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The Asian Financial Crisis

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MORRIS GOLDSTEIN

THE ASIAN
FINANCIAL CRISIS
Causes, Cures, and
Systemic ImplicaUons

INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS


Washington, DC
June 1998

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1
Introduction

The turmoil that has rocked Asian foreign-exchange and equity markets
since June 1997 and that has spread far afield is the third major currency
crisis of the 1990s. Its two predecessors were the crisis in the European
Monetary System (EMS) of 1992-93 and Jhe Mexican peso crisis of
1994-95.
At the meeting of heads of state of the Asia Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (APEC) forum in Vancouver in November 1997, US President Bill
Clinton first characterized the Asian crisis as "a few small glitches in the
road"-a description that has given way to less rosy scenarios as evidence
of the depth and breadth of the crisis has accumulated. As shown in
tables 1 and 2, currency and equity markets in emerging Asia recorded
huge falls-on the order of 30 to 50 percent-in the second half of 1997
(as measured from the end of June, just before the floating of the Thai
baht). Developments during the first four months of 1998 have been
mixed: on the positive side, there have been some rebounds in exchange
rates in Thailand and South Korea and in equity prices in the Philippines;
in the negative column, the downward slide in the Indonesian rupiah
has accelerated, and even where currency and equity prices have
rebounded, the cumulative decline over the crisis period as a whole
remains very large.
Moreover, forecasts of 1998 economic growth in the region-which
stood in the 6 to 8 percent neighborhood prior to the crisis-have been
sharply marked down since then (see table 3).' Thailand, Indonesia, and

1. Goldstein and Hawkins (1998) show that these downward revisions of 1998 growth
forecasts for the Asian emerging economies represent some of the largest downward イ・カゥセ
sians (over a 6-.month period) ,?f the 19905.

1
Table 2 Stock markets, 30 June 1997 to 8 May 1998
Percentage. Cumulative:
change Percentage change
6/30/97- change' 6130197-
6130197 12131/97 12/31/97 5/8198 1/1/98-6/8198 5/8/98
Thailand. 527.3 372.7 -29.3 386.4 3.7 -26.7.
Malaysia 1,077.3 594.4 -44.8 580.1 -2.4 -46.2.
Indcnesia 725.0 401.7' -44.6 434.7 8.2 -40.0
Philippines 2,809.0 1,869.2' -33.5 2,210.0 18.2 -21.3
Hong Kong 15,197.0 10,722.8 -29.4 10,060.4 -6.2 -33.8
Korea, South 745.4 376.3' -49.5 373.0 -0.9 -50.0
Taiwan 9,030.0 8,187.3 -9.3. 8,210.8 0.3 -9.1
Singapore 1,988.0 1,529.8 -23.0. 1,420.8 -7.1 -28.5
Note: All stock market indices are local indices. The Hang Sang index Is used for Hong Kong
and the Straits Times for Singapore.
a. As of 12130/97.
b. As of 12129/97.
Sources: Bloomberg; Financial Times .(various issues).

Table 3 Real GOP growth and growth forecasts, 1996-98 (percentages)


IMF forecasts Consensus forecasts
1998 1998 Change 1998 1998 Change In
(as of (as of in 1998 (0. of (as of 1998
1996 1997 May 97) April 98) foroco.t Juno 97) April 98) forecast
Indonesia 8.0 5.0 7.4 -5.0 -12.4 7.6 -6.3 -13.9
Thailand 5.5 -0.4 7.0 -3.1 -10.1 5.9 -4.1 -10.0
Korea, South 7.1 5.5 6.3 -0.8 -7.1 6.1 -1.6 -7.7
Malaysia 8.6 7.8 7.9 2.5 -5.4 8.0 1.1 -6.9
Philippino. 5.7 5.1 6.4 2.5 -3.9 6.3 2.2 -4.1
Singapore 6.9 7.8 6.1 3.5 -2.6 7.3 2.7 -4.6
Hong Kong 4.9 5.3 5.0 3.0 -2.0 5.5 3.0 -2.5
China 9.7 8.8 8.8 7.0 -1.8 10.4 7.8 -2.6
Talwan 5.7 6.9 6.3 5.0 -1.3 6.5 5.9 -0.6
Sources: IMF, World Economio Outlook (various Issues); Goldstein and Hawkins (199B);
Consensus Economics, Inc., Asia-Pacific Consensus Forecasts (June 1997 and April 1998).

South Korea are now expected to suffer recessions this year, and growth
in Malaysia and the Philippines is likely to be only about a third of what
was anticipated prior to the crisis. Excluding China, growth in emerging
Asia is now expected to be only marginally positive (1 to 2 percent)
this year.
Moving outside the region, it becomes more hazardous to link changes
in 1998 growth forecasts solely to the effects of the Asian crisis, because
2 other factors have also changed. Nevertheless, it is relevant to note that

I.'.............., '......,...... , ,..


t f "Halifax II" reforms to strengthen
In chapter 4, I put forward a se 0R bin (1998) has recently called the
in April 1998 the International Monetary Fund (IMP) (1998b) revised its what US Treas\IrY Secretary Robert u ,,' These proposed reforms are
1998 global growth projection to 3.1 percent-down from 4.3 percent in "international financial a.rchl:ectur:din s: (1) reducing moral hazard
grouped under the ヲッャ キュセ セカ・GZ[ゥエケ togprivate debt イ・ウ」ィ 、オャュァセI
October 1997, and (roughly) two-thirds of that downward revision might
be attributed to slower growth in developing Asia. Turning to growth in d brin ing more order an ex. 10 in countries and rna g
the largest industrial countries, there is a consensus that Japan has been :'rength!ning prudential ウエBZL 、。イ セ m ャセZョエ セ・ standards. sooner; (3).
hardest hit by the Asian crisis, with its impact exacerbating Japan's serious
it more attractive for Zセエョオッ」 セエ ・セョオ in international finanCIal markets,
homegrown problems.' In the United States, the contractionary impact of improving transparency an sC osu h' and (5) shoring up risk manage-
the Asian crisis has so far been more subdued, and the IMP's latest (1998b) 4 iving IMF surveillance o:.'0r<; punc ,
forecast for 1998 growth is in fact now higher than itwas before the crisis.' HュI・セエ in global financial inStltutl°lns. from the crisis and offers some
My aim in this book is threefold: first, to explain how theAsian financial 5 tl' s 10 esSOns
Finally, chapter ouk ュセ t the future role of the lMF.
crisis arose and spread; second, to outline the kinds of corrective policy brief concluding remar s a ou
measures and reforms that would help to end the crisis; and third, to
suggest a package of improvements in the international framework for
crisis preventidn and crisis management.
Chapter 2 discusses the three main interrelated origins 9f the crisis,
namely: financial-sector weaknesses in Asian emerging economies cum easy
global liquidity conditions; mounting concerns about external-sector prob-
lems in these economies; and contagion from Thailand-first to three larger
economies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN-4)
(Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines), then to North Asia (South
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Japan), and finally to other countries
(ranging from Brazil to Russia and, more briefly, to equity markets in
some major industrial countries). .
Chapter 3 turns to proposals for fixing the crisis. Here, I take up restruc-
turing and reform of financial sectors and prudential supervision in the
ASEAN-4 economies and South Korea, exchange rate policies in Asia,
fiscal and financial'sector policies in Japan, competitive depreciation pres-
sures facing China, and the design and effectiveness of IMP-led official
rescue packages.

2. IMP forecasts for 1998 growth in Japan have fallen from 2.9 percent in the May 1997
World Economic Outlook to zero in the April 1998 edition. The IMF (I99Bb) argues that while
the Asian crisis added to the toll, the faltering of Japan's recovery in 1997 primarily re.f)ected
problems-of its own making, including the large withdrawal of fiscal stimulus when the
recovery was not yet firmly established, the bad loan problem cum more generalized finan-
cial-sectorwE!aknesses, and delays in the implementation of structural reforms. Posen (forth-
coming 1998) comes to a similar conclusion. Liu et al. (1998) also find that Japan's real GDP
is more adversely affected by the Asian crisis than either the United States or Europe but
emphasize that the outcome is heavily influenced. by how one treats the depreciation of the
yen vis-a.-vis the US, dollar and European currencies over the period and by how one
accounts for the real absorbtion effects of exchange rate changes. As argued in chapters 2
and 3, Japan's problems have also been an important element in the origins of the crisis . 1995 following the Mexican peso
4 Th G-7 EconomiC Summit in Halifax, ca?ad; ャZョセ[ッ「。ャ
and have made recovery from the regional crisis more difficult.
financial-architecture issues.
3. In May 1997, the IMP was projecting 1998 growth in the United States to be 2.2 percent; ' .. e paid considerable attention to SUpervlSO
the April 1998 World Economic Outlook envisages US growth of 2.9 percent in 199B. CnslS, INTRODUCTION 5

4 ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS

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