The Asian Financial Crisis
The Asian Financial Crisis
The Asian Financial Crisis
THE ASIAN
FINANCIAL CRISIS
Causes, Cures, and
Systemic ImplicaUons
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1
Introduction
The turmoil that has rocked Asian foreign-exchange and equity markets
since June 1997 and that has spread far afield is the third major currency
crisis of the 1990s. Its two predecessors were the crisis in the European
Monetary System (EMS) of 1992-93 and Jhe Mexican peso crisis of
1994-95.
At the meeting of heads of state of the Asia Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (APEC) forum in Vancouver in November 1997, US President Bill
Clinton first characterized the Asian crisis as "a few small glitches in the
road"-a description that has given way to less rosy scenarios as evidence
of the depth and breadth of the crisis has accumulated. As shown in
tables 1 and 2, currency and equity markets in emerging Asia recorded
huge falls-on the order of 30 to 50 percent-in the second half of 1997
(as measured from the end of June, just before the floating of the Thai
baht). Developments during the first four months of 1998 have been
mixed: on the positive side, there have been some rebounds in exchange
rates in Thailand and South Korea and in equity prices in the Philippines;
in the negative column, the downward slide in the Indonesian rupiah
has accelerated, and even where currency and equity prices have
rebounded, the cumulative decline over the crisis period as a whole
remains very large.
Moreover, forecasts of 1998 economic growth in the region-which
stood in the 6 to 8 percent neighborhood prior to the crisis-have been
sharply marked down since then (see table 3).' Thailand, Indonesia, and
1. Goldstein and Hawkins (1998) show that these downward revisions of 1998 growth
forecasts for the Asian emerging economies represent some of the largest downward イ・カゥセ
sians (over a 6-.month period) ,?f the 19905.
1
Table 2 Stock markets, 30 June 1997 to 8 May 1998
Percentage. Cumulative:
change Percentage change
6/30/97- change' 6130197-
6130197 12131/97 12/31/97 5/8198 1/1/98-6/8198 5/8/98
Thailand. 527.3 372.7 -29.3 386.4 3.7 -26.7.
Malaysia 1,077.3 594.4 -44.8 580.1 -2.4 -46.2.
Indcnesia 725.0 401.7' -44.6 434.7 8.2 -40.0
Philippines 2,809.0 1,869.2' -33.5 2,210.0 18.2 -21.3
Hong Kong 15,197.0 10,722.8 -29.4 10,060.4 -6.2 -33.8
Korea, South 745.4 376.3' -49.5 373.0 -0.9 -50.0
Taiwan 9,030.0 8,187.3 -9.3. 8,210.8 0.3 -9.1
Singapore 1,988.0 1,529.8 -23.0. 1,420.8 -7.1 -28.5
Note: All stock market indices are local indices. The Hang Sang index Is used for Hong Kong
and the Straits Times for Singapore.
a. As of 12130/97.
b. As of 12129/97.
Sources: Bloomberg; Financial Times .(various issues).
South Korea are now expected to suffer recessions this year, and growth
in Malaysia and the Philippines is likely to be only about a third of what
was anticipated prior to the crisis. Excluding China, growth in emerging
Asia is now expected to be only marginally positive (1 to 2 percent)
this year.
Moving outside the region, it becomes more hazardous to link changes
in 1998 growth forecasts solely to the effects of the Asian crisis, because
2 other factors have also changed. Nevertheless, it is relevant to note that
2. IMP forecasts for 1998 growth in Japan have fallen from 2.9 percent in the May 1997
World Economic Outlook to zero in the April 1998 edition. The IMF (I99Bb) argues that while
the Asian crisis added to the toll, the faltering of Japan's recovery in 1997 primarily re.f)ected
problems-of its own making, including the large withdrawal of fiscal stimulus when the
recovery was not yet firmly established, the bad loan problem cum more generalized finan-
cial-sectorwE!aknesses, and delays in the implementation of structural reforms. Posen (forth-
coming 1998) comes to a similar conclusion. Liu et al. (1998) also find that Japan's real GDP
is more adversely affected by the Asian crisis than either the United States or Europe but
emphasize that the outcome is heavily influenced. by how one treats the depreciation of the
yen vis-a.-vis the US, dollar and European currencies over the period and by how one
accounts for the real absorbtion effects of exchange rate changes. As argued in chapters 2
and 3, Japan's problems have also been an important element in the origins of the crisis . 1995 following the Mexican peso
4 Th G-7 EconomiC Summit in Halifax, ca?ad; ャZョセ[ッ「。ャ
and have made recovery from the regional crisis more difficult.
financial-architecture issues.
3. In May 1997, the IMP was projecting 1998 growth in the United States to be 2.2 percent; ' .. e paid considerable attention to SUpervlSO
the April 1998 World Economic Outlook envisages US growth of 2.9 percent in 199B. CnslS, INTRODUCTION 5