National Defence - Defence Strategic Review - Autralia (Avril2023)

NATIONAL
DEFENCE
DEFENCE
STRATEGIC
REVIEW
20
23
Defence acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of Country throughout Australia.
Defence recognises their continuing connection to traditional lands and waters and
would like to pay respect to their Elders both past and present.
Defence would also like to pay respect to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people who have contributed to the defence of Australia in times of peace and war.
© Commonwealth of Australia 2023
ISBN: 978-1-925890-66-2
This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968
(Cwth), no part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission
from the Department of Defence.
NATIONAL DEFENCE
DEFENCE STRATEGIC REVIEW
NATIONAL DEFENCE DEFENCE STRATEGIC REVIEW
ii
Contents
National Defence Statement 2023.............................................5
National Defence – Defence Strategic Review .........................11

Executive Summary......................................................................... 17
1 Current Strategic Circumstances................................................ 23
Australia’s strategic circumstances.........................................................................23
Loss of warning time...............................................................................................24
2 Our Defence Strategic Environment........................................... 27
The Indo-Pacific region ..........................................................................................27
3 National Defence – A Whole-of-Government Approach............. 31
National Defence ....................................................................................................31
Defence of Australia and the Global War on Terror...............................................31
The transition to National Defence.........................................................................32
A whole-of-government approach.........................................................................33
Statecraft.................................................................................................................33
4 Deterrence and Resilience......................................................... 37
5 Climate Change and Support to Domestic Disaster Relief........... 41
Climate change and disaster relief.........................................................................41
Defence and clean energy transition......................................................................41
6 Defence Partnerships................................................................. 45
The United States Alliance......................................................................................45
Regional defence partnerships ..............................................................................46
Defence Cooperation Program...............................................................................47
7 Defence Strategy and Force Design............................................ 49
Defence strategy.....................................................................................................49
Defence strategic objectives...................................................................................50
Defence planning framework.................................................................................50
Force design............................................................................................................50
8 Force Structure and Capability................................................... 53
From a Balanced to a Focused Force......................................................................53
From a Joint to an Integrated Force........................................................................54
Force structure design priorities.............................................................................55
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Defence infrastructure design priorities.................................................................56

Maritime domain force structure design priorities................................................56
Maritime domain immediate investment priorities............................................... 56
Land domain force structure design priorities.......................................................58
Land domain immediate investment priorities......................................................59
Air domain force structure design priorities..........................................................60
Air domain immediate investment priorities.........................................................61
Space.......................................................................................................................62
Command, control, communications, computers and architectures.................... 63
Cyber domain and targeting...................................................................................64
Theatre logistics......................................................................................................65
Capability timeframes.............................................................................................65
Nuclear-Powered Submarine Pathway...................................................................67
National Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise..................................................................67
Guided weapons and explosive ordnance .............................................................68
Integrated air and missile defence.........................................................................69
9 Technology and Asymmetric Advantage..................................... 71
Asymmetric advantage...........................................................................................71
AUKUS Pillar II Advanced Capabilities.....................................................................72
Defence science and technology ...........................................................................72
Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator..........................................................73
10 Force Posture and Accelerated Preparedness............................. 75
Force posture – Australia’s north............................................................................75
Depth in force posture............................................................................................75
Basing......................................................................................................................75
Fuel .........................................................................................................................77
Preparing for nuclear-powered submarines ..........................................................78
Shipyard reform......................................................................................................78
East coast nuclear-powered submarine facility......................................................80
Exercises and operations........................................................................................80
Accelerated Preparedness and logistics..................................................................81
Information and communications technology ......................................................82
Estate and infrastructure........................................................................................83
Security ...................................................................................................................84
11 Workforce................................................................................. 87
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12 Capability Acquisition, Risk and Accountability.......................... 91

Capability acquisition..............................................................................................91
Risk and accountability...........................................................................................93
Indigenous industry groups....................................................................................93
13 Finances and Resources............................................................. 95
14 Implementation, Oversight and Future Planning........................ 99
National Defence Strategy......................................................................................99
The Albanese Government’s Response to the

Defence Strategic Review Recommendations........................ 103
3
A
PART
4
National Defence Statement 2023

There is no more important and consequential task for Government than protecting
the security, interests and livelihoods of its people.
Accordingly, the Albanese Government commissioned an independent Defence

Strategic Review (the Review) to assess whether Australia had the necessary defence
capability, posture and preparedness to best defend Australia and its interests in the
strategic environment we now face.
The Government is grateful to His Excellency, the Hon Stephen Smith, and Air Chief
Marshal Sir Angus Houston AK AFC (Ret’d) for leading this timely and consequential
work. It is the most ambitious review of Defence’s posture and structure since the
Second World War.
The Government supports the strategic direction and key findings set out in the
Review, which will inform all aspects of Australia’s defence policy, planning and
resourcing over the coming decades.
Australia’s strategic environment

Australia’s region, the Indo-Pacific, faces increasing competition that operates on
multiple levels – economic, military, strategic and diplomatic – all interwoven and all
framed by an intense contest of values and narratives.
A large-scale conventional and non-conventional military build-up without strategic

reassurance is contributing to the most challenging circumstances in our region for
decades. Combined with rising tensions and reduced warning time for conflict, the
risks of military escalation or miscalculation are rising.
At the same time, the effects of climate change across the region are amplifying our
challenges, while other actions that fall short of kinetic conflict, including economic
coercion, are encroaching on the ability of countries to exercise their own agency and
decide their own destinies.
Since the 1980s, globalisation and the opening of the Australian economy have
given rise to decades of growth and increased prosperity for the Australian people.
Australia’s economy has become more interconnected with the Indo-Pacific and
the world. In turn, this means Australia has a fundamental interest in protecting our
connection to the world and in the global rules-based order upon which international
trade depends.
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In this environment, we must sharpen our focus on what our interests are, and how to
uphold them. Our focus needs to be on: how we ensure our fate is not determined by
others; how we ensure our decisions are our own; and how we protect our way of life,
our prosperity, our institutions and our economy.
These interests demand we deploy all elements of our national power in statecraft
seeking to shape a region that is open, stable and prosperous: a predictable region,
operating by agreed rules, standards and laws, where sovereignty is respected. That
statecraft includes deepening diplomatic engagement with the many other countries
facing similar circumstances.
It also requires strong defence capabilities of our own and working with partners
investing in their own capabilities. We aim to change the calculus so no potential
aggressor can ever conclude that the benefits of conflict outweigh the risks.
This is how Australia contributes to the strategic balance of power that keeps the
peace in our region, making it harder for countries to be coerced against their
interests.
Australia’s strategic posture

The defence of Australia lies in the collective security of the Indo-Pacific.
The defence of Australia’s national interests lies in the protection of our economic
connection with the world and the maintenance of the global rules-based order.
Accordingly, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) must have the capacity to:
defend Australia and our immediate region;

deter through denial any adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia
through our northern approaches;
protect Australia’s economic connection to our region and the world;
contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and
contribute with our partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order.
As most of these objectives lie well beyond our borders, the ADF must have the
capacity to engage in impactful projection across the full spectrum of proportionate
response. The ADF must be able to hold an adversary at risk further from our shores.
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Capability and resources

Due to the significant changes in Australia’s strategic circumstances, the Government
agrees with the Review’s finding that the ADF as currently constituted and equipped is
not fully fit for purpose.
The Government deeply appreciates those who serve in the ADF and is committed
to ensuring our people have the capabilities and resources they need. Delivering the
Government’s vision and implementing the findings of the Review will require a more
holistic approach to defence planning and strategy.
Australia must have a fully integrated and more capable ADF operating across five
domains which work seamlessly together on joint operations to deliver enhanced and
joined-up combat power.
Navy must have enhanced lethality – including through its surface fleet and
conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines – underpinned by a continuous
naval shipbuilding program.
Army must be optimised for littoral operations in our northern land and maritime
spaces and provide a long-range strike capability.
Air Force must provide the air support for joint operations in our north by conducting
surveillance, air defence, strike and air transport.
Defence must also continue to develop its cyber and space capabilities.
The Government’s immediate actions to reprioritise Defence’s capabilities in line with

the Review’s recommendations include:
investing in conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines through the

AUKUS partnership;
developing the ADF’s ability to precisely strike targets at longer range and
manufacture munitions in Australia;
improving the ADF’s ability to operate from Australia’s northern bases;
lifting our capacity to rapidly translate disruptive new technologies into ADF
capability, in close partnership with Australian industry;
investing in the growth and retention of a highly-skilled Defence workforce; and
deepening our diplomatic and defence partnerships with key partners in the
Indo-Pacific.
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Defence must have the funding it needs to deliver this enhanced capability. To this
end, Defence funding will increase over the next decade above its current trajectory
to implement the Review, including the delivery of the conventionally-armed,
nuclear-powered submarine program through AUKUS.
The Government is also committed to fiscal discipline and will make the hard decisions
to cancel or reprioritise Defence projects or activities that are no longer suited to
our strategic circumstances as outlined in the Review. This will involve reprioritising
planned investments while maintaining the overall level of Defence funding over the
forward estimates.
The Review calls for genuine whole-of-government coordination of Defence policy

and activities with our wider efforts in statecraft. Australia’s foreign policy works
with defence policy as essential and interdependent parts of how we make Australia
stronger and more influential in the world.
Indeed, the recommendations of the Review work in concert with other Government
policy priorities which enhance our security and build our economic resilience. These
include:
our efforts to recruit, train and skill more Australians for jobs in defence and
related industries;
our investments in research and development, manufacturing, and supply
chains; and
our commitments to increasing output of domestically produced renewable
energy, improving our domestic fuel reserves, and establishing a civil maritime
strategic fleet.
The Government is deploying all of these elements of national power to make

Australia more stable, confident and secure.
Working with our partners and the region

Australia must continue to work closely with our Ally and principal strategic partner,
the United States, through the Alliance. Close cooperation with the United States is
central to achieving balance and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
Australia will also strengthen engagement with Indo-Pacific partners, particularly

in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, to maintain peace, security and prosperity in our
region. This includes working with key regional institutions, including the Pacific
Islands Forum and ASEAN.
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A stable relationship between Australia and China is in the interests of both countries
and the broader region. Australia will continue to cooperate with China where we can,
disagree where we must, manage our differences wisely, and, above all else, engage in
and vigorously pursue our own national interest.
The way ahead

Realising the ambition of the Review will require a whole-of-government effort,
coupled with significant financial commitment and major reform.
The Albanese Government’s response to the Review includes specific directions to

Defence with immediate effect, while establishing a methodical and comprehensive
process for long-term and sustainable implementation. To inform this, the
Government has accepted the Review’s recommendation for an inaugural National
Defence Strategy in 2024, which will be updated biennially. The National Defence
Strategy will encompass a comprehensive outline of Defence policy, planning,
capabilities and resourcing, including reprioritisation of the Integrated Investment
Program, to align with the intent and recommendations of the Review.
These actions will set the course for the defence of Australia over the coming decades
in a manner that promotes peace and stability, and helps keep Australians safe.
The Hon Richard Marles MP

Deputy Prime Minister
Minister for Defence
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B
PART
10
National Defence –
Defence Strategic Review
Foreword
On 3 August 2022, we were asked to conduct a Defence Strategic Review (the Review),
with wide-ranging terms of reference and to report to the Government in time for
consideration by March 2023. We reported to the Government on 14 February 2023.
The short period we had for the Review is in contrast to the traditional time afforded
for such comprehensive assessments of force posture, force structure and capability,
namely 12–18 months. In the context of our current strategic circumstances, which
have further deteriorated from those outlined in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update,
the short timetable helped our task. In particular it provides an example of the
strong sense of urgency that is needed in the response required from Defence, the
Government and the nation to address our strategic challenges.
Our aim for the Review was twofold: to provide a strategic assessment and a
far-reaching strategy for the nation and the Government, as well as a roadmap for
Defence to implement our recommendations.
This is the public version of the Review. It is necessarily qualitatively different from
our 14 February 2023 version. It is less detailed, as many of the judgements and
recommendations in the Review are sensitive and classified.
The full classified Review is also strategic in nature, and will require significant effort
and commitment to implement. Many of these challenges will require a whole-of-
government and whole-of-nation effort.
In order to crystallise these challenges in relation to Australia’s security, we have

outlined a new strategic conceptual approach of ‘National Defence’.
Stephen Smith Angus Houston
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The Defence Strategic Review Terms of Reference
Defence Strategic Review
Terms of Reference for the Independent Leads of the Review

3 August 2022
Introduction
An Australian Defence Force Posture Review was last undertaken in 2012 in strategic
circumstances far different to those facing the Australian nation today. The conduct of a new
Defence Strategic Review (‘The Review’) that considers both force posture and force structure
is now required to ensure that Defence has the right capabilities that are postured to meet the
growing strategic challenges that Australia and its partner countries will face in the world in
coming years.
The Review is to be a holistic consideration of Australia’s Defence force structure and posture
by including force disposition, preparedness, strategy and associated investments, including all
elements of Defence’s Integrated Investment Program.
Background
The 2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan recognised the trends
identified in the 2016 Defence White Paper were accelerating at a rate faster than anticipated.
The world is undergoing significant strategic realignment. Military modernisation, technological
disruption and the risk of state-on-state conflict are complicating Australia’s strategic
circumstances. These strategic changes demand the Australian Government re-assess the
capabilities and posture of the Australian Defence Force and broader Department of Defence.
Purpose
The purpose of the Review is to consider the priority of investment in Defence capabilities
and assess the Australian Defence Force’s structure, posture and preparedness in order to
optimise Defence capability and posture to meet the nation’s security challenges over the
period 2023-24 to 2032-33 and beyond.
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Critical Information Requirements
The Review is to be informed by intelligence and strategic assessments of the most

concerning threats which challenge Australia’s security.
The Review will take into account the capability investment, force posture and preparedness
implications of Defence policy and plans, cognisant of relationships with partners and allies.
The Review may be informed by other information the Independent Leads deem significant.
Task
The Independent Leads are to prepare a Review in time for National Security Committee of
Cabinet consideration no later than March 2023.
The Review must outline the future strategic challenges facing Australia, which may require
an Australian Defence Force operational response.
The Review must identify and prioritise the estate, infrastructure, disposition, logistics and
security investments required to provide Australia with the Defence force posture required
by 2032-33.
The Review must consider all elements of the Integrated Investment Program and provide
recommendations for the Program’s reprioritisation, particularly in light of recently
announced large-scale projects, to provide Australia with the force structure required by
2032-33.
The Review must outline the investments required to support Defence preparedness, and
mobilisation needs to 2032-33.
The Review must outline funding needs to 2032-33 to ensure longer-term strategic
investments are progressed.
Recommendations
The Review will make recommendations in relation to Defence force structure, force
posture, and preparedness over the period 2023-24 to 2032-33 and beyond; and on any
other matters which are deemed appropriate to the Review’s outcomes.
Interim Report
An interim report will be provided after the Independent Leads have completed their initial
analysis.
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Acknowledgements
We thank and acknowledge the many people who enabled the completion of the
Review within 28 weeks. Our particular thanks are extended to the Defence Strategic
Review Secretariat which provided support throughout the Review. We thank those
who provided their time and thoughts to the Review through their public submissions
and/or interviews by us. The Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force were
unwavering in their cooperation, providing us with open access to Defence. The
enthusiastic response from Defence to our requests for information or support was
greatly appreciated. We thank the Consul-General Honolulu, staff at the Australian
Embassy in Washington, D.C., and staff at the Australian High Commission in London
for their assistance with our consultations in Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and London.
The Defence Strategic Review Team

Air Chief Marshal Sir Angus Houston AK AFC (Ret’d)
His Excellency, the Hon Stephen Smith
Ms Gabrielle Burrell
Professor Peter J. Dean SFHEA PhD
Major General Richard Vagg DSC
The Defence Strategic Review Team Secretariat

Ms Emma Baxter
Colonel Alistair Dickie
Commander Christopher Doherty
Ms Alicia Evans
Lieutenant Erin Fisher-Stamp
Ms Lauren Hanley
Ms Amy Hawkins
Ms Tamara Kyle
Wing Commander Murray Newberry
Lieutenant Mitch Rand
Mr Doug Steele
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Executive Summary
Defence policy and strategy serve to secure peace and prosperity. In addressing the
Terms of Reference provided by the Government, our objective has been the provision
of recommendations that seek to maintain our nation’s sovereignty, security and
prosperity.
Our approach for this Review is to chart a pathway for the Government to urgently
advance our nation’s security and our National Defence in these challenging times.
The platform for reform is strong. Australia has a strong and deep Alliance with
the United States, a professional defence force and defence organisation, and an
enviable international reputation as a capable country in military, peacekeeping, and
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.
Australia’s strategic circumstances

Since the end of the Second World War, there have been innumerable strategic
papers, defence reviews and white papers aimed at guiding Defence’s contribution to
our security.
During this period, Australia has faced significant security risks, but our current
strategic circumstances are now radically different.
Our Alliance partner, the United States, is no longer the unipolar leader of the
Indo-Pacific. The region has seen the return of major power strategic competition,
the intensity of which should be seen as the defining feature of our region and time.
As a consequence, for the first time in 80 years, we must go back to fundamentals, to

take a first-principles approach as to how we manage and seek to avoid the highest
level of strategic risk we now face as a nation: the prospect of major conflict in the
region that directly threatens our national interest.
Strategically, we may have already entered a decisive period for the Indo-Pacific. As a
result, our ability to address the reduced strategic warning time identified in the
2020 Defence Strategic Update has come into sharper relief.
Climate change will increase the challenges for Defence and Australia, including
increased humanitarian assistance and disaster relief tasks at home and abroad.
The strategic risks we face require the implementation of a new approach to defence
planning, force posture, force structure, capability development and acquisition.
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National Defence – a whole-of-government

approach
Over the past five decades the general approach to our defence policy has been the
Defence of Australia doctrine. That approach was aimed at deterring and responding
to potential low-level threats from a small or middle power in our immediate region.
This approach is no longer fit for purpose. As a result, this Review has outlined a
new strategic conceptual approach to Australia’s defence planning and strategy –
National Defence.
National Defence is focused on the defence of Australia in the face of potential threats
in our region. Our nation and its leaders must take a much more whole-of-government
and whole-of-nation approach to security.
This approach requires much more active Australian statecraft that works to support
the maintenance of a regional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. This requires
deepening diplomatic engagement and stronger defence capabilities to help deter
coercion and lower the risk of conflict.
The Alliance and regional defence partnerships

Our Alliance with the United States will remain central to Australia’s security and
strategy. The United States will become even more important in the coming decades.
Defence should pursue greater advanced scientific, technological and industrial
cooperation in the Alliance, as well as increased United States rotational force posture
in Australia, including with submarines.
Investing in our Indo-Pacific regional partnerships remains essential. Australia’s focus

must be to deepen its engagement and collaboration with partners across Southeast
Asia and the Pacific. The Defence Cooperation Program should continue to grow,
particularly in the Indian Ocean region.
Australia also needs to continue to expand its relationships and practical cooperation
with key powers, including Japan and India, and invest in regional architecture.
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Force design and force structure

The current Australian Defence Force (ADF) force structure is based on a ‘balanced
force’ model that reflects a bygone era. It does not adequately address our new
strategic environment.
The ADF needs a much more focused force that can respond to the risks we face. It
should be informed by net assessment and able to effect a strategy of denial.
To maximise the deterrence, denial and response options for the Government, the
ADF must evolve into a genuine Integrated Force which harnesses effects across all
five domains: maritime, land, air, space and cyber.
The ADF’s operational success will depend on the ability of the Integrated Force to
apply the following critical capabilities:
undersea warfare capabilities (crewed and uncrewed) optimised for persistent,

long-range sub-surface intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
and strike;
an enhanced integrated targeting capability;
an enhanced long-range strike capability in all domains;
a fully enabled, integrated amphibious-capable combined-arms land system;
enhanced, all-domain, maritime capabilities for sea denial operations and
localised sea control;
a networked expeditionary air operations capability;
an enhanced, all-domain, integrated air and missile defence capability;
a joint, expeditionary theatre logistics system with strategic depth and mobility;
a theatre command and control framework that enables an enhanced
Integrated Force; and
a developed network of northern bases to provide a platform for logistics
support, denial and deterrence.
We strongly support the acquisition of a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered

submarine capability, including the establishment of an Australian Submarine Agency.
We also recommend the Government reaffirm its commitment to continuous naval
shipbuilding.
The Defence Science and Technology Group and the new Advanced Strategic
Capabilities Accelerator must enable our research and industry sectors to focus
their work on the development of advanced and asymmetric capabilities in key
technological areas.
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The Integrated Force also requires effective joint enablers. Theatre-level logistics need
to be optimised to enable operations and sustainment of the force. The immediate
focus should be on consolidating ADF guided weapons and explosive ordnance
(GWEO) needs.
Posture and preparedness

National Defence requires a re-posturing of Defence, particularly an enhanced
network of bases, ports and barracks across northern Australia. Comprehensive
upgrade works on these bases must commence immediately, and fuel storage and
supply issues should be rectified.
Workforce
Defence faces significant workforce challenges. This demands an innovative and bold
approach to recruitment and retention.
Both the ADF and Australian Public Service (APS) workforces are understrength,
while the contractor workforce has become the largest single component workforce
element in Defence.
Defence must look to new markets and make further major changes to risk and
policy settings to increase retention and the speed of recruitment. Pay and service
conditions as well as workplace culture for both the APS and ADF should be highly
competitive in the labour market.
Capability acquisition, risk and accountability

Defence’s current approach to capability acquisition is not fit for purpose. The system
needs to abandon its pursuit of the perfect solution or process and focus on delivering
timely and relevant capability.
Defence must move away from processes based around project management risk
rather than strategic risk management. It must be based on minimum viable capability
in the shortest possible time.
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Finances and resources

Between the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the commencement of this Review,
measures were announced which resulted in excess of $42 billion in additional
Defence spending over the planning decade, without the provision of any additional
allocation in the Commonwealth Budget.
New capability requirements, coupled with sustainment demand for existing

capabilities and the need to address severe workforce pressures, will require difficult
decisions and trade-offs to manage the Defence Budget over the immediate period.
This Review proposes reprioritisation of the Integrated Investment Program to enable
new and accelerated capability acquisitions.
More funding will be required. Defence spending must reflect the strategic
circumstances our nation faces.
National security coordination

To enable National Defence, we must move to a more holistic approach to Australia’s
defence and security strategy.
Defence policy development must move away from intermittent white papers to a
biennial National Defence Strategy. This will allow for Defence policy development to
keep pace with a rapidly evolving strategic environment and ensure consistency across
government.
Implementation, oversight and future planning

The proposed Defence Strategic Review Management Board, led by the Secretary and
the Chief of the Defence Force, must provide direct oversight and leadership of the
implementation of the recommendations in this Review as adopted and prioritised by
the Government.
External oversight of implementation is essential. This must be undertaken by Cabinet,

supported by external oversight advisers.
The risks we face are profound and the roadmap we have provided in the Review is
far-reaching. We believe the Review is the most substantial and ambitious approach
to Defence reform recommended to any Australian Government since the Second
World War.
It will be challenging to effect.
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1 Current Strategic Circumstances
Australia’s strategic circumstances

1.1 The primary responsibility of the Australian Government is to protect the
sovereignty and security of the nation to enable its people to live in peace and
prosperity.
1.2 At times, the strategic risks faced by Australia have been significant. In the early
post-Second World War period, the onset of the Cold War, the risk of a third
world war and the threat of nuclear armageddon were real prospects. Australia,
however, was geographically remote from the strategic centre of gravity in
Europe and the Northern Hemisphere. Regional conflicts in the 1950s, 1960s
and 1970s posed a threat in the near region, but no power in the (now called)
Indo-Pacific could contest the United States or fundamentally challenge or
change the United States-led post-war order.
1.3 In the latter Cold War period, Australia faced no direct military threat. The
post-Cold War era that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union featured the
emergence of the United States-led unipolar order. The Global War on Terror
era, although politically and militarily very significant, did not pose an existential
threat to Australia, nor to the United States-led regional strategic order.
1.4 Australia’s strategic circumstances and the risks we face are now radically
different. No longer is our Alliance partner, the United States, the unipolar leader
of the Indo-Pacific. Intense China-United States competition is the defining
feature of our region and our time. Major power competition in our region has
the potential to threaten our interests, including the potential for conflict. The
nature of conflict and threats have also changed.
1.5 Regional countries continue to modernise their military forces. China’s military
build-up is now the largest and most ambitious of any country since the end
of the Second World War. This has occurred alongside significant economic
development, benefiting many countries in the Indo-Pacific, including Australia.
This build-up is occurring without transparency or reassurance to the Indo-Pacific
region of China’s strategic intent. China’s assertion of sovereignty over the
South China Sea threatens the global rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific in a
way that adversely impacts Australia’s national interests. China is also engaged in
strategic competition in Australia’s near neighbourhood.
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1.6 As a consequence, for the first time in 80 years, we must go back to

fundamentals, to take a first-principles approach as to how we manage and seek
to avoid the highest level of strategic risk we now face as a nation: the prospect
of major conflict in the region that directly threatens our national interest.
1.7 As a result of this new strategic reality, our view is that this is not ‘just another
Defence review’ that will shuffle available resources, or tweak the balance of the
ADF. This Review, in conjunction with the acquisition of conventionally-armed,
nuclear-powered submarines, will reshape the force structure, posture and
capability of Defence for coming decades – and necessarily so.
1.8 The strategic risks we face require the implementation of a new approach to
planning, force posture, force structure, capability development and acquisition.
1.9 This necessitates a managed, but nevertheless focused, sense of urgency. It is

clear that a business-as-usual approach is not appropriate.
1.10 As a consequence of the risk that Australia now faces, our nation and its leaders
must take a much more whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach to
security. Defence must take a much more integrated approach.
1.11 We must also make a substantially greater commitment of national resources to

enable a more holistic approach to Australia’s defence and security.
Loss of warning time

1.12 Strategic warning time for conventional conflict is the time a country estimates
an adversary would need to launch a major attack against it, once the adversary’s
intent to do so has been established.
1.13 In the post-Second World War period, Australia was protected by its geography
and the limited ability of other nations in the region to project power. Defence
and the nation had a 10-year warning time as the foundation for planning,
capability development and preparedness for conflict.
1.14 In the contemporary strategic era, we cannot rely on geography or warning time.
Regional military modernisation, underpinned by economic development, has
meant that more countries are able to project combat power across greater
ranges in all five domains: maritime, land, air, space and cyber. Emerging and
disruptive technologies are being rapidly translated into military capability.
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1.15 While there is at present only a remote possibility of any power contemplating
an invasion of our continent, the threat of the use of military force or coercion
against Australia does not require invasion. More countries are able to project
combat power across greater ranges, including against our trade and supply
routes, which are vital for Australia’s economic prosperity. Cyber warfare is not
bound by geography. The rise of the ‘missile age’ in modern warfare, crystallised
by the proliferation of long-range precision strike weapons, has radically reduced
Australia’s geographic benefits, the comfort of distance and our qualitative
regional capability edge.
1.16 The 2020 Defence Strategic Update ended the long-standing assumption in
Defence planning that Australia would have a 10-year warning time.
1.17 Ending warning time has major repercussions for Australia’s management of
strategic risk. It necessitates an urgent call to action, including higher levels of
military preparedness and accelerated capability development.
1.18 These activities require increased Defence spending and a move away from
a business-as-usual approach to policy development, risk management and
Defence preparedness.
1.19 Instead of a 10-year warning time, the Review has identified three distinct time
periods for Defence planning:
the three-year period 2023-2025 (for those matters which must be

prioritised and addressed urgently);
the five-year period 2026-2030; and
the period 2031 and beyond.
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2 Our Defence Strategic

Environment
The Indo-Pacific region

2.1 Australia’s key strategic geographical framework since the 2013 Defence White
Paper, as embedded in subsequent strategic planning documents, has been the
Indo-Pacific.
2.2 The adoption of the Indo-Pacific strategic framework was a deeply significant
change to the basis of Australian defence planning.
2.3 The Indo-Pacific is the most important geostrategic region in the world. It
is a region whose stability and global integration has ushered in decades of
prosperity and enabled the incredible growth of regional economies, including
China.
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2.4 The Indo-Pacific is defined by a large population, unprecedented economic

growth, major power competition and an emerging multipolar distribution of
power, but without an established regional security architecture. Australia sits
at the crossroads of the Indo-Pacific where the proximity to this dynamic region
means that our nation faces unprecedented strategic challenges.
2.5 Australia’s contemporary regional security situation is now characterised by:
strategic competition between the major powers;

the use of coercive tactics;
the acceleration and expansion of military capabilities without necessary
transparency;
the rapid translation of emerging and disruptive technologies into military
capability;
nuclear weapons proliferation; and
the increased risk of miscalculation or misjudgement.
2.6 For military planning, in terms of our strategic geography, the primary area
of military interest for Australia’s National Defence is the immediate region
encompassing the north-eastern Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia
into the Pacific. This region includes our northern approaches.
Recommendation:
• Australia’s immediate region encompassing the north-eastern
Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific,
including our northern approaches, should be the primary area
of military interest for Australia’s National Defence.
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3 National Defence –
A Whole-of-Government Approach
National Defence
3.1 The circumstances described in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and subsequent
comprehensive assessments of our regional security environment require a
coherent national strategic response.
3.2 These are not strategic circumstances for Defence to grapple with alone. We need
both a unifying national strategic approach and a new approach to our nation’s
defence.
Defence of Australia and the Global War on Terror

3.3 In the post-war period, as a general proposition, the major priority for the use
of military force has been based on the concept of the Defence of Australia. This
concept focused on the threat of low-level conflict from small to middle regional
powers.
3.4 The 1976 Defence White Paper focused formally for the first time on this strategic
concept. The independent review of Defence capabilities, the 1986 Dibb Review,
embedded that concept into defence planning doctrine and it became the basis for
the 1987 Defence White Paper.
3.5 After terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, Australia’s focus
turned sharply to the Global War on Terror and Middle East expeditionary force
operations until the mid-2010s.
3.6 Throughout this period the Defence of Australia doctrine remained in place, limited
to low-level regional-based threats. However, from 2001, operational pressures
from Australia’s commitments to these conflicts shifted the focus to capability and
operational design suited to the Middle East. This had a major adverse impact on
capability development for the Defence of Australia concept.
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The transition to National Defence

3.7 Major power competition involves threats and risks far beyond and quantifiably
different to any faced since the end of the Second World War. Australia’s current
strategic circumstances require a new strategic conceptual approach.
3.8 It requires re-examining the traditional notion of the Defence of Australia

concept. That doctrine is no longer suitable. There is a requirement for a new,
holistic approach to Australian defence planning and strategy. We must adopt
a new strategic conceptual approach of National Defence, which encompasses
the defence of Australia against potential threats arising from major power
competition, including the prospect of conflict.
3.9 National Defence must be part of a broader national strategy of whole-of-

government coordinated and focused statecraft and diplomacy in our region.
This approach requires much more active Australian statecraft that works to
support the maintenance of a regional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
3.10 National Defence includes:
Defence strategy and policy supporting whole-of-nation strategies;

an enhanced and expanded Alliance with the United States, including key
force posture initiatives in Australia;
a new, more focused approach to defence planning based on net
assessment;
a focus on deterrence through denial, including the ability to hold any
adversary at risk;
a new approach to critical Defence capabilities that drives force structure;
a new approach to force posture for the ADF;
a whole-of-nation effort to develop strategic resilience;
accelerated military preparedness;
a more capable ADF;
the development of a fully joined-up and Integrated Force;
a new approach to the management of risk across government;
fundamental changes to Defence recruitment and workforce
management;
enhanced sovereign defence industrial capacity in key areas;
a new approach to developing advanced military technology; and
a renewed focus on national planning for Defence preparedness.
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3.11 Adopting the National Defence concept will be the most substantial and
ambitious approach to Defence recommended to any Australian Government
since the Second World War.
3.12 Key to successful outcomes in implementing National Defence will be:

national leadership, statecraft and diplomatic proficiency; accelerated military
preparedness; economic stewardship; scientific and technological prowess; and
climate change action and domestic resilience. It will be challenging to effect.
A whole-of-government approach
3.13 Government must engage with National Defence in a joined-up
whole-of-government manner. Strategic coordination and execution across
government is essential to implement a national strategy and to ensure
Defence’s alignment with this strategic approach. A vital element to ensure this
approach is followed through is Government commitment, will and persistence,
and clear direction to Defence and other government entities.
3.14 Critical to this whole-of-government National Defence approach is to have a

national strategy and unity of effort to Australian statecraft.
Statecraft
3.15 National Defence must be anchored in a broader national strategy. This strategy
should harness all elements of national power to protect Australia’s strategic
interests, and contribute to the maintenance of a regional balance of power in
the Indo-Pacific that is favourable to our interests.
3.16 Our approach to statecraft must include measures internal and external to
Australia and build on actions already underway. Internal measures have
included: increased defence and national security spending; the reorganisation
of elements of the national intelligence and national security community;
substantial investments in cyber security; changes to foreign investment laws;
and measures to resist foreign interference and protect critical infrastructure.
3.17 External approaches have included measures such as: the adoption of the
strategic framework of the Indo-Pacific; expanding regional strategic multilateral,
trilateral and bilateral partnerships, including the reinstatement of the Quad
partnership with Japan, India and the United States; enhancing United States
Alliance force posture arrangements in Australia; capability development
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being pursued through AUKUS; enhancing regional military exercises; and

a substantially heightened focus for Australian diplomacy in the Pacific and
Southeast Asia.
3.18 Australian statecraft now requires a consistent and coordinated whole-of-

government approach to international affairs and the harmonisation of a
range of domestic and external national security portfolios, from trade and
investment to education, minerals and resources, clean energy, climate, industry,
infrastructure and more.
3.19 Statecraft also requires the utilisation of all elements of national power, the
alignment of all supporting government policy, economic resilience and a
consistent strategic narrative.
3.20 The foundation of this approach is the reversal of a long-term reduction in

diplomatic resources, increasing our diplomatic efforts in areas of core national
interest. Our diplomatic capability must be resourced, directed and focused.
3.21 Statecraft must be driven and directed by a clear sense of national strategy and
be coordinated across government through a clear and holistic national strategic
approach.
3.22 Defence’s role in this whole-of-nation strategy is critical. Military power enables
pursuit of a wide range of Australian interests in peacetime and is fundamental
to deterring conflict, defending Australia, and denying an adversary in the event
of armed conflict.
Recommendations:
• National Defence should be adopted as the strategic approach
for defence planning.
• A whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach to our
strategic environment should be adopted.
• The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) should be
appropriately resourced to lead a nationally determined and
strategically directed whole-of-government statecraft effort in
the Indo-Pacific.
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4 Deterrence and Resilience

4.1 Deterrence is about compelling an actor to defer or abandon a planned strategy
or activity by having in place steps and responses to change its risk assessment
and, therefore, decision-making.
4.2 Deterrence can be achieved through raising the costs or reducing the benefits to
an adversary through denial, dissuasion or punishment.
4.3 Deterrence exists in an adversary only as a ‘state of mind’. This makes credibility
in deterrence especially important, while also making the success of deterrence
posture and effects very difficult to assess.
4.4 Deterrence strategy and practice is evolving. In military terms it now spans five
domains: maritime, land, air, space and cyber.
4.5 This requires new ways of thinking about the holistic deployment of Australian
national power to ensure the perceived costs and risks to an adversary remain
greater than the perceived benefit.
4.6 Current Australian defence policy is based on deterrence through denial. This
military application of deterrence theory is based on the concept of establishing
effective defence capabilities relative to the threat.
4.7 Current defence deterrence policy is based on demonstrating an ability to

independently defeat threats within our immediate region. This was credible
with a force structure postured for low-level and enhanced low-level regional
threats.
4.8 However, Australia does not have effective defence capabilities relative to
higher threat levels. In the present strategic circumstances, this can only be
achieved by Australia working with the United States and other key partners
in the maintenance of a favourable regional environment. Australia also needs
to develop the capability to unilaterally deter any state from offensive military
action against Australian forces or territory.
4.9 Although invasion of the Australian continent is a remote possibility, any

adversary could seek to coerce Australia through cyber attacks, incursions in our
north west shelf or parts of our exclusive economic zone, or disruptions to our
sea lines of communication. By developing a resilient and capable ADF that can
hold forces at risk in our northern maritime approaches, Australia could deter
attacks on Australian forces or territory.
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4.10 In our current strategic circumstances, the risk of nuclear escalation must be
regarded as real. Our best protection against the risk of nuclear escalation is the
United States’ extended nuclear deterrence, and the pursuit of new avenues of
arms control.
4.11 A central component of deterrence is resilience. Australia’s deterrence efforts sit

within a whole-of-government framework. This relies on harnessing all elements
of national power.
4.12 Resilience requires the ability to withstand, endure and recover from disruption.
Resilience makes Australia a harder target and less susceptible to coercion.
Critical requirements include:
an informed public;
national unity and cohesion;
democratic assuredness;
robust cyber security, data networks and space capabilities;
supply chain diversity;
economic security;
environmental security;
fuel and energy security;
enhanced military preparedness;
advanced munitions manufacturing (especially in long-range
guided weapons);
robust national logistics; and
a national industrial base with a capacity to scale.
4.13 A high level of resilience would signal to an adversary the extent of Australia’s
resolve to defend itself. This would contribute to deterrence.
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5 Climate Change and Support to

Domestic Disaster Relief
Climate change and disaster relief

5.1 Climate change is now a national security issue. Climate change will increase
the challenges for Australia and Defence, including increased humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief tasks at home and abroad. If climate change
accelerates over the coming decades it has the potential to significantly increase
risk in our region. It could lead to mass migration, increased demands for
peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and intrastate and interstate conflict.
5.2 Climate change holds a number of significant implications for Defence. The
acceleration of major climate events risks overwhelming the Government’s
capacity to respond effectively and detracting from Defence’s primary objective
of defending Australia. Climate events already place concurrency pressures on
the ADF and this has negatively affected force preparedness, readiness and
combat effectiveness.
5.3 Defence is frequently required to make large contributions to domestic disaster

relief efforts as well as support to the community, such as during the COVID-19
pandemic. However, Defence is not structured or appropriately equipped to act
as a domestic disaster recovery agency concurrently with its core function, in any
sustainable way.
5.4 State and local governments, in partnership with the Commonwealth, must have
in place the necessary plans, resources and capabilities to deal with all but the
most extreme domestic disaster operations.
5.5 Defence must be the force of last resort for domestic aid to the civil community.
This is critical given the urgent geostrategic risks that the nation faces and the
need for the ADF to be in a position to respond to regional contingencies.
Defence and clean energy transition

5.6 Australia has the potential to benefit substantially from global decarbonisation
if we can harness our renewable and mineral resources and drive investment
in clean technology supply chains and energy intensive industry. Defence also
needs to focus on clean energy transition.
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Recommendations:
• The Commonwealth should work with the states and territories
to develop national resilience and response measures for
adverse climate change at the local level without the need of
ADF support, except in the most extreme emergencies.
• Defence should be the force of last resort for domestic aid to
the civil community, except in extreme circumstances.
• Defence should accelerate its transition to clean energy to
increase our national resilience, with a plan to be presented to
the Government by 2025.
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6 Defence Partnerships
6.1 To protect Australia’s strategic interests, we must contribute to the maintenance
of a regional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific that is favourable to our
interests.
The United States Alliance

6.2 Australia’s strategic culture has long been based on a major power alliance.
Every Australian Government since Federation has assessed our strategic
circumstances and reaffirmed the centrality of an alliance partnership in
relationship to our strategic interests.
6.3 Contrary to some public analysis, our Alliance with the United States is becoming
even more important to Australia. This will increasingly include working
more closely with the United States and other partners. Recent advances in
the United States-Japan Alliance and the Australia-Japan Special Strategic
Partnership, as well as the Australia-United States-Japan trilateral relationship,
are key indicators of the deepening relationships between the United States and
its allies in the Indo-Pacific.
6.4 The Australia-United States Alliance, enabled through the ANZUS Treaty, will
continue to grow and adapt. In the context of the Alliance and the deteriorating
strategic environment, Australia must be more self-reliant so we are able to
contribute more to regional stability.
6.5 This change will require a shift to:
more active Australian statecraft using all elements of national power;

greater advanced scientific, technological and industrial cooperation in
the Alliance;
increased bilateral military planning;
increased United States rotational force posture in Australia, including
submarines;
engagement with the United States on deterrence, including through joint
exercises and patrols; and
strengthening Australia’s sovereign military and industrial capabilities.
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Regional defence partnerships

6.6 Investing in Indo-Pacific regional defence partnerships is critical and must be
focused on Australia’s primary area of military interest.
6.7 Southeast Asia is one of the key areas of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.
Investing in partnerships in this region will be critical to maintaining the regional
strategic balance.
6.8 The Pacific is critical to the security of Australia and the region. Australia’s
positive work in development assistance, disaster response and multilateralism
remains essential. New Zealand is a key partner for Australia in the Pacific.
6.9 Australia is a significant Indian Ocean state with the longest Indian Ocean
coastline and the region’s largest search and rescue area.
6.10 Australia must continue to expand its relationships and practical cooperation
with key powers, including Japan and India.
6.11 Defence is already engaged in extensive international engagement efforts in

our region but a refocusing will need to be undertaken to maximise benefits
and alignment with the strategic circumstances. This refocusing should
ensure Australia effectively engages in bilateral, minilateral and multilateral
opportunities to support mutual interests in the Indo-Pacific. Regional
architecture such as ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum, and their associated
forums, remain critical to Australian engagement in the region. Australia’s
refocus will continue to rely on such forums as reliable avenues to jointly engage
partners at a regional level.
6.12 We must also enhance minilateral cooperation and trilateral partnerships, as well
as engagements with the EU, its member countries and NATO, centred on their
Indo-Pacific strategies.
6.13 Engagement with the United Kingdom in the Indo-Pacific must be enhanced,
including through AUKUS.
6.14 To maximise efforts, Australia must take a more focused and strategic approach.
This means greater coordination between DFAT, Defence and other key
government entities.
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Defence Cooperation Program

6.15 The Defence Cooperation Program has delivered sustained engagement, capacity
building and military effect throughout the Pacific and Southeast Asia over
the past 60 years. The program includes the permanent presence of Defence
personnel, both civilian and military, and funding to deliver training, capability,
equipment and infrastructure.
6.16 In the Pacific and Southeast Asia, the Defence Cooperation Program brand is
considered an exemplar of defence diplomacy. The assistance provided through
the program is also a key pillar of our broader bilateral relationships in the region;
deepening cultural ties and developing enduring people-to-people links.
6.17 The Defence Cooperation Program must continue to grow in importance.

It should be expanded in the Indian Ocean region, particularly the
north-eastern Indian Ocean.
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7 Defence Strategy and Force

Design
Defence strategy
7.1 Based on the Review’s assessment of our current strategic environment, we
recommend the Government directs Defence to adopt a strategy of denial.
Strategy of denial
A strategy of denial is a defensive approach designed to stop an
adversary from succeeding in its goal to coerce states through force,
or the threatened use of force, to achieve dominance.
Denial is associated with the ability and intent to defend against, and
defeat, an act of aggression.
7.2 For Australia, this strategy of denial must be focused on our primary area of
military interest. The key is the presence of a robust ADF. The strategy of denial
must also recognise the importance of non-geographic security threats, including
cyber, space and long-range missile capabilities.
7.3 A strategy of denial for the ADF must focus on the development of anti-access/
area denial capabilities (A2AD). Anti-access capabilities are usually long-range
and designed to detect an adversary and prevent an advancing adversary from
entering an operational area. Area-denial capabilities are shorter range and
designed to limit an adversary’s freedom of action within a defined operational
area. A2AD is often synonymous with long-range strike capability, undersea
warfare and surface-to-air missiles.
7.4 The development of a strategy of denial for the ADF is key in our ability to deny
an adversary freedom of action to militarily coerce Australia and to operate
against Australia without being held at risk.
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Defence strategic objectives

7.5 Defence’s strategic objectives, as laid out in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update,
are to shape Australia’s strategic environment, deter actions against Australia’s
interests, and respond with credible military force, when required. These
objectives must now be seen through the lens of a strategy of denial.
7.6 The achievement of these objectives is beyond Defence’s capabilities alone.

While Defence may lead in some of these areas, it requires a whole-of-
government approach and the harnessing of all elements of Australian national
power and statecraft outlined in Chapter 3.
Defence planning framework

7.7 Defence planning is about risk management. The future Defence planning
framework must be based on building force structure, force posture and
accelerating preparedness on the basis of a net assessment planning process to
ensure it is focused on the levels of risk in our current strategic circumstances.
7.8 The Defence planning framework must also assess different potential levels of
conflict, as the core strategic risks in each are different. This is critical to ensure
Defence priorities are developed on the basis of the levels of conflict that are
credible now and for the foreseeable future, and the time available to develop
military capability to respond.
Force design
7.9 The key focus of the proposed Defence planning framework is the process to
translate strategic policy into a proposed future force structure that can be
realised within the available resources and timeframes.
7.10 Defence’s force design processes must be reformed to more effectively operate
as the design driver of the ADF, and ensure single-service priorities support
integrated capability effects. Defence’s force design must also address the
current bias towards platforms. A platform that cannot be crewed, or does not
have weapons to fire at a range to achieve the desired operational or strategic
effect, will not serve us well in the current strategic environment.
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7.11 The adoption of this approach will necessarily lead to a very different force
structure and posture to what the ADF has today. More attention and resources
must be devoted to crucial future-focused joint capabilities such as information
warfare, cyber capabilities, electronic warfare, and guided weapons and
explosive ordnance. Force design must also embrace changes to mindsets and
technologies to deliver competitive advantage.
Recommendation:
• Force structure planning should be based on the Review.
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8 Force Structure and Capability

8.1 To transition to National Defence, the ADF needs a much more focused force
structure based on net assessment, a strategy of denial, the risks inherent in the
different levels of conflict, and realistic scenarios agreed to by the Government.
8.2 The ADF’s current force structure is not fit for purpose for our current strategic
circumstances.
From a Balanced to a Focused Force

8.3 The current strategic circumstances, the net assessment approach to Defence
planning and our finite human and financial resource base, dictate that the
current balanced force structure and design must now change urgently.
Balanced Force
A balanced force is designed to be able to respond to a range of
contingences when the strategic situation remains uncertain. This
force design required that the ADF respond to low-level threats
related to continental defence, regional operations in support of
Australian interests and global support to our Alliance partner, the
United States.
In this approach, while the balance of the force was primarily

designed for the Defence of Australia, the broader purpose of
the ADF was for it to be structured to respond to a range of
contingencies.
This conceptual approach to force structure planning, which has

led to like-for-like replacements in military platforms in the ADF, is
deeply ingrained in Defence’s culture.
8.4 The force structure of the ADF must now be framed around the concept of
a focused force, based on the assumptions in the Review, and the critical
capabilities required as a consequence.
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Focused Force
This conceptual approach to force structure planning will lead to a
force designed to address the nation’s most significant military risks.
The capabilities required to address identified threats will also

provide latent capability to deal with lower-level contingencies and
crises.
From a Joint to an Integrated Force

8.5 Maximising the deterrent effect and response options from ADF capabilities is
critical. To achieve the maximum benefits from our capability investments, the
ADF force structure must become not only focused, but also integrated.
8.6 The current joint force, namely the combined effect of Navy, Army and Air Force
working together, does not appropriately reflect the growth of domains. The
evolution to five domains – maritime, land, air, space and cyber – demands a
new approach.
8.7 The ADF must rapidly evolve into a genuine Integrated Force, which harnesses
effects across all of the five domains. The Integrated Force must be optimised for
National Defence.
8.8 In effecting our strategy of denial in Australia’s northern approaches, the ADF’s
operational success will depend on the ability of the Integrated Force to apply
the following critical capabilities:
undersea warfare capabilities (crewed and uncrewed) optimised

for persistent, long-range sub-surface intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance and strike;
an enhanced, integrated targeting capability;
an enhanced long-range strike capability in all domains;
a fully enabled, integrated amphibious-capable combined-arms land
system;
enhanced, all-domain, maritime capabilities for sea denial operations and
localised sea control;
a networked expeditionary air operations capability;
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an enhanced, all-domain, integrated air and missile defence capability;

a joint, expeditionary theatre logistics system with strategic depth and
mobility;
a theatre command and control framework that enables an enhanced
Integrated Force; and
a developed network of northern bases to provide a platform for logistics
support, denial and deterrence.
Force structure design priorities

8.9 Defence infrastructure, the five domains, and enabling logistics and other
systems – the Integrated Force – must be focused on achieving the critical
capabilities.
8.10 Given the strategic circumstances and limited resource base we face, investing
in the critical capabilities will require divesting, delaying, or re-scoping other
activities that do not advance the attributes of the Integrated Force.
8.11 Changes in the Integrated Investment Program (IIP) to realise the Integrated
Force will require immediate decisions to realise time, resource (both workforce
and financial) and cultural change.
8.12 This will include rescheduling delivery, reducing in scale, or divesting programs
and previously envisaged core projects not suited for the strategic circumstances
outlined in the Review.
8.13 During the conduct of the Review, Defence conducted a preliminary

reprioritisation of the IIP.
8.14 This identified a range of acquisitions determined to be of lower priority in our

strategic circumstances that could be considered for delay or cancellation.
8.15 Defence must further reprioritise the IIP in line with the force structure priorities,
force design guidance and the strategic assessments in the Review.
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Recommendations:
• Projects should be immediately delayed or cancelled to enable
funds and workforce in the forward estimates and planning
decade to be reallocated to higher priority capabilities.
• The Integrated Investment Program (IIP) should be rebuilt in
line with the force structure design priorities outlined in the
Review.
Defence infrastructure design priorities

8.16 Defence infrastructure must provide a hardened and dispersed platform to
support the deployment of the ADF and the defence of Australian territory and
our interests.
8.17 It must be able to provide a network of fully enabled northern operational bases,
a series of bases in depth to support the Defence enterprise and identification of
relevant civil infrastructure for Defence needs.
Maritime domain force structure design priorities

8.18 Australia’s Navy must be optimised for operating in Australia’s immediate region
and for the security of our sea lines of communication and maritime trade.
Maritime domain immediate investment priorities

8.19 Our strategic circumstances now require that our naval capability contributes
effectively to the ADF’s ability to shape our strategic environment, deter potential
adversaries and deny their ability to achieve objectives contrary to our national
interests.
8.20 The acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will

transform Navy’s capability. Nuclear-powered submarines are key assets both in
effecting a strategy of denial and in the provision of anti-submarine warfare and
long-range strike options.
8.21 An enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet, that complements a

conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet, is now essential given
our changed strategic circumstances.
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8.22 As a maritime nation dependent on our sea lines of communication, it is

essential that the shape, size and scope of the Navy’s surface combatant fleet is
appropriate for the levels of risk we now face.
8.23 Such a fleet should consist of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants in order to
provide for increased strike, air defence, presence operations and anti-submarine
warfare.
8.24 Enhancing Navy’s capability in long-range strike (maritime and land), air defence
and anti-submarine warfare requires the acquisition of a contemporary optimal
mix of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants, consistent with a strategy of a larger
number of smaller surface vessels.
8.25 This would significantly increase Navy’s capability through a greater number
of lethal vessels with enhanced long-range strike (maritime and land) and
air defence capabilities, together with the ability to provide presence in our
northern maritime approaches.
8.26 We have recommended that the Government directs an independent analysis

of Navy’s surface combatant fleet capability to ensure the fleet’s size, structure
and composition complement the capabilities provided by the forthcoming
conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines. The analysis must assess
the capability requirements to meet our current strategic circumstances as
outlined in this Review. This should include assessment of cost, schedule, risk,
and the continuous shipbuilding potential of each option. This examination
should be completed by the end of Q3 2023.
8.27 Navy faces the most significant workforce challenges of the three services.
Assuring an adequate workforce to sustainably meet enterprise priorities and
transformation, government-directed tasking, readiness for future contingencies,
and transitioning new and technologically advanced capabilities into service is
Navy’s biggest challenge.
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Recommendations:
• An independent analysis of Navy’s surface combatant fleet
capability should be conducted in Q3 2023 to ensure its
size, structure and composition complement the capabilities
provided by the forthcoming conventionally-armed, nuclear-
powered submarines. The analysis must assess: the capability
requirements to meet our current strategic circumstances as
outlined in the Review, as well as the cost, schedule, risks and
the continuous shipbuilding potential of each option.
• The acquisition of a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered
submarine capability in the shortest possible timeframe should
be prioritised as part of AUKUS Pillar I.
Land domain force structure design priorities

8.28 Australia’s Army must be transformed and optimised for littoral manoeuvre
operations by sea, land and air from Australia, with enhanced long-range fires.
8.29 As a priority it must be able to provide:
a littoral manoeuvre capability by sea, land and air;

long-range fires, including land-based maritime strike;
air and missile defence; and
close-combat capabilities, including a single armoured combined-arms
brigade, able to meet the most demanding land challenges in our region.
8.30 Enhanced domestic security and response Army Reserve brigades will be
required to provide area security to the northern base network and other critical
infrastructure, as well as providing an expansion base and follow-on forces.
8.31 The land domain force structure design priorities must result in significant
changes to Army force posture and structure. Army’s combat brigades must be
re-roled and select capabilities postured in northern Australia.
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Land domain immediate investment priorities

8.32 Defence must rapidly accelerate and expand Army’s littoral manoeuvre vessels
(medium and heavy landing craft) and long-range fires (land-based maritime
strike) programs. This will require Army to re-posture key capabilities.
8.33 It is essential to immediately accelerate the acquisition of LAND 8710 Phases

1-2 – Army Littoral Manoeuvre Vessels (Landing Craft Medium and Heavy) and
expand the scope of this capability. Without this, only limited numbers of major
land capabilities can be projected offshore.
8.34 We strongly support the decision to acquire the High Mobility Artillery Rocket
System (HIMARS) and its associated missiles. We further recommend the
acquisition of additional HIMARS and strongly support the ongoing
co-development and rapid acquisition of the Precision Strike Missile in all its
forms.
8.35 Meeting the most demanding land combat tasks will require new infantry
fighting vehicles. Our assessment is that the LAND 400 Phase 3 – Land Combat
Vehicle System (Infantry Fighting Vehicle) acquisition must be reduced from
450 to 129 vehicles. This will provide one mechanised battalion in particular for
littoral manoeuvre, including training, repair and attrition stock.
8.36 We expressly advise that only by concurrently delivering these capabilities

– littoral manoeuvre vessels, long-range fires (land-based maritime strike)
and infantry fighting vehicles – will Army be able to achieve the strategic and
operational effect required of the ADF for National Defence and a strategy of
denial.
8.37 Army must cancel LAND 8116 Phase 2 – Protected Mobile Fires (the second
regiment of self-propelled howitzers). These systems do not provide the required
range or lethality. The cancellation of this program, in addition to savings from
the reduction of LAND 400 Phase 3, will help enable the acceleration and the
acquisition of additional HIMARS and a land-based maritime strike capability.
8.38 The acquisition of the UH-60M Black Hawk and AH-64E Apache provides the
opportunity to posture the majority of Defence’s battlefield aviation in Townsville
to enable a robust air-mobile capability. This includes basing the AH-64E Apache
capability in Townsville.
8.39 The battlefield aviation capability will be supported by two industry nodes
centred on: Townsville (Boeing Australia servicing the AH-64E Apache and
CH-47 Chinook) and Sydney/Nowra/Southeast Queensland (Sikorsky Australia
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servicing UH-60M Black Hawk and Navy’s MH-60R Sea Hawk). This has been a
recommendation of several reviews into the management and employment of
Defence’s battlefield aviation capability. We strongly support this approach.
Recommendations:
• Army should be structured and postured in accordance with
the land domain force structure design priorities outlined in
the Review.
• LAND 8710 Phases 1-2 – Army Littoral Manoeuvre Vessels
(Landing Craft Medium and Heavy) should be accelerated and
expanded.
• LAND 8113 Phases 2-4 – Long-Range Fires (HIMARS) and
LAND 4100 Phase 2 – Land-Based Maritime Strike should be
accelerated and expanded.
• LAND 400 Phase 3 – Land Combat Vehicle System (Infantry
Fighting Vehicle) acquisition should be reduced to 129 vehicles
to provide one mechanised battalion.
• LAND 8116 Phase 2 – Protected Mobile Fires (second regiment
of Army self-propelled howitzers) should be immediately
cancelled.
• The delivery of landing craft, long-range fires, and infantry
fighting vehicles should be synchronised.
Air domain force structure design priorities

8.40 Australia’s Air Force must be optimised for all aspects of air warfare. The support
of maritime, littoral and sustainment operations from Australia’s northern base
network will be a high priority.
8.41 Air Force must be able to maintain:
a network of northern air bases with appropriate hardening and dispersal;

crewed and autonomous systems capable of air defence;
strike capability (maritime and land);
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance;
anti-submarine warfare;
command and control for integrated air and missile defence;
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air-to-air refuelling; and

heavy and medium air mobility.
8.42 Air Force must increase the numbers of critical positions and implement a
scalable aircrew training system to meet aircrew requirements across the force,
commensurate with operational requirements.
8.43 Air combat crewing requires a new approach which is consistent with our
strategic circumstances. Air Force must develop a plan to increase aircrew
numbers to ensure that air combat and P-8 maritime squadrons have the
crewing to operate all available aircraft at high tempo. This will substantially
increase preparedness in the mid to long-term.
Air domain immediate investment priorities

8.44 F-35A Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft must be able to
operate the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile. The Joint Strike Missile (JSM) should
also be integrated onto the F-35A. To enable the F-35A fleet to operate the JSM,
the aircraft will need to be upgraded to Block 4 configuration.
8.45 MQ-28A Ghost Bat is a sovereign autonomous air vehicle designed to operate as
part of an integrated system of crewed and uncrewed aircraft and space-based
capabilities. MQ-28A is intended to be an attritable platform, which costs less
than a crewed platform, and can be replaced rapidly. This program should be a
priority for collaborative development with the United States.
8.46 The Review has undertaken detailed discussions in Australia and the United
States in relation to the B-21 Raider as a potential capability option for Australia.
In light of our strategic circumstances and the approach to Defence strategy and
capability development outlined in this Review, we do not consider the B-21 to
be a suitable option for consideration for acquisition.
Recommendations:
• Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile should be integrated onto the
F-35A and the F/A-18F platforms. Joint Strike Missile should
also be integrated onto the F-35A.
• Options should be developed for collaboration and technology
sharing with the United States in the development of MQ-28A
Ghost Bat.
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Space
8.47 Defence’s space capability must be optimised for capability assurance and
communications provision.
8.48 Defence must establish frameworks within a whole-of-government and

whole-of-nation approach to guide the development of the space domain,
including the policy authorities required.
8.49 As Australia’s civil and military space capabilities progress, Defence must
consider the level of sovereign capability needs. This must be offset by the cost
requirements of such capabilities against opportunities to collaborate with the
United States and other partners.
8.50 Commercial capabilities will also play an increasingly important role in

complementing and augmenting Defence’s Space Command structure.
8.51 Space Command needs to be re-postured inside Defence to maximise its

effectiveness. It requires a centralised space domain capability development and
management function, and a method for building and sustaining a trained Defence
space workforce, including a defined career path for space professionals.
8.52 At this stage there is no need to generate a separate Space Force. However, it is
essential that Space Command becomes a command within the Joint Capabilities
Group and the Chief of Joint Capabilities be given a dedicated funding line, with
appropriate authorities to manage it.
8.53 Space Command has the requisite funding for large projects allocated in the IIP but
it is not phased correctly. Space Command also requires additional investment for
smaller, rapid acquisition projects. Given the speed of technological developments
in space, the current capability life-cycle process is too slow. Defence must adopt
an approach that emphasises speed of capability acquisition including off-the-shelf
(commercial and military) capabilities.
Recommendations:
• Space Command should be moved into Joint Capabilities Group
from 1 July 2023.
• A centralised space domain capability development and
management function should be established.
• A method should be established for building and sustaining a
trained Defence space workforce, including a defined career
path for space professionals.
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Command, control, communications, computers

and architectures
8.54 Defence’s command, control, communications, computers (C4) networks
and architectures must collect and integrate a diverse range of information
to enhance situational awareness and facilitate resilient sensor-to-effector
networks. Networks and architectures need to be resilient in the face of
persistent penetration and network attack.
C4 and architectures
C4 consists of the information systems, networks, computers and
other tools required to support command across the spectrum
of Defence operations. C4 is the critical backbone for providing
connectivity of trusted and relevant information and data exchange.
Architectures provide the technical guidelines and standards on

which Defence’s C4 networks are built.
8.55 Defence must adopt an open architecture approach in both hardware and
software. In doing so, Defence will reduce integration complexity and costs, and
break down barriers for Australian industry participation.
Recommendation:
• An open architecture approach should be adopted by Defence
in both hardware and software.
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Cyber domain and targeting

8.56 Australia’s cyber and information operations capabilities must be scaled up and
optimised.
8.57 Under project REDSPICE, the Australian Signals Directorate is significantly

expanding its signals intelligence and cyber capabilities and capacity.
8.58 Defence must enhance its cyber domain capabilities to deliver the required
responsiveness and breadth of capability to support ADF operations. This must
focus on: integrating the defence and management of Defence’s C4 networks
and architectures; delivering a coherent and, where possible, centralised
cyber domain capability development and management function; and building
and sustaining a trained Defence cyber workforce.
8.59 To meet the demands of the deteriorating security environment, Defence must
invest in the targeting systems and processes required to support the use of
advanced and long-range weapons, undersea warfare, and integrated air and
missile defence. Existing plans should be accelerated including development
of key supporting systems and processing, exploitation and dissemination of
intelligence.
Recommendations:
• A comprehensive framework should be developed for
managing operations in the cyber domain that is consistent
with the other domains.
• Defence’s cyber domain capabilities should be strengthened
to deliver the required breadth of capability with appropriate
responsiveness to support ADF operations.
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Theatre logistics
8.60 The Defence logistics and health networks must deliver persistent support and
sustainment for operations. An optimal Defence logistics network must be
resilient through disaggregated and dispersed mutually supporting nodes that
enhance redundancy and survivability.
8.61 Logistics and health networks must be integrated into national and global
networks to deliver the full range of logistics and health effects required by
Defence. Ongoing engagement with industry and partners is required to ensure
additional maintenance, manufacturing, storage and load capacity can be drawn
upon to meet increases in demand.
8.62 Theatre-level logistics must enable capability generation and support from
Australia’s southern regions to the network of northern bases, with sufficient
capacity to service force-flow, as well as providing requisite storage and
distribution means. This requires a robust national road, rail, maritime and air
distribution system.
Recommendation:
• Commander Joint Logistics and Commander Joint Health
should be adequately resourced to deliver Defence logistics
and health networks that are able to deliver persistent support
and sustainment for operations.
Capability timeframes
8.63 To provide focus and coherence for force structure priorities, we recommend
changes to force structure occur over three periods:
2023-2025 – Enhanced Force-In-Being (for those matters which must be

addressed urgently and as an immediate priority);
2026-2030 – accelerated acquisition to the Objective Integrated Force; and
2031 and beyond – delivery of the Future Integrated Force.
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Enhanced Force-In-Being
Force-In-Being refers to the ADF that exists today. The Enhanced
Force-In-Being refers to the extant force with enhancements
that can be achieved in the period 2023-2025 based on the
recommendations in the Review.
Objective Integrated Force

Objective Integrated Force refers to the force that is proposed to be
delivered through the accelerated acquisition and delivery of critical
capabilities in the period 2026-2030 based on the recommendations
in the Review.
Future Integrated Force

Future Integrated Force refers to the force that is under design
consideration. Many capabilities and projects may not yet exist in
the IIP. The Future Integrated Force is the aim point for capability
managers across the five domains.
8.64 To achieve the Enhanced Force-In-Being, immediate capability improvements

must be made to existing capabilities and platforms. These include, but are not
limited to, the fitting of longer-range and more lethal weapons onto existing
platforms, the hardening of command and control networks and bases and,
where possible, the early delivery of relevant priority in-train capability projects.
8.65 The Objective Integrated Force is to be realised through the acceleration or

addition of new capabilities in line with the force structure priorities and
guidance outlined in the Review.
8.66 The Future Integrated Force is the long-term design of the Integrated Force
from 2031 and beyond. It will provide an objective aim point for all domains and
enablers to achieve an Integrated Force that is fit for the strategic circumstances
and in line with the Defence planning framework.
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Nuclear-Powered Submarine Pathway

8.67 The Review strongly supports the acquisition of conventionally-armed,
nuclear-powered submarines. This requires a whole-of-nation commitment.
To support this effort the Review strongly supports the establishment of:
the Australian Submarine Agency as a non-corporate Commonwealth

entity;
the Australian Defence Nuclear Regulator as an element within the
Defence portfolio; and
an east coast nuclear-powered submarine facility.
National Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise

8.68 Our Review has confirmed the importance of naval shipbuilding as a sovereign
industrial capability. We recommend that the Government reaffirm its
commitment to continuous naval shipbuilding.
8.69 Defence must review and update the National Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise
Strategy and supporting Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan. These
must include all the necessary upgrades to fleet units, maintenance and build
requirements. The synchronisation of these key activities will be critical to enable
capability delivery. This plan must balance the need for capability aimed at our
strategic circumstances with the maintenance of the National Naval Shipbuilding
Enterprise.
Recommendation:
• The Government should confirm its commitment to continuous
naval shipbuilding through an updated National Naval
Shipbuilding Enterprise Strategy and updated supporting Naval
Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan.
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Guided weapons and explosive ordnance

8.70 Long-range strike and other guided weapons are fundamental to the ADF’s
ability to hold an adversary at risk in Australia’s northern approaches. To do this,
the ADF must hold sufficient stocks of guided weapons and explosive ordnance
(GWEO) and have the ability to manufacture certain lines.
8.71 The realisation of the GWEO Enterprise is central to achieving this objective.
8.72 The GWEO Enterprise lacks available financial resources over this decade
and lacks the required workforce. It is yet to produce a strategy. While the
establishment of the GWEO Enterprise is appropriate, the manner in which it was
established has inhibited its ability to achieve the stated goals of Government.
8.73 The lack of clarity around roles and responsibilities, the lack of a senior officer
with a singular focus on the GWEO Enterprise and the lack of risk acceptance has
resulted in little material gain two years after its establishment.
8.74 The GWEO Enterprise requires an authority whose singular role is to direct
strategy, capability development, acquisition and domestic production across
all of Defence’s GWEO needs. This requires a model that mirrors the
Nuclear-Powered Submarine Taskforce. It is our strong recommendation that
a senior officer or official be appointed whose sole responsibility is to lead the
GWEO Enterprise with an appropriate underpinning organisational structure.
8.75 The immediate focus must be on consolidating ADF GWEO needs, the
establishment of a domestic manufacturing capability and the acceleration of
foreign military and commercial sales.
Recommendation:
• A senior officer or official with the sole responsibility for
leading the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance
(GWEO) Enterprise should be appointed, with an appropriate
underpinning organisational structure.
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Integrated air and missile defence

8.76 Defence must deliver a layered integrated air and missile defence (IAMD)
operational capability urgently. This must comprise a suite of appropriate
command and control systems, sensors, air defence aircraft and surface (land
and maritime) based missile defences.
8.77 A short-range IAMD capability exists through Navy’s Air Warfare Destroyers and
Army’s enhanced National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System.
8.78 Defence’s medium-range advanced and high-speed missile defence capabilities

should be accelerated.
8.79 While we are supportive of Defence’s approach to developing an ADF common

IAMD capability, we are not supportive of the relative priority that the program
was given. The program is not structured to deliver a minimum viable capability
in the shortest period of time but is pursuing a long-term near perfect solution at
an unaffordable cost.
8.80 In-service, off-the-shelf options must be explored.
8.81 The Chief of Air Force is the appropriate senior officer lead for this capability and
has the appropriate underpinning organisational structure for its delivery and
ongoing sustainment. Defence must reprioritise the delivery of a layered IAMD
capability, allocating sufficient resources to the Chief of Air Force to deliver the
initial capability in a timely way and subsequently further develop the mature
capability.
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9 Technology and Asymmetric

Advantage
Asymmetric advantage
9.1 Technology has a significant impact on the character of warfare and deterrence,
and will shape the changing balance of power.
9.2 Since the 1960s, Defence’s strategic approach has included a focus on
maintaining a regional technological capability edge. The key enabler of this
capability edge has been Australia’s Alliance relationship with the United States.
This ensured that, while small in size, the ADF was highly capable and could
outmatch potential regional opponents in critical areas of technology, planning
and operations. This helped to provide deterrence in low-level contingencies
through military technology and capability overmatch.
9.3 However, military modernisation in the region, and the implications of strategic
competition, mean it is no longer feasible to maintain a broad-based regional
capability edge. To respond, Defence needs to focus on asymmetric advantages
and ensure that we maintain parity or a qualitative advantage in critical military
technology areas.
Asymmetric advantage
Asymmetric warfare refers to military actions that pit strength
against weakness, at times in a non-traditional and unconventional
manner, against which an adversary may have no effective response.
In relation to cost imposition or denial, asymmetric refers to

the application of dissimilar capabilities, tactics or strategies
to circumvent an opponent’s strengths, causing them to suffer
disproportional cost in time, space or material.
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AUKUS Pillar II Advanced Capabilities

9.4 AUKUS Pillar II Advanced Capabilities is prioritising the trilateral delivery of
enhanced Defence capabilities, such as undersea warfare and hypersonics.
9.5 The success of AUKUS is essential for Australia in acquiring asymmetric capability.
AUKUS Pillar II Advanced Capabilities will contribute to strengthening the AUKUS
partners’ industrial bases, eliminating barriers to information sharing, and
technological cooperation. It will develop and deliver advanced capabilities in
areas such as artificial intelligence, hypersonics and maritime domain awareness.
9.6 The ambition of the AUKUS partners is to support technological transfers

as well as break down barriers for intellectual property transfer, domestic
manufacturing, and domestic maintenance of key weapons, technology and
capabilities. This requires dedicated senior-level focus.
Defence science and technology

9.7 The strategic demand for Defence’s capability innovation systems has never
been higher. Defence must have a national science and technology system that
enables the development of disruptive military capabilities, including harnessing
advanced and emerging technologies to provide asymmetric advantage for the
ADF. Defence’s science and technology system must be optimised to deliver
capability by focusing on Defence’s strategic priorities and developing scale
through leveraging national and international partners.
9.8 Relevant programs need to accelerate technology research and innovation

relating to capability. They must also enable appropriate signalling of demand to
research and industry sectors and provide clear methods of communication and
linkages to national research bodies (including the university sector and various
innovation bodies).
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Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator

9.9 The Government’s commitment to establish an Advanced Strategic Capabilities
Accelerator (ASCA) provides the missing link between Defence and innovative
Australian companies beyond the Defence primes. It is our view that ASCA must
be an unencumbered entity outside of Defence that receives capability priorities
from Force Design Division and works with industry to develop innovative
asymmetric capability solutions.
Recommendations:
• Defence Science and Technology Group funding and resources
should be aligned with the priorities identified in the Review.
• The development of selected critical technology areas as part
of AUKUS Pillar II Advanced Capabilities should be prioritised in
the shortest possible time.
• A senior official or officer with sole responsibility and a singular
focus on AUKUS Pillar II Advanced Capabilities implementation
should be appointed to enable expedited focus on capability
outcomes.
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10
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10 Force Posture and Accelerated

Preparedness
Force posture – Australia’s north

10.1 We must posture for the protection of Australia and for integrated defence and
deterrence effects in our immediate region.
10.2 The key line of forward deployment for the ADF stretches across Australia’s
northern maritime approaches. Integral to this sovereign Australian posture is
the network of bases, ports and barracks stretching in Australian territory from
Cocos (Keeling) Islands in the northwest, through RAAF bases Learmonth, Curtin,
Darwin, Tindal, Scherger and Townsville.
Depth in force posture

10.3 As a large island country and continent, we are blessed with strategic depth. In
the age of long-range precision strike, which has brought Australia within range
of regional capabilities, the need for depth in force posture is essential.
10.4 A network of well-established bases and facilities in the south-east of Australia,

as well as our Indian Ocean naval base at HMAS Stirling in Perth and RAAF Pearce
in the southwest, are therefore critical. Bases from Adelaide to Brisbane provide
a level of depth to ADF basing and the national support base.
10.5 Defence must have robust internal lines of communication to take advantage of
Australia’s natural geographic advantages.
10.6 Recent severe floods have highlighted the importance of well-maintained

resilient civil infrastructure, including ports and roads that support this network,
and the need for an ability to restore such infrastructure quickly when lost or
interrupted during severe weather events.
Basing
10.7 Government adopted a series of recommendations in the 2012 Force Posture
Review and 2013 Defence White Paper and allocated resources to improve the
network of bases, ports and barracks.
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10.8 Most of those recommendations relating to the northern bases have not been
implemented.
10.9 Irrespective of this history, it is now imperative that our network of northern
bases is urgently and comprehensively remediated.
10.10 The priority for this network is the series of critical air bases. This series of
northern airbases must now be viewed as a holistic capability system and
managed as such by the Chief of Air Force.
10.11 There must be immediate and comprehensive work on these air bases
undertaken in the following areas:
hardening and dispersal;
runway and apron capacity;
fuel storage and supply;
aviation fuel supply and storage;
GWEO storage;
connectivity required to enable essential mission planning activities;
accommodation and life support; and
security.
10.12 To achieve dispersal, redundancy and resilience in our defence posture there
are clear opportunities in leveraging the capabilities offered by civil minerals
and petroleum resources infrastructure, including those being considered for
decommission by the parent company/organisation.
Recommendations:
• Upgrades and development of our northern network of bases,
ports and barracks should commence immediately.
• Options should be developed to leverage the capabilities
offered by local and state governments as well as civil minerals
and petroleum resources industry infrastructure in northern
and central Australia.
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Fuel
10.13 Fuel distribution in the north and northwest must be more effective and less
vulnerable by introducing a more productive and predictable supply approach.
Deep Defence engagement with the fuel industry is vital in our strategic
circumstances.
10.14 Defence must be cognisant of the capabilities of the fuel industry and what
it can deliver in a range of circumstances. The fuel industry must understand
Defence requirements in a range of contingencies concurrent with civil demands,
including:
the advantages and vulnerabilities of various international sources of

supply and shipping routes;
domestic storage and distribution options on sea and land; and
Defence’s capability to address vulnerabilities.
10.15 A whole-of-government and industry Fuel Council should progress these critical
issues.
10.16 Addressing vulnerabilities, particularly where there are single points of failure
and inadequate capacity in key domestic distribution routes, is essential.
A variety of alternative supply and storage back-up options needs to be
developed to provide a more robust fuel posture.
Recommendation:
• A whole-of-government Fuel Council should be established
as soon as possible with representatives from relevant
departments and industry to deliver resilient national fuel
supply, distribution and storage.
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Preparing for nuclear-powered submarines

10.17 For Australia to become ‘sovereign ready’ to operate nuclear-powered
submarines, we need to develop the requisite infrastructure for
conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine construction and
sustainment.
10.18 This will involve a staged approach to building Australia’s capability and capacity
to sustain nuclear-powered submarines. The first step involves an increased
frequency of visits of United Kingdom and United States submarines to
HMAS Stirling, followed by longer rotations of Royal Navy and United States Navy
submarines at HMAS Stirling, with Australians embedded in their crews.
10.19 These rotations will subsequently involve longer periods of maintenance in

Western Australia. This will require greater participation of Australians in most
aspects of operating and maintaining nuclear-powered submarines.
10.20 To support this initiative, there will be a requirement to upgrade existing

facilities and construct new facilities at HMAS Stirling. Repurposing or adaptive
reuse of existing facilities at HMAS Stirling should be sufficient for many initial
requirements, with some new works required for specific nuclear-powered
submarine support functions.
10.21 To deliver these facilities in the timeframes required, and noting local
construction industry constraints, there will need to be clear prioritisation
of these works with pre-existing planned works. Defence will need to work
closely with the Western Australian Government, relevant local authorities
and communities to ensure this initiative proceeds in a manner that takes into
account local impacts and requirements.
Shipyard reform
10.22 Australia must have the industrial capability and capacity to maintain, sustain
and upgrade our naval vessels and capabilities, including nuclear-powered
submarines. Creating and sustaining this industrial capability, including the
underpinning workforce, is a critical component of self-reliance in
National Defence. In building naval vessels in Australia, we will need to develop
the critical understanding of the platforms required to support sustainment,
maintenance and upgrade activities.
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10.23 To meet the requirements for our maritime and littoral fleets, we must increase
the size of our supporting industrial base. Most importantly, we must grow the
size of our naval shipbuilding workforce.
10.24 This national endeavour requires active Government leadership. There are
currently two major shipbuilding hubs in Australia (Osborne and Henderson).
There is a need for active Government engagement across both naval
shipbuilding sites. This is essential to ensure the successful delivery of both
existing and forthcoming surface ship projects and the nuclear-powered
submarine program.
10.25 At Osborne shipyard, substantial investment is required to grow the

necessary workforce. This is in addition to the infrastructure needed for any
build component of a nuclear-powered submarine, which must be started
immediately.
10.26 Henderson shipyard, near HMAS Stirling, faces some significant challenges to
give it the requisite critical mass for shipbuilding. Under current plans there
is simply not enough work to sustain the number of shipbuilders located at
Henderson.
10.27 Henderson currently plays a crucial role with regard to naval sustainment,
maintenance and upgrade of our naval vessels, as well as the construction of
smaller surface vessels. The completion of a Henderson-based large vessel
dry-dock is a critical enabler for the construction and sustainment of our
naval vessels. Henderson’s critical role in Australia’s naval shipbuilding and
maintenance needs to continue, but Government intervention is required to
consolidate activities.
10.28 We strongly recommend active and urgent Commonwealth and state

government intervention in the Henderson shipyard to remedy significant
challenges around the workforce, the layout and development of the shipyard,
and the relationship between infrastructure, shipbuilders, contractors and
workforce providers.
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East coast nuclear-powered submarine facility

10.29 The current strategic circumstances dictate a need to establish an east coast
nuclear-powered submarine facility. This facility would provide redundancy and
dispersal as well as increasing speed of transit to key east coast operational
areas. Such a facility would also greatly enhance the operational capabilities of
the existing Collins class fleet of submarines on the eastern seaboard of Australia
and the Pacific.
Recommendations:
• Infrastructure development should commence immediately
at the Osborne shipyard to enable the Nuclear-Powered
Submarine Pathway.
• Infrastructure development should commence immediately
at HMAS Stirling to enable the support and maintenance of
conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine operations.
• Industry consolidation options for the Henderson shipyard
should be examined as a matter of urgency.
• An east coast facility should be established for Australia’s future
submarine capability.
Exercises and operations

10.30 Major ADF exercise design must be informed by and reflect Australia’s strategic,
operational and preparedness requirements. Major exercises must also be used
to build preparedness including minimum viable improvements in key areas.
10.31 We believe that the ADF needs to conduct many more of these types of activities
as they have both a positive preparedness and deterrent effect.
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Accelerated Preparedness and logistics

10.32 Through the course of the Review, the need for better preparedness has become
apparent.
10.33 Increased levels of preparedness will require additional investment from the
Government and much more relevant priority setting by Defence. The most
tangible enhancement to our warfighting capability and to self-reliance in
National Defence will come from undertaking Accelerated Preparedness.
10.34 Current levels of ADF preparedness have been based on a 10-year warning time
for major conflict. The end of a 10-year strategic warning time requires Defence
to increase preparedness.
10.35 Accelerated Preparedness should occur in three stages in line with the priority
periods outlined in the Review.
10.36 Accelerated Preparedness will come at a cost. Elements of sustainment and

operating budgets must be reprioritised as Defence focuses more acutely on the
strategic threats.
10.37 To deliver the required capability, there is a clear need to have the correct
infrastructure and logistics support in the right locations to project and sustain
power.
10.38 The reshaping and growth of the national and Defence logistic and health
workforces is a key priority to develop self-reliance, and sovereign supply chains,
and to improve national resilience.
10.39 In order to support Accelerated Preparedness in GWEO, Defence must:
establish the required levels of GWEO stocks;

rapidly acquire additional GWEO stocks from existing suppliers and
contractors;
explore options of other sources of supply or contracting for priority
guided weapons;
rapidly establish a domestic GWEO manufacturing capability; and
increase our GWEO production capacity to support our ongoing needs
and increase the total production capacity of our partners.
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Recommendations:
• Options for the increase of guided weapons and explosive
ordnance stocks, including the rapid establishment of
domestic manufacturing, should be provided to the
Government by Q2 2024.
• A national logistics support concept that considers strategic
and industrial policy needs, and civilian, local and state
government and military logistics capabilities, should be
developed by 2025.
• A National Support Division should be established within
Defence by 2024 to develop concepts and conduct
engagement to harness the nation’s economic, industrial and
societal strength.
Information and communications technology

10.40 Information and communications technology (ICT) is critical to Defence and
modern warfighting capability. It underpins preparedness and is critical to
reliance measures.
10.41 The major initial workforce limitation in this area is the limited number of senior
staff, resulting in issues of scale and delivery needs. This is evidenced by project
slippage and value loss to industry integrators.
10.42 For one of the most complex ICT networks in Australia, Chief Information
Officer Group (CIOG) has a smaller leadership team than Services Australia or
the Australian Tax Office, which have much smaller ICT footprints and classified
network architecture.
10.43 CIOG has become too reliant on individual contractors and is already heavily
outsourced. There are insufficient ADF and APS staff to manage these contractors
and providers and this must be rebalanced.
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Recommendations:
• A dedicated senior official for Chief Information Officer Group
(CIOG) capability management leadership and a dedicated
senior official accountable for the secret network should be
appointed, and the CIOG workforce should be rebalanced to a
60:40 APS- and ADF-to-contractor ratio.
• Defence’s cyber security arrangements should be enhanced in
close collaboration with the Australian Signals Directorate.
• Defence’s cyber security operations capability in Chief
Information Officer Group should be increased and legacy
systems and platforms should be decommissioned.
Estate and infrastructure

10.44 Although the Review has focused its work for force posture and preparedness
on the immediacy of the most important strategic operational estate and
infrastructure considerations in the north of Australia (which must commence
immediately), the Government cannot afford to lose sight of the importance of
foundational estate and infrastructure for Defence.
10.45 We recommend that the Government would benefit from conducting an

enterprise-wide audit to baseline estate and infrastructure. The audit should
focus on workplace health and safety. The protective security of bases should
also be included.
10.46 Once this audit is complete, investment must be made in the estate. Priority
investments should be focused on the northern Australian bases in the first
instance.
Recommendation:
• An enterprise-wide audit to baseline Defence estate and
infrastructure, including protective security, should be
completed no later than the end of 2023.
83
Security
10.47 Protecting Australian-developed capabilities, and ensuring continued access to
sensitive partner technologies, requires a robust security system. This includes
physical security, ICT security and effective security vetting arrangements for
personnel.
Recommendation:
• The transfer of Defence’s Positive Vetting (PV) vetting
authorities to the Top Secret Privileged Access (TSPA) Authority
should be accelerated.
84
85
11
86
11 Workforce
11.1 Defence is facing significant workforce challenges. This was a recurring theme
across all areas of the ADF, APS and defence industry in the Review. This is an
acute issue for Defence and is reflective of broader national challenges.
11.2 To secure the Defence APS and ADF workforce requires an innovative and bold
approach to recruitment and retention. Without creative and flexible responses,
the workforce situation in Defence will continue to deteriorate. Policy, process,
risk appetite and approaches to recruitment must change to increase the speed
of recruitment from application to enlistment and recruitment. Recruitment time
must be achieved in days, not months.
11.3 Defence must bring together the end-to-end people system for the ADF with the
aim of increasing the effectiveness, efficiency, coordination and cohesiveness of
the force. Personnel management of the ADF must be optimised to realise
and sustain the long-term workforce requirements and to ensure that the
Integrated Force can be realised. ADF personnel management should be
centralised into a single integrated system incorporating the five domains, headed
by a Chief of Personnel reporting directly to the Chief of the Defence Force.
11.4 We believe there is a need for a comprehensive strategic review of the

ADF Reserves and reserve service as part of National Defence and in light of the
current strategic circumstances.
11.5 The transition to the Total Workforce Model has significantly improved the
utilisation of the reserve workforce. The ADF Reserves must not just complement
the total Defence workforce but also provide the expansion base for the ADF in
times of crisis. In order to achieve such an effect, Defence needs to investigate
innovative ways to adapt the structure, shape and role of the Reserves, as well as
reconsider past programs, specifically the Ready Reserve Scheme.
87
Recommendations:
• Options should be developed to change Defence’s recruitment
framework to improve the eligibility pool of potential
applications and to align service recruitment requirements to
military employment, especially in key technical and specialist
trades (cyber, engineering, space, etc.).
• Options should be developed to change the policy and risk
settings to improve the achievement of recruitment targets by
2024.
• ADF personnel management should be centralised into a
single integrated system that is headed by a Chief of Personnel
reporting directly to Chief of the Defence Force.
• A comprehensive strategic review of the ADF Reserves,
including consideration of the reintroduction of a Ready
Reserve Scheme, should be conducted by 2025.
88
89
12
90
12 Capability Acquisition, Risk and

Accountability
Capability acquisition
12.1 Timely and strategically relevant capability acquisition is critical in the coming
period. Defence’s current approach to capability acquisition is not suitable
given our strategic circumstances, and there is a clear need for a more efficient
acquisition process. The increasing volume and complexity of capability projects
is overwhelming Defence’s capability system, its limited workforce and its
resource base.
12.2 Although the cancellation or postponement of projects in the IIP is made

extraordinarily difficult, little scrutiny is given to projects entering it. Defence has
had an over-reliance on bottom-up proposals forming the bulk of new entries
into the IIP, and a surprising lack of top-down direction or genuine
joint-assessment of pre-Gate 0 proposals.
12.3 Once projects have entered the IIP, capability managers have too much latitude
to make design changes, tinker with capability outcomes, and indulge in the
quest for perfectionism. These behaviours result in delay and strategically
significant capability outcomes not being achieved in a timely manner, or at all.
12.4 Clear direction from the Government and clear expectations placed on Defence
for acquisition and delivery are critical to resolving this issue. To achieve this,
in the first instance a threshold judgement must be made at the joint senior
level, and agreed to by the Government, on what minimum viable capability is
required and what is readily available.
12.5 When capability is readily available there should be an emphasis on getting it

into service without delay and achieving value for money. Defence must, where
possible, acquire more platforms and capabilities via sole source or off-the-shelf
procurement, and limit or eliminate design changes and modifications. When
subsequent design changes or enhancements to capabilities are proposed, we
recommend these be independently tested by sceptical and trusted advisers.
12.6 In our new strategic circumstances the focus must be on the capabilities of the
Enhanced Force-In-Being, with an emphasis on incremental upgrades through
the life of a capability rather than pursuing longer-term solutions. This does not
mean that Defence can lose sight of the future force’s requirements, but rather it
91
must rebalance priorities for our current strategic circumstances.
12.7 Strategically important and urgent projects, and low-complexity projects,

must both be streamlined. Projects of high strategic importance and urgency
must be given special consideration for accelerated acquisition and delivery.
Low-complexity projects, such as like-for-like replacements and off-the-shelf
acquisitions, are consuming too much time and resources. The default for
these should be single source and other measures to streamline approvals and
acquisition.
12.8 Australian industry content and domestic production must be balanced against
timely capability acquisition. Previous government direction to meet mandated
Australian industry content skewed the capability acquisition process so that
capability outcomes were secondary to creating opportunities for Australian
industry – even when a clear rationale was lacking.
12.9 To enable Australian defence industry to deliver capability, acquisition processes

must minimise the burden of working with Defence, particularly for small and
medium enterprises. This will have the advantage of faster capability delivery
while building depth in Australian defence industry where required.
12.10 Defence must consider Australian industry content when it makes sense
and delivers capability outcomes on time. It is essential to ensure Australian
sovereign defence industry capability is supported where it makes strategic
sense.
12.11 A key part of setting projects up for success is ensuring that project teams
and managers have the appropriate skills to effectively deliver these major
projects. This includes experience in project delivery and commercial and
industry expertise. The erosion of the APS workforce in Capability Acquisition and
Sustainment Group (CASG) has significantly degraded these skills.
12.12 Across CASG, and CIOG, we have seen evidence of contractors managing
contractors through several layers of a project’s governance structure with
inadequate Commonwealth oversight. As a priority, Defence must move away
from its current dependence on external service providers for roles that should
be done by ADF or APS personnel.
92
Risk and accountability

12.13 Mechanisms put in place to manage risk in Defence acquisitions do not serve us
well in the current strategic environment. They are burdensome and misguidedly
risk-averse.
12.14 In the past, Governments have successfully engaged with and accepted risk
during periods of conflict and crisis, and previous reform efforts have highlighted
the need for streamlined, risk-based and accountable decision-making.
Accordingly, to manage the risks inherent in the escalated strategic environment
there must be reconceptualisation of risk across government.
Indigenous industry groups

12.15 We had a number of sessions with Indigenous industry groups. Defence should
continue its efforts to make full use of these companies, where relevant,
including small and medium enterprises servicing local areas across Australia.
Defence should build awareness and understanding of the importance of
Indigenous engagement procurement decisions, including the sole-sourcing
option through Exemption 16 of the Commonwealth Procurement Rules.
Recommendations:
• Options should be developed as soon as possible to change
Defence’s capability acquisition system so that it meets
requirements and is reflective of our current strategic
circumstances.
• Australian industry content and domestic production should be
balanced against timely capability acquisition.
• Options should be developed as soon as possible to streamline
and accelerate the capability acquisition process for projects
designated as strategically urgent or of low complexity.
• A new simplified programmatic approach should be developed
to replace the current Capability Program Architecture by 2024.
• The delivery of capability within the required time, together
with value for money, is the priority in our current strategic
circumstances and should be enabled by appropriate risk-
based behaviours.
• Government procurement and Budget Process Operational
Rules should be amended to ensure consistency with the
urgency required and the strategic risk involved.
93
13
94
13 Finances and Resources

13.1 The 2020 Defence Strategic Update recommitted to funding at a growth rate
of 5-6 per cent per annum. The 2020 Force Structure Plan outlined a positive
growth trajectory for capability development. Despite these commitments,
Defence’s Budget is carrying significant pressures across acquisition, sustainment,
workforce and operating categories.
13.2 At the commencement of the Review (as at 3 August 2022), Defence’s Budget
across the forward estimates was over-programmed by 24 per cent for capability
acquisitions, 4 per cent above the recommended level in the 2016 Defence
White Paper.
13.3 Since the 2016 Defence White Paper, Defence funding over the planning decade
from 2022-2023 to 2031-2032 was reduced. This includes:
$3.6 billion for REDSPICE (to 2025-2026);

$2.7 billion transferred to other agencies; and
$12.2 billion through a strategic reserve adjustment ($9 billion) and
efficiency dividends ($3.2 billion).
13.4 Between the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan and
the establishment of the Review, measures were announced which resulted
in excess of $42 billion in additional Defence spending over the planning
decade to 2032-2033, without the provision of any additional allocation in the
Commonwealth Budget. This includes:
$7.9 billion further funding for REDSPICE beyond 2025-2026;

$32.2 billion for the establishment of the GWEO Enterprise; and
$1.9 billion to achieve AUKUS Pillar II Advanced Capabilities.
13.5 New capability requirements coupled with sustainment demand for existing
capabilities and the need to address severe workforce pressures will require
difficult decisions and trade-offs to manage the Defence Budget over the
immediate period.
13.6 Defence planning is about managing strategic risk. Defence spending must be a
reflection of the strategic circumstances our nation faces.
95
13.7 The full cost of the Review recommendations will not be able to be fully
quantified until Defence has analysed the capability recommendations in the
Review and costed them.
Recommendations:
• Defence funding should be increased to meet our strategic
circumstances.
• Lower-priority projects and programs should be stopped or
suspended to free essential resources which can be allocated
to projects and programs that align with the priorities in the
Review.
• Funding should be released through the rebuild and
reprioritisation of the Integrated Investment Program (IIP)
and reinvested into priority Defence projects, programs and
activities consistent with the Review.
96
97
14
98
14 Implementation, Oversight and

Future Planning
National Defence Strategy

14.1 To enact a new strategic conceptual approach to defending our nation –
National Defence – we require a more holistic approach to Australian defence
and security strategy.
14.2 Defence policy development should move away from intermittent white papers
to a biennial National Defence Strategy to ensure strategic consistency and
coordination of national policy implementation.
14.3 This would allow for Defence policy to keep pace with the rapidly evolving
strategic environment, to respond effectively to the Government’s priorities, and
to provide clarity of process and approach to Defence and defence industry.
Recommendation:
• Defence should move away from white papers to produce a
National Defence Strategy on a biennial basis. The first National
Defence Strategy should be delivered no later than Q2 2024.
14.4 The Review makes significant recommendations based on a first-principles

approach as to how to manage the highest level of strategic risk. It is therefore
critical that a disciplined approach to implementation is undertaken.
14.5 We have provided some urgent recommendations that we believe must be

implemented without delay. Other recommendations can be incorporated
into future Budget cycles so that the Government can consider holistic
analysis of implications, including cost, industrial and workforce impacts, and
interdependencies.
14.6 Defence work on lower-priority projects and programs must be stopped,

suspended immediately or progressively reduced as transition requires. This will
free essential resources – the workforce in particular – for allocation to projects
and programs that align with the priorities outlined in the Review to meet our
current strategic circumstances.
99
14.7 External oversight is essential to ensure recommendations are implemented as

intended and work reflects the Government’s direction.
14.8 We propose a three-tier system is adopted to oversee the implementation of the

Review. This consists of:
Tier 1. Cabinet-level Oversight to ensure the highest levels of strategic

direction.
Tier 2. External Oversight Advisers to ensure that Defence actions
are implemented in accordance with the intent of the Review
recommendations and accompanying Government direction.
Tier 3. Defence Strategic Review Management Board, internal to
Defence, to provide direct oversight and leadership of the implementation
of the Review.
Recommendation:
• A three-tier system should be adopted to oversee and lead the
implementation of the Review recommendations.
100
101
C
PART
102
The Albanese Government’s

Response to the Defence Strategic
Review Recommendations
Our Defence Strategic Environment (Chapter 2)
Australia’s immediate region encompassing the north-eastern
Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific,
Agreed
including our northern approaches, should be the primary area of
military interest for Australia’s National Defence.
Government response:
The Government agrees with the primary area of strategic military interest
proposed in the Review. Defence will adjust its force structure, posture and
planning accordingly.
The Government also notes that in the contemporary strategic environment,
developments in cyber, space and long-range precision strike mean our defence
interests are not bound by geography alone.
National Defence – A Whole-of-Government Approach (Chapter 3)

National Defence should be adopted as the strategic approach for
Agreed
defence planning.
A whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach to our
Agreed
strategic environment should be adopted.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) should be
appropriately resourced to lead a nationally determined and
Agreed
strategically directed whole-of-government statecraft effort in the
Indo-Pacific.
National Defence will be the strategic approach for defence planning.
The Government agrees with the Review recommendations for genuine
whole-of-government coordination.
DFAT will be appropriately resourced to lead a whole-of-government statecraft
effort in the Indo-Pacific.
103
Force Design, Structure and Capability (Chapters 7 and 8)

Force structure planning should be based on the Review. Agreed
Projects should be immediately delayed or cancelled to enable
funds and workforce in the forward estimates and planning Agreed
decade to be reallocated to higher priority capabilities.
The Integrated Investment Program (IIP) should be rebuilt in line
Agreed
with the force structure design priorities outlined in the Review.
The Government agrees and will reprioritise Defence’s IIP to fund immediate
and longer-term priorities. The Government will rebuild the IIP as part of the
inaugural National Defence Strategy.
A Fully Integrated and More Capable ADF (Chapters 8 and 10)

Maritime Domain
An independent analysis of Navy’s surface combatant fleet
capability should be conducted in Q3 2023 to ensure its
size, structure and composition complement the capabilities
provided by the forthcoming conventionally-armed, nuclear-
Agreed
powered submarines. The analysis must assess: the capability
requirements to meet our current strategic circumstances as
outlined in the Review, as well as the cost, schedule, risks and the
continuous shipbuilding potential of each option.
The acquisition of a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered
submarine capability in the shortest possible timeframe should Agreed
be prioritised as part of AUKUS Pillar I.
The Government should confirm its commitment to continuous
naval shipbuilding through an updated National Naval
Agreed
Shipbuilding Enterprise Strategy and updated supporting Naval
Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan.
Infrastructure development should commence immediately at
the Osborne shipyard to enable the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Agreed
Pathway.
Infrastructure development should commence immediately
at HMAS Stirling to enable the support and maintenance of Agreed
conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine operations.
Industry consolidation options for the Henderson shipyard should
Agreed
be examined as a matter of urgency.
104
Land Domain
Army should be structured and postured in accordance with
the land domain force structure design priorities outlined in the Agreed
Review.
LAND 8710 Phases 1-2 – Army Littoral Manoeuvre Vessels
(Landing Craft Medium and Heavy) should be accelerated and Agreed
expanded.
LAND 8113 Phases 2-4 – Long-Range Fires (HIMARS) and
LAND 4100 Phase 2 – Land-Based Maritime Strike should be Agreed
accelerated and expanded.
LAND 400 Phase 3 – Land Combat Vehicle System (Infantry
Fighting Vehicle) acquisition should be reduced to 129 vehicles to Agreed
provide one mechanised battalion.
LAND 8116 Phase 2 – Protected Mobile Fires (second regiment of
Agreed
Army self-propelled howitzers) should be immediately cancelled.
The delivery of landing craft, long-range fires, and infantry
Agreed
fighting vehicles should be synchronised.
Air Domain
Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile should be integrated onto the
Agreed
F-35A and the F/A-18F platforms. Joint Strike Missile should also
in-principle
be integrated onto the F-35A.
Options should be developed for collaboration and technology
sharing with the United States in the development of MQ-28A Agreed
Ghost Bat.
Space Domain
Space Command should be moved into Joint Capabilities Group
Agreed
from 1 July 2023.
A centralised space domain capability development and Agreed
management function should be established. in-principle
A method should be established for building and sustaining a
Agreed
trained Defence space workforce, including a defined career path
in-principle
for space professionals.
105
Cyber Domain
A comprehensive framework should be developed for managing

operations in the cyber domain that is consistent with the other Agreed
domains.
Defence’s cyber domain capabilities should be strengthened
Agreed
to deliver the required breadth of capability with appropriate
in-principle
responsiveness to support ADF operations.
The Government will develop a fully integrated and more capable ADF
comprising five domains, which work seamlessly together on joint operations to
deliver enhanced and joined-up combat power.
The Government will further develop and consider those recommendations
that it has agreed to in-principle as part of the National Defence Strategy to be
delivered in 2024.
Technology and Asymmetric Advantage (Chapters 8, 9 and 10)

Defence Science and Technology Group funding and resources
Agreed
should be aligned with the priorities identified in the Review.
The development of selected critical technology areas as part of
AUKUS Pillar II Advanced Capabilities should be prioritised in the Agreed
shortest possible time.
A senior official or officer with sole responsibility and a singular
focus on AUKUS Pillar II Advanced Capabilities implementation
Agreed
should be appointed to enable expedited focus on capability
outcomes.
A senior officer or official with the sole responsibility for leading
the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise
Agreed
should be appointed, with an appropriate underpinning
organisational structure.
Options for the increase of guided weapons and explosive
ordnance (GWEO) stocks, including the rapid establishment of
Agreed
domestic manufacturing, should be provided to the Government
by Q2 2024.
The Government agrees that new technology and asymmetric advantage is
a priority, and will ensure the ADF has the capacity to engage in impactful
projection across the full spectrum of proportionate response.
106
Workforce (Chapter 11)

Options should be developed to change Defence’s recruitment
framework to improve the eligibility pool of potential applications
and to align service recruitment requirements to military Agreed
employment, especially in key technical and specialist trades
(cyber, engineering, space, etc.).
Options should be developed to change the policy and risk
settings to improve the achievement of recruitment targets by Agreed
2024.
ADF personnel management should be centralised into a
single integrated system that is headed by a Chief of Personnel Agreed
reporting directly to the Chief of the Defence Force.
A comprehensive strategic review of the ADF Reserves, including
consideration of the reintroduction of a Ready Reserve Scheme, Agreed
should be conducted by 2025.
The Government agrees with these recommendations and recognises that
people are Defence’s most important capability. The Government will invest in
the growth and retention of a highly-skilled Defence workforce.
Force Posture and Accelerated Preparedness (Chapters 8 and 10)

Posture, Basing and Infrastructure
Upgrades and development of our northern network of bases, Agreed
ports and barracks should commence immediately. in-principle
Options should be developed to leverage the capabilities offered by
local and state governments as well as civil minerals and petroleum Agreed
resources industry infrastructure in northern and central Australia.
An enterprise-wide audit to baseline Defence estate and
infrastructure, including protective security, should be completed Agreed
no later than the end of 2023.
An east coast facility should be established for Australia’s Agreed
future submarine capability. in-principle
Fuel
A whole-of-government Fuel Council should be established as
soon as possible with representatives from relevant departments Agreed
and industry to deliver resilient national fuel supply, distribution in-principle
and storage.
107
Logistics and Health

A national logistics support concept that considers strategic and
industrial policy needs, and civilian, local and state government Agreed
and military logistics capabilities, should be developed by 2025.
A National Support Division should be established within Defence
Agreed
by 2024 to develop concepts and conduct engagement to
in-principle
harness the nation’s economic, industrial and societal strength.
Commander Joint Logistics and Commander Joint Health
should be adequately resourced to deliver Defence logistics and
Agreed
health networks that are able to deliver persistent support and
sustainment for operations.
Information and Communications Technology
An open architecture approach should be adopted by Defence in Agreed
both hardware and software. in-principle
A dedicated senior official for Chief Information Officer Group
(CIOG) capability management leadership and a dedicated senior
official accountable for the secret network should be appointed, Agreed
and the CIOG workforce should be rebalanced to a 60:40
APS- and ADF-to-contractor ratio.
Defence’s cyber security arrangements should be enhanced in
Agreed
close collaboration with the Australian Signals Directorate.
Defence’s cyber security operations capability in Chief
Information Officer Group should be increased and legacy Agreed
systems and platforms should be decommissioned.
Security
The transfer of Defence’s Positive Vetting (PV) vetting authorities
to the Top Secret Privileged Access (TSPA) Authority should be Agreed
accelerated.
The Government agrees with the priority the Review places on force posture
and accelerated preparedness. The Government also remains committed to
safeguarding Australia’s national fuel supply, distribution and storage.
The Government will develop a process to consider all feasible options for an
east coast facility to support Australia’s future submarine capability. A decision
on the location for this facility will be made late in this decade.
Other recommendations that have been agreed to in-principle will be further
developed and considered as part of the National Defence Strategy to be
delivered in 2024.
108
Capability Acquisition, Risk and Accountability (Chapter 12)

Options should be developed as soon as possible to change
Defence’s capability acquisition system so that it meets
Agreed
requirements and is reflective of our current strategic
circumstances.
Australian industry content and domestic production should be
Agreed
balanced against timely capability acquisition.
Options should be developed as soon as possible to streamline
and accelerate the capability acquisition process for projects Agreed
designated as strategically urgent or of low complexity.
A new simplified programmatic approach should be developed to
Agreed
replace the current Capability Program Architecture by 2024.
The delivery of capability within the required time, together
with value for money, is the priority in our current strategic Agreed
circumstances and should be enabled by appropriate risk-based in-principle
behaviours.
Government procurement and Budget Process Operational Rules
Agreed
should be amended to ensure consistency with the urgency
in-principle
required and the strategic risk involved.
The Government agrees the current capability acquisition process is not fit
for purpose. Defence will reform the capability acquisition process to achieve
more timely and relevant capability outcomes in response to our strategic
circumstances, with an emphasis on minimum viable capability.
The Government will consider potential amendments to the Budget Process
Operational Rules in the context of the 2024-25 Budget process. The remaining
recommendation agreed to in-principle will be further developed and
considered as part of the National Defence Strategy to be delivered in 2024.
Climate Change and Support to Domestic Disaster Relief (Chapter 5)

The Commonwealth should work with the states and territories
to develop national resilience and response measures for adverse Agreed
climate change at the local level without the need of ADF in-principle
support, except in the most extreme emergencies.
Defence should be the force of last resort for domestic aid to the Agreed
civil community, except in extreme circumstances. in-principle
109
Defence should accelerate its transition to clean energy to

increase our national resilience, with a plan to be presented to Agreed
the Government by 2025.
The Government acknowledges that the ADF’s role in providing assistance
to the civil community following natural disasters comes at a cost to force
preparedness, readiness and combat effectiveness. The Government will work
in partnership with states and territories to further develop national resilience
response mechanisms.
The Government will further develop and consider those recommendations
that it has agreed to in-principle as part of the National Defence Strategy to be
delivered in 2024.
Finances and Resources (Chapter 13)

Defence funding should be increased to meet our strategic
Agreed
circumstances.
Lower-priority projects and programs should be stopped or
suspended to free essential resources which can be allocated to Agreed
projects and programs that align with the priorities in the Review.
Funding should be released through the rebuild and
reprioritisation of the Integrated Investment Program (IIP) and
Agreed
reinvested into priority Defence projects, programs and activities
consistent with the Review.
The Government agrees that Defence must have the requisite funding to
deliver the agreed priorities and capabilities recommended in the Review.
The Government will increase Defence funding over the next decade above its
current trajectory to implement the Review. This will include a rebuild of the IIP.
Implementation, Oversight and Future Planning (Chapter 14)

Defence should move away from white papers to produce a
National Defence Strategy on a biennial basis. The first National Agreed
Defence Strategy should be delivered no later than Q2 2024.
A three-tier system should be adopted to oversee and lead the
Agreed
implementation of the Review recommendations.
Government Response:
The Government will release the inaugural National Defence Strategy in 2024
which will encompass a comprehensive outline of Defence policy, planning,
capabilities, and resourcing.
110
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NATIONAL

© Commonwealth of Australia 2023

National Defence – Defence Strategic Review .........................11

Defence infrastructure design priorities.................................................................56

12 Capability Acquisition, Risk and Accountability.......................... 91

The Albanese Government’s Response to the

National Defence Statement 2023

Accordingly, the Albanese Government commissioned an independent Defence

Australia’s strategic environment

A large-scale conventional and non-conventional military build-up without strategic

Australia’s strategic posture

 defend Australia and our immediate region;

Capability and resources

The Government’s immediate actions to reprioritise Defence’s capabilities in line with

 investing in conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines through the

The Review calls for genuine whole-of-government coordination of Defence policy

The Government is deploying all of these elements of national power to make

Working with our partners and the region

Australia will also strengthen engagement with Indo-Pacific partners, particularly

The way ahead

The Albanese Government’s response to the Review includes specific directions to

The Hon Richard Marles MP

In order to crystallise these challenges in relation to Australia’s security, we have

Stephen Smith Angus Houston

The Defence Strategic Review Terms of Reference

Defence Strategic Review

Terms of Reference for the Independent Leads of the Review

Critical Information Requirements

The Review is to be informed by intelligence and strategic assessments of the most

The Defence Strategic Review Team

The Defence Strategic Review Team Secretariat

Australia’s strategic circumstances

As a consequence, for the first time in 80 years, we must go back to fundamentals, to

National Defence – a whole-of-government

The Alliance and regional defence partnerships

Investing in our Indo-Pacific regional partnerships remains essential. Australia’s focus

Force design and force structure

 undersea warfare capabilities (crewed and uncrewed) optimised for persistent,

We strongly support the acquisition of a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered

Posture and preparedness

Capability acquisition, risk and accountability

Finances and resources

New capability requirements, coupled with sustainment demand for existing

National security coordination

Implementation, oversight and future planning

External oversight of implementation is essential. This must be undertaken by Cabinet,

It will be challenging to effect.

1 Current Strategic Circumstances

Australia’s strategic circumstances

1.6 As a consequence, for the first time in 80 years, we must go back to

1.9 This necessitates a managed, but nevertheless focused, sense of urgency. It is

1.11 We must also make a substantially greater commitment of national resources to

Loss of warning time

 the three-year period 2023-2025 (for those matters which must be

2 Our Defence Strategic

The Indo-Pacific region

2.4 The Indo-Pacific is defined by a large population, unprecedented economic

2.5 Australia’s contemporary regional security situation is now characterised by:

 strategic competition between the major powers;

defend Australia and our immediate region;

investing in conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines through the

undersea warfare capabilities (crewed and uncrewed) optimised for persistent,

the three-year period 2023-2025 (for those matters which must be

strategic competition between the major powers;

Defence strategy and policy supporting whole-of-nation strategies;

more active Australian statecraft using all elements of national power;

undersea warfare capabilities (crewed and uncrewed) optimised

an enhanced, all-domain, integrated air and missile defence capability;

a littoral manoeuvre capability by sea, land and air;

a network of northern air bases with appropriate hardening and dispersal;

air-to-air refuelling; and

2023-2025 – Enhanced Force-In-Being (for those matters which must be