REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO…………/2023

[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL) NO. 1249/2023]

Ramesh Chandra Vaishya …APPELLANT

VS.

The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. …RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

Leave granted.

2. The present appeal, by special leave, questions the judgment and order

dated 23rd May, 2022 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court

of Judicature at Allahabad (“High Court”, hereafter) dismissing an

Signature Not Verifiedapplication under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731
Digitally signed by
NEETA SAPRA
Date: 2023.05.22
11:41:59 IST
Reason:

1
Application u/s 482 No. 38374 of 2018

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 (“Cr. PC”, hereafter) instituted by the appellant seeking quashing of the

charge-sheet as well as the pending criminal proceedings2.

3. In a nutshell, the prosecution's case is that on 14th January, 2016, at

about 7.00 am, the appellant was engaged in an altercation with the

second respondent (“complainant”, hereafter) over the issue of drainage

of water. It is alleged that during this altercation, the appellant verbally

hurled caste related abuses towards the complainant and his family

members, and subsequently physically assaulted the complainant

causing him multiple injuries. Consequently, on 20th January, 2016, a

First Information Report (“first F.I.R”, hereafter) was registered against

the appellant under sections 323 and 504, Indian Penal Code, 1860

(“IPC”, hereafter) and 3(1)(x), the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled

Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“SC/ST Act”, hereafter).

4. Investigation was conducted by the concerned Circle Officer (“I.O.”,

hereafter). Upon investigation, which was completed within a day, the

I.O. reached the conclusion that there were materials against the

appellant to send him up for trial and consequently, a charge-sheet

dated 21st January, 2016 under sections 323, 504, IPC and 3(1)(x),

SC/ST Act was filed before the concerned court against him. The court

took cognizance of the offence on 3rd May, 2016.

5. It is important to emphasize at this juncture that the appellant intended

to lodge an F.I.R. arising out of the same incident. According to him, he

2
Case Crime No. 23 of 2016; Criminal Case No. 376 of 2016

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 was badly beaten up by the complainant and his son with canes and

lathis on 14th January, 2016, as a result of which he too sustained

injuries. On the same date, when the appellant approached the police

station to lodge the F.I.R., it was not registered; instead, the appellant

was challaned and kept under detention by the concerned inspector in-

charge under sections 151, 107, and 116, Cr. PC. He was subsequently

released upon furnishing bail bond. Owing to the failure of the Police to

register the F.I.R., the appellant moved an application under section

156(3), Cr. PC. Pursuant to the order passed by the Magistrate, an F.I.R.

dated 18th February, 2016 (“second F.I.R.”, hereafter) was registered for

the offences under sections 323, 325, 392, 452, 504, 506, IPC against

the complainant (second respondent).

6. It is also noted that the appellant has instituted a suit3 before the civil

court seeking permanent injunction against the complainant’s continued

encroachment upon the appellant’s lands. The same is pending

consideration before the competent court.

7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid charge-sheet, the appellant invoked the

jurisdiction of the High Court on 5th October, 2018 by applying under

section 482, Cr. PC. He sought quashing thereof as well as the criminal

proceedings against him on the grounds that the said charge sheet

discloses no offence and the present prosecution has been instituted

with mala fide intention for the purposes of harassment.

3
C.S. No. 07 of 2017

3
8. Having held that a prima facie case for grant of interim relief was set up,

the High Court, vide interim order dated 15th November, 2018, directed

that no coercive action be taken against the appellant, pending

consideration of the application under section 482, Cr. PC.

9. However, upon a contested hearing, the High Court found no material

irregularity in the charge-sheet or the procedure followed by the Court

below in taking cognizance, and proceeded to dismiss the appellant's

application under section 482, Cr. PC vide the impugned judgment and

order. The High Court held that, at this stage, it cannot be concluded

that a cognizable offence has not been disclosed, as the allegations are

factual in nature and would require leading of evidence by the parties.

Relying on the decision of this Court in Mohd. Allauddin Khan vs. The

State of Bihar and Ors.4, the High Court emphasized that at the stage

of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under section 482, Cr.

PC, the court has limited jurisdiction and it cannot appreciate the

evidence in order to determine whether, prima facie, a case has been

made out against the accused. The High Court noted that without

evidence, it is not possible to ascertain the veracity of the allegations at

this stage; the application for quashing of a charge-sheet or criminal

proceedings under section 482 Cr. PC, therefore, cannot sustain.

10. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Ms. Shukla, learned counsel

advanced the following submissions:

4
(2019) 6 SCC 107

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 a. The first F.I.R., which was registered after a delay of six days, is

an afterthought and creates serious doubts over the allegations of

the complainant.

b. The charge-sheet was filed on the very next day of registration of

the first F.I.R., without conducting proper investigation. The

charge-sheet fails to take note of the second F.I.R. registered at

the instance of the appellant and the medical report.

c. The complainant, being an influential person in the village,

maliciously initiated criminal proceedings against the appellant

with an ulterior motive to scuttle the already pending civil dispute

in the civil court between the parties.

d. The Police did not act on the appellant's complaint. The second

F.I.R. dated 18th February, 2016 was registered only after an order

was passed on the appellant’s application under section 156(3),

Cr. PC by the Magistrate.

e. State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors.5 was

placed in support of the contention that if the contents of the F.I.R.,

taken on their face value, does not make out any case against the

appellant, such an F.I.R. registered with ulterior motive deserves

to be quashed.

f. Hitesh Verma vs. The State of Uttarakhand & Anr.6 was also

placed to support the contention that the High Court ignored the

5
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
6
(2020) 10 SCC 710

5
 misuse and abuse of the provisions of the SC/ST Act by the

complainant; neither the contents of the first F.I.R. nor the

charge-sheet discloses the precise content of abusive language

employed by the appellant so as to attract the provisions of section

3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act.

11. It was, accordingly, prayed that relief prayed for by the appellant be

granted.

12. Mr. Prasad, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the first

respondent (State) while seeking dismissal of this appeal contended as

follows:

a. The appellant had committed a serious crime as a result of which

the complainant had sustained multiple injuries in the resultant

altercation.

b. The Police, on the basis of the statement given by the complainant

and the investigation that followed, filed the charge-sheet dated

21st January, 2016 before the trial court after following due

procedure.

c. The High Court, vide the impugned judgment and order, has

rightly dismissed the application for quashing presented by the

appellant.

d. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. PC

should be sparingly exercised with complete circumspection and

caution and the High Court was not in error in refusing to exercise

jurisdiction.

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13. Mr. Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the complainant (second

respondent) supported the impugned judgment and order of the High

Court. According to him, completion of investigation within a day by

the I.O. may seem to be unusual but is not an impossibility. He also

contended that the charge-sheet having been filed, the law must be

allowed to take its own course; and, if at all the appellant is aggrieved

by framing of charges, he may seek his remedy in accordance with law.

No case for interference having been set up by the appellant, Mr.

Shukla prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

14. We have heard the parties and perused the judgment and order of the

High Court together with the materials on record.

15. Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, prior to its amendment notified vide

S.O. 152(E) dated 18th January, 2016, read as follows:

“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities. — (1) Whoever, not

16. The first F.I.R., registered at the instance of the complainant, is silent

about the place of occurrence and who, being a member of the public,

was present when the appellant is alleged to have hurled caste related

abuses at the complainant. However, on a reading of the second F.I.R.

registered at the behest of the appellant, it appears that the incident

took place at the house of the appellant.

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17. The first question that calls for an answer is whether it was at a place

within public view that the appellant hurled caste related abuses at the

complainant with an intent to insult or intimidate with an intent to

humiliate him. From the charge-sheet dated 21st January, 2016 filed by

the I.O., it appears that the prosecution would seek to rely on the

evidence of three witnesses to drive home the charge against the

appellant of committing offences under sections 323 and 504, IPC and

3(1)(x), SC/ST Act. These three witnesses are none other than the

complainant, his wife and their son. Neither the first F.I.R. nor the

charge-sheet refers to the presence of a fifth individual (a member of

the public) at the place of occurrence (apart from the appellant, the

complainant, his wife and their son). Since the utterances, if any,

made by the appellant were not “in any place within public view”,

the basic ingredient for attracting section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act

was missing/absent. We, therefore, hold that at the relevant point of

time of the incident (of hurling of caste related abuse at the

complainant by the appellant), no member of the public was

present.

18. That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant had hurled caste

related abuses at the complainant with a view to insult or humiliate

him, the same does not advance the case of the complainant any

further to bring it within the ambit of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act.

We have noted from the first F.I.R. as well as the charge-sheet that the

same makes no reference to the utterances of the appellant during the

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course of verbal altercation or to the caste to which the complainant

belonged, except for the allegation/observation that caste-related

abuses were hurled. The legislative intent seems to be clear that every

insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to

an offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course,

such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he

being a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls

another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any

place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act

intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language.

Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be

a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract

section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks.

Since section 18 of the SC/ST Act bars invocation of the court’s

jurisdiction under section 438, Cr.PC and having regard to the

overriding effect of the SC/ST Act over other laws, it is desirable that

before an accused is subjected to a trial for alleged commission of

offence under section 3(1)(x), the utterances made by him in any place

within public view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R. (which is not required

to be an encyclopaedia of all facts and events), but at least in the

charge-sheet (which is prepared based either on statements of

witnesses recorded in course of investigation or otherwise) so as to

enable the court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makes out a

case of an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed for

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 forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before it,

prior to taking cognisance of the offence. Even for the limited test that

has to be applied in a case of the present nature, the charge-sheet

dated 21st January, 2016 does not make out any case of an

offence having been committed by the appellant under section

3(1)(x) warranting him to stand a trial.

19. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the decision in Hitesh Verma (supra) cited

by Ms. Shukla can be pressed in aid to support the view that we have

taken above.

20. The second question that would engage our attention is, whether the

criminal proceedings against the appellant should be allowed to be

taken further in view of the appellant facing accusation of offences

punishable under sections 323 and 504, IPC.

21. Section 323, IPC prescribes punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.

Hurt is defined in section 319, IPC as causing bodily pain, disease or

infirmity to any person. The allegation in the first F.I.R. is that the

appellant had beaten up the complainant for which he sustained

multiple injuries. Although the complainant alleged that such incident

was witnessed by many persons and that he sustained injuries on his

hand, the charge-sheet does neither refer to any eye-witness other

than the complainant’s wife and son nor to any medical report. The

nature of hurt suffered by the complainant in the process is neither

reflected from the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet. On the contrary,

the appellant had the injuries suffered by him treated immediately

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 after the incident. In the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent

(State) in the present proceeding, there is no material worthy of

consideration in this behalf except a bald statement that the

complainant sustained multiple injuries “in his hand and other body

parts”. If indeed the complainant’s version were to be believed, the I.O.

ought to have asked for a medical report to support the same.

Completion of investigation within a day in a given case could be

appreciated but in the present case it has resulted in more disservice

than service to the cause of justice. The situation becomes all the more

glaring when in course of this proceeding the parties including the first

respondent are unable to apprise us the outcome of the second F.I.R.

In any event, we do not find any ring of truth in the prosecution case

to allow the proceedings to continue vis-à-vis section 323, IPC.

22. What remains is section 504, IPC. In Fiona Shrikhande and Anr. vs.

State of Maharashtra7, this Court had the occasion to hold that:

“13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. (a)
intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation
to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know
that such provocation would cause another to break the public
peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must
be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the
public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who
intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will
give provocation to any other person and such provocation will
cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in
such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One
of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there
should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult
and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as

7
(2013) 14 SCC 44

11
 such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section
504 IPC.”

23. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, we have little

hesitation in holding that even though the appellant might have abused

the complainant but such abuse by itself and without anything more

does not warrant subjecting the appellant to face a trial, particularly in

the clear absence of the ingredient of intentional insult of such a degree

that it could provoke a person to break public peace or commit any

other offence.

24. We record that the High Court misdirected itself in failing to appreciate

the challenge to the criminal proceedings including the charge-sheet in

the proper perspective and occasioned a grave failure of justice in

rejecting such challenge.

25. For the reasons aforesaid, we unhesitatingly hold that it would be an

abuse of the process of law to allow continuation of Criminal Case

No.376 of 2016. While setting aside the impugned judgment and order

of the High Court, we also quash Criminal Case No.376 of 2016.

26. Consequently, this appeal succeeds. Parties shall, however, bear their

own costs.

…………………………….J
(S. RAVINDRA BHAT)

.……………………………J
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
NEW DELHI;
19th May, 2023.

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