.5 16.0 10.2
21.2 Overkil
l
No launch - HIT SHIP
36.4

ASM2/SAM2 9.6 25.0

threats. 76 Default_Radar SSLSS
2 SSS @ 12 nm;
ASM1/SAM1 11.3 1.4
Overki l l

No launch - HIT SHIP 11.9 0.1 7.6 10.1 3.1 HIT 20.4
1 second apart

• Similarly, the SATH results for ASM1/SAM2

ASM2/SAM1 11.7 1.4 7.1 12.0 2.7 HIT 22.4 12.0 1
12.1 Overkil
l
No launch - HIT SHIP
22.3

ASM2/SAM2 6.3 14.0 Overki l l

cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement.
18
 SSD/SADM Comparison
Criteria SSD SADM

Ease of use Easy to set up and use – low learning curve. Significant learning curve for new users. Large
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect, launch, set of default values available, but analyst must
intercept, etc.) you wish to study. validate them for his study. Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs Runs fairly quickly, though it can take hours to
to analyze in minutes. complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs.
Modeling Uses look up tables to characterize most Uses physics based models more than look up
approach performance. Validity depends on source of tables (models sensor detections / flies missile
data; excellent if from high fidelity sims. at physics level).
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic, providing low Sensor models are medium fidelity, allowing an
fidelity. Analyst will use sensor as “black box” analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
using SSD. their study with a sensor as key component.
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons, Medium fidelity physics based models. No
and model can be readily adapted for new capability to model dual mode missiles like
weapon models using look up tables. RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today, though in
development.
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analyst’s Provide results tuned to ship system designer’s
needs. needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors,
weapons, and threats available. Utilized in
Navy for hard kill / soft kill interaction analysis.

Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve

19
 Model(s) Life Cycle View
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced

Ship Self Defense combat survivability data Ship Self Defense combat survivability data
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions, Develop ICD, Conduct AoA
for projected ship systems and threats. for projected ship systems and threats.

Ship Self Defense combat survivability data

Ship Self Defense combat survivability data
for projected ship systems and threats. This
Reduce technology risk, determine and mature the appropriate set of for projected ship systems and threats. This
Technology Development will include updated sensor, C2, and weapon
technologies to be integrated into a full system, demonstrate on prototypes. will include updated sensor and weapon
models using updated design and
performance data from this phase.
performance data during this phase.

Develop a system or an increment of capability; complete full system integration Ship Self Defense combat survivability data
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data
(technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development); develop for developed ship systems and projected
Engineering and for developed ship systems and projected
manufacturing process; ensure operational systems integration (HSI); design for threats. This will include updated sensor, C2,
Manufacturing Development threats. This will include updated sensor and
producibility; ensure affordability; minimizing the logistics footprint; and and weapon models using updated design
weapon performance data from this phase.
demonstrate system integration, interoperability, safety, and utility. and performance data during this phase.

Ship Self Defense combat survivability data

Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected
Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs. Operational test
Production and Deployment for existing ship systems and projected threats. This will include updated sensor, C2,
and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system.
threats. and weapon models using updated design
and performance data during this phase.

Ship Self Defense combat survivability data

Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected
Operations and Support support performance requirements, and sustains the system in the most cost- for existing ship systems and projected threats. This will include updated sensor, C2,
effective manner over its total life cycle. threats. and weapon models using updated design
and performance data during this phase.

• This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
• SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
• SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors, C2, and weapons
• The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle, while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
• We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study.
20
 Extended SADM Applications

SADM can be extended to include

higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis, or……..
SADM w/ Missile 6 DOF

SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs).

21
 Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises

Bethpage: NG BAMS
JLENS
CNR Radio

WPAFB:
SIMAF

Whiteman: B-2

Redstone (3): DTCC, GMAN, SED

Charleston (2):
Tucson : RMS
IPC, MEF-MEU

Ft Huachuca: JITC

Ft Hood (2): CTSF, TTEC

Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
22 Joint
Industry
 Summary/Conclusions
• This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity, data
requirements, and learning curve for the models evaluated
• Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM, while similar
models in many ways, provide unique capabilities
– SSD provides an important “quick look” capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
– SADM provides a more “in depth” look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
• We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis

23
 About the Author
• TIM JAHREN, PHONE: 407-341-9780, EMAIL:
JAHREN@RAYTHEON.COM
• TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of
companies for 30 years. Tim has been a leader in the
Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for
15 years. He is the current chair for SISO's System Life Cycle
(SLC) forum. He has supported a wide variety of M&S and
Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs, including the
Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise, the Navy's DD-
21 and DD(X) programs, and the Army's Future Combat
System. Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical
engineering from Northwestern University and a masters
degree in electrical engineering with a focus on
communication systems from the University of Southern
California.

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