A 'THOUSAND TEACHIN GS

The UfJaddasahasri of Sankara

Translated and Edited by

SENGAKU MAYEDA

.Foreword bv
JOHN M. KOLLER

STATE UNIVERSIT Y OF NEW YORK PRESS

I
I
l
 'fo Norman

First published in t;. S. A. by

State University of New York Press, Albany

ii;) 1992 l:Hiversity of Tokyo Press

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

Published in Japan by University of"fokvo Press, 1979

No part of this book mav be used or reproduced

in any manner whatsoever without written permission
except in the case of brief quotations embodied in
critical articles and reviews.

For information, address State University of New York

Press, State University Plaza, Albany, N. Y. 12246

Production by Dana Foote

Marketing by Bernadette LaManna

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Sa11karacarya.
[UpadesasahasrI. English] ,
A thousand teachings : the Upade5asahasr1 of Sankara I translated
and edited by Sengaku Mayeda ; foreword by John M. Koller.
p. cm.
Ti"anslation of: Upade5asahasrL
Reprint, with new foreword. Originally published: Tokyo:
University ofTbkyo Press, 1979.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0- 7914-0943-0 (hard alk. paper). - ISBN 0 ·- 79H--·0944--9
(pbk. : alk. paper)
!. Advaita. I. Title.
B 133.S49Ufi213 1992
181 '.482-dc20 91-96,11
CIP
10987654
 CONTE NTS

Foreword by.John M. Koller [xi]

Preface [xv]
Abbreviati ons [xxi]

AN INTRODU CTION TO THE

LIFE AND THOUGH T O:F SAi\JKARA

I. The Life and Works of Sankara [3]

II. Sankara's Central Doctrine and His Position in the

History of the Vedanta [11]

II I. Atman:'> Identity with Brahman [ 18]

A .Theological and Cosmological Approach [ 18]
l. A Cosmological Proof of the Identity [18)
2. Charac.teristics of Sankara's Cosmological View [22]
3. Sankara's View of Gross Elements [26]
B. Psychological and Epistemological Approach [27J
l. Structure of the Individual [28]
2. Psychology of External Perception [33]
3. Semantic Analysis of Perception [38]
4. Psychology of Internal Perception [40]
5. Four States of Atman [43]

C. Exegetical Approach [46)

l. T.he Means of Knowledge [4fi]
2. The Sentence "Tat Tvam Asi" [49]
3. Ari Exegetical Method: Anvaya and Vyatireka [50]
4. Later Advaitins' Exegetical Method [53]
5. Discontinuan ce of Sankara's Method [54]
6. The Sentence "Aharp Brahmasrni" [57]

vu
vm CONTENTS CONTENTS IX

IV. Transmigration and final Release [69] II. Prose Part (Gadyabandhrz)
A. Transmigration [69] L How to Enlighten the Pupil (Si~yapratibodhanaprakarar.w) [2ll]
B. Final Release [73] 2. Awareness (Avagatipralwrm.w)[234]
C. Transmigrator [75] 3. Parisanlkhyana Meditation (Parisar.aldi:'fii.napraJwrana) [251]
D. Avidyii. [76]
1. Nature of Avidyr1 [76]
2. The Locus and the Object of Avidyr"i [791 Index [255]
3. A Theoretical Defect in Avid-yci [82]
E. The Means to final Release [84]
E Sar1kara's View of Ethics [88]

A THOUSAND TEACHINGS
(TRANSLATION AND NOTES)

I. Metrical' Part (Padyabandha)

I. Pure Consciousness (Caitanyapralwrana [ 103 J
2. Negation (Prati~edhapraka.rm:w.) [ 108]
3. The Lord (l.5varaprakararJa) [ 110]
4. "!"-notion (Ahmrzpratya.yapraka.ra.~ia.) [ 112]
5. Suspicion of Urine (M~iltrafonkaprakara(ia) [ 114]
6. Having Cut (Chittvaprakarm.w) f llG]
7. Located in the Intellect (BuddhyiiriuJhajJrakara~w) [118]
8. The Nature of Pure Consciousness (CitisvarilpapralwrarJa) [ 120]
9. Subtlety (Siik:smat(Ipra.kara1:w) f 121]
10. Seeing (DrsiprakararJa) [123]
l l. The Quality of Being the Beholder (ik~iti:tvaprakara.na) [ 126]
12. In the Sunlight (Prakii§a.sthaprakara~w) [129]
13. Eyclessness (Acaksu,~(vapra.kararJa) [132)
14. Dream and Memory (Svapnasrnrtiprakara'l'J.a) [136]
15. One Thing Cannot Be Another (Niinyadanya.tprakara~ia) [142]
16. Consisting of Earth (Piirthiva.praka.rar;a) [149]
17. Right Thought (Samyailmatipra.kamlJ.a) [160]
18. Thou Art That (Tattvarnasipra.karaw1) (172]
19. Annihilation of Fever (fvaranafapraka.rww) [203]
 FOREWORD

We are fortunate to have Sankara's A. Thousand Teachings avail-

able in this excellent translation at an affordable price. No other
Vedanta text is so accessible and so effective in introducing stu-
dents to the central issues of Advaita Vedanta. Sankara (700 -
750) is generally regarded as one ofindia's greatest philosophical
and religious thinkers, and A Thousand Teachings is the best intro-
duction to his thought. Because of his critique of Mimarµsa,
SaJ:pkhya, Buddhism, and the other traditions, it is also an excel-
lent introduction to the whole field of Indian philosophy. In my
experience this text is without equal in successfully engaging stu-
dents in thinking about the central issues that have shaped the
on-going Advaita tradition and that have dominated the history
of Indian philosophy.
In A Thousand Teachings, the only clearly authentic work of
Sa1ikara that is not in the form of a commentary, we find the
central teachings of non-dualistic Vedanta set out in clear and
direct language. Philosophers will be impressed by the careful
conceptual analysis and vigorous argumentation Sankara employs
to support his own views and to refute the competing views of
others. In the second chapter of the prose part, the philosophical
centerpiece of the text, the teacher keeps questioning the student,
pushing him to analyze his claims and to examine the arguments
supporting them. In doing so, the student repeatedly challenges
the teacher's clairns and arguments, creating a profound and sub-
tly argued philosophical dialogue in the process.
Students of religious thought, on the other hand, will find this
text an interesting example of how reason is used to support rev-

Xl
XU FOREWORD FOREWORD xm

elation, for Sai1kara acknowledges that despite the power of rea- why negation arrives not at nihilistic emptiness but at Atman, the
son, ultimately it is ,~ruti (revelation) that is the source of truth. ultimately real.
Furthermore, though reason can clarify truth and remove ol~jec­ Chapter 4, "I-Notion," asks, How can action, which is rooted in
tions to it, its confirmation is not found in logic, but in experience, identification of Self with the agent, produce its result when this
in the experience of meditative insight. This understanding of identification has been removed by the knowledge that the true
the relationship between revelation, reasoning, and meditation - Self is not an agent? Sailkara answers that actions undertaken as
typical of much Indian thought - underlies the organization of a result of ignorant identification with agency continue to pro-
the text. Of the three chapters of the prose part, the first recalls duce their results, but when it is realized that Self is not agent
the Sruti teachings concerning liberating knowledge, the second then no new actions and results are produced. Agency and action
provides rational clarification and removes conceptual difficulties, result from mistaking the body for the Self. "A man who has
and the third directs the seeker of knowledge to meditation. knowledge of Atman, which negates the notion that body is )i:t-
In Part I, in the nineteen chapters addressed to students as a man ... is released even without wishing," says Sailkara [I.4.5].
kind of textbook of Vedanta, Sai1kara combines the authority of In Part Two, addressed to teachers, Sankara explains how the
revelation Uruti) with philosophical reasoning to answer the main teacher should guide a student who is seeking liberation from the
questions raised by a non-dualistic interpretation of reality. Each suffering of sarrisara. Chapter 2, the heart of this part of the text,
short chapter addresses a specific question, as illustrated here by is in the form of a dialogue which may well represent actual ex-
a brief analysis of the first (pur chapters. changes between Sankara and his students. The student displays
Chapter I, "Pure Consciousness," takes up the question, Why is a highly critical intelligence, refusing to accept the teacher's word
knowledge alone capable of realizing final beatitude? Why not when it runs counter to his own understanding. Time and again,
action? Sai1kara explains that since the Self is of the nature of the student objects to questionable distinctions, questions the ap-
pure consciousness, knowledge, because it is also of the nature of propriateness of examples, and challenges the teacher's analyses
pure consciousness can be effective in removing the ignorance and arguments. But these philosophical exchanges are not moti-
that stands in the way of blissful self-realization. Action, on the vated by mere curiosity; they are important means of arriving at
other hand, because it belongs to the body, and therefore is not of the truth that will deliver one from the bondage of suffering.
the nature of pure consciousness, cannot be effective in removing The dialogue begins with the student asking, "How can I be
this ignorance. released from transmigratory existence?" Noting that he experi-
Chapter 2, "Negation," addresses the question, Why is the way ences suffering in both the waking and dreaming state, he asks
of negation effective in realizing the Self? Here Sal'lkara ex plains about the cause of this suffering: "Is it indeed my own nature or
that what is of the nature of o~ject can be negated, but what is of [is itl due to some cause, my own nature being different?" The
the nature of pure subject can never be negated. Therefore ne- student is keenly aware that if suffering is an inherent feature of
gation can serve as an effective way of discriminating the pure human existence no release is possible. He goes on to say, "If [this
Self from the self identified as an object. is] my own nature, there is no hope for me to attain final release,
Chapter 3, "The Lord," continues the discussion of negation, since one cannot avoid one's own nature. If [it is] due to some
addressing the question, If the way of negation is followed to its cause, final release is possible after the cause has been removed."
limit, wouldn't we arrive at mere nothingness, the nihilistic emp- "\\Then the teacher replies, "This is not your own nature but is
tiness (funyatii) of the Buddhists? Sai1kara answers that negation due to a cause," the student asks, "\Vhat is the cause? And what
removes only the qualities falsely imposed on the pure Self. What will remove it? And what is my own nature?" Upon being told
is negated is not Atman, but the characteristics of objects that are that the cause is ignorance, which can be removed by knowledge,
non-Atman, superimposed on Atman through ignorance. This is the student asks, "What is that nescience? And what is its object?
XIV J<'OREWORD

And what is knowledge ... ?" [II.2.46~49]

In the continuing dialogue the teacher explains the fundamen-
tal Vedic teaching presented in the Upani~ads: One's innermost PREFACE
being, the Atman, is the ultimate reality, Brahman. The knowledge
wherein this identity is realized removes the ignorance consti-
tuted by wrong identification with the body-mind and recovers
the original perfection of the Self, releasing one from the suffer-
ings of this sa'f(!Saric existence.
Thus, in response to the student's questions the main concerns
of Advaita Vedanta are addressed, namely: ( 1) How is release
from suffering possible? (2) ls suffering inherent in human exis-
tence? (3) Or is it caused by something outside of one's own na-
ture? (4) What is the nature of the Self? (5) What is the cause of Sankara (700-750) has usually been regarded as the greatest
suffering? (6) If the cause is ignorance, how can it be removed? philosopher of India since P. Deussen praised his philosophy and
(7) What is ignorance? (8) How is ignorance related to knowl- compared it with those of Parmenides and Kant. 1 It has also been
edge? (9) How is it possible for the self, said to be of the nature pointed out that, like Meister Eckhart, he was not so much a
of knowledge, to be ignorant? ( 10) If the ignorance which causes philosopher as a theologian. 2 Sankara was indeed a metaphysi-
suffering does not belong to the Self, then how can it cause the cian or theologian, but, like Gotama Buddha and other great
self to suffer? religious teachers, he was primarily concerned with the salvation
Ti) answer these questions the teacher must explain the differ- of people suffering in transmigratory existence here in this present
ence between what is truly real (sat) and what only appears to be world and not with the establishment of a complete system of
real (maya), and explain how what is merely appearance can be philosophy or theology.3
superimposed on what is ultimately real. In these explanations This book contains an annotated English translation 4 of San-
the unique response of Ad vaita Vedanta to the generic problem kara's Upadesasiihasri or "A Thousand [Verses of] Teachings,"5
of how to attain release from suffering is fully laid out in this rich accompanied by an Introductory Essay. The translation is based
dialogue. upon my edition of the text which has been published in a roman-
Let me turn now to Professor Sengaku Mayeda's translation of ized version of the Sanskrit (Sankara's Upadefasiihasri, Critically Edited
the text and his critical study of Sankara's life and thought. The with Introduction and Indices. Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1973).
translation is a model of accuracy that allows the force of the orig~ As already stated in the Preface there, it is not my purpose to
inal to shine through. The notes following each chapter are help- point out yet again the importance of the Upadefosahasri in the his-
ful and to the point. tory of the Advaita Vedanta, which has been the main current of
The introduction to the life and thought of Sankara by Profes- thought in India for many centuries. But it is perhaps necessary
sor Mayeda is a masterpiece that will be appreciated by students to describe briefly the character of the Upadefosiihasri.
and teachers alike. Through a careful examination of A Thousand The UpadeJasahasri consists of two parts, one in verse and the
Teachings in the larger context of Sankara's other works and in other in prose. The verse or Metrical Part (Padyabandha) comprises
relation to its place in the whole field of Indian philosophy, Pro- nineteen chapters (prakara7Ja). Manuscripts indicate that the two
fossor Mayeda has given us an excellent introduction to Sankara, parts were regarded as independent works, as it were, and studied
opening the door to a deep appreciation of his thoug·ht and to or commented upon separately. They also suggest the possibility
further study. that any single chapter could be selected, copied, and studied
Jrnrn M. KoLu,:R
Troy, New York xv
XVl PREFACE PREFACE xvu

apart from the rest. 6 This means that reading of the text may begin In the Vedanta school there are three stages in the attainment
anywhere. of final release: (a) hearing (frava~ia), (b) thinking (rnanana), and
In the Metrical Part, perforce translated here into prose, three (c) meditation (nididhyiisana). 7 They appear to correspond to the
kinds of meter are used, but the prevailing one is anU.f/ubh, which first, second, and third chapters, respectively, of the Prose Part. 8
consists of 8 syllables to a quarter. Chapters 8, 10, and 19 are en- In the first chapter the teacher expounds to a pupil the purport
tirely composed in the va?'[t!astha meter with 12 syllables to a of the scriptures using numerous citations from both the revealed
quarter. This meter is also used in verses 41-50 of Chapter 14, texts (Sruti) and the traditional texts (srm:ti). In the second chapter
verse 54 of Chapter 15, and verses 68-74 of Chapter 16. The only the pupil reflects on the purport of the scriptures over and over
use of the sragdharii meter, which has 21 syllables to a quarter, is again by means of his own reasoning and by discussing with the
found in verse 81 of Chapter l 7. teacher such fundamental themes as nescience (avidyii) and su-
In the Metrical Part, the author discusses and repeatedly ex- perimposition (adhyaropary,ii). The third chapter describes the
plains many basic problems of Advaita or "non-dualism" from dif- parisanikhyiina meditation.
ferent points of view, sometimes in the form of a dialogue. He first The Prose Part must have been written on the basis of Sankara's
denies the validity of all kinds of action caused by ignorance practical and pedagogical experiences. The question and answer
(ajnana). At the same time he asserts that knowledge (vidya) is the exchanges between a teacher and his pupil in the Prose Part prob-
remover of ignorance which is the cause of transmigratory ex- ably were based upon such interchanges between the author and
istence (sarµsara). He state§ that Atman (Self) cannot be negated his disciples. The Prose Part is a handy guide for teachers, while
and explains the identity of Atman with the Lord (isvara). Again the Metrical Part is, as it were, a textbook for the pupils.
making clear the nature of actions, he points out the cause of delu-
sion, sharply distinguishes Atman from the intellect (buddhi) and Four years have already passed since the publication of my
declares that, from the standpoint of the highest truth (paramartha), edition of the text, though I had intended to publish the transla-
I ( = Atman) am the supreme Brahman, or absolute. The main tion without delay. One of the reasons for this delay was the fact
topic is the great sentence (mahavakya) "tat tvam asi" (Thou art that there was nobody who could look over my English, which is
That), to which the longest chapter, the eighteenth, consisting of not my mother tongue. Fortunately Mr. Trevor Leggett, who is
230 verses, is devoted. All these subjects are not systematically not only a specialist in J apancse Buddhism and culture but also
expounded. The entire exposition is pervaded by the author's versed in Sankara's pl-lilosophy, kindly read the manuscript of
firm faith in Atman. He passionately refutes the teachings of other this translation and suggested changes in English expression. With-
philosophical schools--Lokayata, Buddhist, Jain, Sarµkhya, out his warmhearted cooperation this translation could not have
Vai§e~ika, and so forth. This vigor of his polemic is easily seen in been completed. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to
verse I, 16, 65: "As [their assumptions] contradict the scriptures him.
and reasoning, they should never be respected. Their faults can be Thanks are also due to Dr. Marie G. Wanek, my former student
pointed out hundreds and thousands of times." in Indian philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania, who also
The Prose Part opens, in a simple style, with the declaration that helped me improve my English translation.
the author will explain how to teach the means of final release Publication of this book was aided by a grant from the Ministry
(mokfa) for the benefit of the seekers after final release; the means of Education, Science and Culture, Japan, and by the annual
is knowledge of the identity of Atman with Brahman. He describes publication subsidy of the University of Tokyo Press. I am grateful
the qualifications of a pupil who is to receive an invitation to for the support of these organizations.
knowledge, and also the qualifications of a teacher: a pupil should
be a seeker after final release (mumuk,rn) while a teacher should al- March 26, 1977
ready be released (mukta). SENGAKU ]vfAYEDA
xvm PREFACE PREFACE XlX

Notes to the Preface commentaries on the text:

(i) Anandajiiana's Upadefasiihasrl(ikii (alias Upadesasiihasr'ivivrti)-th is is unpub-
lP. Deussen, The ,irystem if the Vedanta (Reprint edition. New York: Dover Publi- lished. The manuscript 2552 (Eggeling 2279) in the India Office Library
cations, Inc., 1973), p. 48. (London) has been utilized.
2R. Otto, Mysticism East and West (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 33. (ii) Bodhanidhi's Upadeia[sahasra]granthavivaraf}a--this is unpublished and com-
3Cf. K. H. Potter, Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (Engle)"ood Clif:!S, N. J.: ments on the Metrical Part alone. The manuscript 776 (TR 164) in the Advar
Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 165. According to Potter's classification, Sankara and Rama- Library (Madras) has been utilized. .
nuja, as well as Gotama Buddha, are both path, philosophers and speculative philos- (iii) Ramatirtha's Padayojanikii--this has been published several times in India
ophers (ibid., pp. 36-37). Potter also says: "Sarp.karacarya . . . seems to teeter (see Mayeda Upad, pp. 19-21 ).
between leap and progress philosophy ... " (ibid., p.100). For descriptions of the printed editions of the text, see Mayeda Upad, pp. 19--21.
4The Upad has been translated into modern Indian languages such as Marathi, 5 The full title of the text isSakalavedopaniratsiiropadeiasiihasri or "A Thousand [Verses
Bengali, Kanarese, and Hindi: of] Teachings, which is the Essence ofall the Upani~ads of the Veda"; this title appears
(a) Sa'(lkariicarya-krta-Upadefasiihasrl, Marii!hibhiifD.rrztara, ed. by Sitarama Maha- in colophons of manuscripts and printed editions of the text. Cf. Mayeda Upad, p. 68,
deva Pha<;!ake. Poona: Bharatabhl:i~a1,1a Press, 1911. note 11.
(b) Srimac-Chaiikara-viracita Upadefasahasrz, Miila, Anvaya, Vangiilii Prati§abda, Riimat'irtha- 6 The formation of the text is described in Mayeda Upad, pp. 65--68.
t'ikii, Vahgalanuvada Eva7(l Tatparyiisaha, by Srlyukta Ak~ayakumara SastrI. Calcutta: 7 This is based upon Brh. Up. II,4,5 ( = IV,5,6): iitmii va are dra{favyab hotavyo man-
Metcalfe Press, 1915. tavyo nididhyiisitavyab (Atman should be seen, heard of, reflected on, and meditated
(c) Prakara~agal~, Sampufi I. (Upadefasiihasri, Gaqya, Padya; Aparok{anubhuti; Advai- upon). In his Vediintasara [XXX] l 96 Sadananda adds one more stage called "con-
tfinubhiiti), by Sri Saccidanandasarasvati. Holenaraslpuram: Adhyatma Prakasa centration''. (samiidhi).
Karyalaya, 1949. 8 Cf. P. Hacker, Upadeshasiilwsri van }Jeister Shankara, p.9.
(d) Srimad-fidya-Sankariiciiryakrta-Upadefasiihasrz, Hindi Anuviida Sahit, tr. by Munilal.
Benares: Bhargava Pustakalaya, 1954.
There is an English translation of the whole text of the U pad:
(e) A Thousand Teachings in Two Parts-Prose and Poetry--oJ Sri Sankarachllrya, tr. into
English with Explanatory Notes by Swami Jagadananda. Madras: Sri Rarnakrishna
Math, 1949.
However, this translation seems to be more faithful to Ramatirtha's commentary,
Padayojanika, than to the original, as I have pointed out elsewhere (Philosophy East and
West, vol. 12, no. 3, 1962, pp. 261-263).
There is a German translation of the Prose Part of the text:
(f) Upadeshasiihasri von A1eister Shankara, aus dem Sanskrit iibersetzt und erl/iutert von
Paul Hacker. Bonn: Rohrscheid Verlag, 1949.
This is based upon the text contained in the Minor Works o.f Sri Sankariicarya (Poona:
Oriental Book Agency, 1952). It is a very reliable translation and its footnotes are
useful.
The eighteenth chapter of the Metrical Part has been translated into English and
French:
(g) "That Thou Art" by Sri Sa1J1kara (Chapter Eighteen efthe Upadesa Sahasrf), tr. by
A. J. Alston. London: Shanti Sadan, 1967.
This is based on D. V. Gokhale's edition: Shrf Shankarach.Srya's Upadeshasahasrt with the
Gloss Padayojanikii by Shrf Riimatrrtha (Bombay: The Gujarati Printing Press, 191 7).
(h) Guy Maximilien, Tattvamasi de Sankara: Texte avec introduction, traduction et notes
(These de troisieme cycle en Sorbonne, 1974, unpublished).
The present writer contributed his English translation of the Prose Part based on
Mayeda Upad to: A Source Book if Advaita Vedanta, ed. by Eliot Deutsch and J. A. B.
van Buitenen (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1971, pp. 122-151) and a
Japanese translation of the Prose Part to: Annual of Oriental and Religious Studies, no.
10 (1973), pp. 44-58, no. 8 (1971), pp. 57-69, and no. 15 (1978), pp. 38-40.
In preparing my English translation I have taken the above listed translations in
European languages into consideration. In addition, I consulted the following three
 ABBREV IATIONS

Ait. Up. = Aitarrya UpaniJad .

.BhG = .BhagavadJ(itii .
.Brh. Up. = Brhadara'!}yaka Upani.yad.
:BS = .Braftmasiltra.
l3SBh = Sankara, Brahmasutrabha~ya (Bombay: Niq1aya-Sa gar
Press, 1934) .
.BUBh = Sankara, Brhadara'!}yakopani~adbha~ya (Anandasra ma
Sanskrit Series, voL 15, 1939).
Chand. Up. = Chandogya Upani~ad.
Eigen = P. Hacker, "Eigentilml ichkeiten der Lehre und Ter-
minologie Sankaras: Avidya, Namaropa, Maya, Isvara", ,()it-
sc!zrift der Deutschen lvforgenliindischen Gesellschaft, vol. 100 ( 1950),
pp. 246-286.
GBh = Sankara, .Bftagavadgztabha!ya (Bombay: Niq1aya-Sa gar
Press, 1936).
GK= Gau<;lapada, Gaurfapiidlyakarikii (see GKBh).
GKBh = Sankara, Gaurf apadlyabhaJya (Anandasra ma Sanskrit
Series, vol. 10, 1900).
Kath. Up. = Katha Upani!ad.
Kaw~. Up. = Kau~ztaki Upani.yad.
Mar.iq. Up. = lvfiirJ4flkya Upani.yad.
Manu = Manusmrti.
Mayeda U pad = S. Mayeda, Saizkara's UpadeJasiihasrz, CriticaUy
Edited with Introduction and Indices (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press,
1973)'

XXl
xxn ABBREVIATIONS

M.N. Up. = Mahiiniiraya7Ja Upani~ad.

Nai~ = Surdvara, Nai~karmyasiddhi (The Nai~karmya-Sidddi of Sure-
.foariiciirya with the Candrika rif ]niinottama, edited with notes and
index by the late Colonel G.A. Jacob and revised with introduc-
tion and explanatory notes by M. Hiriyanna. Bombay Sanskrit
and Prakrit Series No. XXXVIII, 1925). AN INTRODUCTION
Nakamura I = H. Nakamura, Shoki no Vedanta Tetsugaku (=Early TO THE l,IFE AND
Vedanta Philosophy. Shoki V cdiinta Tetsugakushi, vol. I.
THOUGHT OF SANKARA
Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1950).
Nakamura II = H. Nakamura, Brahmasutra no Tetsugaku ( = The
Philosophy of Brahmasatra. Shoki Vedanta Tetsugakushi, vol.
II. Tokyo: I wanami Shoten, 1951).
Nakamura III = H. Nakamura, Vedanta Tetsugaku no Hatten ( =
The Development of Vedanta Philosophy. Shoki Vedanta Te-
tsugakushi, vol. III. Tokyo: I wanami Shoten, 1955).
Nakamura IV= H. Nakamura, Kotoba no KeijiJogaku (=The
Metaphysics of LangJ1agc. Shoki Vedanta Tetsugakushi, vol.
IV. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1956).
PBh = Sankara, Padabhii.ua (The Kena Upanishad with Sri Shanka-
ra's Commentaries, ed. by Sri Swami Saccidanandendra Sarasvati.
Holenarasipur: Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya, 1959).
Pras. Up. = Prafna Upani~ad.
Ss = Sarvajfiatman, Sarrzkfepaiarfraka (The Sarhk~epaiarfraka ef
Sarvajniitman, Critically edited with Introduction, English Translation,
Notes and Indexes by N. Veezhinathan. Madras: University of
Madras, 1972).
Svet. Up. = Svetiisvatara Upani~ad.
Taitt. A. = Taittiriya Ar~yaka.
Taitt. Up. = Taittir'iya Upanifad.
Unters = P. Hacker, Untersuchungen ilber Texte des frilhen Advaita-
vada, ]. Die Schiller Sankaras. Mainz: Vcrlag der Akademie der
Wissenschaften und der Literatur, 1950).
Up. = Upanifad.
U pad = Sankara, Upadeiasa hasr i (see Mayeda U pad) .
VP = Dharmaraja Adhvarin, Vediintaparibhli.fii (Vediintaparihhii~ii
by Dharmariija Adhvarin, ed. with an English Translation by S.S.
Suryanarayana Sastri. The Adyar Library Series, No. 34,
1942).
WZKSO = Wiener .?.,eitschriftfilr die Kunde Sud- und Ostasiens.
 I. THE LIFE AND WORKS OF SANKARA

There are many works which profess to be biographies of San-

kara.1 The most famous of all is the Sailkaradigvijaya, written by
Vidyarar:iya in the fourteenth centu~y. 2 All these biographies were
composed hundreds of years after Sankara's death and are filled
with legendary stories and incredible anecdotes, some of which are
mutually contradictory. Today there are no extant materials
from which to reconstruct his life with certainty.
Setting the date of Sankara's birth is probably one of the most
controversial problems in the history of Indian philosophy, not
only because he is one of the greatest Indian philosophers but also
because a solution is inseparable from the correct understanding of
one of the most important and critical periods of the history of
Indian thought. It has been customary to adopt the birth and
death dates asserted by K. B. Pathak in 1882, 3 788 and 820,
but these dates have no firm basis. After reviewing and criticizing
all the conflicting opinions, Hajime Nakamura proposed in 1950
that the dates should be shifted to 700-750. 4 This view has been
accepted by such scholars as L. Renou 5 and D. H. H. Ingalls. 6
During the fifth and sixth centuries the Huns invaded India
from the central Asian steppes, and the political system of the
Gupta empire, under which India had enjoyed her golden age of
classical culture, was completely broken up in the sixth century.
In the seventh century King Haqa restored peace in North India,
but after his death India fell into chaos again. Thus $~n_k;:i.r:_<l_'\:Vas.
<1:<:~iy~jJ:1 _C()fl!p()sing}_1is works 11nci prnpagatirig his _ teachings d11r::-

3
4 INTRODUCTION THE LIFE AND WORKS OF SANKARA 5

~r1gan era of political division and social unrest in India; Bud- Kumarila's pupil, though he later established the Prabhakara
dhism was on the wane and Hinduism on the rise. school in opposition to his teacher. 17 Mai.i<}anamisra was an-
Tradition says that Sankara was born into a pious Nambudiri other contemporary who held Advaitic views different from
Brahmin family7 in a quiet village called Kalac;li on the banks of Sankara's. It has been remarked that "quring the age of Sarpkara
the Cun;ia (or Pan;ia, Periyaru) River in Kerala, South India. 8 and for some centuries following it, Ma:r;u;lana's authority on
He is said to have lost his father, Sivaguru, early in his life. ~9-n~a,ra questions relating to Advaita was recognized to be at least as high
i:.~I.1()1lnced the world and became a saTfl7?J1i'isin (ascetic) againsthis and
• I
important as that of Sarpkara himself. "18
mother's will, and went to Govinda (670-720) 9 to receive instruc:- Sa,nkara would not teach his doctrine to city dwellers. In
tion. No reliable information about Govinda is available, 10 but he cities the power of Buddhism was still strong, though already
is traditionally said to have been a pupil of Gauc;lapada (640- declining, and Jainism prevailed among the merchants and
690) .11 Gau<}apada is notable as the author of an important manufacturers. Popular Hinduism occupied the minds of ordinary
Vedanta work, Gau<f.apiidz.ya~i!_tika, in which the influence of Maha- people while city dwellers pursued ease and pleasure. There were
ya11a Buddhism is evident and, especially in its last chapter, also hedonists in cities, 19 and it was difficult for Sankara to
even dominant.12 communicate Vedanta philosophy to these people. Q9r:iseque11tJy
.It is said that Siva, one of the principal gods in Hindusim, was he propagated his teachings chiefly among sarp.Tl;)!lt~ins, who had
Sankara's family deity and also that he was, by birth, a Siikta, or renounced the world, and intellectuals in the villages, and he
worshipper of Sakti, the cqnsort of Siva and female personification gradually won the respect of Brahmins and feudal lords.20 J.:r~
of divine energy. Later he came to be regarded as a worshipper of gJ,_3._de enthusiastic efforts to restore the orthodox Brahmanical
Siva and even as an incarnation of Siva himself. But his doctrine tradition, without paying attention to the bhakti (devotional)
is very far removed from Saivisrn and Siiktism. It can be ascer- movement, which had made a deep impression on ordinary
tained from his works that he had some faith in, or was favorable Hindus in his age.
to, Vaig1avism.13 It is likely that he was familiar with Yoga, since It is very likely that Sankara had many pupils, but we know
he is the author of the rogasutrabha~yavivara1Ja, the exposition of only four from their writings: Padmapada, Sure$vara, Totaka (or
Vyasa's commentary on the Togasiitra, a basic text of the Yoga Trotaka), and Hastamalaka. 21 Padmapada wrote a commentary
school. 14 A recent study, though not fully acceptable, has suggested on Sankara's commentary on the first four sutras (aphorisms) of
that he was first an adherent ofYoga and later became an Advai tin. 15 the Brahmasiltra, called Paficapiidika, on which in the middle of
Biographers narrate that Sankara first went to Kas1 (Varar;iasi), the tenth century A.D. 22 Prakasatman composed a commentary
a city celebrated for learning and spirituality, and then travelled entitled Pancapadikavivara'l}a. The Vivarai;ia school which Padma-
all over India, holding discussions with philosophers of different pada started was the most influential among the later Advaitins
creeds. His heated debate with Ma9c;lanamisra, a philosopher of until it was overshadowed by the Bhamati school. Sure5vara is
the Mimarpsa school, whose wife served as an arbiter, is perhaps the known as the commentator on Sankara's commentaries on the
most interesting of the episodes reported in his bisgraphy 16 and Brhadiira'l}yaka Upanifad and the Taittirrya Upani.rad. His independ-
may reflect a historical fact: keen conflict between Sankara, who ent work .Naifkarmyasiddhi is "intended to reiterate the views
regarded the knowledge of Brahman as the only means to final embodied in the Upadefasahasri" of Sankara. 23 Totaka and Has-
release, and the Mimarpsa school, which emphasized the perfor- tamalaka are the authors of the Srutisarasamuddharaf}a and the
mance of ordained duty and the Vedic rituals, and to which be- Hastiimalakaf lokal;z, respectively, but their influence upon the
longed eminent philosophers such as Kumarila Bhatta, Prabha- development of the Ad vaita Vedanta seems to be negligible.
kara, a~d Mai:ic;lanamisra. It is traditionally believed that Kumari- It is also traditionally believed that Sankara founded four
la was Sankara's senior contemporary and that Prabhakara was monasteri~s (mafhq), at Sp:'1geri (Srnge;i~~tha, South), Pu~i
6 INTRODUCTION THE UFF. AND WORKS OF SANKARA 7

(Govardhanamatha, East), :Qy:ii.:r:al<a (Saradamatha, West), and should be noted that he made full use of his knowledge of Bud-
Badari:natha (Jyotirmatha, North). The most important of the dhism to attack Buddhist doctrines vigorously, or to assimilate
four is the one at Sr~geri in Mysore Province. In founding them into his own Vedantic nondualism, and he made great ex-
monasteries he was probably inspired by the Buddhist vihara ertions to "revedanticize" the Vedanta philosophy, which had
(monastery) system.24 In any case, the monasteries must have been made extremely Buddhistic by his predecessors. The basic
played a significant role in the development of his teachings into structure of his philosophy is nearer to Sai:µkhya, a philosophic
the leading philosophy of India. system of nontheistic dualism, and to the Yoga school, than to
More than three hundred works-commentaries, expositions, Buddhism.
and poetry-are attributed to him. 25 Most of them are not It is said that Sankara died at Kedarnatha in the Himalayas.
accepted as authentic. 26 ~~~-111~~terpi_ef_~JUh~ Brahmasilt?:q.k.qEL'.Jlq, The Advaita Vedanta school he founded has always been pre-
the commentary on the Brahmasiltra, which is the fundamental eminent in the learned circles of India. His doctrine has been
text of the Vedanta school. In fact, we should define Sankara as the source from which the main currents of modern Indian
the author of the Brahmasiltrabhii~ya, and use it as the yardstick thought are derived.
against w~ich to measure the authenticity of other works ascribed
to him. 27 Sankara also wrote commentaries on the Brhadarar;yaka,
Chandogya, Aitareya, Taittiriya, Kena, 28 ifa, Katha, Mur;qaka,
Prafna, and Mil1Jqukya Upani~ad. 29 Those commentaries are Notes t:o lnt:roduction, I

probably all genuine, but' the commentary on the Svetafvatara 1 For example, (I) Anantanandagiri, Guruvijaya; (2) Anandagiri, .~ankaravijaya [ed.
Upani~ad, which is traditionally ascribed to him, may be spuri- by Jayanarayal).a Tarkapancanana. Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1868; ed. by
ous. 30 The commentaries on the Gaurfapiidiyakarika and the Adhyat- Panditjibananda Vidyasagara. Calcutta: Sarasudhanidhi Press, 1881]; (3) Govin-
daniitha, Sankariiciiryacarita [Trichur: The Kerala Publishing House, 1926]; (4) Cit-
mapa!ala of Apastamba-Dharmasiltra seem to have been written by sukhacarya, BrhatJaftkaravijaya; (5) Cidvilasa, Sailkaravijayaviliisa; (6) Paramdvara,
Sankara himself. 31 As I have already mentioned, he is probably Acaryavijayacampu; (7) Rajacu<Jamal).idikiita, Sankariibhyudaya; (8) Vallisahaya~ San-
the author of the YogasiltrabhiifyavivararJa.3 2 These works are all karaviJaya; (9) V,idya sankar~, Sankaravija;·a; ( 10) Vidvadbalakakasilak~.rnai:ia Sastri,
commentaries on one or another text. The Upadefasahasri, which Guruva1f!sakiivya [Srirailgam: Sri Va!).i Vil as Press, n.d.]; ( 11) Vyasacala, Sankaravijaya;
(12) Sadananda, Sankaravijayasiira; (13) Sadasivabrahmendra, Gururatnamiilti; and (14)
is translated here, is the only non-commentarial work whose Sarvajiia Sadasivabodha, Pu!Jyaslokamafijarz, and its Parifif!a by Atmabodha.
authenticity has been conclusively demonstrated.33 2 Editions: (1) Bombay: Ga~1pat Krg1ajl's Press, 1864; (2)Anadasrama Sanskrit Series,

Penetrating insight, analytical skill, and lucid style characterize vol. 22 (Poona), 1891; (3) Hardvar: Sri Srava(lanatha Jiianamandir, 1943 - this edition
contains a Hindi translation by P Baladeva Upadhyaya; and (4) Sringeri: The Sringeri
Sankara's works. He cannot be called a particularly original Matha, 1956. The first chapter of the Saiikaradigvijaya was translated into German by P.
philosopher,34 but it has to be remembered that in India it is not Deussen in his Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, I, 3 (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1908), pp.
originality but fidelity to tradition which is the great virtue. He 181- 189.
3 Indian .Antiquary, XI (1882), pp. 1 74-175.
was an excellent exegete, with an approach to truth which was
4 Nakamura I, pp. 63--121. In opposition to this view K. K. Raja published an arti-
psychological and religious rather than philosophical. 35 He was cle, "On the Date ofSaqlkaracarya and Allied Problems," in the At[yar L,ibrary Bulletin
really not so much a philosopher as a pre-eminent religious (vol. XXIV, pts. 3-4, 1960, pp. 125-148) suggesting that the works of Sankara were
leader and a most successful religious teacher. His works show composed toward the close of the eighth century. P. Hacher places him before or
around 700 A.D. (Orientalistische Literaturzeitung 59, 1964, p. 235-236). Cf. Giuseppe
him to have been not only versed in the orthodox Brahmanical
Morichini's review of Nakamura's book, East and West, 1960, pp. 33-39.
traditions but also well acquainted with Mahayana Buddhism, 5 Journal Asiatique, Vol. CCXLIII (1955), no. 2, pp. 249-251.
so much so that he was often criticized as a "crypto-Buddhist" 6 Philosopky East and West, Vol. 3 (1954), p. 292, n. 2.
7 The Nambudiris are the only original Brahmins ofKerala, whose origins cannot be
(pracchannabauddha) by his opponents because of the similarity
traced back outside Kerala. Even today they form a unique community among the
between his doctrine and Buddhism. Against this criticism, it many kinds of Brahmins in India, preserving some of the ancient Vedic and early
8 INTRODUCTION THE LIFE AND WORKS OF SANKARA 9

post-Vedic traditions and rites which are extinct elsewhere. It is of interest to note bay, 1925), p. xxxii; S. Kuppuswami Sastri, The Brahmasiddhi by Aciirya Mar;t!anamiira
that insofar as they adhered to any philosophical system at all, it was to the Bhiit(a with Commentary by Sankhapii1Ji, Edited with Introduction, Appendices and Indexes (Madras
school of Purva Mimarµsa, which Sankara severely attacked in his works. Itis said that Government Oriental Manuscripts Series no. 4. Madras, 1937), pp. x.xiv f.; Dinesh
Advaita was adopted by many Nambudiris only after having become quite popular Chandra Bhattacharya, Indian Historical Quarterly, vol. VII (1931), pp. 301-308;
in other parts of India. See j. F. Staal, "Notes on Some Brahmin Communities of Amarnath Roy, ibid., vol. VII (1931), p. 632; J. M. Van Boetzelear, Surefvara's Tait-
South India," Art and Letters, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, vol. XXXII (1958), no. I, pp. 1-7. tiriyopani~adbhiifyaviirtikam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971), p. 1.
B At present there is a walled enclosure overlooking the ghat in Kala<;li which con- 17 Cf. S. Dasgupta, A Histor_y of Indian Philosophy, vol. I (Cambridge, 1951), pp.
tains sites known traditionally as Sankara's birthplace, the place where his house stood, 370-372.
and the place on which the remains of his mother were cremated. This compound 18 K. K. Raja, "On the Date ofSarµkaracarya and Allied Problems," pp. 142-143.
also contains two shrines, the Sarada and the Sankara, and a pafha1iilii. which offers in- Cf. S. Kuppuswarni Sastri, The Brahmasiddhi, p. !ix; L. Schmithausen, Ma1Jefanamifra's
struction in Veda and Vedanta in a traditional way. Vibhramavivekaf:z mit einer Studie zur Entwicklung der indischen Irrtumslehre (Wien: Kom-
9 Nakamura III, p. 244. missionsverlag dcr Osterreichischcn Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1965); Tilmann
10 Tradition has it that Govinda was the author of the commentaries on the Chand. Vetter, MaFJefanarnifra's Brahmasiddhil;z, Brahmakiil}efa~, Ubersetzung, Einleitung und Anmer-
Up., Devatiika~ef,a, and BS, though they are not extant. He is also reported to have kungen (Wien: Kommissionsverlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,
written the Togatiiriivali, which is unpublished. See M. Rangacarya, The Sarva-Siddhiin- 1969); M. Biardeau, La philosophie de MaQef,ana Mi1ra vue a partir de la Brahmasiddhi
ta-Sangraha of ,§ankariicarya (Madras: Government Press, 1909), p. viii; Nakamura III, (:Publications de l'Eco~e fran~aise d'extreme-Orient vol. LXXVI. Paris, 1969).
pp. 244-247. 19 H. Nakamura, "Sankara Tetsugaku no Rekishiteki Shakaiteki Tachiba," Dr.
11 In his paper (Atlyar Library Bulletin, vol.XXIV, pts. 3-4, pp. 125-148) K. K. Raja Hakuju Ui's Felicitation Volume (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1951), p. 361.
assigns Gau<;lapada to the fifth century A.D. and denies the tradition that makes him 20 See Upad II,1,2 and its notes 3 and 6.
a paramaguru of Sankara, interpreting the Sanskrit term as "supreme preceptor" 2l. P. Hacker, Unters.
instead of the more usual "teacher's teacher." See T.M.P. Mahadevan, Gauifapii.da; A 22 See K. Camrnann, Das System des Advaita nach der Lehre Prakalii.tmans (Miinchener
Stut{y in Early Advaita (Madras:.University of Madras, 1960), pp. 15--16. Nakamura, Indologische Studies Bd 4. \Viesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1965), pp. 4-8.
on the other hand, regards him as an editor of the K arikii. rather than its author and 23 M. Hiriyanna, The Naifkarmya-Siddhi of Surefvaril.ciirya, p. viii.
accepts the tradition that he was Sankara's teacher's teacher. See Nakamura III, pp. 24 P. V. Kane, History of Dharmafiistra, Vol. II, Pt. II (Government Oriental Series
589-602. Olass-B, No. 6. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1941 ), p. 907; K.
12 See Introduction, II, p. 13. The Gauef,apadiyakarikii is also called M ii.Qt}uk;yakarika, A. Nilakanta Sastri, A History ef South India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958),
Mii~ef,iikyopanifatkiirika, and Agama.lastra (cf. Nakamura III, pp. 520-523). p. 417.
13 See Nakamura III, p. 531; P. Hacker, "Relations of Early Advaitins to Vaig1a- " Cf. Th. Aufrecht, Catalogus Catalogorum, 3 vols. Leipzig, 1891-1903.
vism", WZKSO, vol. IX (1965), pp. 147-154. This may be related to the fact that 25 In India it has been a common practice to lend a book authenticity by attributing

Sankara pays the highest regard to the BhG among the non;Vcdic texts (see S. J\1aye- it to a farpous author. Besides, all the heads (Jagadguru) of the Spigerimatha have had
da, "The Authenticity of the Upaddasahasri Ascribed to Sankara," :JAOS, vol. 85, the title Sankaracarya, and any literary or p~ilosophical work written by any of these
No. 2, 1965, pp. 187-188; Mayeda Upad, p. 44). It should be noted here that a large heads could he legitimately called a work of Sankaracarya. Cf. K. K. Raja, Adyar Li-
percentage of the present Nambudiris (see note 7) have Narayai:ian for their individual brary Bulletin (vol. XXIV, pts. 3-4), pp. 127-128. It is thus not easy to decide which
name, that the name Narayai;ta is very sacred to them, and that the most famous works were really written by our Sankara. P. Hacker pointed out that Sankara's con-
temple of Kerala is the Guruvayur temple where Kr~i;ta is worshipped and whose temporaries had styled him Bhagavat, Jlhagavatpada, and Bhagavatpujyapada and
priests are drawn only from particular Nambudiri families. Cf. J. }'. Staal, Art and that the BSBh is invariably ascribed to Satikara-Bhagavat, -Bhagavatpada, or -Bhaga-
Letters, India, Pakistan, vol. XXXII ( 1958), no. 1, p. 5. vatpujyapada in the colophons. From this fact he concluded that "we are entitled to
14 Sec note 32, below, and Introduction, III, B, note 63, pp. 64-65. regard provisionally as genuine those works that arc described in their colophons as
15 See P. Hacker, "Sankara der Yagin und Sankara der Advaitin," WZKSO, vol. productions of the Bhagavat, whereas all the works that are usually attributed to San-
XII-XIII (1968/1969), p. 119-148. It ,may, however, be necessary to reexamine his kara-Acarr,a in the colophons are suspicious of being spurious" (P. Hacker, "Sankara-
opinion. Cf. H. Nakamura, "Notes to Sankara's 'Yogasutrabha4yavivaraQa [I]" (Journal carya and Sarikarabhagavatpada," New Indian Antiquary, vol. IX, 1947, pp. 182-183).
of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. XXV, no. l, 1976, p. 77). He applied this method and concluded that all the commentaries on the Prasthiinatrayi
16 Madhava, Sankaradigvijaya VIII. Cf. T.M.P. Mahadevan, Harnage to Sankara are genuine. But he denied the authenticity of the Svetii.fvataropanifadbhiirya in its present
(Jayanti Series no. 4. Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1959), pp. 18-23. Tradjtion says that form. Cf. P. Hacker, WZKSO, vol. XII-XIII (1968/1969), p. 147.
Mai:i<;lanamisra, converted to the Vedanta, was named Surdvara by Sankara. This 27 Cf. Mayeda Upad, p. 22.

tradition seems to be baseless, though the question may have not yet been settled. See 28 There are, two commentaries on the Kenopanifad which arc ascribed to one and the

M. Hiriyanna, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society ef Great Britain and Ireland (1923), pp. same author, Sankara; one is entitled Padabhiitya and the other Vii.kyabhiifya. Both of
259-263; ( 1924), pp. 96-97; M. Hiriyanna, The Nai~karmya-Siddhi ef Sureivariiciirya with them seem to be genuine. See S. Mayeda, "On Sankara's Authorship of the Kcnopani-
the Candrikii ef ]iianottama (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series no. XXXVIII. Born- iadbha~ya," lncki-IranianJournal, vol. X (1967), no. 1, pp. 33-55.
10 INTRODUCTION

29 Cf. S. Mayeda, "On the Author of the Mar:i9ukyopani~ad- and the GauQ.apadi-
ya- Bha~ya," Professor V. Raghavan's Felicitation Volume, Adyar Library Bulletin, vols.
31-32 (1967-68), pp. 73-94.
ao See note 26, p. 9; Anandasrama Sanskrit Series No. 9 (1918), pp. [l]-[2]; S. II. SANKARA'S CENTRAL DOCTRINE
Mayeda, "Narayar:ia's Kenopani~addipika," Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, AND
vol. XX (1972), no. 2, p. 97.
a1 See note 29 and P. Hacker, WZKSO, Vol. XII-XIII (1968/1969), S.147. HIS POSITION IN THE HISTORY
32 T. Chandrasekharan (ed.), Piitanjalayogasutrabhiify~vivarm;wm (Madras Govern-
ment Oriental Series no. XCIV. Madras, 1952). On Sankara's authorship of this
OF THE VEDANTA
Vivara~a, see Introduction, III, B, note 63, pp. 64-65.
33 Maveda Upad, pp. 22-64. There are many other non-commentarial works as-

cribed t~ Sankara but their authenticity is very doubtful. For exampJe, the following
works do not seem to be authentic, though they are widely accept~d as Sankara's works:
(1) The Vivekaciiefama~i-see D. H. H. Ingalls, "The Study of Satikaradirya," Annals
of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, vol. XXXIII ( 1952), p. 7; S. Mayeda,
"Sankara's Upaddasahasrl: Its Present Form," Journal of the Oriental Institute, vol. XV All the systems of Indian philosophy, including materialism
(1966), nos. 3--4, p. 252, footnote 3; (2) The Saundaryalahari-;-see W. Norman Brown,
The Saundfl~yalaharz, or Flood of Beauty traditionalf:y ascribed to Sankaracarya (Harvard Ori- (Lokiiyata), Jainism, and Buddhism, have as their ultimate'
ental Series 43. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 25-30; (3) The Sar- objective the attainment of final release (mok-?a) from transmigra-
vasiddhiintasangraha-see P. Hacker, New Indian Antiquary, vol. IX ( 1947), pp. 18-4-185; tory existence (sm71siira), a fact which Western philosophers have
(4) Viikyavrtti and Laghuvakyavrtti-sec S. Mayeda, "On the Vakyavrtti," Professor H.
Nakamura's felicitation Volume (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1973), pp. 57-69.
not always appreciated. In India philosophic speculation is simply
34 Nakamura IV, pp. 420-43 7. Taking up ideas which have generally been regarded a practical means to the goal. It is pursued out of a deep craving
as characteristic of Sankara's teachings, Nakamura has shown that each of those had for the realization of the religious purpose oflife, though, of course,
already been expressed by some of his predecessors and that Sankara himself was not t,here are considerable differences of degree in earnestness and
the originator. ,
35 Cf. Eigen, p. 256; D. H. H. Ingalls, "Sarnkara on the Question: Whose Is Avi-
enthusiasm among Indian philosophers and thinkers.
dya?" Philosophy East and West, vol. 3 (1953), no. 4, p. 72. It was the knowledge of Brahman, the absolute, that Sankara
t~ught to his followers over and over again. The teaching that
Atman, one's inner Self (pratyagatman), is wholly identical with
Brahman 1 i~ not only the starting point of his philosophy but also
its goal. Sankara's central doctrine is Atman's identity with
Brahman; this truth arrived at by Upani~adic thinkers was the
culmination of the serious quest for universal truth which ~gvedic
Boet-thinkers had first begun probably before 1000 B.C. In
Sankara's view the knowledge of this truth is the means (siidhana)
to final release. He says:
When the knowledge (uidyii) [of Brahman] is firmly grasped, it
is conducive to one's own beatitude and to the continuity [of
the knowledge of Brahman]. And the continuity of knowledge
[of Brahman J is helpful to people as a boat is helpful to one
wishing to get across a river. ( drrf.hagrhWi hi vidyatmanal;. .freyase
santatyai ea bhavati / uiqyasantatis ea pra1J.Yanugrahii_ya bhavati naur
iua nadiT[I titir ~o/z-Upad II, 1,3)
Philosophy is not his aim but is rather a vital weapon with which

11
12 INTRODUCTION SANKARA'S CENTRAL DOCTRINE

to fulfil his aim, which is to rescue people out of transmigratory Sankara, Bhaskara, and Ramanuja, the three commentators on
existence. Logic and theory are subordinate to this end. the text, this theory is based upon BhagavadgWi XV,7. The individ-
Sankara is an epoch-making reformer of the Vedanta school of ual Atman is different from Brahman (nil.nil., BS II,3,43; vaife,rya,
philosophy, the founder of which is traditionally said to be Badara- BS I,2,8; bheda, BS II, 1,22) but it is also described as non-different
ya:r;ia (100-1 B.c.).2 Badarayal).a is regarded as the author of the (avaifefya, BS III,2,25). 8 This fact indicates that the Bralzmasillra
Brahmasutra3 which, together with the Upani~ads and the Bhagavad- stands in the line of difference-and-non-difference ( bhediibheda),
gztii,4 constitute the threefold canon (prasthanatraya) of the Vedan- although this technical expression is not used in the tcxt.9 As the
ta school. Brahmasiltra itself suggests (BS III,2,27), it is probable that the
Though the Brahmasiltra is attributed to Badarayal}.a, it cannot above view reflects an intention to synthesize two contradictory
be considered a work composed by a single author; it was based teachings in the Upani~ads, one being the teaching that the individ-
upon about 700 years' activities by many scholars, and was given ual Atman is different from Brahman 10 and the other that ol their
its present form probably around 400-450 A. D. 5 Before the non -d ifferen ce .11
composition of the Brahmasiltra there must have been different During the period between the Brahmasutra and Sankara the
interpretations of the Upani~ads and various theories on meta- Vedanta experienced a significant transformation. There was a
physical problems related to the Upanieyads, which latter contain buddhification of the Vedanta tradition. In this period the Gau-
diverse, even mutually contradictory, and unsystematized teach- efapadzyakii.rikii, which is traditionally ascribed to Gauc:;lapada, was
ings. The Brahmasiltra .summarized, arranged, criticized, unified, composed, comprising four chapters (prakararia), ostensibly to ex-
and systematized those different or conflicting interpretations and plain the Mo:1yf u9opani~ad. 12 Modern scholarship has revealed
theories. that the Mrt1yf u9opani~ad already shows Buddhist influcnce 13 and
In consolidating the V edantic position, the Brahma.sfltra made a that the Gauefapadiyakarikii is a work greatly influenced by Bud-
special point of refuting the dualism of the then prevailing Saqi- dhism ; each succeeding chapter of the Gauqapadiyakarikii is more
khya school which posited Puruia (Spirit) and Prak1ti (Matter) as Buddhistic than that preceding it. 14 It seems to me that the
the independent ultimate causes of the U niversc. The Brahmasfltra Ma'f}qukyopanifad and the four chapters of the Gauqapadiyakarika
maintained instead that Brahman alone is the absolute ultimate represent five stages of increasing Buddhist influence upon the
cause of the Universe. Thus the Brahmasiltra characterized Vedanta Vedanta tradition. The fourth chapter, which constitutes nearly
as a monistic system devoted to inquiry into Brahman (brahma- half of the whole text, has hardly anything to do either with the
jijff.iisii, BS I,1,1). This characterization distinguished the Vedanta U pani~ads or with the Brahmasutra and may well be regarded as a
not only from the Saqikhya, which is of all the Indian philosophic Buddhist text.15
systems doctrinally most akin to it, but also from the sister system, Sankara's composition of the commentary on the Gauqapadzya-
Mimaqisa, which has dharma6 as the object of its inquiry. karikais an epochal event in the history ofthe Vedanta, since it may
The most crucial problem among the Vedantins is the relation- be said that this commentary represents a turning point in the
ship between Brahman, or absolute, and the individual Self, Atman. Vedanta tradition, which until then had been becoming more and
Controversy concerning this problem led to the splitting up of the ;riore Buddhistic. It was in consonance with the general tendency of
Vedanta school into many minor schools. The Brahmasfltra in- Sankara's time, for the age of the happy coexistence of Buddhism
dicates that at the time of its composition this was already a and Hinduism had already passed when he was born, and his age
significant problem.7 Today it is generally accepted that the was marked by a Hindu revival. 16 Although he tried to Vedanticize
central doctrine of the Upani~ads is the identity of Brahman and the Gaurjapadiyakiirika, an extremely Buddhistic text, he did not
Atman. The Brahmasiltra, however, declares that the individual" ignore the Buddhistic elements in the work; as I have shown
Atman is a portion (a1'(1ia) of Brahman (BS II,3,43). According to elsewhere, 17 he skillfully gave them a Vedantic character and
14 INTRODUCTION SANKARA'S CENTRAL DOCTRINE 15

adopted them into his own system. 18 Thus the Vedanta in the !962), pp. 1160-:1173. It should be noted here that Surdvara, one of Sankara's pupils,
rnay be attnb~.t.rng the BS to Jaimini when he says:yadi hy ayamabhiprii.yo 'bhaviuat
Brahmasiltra, which may be characterized as realistic monism, was "athiito brahmaJiJfWsa / janmii.qy a.sya yata&" iry evamadibrahmavastusvariipamti.trayiithiitmya-
transformed into illusionistic monism, which regards everything prakafanapararrz gambhiranyiiyasarridrbdha1J1 sarvavedantiirtharp.imiirrzsanarrz irlmacchiirfrakam
but Brahman as unreal. At the same time the difference between nasiitrayif)at (Nai~ I, 91). But M. Hiriyanna in his edition of the Nai~ rejects thisinte;-
the individual Atman and Brahman is looked upon as due to nesci- pretation, ass~rti~g that it is better to suppose "that when he wrote the passage, our
author was thrnkrng more of the harmony between these two pre-eminently orthodox
cnce (aviqya) and therefore unreal. Sankara asserted that, although systems than the difference in their authorship." (The Naifkarmya-Siddhi of Sure Jvarii.ciir-
the individual Atman appears to be different from Brahman in the ya with the Candrikii of Jiiiinottama, p. 230). On the other hand, H. Nakamura has pro-
sphere of nescience, they are wholly identical from the stand- posed a new theory that, just as there were some people who attributed the present
13S to Badarayai:ia, there were probably others who ascribed it to jaimini, and he
point of the highest truth (paramartlza). This view of the relationship rejects S. K. Belvalkar's opinion thatjaimini also wrote a Sarzraka-Siitra (Nakamura
between Atman and Brahman is called "non-dualism" (advaitavtlda), II, pp.42-44).
in contrast with the theory of difference-and-non-differenc e ( bhe- 4 Cf.J. N. Farquhar, An Outline of the Religious Literature of India (Reprint edition,
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967), p. 128 and p. 173.
dabhedavada) which was overshadowed by it, in spite of the vain 5 See Nakamura II, pp. 94--96.
efforts by Bhaskara, probably soon after the death of Sankara, to 6 The term dharrna in the Mimiiqlsa has a particular meaning. The }.{zmamsiisiitra

revive it by writing another commentary on the Bralzmasiltra from I,1,2 defines it as "that which is indicated by the Vedic injunction as cond~cive to
the standpoint of that older tradition. 19 welfare." Cf. Ganganatha.Jha, Piirva·Mimiirp.sa in Its Sources (Benares: Benares Hindu
University, 1942), pp. 172-174.
The Advaitic tradition started long before Sankara; it has its 7 (X BS I,4,19-22. It has been pointed out that Kafakrtsna stood in the line of
origin in the Upani~ads. ,The Gauqapadiyakarika is the earliest extant bhedabheda, regarding the individual Atman as a portion (arrifa) of Brahman (Nakamura
text that advocated illusionistic Advaita. 20 It was, however, II, pp. 7-12. Cf. BS II,3,43). Au<Julomi held the opinion that they are different in the
state of transmigration which is real and non-different in the state of final release
Sankara who established the illusionistic Advaita tradition based
(Nakamura II, pp. 22-23. Cf. Anandajiiana on BS I,4,21). Asmarathya was of the
on the concept of nescience 21 and the Sarpkhyan dualism, and opinion that they are in the relationship of the material cause and its modification
made it the main current of the Vedanta. (prakrtivikarabhiiva, Bhaskara on BS I,4,21. Cf. Nakamura II, pp. 25-26).
8 See Nakamura II, p. 273 and p. 448.
Sankara's Upadefasalzasrz is dedicated to explaining the identity
9 See ibid., pp. 446-451.
of Atman and Brahman and repeatedly teaches that the knowledge 10 In his BSllh (III,2,27, p. 658), Sankara quotes Mai:ic;l. Up. III,1,8; 2, 8 and Brh.
of that identity is the means to final release. In the following pages Up. III,7,15 as examples of texts on ,the difference between Atman and Brahman.
we shall see his demonstration of the Brahman-Atman identity, and n In his BSBh (III,2,27, p. 658), Sankara quotes Chand. Up. VI,8,7; Brh. Up. I,4,
I O; III,4, 1; 7,3 as examples of texts on the non-di!"erence. In his Upad II, 1,6 he says
his view of final release.
~t first of all a teacli_er should teach his pupil the Srutis which are concerned primarily
wHh the oneness of Atman with Brahman, and he quotes as examples Chand. Up. III,
14,1; VI,2,l; VII,24,l; VII,25,2; Ait. Up. I,1,1.
12 V. Bhattacharya rejected the tradition that the GK interprets the Mai:i<). Up. and

Notes to Introduction, II asserted that the Mai,H,L Up., being based upon the GK, came into existence after the
GK. See V. Bhattacharya, "Mar.i<)ukya Upanisad and the Garn.!apada Karika," Indian
l In his Mysticism East and West (pp. 28-29), R. Otto points out the similarity be- I~istoric~l Qua~terly. I (1925), pp. 119 - 125; V. Bhattacharya, The Agama.iiistra of
tween Sankara and Meister Eckhart on this point. (Tau4apada (University of Calcutta, 19.52), pp. 46 - 52; R. D. Karmarkar, Gaudapada-
2 Nakamura q, p. 55. Karikii (Government Oriental Series, Class B, no. 9, 1953), pp. xxxi- xxxiii; Nakamura
3 In his BSBh Sankara does not clearly say that the author of the BS is Badarayar;ia. m, pp. 557 - 565.
When he comments, however, on the last sutra he says, "ata uttara?Jl bhagaviin biidariiya~a 13 Especially Mai:i<). Vp. VII and XII. See Nakamura III, pp. 289-303 and 559·-

iiciirya~ pafhati" (p. 905), so it is likely that he regards Badarliyai:ia as the author of the 561.
14 Nakamura III, pp. 562-589.
whole text. It seems that the identification ofVeda-Vyasa with Badarayai:ia begins
15 Ibid., p. 587.
with Vacaspatimifra (Mangalacarar;a of his Bhamat'i). Later it became usual to identify
16 Cf. Nilakanta Sastri, A History of South India (Madras: Oxford University Press,
Badarayai:ia with Veda-Vyasa and with Vyasa, who is regarded as the author of the
Mahii.bhiirata and other Smrtis. Cf. Nakamura II, pp. 52-58; P. V. Kane, History ef 1958), pp. 411-41 7.
Dharmasii.stra, vol. V, pt. II (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 17 S. Mayeda, "On the Author of the Mai:ic;lukyopani~ad- and the Gauc;lapadiya-
16 INTRODUCTION SANKARA'S CENTRAL DOCTRINE 17
Bha~ya," Professor V. Raghavan's Felicitation Volume, Adyar Library Bulletin,· vols. 31-32 Up. II,5,19-; 27; 28 [twice]), citta (GK IV,61 [twice]), and manas (GK III, 29
(1967-68), pp. 73-94. For example, the term dharma in GK IV is no doubt used in a [twice]), and (2) (magical) illusion (GK 1,7; II,31; IV,58. mayiimaya, GK IV,59;
Buddhist sense, i.e., "a thing" or "an object of knowledge" (cf. V. Bhattacharya, "The 69; miiyiimii.tra, GK I,17; mayopama, GK l"., 58; mayahastin, GK IV, 44).
Gauqapada-Kiirika on the MaQ.qUkya Upani!ad," Proceedings of the Secm;d All-India 21In his Brahmasiddhi, Mai;i<;lanami~ra, Sankara's senior contemporary, also ad-
Oriental Conference, 1920, p. 442, and Nakamura III, pp. 507-508); but Sankara ex- vocated a non-dualism very similar to SanJrnra's but with a slight difference. But Mai;i-
plains it as Atman in GKBh IV, l,p.156; IO,p.162;46, p. 189; 53, p. 193; 81, p. 207; <;lanami5ra did not attain the prestige of Sankara, and some of the Advaitins such as
91, p. 215; 92, p. 215; 96, p. 218; 99, p. 220. He sometimes does not interpret it Surdvara, Vimuktatman, Sarvajiiatman, Prakasatman, and Anandanubhava took up
(GKBh IV, 6; 8; 21; 33; 98). This fact probably does not indicate ignorance of the an attitude of overt opposition to him. See S. Kuppuswami Sastri, The Brahmasiddhi by
Buddhist usage of the term, but rather an intentional misinterpretation by Sankara so iicarya Mar;efanami1ra with Commentary by Sankhapa~i, Edited with Introduction, Appendices
as to give the text an Advaitic character. and Indexes (Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Series no. 4. Madras, 1937),
18 This is the reason why Sankara has been censured as "crypto-Buddhist" (pracchan- p. Jix.
nabauddha) by some of his opponents. But in fact he was a genuine Vedantin who was
faithful to the orthodox Brahmanical tradition and antagonistic to Buddhism, al-
though the traditional claims that he persecuted the Buddhists and the Jains and de-
stroyed their books (see J. N. Farquhar, An Outline of the Religious Literature of India,
p. 175) are difficult to credit. His successful absorption of Buddhism into Vedanta
represents a victory over Buddhism and not a surrender to it. Hinduism is all-inclusive.
Among the six systems ofindian philosophy Vedanta has been most flexible and has
always had extraordinary absorptive capacity. Without losing its own basis Vedanta
has continued to be revitalized by incorporating foreign elements into its own system,
whereas all other systems have either died out or barely survived.
19 On Bhiiskara's bhedabhedqviida and other related theories, see P. N. Srinivasachari,
The Philosophy of Bhedabheda (Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1950); S. Dasgupta, vol.
III (1961), pp. 1-11. According to Aufrecht's Catalogus Catalogorum (I, pp. 383-386),
there are 49 different commentaries on the BS which were composed from various
philosophic stan9points. After Bhiiskara, Ramanuja, identifying Brahman with Nara-
yaQ.a, attacked Sankara's system and wrote a sectarian commentary from the philo-
sophic standpoint styled vifif/ddvaita (Non-dualism of the qualified One). On the mean-
ing of this compound, seeJ. A. B. van Buitenen, Ramanuja on the Bhagavadgita (Graven-
hage: H. L. Smits, 1953, p. 1, n. 1). There are supposed to be five (or ten) famous
schools of Vedanta (paficavedantasaT[lpradaya) which hold characteristic and differing
philosophic views con9erning the relationship between Brahman and Atman. They are:
(!) Advaitava1a of Sankara [non-sectarian]; (2) Visi~tadvaitavada of Ramanuja
( 1017-1137) [Srivai~Q.ava Sect]; (3) Dvaitadvaitavada of Nimbarka ( 1062-1162)
[Nimbiirka Sect]; (4) Dvaitavada ofMadhva (1230) [Madhava Sect]; and (5) Sud-
dhadvaitaviida ofVallabha (sixteenth century) [Vallabhiicarya Sect]. Cf.J. N. Farqu-
har, An Outline efthe Religious Literature ef India, p. 287; Nakamura II, p. 99; Roma
Chaudhuri, Doctrine ef Srikantha (Pracya vani Research Series no. XI, Calcutta, 1962),
vol. I, p. 2.
20 No use of the term avidyii occurs in the GK although Sankara uses it in his com-

mentary on the GK (see S. Mayeda, "On the Author of the Mai;iqukyopani~ad- and
the Gau<;lapadiya-Bhiiffa," pp. 73-94). Gauqapada's illusionism is based upon the
concept of ma_rii, influenced by Mahayana Buddhism. It is no't always easy to deter-
mine the meanings in which the term miiJd is used in the GK. But it is certain that the
term maya there is far removed from that in works oflater Advaitins, where it means
the material cause of the universe indescribable as being or non-being (sadasadbhyam
anirvacanlya-). As far as I can see, the meanings of miiyii in the GK are: (1) the mirac-
ulous power of god or synonyms for him such as iitman (GK II,12; 19; III, 10, 24
[twice]-one of which is Indra's mayii in the quotation from !J.gveda VI,47,18 = Brh
 ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 19

the origination, subsistence, and dissolution of this universe

p~oceed." Brahman as the ultimate cause of the universe is regarded
III. ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH as different in essence from this material universe (BS II, 1, 4). It is
BRAJ!MAN Being (sat, BS II,3,9). Although the Brahmasfitra does not explicitly
characterize Brahman as Knowledge (jniina) or Pure Consciousness
(caitanya, cit), the Brahmasiltra seems to assume it 1* in its presen-
tation (BS I,1,5; 1,9; 1,10; II,2,3; 2,9; III,2,16). Later Vedanta
writers 2 describe the positive nature of Brahman as Being-Con-
sciousness-Bliss (sac-cid-iinanda). Though this well-known expression
is not found in the Brahmasiltra, the description of Brahman there
may well point to it. 3 Brahman in the Brahmasutra seems to be
Sankara holds that Brahman is Atman and Atrnan is Brahman, conceived as the personal l3eing rather than impersonal principle. 4
but this truth may Le approached along different lines. When This is clear from the fact that the word "para~" (the Highest
Sankara undertakes his search for the truth---or, rather, when One in the ruasculineform) is used for Brahman (neuterform). 5 The
he explains to his pupils or readers the truth that he has al- same thing is true of Sankara's work, in which (pararrz) brahma (n),
ready attaincd---hc docs it from two different starting points. andparamiitman are interchangeable with zfvara (the Lord). 6
Accordingly, in the Upadesasiilwsrz, two different approaches are According to the dualistic Sarpkhya, Puru~a (Spirit) and Prakrti
recognizable. When in' his search for the truth he sets out from (Matter) are respectively the efficient cause and the material cause
Brahman as the ultimate cause of the universe, he comes, through of the universe. Against this theory the Brahmasiltra maintains that
a theological or cosmological approach, to the knowledge that !Jrahman is both the efficient and the material cause (BS I,4,23-
Brahman is Atman. When his investigation sets out from the inner 27) .7 There is no other ultimate cause of the universe than Brah-
Atman, he arrives, through a psychological or epistemological man. Thus the creation of the universe is nothing but self-creation
approach, at the knowledge that Atrnan is Brahman. The second line (iitmakrti, BS I,'1,26). Brahman is the creator of all things and
of approach is adopted much more frequently than the first in Brahman transforms itself into all things.s The Brahmasiltra calls
Sankara's works, including the Upadefasahasri. However, neither this type of creation "transformation" (parit}ama, BS I,4,26). Thus
of them can be complete by itself~ and there is a third aspect which it is certain that the Brahmasiltra holds satkii.ryavada as its theory of
is that the knowledge of Brahman and Atman is attainable only causation (BS 11,1,7; II,1,16-20).
through the Srutis and so the conclusion arrived at by the two There are three representative types of cosmological theory in
' ,
approaches is to be confirmed and authenticated by the Srutis. India. The first is the pari1Jiimavada, the theory of transformation;
Through an exegesis of the Srutis, Sankara determines that the this is based upon the theory (satkaryavada) that the effect, though
Srutis state the truth of the identity of Brahman and Atman. In the different in appearance or phenomenally, is substantially identical
following pages I would like to examine his doctrine in greater with the cause, and pre-exists latently in it. The second is the
detail through his discussions and speculations along the three iirambhaviida, the theory of atomic agglomeration, which is based
different lines of approach. on the theory (asatkaryavada) that the effect, being something
newly produced, does not pre-exist in the cause. The third is the
A. Theological and Cosmological Approach vivartavada, the theory of false appearance, which is closely con-
nected with the first and peculiar to the Advaita Vedanta school.
1. A Cosmological Proof of the Identity Although the Brahmasutra sharply attacks the Sarµkhya system, the
The BrahmasiUra (I, 1,2) defines Brahman as "that from which * Footnotes to section III, A begin on p. 58.

18
20 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 21
Vedanta of the Brahmasiltra is very similar in its fundamental cos- the first of the five material elements, arose from Brahman. But
mological theory to the Sarpkhya, which also maintains pariTJll- Sankara says:
mauada and satkiiryauada, and it is essentially different from the [Originally] unevolved, this Name-and-Form took the name-
Nyaya-Vaise~ika which adopts arambhaviida and asatkaryauada. and-form of "ether" in the course of its ·evolution from this
By postulating Brahman as the only ultimate cause of the uni- very Atman ( = Brahman). And in this manner this element
verse, the monism of Vedanta encountered theoretical difficulties named "ether" arose from the highest Atman . . . (Upad
which the Samkhyan dualism avoided by proposing two ultimate 11,1,19).
causes, Puru~a and Prakrti, and which are more or less inherent in In the Brahmasiltra ether arises directly from Brahman. According
any types of monism or monotheism: to Sankara, however, the Unevolved Name-and-Form first of all
I. If Brahman is one Being (sat) alone without any distinction, evolves from Brahman and then becomes something describable as
how is the manifoldness of the universe possible? 9 "ether." Therefore, ether arises from Brahman only indirectly.
2. If Brahman is Pure Consciousness (cit) and if satkaryavada is From this name-and-form called ether there arose air; from air,
to be assumed, how can it create this material world ?10 fire; from fire, water; from water, earth, in that order. Further,
3. If Brahman is Bliss (ananda), why did it create this world full ether entered into air, air into fire, fire into water, water into
of sufferings? Is it not possessed of the faults of unfairness (vai~amya) earth; so arose the five gross elements. From earth rice, barley,
and lack of compassion (nairghrtJya) ?11 and other plants consisting of the five elements are produced.
The Brahmasiltra tried to solve these problems but could not do Frorn them, when they have been eaten, blood and sperm are pro-
so satisfactorily12; its replies were too crude and naive to... silence duced in the bodies of women and men respectively. Blood and
the opponents. These problems remained to be solved by Sankara sperm, produced by churning with the stick of sexual passion, driv-
and other later Vedanta philosophers. en by nescience and sanctified with sacred formulas, are poured
In order to solve them, especially the first and second ones, in to the womb at the proper time. By saturation with fluid from
Sankara introduces into the Vedanta system a new principle the womb, they become an embryo, which is delivered in the ninth
called "Unevolved Name-and-Form" ( avyakrte niimarilpe), for or tenth month (Upad II,l,20). In this manner the body consists
which he depends upon the Chandogya Upani.yad 13 and which of not}1ing but name-and-form. The mind and sense organs also
is peculiar to Sankara's cosmology. As P. Hacker first pointed consist only of name-and-form (Upad II,1,22).
out,1 4 in the Brahmasiltrabha.yya the term means a kind of In this context Sankara then asserts on the authority of the
primary material or state out of which the world evolves. In the Srutis 15 and the Smrtis 16 that Brahman, after creating the body,
Upadelasiihasri (II, 1, 18) also, when he says that the highest entered the name-and-form of the body as Atman. Therefore,
Atman is "the evolver of that Unevolved Name-and-Form" which Brahman is Atman, which is different from the mind, the senses, the
is the seed of the world (jagadbljabhuta), and which is different in body, and the like, since they consist of name-and-form, although
essence from the highest Atman, he certainly means by the term a through nescience ordinary people identify Atman with the body,
kind of primary material of the world, which corresponds to Pra- the mind, or a combination of the two.
krti in the Sarp.khya doctrine. In the Sarpkhya everything material, The above is an outline of Sankara's cosmological view and his
including the intellect (buddhi), I-consciousness (aha7!1kilra), mind cosmological demonstration of Brahman's identity with Atman.
(manas), and the senses, evolves from the Prakrti. Similarly, for The originality of his cosmology lies in introducing into his basi-
Sankara everything material evolves from Unevolved Name-and- cally traditional view a new concept, Unevolved Name-and-Form.
form, which according to the Upadefasahasri (II, 1, 18-22) itself first But to evaluate properly his position in the history of the Vedanta
evolved from Brahman. On the authority of the Taittir'iya Upani~ad we must make a more detailed examination.
(II,!, I), the Brahmasiltra (II,3, 1-7) simply maintains that ether,
22 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 23
2. Characteristics of Sankara's Cosm.ological View from the highest Atman, as dirty foam from clear water. Neither
In the Brahmasutra (II,3, 1-7) the material element ether is is foam [identical with] water, nor absolutely different from
treated as a direct transformation of its sole cause Brahman, on the water, since it is not seen without water. But water is clear and
authority of the Taittir!ya Up. (II, 1, I). This theory, however, different from foam, which is ofthe nature of dirt. Likewise, the
contradicts the Vedanta system itself, since the latter holds to sat- highest Atman is different from name-and-form which corre-
karyavada, which cannot admit that a material element, ether, can sponds to foam; Atman is pure, clear, and different in essence
evolve directly from Brahman, which is Pure Consciousness. from it. . . . (te namarilpe 'vyakrte sati i!Jilkriyamal'Je tasmad etasmad
According to Sankara, originally Unevolved Name-and-Form atmana akafanamakrtz sarµvrtte / tac cakiisakhya1[l bhatam anena
evolves from Brahman, and in the course of its evolution becomes prakare'l}a paramatmanaf:z sarrzbhutarrz, prasannat salilan malam iva
ether. Therefore, ether evolves indirectly from Brahman. Con- phenam / na sal£la1'fl na ea salilad atyantabhinnal'!' phenam / salilavyati-
sequently his introduction of "Unevolved Name-and-Form" into reker;.adarfanat / salila'fl tu svaccham anyat phenan malarapat / evarrz
the Vedanta system may be effective in explaining the manifold- paramlitma namarilpabhyam anyaf:t phenasthanryabhyarrz suddlzaf:z pra-
ness of the universe, the creation of this material world, and other sannas tadvilakral'Ja~ / . . . Upad II,1,19).
theoretical difficulties which the monism of the Brahmasutra had to This simile is a variation of the simile of the sea and its waves,
face. However, in doing so, Sankara comes near to a dualism like foam, or other modifications. It is logically appropriate for the
that of Sarµkhya. The acceptance of a cause other than Brahman bhedabhedavada, which asserts that the relationship between Brah-
leads to the abandonmept of monism, the basic standpoint of the man and Atman, or Brahman and the phenomenal world, is both
Vedanta. different and non-different, as the sea is different and non-different
It is certain that Sankara was well aware of this theoretical dif- from the waves.
ficulty. In his conception, Unevolvcd Name-and-Form is the However, the parallel simile plays a different role in the passage
supersensible seed of the world (jagadbijabhata), which is not de- quoted above. There it is stressed that foam, which is of the nature
scribable as "this" or anything else (tattvanyatvabhyam anirvacan'iya·) 17 of dirt, is essentially different from clear water. Although foam is
and is known only to Brahman itself (svayarrwetfya, Upad II, 1,18). different in its nature, it is not regarded as absolutely different
But he is always careful never to define it as an independent ma- from water for the very weak reason that it is not seen without
terial cause of the world. On the one hand he stresses its essential water; this aspect of their non-difference is only touched on. Such
difference from Brahman (svatmavilak~ar;,a, Upad II,1,18). On the relationship of clear water and foam is not that of bhedabheda, since
other hand he asserts that it evolves from Brahman (te nil.marilpe . . . the bherlabheda relation presupposes an essential non-difference
vyakriyamiit;e . .. atmana~, Upad II,1,19). Thus he shows its dif- between two things.
ference from Prakrti of Sarp.khya. He also denies its independence It is more significant that Sankara describes water as "clear"
of Brahman, by characterizing it as abiding in Brahman (svatmastha, (prasanna, svaccha) and "pure" (Suddha ), while he characterizes
Upad I,1,18). foam as "being of the nature of dirt" (malarilpa, Upad II,1,19).
In the Upade.fasahasri (II,1,19) he tries to explain the relation- Hacker has c.ommented: " . . . but here he is satisfied with a
ship between Brahman and Unevolved Name-and-Form. He com- simile which indeed attributes lower value but not lower reality
pares their relationship with that between "clear water" and to the world than to Brahman." 18 If we set the above quotation
"dirty foam" which arises from clear water: (Upad II,l, 19) apart from the whole context of the Upadefasahasrz,
[Originally] unevolved, this name-and-form took the name- this comment is correct, but, looking at the whole work, I would
and-form of ether in the course of its evolution from this very think that the above simile also ascribes a lower reality to foam,
Atman. And in this manner this element named "ether" arose because the term "dirt" used in contrast with "clear" and "pure"
24 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 25
hints not only at ajudgment of value but also at the important con- "superimposed through avir_fya" (avidyadhyasta, avic!Jadhyiiropita),
cept of avidya. In the first chapter of the Upadeiasahasrz, where our and "consisting of avir_fya" (avirfyatmaka) .19
present cosmological discussion appears, Sankara does not use In the Sarpkhya system Prakrti is a real, independent, and eter-
similes suitable to his illusionisrn, such as a snake and a rope, or nal cause of the universe together with Puru~a. Sankara has tried
silver and mother-of-pearl. This is probably because the first chap- to save monism by characterizing name-and-form as unreal and as
ter is meant for a novice at the first stage of the Vedantic education falsely constructed upon Brahman through avidya. But, while doing
who has just been initiated into Sankara's Vedanta and is un- so, he introduced another difficult problem, avirfya, for his follow-
familiar with the illusionistic way of thinking. In such a context ers. What is avidya? This problem gave birth to very great contro-
it is possible to interpret "dirt" as standing for the term avidya, versy among the followers of Sankara himself, just as later the
which is first taken up for discussion in the second chapter of the problem of the relationship between Brahman and Atman was to
Upadesasahasri, intended for a pupil at the second stage of the play a central role in the di vision of the whole Vedanta school.
Vedantic education. It has been generally believed that Sankara advocated vivar-
In the Upadefasahasri the adjectives nirmala (clear) and fuddka tavada, which is based upon satkara'l}avada. 20 However, Nakamura21
(pure) are used only for the real Atman. The word "dirt" is com- and Hacker22 have pointed out that Sankara either was not aware
pared to something unreal, in contrast with something real. For of an illusionistic usage of the word vivarta or else deliberately dis-
example: regarded it, and that he did not advocate the so-called vivartavada.
As superimposition is,[made] upon Atman, so [its] negation is In fa.et, his cosmological view as described here cannot be labelled
[made from Atman], just as the superimposition of dirt upon the vivartavada. What is it then?
sky and negation of it therefrom are made by the foolish Sa.nkara' s special expression, "U nevolved Name-and-Form,"
(atmaniha yathadhyasal:z prati~edhas tathaiva ea / was not ad opted even by the pupils he taught personally. One of
maladhyasani~edhau khe krryete ea yathabuddhailj, 11 Upad n, 18,22). the reasons for this may be that historically the phrase is remote
. . . A general rule cannot be made that superimposition is from any connotation of illusion. Consequently some qualification
made only on that which is adventitiously established and not like avidya (or dirt) is needed in addition in order to associate the
on that which is permanently established, for dirt and other concept of illusion with this realistic phrase, and as a result the
things on the surface of the earth are seen to be superimposed use of the phrase "name-and-form" must have introduced a
upon the sky [which is permanently established] double 5heoretical difficulty into Vedantic monism. Padmapada,
(. . . na hi kadacitkasiddhav evadhyaropm;a na nityasiddhav iti one of Sankara's personal pupils, used the term avic!Ja (or mayii)
niyanturri fakyaT{I, akase talamaladyadhyaropai:iadarsanat--Upad 11,2, for the material cause of the world, probably because of his aware-
61). ness of the difficulty. Padmapada distinguished the usage of vi-
The analogy of dirty foam seems to be capable of expressing the tJarta from that of paritJama, and his commentator Prakasatman in
same illusoriness as that of the unreal snake superimposed upon a the tenth century gave a definition to vivarta. Since then the cos-
rope (Upad II,2, 109, etc.). Moreover, in the Upadefasahasri this mology of the Advaita Vedanta has moved from pariT,J.amaviida to
world, which originally evolved from the name-and-form and cor- vivartavacla; according to this theory, the world is the parii:iama of
responds in the analogy to foam, is described as the "outcome of avidya and the vivarta of Brahman.23
avir_fya" (avidyaprabhava, Upad I,17,20) and "superimposition due Hacker defines Sankara's cosmological view as "a kind of illu-
to avidya" (avir_fyadhyasa, Upad I,6,3). This is also ascertained sionistic parir:iamavada. " 24 It seems to me that it is in its essence
from the Brahmasiltrabha~ya, where the name-and-form is described different from the reali~tic parir;,amavada of the early Vedanta, be-
as "made of avidya" (avic!Jakrta), "falsely constructed by avir{yll" cause besides Brahman Sankara postulates an illusory Unevolved
(avidyopasthiipita), "falsely imagined through avidya" (avir_fyakalpita ), Name-and-Form which corresponds to avidya (or mayii). According
26 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 27
to the early Vedantic theory, the world is the parir;iima of Brahman. name-and-form of "ether" in the course of its evolution.
According to Sankara, the world is the evolution of U nevolved Becoming grosser in the course of evolution, the name-and-form
Name-and-Form. The relationship between Brahman and the from ether becomes air; from air, fire; from fire, water; from
world is comparable to that between pure water and foam whose water, earth. In this order each preceding [element] has entered
nature is dirt. They are essentially different from each other; each succeeding one and the five gross elements, [ether, air, fire,
Brahman, the cause of the universe, is real, while the world, the water, and] earth, have come into existence. Consequently earth
effect, is unreal. Sankara does not use a technical terrn with which is characterized by the qualities of the five gross elements . . .
to express his new cosmological view, but its contents are much (te namarupe 'vyakrte sati vyakriyamatJe plzenasthiiniye aka.fanamakrti
closer to vivartavada than to parit}iimavada. It might be styled as sa1[1V[lte // 19 // tato 'pi sthulabhavam apadyamane nlimarupe l!.Jlikriya-
"early vivartaviida." marie vayubhavam apadyete, tato 'py agnibhiivam, agner abblzavam, fa-
tal; prthvzbhiivam ity evar(!kramer;a purvapilrvo[ ttaro J ttariinupravefena
3. Sankara's View of Gross Elements paiicamahabhiltani Prtfzivyantliny utpannlini / tatal; pancamahabhuta-
When Advaita writers explain how the subtle elements are com- gu1Javifir!ii Prth[i]vz-Upad II,l, 19-20).
bined to produce gross elements, they resort to the theory of tri- This passage may 31ot be strong enough evidence to lead us to
vrtkarar;a "compounding each gross element from all three subtle the conclusion that Sankara supported the so-called panc"ikara1}a,
elements" 25 or to that of paficikara7Ja "compounding each gross but at least it enables us to suppose that he held a very similar idea.
element from all five suJ;>tle elements." 26 Does Sankara hold the Moreover, of his works which can be regarded as authentic only
former theory or the latter? This is another point to be examined the .Brahmasiltrabhii-?ya (II,4,20-2) and the Chiindogyopani~adbhlifya
in his cosmological view. (VI, 3,2-4) that refer to trivrtkaratJa. This reminds us that the term
On the basis of C!zandogya Up. (VI,3,2; 3) the Brahmasiltra cites iinanda is referred to only when the text to be interpreted forces
the theory of trivrtkarat}a, which assumes the existence of three him to mention it. 30 \Ve may infer, after our examination above,
elements, fire, water, and food, although the Bra!zmasiltra itself that he held a kind of paiiczkarar;a, accepting the five gross elements,
accepts five elements, namely earth, water, fire, air, and ether, and t~erefore disregarded trivrtkarat;a. In this sense it may be said
in accordance with Taittiriya Up. (II,l). In this respect the that Sankara paved the way for the later establishment of the
Brafzmasiltra is eclectic and theoretically inconsistent. Vacaspati- theory of paiicikaraJJa. 31
mifra (ninth century) and Amalananda (thirteenth century) pre- In any case, it should be emphasized that Sankara did not in-
ferred trivrtkarar;a to paiicikararJa since they did not accept that air tend to establish any system of cosmology of his own, but only to
and ether also have parts of other elements incorporated in them, make use of cosmological discussion for the purpose of leading his
and because there is no authority for pancikarm;a in the Veda. 2 7 pupils to final release. What he really wants to say is simply that
Later, Sadananda 28 and Dharmaraja29 established the theory of from a cosmological point of view Brahman is identical with Atman.
paiicikarar;a while disregarding that of trivrtkara7Ja, although they
were still relying upon the Chandogya Up. (VI) for scriptural
support. :B. Psychological and Epistemological Approach
In his Brahmasiltrabhaua Sankara refers to the five gross elements
and comments on trivrtkara1}a, which the Brahmasiltra mentions, lf Atman is identical with Brahman, Atman must be Pure Con-
but he does not refer to pancikara1Ja. In the Upade.Sasahasri this term sciousness (caitanya)--eternaI, changeless, ever-free, and fearless
is not used, but the author seems to suggest paficfkara1)a when he exactly in the same manner as Brahman is. However, what ordinary
says: peDple conceive to be Atman is far removed from Brahman, the
This name-and-form . . . , [originally unevolved], took the Absolute. How and why can Atman be Brahman? In order to answer
28 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 29

this question it is necessary to investigate the nature of Atman whereas form and other bodily qualities continue to be perceived.
which is called "inner Self" (pratyagiitman) and to approach it The subtle body persists as long as one docs not attain final release;
through an analysis of psychological and epistemological facts itdoes not originally belong to Atman (Upad I, 15,10).
which are generally regarded as associated with, or based upon, Nothing about the principal vital air is known from the Upadeia-
Atman or as its attributes. saltasr"i, though the Br~hmasiltra refers to it. 4 According to the Brah-
masutra (II,4, 12) and Sankara's commentary on it, it has five func-
1. Structure of the Individual tions (pancavrtti): expiration (prar;w) ; inspiration (apana) ; iryiina (a
The Vediintic view of the structure of the individual, which is sort of combination of both; that which supports life when the
akin to the Sii:rpkhya-Yoga view, has its origin in the Upani~ads breath is held with a great effort); udana (the faculty which at
and has already been established in the Brahmasfltra. In the Upa- death brings about the passing of the Atman from the body); and
defaslihasri and his other works Sankara tries neither to improve samiina (the principle of digestion). 5
upon it nor to create a new theory; he seems to adopt the then gen- The rest of the components arc jointly termed in the Brahmasfitra
erally accepted opinion. (II,4,1) priit;a (life organ), which is synonymous with indriya (BS
According to Buddhism, which maintains non-existence of any II,4, 17). The principal vital air, which is concerned with uncon-
permanent Atman, the individual consist'> of five aggregates (skan- scious life, is by nature different (vailakfatJya, BS II,4, 19) from
dha): matter (rupa), perception (vedanii), mental conceptions and prat;a, the organs (BS II,4,11; 1 7) which are related to conscious
ideas (sarp.jii.a), volition, (sarµskiira), and consciousness (vijfiana); Hfe. 6 Among these life organs, the five organs of action which are
the first one is the body of the individual and the other four con- concerned with activity (karman) are speech, hand, feet, generation,
stitute the mind. There is therefore no room for Atman in the and evacuation (Upad I, 16,3).
Buddhist system. In the Vedanta and in the other philosophical The senses have perception (buddhi) of their objects as their pur-
systems of India, on the other hand, it is the essence of the individ- pose (Upad I,16,3).7 They are the cause of perception of their
ual. In addition to Atman, Sankara recognizes five more compo- objects (JlSBh II,4,19, p. 587).8 There are five senses: auditory
nents of the individual, which constitute the limiting adjunct (up- (froira), cutaneous (tvac), visual (cak~us), gustatory (rasana), and
adhi) of Atman1*: the body, gross (sthilla) and subtle (silk~ma) ; the olfactory (ghriitza), since there are five different perceptions (bud-
principal vital air (mukhyapratJa) ; the five organs of action (kar- dhibheda), having as their respective objects sound (fabda), touch
mendriya); the five senses (buddkindriya); and the internal organ (spar.fa), form-color (rupa), taste (rasa), and smell (gandha) (BSBh
(antabkara1Ja). II,4,6, p. 572. Cf. Upad I,3, 113-116). 9 According to Sankara's
The gross body is the perceptible body which perishes at the cosmology, the auditory and other senses as well as the body and
time of death and consists of the five elements (Upad I,16,1-2). things external are evolutes of the five elements (ether, air, fire,
Sankara refers to the subtle body (liizga, Upad I,11,14; 15,10) water, and earth). The five elements are in turn evolutes of the
without any explanation, but the Brahmasi1tra discusses it in detail. 2 Unevolved Name-and-Form. Sound and other objects of the senses
In the Brahmasi1trabha~ya Sankara describes it as "the subtle parts are qualities (gut;a) of ether and other elements respectively. As in
of the elements, which subtle parts constitute the seed of the the Nyaya system, 10 each sense is thought to have as its object some-
[gross] body." 3 The gross body is dissolved at death, but this sublte thing ofits own kind (Upad II, 16,2) ;for example, the auditory sense
body is assumed to accompany Atman when it transmigrates. Ac- has sound, a quality of ether, as its object. Like external objects,
cording to the Brahmasiltra (IV,2,11; BSBh IV,2, 11), bodily warmth however, the senses are material and have no consciousness at all.
belongs to the subtle body since it is not felt in the body after death, Vidyarar:iya, the author of the Vivarmy.aprameyasarp.graha, rejects
various views of the senses which were held by the Buddhists, the
*Footnotes to section III, B begin on p. 60. Mimaipsakas, and others, and he defines the senses as the instru-
30 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 31
ments (karm:za) of perception, their existence being no more than vZ)nana, and citta is called antal;karm:za: these antal;karm:zas
inferred. According to him, the senses are neither sense-orifices be represented by the two words buddhi and manas. Sankara
(golaka), nor a peculiar capacity (fakti) of the organ, nor a different out a self-contradiction in the Sarpkhya system, saying that
substance (drmrya) having its locus in the visible sense-organ. 11 the antalJ,karaJ;ta as three in one place and as one in anoth-
Such discussions concerning the nature of the senses are apparent- place (BSBh II,2,10, p. 425), but Sankara himself does not
ly absent from Sankara's w~rks. It is likely that he made no attempt make his own position clear with regard to whether the antal;ka-
to investigate the nature of the senses, simply accepting what was is one or more.
commonly or traditionally known about them in his time. He In most of the cases in Sankara's works the manas is merely another
strongly emphasized that they were different from Atman. of the buddhi, or at least it is indistinguishable from the latter.
Sankara's concept of the internal organ is not so clear. In his also indiscriminately uses the terms citta and dki as synonyms of
Brahmasutrabhafya he says that "the internal organ which consti- manas and the buddhi without specification.15 When for some
tutes the limiting adjunct (upadhi) of Atman is called in different tlnknown reason Sankara seeks to distinguish the buddhi from the
places by different names, such as manas~ buddhi~ vijftiina, and he, like the Sarpkhya, attributes the function of nifcaya
citta." 12 With regard to the manas (mind) he also makes the follow- JI,3,32, p. 541; Upad I,16,4; GBh III,42, p. 180) oradhy-
ing comments: " . . . finally there is the manas which has all things (Upad I, 16, 21) to the buddhi, and that of vikalpa (Upad
for its objects and extends to the past, the present and the future; L,16,3) or sarrzkalpa (l.Jpad I,16,21) or sarrzkalpavikalpa (GBh III,
it is one only but has var:,ious modifications (anekavrttika)." We find 42, p. 179; X,22, p. 456) or vivekabuddhi (GBh V, 13, p. 257) or
it designated by different terms in different places, as manas or bud- sal'{lfaya (BSBh II,3,32, p. 541) ofthe five senses and five organs of
dhi or aharµkara or citta, according to the differences of its modifica- attiontothemanas. Relying probably upon the Katha Up. (III,10)
tions (vrttibheda). And the Sruti also, after having enumerated its and the Bhagavadgita (III, 42), he says that the buddhi is superior
various modifications (vrtti), such as desire, says at the end : "All t9 the manas since the buddhi conveys the objects of experience to
this is manas only" (Brh. Up. I,5,3).1: On the basis of the above Atman ( BSBh I, 4, 1, p. 294) .16 In these instances the manas and the
passages Deussen considers that for Sankara the two expressions burldki are distinct from each other as in the Sarpkhya system.
antal;karm;ta and manas are completely interchangeable. 14 In fact According to Dharmariijadhvarindra, the antaMarar;za is one and
Sankara sometimes interprets the word "manas'' as antaM,arm:.za Qas four different modifications (vrtti), namely manas, buddhi,
(GBh V,19, p. 267; PBh 1,2, p. 13; I,6, p. 24, etc.). aha1!lkiira, and citta, the respective objects _of which are saT{lfaya,
Deussen further remarks that for Sankara there is on!)' one nifcaya, garva, and smarar:za (VP.I,58). 17 Sankara's concept of
antal;karar;za, the manas; even the buddhi is for him not a distinct a11ta&kara1:za is still unorganized and ambiguous, but it points to the
faculty. But Sankara uses the expression "twofold anta!ykarar;a" systematized Vedantic concept of anta~karar;za.
(antaf:tkarar;advaya, Upad I,3,116), so it is possible for us to infer It is a controversial problem for later Advaita philosophers
that Sankara may recognize the existence of two antaf:zkarar;as, whether or not the manas is an indriya (sense).18 The Nyaya-Vai-
though it is not clear what they would be. When Sankara com- se~ika, the Mrrnarpsa, and the Saiµkhya commonly assert that the
ments on the word manas in the Kena Up. (I,2 and 6), he inter- rnarzas is an indriya. In the Brahmasutrabhava (II,4,6, p. 572) the
prets it as antaf:tkarar;a and says that the word manas in this case manas is one of the life organs (prar;a), 19 but nowhere in Sankara's
comprises both the manas and the buddhi. If so, the "twofold ar:,tal;- writings does he explicitly affirm or deny that it is an indriya. How-
karar;a" might indicate the buddhi and the manas. Moreover, San- ever, he briefly refers to this problem as follows:
kara describes Atman as "Witness of all the antal;kara'!,las" (krtsna- nanu manaso 'py evarµ sati varjanam indriyatvena prar;zavat syilt, "manal;
ntaf:tkarar;ekfm:za, Upad I, 18, 176). This expression might suggest sarvendriyar;i ea" (Mur;c;L Up. II,1,3) iti Prthagvyapadefadarfaniit/
that each of the modifications of the antaf:tkarar;a such as manas, satyam etat/ smrtau tv ekadafendriya:rfiti mano 'pindriyatvena srotriidi-
32 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 33
vat sarµgrhyate/ prar;a.rya tv indrLvatvarµ na frutau smrtau va prasiddham e manas and the indriyas consist of name-and-form (namarupat-
asti. ([ObjectionJ If it is so, the manas also would have to be ka, Upad I,1,22) and that they are, therefore, by nature differ-
excluded from the class of indriya, like the [mukhyaJpral}a, because from Atman. It is not important at all to Sankara whether
it is found [in Srutis J that in the passage "The manas and all the not the manas is an indriya: what he wishes to emphasize is that
indriyas" (Mur:iq. Up. II,1,3) [the manas and the indrryas] are the manas nor the indriyas arc Atman.
being mentioned separately. [Answer] True, but in Smrtis Name-and-Form as the primary material of the universe
eleven indriyas are mentioned; so the manas also, like the auditory doctrine corresponds to prakrti in the Sarpkhya,21 his
sense and s-o forth, is comprised in the class of indrryas. lt is, how- of the manas seems to be close to that of the Sarpkhya and
ever, established, neither in the Srutis nor in the Smrtis that the removed from that of the Nyaya-Vaisqika, according to which
rmukhya] praria is an indrrya.--(BSBh II,4,17, p. 586) manas is an eternal substance (dral!Ja) distinct from the physical
When Vacaspatimisra commer;ts on this particular passage in such as earth and water. 22 Sankara is in agreement with
his B!zamati, he tries to interpret Sankara's argument as favorable Sarp.khya in regarding the manas as material and unconscious.
to the view that the manas is an indriya. If Vacaspatimifra is right, contrast with the Nyaya-Vaisqika, he denies that the prarias
it would follow that Sankara accepts the view of the Smrtis, reject- the manas are of atomic size (paramar;utulyatva) and main-
ing that of the Srutis. This is contrary to the attitude of Sankara tains that they are subtle and limited in size (sauk,fmyapariccheda)
and other Vedantins towards the Srutis and the Smrtis. Though (llSBh II,4, 7, p. 574).
Dharmarajadhvarin dra.does not refer to this passage of the Brah- The Brahmasiitra (II,3,32) attempts to prove the existence of the
masutrabharya, he contradicts the view of those who assert on the anta4kara1].a on the ground of an argument similar to that of the
basis of the Smrtis that the manas is an indriya (VP I,12). Vaise~ika. 23 Commenting on the siitra, Sankara says that if the
As D.M. Da~ta remarks, Sankara may "simply notice the differ- existence of the antabkarm:w were not accepted, either perpetual
ence of opinion, without trying either to reconcile the two opinions perception would result, whenever the three means (sadhana) of
or reject one infavor of the other." 20 Sankara's purpose in introduc- perception-Atman, the senses, and their objects--wcre in prox-
ing the two views is not to point out that they are different, but ra- imity; or else, if perception were not to follow on the conjunction
ther to show that the muklryapraria is regarded as an indriya neither of the three causes, there would be no perception at all. The exist-
in the Srutis nor in the Smrtis whereas the manas is considered to be ence of some manas, therefore, has to be accepted, by attention or
an indri ya in the Smrtis, though not so in the Srutis. From this fact non-attention of which, perception and non-perception take place.
he con~ludes that the eleven prarias including the manas are dif- He quotes a passage from Brhadara!Jyaka Up. (I,5,3) as scriptural
ferent in essence from the mukhyaprarza. It is, therefore, not pos~ble evidence. 24
from the quoted passage to draw any conclusion concerning San- Sankara's concepts of the senses and the antal;karal}a have so far
kara's opinion on the problem in question. , been dealt with. Atman not only occupies the most important posi-
However in his argument mentioned above Sankara does not tion among the means of perception ( upalabd~isad!zana, BSBh II,
' c
deny but rather admits the validity of that evidence from which 3,32, p. 541) but also constitutes the whole of Sankara's doctrine.
the opponent has come to the conclusion that the manas should be Here I will focus 011 its role in perception.
excluded from the class of indriyas; the evidence is the fact that the
manas is mentioned separately from the indriyas in the passage "the 2. Psychology of External Perception
manas and all the indriyas" (manal; sarvendriyarzi ea, Mul).<;l. Up. II, Although there is a divergence of opinion about the definition of
1,3). If so, he may intentionally or unintentionally be differentiat- perception among the different schools of Indian philosophy, it is
ing the manas from the indriyas conceptually, when he uses the generally defined as knowledge produced by the contact of sense
expression "the manas and the indriyas" (manas cendriyal!i ea, Upad and object. But this definition is not acceptable to the Advaita
I, l, 22). But the expression is being used to maintain that both nor to the Prabhakara Mimarpsa and the Jaina system. 25 Sankara
34 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 35
does not make any attempt to define perception. According to Dhar- II,2, 74; 3, 113). The five senses are necessary for the perception of
marajadhvari:n dra, the defining feature (prayojaka) of perception external objects. They serve the purpose of discerning the special
is not the sense-object contact but the identity (abheda) between object of each sense, such as smell (gandhadivi.yayavife.yaparicchedar-
the consciousness (Atman) limited by an object like a jar ( vi~ayacai­ thatva, BSBh II,3, 18, p. 530). It is, however, not certain whether or
tanya) and the consciousness limited by the modification (vrtti) of not Sankara, like VidyaraI).ya and other Advaitins, 30 holds that
the anta(tkarar:ia (pramiir:iacaitanya) (VP I,16). In the case of the for perception to take place, the senses have to go out, reach their
perception of a jar, the antabkarm;ia goes out toward it through :he objects, and have contact with them. He merely says that the
visual sense and is transformed so as to assume the form of the Jar. senses are directed toward external objects (bahirmukha, BUBh
Such transformation (parir.ama) is called "modification " ( vrtti) IV,3,6, p. 551).
of the antahkarana. The two limiting conditions of Atman-conscious- The antabkararta plays a vital role in external perception. Sound
ness, whic.h ar~ the jar and the ~odification, occupy the same and other external objects, which are not self-established (svata(t-
locus, and thus do not show themselves as different. The identity siddhya.sarp.bhava), are established (siddhi) through the rise of pra-
of the two is the defining feature which distinguishes perception vayas (notions) of the buddhi or anta(tkarar:ia, which take the form of
from inference, where the anta(tkarar:ia does not go out to the object external objects such as blue and yellow. These pratyayas, which
(VP I,18-19). 26 in Sankara's works 31 are sometimes preceded by the adjective
Like the Nyaya and other schools of Indian philosophy, Dhar- bauddha, are nothing but modifications (bheda) of the buddhi, caused
marajadhvarin dra recognizes two classes of perception: one is by the forms of external objects (bahyakii.ranimittatva) and having
savikalpa perception, which is the knowledge of a thing as qualified mutually exclusive attributes (Upad II,2,74). Like later Advaitins
by an attribute (vaifi,rtyavagiihin), and the other is nirvikalpa per- Sankara also uses the term vrtti in the sense of modification of the
ception, which is the knowledge of a thing as unrelated to anything antaftkarat)a, 32 a usage which is probably based upon that of vrtti
else (sal'{lsargiinavagahin) (VP I,59). 27 According to another classifi- in cittavrtti as in the Yogasfitra. 33 But Sankara seems to prefer the
cation which he makes, perception is again twofold: one is the per- term praqaya to vrtti. 34 In order to explain this mechanism of per-
ception due to Jiva..1ak.yin which is the consciousness having the ception, Sankara uses the similes of copper and its mold, light and
antafJ.karar:ia as its limiting adjunct (anta~karar;.opahitarri caitanyam), its object. He says as follows:
and the other is that due to ifvarasak.yin which is the consciousrress mil~iisiktal'{I yathii tamral'{I tannibhaf!! jilyate tathii /
having miiyii as its limiting adjunct (mayopa~itarp. caitanyam) (VP rilpadin l!Jiipnuvac cittal'{I tannibharp. dr fyate dhruvam //
I,66-73).28 No such classifications appear in Sankara's works. (Just as [molten] copper appears in the form of the mold into
Dharrnarajadh var!ndra classifies perception in yet another way. which it was poured, so it is certainly experienced that the
Perception is twofold, namely the knowledge arising from the citta, when pervading [the external objects] such as form-color,
senses (indriyajanya) and that not so arising (indriyajanya), as for appears in their forms.-Upad I, 14,3 [ = Paiicadasi IV,28])
example the perception of pleasure, etc. (sukhadipratyak~a) (VP l!Jaff.jako vii yathaloko vyangyasyakiiriitiim iyiit /
I, 120) .29 This classification corresponds to that of external (bafrya- sarvilrtha1,£Yafijakatvad dhir arthiikiirii pradr fyate / /
pratyak.ya) and internal perception (miinasa- or li.ntarapratyakfa) in (Or, just as light, the illuminator, assumes the forms of what it
the Nyaya. Sankara does not classify perception in any way, but he illuminates, so the dhi is seen to have the forms of its objects,
discusses problems of both external and internal perception. since it is the illuminator of all the objects.-Upa d I, 14,4 [ =
How are external objects perceived? What is the mechanism of Paiicadafz IV ,29))
perception? According to Sankara, external objects of perception It has been maintained by N. K. Devaraja that the two elements
such as sound and touch are material and unconscious; they do in the Vedantic theory of perception, "the going out of the antab-
not have any knowledge of themselves nor of others (Upad I,14,41; karatta to the object" and "the antabkarar:ia assuming the form of the
36 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 37

object," arc missing in Sankara's discussion of perception as well 'nbjects, Atman itself could not be free fr~ change and destruction
as in Padmapada's.3 5 However, the two star;zas above show ~~Upad II,2, 74). In other words, if Atman's perceivership con-
clearly that the second clement is contained i;i Sankara's view of sisted in pervading the buddhi which is appearing in the forms
perception. The idea may not be original to Sankara. Already in Of the external objects (Upad I, 14,6), .4.tman, like the buddhi,
Vyasa's Yogasiltrabha~ya (I, 7) it is mentioned that the citta is colored would also be subject to change, and the basis of Sankara's doc-
by external things through the senses. 36 It is to be noted here that the winc would be destroyed. In order to get round this theoretical
two stanzas under discussion are quoted in Vidyara:r;iya's Paiicadasi difficulty, which is a problen; common to the Advaita and the
(IV,28 and 29) as the authority for his own view of perception. Sli.rµkhya40 and the Yoga, 41 Sankara introduces the concept of
The stanzas also show that in Sankara's view, the first element .:~bhasa.42 As I have pointed out elsewhere, 43 he uses this term to
too is present to a considerable extent. Unlike Dharmarajadhva- ::fo.ean both "reflection" and "false appearance." When abhasa
rindra, Sankara docs not explicitly say that the antal;kara?Ja goes out .means simply reflection and no more, the terms pratibimba (Upad
to the place of the object through the senses, 37 but he says that the )1,5,4), praticc!zliya (BUBh IV,3,7, p. 561),44 and chiiyii (Upad
citta or antal;karm:ia pervades (ryapnuvat, Upad 1,14,3; sa7!1ryapti, 11 12,6; 14,33) are its synonyms. When the reflection (abhasa) of
Upad I,18, 115) the external object such as form-color. It would be ····' -
self-effulgent Atman-consciousness (caitanyapratibimba, Upad I,5,4)
natural to take it that the antal;karat:ia, which is located internally pervades the buddlzi, which is by nature unconscious but endowed
and is not omnipresent, would have to go out in order to pervade· \ 'with action, the buddhi falsely appears (iibhasa) as perceiver
its object which is exter,nal. .Jbecause of Atman's consciousness (bod!w, Upad I,5,4) in it, together
When the antal;kara?Ja pervades its object, the object is called · with the fact of its own action, just as torches and other things
"the one which is seated in the buddhi" (buddhyarilqha, Upad I,7,1; :appear to be possessed of the power of burning on account of the
18,94; 11,2,70).38 Sankara explains this as follows: .fire in them (U pad I, 18, 71). After pervading, and taking the forms
iilokastho l',hato _yadvad buddhyaruqho bhavet tatha / of, external objects, the buddhi becomes, as it were, an illuminator
dhivyaptil; ~yiid ghaf aroho dhiyo vyaptau kramo bhavet // account of the reflection of Atman in it, and thus perceives
(Just as a jar [when pervaded by light] becomes something external objects (Upad I, 18,155 and 157). Just as the face is
situated in the light, so docs it [when pervaded by the buddhi] be- different from its reflection in the mirror, Atman is different from
come something seated in the buddhi. It is the buddhi 's pervasion its reflection in the buddhi (Upad I, 18,32 and 33), and the reflec-
[of the jar] that is the jar's being seated [in the buddki]. In the tion is by nature unreal (Upad I,18,40-46; 18,87). The appear-
pervasion by the buddhi there would be sequence [of stages].-· ance (abhiisa) and disappearance (abhava) in the buddhi is due to
Upad I,18, 156, cf. Upad I, 18,155 and 157) the Seeing (dr.yfi =Atman, Upad I,18,84). Atman's perceivership
It is thus necessary for perception of external objects that the means not that Atman is the agent of an action of perceiving, but
antal;karar;ta assume the forms of those objects located in the buddhi. that the reflection of self-effulgent Atman whose nature is percep-
It is, however, not sufficient since the antak~arat:ia and its pratyayas tion is in the pratyayas of the buddhi. Atman does not do anything but
are both unconscious and material like the external objects and the simply exist. 45
senses. The antal;karar;ta and its pratyaya are merely objects percep- There is no doubt that the exposition of abhiisavada in the Paii-
tible (griihya) by a perceiver (grahaka) different from themselves cadasi is largely indebted to Sankara's view. Vidyara:r:iya himself
(Upad 11,2,74). This perceiver, according to Sankara, is Atman. 89 clearly admits that the difference between the Brahman-conscious-
His discussion now tends to be metaphysical rather than psycho- ness and the fruit (phala)--i.e., the reflection of consciousness
logical. (cidabhasa)---is stated in Sankara's Upadefasahasrl. 46 It is worthy of
According to Sankara, Atman is transcendentally changeless note that Vidyarai;iya, like Sankara, regards the reflection as wholly
(kutastha) and constant (nitya). Now if Atman, as perceiver, were unreal, whereas according to the pratibimbavada of the Vivara:i;a, 4 7
taken as perceiving the pratyayas having the forms of the external it is real.
38 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 39

3. Semantic Analysis of Perception figuratively used in the sense of the "action" of cutting which
There are various opinions among Indian philosophers about signified by the verbal root, though primarily it means the
the essential nature of knowledge. According to the Nyaya-Vaise- :static situation which has resulted from the "action" of cutting
~ika, knowledge is a quality of Atman-substance. The Buddhist and (Upad 11,2, 76-85). 53 It is, therefore, reasonable to assert that
the Mimarpsa systems commonly characterize knowledge as an Jtman is perception.
activity. Sankara and other Advaitins, however, stand on the One expresses one's experience of perception by means of
Upani~adic axiom that knowledge or perception is Atman itself. and says, janami (I know) or janati (He knows). 54
But the word "perception" (upalabdhi) 48 is generally conceived to According to the ordinarily accepted understanding of this sen-
mean an "action" of perceiving which is indicated by the verbal tence, "I" or "he," who is the subject of knowledge, "knows" some
root (dhiitu) upa-labh49; action is nothing but change (Upad of knowledge, just as, in case of the sentence devadattab
II,2, 76). 50 It would thus be contradictory to assert that Atman karoti, Devadatta, who is the agent of action, performs a certain
is transcendentally changeless and yet that perception is Atman. by himself. The verbal root denotes action while the verbal
Sankara defends his position by maintaining that this ordinarily suffix indicates an agent. Thus the meanings of the verbal root
accepted sense is merely a figurative meaning (upacara) of the word (prakrti) and the verbal suffix (pratyqya) are different from each
"perception." A verbal root can directly refer only to some pra- other, but they have a common substratum (a.frqya, Upad I, 18,
ryqya of the buddhi, which does have "action" as its nature. As 51 and 52), namely Devadatta. Therefore, the two meanings
mentioned before, it is when the reflection of Atman is in it that belong to one and the same subject; Devadatta is the agent who
the buddhi falsely appear'.~ as perceiver. In other words, the buddhi actually performs an action. Likewise the verbal rootjiia refers to
becomes consciousness-like ( cinnibha) and is called jfia (= Atman), the action of perceiving while the verbal suffix -ti or -mi indicates
when the Atman-consciousness (caitanya, cit) is superimposed upon the ageut. 55 Therefore, "I" or "he," like Devadatta, is the agent
it (Upad I, 18, 65; 68). When the reflection of Atman is in the who actually perceives the object of perception. Ordinary people
buddhi and the doership (kartrtva) of the buddhi is superimposed consider this "I" or "he" to be Atman and think of themselves as
upon Atman, 51 Atman falsely appears as the perceiver, and it is different from Brahman, which is actionless (akriya) and constant
said that thejfia knows (Upad I,18,65; cf. Upad I,18, 70). There- (nitya).
fore, the entire process of perception, including all the perceiving Rejecting this ordinary understanding, Sankara asserts that the
activities of the pratyaya of the buddhi, such as pervading its objects verbal suffix indicates merely the reflection (abhasa) of Atman which
and assuming their forms and colors, comes down to the fact that is in the buddhi, and that the verbal root means action (kriya) of
Atman-perception, transcendentally changeless, falsely appears the buddhi. People say janati because they fail to distinguish
(abhiisa) as perceiver (iitmanal:z upalabdhyabhasaphaliivasana~, Upad Atman from its reflection and the buddhi (Upad I, 18,53). Percep-
II,2, 77); however, this does not entail any change in Atman- tion (avabodha) docs not belong to the buddhi and action does not
perception. At the end of the perceiving process taking place in the belong to Atman. For this reason the expressionjanati is applicable
buddhi,52 there is .Atman-perception falsely appearing as perceiver. neither to the buddhi nor to Atman (Upad I, 18,54). Neither Atman
In this sense the perceiver is nothing but constant perception nor the buddhi can be the subject of the sentence janati, which
(nityopalabdhimatra, Upad II,2, 79). The word "perception" is, requires the subject to be possessed of both perception and
therefore, being used only figuratively when it has the sense of an action.
"action" of perceiving. For example, the "action" of cutting Then what is the subject of this sentence? When consciousness
(chidikriyii) results, at the end of the whole process of the cutting (caitanya), the nature of Atman, is superimposed upon the buddhi
"action," in the static situation where the object that was to be cut which is unconscious and of the nature of action, the buddhi
has been separated into two parts (dvaidhibhiiva); the word "cut" becomes consciousness-like ( cinnibha, Up ad I, 18,65; 68), assuming
40 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 41

the form of Atman. Then the notion (dhi) that "I am the Seeing yaka Up. I,5,3; "Desire, volition, doubt, faith, lack of faith,
(Drfi = Atman)" occurs to the buddhi (Upad I, 18,84; 89). This steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, shame, meditation, fear . . .
notion is called ahaT!ldhi (Upad I,2,2) or ahaT?Zpratyaya (Upad II,2, all this is truly mind." 57 This Sruti passage also constitutes the basis
52; 2,53. etc.), i.e., "I"-notion. It is also called ahaTflkriyii (Upad of Dharmarajadhvar.indra's theory of indriyajanya perception
I,14,43), aharJ1-kllra (Upad I,1,24; II,1,6, etc.), or simply aham (VP I,120).
as neuter (Upad I,5,5; 18,203). Atman is said to be the object of Sankara refutes the Nyaya-Vaise~ika position that not only
this ahaTflpratyaya (aharµpratyayavifaya, Upad II,2,52; 2,53; BSBh knowledge but also pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition
II,3,38, p. 545; asmatpratyayavifaya, BSBh, Introduction, p. 17). are qualities (gu11a) which inhere in Atman-substance (Upad I,16,
The buddhi as the bearer of ahaT!lklira is called ahaT?Zkartr (Upad 51-66). 58 He says that if the position is accepted, then pleasure, for
I,14,24; 18,20, etc.). This aharµkartr is the subject of the sentence example, cannot be an object of knowledge, since knowledge and
janami or janati (Upad I,18,65), since the meanings both of the pleasure are qualities of one and the same Atman-substance (Upad
verbal root and of the verbal suffix belong to it. Words are appli- I,16,57). :Furthermore, according to the Nyaya-Vaise~ika, pleas-
cable to the ahaT!lkartr but not to Atman, since the former has ure, pain, etc., as particular facts are perceived when they come
generic attributes (jati), action (karman), etc., which are absent in in contact with the manas through their inherence (samavaya) in
Atman. Atman which is conjoined (sarµyukta) with the manas. However,
Thus, from a semantic and psychological anaJysis of perception, pleasure and knowledge cannot come in contact with the manas
which seems to be uniqpe among Advaitins, Sankara rejects the simultaneously. Therefore, pleasure cannot be an object of knowl-
ordinary concept of Atman and, while doing so, refutes the act edge (Upad I,16,52 and 53) as they assert it is.
theory of knowledge according to which knowledge is a kind of Sankara maintains that pain is an object (vi~aya) of buddhis, 59
activity or function (kriya). It may not be out of place to note here which are in turn objects of the inner Atman (Upad I, 18,201 ).
that Jayanta finds the origin of act theory in a grammatical prej- He considers desire, aversion, and so on to be attributes (dharma)
udice, a confusion between knowledge as manifestation and the of the "k~etra" (i.e., the object of knowledge) and not those of
verb "to know" as denoting an action. 56 Atman (U pad II,1,36). His view is based upon Bhagavadgtta XIII,
6: "Desire, hatred, pleasure, pain, the aggregate, intelligence
4. Psychology of Internal Perception (cetana), and steadfastness-this is kfetra briefly described with
With regard to so-called internal perception, Sankara refers to its modifications. " 60 In his commentary on this stanza Sankara
such mental or psychological events as the feelings of pleasure and interprets '"kfetra" as the anta[lkarm;a 61 which is an o~ject of
pain (sukhadul;tkhavedana), passion (raga), aversion (dve~a), desire perception (jfieya ). Dharmarajadhvar1ndra also regards desire
(kama, iccha), and fear (bhaya). All these mental events are per- and the other~ as attributes of the manas (manodharma, VP I, 7).
ceived as objects of perception just as are jars and other external Furthermore, Sankara interprets the word cetana in the above stan-
objects. They are, therefore, different from their perceiver, Atman za as antaf:zkara1Javr tti or "a modification of the antal;kara1Ja"
(Upad II,2, 70). All these impurities (afuddhi) are in the object of which manifests itself in the aggregate of the body and the senses,
perception and never in Atman, the subject of perception (Upad II,2, filled with the juice of the reflection of the Atman-consciousness
36). They have the same substratum (afraya) as the impressions (ii.tmacaitanyabhasarasaviddha, GBh XIII,6, p. 543): desire and so on
(saTflskiira) of pain, of form-color, and so forth (U pad I, 15, 13; are modifications (vrtti) of the manas (BSBh II,4,6, p. 572).
II,l,35). Their substratum is the antafJkarar.ia. Even the discrimi- Dharrnarajadbvarlndra says that desire (kama) and other attri-
nating notion (vivekz pratyayafJ,), "I am the knower, not the object butes of the manas are knowledge taking on the form of vrtti
of knowledge, p~re, always free," also belongs to the buddhi (vrttirupajfiana, VP I, 7).
(Upad I,12,14). Sankara's view is based chiefly upon Brhadarar;i- According to Sankara desire and other psychological events are
42 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 43

perceived as objects just as a jar and other external objects are internal, seated in the buddhi (buddhyaruqha, Upad II,2,
perceived as objects (Upad II,2, 70). There is no essential differ-
ence between external and internal perception, since in the process does not seek to go beyond this point with regard to
of perception objects of external perception are transformed into . However, Dharmarajadhvarindra finds here the de-
pratyayas or vrttis of the buddhi which are in the form of those exter- feature of perception which is common to the indriyajanya
nal objects, and objects ofinternal perception are also transformed indriyajanya perception. In both cases the consciousness
into pratyayas which are in the form of pleasure, pain, and other '"-"'"''n by the vrtti of the anta~karm:za (pramti1Jacaitanya) is identical
objects of internal perception: that limited by the object (vi~qyacaitanya) such as a jar in the
ya tu syan manasi vrttis cak.yu.yka ruparafijana I and pleasure in the indriyajanya (VP 1,21-22).
nityam eviitmano drNya nityaya drfyate hi sa II Dharmarajadhvarindra seems primarily to aim at the comple-
(The modification of the manas, which is caused by the visual tion ofthe Vedantic theory of means ofknowledge. On the other
sense and is depicted by form-color [of its object), is certainly band, Sankara is primarily concerned not with the establishment
always seen by the constant Seeing of Atman.-Upad I, 13,6) any epistemologically or philosophically perfect system but
tathanyendriyayuktii ya vrttayo vifayanjanal} / the salvation of people suffering from transmigrat,ary ex-
smrtz ragadirupa ea kevalantar manasy api /I istence here in the present world. The only truth that Sankara
(In like manner the modifications [of the manas Jwhich are con- intends to arrive at from his analysis of perception is that of the
nected with the senses other [than the visual one] and are identity of Atman and Brahman.
depicted by [extern~l] objects; also [the modification of the In his book A History of Indian Philosophy, Dasgupta considers
manas] in the form of memory and in the forms of passion and that Padmapada, one of Sankara's disciples, was probably the first
the like, which is unconnected [from the senses], located in the to attempt to explain from a Vedantic point of view the process
manas. -U pad I, 13, 7) ofperception, which was elaborated by Prakasatman (tenth cen-
manasyas tadvad anyasya drfyante svapnavrttaya~ / tury) and later writers, and that Padmapada's views were all col-
dra~tur drNis tato nitya fuddhananta ea kevala /I lected and systematized in the exposition of the Vedantaparibhiifii
(and the modifications of the manas in the dreaming state are ofDharmarajadhvarindra in the sixteenth century. 62 However, my
also seen to be another's. The Seeing of the Seer is, therefore, investigation has shown that Sankara's view of perception, which
constant, pure, infinite and alone.--Upad I, 13,8) has so far been overlooked and seems to depend considerably upon
The only difference in mechanism between external and the Sarpkhya and the Yoga views, 63 already displays the essential
internal perception lies in the fact that the modifications of the characteristics of the later Advaita theory of perception.
manas are connected with the senses in case of external perception and
not in case of internal perception (Upad I, 13, 7). Though Sankara 5. Fou.r States of Atm.an
does not try to analyze perception and though it is not clear The previous sections have been concerned with our daily
whether or not he considers the manas to be an indriya, the above mental and psychological experiences in the waking state (jagrat).
distinction easily leads one to Dharmarajadhvarindra's division But Indian thinkers were not contented with the investigation of
of perception into the two types, indriyajanya and indriyajanya. the waking state. They also speculated on the dreaming state
Pleasure and the like, which have the buddhi as their substratum, (svapna) and deep sleep (su~upta) and discovered metaphysical
differentiate the buddhi, which, being illumined by the constant significance in those states. Their speculation even extended to a
light of Atman, appears as Atman in the aggregate of the body fourth state (caturtha, turya, turiya) which transcends the above
and the senses (Upad I, 16, 7). Thus it is through immovable con- three.
sciousness (Upad II,2, 73) that one perceives everything, external Philosophic speculation on the four states started with Upani-
44 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 45

sadic thinkers, s4 and its most systematic exposition is seen in the sleep. 68 In the Vedantic theory, however, the Atman in this state is
Mar:u/Jlkya Up., on which Sankara wrote a commentary. 65 The a mass of mere consciousness (prajfianaghana, Mm;q. Up. 5; ghana-
Brahmasiltra also discusses the four states (BS III,2,1-9) as well as prajiia, GK I,l). Nobody sees anything in the state of deep sleep,
the state of swooning (mugdha, .BS III,2, 10), 66 which is not ex- but this does not mean that in deep sleep Pure Consciousness ceases
amined in the Upani~ads. It is, however, to be noted here that to be (Upad I,18, 97). It is only because there is no object of sight that
the Brahmasiltra, which stands in the line of bhedablzeda, neglects nothing is seen in the deep sleep, and not because sight-i.e., Pure
or perhaps may not know of this fourth, which could properly Consciousness-cea ses to be. It is by Pure Consciousness that one
fit into a non-dualistic system alone. 67 denies the existence of the objects of sight (Upad II,2,90-93). This
According to Sankara, Atman is the only one, eternal and change- Atman is free from the pain which is experienced in the waking and
less. Nevertheless, it appears in many ways because of the dreaming states (Upad II,2,45). It is in a purer form, but not yet
limiting adjunct (upadhi), just as one and the same gem appears perfect. Just as one goes from the waking state to the states of
different when blue or yellow color is put near it (Upad I,17,16; dream and deep sleep, one comes back from the state of the deep
17,26; 17,27). Atman appears and is designated differently accord- sleep to the dreaming and waking states. In this sense this state is,
ing to the three states. When Atman is in the waking state and so to speak, the seed (bija) of the two other states (Upad I,16,18).
external (bahya)--in other words, perceiving external objects-it Therefore, the Atman in this state is called aZ!)lilkrta (unmanifrst,
is called viraj or vaisvanara (Upad I, 17,64, cf. Vedantasara [XVII] Upad I, 17,64). The state of deep sleep is also called tamas (dark-
36). In the waking state both the five senses (Upad I,17,24) and ness) or ajfiiina (ignorance). When this seed has been burnt up by
the internal organ are at work and, according to the Mar:uf.ukya the knowledge of Atman, it is like a seed that has been scorched,
Up. and Gaurj.apadiyakarika, it is conscious of external objects without power of germinating (Upad I,17,25).
( bahifprajna, MaQQ. Up. 3; GK I, l). The above three states are only adventitious and not one's own
When Atman is in the dreaming state, the five senses cease to nature, since they perish like clothes and wealth (cf. U pad II,2,
function and only the internal organ is functioning. The Atman 86-89). The triad is a verbal handle (viicarambha(la) and conse-
in this state is called taijasa (Upad I, 15,24, cf. Vediintasara [XVlI] quently unreal (Upad II, 17,65). Vaifvanara, taijasa, and prajna
117) or prajapati (Upad I,17,64), and it is conscious of things are all merely Atman with limiting adjuncts (sopadhi, Upad I,15,
internal (anta!J,prajfia, Mal,1Q. Up. 4; GK I,1). In other words, 29). "Tl1e Atman without limiting adjuncts (anupadhika) is inde-
the object of perception in this state is not an external object but scribable, without parts, attributeless and pure; neither mind
a residual impression (vasana) of something grasped through the nor speech reach it" (Upad I,15,29). This Atman is turiya (Upad
senses in the waking state (Upad I,11,10; 15,24); this is like recol- I, 10,4). This Atman cannot be expressed by any words.
lection of a memory in the waking state (Upad I, 14, 1; 17,24). Since Since this turiya (Upad I,10,4) is nothing but Brahman, it is,
in the dreaming state Atman is free from limiting adjuncts such though indescribable, indicated by means of all the possible
as the body and the senses, Atman appears in a purer form and negative adjectives which are used to describe Brahman: "non-
is seen to be self-effulgent (svayaT[lprabha), just as a sword is seen dual" (advaya), "free from desire" (akama ), "unborn" (aja ), "free
to shine when drawn from its sheath (Upad I,11,11). fr()m evils" ( apahatapapman), "fearless" (abhaya). Adjectives such as
In the state of deep sleep everything vanishes (Upad I, 17 ,64) ; "absolutely changeless and constant" (kutastlzanitya), which are
even the internal organ ceases to function. The Atman in this state affirmative in form but really negative in intention, are also
is called praJiia (Upad I,15,25; 17,64); it sees nothing else (anan- employed to characterize it.
yadrs, Upad I, 15,25). Deep sleep is usually regarded as the entire This Atman is always the same in all beings (Upad I,8,3; l 0, 9);
cessation of consciousness. The Vaise~ilw thinks that consciousness though perfectly stainless and non-dual, it is covered by inverted
is adventitious because Atman does not have this quality in deep knowledge (viparyqya) which is avidya (nescience, Upad I, 10,8).
46 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 47
This last is the reason why the highest truth, that Atman is Brahman, 133). It is true that Sankara's doctrine is on the whole illusionistic,
is not generally recognized. but his arguments are strikingly realistic and not idealistic. He
maintains that knowledge (jniina) results from the means of
:Im ow ledge (pramiirzaJa11;_ya) which have existing things as their
C. Exegetical Approach objects (J'athabh11tavifaya) and that knowledge, therefore, depends
upon existing things (vastutantra) and not upon Vedic injunction
1. The Means of Knowledge (codanfitantra) nor upon man (puru~atantra) (BSBh I,1,4, p. 83).3
Early Vedanta philosophers did not pay much attention to prob- He rejects the Vijiianavadin's position that there is no difference
lems concerning the means of knowledge (pramil'l)a) by which whatever between knowledge and the object of knowledge, the
valid knowledge (pramii) is attained, although to other schools latter being nothing but the former, since for Vijiianavada no
of Indian philosophy these were important, even essential, topics. external objects exist. 4
The Materialists (Carvaka) accepted only sense-perception (pra- In his arguments he often takes it for granted that the means of
tyak~a) as the means of knowledge, rejecting all others. Some }mowledge are generally accepted. 5 There is no doubt that he was
Vaisqikas and the Buddhists recognized both sense-perception and well acquainted with nyaya (logic). In his writings he refrrs to at
inference (anumana), to which the Sarpkhyas added a third least three means of knowledge: sense-perception, inference, and
means: statement by an authority (iiptavacana or fabda). The Nai- verbal testimony. 6 In no place in his works, however, docs he give
yayikas accpeted comparison (upamana) in addition as a fourth :any systematic account of them, though he is aware of the relative
means. :importance of the various means of knowledge. His disregard
In the Brahmasiltra (I,3,28; III,2,24; IV,4,20) ''pratyak-1a" and or deli berate avoidance of the point is largely based upon his
"anumana" are accepted as means of knowledge, but the words have rdigio-philosophical standpoint. Atman-Brahman, the knowledge
a quite special meaning and merely stand for "Srutis" and "Smr- of which is the means to final release (mok~a), is self-evident (sva-
tis," respectively. 1* The Brahmasutra does not discuss problems of pramar;aka, Upad 1, 18,203) and self-established (svatal_tsiddha, Upad
pramar;a. Early Advaita writers are interested only in demonstrat- II,2,93, etc.). Therefore, Atman-Brahman is by nature independent
ing the illusory nature of the world and engaged in discussing the <>f the means of knowledge; Atman-Brahman is established neither
metaphysical aspect of knowledge (jfziina) which is the nature of by sense-perception nor by other means of knowledge (Upad II,2,
Brahman-Atman, and not in examining the means of knowledge. 60). An investigation of the means of knowledge is of no use for
In the tenth century, Prakasatman employs four means of attainment of final release.
knowledge in his philosophical discussion: sense-perception, Then how is the know ledge of Atman-Brahman obtained? It is
inference, postulation (arthapatti) and verbal testimony (fabda). 2 attai11ed only through the Srutis (Upad I,11,9; 18,217, etc.), which
In the sixteenth century, Dharmarajadhvarindra enumerates are not to be doubted (anatifankyatva, Upad I,17,67) and are the
six means of knowledge, the above four and two additional ones, right means of acquiring knowledge (pramar;a, Upad I, 17,8. Cf.
comparison and non-cognition (anupalabdhi) (VP, Upodghata 10); Upad I, 18,216; BS I, 1, 7). Sankara's firm conviction that the
he devotes the first six chapters of his Vedantaparibhaw. to the Sruti is infallible is seen here and there in his works. No argument
establishment of a Vedantic theory. or justification is necessary for the validity of the Sruti. This is not
Sankara himself does recognize the significance of the means peculiar to Sankara but is the basic standpoint of the Vedanta and
of knowledge, remarking that everything (sarvapadiirtha) is the Mimarpsa. 7 His absolute reliance on the Sruti leads to the
established through verbal testimony (Jabda), inference (anumiti), denial of tne validity of the other means of knowledge (Upad I, 18,
and other means of knowledge, and not otherwise (Upad I, 18, 7; 13,183; 18,223). Nevertheless, use is made of the other means in
"'Footnotes to section III, C begin on p. 65. order to kn.ow Atman-Brahman (Upad I,18,134) as well as the ob-
48 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 49

jects of knowledge (pramoJa) different from Atman (Upad II,2,93);' ~deva, of the Madhyamika school of Buddhism. It is probable
However, it is only before the attainment of the knowledge of · · t they influenced the Brahmasutra, which also utilizes this type
Atman that sense-perception and other means of knowledge ar argument. 12
valid (Upad I, 11,5). It is to be noted here that Dharmarajll"' • However, no matter how reasonable an argument may be, it
dhvarindra, who systematized the Advaita theory of the means" ~nnot be accepted by the Vedantins if it is incompatible with the
of knowledge, also carries on his discussion of the means qf is. The Vedanta, which may be styled "a positive theology
knowledge under the same condition. He says: " 'In your [=Ad" d upon scripture," 13 began originally as an exegesis of the Vedas,
vaitin's] view, ajar etc. are sublated since they are unreal. So how pecially the Vedanta, i.e., the Upani!?ads, which resulted in the
=
can knowledge of them be valid know ledge?' We [ Advaitins] J:rlposi tion of the Brahmasatra. The Brahmasiitra records differences
reply, 'Because a jar, etc., are sublated after the realization of ·• interpretation of many places of the Srutis but unfortunately it
Brahman. . . . but they are not sublated in the state of transmi- r es not discuss systematically any methodological problems con-
gration.' " 8 An investigation of the mea!1s of knowledge is after all. ning the exegesis of the Vedas. In his many commentaries Sankara
in the sphere of nescience (avidya) for Sankara. snot deal with these problems; he presents only the results of
Like the author of the Brahmasiitra Sankara --ecognizes the au• lying his exegetical and theological method.14 But some of
thority of the Smrtis. To support his argument he often quotes kara's exegetical principles are recognized in the Upadefasahasri.
Sruti passages, especially Upani~adic passages, and then Smrti
passages which are not incompatible with the former (Upad II, r, . The Sentence "Tat Tvam Asi"
8). 9 However, Sankara is endowed with too much creativity and '. An Indian syllogism begins with a proposition named pratijfi.a
reasoning power to remain a simple traditionalist. Further- esis) which contains a minor (pakfa) and a major term (sadhya)
more, the time did not allow him to rest his case entirdy on the' a which is restated in the fifth and last proposition, called
Srutis and Smrtis. He has to defend his position, and to meet the. mrzna (conclusion). The pratijna shows what the subject of
opposition ?f those who do not accept the authority of theseri rence is and what is to be proved. 15 The author of the Brah-
scriptures. Sankara salutes his teacher's teacher, who defeated· iJ.tra, Sankara, Bhaskara, Ramanuja, and other Vedanta exe-
hundreds of enemies of the Srutis by means of sword-like words . es also seem to have begun with their own philosophical or
supported by thunderbolt-like reasoning (yukti) and protected the eological viewpoints, the validity of which was to be proved or
treasure of the meaning of the Vedas (Upad I, 18,2). He himself stified by means of their skilful exegetical techniques.16 This is
declares: "Thus both the false assumption based upon dualism· rear from the fact that founders and important philosophers of
and the view that Atman does not exist have been rejected through inor schools of the Vedanta wrote commentaries on the Brahma-
reasoning (yukti)" (Upad I, 16,68). As in Buddhism and othe\:'< >Jft.t'f'a from their own philosophical or theological standpoints in
systems of Indian philosophy, so in Sankara, not only scriptural; :?rder to give authoritative standing to their doctrines or theolog-
testimony (.fruti, fastra) but also rational proof(yukti, Upad I, 16,65; 'iC:al systems by demonstrating that these could successfolly and
18,43; 18,88; 19,25; nyaya, Upad II,1,44; anumana, Upad I,12,18; be used to interpret the Brahmasiltra.
18, 14) constitutes an essential part of the arguments.10 It is also Whatever standpoint an exegete may adopt, he has to work
noteworthy that, to refote objections, Sankara frequently resorts to' .,.,,,,.H'"" the conviction that all the Srutis and other works regarded
arguments based on prasanga (reductio ad absurdum), in which he 1as authoritative are coherent and consistent in every respect and
first admits an opponent's thesis for argument's sake, and then do not contradict one another, 17 though this is absolutely impos-
points out how, if it were accepted, a conclusion which is not ble for mod:rn philologists to admit. From his standpoint of
desired by the opponent would be arrived at. 11 This type of ar- on-dualism, Sankara states his view of the Vedas as follows:
gument was often employed by Nagarjuna and his disciple, As [the Vedas] are devoted to one object [only], i.e., the kn owl-
50 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 51

edge [of Brahman], [the wise] know that they [consist of] o ual relationship cannot be conveyed by the words but by the
sentence [only]. The oneness of Atman [and BralzmanJ shoul -meanings ; the knowledge of the logical connection between
indeed be known through the understanding of the meaning · remembered individual word-meanings precedes that of the
[this one] sentence. (Upad I,17,9) ~nce-m eani ng. 20
Thus the huge bulk of the Vedas is equated with a single sent enc nkara docs not positively take one side or the other, 21 but in
"tat tvam asi" (Thou art That), which was uttered nine times ·. Upadefasahasrz he expresses his idea fragmentarily:
the Upani~adic philosopher Uddalaka Arur;i to his son, Svetaket · here is 110 fixed rule in the Veda to the effect that in a sentence
in their famous dialogue in the Clzandogya Up. (VI,8-16). Thi [particularJ word should be placed first and another [par-
sentence is looked upon as imparting the essence of the entir 'cularJ word should be placed next. (Upad I,18,175)
Vedas, namely the identity of Brahman and Atman. Tremendo .d. then he continues to assert in the same stanza:
efforts to interpret the sentence were made by Sankara and hi. ~he syntactical relation of words (padasarJlgatya) is based upon
followers. One other Sruti sentence--" a!zam brahmasmi" (I a s[their] meanings.
Brahman) (Brh. Up. 1,4, 10) also was assigned great importancet further says:
These celebrated sentences came to be designated mahavak.J.<ffe he knowledge that one is ever-free arises from the sentence
(great scntences) 18 by later Advaitins such as Sadananda.1 9 In the.\ nd not from anything else. The knowledge of the meaning
Upadefasahasri the term "aham" in the aham brahmasmi sentence i~ f the sentence is also preceded by recollecting the meaning of
explained alongside t}1e interpretation of "tat tvam asi" ( cf. Upa~· e words. (Upad I, 18, 188)
I,18,96; 18,101, etc.), but the meaning of the former sentenc~ view is that nobody can know the sentence-meaning without
is not specifically analyzed, probably because an examinaticm pf llecting the word-meanings (Upad I, 18, 178). These remarks
"aham" is nothing hut that of "tvam," and the two sentences ai:~: r19t sufficient for us to infer any definite conclusion, but it seems
syntactically the same. Therefore, our attention will first be · e that he takes the abhihitiinvaya theory as a basis, or at least
focused on the sentence "tat tvam asi." t lie holds a similar opinion. His followers are divided among
selves on this problem, but almost all important Advaita
3. An Exegetical Method: Anvaya and Vyatireka " ters such as Vacaspatimisra support the theory of the Bhatta
An interpretation of an Upani~adic sentence involves a semanti,_.:1 ool. 22
analysis. How is the meaning of a sentence apprehended? Whe~ f, in order to understand the sentence-meaning, the word-
one hears the words of a sentence, one gets a unitary sense which. anings have first to be recollected, the next problem is: How
is the meaning of the sentence. How is this possible? The Mimarµ; word-meanings be recollected? In this connection Sankara
sakas proposed two different solutions to this problem. Accordini,· rs to the anvaya1Jyatireka method. 23 His failure to give an ex-
to the anvitabhidhana theory of the Prabhakara school of Mimarµ .nation of this method, which he seems to assume is well
the meaning of a sentence can be known only through memo wn, prevents us from getting a clear understanding of it. He
since both the individual word-meanings and their syntacti~ cribes it as the logical means (yukti, Upad I, 18,96) by which,
mutual relationship, which constitute the meaning of a sentence,. en hearing the words in a sentence, one can recollect (sar?J.srnrti,
are conveyed by the words themselves which are remembered tQ'• pad I, 18,176: smara~ta, Upad I, 18, 178; srnaryate, Upad I, 18, 189),
possess certain meanings. This theory was severely criticized by thtk scriminate ( viveka, Upad I, 18, 180) or ascertain ( avadhararJa,
Bhatta school of Mimarµsa, who asserted the abhihiiiinvaya theory; .ad I, 18,96) their meanings.
that the meaning of a sentence can be understood indirectl)'. iJnhis Nai~karmyasiddhi (II,8,9 ;III,31, etc.), Sure8varaalsoapplies
through the recollection of the individual word-meanings since, .e anvayavyatireka method to an interpretation of the sentence
although the words can convey their individual meanings, thei .ta,t tvam asi." Though the method is not defined in his work,
52 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 53

either, it is treated not only as an exegetical method but also as a Wfhat" refers to the inner Atman (Upad I, 18, 170; 18, 194). This is
term signifying logical thinking or logical me~hod. It is used as a the meaning which is present (anvaya) in, or compatible with, the
synonym for nyaya and anumana. 24 However, Sankara says that the words. This is the anvcrya method, that of positive formulation.
anvayavyatireka method is mentioned only for the purpose of dis- the other hand, the word "Thou" ordinarily means "a sufferer
criminating the meaning of the word "Thou" and for no other pur- pain" (dubkhin, Upad I,18,181; dubkhitva, Upad I,18,195). This
pose (Upad 1,18,180). Therefore, the usage of the method is limited is the meaning absent (vyatireka) in, or incompatible with, the
and serves only an exegetical purpose, though it is used as a syn- "That." Therefore, this meaning is excluded (apoha, Upad
onym of yukti in the Upade5asiihasrz (I,18,96). Furthermore, it seems I,18,181) or removed (varayetam, Upad I,18,195) from the word
to be a meditational method rather than an exegetical method. An «~Thou." Further, the word "That" may mean here "something
attempt will be made to reconstruct the method as far as possible. other than the inner Atman" (apratyagatman, Upad I,18, 195), 27
In Sankara's view, in the sentence "Thou art That," the but this meaning is absent (vyatireka) in, or incompatible with, the
meanings of the two words "That" (tat) and "art" (asi) are already word "Thou." For this reason the meaning "something other
known (Upad I,18, 193). For him, the word "That" means than the inner Atman" must be removed from the word "That"
Brahman, or Existent (sat, Upad I,18,169) or Painless One (nirdu~­ (Upad I, 18,195 ). This is the vyatireka method, a negative formu-
kha, Upad I, 18,169).25 The word "art" means that the words lation used to exclude all the incompatible meanings. In this
"That" and "Thou" have the same referent ( tulyan'iqatva, U pad sense the two words "Thou" and "That" are said to mutually
I,18,169; 18,194). 26 Therefore, the sentence "Thou art That" is convey the meaning of the sentence, "Not this. Not so" (Upad
taken to be an identity judgment and not a universal positive judg- I,12, 195). The above is a tentative outline of Sankara's anvaya~ya­
ment. Sankara compares it to the sentence, "The horse is black!' tireka method.
(nilafvavat, Upad I, 18, 169) since, like "horse" and "black,''
"Thou" and "That" have the same referent. Although the mean- f. Later Adva.itins' Exegetical Method
ings of these two words arc known, the sentence-meaning is still In later Advaitins' works, Sankara's anvayavyatireka method
not understood since help is needed for the recollection of the came to be replaced by another method, jahadajahallak~at:zii. It is
meaning of the word "Thou" (Upad I,18,179; 18,193). Here it is usual to distinguish three kinds of lakfat:za 28 (transfer or meta-
that the anvayavyatireka method is applied, to ascertain the meaning phor), according to how closely the primary meaning is retained
of the word "Thou" (Upad I,18,180). When the meaning of the in the actual meaning:
word "Thou" has been discriminated clearly, the sentence-mean- 1. ]ahallak~ar;za (or Jahatsvlirthti lak~arza). For example, in the
ing "I am ever-free" becomes manifest (Upad 1,18,179; 18, 180; sentence gangayarri gho~a~ (the village is on the Ganges), the
18, 181 ; cf. N ai~ II, I). primary meaning of the word gaftga (Ganges) is abandoned and
Now in the sentence "Thou art That," through the word "art'' the secondary meaning "the bank ( tira) of the river Ganges" is
indicating an identity judgment, the word "Thou" comes to be taken. In this case the primary meaning is rejected since it is con-
used in connection (yoga) with the word "That" which refers to trary. to fact that the village should be situated actually on the
the Painless One (nirdubkhavacin, U pad I, 18, 16 9) . Therefore, the Ga11ges. A secondary meaning, connected with the primary mean-
word "Thou" must also refer to that Painless One (Upad I,18, i:ng, is adopted to suit the context.
169; 194). The word "Thou" has various meanings. But, among 2. Ajakallak~alJli (or Ajahatsvarthii lak~at;.a). In the sentence
them, "the inner Atman" (pratyaglitman) is the only meaning that is kuntaf.z pravi!anti (the lances enter), the word "kuntalJ," refers to the
compatible with "the Painless One." And through the word "art" lances themselves and the men who carry them. In this example
indicating an identity judgment, the word "That" comes to be the secondary meaning includes the primary sense as well.
used in connection with the word "Thou." Therefore, the word 3. Jahadajahallakfa7Ja. This is a lakfar;ta in which a word expres-
54 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 55

sive of the qualified abandons part of its meaning and denotes , pumttn" (This is thatj~erson) (Ss I, 149; 151) .35 These facts may
another part. In a sentence like "so )al!l devadattab" (This is that w us to suppose that Sankara's method was already neglected
Devadatta) the word "that" (sas) refers to Devadatta as qualified the time of his own pupils, or at any rate of Surdvara's. 36
by the past time and space whereas the word "this" (ayam) points Why was Sankara's method dropped by later Advaitins? One
at the same Devadatta as qualified by the present time and son is that the method contains a defect in logical exactitude,
space. 29 Though this sentence is an identity judgment, it does not d the other is that his technical terms are loanwords from Grarn-
mean that the two incompatible qualifiers "this" and "that" are arians or N aiyayikas. The logical defect occurs where he com-
identical, nor does it signify that the person qualified by "this" res the sentence "tat tvam asi" with "nlliisva-." There are two
is identical with the same person when qualified by "that." The sen- eories, sal!lsarga and bheda, concerning the problem of how
tence should be understood to mean the identity of the substantive .1:1entence can have a single meaning, when the words forming it
Devadatta by abandoning the incompatible elements. In this case ve definite meanings of their own. According to the first, the
only a part or an aspect of the primary meaning is retained; the caning of a sentence is sal'fl-sarga or the mutual association of the
rest, which is incompatible, is abandoned. ''.!Yord-meanings. In an example like "gauf fukla" (The cow is
Rejecting the first two lakw1;as, 30 the later Advaitins accept the .~hite), this sentence denotes the association of cowness and

third and apply it to the sentence "Thou art That" as an exegetical ·~Jiiteness,and the words constitute a syntactic unity. In the theory
method. "That" is qualified by all-knowingnes s (sarvajiiatva), and ~f bkeda, o~ the other hand, which is mutual exclusion by the
"Thou" is qualified b:y the inner organ (antabkarar;.a). But the ·~ord-meanmgs, the word "white" excludes all colors other than

sentence indicates the identity of "That" and "Thou" in their ~.~white" and the word "cow" excludes all white things other than

essence, excluding one mutually incompatible elements (VP IV, qows. Since Kurnarila refers to the latter theory,37 Sankara might
26). "That" and "Thou" cannot be identical with each other in .~C, ex:pected to have known it. But his comparison of "tat tvam asi"
their meanings which arc universal consciousness and an in- '1ith "nilafva-" does not deal with this problem, as it is only con-
dividual consciousness, respectively. The sentence means the ·. erned with showing the identity of the referent. When Surdvara
;:··-~
identity of consciousness common to both only by abandon- ,., nowever, compares the sentence with "nilotpala-", he definitely'
ing the two incompatible qualifiers "universal" and "individ- the above discussion in mind and rejects an opponent's asser-
ual. "31 that the meaning of the sentence is the mutual association of
two word-meaning s as in the case of "n'ilotpala-" (Nai~ III, 76).
5. Discontinuan ce of Sankara's Method Furthermore, he seems to take the second vicw.38 Through the
As I have mentioned, Sankara's anvayavyatireka method was in- statement "nilotpala-," non-blueness and non-lotushood are im-
herited by his disciple Surdvara. Though Surdvara has tried to mediately ruled out. Likewise, through the sentence "tat tvam
theoretically strengthen it, his use of the method does n()t seem to asi," non-Brahmanh ood and otherness are excluded from the
be very much different from that of his guru.3 2 Sankara compares individual Atman and Brahman respectively. But "nzlotpala-" is not
"tat tvam asi" with "nzltt.foa-" (The horse is black)(Upad I, 18,169), in essence comparable to the sentence "tat tvam asi" since "tat"
while Surdvara employs the sentence "n'ilotpala-" (The lotus is and "tvam" are incompatible in parts of their meanings whereas
blue) (Nai'} III,2). Padmapada, 33 another of Sankara's disciples,
" -z " m.a. an d " utpal a,, are not mcompat1ble
. . . their meanings.39
m
compares the same sentence with "so yam" 34 (This is that) which This is true of the example "niliifva-." Sentences such as "nllotpala-"
becomes the stock-instance of jahadajahallakfa'(lil. Sarvaj fiat- and "nflasva-" are suitable for the theories of bheda and sa7'(lsarga,
man (900 A.D. ), who is traditionally regarded as a disciple of but not for an Advaitic interpretation of "tat tvam asi." This may
Suresvara, refers in his Sal'fl-k~epafariraka (I, 154-157) to the three- beat least one of the reasons why Padmapada uses the example "so
fold transfer (lak~m;ikavrtti) and compares the sentence with '"so 'yam" instead of "niliifva-," abandoning the example used by his guru
56 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 57

and fellow disciple. The sentence "so 'yam" shows that the subject e part of their meanings which is retained is determined by the
and its predicate have the same substratum and at the same time rya method, and the other part, which is incompatible and to
indicates that they are mutually incompatible in some aspect of bandoned, is determined by the vyatireka method. Therefore,
their meanings. It has opened the way for the later stock-instance nkara's method can be said to be essentially the same as jahad-
"so 'yaTfl devadattal;." This is one reason why the method of anvayazrya ... ahallak:>m:za. The fundamental principles of the exegetical method
tireka used in conjunction with the "nilafva" example may have , pcerning the sentence "tat tvam asi" were set up by Sankara and
come to be dropped. \~y~tematized by Sarvajfiatman.42
The terms anvaya and zryatireka are used by the N aiyayikas and the
Grammarians, but in a different way from the way they are used (f, The Sentence "Aham Brahmiismi"
by Sankara and Surdvara. The N aiyayikas use the anvayazryatireka ;'//As for the sentence "ahaTfl brahmiismi" (I am Brahman), Sankara
for establishing an invariable concornitance (zryapti) between ke Surdvara43 tries to clarify only the meaning of the word
hetu and sadhya. The Grammarians use it "to demonstrate that .11-ham" (I) in the sentence alongside the clarification of "tvam,"
certain meanings are justifiably attributed to certain linguistic 'nee" akam" in the sentence is identical with "tvam."44
items." Sa:ri.kar~'s usage, which is concerned with the problem of Ordinary people wrongly think of "aham" as the body (dehii-
word-meanings, is closer to that of the Grammarians than to that Mimanin, Upad I,12,5), as an experiencer (bhoktr, Upad I,12,7,
of the Naiyayikas, but it is not identical to it. 40 His anvaya1!)atireka .;etc.), or as an agent (kartr, Upad I,12,17), and justify themselves
method is not used for.the sake ofdetermining"the constant co- 'As follows:
occurrence (sahacarya) of a linguistic item (fabda) and a meaning The meaning of verbal root and verbal suffix, though different
(artha)," 41 but only for the purpose of discriminating the mean- [from each other], are seen to have one and the same subject
ings of words in the sentence "tat tvam asi," especially "tvam" (Upad as in "karoti" (he does), "gacchati" (he goes), etc. according to
I, 18,178; 180). When we examine it more closely, we find that . universally accepted opinion. (U pad I, 18,51)
the anvayazryatireka method is a means of realizing the true Atman, ~'This is the reason why they cannot understand the meaning of the
excluding non-Atman and, in essence, a kind of meditation and on ~entence "ahar[l brahmasmi." Taking the example of a sentence
the same line with parisal!lkhyana meditation (Upad II,3), which ~)anii.mi" (I know) or "janati" (he knows), we have already seen
Sankara urges. He uses a well-known term namarupa in a peculiar ~ow such a grammatical presupposition is wrong.45 According to
sense of his own, i.e., to mean the material cause of the world, but Sankara, the subject of the sentence ''jiiniimi" is merely the ahaJ!l-
his usage was disregarded even by his disciples. It seems to me that lcartr which is the buddhi as the bearer of ahaTflkara ("I" -notion),
his anvayavyatireka method shared the fate of namarupa. sil1ce the meanings of both verbal root and verbal suffix can belong
Sankara's anvayavyatireka method has thus been supplanted by · to it. The words are capable of expressing the ahal!lkartr which has
jahadajalzallakwr:ia. Although his method was not yet well systema- .generic attributes (jati) and action (karman), but not of expressing
tized, it was the first attempt at a methodological approach to the Atman devoid of them (Upad I,13,28). Atman is said to be the
mahiiviikya sentence. He was the first to give an exegetical and logi- object of aha111-praf;yaya (ahal!lpratyayavi~aya, Upad II,2,52; 2,53.
cal foundation for the non-dualistic interpretation of that sentence. d. BSBh II,3 ,38, p. 545; asmatpratyayavi~aya, BSBh, Introduction,
Moreover, when he says, "Without abandoning their own mean- p. 17). Therefore, words referring to the ahaTflkartr, in which there
ings (svartlza) [the words "Thou" and "That"] convey a special is the reflection of the inner Atman, can indicate the latter indirect-
meaning (vifiNarthasamarpaka) and result in the apprehension of ly but never designate it directly (Upad I, 18,29). As the ahaT?Zkartr
the inner Atman" (Upad 1,18,171), he suggests the essential char- has the reflection of Atman and appears to be Atman, it is expressed
acteristic ofjalzadajahallak~m:ia, namely that the two wor~s retain Py words which are used in the sense of Atman, just as words which
part of their meanings. It should be emphasized that for Sankara, mean fire are not directly used in the sense of, for example, a torch,
58 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 59

but only indirectly, since they mean something different from a world, there are many cases where things material come forth from things conscious.
torch (Upad I, 18,30-31). Atman can neither be expressed by words For example, hair and nails grow from humans. There are also cases where things con-
scious come forth from things material. For example, worms come out from cowdung.
nor cognized (U pad I, 18,5 7). Therefore, the primary meaning of Therefore, it is not unreasonable that things material come out from Brahman (BS II,
"I" or "Thou" is not the inner Atman but the aharrzkartr which ordi- 1,6). :Reply to the third question: Even though Brahman creates the universe for the
nary people mistake for the inner Atman through aviqyii. If the an- sake of Its sport (lilii), there are no faults of unfairness and absence of compassion
(nairghp;zva) in Brahman, since I tcreates various conditions for each individual in accord-
vayavyatireka method is applied to the sentence "I am Brahman"
ance with the merits and demerits which each individual has created in the past Jives;
here, it is determined that "I" means the inner Atman and not the therefore, even though an individual may suffer more or suffer less, we cannot say that
aharrzkartr. J3rahman is without compassion. And even though one individual does not have the
For this reason the sentence "aha1Jl brahmasmi" also shows the same amount of pleasure and pain as others, we cannot say that Brahman is unfair (BS
JI, 1,34. cf. BS II,1,33; 3,42). Cf. Nakamura II, pp. 435-441.
identity of the inner Atman and Brahman. One of the ten boys Hnamarii.pe i:yakaravii~i, Chand. Up. VI,3,2 (cf. BS II,4,20) and niimariipayor nirvahitii,
who crossed the river, when counting the party, failed to count Chand. Up. VIII,14,l (cf. BS I,3,41).
himself and thought that one boy was missing. When he was 14Eigen, pp. 258-259; Mayeda Upad, pp. 31-34.
l.5for example, Taitt. A. III,11,1; 12,7; Taitt. Up. II,6,1; Brh. Up. I,4,7, etc.
told, "You are the tenth," he immediately realized that he was J.6for example, Manu XII, 119; BhG V, 13; XIII,~, etc.
the tenth. Similarly, through such sentences as "Thou art That," l ?By the expression tattvfinyatviibhyii.m anirvacan~ya-,Sarikara indicates indeterminacy

right knowledge concerning the inner Atman will become dearer of the primary material nii.marupa which is to be transformed into something. There is
(Upad I,18,190) and one comes to know one's own Atman, the no implication here as to the ontological status of the primary material. Instead of
tattvanyatviibhyam, the term anirvacaniya associated with sadasadbf!)!iim, which expresses
Witness of all the internal organs (Upad I,18,174). Unless and until aI1 ontological judgment, is, in later Advaitins' works, used as an adjective of avidyii or
one can realize, "I am the existent,'' the sentence "Thou art miiyii., which is regarded as the primary material. See Eigen, p. 261-264; D. H. H. In-
That" will still be meaningless (Upad I, 18,90). galls, "The Study of Sarnkaracarya," Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Insti-
tute, vol. 33 (1952), p. 7; Mayeda Upad, pp. 32-34. The term anirvacanzya as an attri-
bute of aviqyil appears first in Ma:i:ic;lanamisra's Brahmasiddhi. See S. Kuppuswami Sas-
tri, Brahmasiddhi by Aciirya Mai:zefanamifra with Commentary by Sankhapii!Ji (Madras Go-
vernment Oriental manuscripts series, no. 4, 1937), p. 9, line 14; S. Dasgupta, A His-
Notes to Introduction m, A tory of Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 89; Eigen, p. 255, noJe 1. Therefore, this new truth-
value of avidya, anirvacaniyatva, seems to have existed in Sankara's time. The association
lCf. Nakamura II, p. 424. of the term with avidya occurs in the doctrine of all Advaitins except Sankara, Surd-
'
2 Sarikara -
does not accept tinanda as a positive character of Brahman-.Atman.Sfe Eigen, vara, and Totaka. Cf. D. H. H. Ingalls, "Samkara on the Question: Whose Is Avi-
p. 276; Mayeda Upad, pp. 39-40. Cf: D.H.H. Ingalls, "The Study of Samkara- dya ?" Philosophy East and West, vol. 3 ( 1953), no. 1, pp. 69 ff.
carya," Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, vol. 33 (1952), p. 7. lBUpadeshasahasri von Meister Shankara (Bonn: Ludwig Rohrscheid Verlag, 1949),
3Cf. Nakamura II, p. 426. p. 19, note 71.
4Cf. Nakamura II, p. 424. Badarayai;ia's Brahman is the Highest One who is above 19Eigen, p. 264-267.
the deities. He is the supporter (dhrti) of the world (BS I,3, 16). He is also conceived as 20Cf. S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I (Cambridge, 1951), p. 258,
the cause of the fruits of action (BS III, 2,38; 41). note 1 and p. 468.
5BS II, 3,46. 21Nakamura IV, pp. 328-332 and p. 430; The Indian Development of Philosophical Spec-
6Cf. Mayeda Upad, pp. 38-39. ulations (injapanese; Tokyo: Genrisha, 1949), pp. 240-244.
7Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. II (New York: The Macmillan Co., 22P. Hacker, Vivaria (Mainz: Verlag der Akadernie der Wissenschaften und der
1958), p. 437; Nakamura II, pp. 427-437. Literatur, 1953), pp. 208-213.
BCf. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 437. 23 Cf. P. Hacker, Vivarta, pp. 220--225 and pp. 234--236.

9BS II,1,24; Nakamura II, p. 435. 2 4"eine Art illusionistischer PariQ.amavada," Vivaria p. 210.

lOBS II, 1,4 and 6. 25 The idea oftrivrtkarai:za first appears in Chand. Up. VI,3-4. This is the theory that
llThis is the problem of evil. Cf. Nakamura II, pp. 439-440; R. Otto, Mysticism East gross elements are triply mixed from the three subtle elements, fire (tejas), water (ap),
and West (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 125-126. and food (anna); a preponderance of one of the three subtle elements over the two
12Reply to the first question: Brahman Himself can create the world, just as milk others brings about the differences among fire, water, and other gross elements. San-
spontaneously becomes curd, and just as gods create various things without any in- kara discusses this problem in the BSBh II,4,20-22. Cf. .P. Dewsen, The System qfthe
struments (BS II,1,24-25). Rc:!plytothe second question: It needs no discussion. In this Ved finta, pp. 240-241; S. Dasgupta, A History ef Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 74, note l.
60 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 61

28The fully developed theory of paiicikara'f}a, the oldest reference to which may be. 'fayalocanahetutvaT[I cendrfyii.~iim, B~Bh II,4,19,p. 587. Sankara refutes the Vaise~ika
Mbh XII,9089 and XII,244,2 (Poona Critical ed.), asserts that the five subtle ele-.; ion that the Consciousness of Atman is adventitious, but maintains that though
ments-ether (aka.la), air (viiyu), fire (agni), water (ap), and earth (Prthivi)-are firs~ "ciousness is Atman's constant nature, still the senses are of use since they serve the
divided into two halves; then one of the two halves of each subtle element is combined;; of discerning their special respective objects nityasuariipacaitanyatve ghriir;iidyiina-
with one-fourth of each remaining halfofall the other subtle elements. Thus one halfo~ iti cet, na, gandhiidivirayavifqaparicchediirthatuiit/ tathii hi dariayati--"gandhaya
each gross element (e.g. earth) is made from itself and the other half of it is constituted.' " (Chand. Up. VIIl,12,4)ityadi, BSBh II,3, 18, p. 530.
of four equal parts of each of the other elements (ether, air, fire, and water); i.e., one~ f. J&iiyaslitra3,1,52-61.
eighth of it is from each of the other four elements. The U pad seems to be based upoll;, f. Nyayasfltra 3,l,62-73; S. Chatterjee, The Nyiiya Theory qf Knowledge, pp. 133-
Taitt. Up. II, I and BS II,3,l-12. Cf. Pancadali I, 27; Vediintasiira [XV] 123-128; P:,.
Deussen, Al lgemeine Geschichte der Phi losophie. I.3 (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1908), p. 446 ;, Vivaraf}aprameyasarµgraha (AcyutagraIJ1thamala 8, Saqwat 1996), pp. 613-620.
S. Dasgupta, History ef Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 74, note l; P. Hacker, Upadeshasii..., T. M. P. Mahadevan, The Philosophy ef Advaita (Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1957),
hasri von Meister Shankara, p. 20, note 72; H. Nakamura, The Vediintasiira (Kyoto: Heira- 22-24; D. M. Datta, The Six Ways ef Knowing (Calcutta: University of Calcutta,
kuji Shoten, 1962l, pp. 152-153. 0), pp. 39-40.
278. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 74, note l. f ac ciitmana upiidhibhiitam antaftkarararri mano buddhir vijfiiinarri cittam tti ciinekadha tatra
2BVediintasiira [XV] 124. Cf. Paiicadaii 1,27. It is to be noted here that Sadananda hilapyate, BSBh II, 3,32, p. 541.
defends paiicikara~a hy a.~serting that the Sruli which sets forth trivrtkaratfa indirectly re- rviirthaviraya111 traikiilyavrtti manas tv ekam anekavrttikam/ tad eva vrttibhediit kvacid
fers to it (Vediintasiira [XV] 126). vad vyapadif..vate-"mano buddhir aha1Jlkiiras cittarri ea" itif tathii ea Jruti{i kiimiidyii
2syp VIII, 30. idhii vrttir anukramyiiha--"etat sarvaT[I mana eva" (Brh. Up. l.5.3) iti, BSBh II,4,6,
30See note 2, above. 272.
31A work entitled Pancikarar;a, whish treats pancikara~a as a way of meditation (samii- ~4P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, p. 330.
dhividhi), is traditionally ascribed to Sankara, but it may not be authentic. Th.ere is the 15for example, cittf, Upad I,12,l; II,2, 75; etc.; dhi, Upad I,9,6; 14,4; 14,5; II,l,35;
following negative evidence:(!) Brahman is described as "paramiinandiidvaya" although . Surdvara, like Sankara, uses these terms as synonymous with buddhi and manas.
Sankara as the author of the BSBh avoids using iinanda as the nature of Brahman (see P. Hacker, Unters, p. 1950.
note 2). (2) In its colophon the work is aaributed to Sankaracarya and not to ~ankata­ · rayebhyas ea manasai} paratuarri, manomulatviid viraymdriyavyavahiirasya/ manasas tu
bhagavadp~da, as would he ~xpected if it were a genuine work (cf. P. Hacker," Sankar~: ii buddhiN buddhil'[I hy ilruhya bhogyajiitarri bhoktiiram upasarpatif buddher iitmii mahiin
carya and Sankarahhagavadpada," New Indian Antiquary, vol. 9, 1947, pp. 176-178 o.i}, .• ., BSBh I,4, 1, p. 294.
and pp. 182-183). (3) The whole text, which is an independent and non-commental): J.7Cf. D. M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing, p. 48.
work, is colored by SaIJ1khyan doctrine and sets forth a pancikara'l}a theory different from :1;80f. T. M. P. Mahadevan, The Philosophy ef Advaita, pp. 29-31; D. M. Datta, The
the one mentioned above; it is said that from Brahman there arose a1yakta; from avyakta; ix Ways of Knowing, pp. 53-59.
mahat; from mahat, aha'!lkiira ;from aharrikiira, paficatanmiitra; from paiicatanmiitra, paiica, l 9Cf. P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, p. 327.
mahiibhiita. Such a theory of evolution is not advanced in any of his works which can b~ 20D. M. Datta, The Six Ways oJ Knowing, pp. 53-55. Cf. T. M. P. Mahadevan, The
regarded as genuine, except the GBh. The BhG, which has Sarpkhya as one of its doc, ilosopfvi ef Advaita, pp. 29--31 .
trinal bases, refers to a very similar idea of evolution (VII, 4 and XIII, 5 ), Consequent· 21See Introduction, III,A,l, pp. 18-21.
ly Sankara as its commentator seems to be forced to comment on it, just as he refers to 2 2Cf. S. Chatterjee, The Nyiiya Theory ef Knowledge, pp. 144-145.
the term iinanda only when the text to he interpreted forces him to do so. Moreover", his 23 Cf, S. Chatterjee, The Nyiiya Theory of Knowledge, p. 145; D. M. Datta, The Six
idea of evolution in his GBh is slightly different from that of the Paiic'ikara~a: in the !at· of Knowing, p. 47 and pp. 52-53.
ter avyakta evolves from Brahman(brahma~o 'zryaktam), while in the former avyakta is re· P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, p. 326 and pp. 331-332; BUBh I,5,3.
garded as ilvarasakti (GBh XIII,5) and as mama isvari miiyiifaktib (GBh. VII, 4). 2 5Cf. S. Chatterjee, The .Nyiiya Theory of Knowledge, pp. 116-130.
26 Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. II (New York: Macmillan Co.,
Notes to Introduction, III, B
pp. 488-489; S. Chatterjee, The Nyaya Theory oJ Knowledge, pp. 122-124.
lSee P. Deussen, The System ef the Vedanta (Reprint ed.; New York: Dover Puhlica· 27 Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosopl!J, vol. II, p. 490; S. Chatterjee, The Nyfiya
tions, Inc., 1973), pp. 325-327; Nakamura II, pp. 457-463. :Theory of Knowledge, pp. 190-191; D. M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing, pp. 93-
2BS I,4,2; III,3,30; IV,2,9-11. 102.
3dehabljair bhiitasiik~mair, BSBh III, 1, I, p. 594. 28 Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 490.

4BS II,4,8-19. 39 Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. II, pp. 489-490.

5For a detailed account of the principal vital air, see P. Deussen, 30 Vivara~aprameyasarrzgraha, pp. 621-"623; T. M. P. Mahadevan, The Philosophy ef
Vedanta, pp. 333-336. >:Advaita, pp. 26-28; D. M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing, pp. 40-42; S. Chatterjee,
6Cf. P. Deussen, The System <if the Vedanta, pp. 336-337. · The .Njaya Theory ef Knowledge, pp. 138-144. VP (I,122-123) says that all the senses
7Cf. S. Chatterjee, The Nyiiya Theory of Knowledge (Calcutta: University of Calcutta; ·prqduce perceptual knowledge (pratyakfajfiiina) only when they are connected with
1950), pp. 138-139. '.their respective objects and that ghrii~a, rasana and lvac produce perceptions of gandha,
62 INTRODUCTION
ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 63
rasa and spar fa, while remaining in their own places, whereas cak{us and frotra go to
und of theories of the Gestalt school of psychology in his book, pp. 60-70. Cf. T.
the place of their objects by themselves and perceive their respective objects.
P. J'vfahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita, pp. 32-33.
31For example, bauddhais . . . pratyayair, Upad I,18,68; bauddha!; pratyayab, Upad II,
ee note 33, above. This idea may be traced back to the Brh. Up. I,5,3.
2, 77; bauddhapratyaya, Upad II,2, 78; labdiidyiikiirabauddhapratyaya, Upad II,2,84; baud.
."$.7~ntaf;kararJ.am api cak1uriididviirii nirgatya ghafiidivirayadefaT'f' gatvii . . . , VP I, 18.
dhiib pratya_yab,PBh II,4,42, p. 34. This expression is also found in the rogasiJtrabha1ya,.
,~sJudging from the illustration "iilokastho gha{o yadvad buddhyiirilefho bhavet tathii"(Up-
vivarana (Madras Gov. Oriental Series no. XCIV, 1952, p. 354) which is ascribed to
I '
d,I 8, 156), -iirur/ha is probably synonymous with-stha. Rarnatirtha, a commentator
Sankara. Cf. note 62.
Upad, interprets the term as buddhivrttikoefikrta ( Padayojanika II, 7, I; 18,94). How·
32For example, vrtti, Upad I, 13, 7; 18, 1; antaf;karar.zavrtti, GBh XIII, 6, p. 543; dhiyo
, Dignaga uses the term in a different sense; in his usage it is synonymous with
vrttib, Upad I,17,35; buddhivrtti, BUBh IV,3,7,p. 561 (cf. Yogasfitrabhiifyavwara~a, p.
lf?ila or vikalpita. Sec Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, vol. II (Reprint ed. New
355) · manaso vrttih Upad I 17 36· miinasi vrttib, Upad I,13,6. Instead of vrtti, vrtta is
als; ~sed, for ~xa~ple, man~so ~rtt~m, Upad I, I 1,3; manovrttam, Upadl,11,4.Cf. VP 1,4.
rk: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962), p. 19 and p. 143. Vacaspatirnisra, the author
tlie Bhiimati, interprets as b~ddhiparikalpita the term buddlryiiruefha which is used in the
aa Yogasfitra I,2; IV, 18. Cf. Yogasutra I, 4; 5; IV, 23. cittavrtti in the rogasutra and its
II,2,28, p. 467, when Sankara mentions a Buddhist doctrine.
Bhaua seems also to be synonymous with cittapracara in the Upad (II,2,75; 82). The
_39for example, "bodha" ·sabdena bauddhiib pratyaya ucyante/ sarve pratyaya vifayibhavanti
following argument about Atman's changelessness in the U pi;d resembles the Yogasfitra
[VO sa iitmfi sarvabodhiin pratibudkyate sarvapratyayadar ft, PBh II,4,42, p. 34; svabuddhyii-
(IV, 18) and its Bhiifya to the extent that we have to admit Sankara's indebtedness to
harn eva sarvam upalabhase . . . kfi/asthanityacaitanyasvaruper.za, Upad II,2,73; ahaT[lhi
the Yogasiltra and its Bhii.fya: yatas te{iiT'f' pratyayii.ndf!J niyamena afe{ata!; upalabdher eva
nyaf samastam arthar[ljiiniimi buddhyii.ruefham, Upad Il,2,70.
aparir.ziimitviit kii{asthatvasiddhau, nifcayahetum eva afe1acittapraciiropalabdhi'!' saT'f'sayahetum
'.'n,,~ocf. Siil(lkkyakiirikii 20 and Gaurjapiidabh.arya 20.
att/za/ radi hi tava parirJ.iimitvaT'f' syiit, aJe1asvavi{ayacittapraciiropalabdhir na Jyo.t, citta.rywa
· UCf. Yogasfitra IV,17-18 and Yogasfitrabhiirya IV,17-18.
svavif;ye, yathii cendriyii~iiT'f' svavi{aye{u/ na ea tathiitmanas tava svavifayaikadeiopalabdhiM
'{,;~MNacaspatimisra says in his Tattvakaumudi (Poon Oriental Series, no. JO, I 95 7, p. 10):
atah kutasthataiva taveti. Upad II,2, 75.
, )'alJI buddhitattvavartina jiiiinasukhiidina tatpratibimbitas tacchayiipattya jiiiinasukhadimiin
Yoga~iltra IV, 18 reads: sadajiiataf cittavrttayas tatprablwb puru1aryii/Jarivamitvat.
bhavatui cetano 'nugrhyate/ citicchayiipattyii 'cetanii 'pi tadadhyavasiiyo 'py acetanaf
Cf. sarve siim manaso vrttam avi~He~a paiyatab /
;i;1.:ttanavad bhavat iii. The Sii7Jlkhyakiirika lacks the concept of pratibimba, though Vijfiana·
tasya·m~ nirvikara~a viiefab ryiit kathaT'f'cana// Upad I,11,3.
tihilqu often refers to it. Cf. R. Garbe, Die Stif!lkhya·Philosophie (Leipzig: H.Haessel,
Cf. . . . drJimiitrerJ.a puru1·erza drfyiinii1[1 cittavrttiniirrz cidiitmanii vyapyamiinntvat, drn1fii
;{1!917), pp. 84-85 and pp. 376-378. As far as I know, Viicaspati is the first writer to in-
puru1a iti . . . , rogasiitrabhiiJ.yavivara~a I,4, p. 15.
froduce the concept into the SaJ"flkhya system as an elaborate form of saT'(iyoga in SiiT'f'-
The idea that the buddhi assumes the forms of external things through the senses is
:_,;;k:Jiyakdrikri 20 in order to explain the relationship between iitman and the buddhi. Smµyoga
also expressed in Vyasa's rogasiitrabhii1ya I, 7: indriyapranii likaya cittasya ba hya11astupariigfit
tadvifayii siimiinya11ifefdlmano 'rthasya vije1avadhara~apradhiinii vrttib pratyakya7Jl pramar:zam.
'.fw a realistic connotation which is suitable for the classical Sarµkhyan doctrine, but
. pratibirnba is an illusionistic term. It is probablt; that the Siiiµkhya borrowed this idea
In his Togasiitrabhii,yavivara'l}a (p. 19) Sankara comments on this sentence as follows: ...
··· frorn the Advai ta Vedanta. On the other hand,Sankara's iibhiisa seems to be based part-
indriyam eva pra~aefikaya dvararri iahdaqyakiiravrttirupe~a parir.zamamanasya cittasya/ atas tat
upon the Buddhist usage of the term. See S. Mayeda, "The Meaning of Abhiisa in
tenendriyadviire~a siimiinyavife{iitmakabahyavastvakrirataya pari~amamanam uparajyate/ ta.rya
taduparagad dhetob "citta.rya" yii mudra pratimudriivat "vrttib" siimanyavilefdtmakavastupariige U padesasahasri" (in Japanese), :Journal o.f Indian and Buddhist Studies, vol.
(1958), no. 1, pp. 174-177. ,
'pi "vife[iivadhiira~apradhiinii" saiva "pratyakJa'!' prarniir.zam." He expresses the same idea
43S, Mayeda, "The Meaning of Abhasa in Sankara's Upaddasahasri."
elsewhere in his Vivara~a, for example: indriyamiirge'l}a cittarrz bahyakiimya parirJ.amamiina7Jl
4~praticchayii is synonymously used: buddhis tiivat svacchatvad iinantaryac catmacaitanya-
hi saT[lbadhyati ... ato vi{ayii iitmiikiire~a pari~atarrz "cittam abhisarrzbadhyoparaiijayanti,"
hhi'flt1cc,oa11a bhavati/ tma hi vivekinam api tatriitmabhimiinabuddhib prathamii/ tato 'py iin·
IV, I 7, p. 347; svaeJ!a bauddhaeJ!a pratyayasyopalabdhir bhavati/ tadartham eva hi sii buddhi~
antaryiin mnnasicaitanyavabhasatii buddhisaf!Jparkiit/ tata indriye{u/ manab saT'(iyogiit/ tato 'nan·
fabdiidipratyayaruper.za parirJ.amate, IV, 22, p. 354. Furthermore)t is significant for the
tarar11 !arire/ indriyasaT'(iparkat. piiramparye~a krtsnaT'(i kiiryakaranasaf!Jghiitam iitmii caitanya·
later Advaita theory of pramiir.za that )'yiisa and his interpreter Sankara define pratynkra
svarupajyot i{ii vabhii.sayati/ tena hi sarva_rya lokasya kiiryakarar.zasa'!lithate tadvrttifu caniyatat-
on the basis of the concept of vrtti. Sankara further says in his Vivara~a (I, 7, p. 19):
mabhimiinabuddh.i yathaviveka'!' jayate, BUBh IV,3,7, p. 561.
prama~iikhya vrttis tridhaiva bhidyate/ tatra pramii~akhyayaf cittavrtte!; pratharno bhedab
45Cf. Upad I,18,154-155.
praty9k1am. _ .
46braJzmacitpha/a_yor bhedab sahasryarrz viirutoyatab, Paiicadafi VIII, 12.
34Sankara as the author of the ro,~asiitrabhafyamvara~a also usespratyayn as a synonym
47Cf. T. M. P. Mahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita, p. 225.
of vrtti ( IV,22, p. 354): bauddha~ pratyayojiiyamiina eva tasyaf; ( = citel:z) karmatilm iipaqyate/
48 Jn the Nyaya, Va}se~ika system upalabdhi andjiiana, which are considered to be the
taT[I. bauddh.arp. pratyayai,n vrttim ""anupatanty" upalabhamiinii "bhoktrfaktib." .
35N. K. Dcvaraja, An Introduction ta .§ankara's Theo~y of Knowledge (Varanasi: Molllal
nature of Atman by Sankara, are treated as synonyms of buddhi and pratya_ya: buddhir
upalabihirjfiiinam ity anarthantaram, Nyii.yasfitra, I.1,15; buddhirupalabdhir jfiiinarp. prat_yaya
Banarsi Dass, 1962), pp. 99-102. Cf. S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. II
(Cambridge: University Press, 1952), pp. 105-106. Radhakrishnan regards this theory iii paryayab, Vai!efikopaskiira, 8, 1,1. Cf. .Nyayakosa (Bombay Sanskrit & Prakrit Series
no. XLIX, 1928), pp. 604-608.
as crude from the scientific point of view in his Indian Philosophy, vol. II (Ne:; York:
Macmillan Co., 1958), pp. 492--493. Cf. N. K. Devaraja, A.n Introduction to Sankara's 49For exan1ple, MahribhO.{ya III,2,84 defines dhiitvartha as kriyii. Cf. L. Renou, Ter-
Theory of Knowledge, p. 100. D. M. Datta has tried to defend this theory on the minologie Grammatical e du Sanskrit (Bibliotheque de !'Ecole des Hautes Etudes no. 280-
282}. pp. 168-169.
64 INTRODUCTION ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 65
50Cf. R. C. Pandeya, The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy (Varanasi: Motila! (I,6; II, 44). It is, however, only the Togasutra (I,6) that he quotes concerning the
Banarsidass, 1963), pp. 118--120. problem of perception. He says: eva'!l tarhi 'pararnatam aprati{iddham anumataTJ! bhavati' iti
SI According to Sankara, avicfyii is superimpostion (ad/ryiisa, adhyiiropa). See Intro. f"!yo,yad ihapi yogasiistraprasiddhii manasaf:i pancavrttayab parig rhyante "pramiiry.aviparyayavi-
duction, IV, D, I, pp. 76-79. /6Jlpanidriism1tcrya/:l "( Togasutra I,6) niima/bahuvrttitvamiitreT}a vamanab prii!}asya nidarlanam
5 2Probably Sankara does not conceive the idea that "as soon as the antabkara~a has fti rlraf ja1!)!am/ jzvopakara!}atvamapi priir;asya paficavrttitviin "manovad" itiyojayitavyam, BSBh
assumed the shape or form of the object of its knowledge, the ignorance (ajiiiina) with II,4,12, p. 581. In this context it is sjgnificant that there is a commentary on Vyasa's
reference to that object is removed, and thereupon the steady light of the Pure Con- 'fogasutrabhii~ya which is ascribed to Sankara. The authenticity of this text has not yet
sciousness (cit) shows the object which was so long hidden by ignorance" (Dasgupta, been established, but as far as I can see now, there is no conclusively negative evidence.
A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I, p. 472). As I have alre~dy pointed out (see especially notes 30, 32, and 33), the text reveals
53 The Indian grammarians' defintion of a verb varies. The liJahiJ.bhii{ya (I,3, I) discuss- similarities to Sankara's view of perception. This fact may point to this authorship of
es whether a verb denotes action (krryiivacana) or state (bhiivavacana). Cf. L. Renou, the text. Cf. P. Hacker, "Sankara der Yagin and Sankara der Advaitin: Eine Beo-
Terminologie Grammatica le du Sanskrit, p. 244; R.C. Pandeya, The Problem of Meaning in pachtunge~" WZKSO, vol. XII-XIII ( 1968/1969), pp. 117-148; H. Nakamura,
Indian Philosophy, pp. 118-120. In Nirukta I, 1 Yaska defines a verb as bhiivapradhana; "N'otes on Sankara's Togasiitrabhiisyavivarary.a" (Prof.]. Okuda Felicitation Volume. Kvoto:
bhiiva as the,result of action is predominant in the meaning ofa verb and action is only Heiraknji Shoten, 1976), pp. 1219-1229; do, "Sankara's rogasutrabhiifyavivara~a· [I]"
secondary. Sankara's concept of a verb seems to be close to Yaska's. It is worthy of note (Journal qf Indian anrl Buddhist Studies 25-1, 1976), pp. 70-77; [II] (Journal ef Indian and
that in this respect Sankara's position is different from that ofl\1al)t;lanamisra who is a Buddhist Studies 26-I, 1977), pp. 119-127; Trevor frggett, The Chapter of the Seif
senior contemporary of Sankara. Cf. R. C. Pandeya, The Problem of Meaning in Indian (London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 173-175.
Philosophy, pp. 117-123. 64Cf. P. Deussen, The Philosophy af the Upanifads (Reprint ed. New York: Dover
MAccording to the Naiyiiyikas there is first the cognition of an object, "This is a Publications, Inc., 1966), pp. 296-312; T.M.P. Mahadevan, Gau<f,apiida: A Stucfy in
pot" which is technically called vyavasiiya. Then another cognition, "I know the pot," (University of Madras, 1960. 3rd ed.), pp. 95-106.
which is called anuvyavasiiya, takes place after the second cognition cognizes the 6SThis is one of his authentic works. See S. Mayeda, "On the Author of the Man-
first. Cf. .N)iivasiddhiintamaiijariprakiifa 69; VP I,50-51; S. Chatterjee, The .Nyiiya Theory t,!Ukyoparri1a<l- and the Gauc;Iapadiya-Bha~ya," Prof. V. Raghavan's Felicitation Volu~e
of Knowledge, pp. 187-188. The Advaitins do not accept this theory. According to the ojtheAdyar Library Bulletin, vols. 31-32, 1967-68, pp. 73-94.
PaiicadaSi (VIII, 15-17), the expression "This is a pot" is based upon iibhiisa whereas ' 66Th.is state is not regarded as an independent state. Cf. Nakamura II, pp. 468-469;
the expression "The pot has been known" comes from Brahman. ?. Deussen, The Sbstem of the Vedanta, pp. 352-353.
5SThe meaning of the verbal suffixes is a controversial problem. Cf. R. C. Pandeya, 67 Some scholars think that the three states are investigated by the loJii1p/ukyopanifad
The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosopfry, pp. 123-128. and the GKBh to establish the non-duality of Atman. See T.M.P. Mahadevan,
56]Vyayamaiijari (Vizianagara Sanskrit Series vol. 8, no. 10), p. 20. Cf. S. Chatte1jec, Gaucj.apiida, p. 95; R. D. Karmarkar, Gauifapiida-Kiirikii (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental
The Nyiiya Theory of Knowledge, pp. 11-12. Research Institute, 1953), p. Ii.
57 kiimab sa7[1kalpo vicikitsii, iraddhiilraddhii, dhrtir adhrtir hrir dhir bhir ity etat sarvam 68 Cf. M. Hiri yanna, Out lines of Indian Philosopfry (New York: Macmillan Co., 1932),

mana eva, Brh. Up. I,s,;i. p. 230; Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy (London: Rider &
ss1n BSBh II,2, 17 Sankara refutes the Vaisqika position that the six categories, Co., 1960), p. 177.
namely substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence, are ab-
solutely different from one another and have different characteristics and that quality, Notes to Introduction, III, C
action and the like have the attribute of depending on substance. According to
Sankara a quality is essentially of the nature of the substance (dravyatmakatii gu~asya, 1P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, pp. 23-24 and p. 90; Nakamura II, pp. 409-
BSBh II,1,17, p. 444), Cf. N. K. Devaraja, An Introduction to Sankara's Theory of Knowl- 419.
edge, p. 93. 2K. Camman, Das System des Advaita nach der Leh.re Prakiisiitmans (Wiesbaden: Otto
59buddhi in a plural form in the present case probably meanspratyaya of the buddhi. Harrassowitz, 1955), pp. 4-8.
60icchii dve.rab sukha7[1 dubkharri sarrighiitas cetanii dhrti!if 3 Cf.13S13h I,1,1, p. 35; PBh, Introduction, p. 6; Upad I,1,13; P. Hacker, Unters, p.

etat k~etrarri samiisena savikaram udahrtam// 2047 ;J. F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism (Madras: University of Madras, 1961), pp.
61GBh XIII,6, p. 542-544. 101-102.
62Vol. II, pp. 105-106. As for the theory of knowledge of Padmapada and Prakasat- 4Cf. BSBh II,2,28; Upad I,16,10-14; 18,141-152.

man, see P. Hacker, Unters, pp. 2047-2055 and K. Camman, Das System des Advaita >p. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, pp. 89-90.
nach der Lehre Prakasiitmans (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1965 ), pp. 132-155. 6S. Radhakrishnari, Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 488. Sankara uses the term anupala-

6 3 I have already pointed out some similarities of Sankara's view to that of the Sarp· bdhi (cf. U pad II,2,59; 2,90) but it is probably not a technical term.
khya and the Yoga. See notes 30, 31, 32, 33, 39, 40, 41. In the BSBhSankara quotes the 7 In order to show the absolute authority of the Veda, the Mimarpsakas assert that the

Nyayasutra, the Vaifefikasiltra, the Sii7[1khyakiirikii, the Yogasiltra, and theMtmii1?1slisiltra Vda is not tb.e work of any person (apaurustrya).See lvHmiimsasUtra I I 27-32 · Sarvadar-
among the texts belonging to the six systems of Indian philosophy. He quotes these Janasal{lgraha (Poona: BhandarkarOrientai Research Insti;ute, 1924) XII,lt:
128-216;
texts in order to attack their tenets except the.Nyiiyasiltra (I, 1,2; 18) and the Yogasiltra P. V. Kane, History ofDkarmaslistra, vol. V, pt. 2, pp. 1202-1204;G.Jha, Purvamimli7[1sii
66 INTRODUCTI ON ATMAN'S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN 67
in Its Sources, pp. 126-127. Sankara also accepts their view (apauru{eya, BSBh I,2,2, p. Atman and the two word-meanings (siimiiniidhikara'l}yal[l ea vi1e{a'l}avi1e{yatii / lakfyala!a7J:a-
163). Cf. P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, pp. 94-96. sal[lbandha~ padii.rthapraryagiitmaniim // Nai~ III,3). Sadananda adopts it in his Vediinta-
Bnanu siddhiinte ghaftider mithyatvena biidhitatviit tajjfiiina0 kathaT[I pramar;am? ucyate- sara ([XXIII] 167-169). The first relationship seems to correspond to Sankara's
brahmasiik{iitkiiriinantara0 hi ghafiidiniil[l biidha/l, . .. na tu sa7]'lsiirada1iiyarri biidha!z, . . . , tulyanitf.atva, which probably means not only the grammatical apposition but also the
VP, Upodghata, 7-8. identity of referents.
9 Mima0siisiltra I,3,3 reads:"When there is conflict [between Veda and 27This meaning seems to correspond to "parokyya" or "parokfatva" (remoteness,
Smrti], the
Smrti should be disregarded because it is only when there is no suc;h co:r;flict that there otherness) which is regarded as the meaning of"tat" inNai~ III, 77; 78 and Vediintasii.ra
is an assumption [ ofVedic text in support of Smrti]." Among the Srutis Sankara quotes [XXIII] 170.
the BhG most frequently and almost neglects the PuriiT}as from which Ramanuja cites 2Bfor a detailed explanation, see K. K. Raja, Indian Theories ef Meaning, pp. 249 ff.;
profusely. R. V. de Smet, "Langage et connaissance de l'Absolue chez <;aqikara", pp. 38-40;
lOCf. BS II,1,36; III,2,38-40; Nakamura II, p. 414. H. Nakamura, The Vediinta-Siira, pp. 160-163.
llSee Upad I,16,50; 18,61; 18,75; 18,88; II,2,56, etc. 29"sa" indicates something remote either in space or time while "ayam" points to
12Bs II,1,1; 1,8; 1,11; 1,21; 1,26; II,3,32. Cf. Nakamura II, pp. 418-419. something near to the speaker or his time. See J. S. Speijer, Sanskrit Syntax (Reprint ed.,
13J.A.B. van Buitenen,Riimii mga's Vedi'irthasa0graha (Poona: Deccan College, 1956), Dcll1i: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973), pp. 202-203.
p. 48. 30 Cf. Vedantasiira [XXIV] 175; [XXV] 176 (= Paiicadali
VII, 75); [XXVI] 183.
14Cf. R. V. de Smet, The Theological Method ef Sal"(lkara (Thesis Rome, Pontifical Uni- 31D. M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing, pp. 319-320.
versitas Gregoriana, 1953), which has not yet been published; R. V. de Smet, 32 P. Hacker eltplains Surdvara's anvayavyatireka as: "Reflexion
darUber, dass der
"Langage et connaissance de l'Absolue chez <;;arµkara" (Revue Philosophique de Louvain, Inhalt der Worter und setzes wohlbegrilnde t und das Gegenteil logisch unmoglich
Tome 52, 1954), pp. 31--74; J.A.B. van Buitenen, Ramiinuja's Vediirthasarrigraha, pp. ist" (Unters, p. 1980). Cf. Nai~ II,8-9; Unters, p. 1999, note 2.
48--69. 33 Paiicapiidikii (Madras Government Oriental Series No. CLV),
IX, pp. 345--346.
15JVyiiyasiltra I, 1,33 and its Bhii-ua. Cf. S. Chatterjee, The Nyiiya Theory of Knowledge, 34Cf. J.A.II. van Bui ten en, Riimii~uja' s VediirthasaT(!graha, pp. 62·-64. The Vakyavrtti,
p. 274. ,' which is traditionally attributed to Sankara and devoted to an interpretation of the
16J have shown elsewhere how Sankara advaitinized Gauefapiidiyakarika, an ex:tremely sentence' 'tat tvam asi," compares it with "so 'yam" and treats it as bhiigalakyar;ii (partial
Buddhistic text. See S. Mayeda, "On the Author of the Mal).<)ukyopani~ad- and the transfer, 48), which is a synonym for jahadajahallak{a1Jii. Sadananda uses the term bhii-
Gau<)apadiya-Bha~ya," Dr. V. Raghavan Felicitation Volume, The Adyar Library Bulletin, galaksa1Jii. in his Vedantasiira[X XXIII] 172. Appayadik~ita styles it bhii.gatyagalakfar;ii in
vols. 31--32, 1967-68, pp. 73-94. his Siddhiintales'asa0graha (ed. by S. S. Suryarn~rayana Sastri, vol. II, Madras, 1937,
17Cf. R. V. de Smet, "Langage et connaissance de l'Absolue chez c:;:arpkara," p. 50. p. 55). The Viikyavrtti shows some more non-Sankaran characteristics: (1) the term
lSit is said that there are 11 or 12 sentences called "mahiiviikya." See Colonel G. A. ii.nanda is used as a positive characteristic of Brahman-Atman (11 12 30 39· 40 53) · (2)
Jacob, The Vedantasiira q/ Sadiinanda, together with the Commentaries of N rsiizhasarasvatf the work is attributed to Sa:rikaracarya or Sankarabhaga~at; a;d '(3) ;h~ t~rrns
and Riimatfrtha (Bombay: Nirr,iaya-Sagar Press, 1934), pp. 155-·156. jaefa and ajarja are used (20). As for the authorship problem of the Viikyavrtti, see my
19Vediintasiira [IX] 65; [XXIII] 166. Ramanuja calls these sentences Jodhakavii.kya. article "On the Vakyavrtti" (in Japanese. Dr. H . .Nakamura Felicitation Volume: Indian
Cf. J. A. B. van Buitenen, Rii.miinuja's VediirthasaT[lgraha, p. 58. Thought and Buddhism. Tokyo: Shunjusha, 197S, pp. 57-69). The Vivekacudiimani
20Cf.Le Tattvabindu de Viicaspatimi.fra :Edition critique, Traduction et lntrorluction, par M. which is also traditionally ascribed to Sankara, refers to jahati ( = jahallak{a;ii) a~d
Biardeau (Publications de l'Institut Franc;ais d'Indologie N°3. Pondichery, 1956), =
ajahati ( aja hallakra~ii) (24 7) and compares the sentence with "sa devadatto 'yam"
pp. xxvi-xxvii; D. M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing, pp. 296-307; K. Kunjunni Raja, (248). This worlds also not genuine.
Indian Theories of Meaning (Adyar Library Series, vol. 91, 1963), pp. 191-227; G. Jha, 35 Cf. J.A.B. van Buitenen, Riimii.nuja's Vedii.rthasarrzgra
ha, p. 64.
Pilrva-Mima0sa in Its Sources (Benares Hindu University, 1942), pp. 151-152. 36 The Paiicarlafl (I ,37-4 7; IV, 74) adopts the anvayavyatireka
method while using "so
21Cf. D. M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing, p. 302. 'yam" as a sample sentence.
22cr. ibid., p. 301. 37 Tantraviirtika (Anandasrama S.S. No. 97), p. 447.
Cf. K. Kunjunni Raja, lndian
23Sankara does not mention this method when he comments on the sentence "tat Theories of Meaning, p. 193.
tvam asi" (Chand. Up. VI, 8-16) in his Chiindogyopanieadbhii![ya. As far as I know, the 3Btatpadarri prakrtarthaT[I vat tvarripadal[l pratyagiitmani I
Upad is the only work of his that refers to it. rlilotpalavad etiibhy0.1J1 duMhyanatmatvaviira1Je // Nai~ III, 2. Cf. Unters, pp. 1981-
2ianvayavy~tirekanyiiya, Naiey III,54 (cf.yukti, Nai~ II,21); linga, Nai~ III,33; anumilna, 1983.
Nais III,34. Cf. Unters, p. 1999. 39Although Surdvara does not state explicitly, he seems to be well aware of this
2icf. Sankara ad Chand. Up. VI,8,7. defect for he rejects application of the two theories, hheda and sal[lsarga, to the sentence
26Theoretically strengthening Sankara's method of Anvaya-V)atireka, Surdvara "tat tvam asi" on the ground that "tat" and "tvam" are incompatible in their ordinary
points out a threefold relationship in the sentence "tat tvam asi": (I) the identity of meanings and asserts that the sentence "tat tvam asi" expresses aviikyartha (non-sentence-
referents (siimiintidhikara'!_Ya) of the two words, tat and tvam, (2) the subject-predica te meaning) beyond either mutual association or exclusion of the two word-meanings
relation (vi1era~avi1e{yatii) between the two word-meanings , and (3) the relation of ~Nai~ IJI,23-28). He also points out the difference between the identity of Brahman and
indirectly indicated and indirect indicator (lak!fyalakfa~asa1[lbandha) between the inner Atman and that of the lotus and blue ( tadamyam amryos tasmiin nilotpalavilakfalJam, Sa'!'-
68 INTRODUCTI ON

bandhaviirtika, 905). It may be due to his extraordinary devotion to his guru (cf.
Mayeda Upad, pp.44-49) that he did not abandon it though he knew its defect.
However, Padmapada, who was a more independent thinker than Surdvara, could
give it up. P. Hacker remarks about his personality: "Im ganzen konn.en wir sagen, daB IV. TRANSM IGRATIO N AND FINAL
Padmapiida ein schlechter Kommentator, dafiir aber ein um so selbstilndzgerer Denker ist"
(Unters, p. 1933).
RELEASE
4DG. Cardona, in his article "Anvaya and Vyatireka in Indian, Grammar" (The
Atfyar Library Bulletin, vols. 31-32, 1967-78, p. 347), seem.s W take ~a6k~ra's usag~ as
the same as that of the Grammarians. D.S. Ruegg (Contributions a l hzstozre de la phzlo-
sophie linguistique indienne. Paris, 1959, p. 32), J. F. Staal (Philosoph?' East and West, vol.
10, 1960, pp. 54-55), H. Scharfe (Die Logik im Mahiibhii.~ya. Berlin'. 1961, Pf'.· 93-~6)
and others have discussed anvaya-vyatireka, but they have taken mto cons1derat1on
only the usage of the term in Indian logic and grammar. It was probabl,Y P. Hacker
who first pointed out its Advaitic usage (Untcrs, p. 1980 and PP· 1999-2000) ·After
himJ.A.B. van Buitenen, in his Riimiinuja's VediirthasaT[lgraha (Poona, 1956, PP· 62-64)
paid some attention to it.
41G. Cardona, "Anvaya and Vyatireka in Indian Grammar," p. 345. A. Transmigr ation
42Dharmarajad hvarindra introduces jahadajahal lakfa1Jd as the traditional view, but
denies that the sentence "tat tvam asi" is a lakfa~ii (VP IV, 27-30). In a dialogue in the Upadefasahasri (II,1,9-12) a teacher says to
43See Unters, p. 1980. his pupil who wishes to get out of the ocean of transmigrat ory ex-
44Sec Unters, p. 1983.
45lntroduction , III,B,3, pp. 38-40. istence:
When you are dead your body will be eaten by birds or will
turn into earth right here. How then do you wish to get out of
the ocean of transmigrat ory existence? Because if you turn into
ashes on this bank of the river you cannot get across to the other
side of the river. (II,1,11)
The pupil answers:
I am. different from the body. The body is born, dies, is eaten
by birds, turns into earth, is destroyed by weapons, fire, and so
forth, and suffers from disease and so on. I have entered this
body as a bird enters a nest, by force of the merit and demerit
accumulate d by myself. Again and again, by force of the merit
and demerit, when this body perishes, I shall enter another body
as a bird enters another nest when its previous one has been
destroyed. Thus I am in beginningle ss transmigrat ory existence.
I have been abandoning [old] bodies which have been obtained
one after another in the spheres of gods, animals, men, and hells
by force of my own karman and I have been getting other new
bodies over and over again. I am forced by my own karman to
rotate in the incessant cycle of birth and death as in a water-
wheel. I have obtained this body in the course of time. I am
tired of this rotation in the wheel of transmigrat ory existence, so
I have come to you, Your Holiness, in order to end the rotation

69
70 INTRODUCTION TRANSMIGRATION AND FINAL RELEASE 71

in the wheel of transmigratory existence. Therefore I am etcr. {Jiowever, is primarily concerned with the second one and pays no
nal and different from the body. The bodies come and go like a attention to what happens after death. He is not interested in the
person's garments. (II,1,12) future life, which is anyway nothing but transmigratory existence.
In another dialogue a pupil, tired of transmigratory existence llis immediate task is to lead a seeker after final release, who
characterized by birth and death and seeking after final relaese, tired of transmigratory existence, to the final goal, namely the
asks his Brahmin teacher: cessation of the future life. What concerns Sankara most is final
Your Holiness, how can I be released from transmigratory exis. release (mok~a) from the transmigratory existence which we are ex-
tence? I am a ware of the body, the senses and [theirJ objects; I : periencing every moment in this present world.
experience pain in the waking state, and I experience it in the Sankara analyzes the nature of transmigratory existence as fol-
dreaming state after getting relief again and again by entering . lows:
into the state of deep sleep again and again. Is it indeed my own Karmans [as the results of actions, good or bad, in the past exis-
nature or [is it] due to some cause, my own nature being differ- tence] produce association with a body. ·when there is associa-
ent? If [this is] my own nature, there is no hope for me to attain tion with a body, pleasant and unpleasant things are inevitable.
final release, since one cannot avoid one's own nature. If [it is] From these result passion and aversion [and] from them actions
due to some cause, final release is possible after the cause has (kriya). (Upad I,1,3)
been removed. (II,2,45) [From actions] merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) result
What is transmigratory existence (sarpsara)? What is its cause? [and] from merit and demerit there results an ignorant man's
This is an important problem for Sankara to clear up. In the association with a body in the same manner again. Thus this
UpadeJasahasr'i it seems that two types of transmigratory existence transmigratory existence rolls onward powerfully forever like a
arc distinguished. One is the transmigratory existence characteris- wheeL (Upad I,1,4)
tic of birth and death (janmamarar;.alak~a1).a, Upad II, 1,45) which The term karman has various meanings in Sankara's works as in
takes place in past, present, and future existences. It is expressed other Indian texts. The term in the first stanza quoted above
in the answer of the first pupil, who is just a novice and still at the means the results of actions, good or bad, in the past existence.3
first Vedantic stage of his training or sravar:ia ("hearing").1* It The term kriya in the same stanza seems to be used in the sense of
may be called "external transmigratory existence" and can be actions, good or bad, which require verbal, physical, and mental
traced back to the Upani~adic concept of transmigration. activities, 4 including the V edic rituals. 5 When Sankara takes up
The other type is the one which is characterized by the waking karman to discuss its nature and value as the means to final release
and dreaming states (jagratsvapnalak~ar;.a, Upad II,2, 11 O; cf. I, 16, (mokfa), he often uses the term synonymously with kriya in the sense
18) or by agency and experiencership (kartrbhoktrtvalak§a'!la, Upad mentioned above.
I,18,49; kartrtvabhoktrtvalak~a1).a, Upad II,2,51). This type of It appears from what Sankara says that he conceives of transmi-
transmigratory existence, which is shown in the answer of the se- gratory existence as the following cycle: (I) karmans or works as the
cond pupil, who has reached the second stage of his Vedantic results of actions in the previous existence-(2) one's connection
training or manana ("thinking"), 1* may be called «internal trans- with the body-(3) experience of pleasure and pain---(4) passion
migratory existence" which is experienced in this present world. and aversion ( = dofa, U pad I, 1, 7)-(5) actions (kriya)--(6) merit
By the word "sa1[1.siira" is generally meant the first type of trans- and demerit ( = karmans). In other words, transmigratory existence
migration, which lays stress on the existence after death. 2 Of is the continuously recurring process of the performance of actions
course it includes the second type, but the latter focuses attention (karman or kriya) and the experience of their fruits. In this sense it
chiefly on the present daily life. The author' of the Upadeiasahasrf, is possible to replace the above cycle oftransmigratory existence by
*Notes to section IV, A are on p. 94. another, that of doership (kartrtva) and experiencership (bhoktrtva):
72 INTRODUCTION TRANSMIGRATION AND FINAL RELEASE 73
Their view is that the transmigratory existence exists as a real B. Final Release
substance characterized by doership and experiencership (Upad
I,18,49). Al most all systems of Indian philosophy have final release as
The pupil said, "Even though I exist [eternally], still I am not their final goal; for the Hindus it is man's fourth and final aim,
the highest Atman. My nature is transmigratory existence which the culmination of the other three, which are dharma (virtue), artha
is characterized by doership and experiencership, since it is (material gain), and kiima (love). However, there is considerable
known by sense-perception and other means of knowledge." variety in the way it is conceived. The author of the Upadefasaha-
(Upad II,2,51) sri refers to the following various ideas of final release:
Transmigratory existence can also be described as the waking (1) lt is a change of state (avasthiintara).
and dreaming states (Upad I, 16,18; II,2, 110) since the perfor- (2) It is Atman's connection (sa7J1.yoga) with Brahman.
mance of actions and the experience of their fruits take place in (3) It is Puru~a's disconnection (viyoga) from Prakrti.
the waking and dreaming states. The seed (blja) of the two states (4) It is for Atman to go to Brahman or for Brahman to come to
is the state of deep sleep and consists of darkness (tamas = avidyii, Atman.
Upad I,17,25; GK I, 13). Similarly, the ultimate cause of this (5) It is the destruction of Atman.
transmigratory existence is ajnana or ignorance (Upad I,1,5; II, The first view, which includes the fifth, is refuted as follows:
2,110), which is also called the controller of transrnigratory exis- Likewise, as the nature of Atman is changeless, It has no change
tence ( niyamaka, U pad l, 16, 17). of state, for if It had any change of state, Its destruction would
In another place (Upad II,3,112) the cycle oftransmigratory no doubt occur. (Upad I,16,38)
existence is described as: (1) nescience (avidyii)-(2) faults (do~a)­ To him who [asserts that] final release is a change of state, final
(3) verbal, physical, and mental activities----(4) accumulation of release is artificial; therefore, it is perishable (Upad I,16,39ab).
karmans the results of which are desirable, undesirable, and mixed. Likewise, it is also unreasonable that [final release] is a change
In this way transmigratory existence can be traced back to ignor- of state [in Atman], since [It] is changeless. If there were change
ance or nescience. 6 This cycle reminds us of the Buddhist theory [in Atman], [It] would have parts; consequently [It] would
of dependent origination (pratityasamutpiida), which abo has nes- perish like ajar, etc. (Upad I,16,63)
cience as its first factor. 7 The second, third, and fourth views are criticized as follows:
As knowledge is the very nature of Atman it is constantly applied It is by no means reasonable that final release is [Atman's] con-
figuratively to the intellect. And the absence of discriminating nection [with .Brahman] or disconnection (from Prakrti], since
knowledge (aviveka) is beginningless; this and nothing else is [Its] connection [with .Brahman] and disconnection [from Pra-
taken to be transmigratory existence. ( U pad I, 16, 61) krti] arc not permanent. And [it is by no means reasonable that
Therefore let transmigratory existence be nothing but nescience final release is for Atman] to go (gamana) [to Brahman or for Brah-
(avicfyamiitra) due to the absence of discriminating knowledge. man] to come (agamana) [to Atman]. (Upad I,16,39cd-40abc)
Because of [the existence of] the immovable Atman, transmigra- The last view is denied :
tory existence is always existent in Atman as it were. (Upad I, But one's own nature is not abandoned, since one's own nature
18,45) has no cause, the others ( = a change of state, etc.) indeed have
Thus transmigratory existence is said to be nothing but the their causes. One's own nature is indeed neither accepted nor
absence of discriminating knowledge (aviveka) concerning Atman abandoned by oneself [or by any others]. As [It] is the nature of
and non-Atman, or to be nothing but nescience (avidyii) due to the all, It cannot be abandoned nor grasped, since It is not different
absence of discriminating knowledge. [from anything]. Therefore, It is eternal, since [It] is not an
74 INTRODUCTION TRANSMIGRATION AND FINAL RELEASE 75

object and not separated [from anything]. (Upad I,16,40d-42) be said that final release is to attain the view of Brahman-Atman
Among the above five opinions the second one attracts our at- identity (Upad II, 1,28; 1,29), abandoning that of Brahman-Atman
tention. Sankara does not make clear who advocates it, but it is difference (Upad II,1,27; 1,28; 1,29; 1,42). In other words, it is
in line with the Brahmasfltra, according to which final release the cessation of avir.fyii (Upad I,17,7) or the cessation of false
is the connection (yoga) of the individual Self with Brahman (BS superimposition (mnadhyasa, ypad I,16,30) upon Atman which is
I,l,19); when they are united, the individual Self enters into the ever-released. In this respect Sankara's concept of final release is
relation of non-division (avibhiiga) from Brahman (Upad IV,2, very similar to the Mahayana Buddhist view of nirvii!za, character-
16) . 1 * It is very likely that Sankara is here rejecting the traditional ized by Candrak!rti as "being of the nature of destruction of all
Vedantic concept of final release. And it may be remarked that false assumptions" (sarvakalpanak1ayarupa). 3
when he comments on the term ''yoga" in the BrahmasUtra, he inter-
prets it in the sense ofidentity, 2 probably in order to avoid direct
contradiction of the Brahmasutra. C. Transmigrator
There is no change of state in Atman. There is nothing which
binds Atman. There is no bondage in Atman (Upad I, 16,57). Atman The concept of transmigration presupposes the existence of the
is ever-free, ever-released, pure, transcendentally changeless, in- transrnigrator or the subject of transmigratory existence. The
variable, immortal, imperishable (Upad I,13,3). There is no author of the Upadelasiihasri mentions several different views of
ignorance (ajniina) in Atman which has eternal knowledge as its the transmigrator:
nature, just as there is no darkness in the sun which has light as (1) It is the reflection (iibhasa) in the bearer of the "I" -notion
its nature (Upad I,16,37). If Atman, our true nature, is really such, (Upad I,18,33).
then what is bondage? If there were no bondage, there would (2) It is part of the Knower (.'fna = Atman) (Upad I, 18,34).
be no release from it. If so, the Srutis and other scriptures, which (3) It is a modification (vikara) of the Knower (Upad I,18,34)
teach us bondage and liberation from it, would be meaningless. (4) It is the bearer of the "I"-notion (aha'f!lkartr) which bearer
According to Sankara, bondage is a confused idea (bhranti) of is the locus of Atman (Upad I,18,34).
the intellect and final release is the cessation thereof (Upad I, 16, (5) It is the independent (svatantra) bearer of the "I"-notion
59). When illumined by the light of Atman, the intellect thinks (aha?Jlkartr) (Upad I,18,35). 1*
that there is knowledge in itself and that there is no other knower (6) It is the individual continuity of the "!"-notion, (aharrikarii-
than itself. This is the confused idea which is in the intellect (Upad disarp.tana) (Upad I,18,35). 2 ,
I,16,60). It is the absence of the discriminating knowledge of Atman Among these five different opinions Sankara explicitly mentions
and non-Atman, which absence is nothing but the transmigratory only the name of the holder of the sixth view, that is to say, the
existence (Upad I,16,61; 18,45). Just as when, in the twilight, a Buddh.ists (saugata). The second is the theory which is found in the
rope is mistaken for a snake, the snake, though unreal, exists in the Brakmasiltra (II,3,43) and the Bhagavadp,'itii (XV, 7) and which is
rope by the fact of the existence of the rope until the moment when also asserted by Bhartrprapafica, Sankara's predecessor in Ve-
the two are differentiated, so transmigratory existence, although danta. 3 Th.e third also is said to have generally been advocated by
not real, always exists in Atman by virtue of the existence of the early Vedanta philosophers such as Bhartrprapa:fica. 4
immovable Atman, but only until the two are differentiated Sankara opposed all the above theories. The reflection of Atman
(Upad 1,18,45; 18,46). cannot be a transmigrator as in the first theory, since it is unreal
For this reason final release is merely the attainment of the (avastu, Upad I,18,44). Naturally the second, third, and sixth
discriminating knowledge of Atman and non-Atman. Or, it may are quite unacceptable to Sankara's Advaitism, although no verse
*Notes to section IV, B are on p. 95. *Notes to section IV, C are on p. 95.
76 INTRODUCTION TRANSMIGRATIO N AND FINAL RELEASE 77
is specifically devoted to their refutation. The fourth and fifth are own nature or [is it] due to some cause, my own nature being
rejected on the ground that the bearer of "!"-notion is non-con-. different? If [this is] my own nature, there is no hope for me to
scious (Upad I,18,44). attain final release, since one cannot avoid one's own nature. If
What then is his view of the transmigrator? Atman cannot be a [it is] due to some cause, final release is possible after the cause
transmigrator since It is transcendental ly changeless (Upad I, has been removed.
18,44). Furthermore, in Sankara's philo~ophy, Atman is the only When the teacher replies to him that transmigratory existence is
existent; there exists nothing else. Then Sankara says: due to some cause, he asks his teacher what its cause is and what
Therefore, let transmigratory existence be nothing but nescience his own nature is (Upad II,2,47). In reply to him the teacher as-
due to the absence of discriminating knowledge. Because of [the serts that the cause is avidya, which is removed by knowledge
existence of] the immovable Atman, the transmigratory existence (uidyii) (Upad II,2,48). Then the pupil asks hi5 teacher again:
is always existent in Atman as it were. (Upad I,18,45) What is that aviqyrt? And what is its object? And what is knowl-
Atman is ever-released and transcendental ly changeless, and It does edge, remover of avidya, by which I can realize my own nature?
not transmigrate. Nevertheless, It is regarded as a transmigrator, (Upad II,2,49)
but only because of avidya. In fact, there exists no transmigrator Sankara in another work gives asimilar example of questions to
anywhere, as the transmigratory existence itself is unreal. Then be put t() teachers:
what is avidya? This must now be considered. How does bondage come about? How does release come about?
What is knowledge? What is avidya?" (GBh IV, 34, p.232)
In reply to this question, the teacher says:
D. Avi1Ja.1* . Though you are the highest Atman and not a transmigrator, you
hold the inverted view, "I am a transmigrator. " Though you
l. Nature of Avidyii are neither an agent nor an experiencer, and exist [eternally],
As we have seen in the previous pages, our inner Atman is trans- [you hold the inverted view, "I am] an agent, an experiencer,
cendentally changeless (kilfastha), constant (nitya), eternal, pure, and do not exist [eternally]"--~this is avidya. (Upad II,2,50)
nondual, unborn, free from desire, fear, and evils, and not subject to la other words avidya is the superimpositio n of the qualities of
transmigration ; as the U pani~adic passages such as "tat tvam asi" one thing upon another (Upad II,2,51). 2 In his Brakmasatrabha,fya
say, our inner Atman is nothing but the universal Self, Brahman. Sankara defines superimpositio n (adhyasa) as "the appearance, in
However, wed o in fact experience pleasure and pain, and sink into one thing, of another thing previously perceived, in the form of a
transmigratory existence in our daily life. Our actual life is just memory." In his philosophy avidya is mutual superimpositio n of
the reverse of the above-mention ed original and true state of man. Atman and non-Atman such as the body, the senses, and the inner
The Upadefasakasrz (II,2,45) relates the following dialogue organ (anta&karar;,a, buddhi). For example, mistaking a rope for a
between a teacher and his pupil, who is tired of transmigratory snake in twilight, people are frightened. Or they are delighted when
existence and is seeking after final release: they mistake mother-of-pea rl for silver. In these examples, when
Your Holiness, how can I be released from transmigratory exis~ they see a rope or mother-of-pea rl, they remember in it a snake or
tence? I am aware of the body, the senses and [their] objects; a piece of silver which they have previously perceived. In other
I experience pain in the waking state, and I experience it in the words, they superimpose the qualities of a snake or of silver upon
dreaming state after getting relief again and again by entering a rope or a piece of mother-of-pea rl. They are frightened or
into the state of deep sleep again and again. Is it indeed my delighted to see a snake or silver falsely projected onto a rope or
*Notes to section IV, D begin on p. 95. mother-of-pea rl through this kind of psychological process.
78 INTRODUCTION TRANSMIGRATION AND FINAL RELEASE 79

Likewise, people superimpose upon Atman qualities of non. miiyii, and mo1:eover, maya has little terminological significance.7 It
Atman which is merely material product of the Unevolved Name- is peculiar to Sankara that two different historical starting points
and-:f'orm, and they wrongly conceive of Atman as different from are recognized in the usage of the term miiya: one is the Maya of the
Brahman. Without discriminating Atman from non-Atman, they Vai~I,lavism of the Bhagavacf..g'ita which means the miraculous and

continue in transmigratory existence. Ordinary people think of veiling power of the god Viigrn, and the other is the maya of Maha-
the bearer of "I"-notion as Atman. But this is not right since the yana Buddhism in the sense of illusion or magical illusion, to which
bearer of"I"-notion is merely the bearer of the notion that "I arn the void,. or unreal appearance of things illusory is compared. The
Atman" which arises by error in the inner organ, when the Pure maya of Sankara's followers loses its theistic element and is regard-
Consciousness, i.e., the nature of Atman, is superimposed upon the ed as the material cause of the universe.s
inner organ. The atman which they conceive to be Atman is not
true Atman but the bearer of "!"-notion-that is, the inner organ .2. The Locus and the Object of Avidya
upon which the nature of Atman is superimposed through avidya. When avic{ya is accepted, another question arises: Whose is
As is clear from the above examination, avidya in Sankara's view avidya? What is the ~ocus (a.fraya) of avidya? In other words, who is
is a kind of psychological and perceptual error, or an innate psy- the transmigrator? Sankara hold that everything except Brahman-
chological and epistemological defect. Avidyii is identical with the .Atman is unreal and falsely constructed by avidya. Presumably then
original error of all beings, and mithyajfiana (false knowledge) is a avidyii should belong to Brahman-Atman. If so, Brahman-Atman Itself
synonym ofit. In the cat>e of Sankara's followers, however, avidya should be in transmigratory existence, and Sankara's position be-
is the material from which all forms of mithyajnana come ; avidya is comes untei:_able. But he in fact declares that there is no ignorance
not mithyajnana but the cause of mithyajfiana. 3 In Sankara's works, (ajfiana) in Atman which has eternal knowledge as its nature,just as
avirfya is sometimes treated, like sexual desire (kama), as a kind of there is n? darkness in the sun which has light as its nature (Upad
psychic affection (klefa), as in the Yoga system. 4 Psychic affection I,16,37). Sankara is quite aware ofthe difficulty in finding a logi-
is regarded as a wider concept to which avidya belongs. As is seen in cal solution to the whole question. He says:
such instances as avidya-kiima-karman (avidya, desire and action, lfyou ask, "Vvhose is avic{ya?" we reply, "It belongs to you who
Upad 1,15,21; BSBh I,2,17, p. 181), avidya is the first and most ask." [If you ask,] "Is it not declared by the Upani~ads, (I am
dangerous member of a series of psychic affections that causes the Brahman>?" [we reply,] "If so, you are enlightened; avidya
others. does not belong to anybody." (BSBh IV,1,3,p. 833)9
However, later Advaitins materialized and raised avidya to the In the Upadefasiihasri, the same question is put to the teacher by
status of a metaphysical and eternal substance or a cosmic power his pupil:
(fakti). They regarded it as the primary material cause of the uni- ~our Holiness, is the mutual superimposition of the body and
verse (upadana), abandoning Sankara's U nevolved Name-and- Atman made by the composite of the body and so on or by At-
Form. In order to save monism, they characterized avidya as inde- man? (Upad II,2,62; cf Upad I, 18,20)
finable as real or unreal (sadasadbhyam anirvacanrya-), 5 belonging This question appears different, but is almost the same. It may be
neither to the category of being nor to that of non- being. It is paraphrased as: "Your Holiness, which is the locus of avidya, the
given a lower reality than Brahman and a higher reality than the composite of the body and so on, or Atman?" To this question the
unreal. teacher answers as follows:
The philosophy of Sankara and his followers has generally been What would happen to you, if [the mutual superimposition] is
called mayaviida (illusion theory). 6 And the term avidyii is often mad~ by the composite of the body and so on, or if [it] is made
taken as a synonym of maya by later Advaitins. However, in by Atman? (Upad II,2,63)
Sankara's philosophy the concept of avidya is different from that of In reply to this question the pupil says:
80 INTRODUCTION TRANSMIGRATION AND FINAL RELEASE 81

If I am merely the composite of the body and so on, then I am of purely theoretical concepts. 11 He does however in the Upade.fo-
non-conscious, so I exist for another's sake; consequently, the sahasri pay some attention to this problem.
mutual superimposition of body and Atman is not effected by me. After the teacher gives a definition of avidyii (Upad II,2,50), his
If I am the highest Atman different from the composite [of the pupil raises an objection:
body and so on], then I am conscious, so I exist for my own Even though I exist [eternally], still I am not the highest Atman.
sake; consequently, the superimposition [of body] which is the My nature is transmigratory existence which is characterized
seed of every calamity is effected upon Atman by me who am by agency and experiencership, since it is known by sense-per-
conscious. (Upad II,2,64) ception and other means of knowledge. [Transmigratory exis-
Quite unexpectedly the teacher retorts: tence] has not avidya as its cause, since avidya cannot have one's
If you know that the false superimposition is the seed of [every J -0wn Atman as its object.
calamity, then do not make it! Then, on the basis of his idea of a general rule that mutual su-
In the above conversation the teacher would not make clearwhic h perimposition is possible only when two things are fully known, as
of the two, the composite or Atman, is responsible for the mutual in the case of silver and mother-of-pearl, the pupil denies that mu-
superimposition. The questions and answers continue further wit:h tual superimposition takes place between non-Atman and Atman,
the teacher skillfully leading his pupil to the realization, through which is not fully known. His teacher rejects the proposed general
psychological and epistemological argument, that he himself is rule and explains how the mutual superimposition of body and
transcendentally changeless (Upad II,2,66-83). Finally, the pupil Atman occurs (Upad II,2,51-54). In this discussion the teacher
says: affirms only the possibility of the mutual superimposition of Atman
If so, Your Holiness, I am of the nature of transcendentally and non-Atman. It is not possible for us to judge whether Sankara
changeless and eternal perception whereas the actions of the. affirms or rejects the pupil's statement quoted above that avidyii
intellect, which have the forms of [external objects J such as cannot have one's own Atman as its object. As in the case of the
sound, arise and end with the result that my own nature which I ocus of avidya, Sankara refrains from giving a clear-cut reply to
is perception falsely appears [as perceiver]. Then what is my the problem of the object of avidya, although he is well aware that
fault? (Upad II,2,84) it is theoretically important.
Then the teacher concludes: However, even Sankara's personal pupils were already unwilling
You are right. [You J have no fault. The fault is only avidyii as I to shelve the question, and Surdvara, one of them, further develops
have said before. (Upad Il,2,85) the concept of avidya ( = ajnana) :
Sankara knows what the questioner is really asking, but he And that ajiiana cannot be self-existent. Therefore, it must be
deliberately does not give him the sort of answer that he is actually admitted that it is ajfi.ana of someone about some object.
looking for.10 Instead of dwelling on futile arguments, he leads the tac cfljiianaJ!l svatmamiitranimittarµ na sa1[1-bhavatiti kasyacit kasminscit
questioner directly to true realization. Like Gotama Buddha who vi~aye bhavatity abhyupaganta1!.Jam. (Nai~ III, Introduction)
avoided metaphysical speculation because of its uselessness for In other words, Surdvara stresses the locus and the object of
nirvar;ia, Sankara too refrains from engaging in endless and profit- avidya and logically concludes that Atman is both the locus and the
less speculation on avidya. He is a religious teacher who has before object ofavidya. His view is accepted by Sarvajfiatman, and further
him an aspirant actually suffering in transmigratory existence and by Prakasatman of the VivaraI)a school of the Avaita Vedanta.
seeking final release. Indulgence in profitless speculation is nothing On the other hand, Mar;9anamisra, the author of the Brahmasid-
but the result of avidya. rlhi, 12 assertes that the locus of avic[ya is jiva, the individual atman,
Similarly, the object of avidyii also is not discussed by Sankara in and that the object of avidya is Brahman, which is concealed by it.
his Brahmasutrabha~ya partly because he avoids in general the use His view is accepted by Vacaspatimi8ra, the author of the Bha-
82 INTRODUCTION TRANSMIGRATION AND FINAL RELEASE 83

mati, and forms the fundamental standpoint of the Bhamati school not composite. Although Atman exists as connected with nothing,
of the Advaita Vedanta. This is one of the basic differences be- it docs not follow that the body and other things are without
tween the two schools. Atman, just as, although space is connected with nothing, it does
aot follow that nothing has space. Therefore, there would not
3. A Theoretical Defect in Avidya arise the fault that [I shall] arrive at the Nihilists' position.
Certainly the most crucial problem which Sankara left for his (Upad II,2,58)
followers is that of avidya. If the concept of avidya is logically ana- Thus the teacher docs not give any definite answer to the point
lyzed, it would lead the Vedanta philosophy toward dualism or raised by his pupil that a further examination of avidya as mutual
nihilism and uproot its fundamental position. superimposition results in nihilism. As far as I know, Sankara's
As we have seen above, avidya is mutual superimposition (an- own pupils did not take up this problem; it was Sarvajfiatman who
yonyadhyasa) between Atman and non-Atman. If so, avidya would first tired to treat it.
come to be logically untenable. Sankara himself is aware of this Sarvajfiatman is traditionally said to be a pupil of Surdvara.13
fact and points it out in the pupil's question to his teacher: In his Sa'f'[lk~epasariraka he has further developed the concept of
Is it not experienced that the thing which is superimposed [upon avidya on the basis of the ideas of his teacher and oi Padmapada,
something else] through avidyadoes not exist [in the latter]?-for and tried to tackle the problems left unsolved by Sankara.
example, silver [does not exist] in a mother-of-pearl nor a per- In Sarvaj fiatrnan' s opinion avidya is beginningless (anadi, Ss I,
son in a tree-trunk nor, a snake in a rope? . . . Likewise, if the 454-); it is not simply a negative entity like the absence of knowl-
body and Atman are always mutually superimposed in the form edge but a positive entity (bhttvarupa, Ss I,320-322). He identifies
of constantly non-distinct notions, then they cannot exist in each it with maya (Ss II,190; 191; III,94; 105; 108-9). Following his
other at any time. Silver, etc., which are superimposed through teacher's opinion that Atman is both the locus and the object of
avidya upon mother-of-pearl, etc., do not exist [in the latter] avidyii (Ss I,316; 318; 319; III, 15), he rejects Mai;i.<;lana's view
at any time in any way and vice versa; likewise the body and (Ss II,174). His avidyii is the cause (nimitta) of superimposition
Atman are mutually superimposed through avidya; this being (adlzyasa, Ss I,27). He says:
the case, it would follow as the result that neither the body nor The idea that by [accepting] mutual superimposition, this world
Atman exists. And this is not acceptable, since it is the theory of would turn out to be without a basis and void, is a great confu-
the Nihilists . . . . For this reason the body and Atman arc not sion of thought, arising out of the obstinacy of certain "Great
superimposed upon each other through avidya." (Up ad II,2,55) Men" who are [actually] in a total ignorance; thus it has no-
With the above objection the pupil has put forward a cogent thing to support it
argument striking at the very basis of the Advaita doctrine. If . . . . mahiin sa1?1bhrama~/
mutual superimposition is accepted, not only the body but Atman ke~ii.IJlcin mahatam anilnatamasiirrz. nirbandhamatrafrayad
as well would come to be non-existent. The teacher well under- anyonyadhyasane niraspadam idarri sunya'l!ljagat syad iti // Ss I,31 bed
stands what the pupil wants to say but does not answer directly. To justify his statement, he proposes two new technical terms:
Deliberately side-stepping the sharp thrust of the question, the one is adhi~f hana and the other is adhara. 14 Adhi~thana is the object
teacher asks instead what the relationship is between the body and of moha ( = avidya) with its products (savilasamohavi~aye vastuni, Ss
Atman. The pupil answers that they are permanently connected I,31. Cf. S§ I,32). Avidya has two faculties: one is an obscuring
with each other like the interconnected bamboo and pillars of the faculty (avarm1afatki) and the other is a projecting faculty (vibhra-
structure of a house. The teacher rejects this by means of Sarµ- mafakti = vikfepasakti, Ss I,20). Aviqya works on its. object, i.e.,
khyan arguments and then concludes: Atmari, and projects it in various forms illusorily. It is adhi~!hana
Not so; because it is accepted that Atman, like space, is by nature that is .Brahman-Atman, the object of avidya. On the other hand
84 INTRODUCTION TRANSMIGRATION AND FINAL RELEASE 85

adhara is the locus of superimposition (adhare 'dhyasanasya vastuni, it is prohibited [by the Srutis] to hold the view that [At-
Ss I,31). In the case of the false knowledge of a piece of mother- man] is different [from Brahman]; use of the rituals is [made] in
of-pearl ("This is silver"), the mother-of-pearl is adhi~thii.na and the the sphere of [the view] that [Atman] is different [from Brah-
adhara is the referent of the term "this" which is the locus of super- man]; and the sacred thread and the like are requisites for the
imposition. rituals. Therefore, it should be known that the use of rituals and
The adhi~!hana is essentially different from adhara. If they were their requisites is prohibited, if the identity [of Atman] with the
to be the same, or if a pair of things unreal were to be mutually highest Atman is realized, since [the use of] rituals and their
superimposed, this world would indeed be void without any sub- requisites such as the sacred thread is contradictory to the
strate (Ss I,32; 33), but his position is that if two things, one real realization of the identity [of Atman] with the highest Atman.
and the other unreal, are mutually superimposed, 15 the above cri t- [The use of] rituals and their requisites such as the sacred
icism does not hold good (Ss I,33). Thus Sarvajfiatman, intro- thread is indeed enjoined upon a transmigrator [but] not upon
ducing two new concepts adhi~thana and adhara into the system, has one who holds the view of the identity [of .Atman] with the
tried to demonstrate the reality of the mother-of-pearl as adhi~­ highest Atman, and the difference [of Atman] from It is merely due
thana, i.e., Atman, translating mutual superimposition between a to the view that [Atman] is different (from Brahman]. (Upad
mother-of:pearl or adhi~!hiina and silver into one between "this" 11,1,30)
or adhiira and silver. Use of all the rituals and their requisites such as the sacred thread
However, as I have disGussed elsewhere, 16 Sarvajnatman's solu- is made by those who hold that Atman is different from Brahman.
tion is not satisfactory, and if we examine the nature of "this" The compound avid;1a-kama-karman is sometimes used in Sankara's
more closely, we find that his position leads into regress ad infinitum. works :1* avidya causes kama (desire) from which karman (action)
He succeeded to some extent in making the theory of mutual results. 2 Action does not contradict nescience but is of the same
superimposition look logically tenable, but he could not demon- nature. Therefore, action cannot be the means to final release.
strate any real solution. After him arguments about avidya conti- Furthermore, any result of action is not final release but some-
nued, but, as far as I know, no one attempted to solve this problem. thing non-eternal (Upad I, 17,8), either to be produced, to be
obtained, to be changed, or to be purified (Upad I,17,50).3 Thus
action of any kind should be abandoned.
E. The Means to Final Release [Tb.e Srutis] would not declare that [Atman J is by nature unre-
lated to the rituals, by nature unconnected with the class and
According to Sankara's concepts of transmigratory existence other factors of rituals, if it were not desirable that the rituals
and final release, the means to final release must necessarily be and sue h requisites of the rituals as the sacred thread be aban-
something which leads the aspirant to the cessation of nescience, doned completely. Therefore, the seeker after final release
the nature of which is the mutual superimposition of .Atman and should abandon the rituals together with their requisites since
non-Atman. [they] are contradictory to the view of the identity [of.Atman]
Action (karman) arises from the innate conviction "I am an with the highest Atman. (Upad II,1,32)
agent. This is mine" (Upad I,1,13), which results from a false Because of the incompatibility [of knowledge with action] a
superimposition of non-Atman -such as the body, senses, and man who knows thus, being possessed of this knowledge, cannot
inner organ-upon the actionless Atman. As is clearly shown in perform. action. For this reason action should be renounced
the above cycle of transmigratory existence, action has as its cause by a seeker after final release. (Upad I,1,15; cf. Upad I,1,21;
ignorance (Upad I,11, 15) which has to be removed in favor of 13,222)
final release. With regard to rituals, Sankara says: *Notes to section IV, E are on p. 96.
86 INTRODUCTION TRANSMIGRATION AND FINAi, RELEASE 87

Thus there is no hope of attaining immortality through fruit, and so does not depend upon anything else, [we re-
which has ignorance as its cause (Upad I,11,5). Not so! Just as the Agni~toma sacrifice, though it has per-
Accordin~ to Sankara, it is only knowledge of Brahman and manent fruit, depends upon things other than itself, so, though
nothing else that by nature contradicts knowledge. Only the, knowledge [of Brahman] has permanent fruit, it always depend
knowledge of the identity of Atman with Brahman can be the means action. Thus some people think.
to final release: [ReplyJ: [We sayJ Not so, because action is incompatible [with
Only knowledge [of Brahman] can destroy ignorance; action knowledge]. In fact action is incompatible with knowledge [of
cannot [destroy it] since [action] is not incompatible [with ig. Brahman], since [it] is associated with misconception [of Atman].
norance]. Unless ignorance is destroyed, passion and aversion And knowledge [of Brahman] is declared here [in the Vedanta J
will not be destroyed. (Upad I,1,6) to be the view that Atman is changeless. (Upad I,1,8-12)
Knowledge of Brahman is called the supreme purification (para- .Knowledge of Brahman depends upon the real (vastvadkina), where-
mam pavanam, U pad I, 16, 71 ), since it enables the aspirant to be as the Vedic injuction to perform actions depends upon an agent
fre~ from every kind of evil. Sankara enthusiastically advises the kartrarlhina, Upad I, 1, 13) whose very existence is a result of
aspirant to be firmly established in the path of knowledge (jff.ana- ~uperimposition of non-Atman upon Atman through nescience. San-
patha): kara further says:
Thus both the false assumptions based upon dualism and the Because of the incompatibility [of knowledge with action],
views that Atman does not exist have been rejected through therefore, one who knows so, being possessed of this knowl-
reasoning; seekers after final release, being free from doubts edge, cannot perform action. For this reason action should be
which arise from the views of others, become firm in the path renounced by a seeker after final release. (Upad I,1,15)
of knowledge. (U pad I, 16,68) Those who know, "I am Brahman" (Brh. Up. I,4,10) and [yet
Knowledge of Brahman is incompatible not only with ignorance think], "I am doer and experiencer" are deprived of both
but also with action. The realization of the nature of Atman comes knowledge and action; they are materialists (nastika) without
about only when there is cessation of actions (Upad I,l 7,43). adoubt.(Upad I, 11,8)
When actions have been renounced, the nature of Atman is real- Thus Sankara will not a!Jow that action has any value as a means
ized. The renunciation of all actions becomes the means for discrim- to final release, and evenjif.anakarmasamuccayavada is also re;jected
inating the meaning of the word "Thou'' in the sacred s,entence by him. From his philosophical standpoint even ethical or moral
"Thou art That" (Upad I, 18,219). From this viewpoint Sankara actions are still based upon nescience and must therefore be re-
also vehemently refutes jnanakarmasamuccayavada, the opinion that jected, since their incompatibility with knowledge must hinder the
knowledge must be combined with the performance of actions aspirant in attaining knowledge of Brahman. When Sankara explains
in order to attain final release. 4 h.ow one knows one's own Atman from a sentence of the Srutis, he
[Objection] : Should not [certain] action too be always per- relies upon the well-known illustration of the ten boys who
formed while life lasts? For this [action], being concomitant with crossed a river. Counting the party after the crossing to make
knowledge [of Brahman], leads to final release. Action, like sure none was missing, the leader failed to count himself and
knowledge [of Brahman, should be adhered to], since [both of thought that one boy was mising. But when he was told, "You
them] a;e equally enjoined [by the Srutis]. As the Smrti 5 also arc the tenth," he realized immediately that he himself was the
[lays it down that] transgression [results from the neglect of tenth. 6 In like manner one attains true knowledge of Brahman-
action, so], action should be performed by seekers after final Atman from such sentences of the Srutis as "Thou art That." This
release. [If you say that] as knowledge [of Brahman] has perma- is a logical conclusion from Sankara's position.
88 INTRODUCTION TRANSMIGRATION AND FINAL RELEASE 89

'
F. Sankara's View of Ethics action is self-contradictory. Bhaskara (c. 750-c. 800) in his own
Gitabhafya (III, 4) has already severely criticized Sankara's self-
As we have seen in the previous section, Sankara accepts the contradiction in this respect. 3 How should we understand this
knowledge of Brahman as the only means to final release, rejecting self-contradiction? It is not likely that Sankara contradicts himself
action in any form. In fact, however, Sankara does not one-sidedly unknowingly. It can hardly be other than intentional. For
teach only the knowledge of Brahman, but here and there in his wh.at purpose does he knowingly sacrifice logical and theoretical
works recommends certain ethical and moral actions. In the consistency?
Upadeiasahasrz, though he says that knowledge is the realization of One of the most influential schools of philosophy at Sankara's
the identity of Brahman and Atman and states that this is affirmed time was the Mimarp.sa to which belonged Kumarila (c. 650-
most emphatically in the Sruti, he goes on to prescribe: ( 1) the c. 700) and l'rabhakara (c. 700). 4 Mal)c;lanamisra in particular
observance of abstention (yama), which consists of abstinence from (c. 670-c. 720), 5 who must have been a younger contemporary of
injury (ahirµsa), from falsehood (sarya), from theft (asteya), from Kumarila and Prabhakara and an elder contemporary of Sankara,
incontinence (brahmacarya) and from possessions (aparigraha); (2) was recognized by Advaitins and Mimarp.sakas both as a high au-
austerities (tapas); (3) the concentration of the mind (samadhiina) thority on the Mirnarµsa. As the author of the Brahmasiddhi he
and (4) the emaciation of the body (dehavi.fo~arza); as well as (5) the played a significant role in the history of the Advaita doctrine.6
performance of the regular permanent rites (nityakarman) and Suresvara, who was the most faithful exponent of Sankara's philos-
sacrifices (yajiia) (Upad .I, 17,21-23). He rejects the opinion of ophy and seems to have attacked Ma9c;lanamisra's position,7 is
those who assert jiianakarmasamuccayavada that prasaJ?lkhyana traditionally said to have been converted from the Mimamsa
meditation should be observed until Atman is apprehended (U pad school to Advaita by Sankara. 8 Judging from Sankara's writings, ~he
I,18,9 ff.), but in the chapter entitled "Parisarp.khyana" in the Mimarp.sa was unquestionably a chief target of his severe attack.
Upadesasahasri (II,3,112-116) he prescribes parisaJ?lkhyana medita- Radhakrishnan remarks: "His ( = Sankara's) denial of the
tion for those seekers after final release who are devoting them- adequacy of works to salvation is a reaction against the exaggerat-
selves to the destruction of their acquired merits and demerits (pu1J- ed emphasis which Mimarµsakas place on V edic ritualism." This
yapu1JYa) and do not wish to accumulate more of them. And he ad- is of course true, and by this theory "Sankara's unnecessary
vises the , wise man to perform parisalflkhyana. 1* Whatever dif- emphasis on the futility of the karmamiirga for the final end of
ference Sankara may recognize between prasal'{lkf?Jana and perfection" 9 ma~ be explicable. However, this theory is not enough
parisa1J1khyana-a difference which he does not explain in his writ- to ex:pl ain why Sankara dares to contradict himself with regard
ings-it is unquestionable that both of them are not knowledge to the problem of action.
but a kind of action. If the Upad were a commentary on some Eliot Deutsch explains why Indian philosophy in general, and
text like the Bhagavadgita, which stresses karmayoga (performance Ad vaita Vedanta in particular, "turns its back on all theoretical
?factions) and bhaktiyoga (loving faith), 3 it might have been that and practical considerations of morality and if not unethical is
at least 'a"ethical' in character" and points out ' '
two reasons: one
Sankara reluctantly had to recommend action, in order to
conform to his text. Bu5 the Upade.fasahasri is not a commentary on is that "the entire Advaita system is permeated with value ques-
any text. Thus when Sankara insists on a complete renunciation tions~ and in such a way, that an independent, separate treatment
of action and at the same time recommends the aspirant to per- of them is unnecessary"; the other is that the neglect of ethics,
form some action, this must certainly be an expression of his own which is quite purposive, is "based on the belief that Brahman tran-
VlCW. scends all moral distinctions and that man, being essentially not
Thus our examination has revealed that Sankara's treatment of different from Brahman, is likewise in his essence 'beyond good
*Notes to section IV, :F begin on p. 96. an d ev1. . her d oes t h"1s ti1eory
·1 ' " 10 N e1t 1 · seem to be satisfactory
· for
90 INTRODUCTION TRANSMIGRATION AND FINAL RELEASE 91

explaining the above-mentioned self-contradiction. We must ... Judging from t~e above requirements, it is a prerequisite that those
adopt another point of view. who come to Sankara for his instruction have some knowledge
The Mimamsa school had experienced significant development about Atman and Brahman and have fulfilled, or are at least
and changes i~ its doctrine by Sankara's time. Jaimini (200-100 seriously practicing, a number of ethical and moral laws prescribed
B.c.) and Sabarasvamin (c. 550) did not pay attention to the by the Dharma.Sastras for their particular castes, stages of life
problem of final release, but later writers of the school had to take (aframa), and the like. 19 Some of the candidates must have been
it into consideration. Jaimini and Sabarasvamin pointed out only Mimarµsakas, others Vedantins following jfianakarmasamuccaya-
the way to life in heaven and stressed the performance of the varla, and yet others Yogins or followers of different creeds.
Vedic rites. Kumarila, 11 Prabhakara, 12 and Mai;c;lanamisra13 advo- Thus when the aspirant started receiving Sankara's teaching
cated their respective Jnanakarmasamuccayavada theories about the of the knowledge of Brahman-Atman, his burning concern must
way to final release. Though not much is known of theories con- previously have been with the performance of action; he might
cerning this problem which were proposed by Vedantins before also have acquired, from the study of the Veda, some knowledge
Sankara, the Brahmasiltra itself stands in the tradition of jfianakar- of Brahman and Atman different from Sankara's. His attachment to
masamuccayavada. Tanka (Brahmanandin) 14 and Bhartrprapaiica1 5 action, which is based on a conviction of Brahman and Atman
were Jiianakarmasamuccayavadins. Bhaskara also expounded jfia- as separate,, must sometimes have been too strong for him to
nakarmasamuccayavada, probably soon after Sankara's death. It is understand Sankara's doctrine of the complete identity of Brah-
highly probable that Jnanafarmasamuccayavada in many varieties man and Atman. In the Prose Part of the Upade.fasahasri Sankara
was prevalent among Mimarp.sakas and Vedantins while Sankara illustrates his teaching method, using the example of a pupil and
was active. Sankara, therefore, seems to have taught his teachings his teacher. The pupil is a Brahmin's son who has become a para-
to, or fought against, mostly thinkers holding various types of maha'!lsaparivrafaka ascetic (Upad II,1,10). After he has been
jfi.anakarmasamuccayavada. The Sarp.khya had already lost their taught, by means of many Sruti and Smrti passages, that he ( =
vitality and Buddhism also was on the wane. Atman) is identical with Brahman and that he himself is free from
In the Upadesasahasri (II, 1,2), Sankara sets forth the following caste, family, and purificatory ceremonies, he put to his teacher
qualifications required in a seeker before he is initiated into the the o bjcction:
knowledge of Brahman-Atman by his teachers 16: I am one [andJ He is another; I am ignorant, experience plea-
1. He must be dispassionate toward all passing objects attain- sure and pain, am bound and a transmigrator [whereas] he is
able as they are by means other than knowledge. essentially different from me, the god not subject to transmigra-
2. He must haveabandoned the desire for sons, wealth, and tion. By worshipping Him with oblation, offerings, homage
worlds and reached the state of a paramaha1!1-saparivr1ljaka ascetic. 17 and the like through the [performance of] the actions prescribed
3. He must be endowed with tranquillity, self-control, and the for [my] class and stage oflife, I wish to get out of the ocean of
like. transmigratory existence. How am I He? (Upad II,1,25)
4. He must be possessed ofthe qualities ofa student, which are ! t is highly probable that this was a typical pupil of the time, and
well known from the scriptures. Sankara's teaching required such pupils to make a total change in
5. He must be a Brahmin18 who is internally and externally their views oflifc. In such a case one of the most effective teaching
pure. methods was to give them a great shock by the radical negation
6. His caste, profession, behavior, knowledge, and family must of action, which they had been considering their most important
have been examined. duty arrd which is based on the view that Atman is different from
7. He must approach his teacher in the prescribed manner. Brahman. They then could be led to the realization of the oneness
92 INTRODUCTION TRANSMIGRATION AND FINAL RELEASE 93
of Brahman and Atman. Sankara's drastic denial of action and of tranquillity (Sama), self-control (darna), compassion (daya), kindness
Jnanakarmasamuccayavada was apparently effective in shocking his (anugraha), and the like and that they should lead blameless
pupils into an insight into the true nature of Atman. lives (abhinnavrtta), free from faults such as deceit (darnbka), pride
Sankara's view is essentially different from antinomianism in (darpa), trickery (kuhaka), wickedness (Sa!/rya), fraud (maya), jeal-
Christianity.20 He does not intend to nullify the moral laws ousy (matsarya), falsehood (anrta), egotism (aharµkara), self-inter-
through his teaching of the knowledge of Brahman and Atman. est (mamatva) ; their knowledge is used for the purpose of helping
In various places he affirms, though admittedly with reservations, others (Upad II,1,6).
that the performance of actions, including the observance of the Iu his famous work Mysticism East and West, Rudolf Otto at-
moral laws, is indispensable for final release. In the Upadesasahasri tempts to get to the heart of mysticism by, comparing Eastern
(I, 17,44) Sankara says that action can take place only before ac- and Western mysticism with reference to Sankara and Meister
quisition ofknowledgc of Atman, since a firm belief that "Thou art .Eckhart. After showing striking similarity between the two great
That" removes any notions of belonging to a certain caste and so masters, he turns to the differences between them, and remarks:
on, which are prerequisites to the performance of action. This It is because the background of Sankara's teaching is not Pales-
statement is indeed negative, but it implies paradoxically the posi- tine but India that his mysticism has no ethic. It is not immoral,
tive meaning that action should be performed before one can it is a-moral. The Mukta, the redeemed, who has attained ekata
achieve cessation of nesciencc. Before the cessation of nescience, or unity with the eternal Brahman, is removed from all works,
abstinence from injury (ahirµsa) and other abstentions (yama), whether good or evil. Vv orks bind man. He leaves all activity
the regular rites, and even sacrifice (yajfia) should be observed and reposes in oneness. . . . With :Eckhart it is entirely differ-
to purify the mind, since knowledge appears when the ~ind be- ent. . . . His wonderfully liberating ethic develops with greater
comes pure like a mirror (Upad I,17,22). According to Sankara, strength from the ground of his mysticism. 2'J
the cessation of nescience is nothing but final release. Practically The same criticism has been made of Sailkara's ethical views as
speaking, therefore, the aspirant should perform actions until well as the ethics of Indian philosophy in general and the Advaita
his attainment of final release. Vedanta in particular. S. Radhakrishnan devotes a chapter of his
Sankara explains what teachers should do when they have begun Indian PhilosofJhy to the defense of Sankara's position against
to teach knowledge to their pupils and see signs that they do not some objections put to him by P. Deussen and other Western
grasp it. The causes which prevent them from attaining knowledge scholars. 23 In his Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Reconstruction,
are demerit, worldly laxity, absence of firm preliminary learning Eliot Deutsch also takes up this problem for consideration and
concerning the discrimination between eternal and noneternal gives a favorable interpretation of the ethics of the Advaita Ve-
things, care about what other people think, pride of caste, and danta.24
the like. He instructs teachers to remove those causes by means of i
! Sankara's teaching is neither "immoral" nor "a-moral." Moral
non-anger (akrodha), abstinence from injury and other abstentions,
and the observances (niyama), which consist of purity (sauca), con-
l and ethical perfection is not his chief topic, not because he denies

tentment (sarJ1.to~a), self-mortification (tapas), study (sviidftyaya), l

l
I
it nor because he is indifferent to it, but because he considers it
to be a matter of course. He says:
and devotion to the lord (iivarapra'!lidhana). He considers these l Having been awakened from the ignorance as to the meanings of
means to be compatible with knowledge, though they are unques-
tionably actions. 21 And he further tells them to help their pupils I~ the words, and seeking for the realization of the meaning of the
sentence, how should one come to follow his desires, when
properly achieve the virtues, such as modesty (amanitva), which I renunciation etc. have been enjoined [on such a man]? (Upad

I
are described as means to attain knowledge (Upad II, 1,4-5). I, 18,226) 25
Moreover, he prescribes that teachers should be endowed with Even if suffering from hunger, one certainly does not want to

I
94 INTRODUCTION TRANSMIGRATION AND FINAL RELEASE 95
Notes to Introduction IV, B
take poison. Nobody whose hunger has been appeased by
sweet food knowingly wants to take poison unless he is a fool. lCf. Nakamura II, pp. 489-493.
(Upad I,18,229) 2tadii.tmanii. yogas tadyogaf:i, tadbhii.vapatti/l, BSBh I,!, 19, p. 124.
3sarvakalpanak1ayarupa, Prasannapadii (Louis de La.Vallee Poussin, Mulamadlryamaka-
These words clearly show Sankara's view of ethics. His radical
kii.rikii de .Nagiirjuna, avec la Prasannapadii., commentaire de Candrakirti. St-Petersbourg,
denial of actions by means of a penetrating analysis is the most 1903-1913 [Bibl. Buddhica, IV]), p. 524, line 6.
effective way to lead to a higher levd those who are suffering in
transmigratory existence, who are already fully committed to the Notes to Intr1>du.ction. IV, C

ethical and moral laws and other requirements for admission to lAnandajiiana and Ramatirtha attribute this opinion to the Bha(ta school of
Sankara's teachings. He brings about in his pupils a sudden rev- Mimarpsa.
olutionary change of world view by uprooting the foundation of 2According to Anandajiiana and Ramatirtha this is the theory of the Prasangikas.
3Cf. Nakamura III, p. I 72. This theory is refuted in GK III, 7.
their present convictions, so that they may easily be led into a 4 See Sai:tkara ad Brh.Up. IV,3,7, p. 560; Nakamura III, pp. 632-633. This view is
totally new vision. He says: rejected in GK II I,7.
. . . when knowledge is firmly grasped, it conduces to one's
Notes to Intr1>du.ction IV, D
own beatitude (freyas) and to the continuity [of knowledg·e].
And the continuity of knowledge is helpful to people as a boat II have already examined Sankara's avidyii. in detail in connection with the author-
is helpful to one wishing to get across a river. ( U pad II, 1,3) ship problem of the Upad in Mayeda Upad, pp. 23-30. Here I have tried to avoid
As in the case of other great• religious teachers like the Buddha, overlapping with that essay as far as possible.
2Cf. BSBh, latroduction, p. 19; Eigea, pp. 248-249; Mayeda Upad, pp. 23-24.
Sankara is primarily concerned with the salvation of people who 3 Eigcn, PP; 248-249. Cf. S. Mayeda, "The Authenticity of the Bhagavadgitabha~ya
are suffering from transmigratory existence here in the present Ascribed to Sankara," pp. 159-160. As I have shown in Mayeda Upad, pp. 24-25,
world and not with the establishment of a consistent philosophical the term mit!?Jajflana is used only once in the Upad (II,3,116), and it is difficult to
or ethical system. 26 Sankara's view of ethics may be vague or self- determine its exact meaning there. But it should be so interpreted as in the BSBh since
the Upad can safely be attributed to S·ankara (see Mayeda Upad, pp. 22-64).
contradictory, but this is because its real aim is the highest possible 4avidyadfn lddan, BSBh IV,2,7, p.861. Cf. Togasutra II,3; Eigen, p. 249; Mayeda
effectiveness in leading his pupils to the final goal. Upad, pp. 25-26.
5See Introduction, III, A, 2, p. 22; Mayeda Upad, pp. 29-30 and pp. 32-34.
6For example, History of Indian Literature by M. Winternitz, tr. by S. jha, vol. III, pt.
II (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967), p. 493. He explains it as "the Maya-theory,
Notes to Introduction IV, A
according to which the world is merely a deceptive vision, an illusion (mayii)" (ibid,
p. 483). Cf. Mayeda Upad, p. 35.
1 Preface, p. xi.
2Cf. P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, pp. 357 ff.; Nakamura II, pp. 483-489. 7Cf: Y. Kanakura, A Study of the Vedanta Philosophy (in .Japanese. Tokyo: Iwanami
3Karman is said to constitute the efficient cause (nimittakarar;a) for the origination of a Shoten, 1932), pp. 225-286; Eigen, pp. 268-269; Mayeda Upad, p. 35.
BCf. Eigen, pp. 271-272; Mayeda Upad, pp. 61-62.
new body (BSBh III, 1,2, p. 597).
9A similar dialogue is also seen in GBh XIII,2, p. 537.
4Kriyii here corresponds to vii.nmanaf:ikiiyapravrtti (verbal, mental, and physical activi-
ties) in Upad II,3,112. 10Cf. Eigen, pp. 254-256; D. H. H. Ingalls, "Sankara on the Question: Whose Is
5Cf. The expression kriyiif:i sarvii diiriignyii.dhiinapilrvikii/l in the immediately preceding Avidya?" Philosophy East and West, vol. 3 (1953), no. I, pp. 69-72.
.ll£igen, pp. 258-259.
stanza (Upad I, 1,2). .
6Cf. BSBh I, l, 1, p. 41 ; II,3,50, p. 561; GBh ~VIII, 12, p. 691; PBh, Introduct10n, 12Cf. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Brahmasiddhi by Aciirya Mal}r!anamifra with Comm. by
4, p. 4; VBh, Introduction, I, p. 61. Ajfidna, in Sankara's usage of the term, is almost Sarikhaf!ii~i (Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Series no. 4, 1937), p. xxviii
but not entirely synonymous with avidyii. His concept of avidyii is wider than that of and pp. 10-11; S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. II, pp. 89-90 and pp.
101-102.
ajfiiina. , -
7fo his Nais (I,l) and Viirtika on Sankara's Taittir~ropani{adbhO.eya (I,7 and IJ,12)), Uit is generally thus admitted according to Ramatirtha, a commentator on Ss (cf.
Sure:\vara als~ gives a similar causal cycle. See J.M. van Boetzelaer, Sureivara's Taitti- S. Dasgupta, A History ef Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 111) but not unanimously (cf.
riyopani1adbha1yaviirtikam Translated into English with an Introduction and Notes (Leiden: N. Veezhiuathan, The Sarhkfepafiiriraka of Sarvajfiiitman Critically Edited with Introduction,
E . .J. Brill, 1971), pp. 7-8. English Translation, Notes and Indexes. Madras: University of Madras, 1972, pp. 4-5).
96 INTRODUCTION TRANSMIGRATIO N AND FINAL RELEASE 97
14Cf. S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. II, pp. 113-114. Hiriyanna, S. Kuppuswami Sastri, and S. Dasgupta, but they do not deny that Surd-
15Cf. BSBh, Introduction, p. 9. He demonstrates that superimposition must be vara was once a Mlmarpsaka. Cf. T. M. P. Mahadevan, The Saf[lbandha-Viirtika of Sure-
mutual and not one-sided (Ss I,34-38). .SVariiciirya (Madras University Philosophical Series No. 6), pp. xi-xii; M. Biardeau, La
16S. Mayeda, "The Development of the Concept of Avidyii in the Advaita Vedanta Philosophie de Ma~<!ana Mifra, p. 2.
System: Sankara and Sarvajiiatman." Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 24--1 9 S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. 2, pp. 627-628.
(1975), pp. 78-83. 10 Eliot Deutsch, Aduaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Reconstruction
(Honolulu: East-West
Center Press, 1969), pp. 99-100.
Notes to Introduction IV, E 11Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. 2, pp. 423-424; M. Hiriyanna, The
.Nai.ykarmyasiddhi ef Sure Juaraciirya (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series No. XXXVIII,
lFor example, Upad I,15,21; BSBh l,2,17, p. 181; GBh XIV, 3, p. 589; PBh IV,9, 1925), p. xxii (note 1); G. Jha, Purva-Mimii0sii in Its Sources (Benares: Benares Hindu
6"7, p. 60; Sankara ad Mu!fq. Up. III, I, 11. Cf. Eigen, p. 249. University, 1942), pp. 37-38.
2Cf. S. Radhakrislman, Indian Philosophy, vol. 2, p. 623. 12 Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. 2, p. 423;
G. Jha, Purva-lvfimamsii,
3Cf. T. M. P. Mahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita (Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1957), pp. 36-37.
pp. 25 7--258. 13 Cf. M. Hiriyanna, Naifkarmyasiddhi of Surefvariiciirya, pp.
xxv-xxvii; S. Kuppu-
4Cf. S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. II, pp. 99-100. swami Sastri, Brahmasiddhi, pp. xxvii-xxxi; xxxiii-xxxvi. Mar;icjanarnisra refers to seven
5Manu XI,41-71, especially XI,44. different theories of the problem of the relation ofjiiiina and karman in his Brahmasiddhi
6For this illustration, see Upad I,12,3. and note 2, p. 129. (p. 26, line 24-p. 28, line 7). It is said that Brahmadatta was also a samuccayaviidin
and was criticized by Surdvara. Cf. Nai1'! I,67; M. Hiriyanna, The Naifkarmyasiddhi
Notes to Introduction IV, F ef Sure Jvara, pp. xxiii-xxv.
14Nakamura llI, pp. 116-117.
IParisa'!'khyiina is mentioned as something which Sankara recommends in PBh I,5, 15 Nakamura III, pp. 183-187; M. Hiriyanna, "fragments
of Bhartrprapaiica,"
29, p. 24, as well. , Proc. III OC (Madras, 1924 ), pp. 439-450; do, The .Nai{karmyasiddhi of Sureivariicarya,
2Rudolf Otto remarks about Sankara's GBh as follows: "With an almost appalling pp. xvii-:nx; Y. K.anakura, A Stwry of the Vediinta Philosophy, pp. 24-102.
persistency and obduracy Sankara uses all the powers of his dialectic and his penetrat- 16 Cf. Upad I,13,27; 16, 7; 17 ,53; I 7,86; 17 ,87; BSBh I, l, 1; Vediintasii.ra
[IV] 4--31.
ing intellect to cloud and twist the clear meaning of the Gita which praises the deed 17 Cf. P. V. Kape, History of .Dharmafiistra, vol. II, pt. II (Poona, 1941), pp. 983 ff.
dedicated to Isvara, and to reduce this action to a lower level than the stage of com- However, when Sankara illustrates the teaching method in the second chapter of the
plete cessation of all willing and doing." (Mysticism East and West, tr. by B. L. Bracey Prose Part of the 1.Jpad, he gives an example of a brahmaciirin and his teacher (Upad
and R. C. Payne. New York: Collier Books, 1962, p. 225). , II,2, 45). The rec1uirernent of being aparamaha'!'sapariu riijaka,might not be very strict.
3Cf. S. Mayeda, "The Authenticity of the Upadesasahasrl Ascribed to Sankara," 18 In his commentary on the Brh.Up. II I,5,l and IV,5,l 5 Sankara
affirms that only
Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 85, no. 2, pp. 190-191; Mayeda Upad, PP· the .Brahmirr can be sarrmyiisin. l\1ost 9f the medieval writers on Dharmafiistras support
50-5 ! ; V. Raghavan,"Bhask ara's Gitabhliffa," Festschriftfiir Erich Frauwallner, WZK- this opinion. But Surdvara is against Sankara's position in this respect. Cf. P. V. Kane,
SO, Bd. XII-XIII, 1968/69, p. 287. History ef Dharmaliistra, vol. II, pt. II, pp. 943-944.
~For the date ofKumarila, see Nakamura I, pp. 107-115. H. Nakamura, A History 19 The Dharmasii.stra in Hinduism corresponds to the Vinaya in
Buddhism. Sankara
of Indian Thought (in Japanese. Tokyo: I wanami Shoten, 1956), p. 17~ is relied upon himselfis the author of t~e commentary on the A1hyiitmapa{ala of the Apastamba-Dhar-
for the date of Prabhiikara. Cf. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Brahmasiddhi by Aciirya MatJefana- masutra (cf. P. Hacker, "Sankara der Yogin und Sankara der Advaitin,'' WZKSO, vol.
milra, pp. 1vii-I viii. XII-XIII, 1968/59, p. 14 7; T. Leggett, The Chapter of the Self. London and Henley:
5Nakamura I, p. 114. M. Biardeau places Mai:i<;lanamisra chronologically between Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. pp. 166-173.
Kurnarila and Sankara and assigns him the dates 7th-8th century (La Philosophie de 20Among the Hindus it may be the Tengalai of the Srivai~!fava Sect who hold a view
Mar;4ana Mi fr a uue apartir de la Brahmasiddhi. Paris: Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient, similar to antinomianism.
1969), p. 1. According to T. Vetter. Mai:iqanamisra lived in about 700 A.D. (Ma~­ 21 In his BSBh (I,1,4, p. 83) Sankara refutes the opinion thatjniina
itself is an activity
efanamisra' s Brahmasiddhib, Brahmakar;efab, Ubersetzung, Einleitung und Anmerkungen. Verof- of the mind (rniinasi kriya).
fentlichungen der Kommission fi.ir Sprachen und Kulturen Siid- und Ostasiens, Heft 22 Mysticism East and West, p. 225.
7, Wien, 1969, p. 15). 23 Jndian: Philosophy, vol. II, pp. 621-634.
6Cf. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Brahmasiddhi, pp. 1vii-I xxv. In his Brahmasiddhi Mal)c;la- 24Advaita Vedanta, pp. 99-102.
namifra attacks a view of the relation between knowledge and action which may well 2>cf. BS III,4,31; BSBh II,3,48.
be Sankara's. 26 Eigen, p. 256; D. H. H. Ingalls, "Sarhkara on the Question:
Whose is Avidya?"
7Surdvara repeatedly refutes prasa'flkhyiinauiida, which may have been advocated by Philosophy East and West, vol. III (1953), no. 1, pp. 69-72.
Mai;i<;lanamisra. See Nai~ I,67; III,123-126; Sambandhavarttika 818-849; S. Kuppu-
swami Sastri, Brahmasiddhi, pp. xxviii-xxxi; xxxiii-xxxvi.
SThe lVfa!fQana-Surdva ra equation has been denied by such able scholars as M.
A THOUSAND TEACHINGS
PART I. THE METRICAL PART
 CHAPTER I
PURE CONSCIOUSNESS

I. Salutation to the all-knowing Pure Consciousness 1 which

pervades all, is all, abides in the hearts of all beings, and is beyond
all objects [of knowledge].
2. Having completed all the rituals, preceded by the marriage
ceremony and the ceremony of installing the sacred fire, 2 the Veda
has now begun to utter knowledge of Brahman.
3. Karmans [as the results of actions, good or bad, in the past ex-
istence] produce association with a body. 3 When there is associa-
tior1 with a body, pleasant and unpleasant things are inevitable.
From these result passion and aversion [and] from them actions.
4. [From actions] merit and demerit result [and] from merit
and demerit there results an ignorant man's association with a
body in the sarne manner again. Thus this transmigratory exis-
tence rolls onward powerfully forever like a wheel. 4
5. Since the root cause of this transmigratory existence is
ignorance, its destruction is desired. Knowledge of Brahman there-
fore is entered on. Final beatitude results from this knowledge.
6. Only knowledge [of Brahman] can destroy ignorance; action
cannot [destroy it] since [action] is not incompatible [with ig-
norance]. Unless ignorance is destroyed, passion and aversion will
not be destroyed.
7. Unless passion and aversion are destroyed, action arises in-
evitably from [those] faults. 5 Therefore, for the sake of final beati-
tude, only knowledge [of Brahman J is set forth here [in the Vedan-
ta].
8. [Objection: ]6 "Should not [certain] action7 too always be
performed while life lasts? For this [action], being concomitant
with knowledge [of Brahman], leads to final release.

103
104 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 1, 9-19 I, I, 20-26] METRICAL PART 105

9. "Action, like knowledge [of Brahman, should be adhered to], the knowledge, "I am the Existent"? Therefore knowledge has no
since [both of them] arc equally enjoined [by the Srutis]. As the helper.
Smrti8 also [lays it down that] transgression [results from the ne- 20. Renunciation is therefore said by the Sruti to "be superior"
glect of action, so] action should be performed by seekers after (M.N. Up. 21,2) to the actions [there enumerated, beginning with
final release. truth and] ending with mental activity. 12 "[Only] this much,"
10. "[Ifyou say that] as knowledge [of Brahman] has permanent says the Vajins' 13 Sruti,
fruit, and so does not depend upon anything else, [we reply:] Not 21. "[is, verily, the means to] irnmortality"l 4 (Brh. Up. IV,5,
so! Just as the Agni!foma sacrifice,9 though it has permanent fruit, 15). Therefore action should be abandoned by seekers after final
depends upon things other than itself: release. [You] said that, as with the Agni,l"fomasacrifice, (knowledge
11. "so, though knowledge [of Brahman] has permanent fruit, it depends upon action].1 5 To this the following reply is given:
always depends upon action. Thus some people think." [Reply:] 22. Because action has to be accomplished through various
Not so, because action is incompatible [with knowledge]. factors of action and varies in its result, knowledge is the opposite
12. In fact action is incompatible with knowledge [of Brahman], of it. Therefore the example is not applicable.
since [it] is associated with misconception [of Atman]. And knowl- 23. Since the Agni~{ oma sacrifice, like agriculture, etc., has as
edge [of Brahman] is declared here [in the Vedanta) to be the view its object a result [to be accomplished through various factors of
that Atman is changeless. action], it requires sup port from other actions [than itself]. But
13. [From the notion,] "I am agent; this is mine" arises action. what else does knowledge depend upon?
Knowledge [of Brahman] depends upon the real, [whereas] the 24. The transgression [resulting from neglect of action] 16 is
Vedic injunction depends upon an agent. 10 imputed only to one who has "!"-notion. A knower of.Atman has
14. Knowledge destroys the factors of action 11 as [it destroys] neither "!''-notion nor desire for the result [of action].
the notion that there is water in the salt desert. After accepting 25. Therefore, in order to destroy ignorance, end transmigra-
this true view, [how] would one decide to perform action? tory existence, and set forth knowledge of Brahman, this Upani~ad
15. Because of the incompatibility [of knowledge with action] a has been commenced.
man who knows thus, being possessed of this knowledge, cannot 26. And the word "Upani~ad" may be derived from the verbal
perform action. For this reason action should be renounced by a root "sad" preceded by the prefix "upa-" and "ni-" and followed
seeker after final release. by the suffix "kvip,' '17 since it diminishes and destroys birth and the
16. It is the innate assumption of people that Atman is not dis- like_ 18
tinct from the body and the like. This arises from nescience. So
long [as they have it], the Vedic injunction to perform actions
would be [valid]. Notes
17. [TheSrutipassage,] "Not thus! Not so!" (Brh. Up. II,3,6),
excluding the body and the like, leaves Atman unexcluded so that lThe Sanskrit term "caitanya" translated here as "Pure Consciousness" is used as
a syn<mym for Brahman-Atman, indicating the nature of It (see Introduction, III,A, I,
[one] may know Atman free from distinction. Thereby nescienee
p. 19).
is removed. 2 Agnyiidhiina, which is the same as the Ag1yadheya, is a Vedic sacrifice performed by

18. Once nescience has been removed through the right means a sacrificer and his wifo with the help of four priests. Cf. P. V. Kane, History ofDhar-
of knowledge, how can it arise again, since it does not exist in the masiistra, vol. II-III (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1941), pp. 986-
998.
one alone, the inner Atman free from distinction? 3Sec Upad I,15,6 (dehayoga{1 kriytihetu~).
19. If nescience cannot arise again, how can there be the 4 0n karman and transmigration, see Introduction, IV,A, pp. 69-72.

notions, "[I am] an agent, [I am] an experiencer," when there is 6"Faults" (do~a) here means passion and aversion. Cf. Upad II,3, 112. Rarnatirtha
106 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, l I, I] METRICAL PART 107

interprets it as passion (raga), aversion (dvefa), and delusion (moha) in his commentary ra1,la), (2) go, reach (gati) and (3) mitigate (avasiidana), and interprets the word "upa-
Padayojanikii. ni-{ad" as: (1) "destroy the seeds of transmigratory existence such as nescience," (2)
6Commentator s Ramatirtha and Bodhanidhi (see Preface, note 4) take this "make seekers after final release go to the highest Brahman," or (3) "mitigate such a
objection (I,8-11) as made against the Advaitins by those who assert that knowledge multitude of miseries as living in the womb, birth and old age (garbhavii.sajanmajariid-
must be combined with the performanse ofreligious actions and duties (jfiii.nakarmasa- Y,upadravabrnda, Sankara ad Kath. Up., Introduction [Sri Sarpkaragranth avalil;t 3.
muccayaviidins). As I have pointed out, Sankara vehemently rejects this position. Cf. S. Srirarpgam, n.d.), pp. 101-102). In another place he explains the word as: (1) "de-
Dasgupta, A History ef Indian Philosophy, vol. II (Cambridge: University Press, 1952), stroy (nifiitayati) such numerous evils as birth, old age and disease (garbhajanmajariiro-
p. 100; S. Mayeda, "Adi-Sankarac arya's Teaching on the Means to Mok~a :Jiiana and gii.dyanarthapuga)," (2) "lead to the highest Brahman," or (3) "mitigate (avasiidayati)
Karman", Felicitation Volume in honour qf Saizkariiciirya qf K afici, Journal ef Oriental completely, i.e. annihilate (vinaiayati) nescience and other causes oftransmigrato ry ex-
Research (Madras), vols. XXXIV-XXX V, 1964-1966, pp. 66-75. istence" (Sankara ad Mui:ic;l. Up., Introduction [Sri Saiµkaragranth avalil;t 3. Srirarp-
7In his English translation (see Preface, note 4) .Jagadiinanda seems to take garn, n.d.], p. 304). Today it is generally accepted by scholars that the word Upani~ad
"karma ... nityalJI kartavyam" as "nityakarma kartavyam" and translates it as "Obliga- derived from the verb upa-ni-sad means "sit (sad) down (ni) near (upa) [some one],"
tory duties should be performed." But, from the context, it seems to me that karman the verbal roots ad being taken to mean ''sit." Cf. Max Muller (tr.), The Upanifads, pt.
here is used in a wider sense which includes nityakarman; karman probably means I (The Sacred Books of the East, vol. 1. Reprint ed. New York: Dover Publications,
action as a means to final release which is in contrast with knowledge as such, and nit- Inc., 1962), pp. lxxix-lxxx:iv; P. Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upanishads (Reprint ed.
yam is an adverb which modifies kartavyam. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966), pp. 10-15; M. Winternitz, A History ef
SCf. Manu XI,41-71, especially XI,44. Indian Literature, tr. by S. Ketkar (Reprint ed. New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint
9This is one of the Vedic sacrifices, in which Soma is used as the offering. It is a Corporation, 1972), pp. 243-244; S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1,
one-day sacrifice and an integral part of the Jyotiffoma sacrifice, which generally occu- p. 38.
pies five days. It is to be performed in spring (vasanta) every year and on a new moon or
full moon day. See W. Caland and V. Henry, L'Agnif/oma,2 vols. (Paris: Ernest Leroux,
Editeur, 1906-1907); P. V. Kane, Hislo1!Ji of Dharmasastra, vol. II-III, pp. ll 33-1203.
lOCf. BSBh I,1,1,p. 35; I,1,4, p. 83; PBh, Introduction, p. 6.
HK ii.raka, which is here translated as "factors of action," is a case-form of a noun
dependent upon a verb. This term comprises the notions of ablation (apadiina), of
giving (sa'!'Pradiina), of instrument (karar;a), oflocation (adhikaral}a), of object (karman),
of agent (kart r), but the notion expressed by the genitive case is excluded from kiiraka.
It is also defined as something instrumental in bringing about the action (kriyiinimitta,
Sarasvatzkar;fhiibhara~a, I, 1,32). Cf. L. Renou, Terminologie grammaticale du Sanskrit
(Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honore Champion, 1957), pp. 127-128.
l2M. N. Up. 21 refers to truth (satyo), penance (tapas), self-control (dama), tranquil-
ity (Sama), giving (diina), and so forth, and concludes that renunciation (nyii.sa) is superi-
or to all those lower austerities (et any avarii1}i tapii.l[lsi nyiisa eviityarecayat).
13Vajin = Vajasaneyin, a Vedic school, to which the Brh.Up. belorygs.
14Brh. Up. IV,5,15 reads: etii.vad are khalv amrtatvam. According to Sankara's corn·
mentary on this passage (Anandaframa S. S. No. 15, 1936, p. 714), the complete
knowledge of Atman which is obtained through "Not thus, not so" and renunciatio~ of
everything are the means to immortality. In order to sum up this meaning, the Sruti
says "et avad are khalv amrtatvam," which means that the mea_ns to Immortality is this
much, and only this much-i.e. this view of the non-dual Atman which is arrived at
through "Not thus, not so" and which does not depend upon any other cause coopera-
tive with it. My translation of this quotation is based upon the above-mention ed inter-
pretation of Sankara which fits here in our present context. Cf. Upad I,11,2.
15See the preceding stanzas 10 and 11.
16See the preceding stanza 9.
17Kvip is a suffix which disappears after having been added to several verbal roots,
including sad, preceded by a preverb. See Pai:iini III,2,61; 76, etc.
IBSankara gives similar etymological explanation of the word "upanifad" in his
commentaries on Upani~ads. He takes the verbal root sad to mean (1) destroy (visa-
 I, 2) METRICAL PART 109

:c:r·. U~a~ I~,2, 77; :3; 103; 108 (avagati~ pramti~aniit[I phalam). 1

, '1~1s s1m1le is used ma famous dialogue between Uddalaka and his son Svetaketu
in Chand.1:3"P· VI,14'.1-2 so that Uddalaka may explain to his son how Atman, though
CHAPTER 2
subtle and 1mpercept1ble, can be realized. A man who is led, with his eyes covered
NEGATI ON away fron: the Gandh~ras and le.ft in~ place where there are no human beings, wil;
at last arrive at Gandhara ~y askmg ~1s way from village to village. In the same way
one who rnP.ets a teacher to mstruct lnm obtains true knowledge.

, l. As [Atman] cannot be negated, [It] is left unnegated (by the

Sruti,] "Not thus! Not so!" (Brh. Up. II,3,6). One attains[It]i n
some such way as "I am not this. I am not this."
2. The notion "[I am] this" arises from the atman [which is
identified with] "this" ( = non-Atman) 1 and is within the range of
a verbal handle. 2 As it has it~ origin in the negated tttman, it could
not become [accepted as] a right notion again [as before].
3. Without negating a previous notion, a following view does
not arise. The Seeing ( = Atman) is one alone, self-establis hed. As
It is the result [of the right means ofknowledg e],3 Itis not negated.
·1. When one has traversed the forest of "this" ( = non-Atman)
which is contaminat ed with anxiety, delusion, and so on, one
arrives at one's own Atman, just as the man from the land of Gan-
dhara [arrived at GandharaJ through the forest. 4

Notes

!Commentator s Anandajiiana, Bodhanidhi, and Ramatirtha interpret "idamiitman"

as "ahat[lkartr" or "the bearer of'I'-notion" (i.e. the intellect), which ordinary people
regard as their Atman (see Introduction, III,B,3, pp. 39--40). But "this" (irlam) means
here the object of knowledge which should be negated as non-Atman in some such way
as, "I am not 'this,' I am not 'this"' (cf. the previous stanza). Therefore, "idamiitma-"
is the same as "niyiddhatma-" or "the negated atman" in the next line. Atman is always
the subject of knowledge and not the object of knowledge. It is not indicated by any
words, since Atman has no universals (jiiti), action (karman) etc. which non-Atman like
the intellect possesses. (Cf. "idamaf(lia," Upad I,12,l l.) Sankara also uses "yu,mad-"
in the sense of"the object" or "non-Atman" in contrast to "asmad-" or "the subject" or
"Atman." (Cf. BSBh, Introduction, p. 4.)
2Cf. Chand. Up. VI,1,4-6.

108
 I, 3] METRICAL PART 111

other" (avitryii niimiirryasminn arzyadharmiidhyiiropat}a, Upad II, 2,51). In other words,

avidyii is mutual superimposition of Atman and non-Atman such as the body the senses
and the inner organ. ' '
CHAPTER 3 5This is an important term in Mahayana Buddhism, especially the Madhyamika

THE LORD School founded by Nagarjuna (150-250). The term "silnyatii" is sometimes translated
as "emptiness," ''.voidness," or "nothingness" and mistaken for absolute negation of
ex:istence, which Sankai;.a also seems to mean by the term here. Buddhists are called
nihilists (vainafika) by Sankara (cf. Upad II,2,55; 2,57; 2,58) and other writers of
the orthodox: schools of Indian philosophy. Sunyata, however, means that nothing has
~ny intrinsic nature of its own (niffesvabhavatva); it denotes the unreality of the founda-
tion of the phenomenal appearance but not the unreality of the appearance as such.
The idea of sflnyatii is not a philosophical concept but, rather, a method which leads to
the penetration into true reality. Cf. E. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India (Reprint ed.
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1967), pp. 242-243.

1. If the Lord is non-Atman, one ought not to dwell upon [the

knowledge] "I am He." If He is Atman, the knowledge "I am
the Lord" destroys the other [knowledge J.1
2. If, being different from Atman, [He] is taken to have char-
acteristics such as "not coarse," 2 what is the use of them when He
is not an object of knowledge? If He is Atman, the notion of differ-
ences is destroyed [by them].
3. Understand, therefore, that [that predication of qualities)
such as "not coarse" are meant to negate false superirnposition4
[upon Atman]. If [they] were meant to negate [false superimposi-
tion] upon something other [than Atman], this would indeed be a
description of emptiness (Sutyata). 5
4. And if it is thought [that they are meant to negate false
superimposition] upon something other than the inner Atman of
a man who wishes to know, the words [of the Sruti], "[He is . . . ]
without breath, without mind, pure[, higher than the high Imper-
ishable]" (Mm:ic;l. Up. II,1,2), would also be meaningless.

Notes

l"Arryanivartikii" may be in the sense of"anya-dhi-nivartikii" if the compound "a11J-

adhihnuti" in the next stanza is taken into consideration." Anyadhi" is synonymous with
"avidyii" according to Upad I, 17,21 (cf. a11yadT{fi, U pad I, 17,6; 56). If so, this sentence
can be translated as: " . . . the knowledge 'I am the Lord' destroys the [notion] of
difference."
2See Brh. Up. III,8,8.
BSee note I.
4 According to Sankara, '' avidyii is the superimposition of the qualities of one upon the

llO
 I, 4] METRICAL PART 113
Notes

lSee Introduction, III,B,3, pp. 39-40.

2 Anandajiiiina and Riimatirtha interpret "nii/w1f!pratyaya-" as "niiham kartii bhoktii
CHAPTER 4 ~ii ki'!' tu brahmaiviismiti. (ya& p'.amii7J~janitaf:i) pratyayaf,I." Bodhanidhi ~!so interprets
in the same way but with a slight difference in expression.
"I" -NOTION 3This line may be a later interpolation. See Mayeda Upad, p. 221.

1. When action, which has the "I" -notion as its seed and is in
the bearer of the "I"-notion ( = the intellect), 1 has been burnt
up by the fire of the notion that "I am not [an agent or an ex-
periencer] ,"2 how can it pr:oduce a result?
2. If [you say:] "[Even after the action has been burnt up,]
production of a result [of action J will take place as previously ex-
perienced," [we reply:] No; it ( = production of a result) is based
upon other action. [If you say,] "When the "I"-notion [as the seed
of action] has been destroyed, we ask you, How can there be
that [action beyond that which has been burnt up]? Answer
that,"
3. [we reply:] As [action] can fashion the body and so on, it
can overpower knowledge in you concerning the Existent and
produce a result. When action comes to an end, knowledge will
ans e.
4. As experience [of the result of action] and know ledge are
both results of action which has already begun to produce a result,
it is reasonable that they ( = knowledge and action) are not
contradictory to each other. But other [action, namely that which
has not yet begun to produce a result,] is different in nature.
5. A man who has knowledge of Atman, which negates the
notion that the body is Atman and is as [firm] as [ordinary peo-
ple's] notion that the body is Atman, is released even wifr10ut
wishing.
[ 5'. Therefore, all this is established. The reasoning is as stated
by us.] 3

112
 I, 5] METRICAL PART 115

desert, a naked hunter of the Cai:i<;lala class, all besmeared with dirt, surrounded by a
pack of dogs. Extremely fierce-looking, he carried a sword and was armed with bow
and arrows. Udailka saw a copious stream of water issuing from the urinary organs of
CHAPTER 5 that hunter. The hunter offered the water repeatedly but udanka did not accept it,
SUSPICIO N OF URINE and finally became angry. But later Vi~nu explained to him that the hunter was Indra
and that he had appeared before him to give him nectar.
2 Cf. Nai1 II,63.
3 See Introduction, III,B,2, pp. 36-37.

4 Ramatirtha in his commentary suggests here the two ways of reading: one is

"buddhe(l iabdiidibhir bhasas" and the other is "buddhe~ labdiidinirbhasas" which I have
used.
5 Anandajiiana, Bodhanidhi and Ramatirtha take this "anubhava" (Pure Experience)
as "Siik.fin .. " ·

l. Just as the sage Udanka did not accept the nectar, thinking
that it was urine, 1 so people do not accept the knowledge of
Atman out of fear that action will be destroyed.
2. Atrnan, abiding in the intellect, is seen as it were moving and
meditating [when the intellect moves and meditates]. The mis-
take about transmigratory e~istence is like that of a man in a
[moving] boat who thinks that it is the trees [along the shore
which are moving].
3. Just as to a man in the boat the trees [appear to] move in a
direction opposite [to his movement], 2 so does Atman [appears to]
transmigrate, since the Sruti reads, "[He, remaining the same,
goes along both worlds,] appearing to think [, appearing to move
about]" (Brh. Up. IV,3,7).
4. Intellect being pervaded by the reflection3 of Pure Conscious-
ness, knowledge arises in it; and so sound and other [objects of
the sense-organs] appear. 4 By this people are deluded.
5. The "I"-notion appears to be as it were Pure Consciousness
and exists for Its sake. And it does not do so, when the "this" -
portion has been destroyed. [So] this Pure Experience 5 [which
is other than "this"-portion ] is the highest [ Atrnan].

Notes

1 This story appears in the Mahiibhdrata, Aivamedhaparvan, Sec. 54, pp. 208-212. It runs
as follows: When Vigm allowed the sage Udanka to ask him for some boon, he asked
for water and Vigm told him to think of him whenever he wanted water. One day,
wandering over the desert, he became thirsty and thought ofVigm. Then he saw, in the

114
 I, 6] METRICAL PART 117

2This stanza appears as Nai* IV,28.

3This stanza appears as Nai~ IV,27.
4Cf, stanza 2.
CHAPTER 6 5This stanza appears as Nai~ IV,29.
6The Upani~adic sentence "aha'!' brahmiismi" (I am Brahman) is one of the Mahlivii-
HAVING CUT kyas (Great Sentences) which the Advaitins consider to be best indicative of the Advaita
doctrine. There are said to be eleven or twelve Mahaviikyas, but among them this
sentence and "tat tvam asi" (Thou art That) are best known.

l. Atman Itself is not qualified by a hand which has been cut off
and thrown away. Likewise, none of the rest [ofthe body] quali-
-
fiies [Atman]. 1

2. Therefore, every qualification is the same as a hand which

has been thrown away, since it is.non-Atman. Therefore, the Know-
er(= Atman) is devoid of all qualifications. 2
3. This whole [universe] is qualification, like a beautiful orna-
ment, which is superimposed [upon Atman] through nescience.
Therefore, when Atman has been known, the whole [universe]
becomes non-existent.3
4. One should always grasp Atman alone as the Knower, dis-
connected [from all qualifications] ,4 and abandon the object of
knowledge. One should grasp that what is called "I" is also the
same as a part which has been abandoned. 5
5. As long as the "this" -portion is a qualification [of atman ],
that ["!"-portion] is different from [Atman] Itself. When the
qualification has been destroyed, the Knower is established [in-
dependently from it], as a man who owns a brindled cow [is es-
tablished independently from it].
6. The learned should abandon the "this"-portion in what is
called "I," understanding that it is not Atman. ["I" in the sentence
of the Sruti] "I am Brahman" (Erh. Up. I,4,10) 6 is the portion which
has been left unabandoned in accordance with the above teaching.

Notes

lThis stanza appears as Nai~ IV,26.

116
 I, 6] METRICAL PART 117
2Tl1is stanza appears as Nai! IV,28.
3This stanza appears as Naii IV,27.
4Cf. stanza 2.
CHAPTER 6 0This stanza appears as Naii IV,29.
6 The Upani!adic sentence "aharrz brahmasmi" (I am Brahman) is one of the Mahiivii-
HAVING CUT kyas (Great Sentences) which the Advaitins consider to be best indicative of the Advaita
doctrine. There are said to be eleven or twelve Mahiiviikyas, but among them this
sentence and "tat tvam asi" (Thou art That) are best known.

I. Atman Itself is not qualified by a hand which has been cut off
and thrown away. Likewise, none of the rest [of the body] quali-
fies [Atman ].1
2. Therefore, every qualification is the same as a hand which
has been thrown away, since it i~ non-Atman. Therefore, the Know-
er ( = Atman) is devoid of all qualifications.2
3. This whole [universe] is qualification, like a beautiful orna-
ment, which is superimposed [upon Atman] through nescience.
Therefore, when Atman has been known, the whole [universe]
becomes non-existent.3
4. One should always grasp Atman alone as the Knower, dis-
connected [from all qualifications], 4 and abandon the object of
knowledge. One should grasp that what is called "I" is also the
same as a part which has been abandoncd. 5
5. As long as the "this"-portion is a qualification [of atman],
that ["!"-portion] is different from [Atman] Itself. When the
qualification has been destroyed, the Knower is established [in-
dependently from it], as a man who owns a brindled cow [is es-
tablished independently from it].
6. The learned should abandon the "this"-portion in what is
called "I," understanding that it is not Atman. ["I" in the sentence
oftheSruti] "I am Brahman" (Brh. Up. I,4,10) 6 istheportion which
has been left unabandoned in accordance with the above teaching.

Notes

lThis stanza appears as Nai! IV,26.

116
 I, 7] METRICAL PART 119
vades its object of knowledge, the object is called "the one which is seated in the in-
tellect" (buddhyaru<f.ha). See Introduction, III,B,2, p. 36. Cf. Upad I,18,155-157.
2 Buddhicii.ra is synonymous with ci ttapracar a (U pad II ,2, 7 5; 82) ,which is again synon-
CHAPTER 7 ymous withcittavrtti in rogasutra I,2; IV, 18. See Introduction, III,B,2, p. 35, and note
LOCATED IN THE INTELLEC T 32.
3Cf. Upad I,17,16; 18,122.

1. Everything located in the intellect 1 is always seen by Me in

every case [of cognition]. Therefore, I am the highest Brahman;
I am all-knowing and all-pervading.
2. Just as [I] am the Witness of the movements in My own in-
tellect,2 so am I [also the Witpess of the movements] in others'
[intellects]. I can be neither rejected nor accepted. Therefore, I
am indeed the highest [Atman J.
3. There is no change in the Atman, nor impurity, nor material-
ity, and because It is the Witness of all intellects, there is no limita-
tion of its knowledge, as there is in the case of knowledge of intel-
lect.
4. Just as in a jewel the forms such as red color are manifested
in the sunshine, 3 so in my presence everything becomes visible
[in the intellect]. Therefore through Me [everything becomes
visible] as [the forms such as red color become visible] through
sunshine.
5. The object of knowledge in the intellect exists when the
intellect exists; otherwise it does not exist. Since the Seer is always
seer, duality does not exist.
6. Just as the intellect, from absence of discriminating knowl-
edge, holds that the highest [Atman] does not exist, just so when
there is discriminating knowledge, nothing but the highest
[Atman] exists, not even [the intellect] itself.

Notes

lPiida a of this stanza appears again as piida a of stanza 18.94. When the intellect per-

118
 CHAPTER 8 CHAPTER 9

THE NATURE OF PURE SUBTLETY

CONSCIOUSN ESS

1. It is to be known that [in the series] beginning with earthl

1. I Myself have the nature of Pure Consciousness, O Mind; and ending with the inner Atman, each succeeding one is more
[My apparent] connection with taste, etc., is caused by your delu- subtle and more pervasive than the preceding one which has
s~on. Therefore no result due to your activity would belong to Me, been abandoned.
smce I am free from all attributes. 2. The means of knowledge show that external earth is the same
2. Abandon here activity bop1 of illusion and come ever to rest as the bodily earth. [External] water and all the other elements
from search for the wrong, since I am forever the highest Brahman, should be known to be the same as [bodily elements].
released, as it were, unborn, one alone, and without duality. 3. Just as the [clear] sky is all-pervading before the origination
3. And I am always the same to beings, 1 one alone; [I am] the of air and other [elements], so am I always one alone, all, Pure
highest [Brahman] which, like the sky, is all-pervading, imperisha- Consciousness only, all-pervading and non-dual.
ble, auspicious, uninterrupted, undivided and devoid of action. 4. It is said that all beings from Brahma down to the plants
Therefore no result from your efforts here pertains to 1\1e. are my body. From what else can the faults such as desire and
4. I am one alone; No other than that [Brahman] is thought to anger arise in Me?
be Mine. In like manner I do not belong to anything since I am 5. Although I am always untouched by the faults of beings,
free from attachment. I have by nature no attachment. There- being the Lord who a bides in all beings, [yet] people look upon Me
fore I do not need you nor your work since I am non-dual. as contaminated [by the faults of beings] just as an ignorant per-
5. Considering that people are attached to cause and effect, I son looks upon the sky as blue.
have composed this dialogue, making [them] understand the 6. As the intellects of all beings are always to be illuminated by
meaning of the truth of their own nature, so that they may be re- My Pure Consciousness, all beings are the body of Me who am
leased from [their] attachment to cause and effect. all-knowing and free from evils.
6. If a man ponders on this dialogue, he will be released from 7. The object ofknowledge [in the waking state] is looked upon
ignorance, the origin of great fears. And such a man is always as having an origin, as is [the object of] knowledge in the dream-
free from desire; being a knower of Atman, he is ever free from ing state. [TrueJ knowledge is constant and without object; hence
sorrow, the same [to beings], and happy. duality does not exist.
8. The Knower's Knowing2 is indeed said to be constant, for
nothing else exists in the state of deep sleep. Knowing in the
Note
waking state results from nescience; therefore the object of knowl-
1 Cf. samo 'haf!i sarvabhiilefu, BhG IX,29. edge shoufd be looked upon as unreal.

120 121
122 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 9, 9

9. Just as the lnfinite3 lacks form-and-color, etc., and is not the

object of sight, etc., so it is not to be taken to be an object of know-
ledge. CHAPTER 10
SEEING
Notes

lThe text reads "gandhader" here, but Anandajfiiina comments on it: Prthivz gandhasa·
bdenocyate, and Ramatirtha also says: gandhasabda~ PrthivlsabdiirthaQ.
2The word jntiti means "relative" in the Upani~ads (for example, Chand. Up.
VI,15, 1; VIII, 12,3; Kau~. Up. I,4). Bodhanidhi and Ramatirtha interpret it asjiiapti.
Anandajfiana's interpretation on this term is not clear but seems to take it as caitanya.
3The word bhfiman is sometimes translated as grandeur, the superlative, acme, and
plenum. The blzilman in Chand. Up. VII,23 is interpreted in BS I,3,8, which takes it as
paramiitman according to BSBh I,3,8, p. 213. 1. The highest [Brahman]-which is of the nature of Seeing, like
the sky, ever-shining, 1 unborn, one alone, imperishable, stainless,
all-pervading, and non-dual-That am I and I am forever re-
leased. Om. 2
2. I am Seeing, pure and by nature changeless. There is by
nature no object for me. Being the Infinite, 3 completely filled in
front, across, up, down, and in every direction, I am unborn,
abiding in Myself.
3. I arn unborn, deathless, free from old age, immortal, self-
effulgent, all-pervading, non-dual; I am neither cause nor effect,
altogether stainless, always satisfied and therefore [constantly]
released. Orn.
4. Whether in the state of deep sleep or of waking or of dream-
ing, no delusive perception appears to pertain to Me in this world.
As tl10se [three states] have no existence, self-dependent or other-
dependent, I am always the Fourth, 4 the Seeing and the non-dual.
5. The continuous series of pains due to the body, the intellect
and the senses is neither I nor of l\1e, for I am changeless. And this
is because the continual series [of pain] is unreal; it is indeed un-
real l:ike an object seen by a dreaming man.
6. It is true tha.t I have neither change nor any cause of change,
since I am non-dual. I have neither good nor bad deeds, neither
final release nor bondage, neither caste nor stages of life, since I
am bodiless.
7. Since I am beginningless and attributeless, 5 I have neither
action nor result [of action]. Therefore I am the highest [Atman],
non-dual. Just as the ether, though all-pervading, is not stained,

123
124 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 10, 8-14 I, 10] METRICAL PART 125
so am I not either, though abiding in the body, since I am sub- as "sadii vibhiita!;z" in his Bha~ya on it. When he comments on the GK, he interprets
tle.6 "sakrdvibhiita" as "sadaiva vibhatm!', sadii bhiirupam" (GKBh IU,36) and as "sadaiva vi-
8. And I am always the same to [all] beings, 7 the Lord, for I am bhiite'' (GKBh IV,81). In his commentary on this stanza, Bodhanidhi interprets "sa-
lqdvibhiita" as "sadabhiisasvarupam iidityavat prakafasvarupatviit na kadacid api tamasiibhi-
superior to, and higher than, the perishable and the imperishable. 8 hhuyate." Ramatirtha interprets it as" ekadaiva visphuritam, sadaiva spaf fam bhiisamiinam.''
Though I have the highest Atman as my true nature and am non- 2 This whole stanza is quoted in Vediintasiira [XXX] 210. Om is the sacred syllable

dual, I am nevertheless covered with wrong knowledge 9 which is called pra~ava and sometimes compared with Amen. It is used at the opening of most
Hindu works and as a sacred exclamation may be uttered at the beginning and end
nesc1ence. ofVedic recitation or before any prayer.
9. Being perfectly stainless, Atman is distinguished from, and 3See Upad l,9,9.
broken by, nescience, residual impression, and actions. :Being filled 4 The atman in the waking state is called vailviinara (Upad I, l 7,65), that in the dream-

ing state taijasa (Upad I, 15,24 ), and that in the state of deep sleep prajiia (Upad I, 15,
with powers such as Seeing, I am non-dual, standing [perfect] in
25; I, 17,65) or auyakrta (Upad l, l 7,65). These three kinds of iitman are not the true At-
my own nature and motionless like the sky. man; they are only the atman limited by adjuncts (sopiidhi, Upad I, 15,29), Free from all
10. He who sees Atman with the firm belief "I am the highest limiting adjuncts (anupiidhika, Upad I,15,29), the true Atman transcends all these three,
Brahman" "is born no more" (Kath. Up. I,38), says the Sruti. When and It is called Tur'iya (Upad I,10,4; Brh. Up. V, 14,3-7), which is also called Caturtha
(Ma1,1<;L Up. 7) or Turya (Maitri Up. VI,19; VII,11,7-8), See Introduction, III,B,5,
there is no seed, no fruit is produced. Therefore there is no birth, pp. 43-46.
for there is no delusion. 5 Cf. anaditviin nirgur;atvan, EhG XIII, 31.

11. "This is mine, being thus," "That is yours, being of such scr. BhG XIII,32, which probably is the basis of this stanza.
7 Cf. BhG IX, 29; U pad I,8,3.
kind," "Likewise, I am so, nQt superior nor otherwise"-[such] scr. BhG XV, 16-18.
assumptions of people concerning Brahman, which is the same [to ,, 9 Yogasiitra I,8 defines "viparyaya" as "mitl!J!iijfiiinam atadrupa/Jratif!ham.'' According to
all beings], non-dual and auspicious, are nothing but their stupid- Sankara's usage of the term rnitl!)!iijfiiina, it is a synonym ofavi1;pii ( cf. Mayeda U pad, pp.
ity. 24-25; Introduction, IV,D, I, p. 78). In GBh XIII,2, p. 529, Sankara refers to three
kinds of auidyii: (l) viparltagriihaka, (2) sarrisayopasthapaka, and (3) agrahar;atmaka.
12, When there is completely non-dual and stainless knowledge, Among those three, (!) seerns to correspond to "viparyaya." Thus, though viparyaya is
then the grcat-souled experiences neither sorrow nor delusion. not a synom.ym ofavidyii, it is probable that aiiic!Ja is a wider concept to which viparyaya
In the absence of both there is neither action nor birth. This is the belongs. All three commentators take avic!Jii as the cause of viparyaya or rnitlryiijiiiina:
(1) Anandajiiana, avidyiimulena mithyiijfiiinenii11rta atmii, (2) Bodhanidhi, viparyayerya
firm belief of those who know the Veda,
mithyiijfiiinmiibllivrta(i iiciidita iva tu.iabdo iviirthe mithytijiiiina1Jl kena hetuneti ced aviqyayti
13. He who, in the waking state, like a man in the state of deep anirvacaniyayii . . . yad viparyayqjiiiina1Jl teniibhivrta iva svatabiuddhasvabhiivo 'pi, and (3)
sleep, does not see duality, though [actually) seeing, because of ~amatirtha, avic{yiivilasita eva viparyaya iry artlw~. The term ';abhivrta" is of interest,
his non-duality, and similarly he who, though [in fact] acting, is smce later Advaitins diaracterize avit[ya as avarar;.alakti, though Sankara does not do so
in his works.
action less-he [only] is the knower of Atman, and nobody else. This 10Cf. na miirrz karmii~i limpanti, BhG IV,H; Upad I,16,71.
is the firm concl us ion here [in the Vedanta].
14. This view which has been declared by me from the stand-
point of the highest truth is the supreme [view] as ascertained in
the Vedanta. If a man has firm belief in it, he is released and not
stained by actions, 10 as others are.

Notes

lSakrdvibhata. "Sakrt" has two meanings: one is "sudden" (for example,sakrdviqyutta,

Brh. Up. II,3,6) and the othey is "always" (for example, sakrdvibhiito hy evaifa brahma-
loka~, Chand. Up. VIII,4,2). Sankara interprets "sakrdvibhiita" in Chand. Up. VIII,4,2
 I, 1 I, 9-16] METRICAL PART 127

9. Just as it is [ordinarily] assumed that Atman is connected with

the results of merit and demerit, 6 although this [connection] is
CHAPTER 11 invisible, so the scripture7 says it should be admitted that Atman
THE QUALITY OF BEING THE is Brahman and that final release results from knowledge.
BEHOLDER 10. The residual impressions [enumerated in the Sruti,]B begin-
ning with a saffron-colored robe, are perceived here only by those
who see dreams. The Seeing ( = Atman) is different from those
[residual impressions], alone.
11. Just as it is seen that a sword [shines J when it is drawn from
its sheath, 9 so the Knower, separated in the dreaming state from
cause and effect, is seen to be self-effulgent.
1. The quality of being the Beholder is self-established as
12. The natural state of the Knower who was awakened by
belonging to beings, and their [apparent] difference from this
being pushed [with the hand] 10 has been declared [in the Sruti]
[Beholder] arises from ignorance. Therefore, the difference is re-
by the sentences such as "Not thus" (Brh. Up. II,3,6, etc.), which
moved by the words, "You arc the Existent."
remove [everything] falsely constructed [upon Hirn].
2. The scripture rejects action with the subtle body, 1 saying
13. Just as a great king and other worlds [that I become, as it
that, since "[The means to] immortality" is "[Only] this much"
were, in the dreaming state according to the Sruti] 11 are things
(Brh. Up. IV,5,15),2 nothing 'else accompanies knowledge.
falsely constructed upon l\!Ie in the dreaming state, so the double
3. I see the modifications of the mind in all beings without
form [of Brahman] and the residual impression should be known
exception. [But] how can I, who am changeless, have differentia-
[as falsely constructed].
tion in any respect?
14. Action is performed by Atman identified with the gross and
4. I am the Beholder of modification of the mind and also of
subtle body [and] in the form ofresidual impression. As My own
the mind [itself], [in beings Jin the waking state as in the dreaming
nature is "Not thus! Not so!" (Brh. Up. II,3,6, etc.), action is not
state; since neither [the mind] nor [its modification exists] in the
performed anywhere by Me.
state of deep sleep, [I am] Pure Consciousness only, all-pervading
15. Therefore there is no hope ofimmortality from action which
and non-dual.
has ignorance as its cause. Since the cause of final release is
5. Just as a dream is true until awakening, so would the identity
knowledge, it does not depend upon anything else but knowledge.
of the body with Atman be [true, as well as] the authoritativeness
16. The immortal is fearless and not injured. Atman [which was
of sense-perception and the other [means of knowled_?e J and the
left unnegated by the Sruti,] "Not thus! [Not so!]" (Brh. Up. II,
waking state until [the attainment of] knowledge of Atman.
3,6, etc.)12 is dear to Me.1 3 Therefore, along with action, one
6. Like ether, though abiding in all beings, I am free from [all]
should abandon anything [else] which is contrary [to Atman or]
the faults of beings; I am the Witness, the Observer, the pure,
different from It.
attributeless Brahman; so I am alone. 4
7. Being different from name, form, and action 5 and by nature
constantly free, I am Atman, i.e., the highest Brahman; I am Pure
Notes
Consciousness only and always non-dual.
8. Those who know "I am Brahman" (Brh. Up. I,4,10) and [yet IJagadananda translates "salinga" as "with their accessories" (i.e., the accessories of
think] "I am doer and experiencer" lose both knowledge and Vedic actions): the sacred tuft of hair on the head, the sacred thread, etc., according to
his footnote 2, p. 116. His translation seems to be based upon Riimatirtha's interpreta-
action; they are materialists (nastika) without a doubt.
tion, according to which "salinga" means "sasii.dhana." According to Anandajiiana,

126
128 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 11

however, "linga" means "hetu" or "sa1J1siirahetu," which may be associated with the
usage oflinga in the Nyiiya. The term "linga" is used three more times in the Upad
(I, 11,14; 15,10; II,1,4). In Upad I,11,14 and 15,10 the word means "the subtle body,"
and Upad I,ll,14 especially suggests that the word "linga" here also means "subtle CHAPTER 12
body." Bodhanidhi supports this, interpreting it as "siikfmasarira."
2See Upad I, 1,20-21.
IN THE SUNLIGHT
3for a fuller explanation of the modification (urtta, vrtti or prafyaya) of the mind or
the internal organ (anta~karal}a), see Introduction, III,B,2, pp. 35-37.
4This stanza is probably based upon the following passag~s of the Upaniiads: (1)
eko devas sarvabhute4ugiicfhas . .. siik~i cetii kevalo nirgur;iaf ea, Svet. Up. VI,! I, and (2)
aham brahmasmi, Brh. Up. I,4,10.
5This stanza is probably based UP,On Brh. Up. I,6, I ( cf. I,6,2 and 3): trl!YaTf! vii. idam,
nil.ma rilfta111 karma. According to Sankara's commentary on Brh. Up., the universe
consists of th9se three, but all of them are non-Atmans. Therefore, one should turn away
from them. Sanka~a holds that this is the import of this section of the Upani~ad. Cf.
Upad II,l,18 ff.; Sankara adBrh. Up. II,3,6, p. 334.
6Cf. pul}yo vai pu1J.yena karmal}ii bhavati papa~ papena, Brh. Up. III,2, 13 (cf. Brh. Up. l. Ju:t as a man thi~ks that a body in sunlight is [itself] bright,
IV,4,5). I so he thrnks that the mrnd 1 which appears to be the Seer is[indeed]
7Ramatirtha quotes Mui:i<;I. Up. III,2,9 and Svet. Up. III,8; 6,15. "I, the Seer."
SCf. Upad I, 14,48. Brh. Up. II,3, 1-6 describes two forms of Brahman: the formed
2. Whatever is seen in this world, Atman comes to be identified
and the formless, the mortal and the immortal. In Brh. Up. II,3,6, the form of the
formless is said to be like a saffrofl-colored robe (mahiirqjana'!' viisas), white wool with it.' C~nsequently [a man] is deluded and so he does not
(pii~cfviivika), the [red] Indragopa beetle (indragopa), a flame of fire (ag'D'arci), the recogmze Atman.
[phiteJ lotus flower (pwp/.arlka), a sudden flash oflightning (sakrdviqyutta). According to 3. Just as [the ~ad who] was himself the tenth thought that he
Sankara's commentary on B;h. Up. II,3,6, p. 333, the formless is the subtle body, the
particular forms of which are residual impressions (viisanii); the saffron-colored robe v:as an:ong the mne [others ], 2 so these deluded folk [think that
and the like are residual impressions. Atman 1s] among the objects of knowledge [such as the intellect]
9The simile of a sword appears in Sankara ad Brh. Up. IV,3, 10, p. 584. and do not [understand] otherwise.
lOBrh. Up. II,l contains a dialogue on Brahman between Gargya Drptabalaki and
Ajata5atru, a king of Benares. Drptabiilaki, though a Brahmin, had only imperfect
4. Explain reasonably how the two incompatible notions, "You
knowledge of Brahman, worshipping It as the Person in the sun, the Person in the moon, should act" and "You are That,"3 can exist at the same time
etc. On the other hand, Ajatasatru, though a king, bad perfect knowledge of and have the same locus.
Brahman and knew It a~ Atman. In the beginning of their dialogue Drptabaliiki explain- 5. He who misconceives the body as Atman has pain; he who has
ed his ideas of Brahman but the king rejected them all. So he had to request the king to
receive him as a pupil. Then the king acceded to his request, saying, "It is contrary to no body4 has by nature no [pain], as in the sleeping state. In order
usual practice that a Brahmin should come to a Kfatrrya, thinking 'He will tell me to remove pain from the Seeing, [the Sruti] says, "Thou [art ]That"
Brahman'" (Brh. Up. II,l,15). The two of them went up to a man who was asleep and (Chand. Up. VI,8, 7, etc.).
called him by various titles. But he did not awaken. Then the king woke him by push·
ing (or rubbing) him with his hand. After that, the king taught Drptabiilaki with
6. A Iogin, seeing the notion [of the intellect] on which the
reference to the states of dreaming and deep sleep that all vital airs, all worlds, all gods, reflection of the Seeing ( = Atman) is mounted like the reflection
and all beings come forth from Atman. of a face in a mirror, thinks that Atman is seen.
HThis is referred to in the dialogue between Gargya Drptabalaki and Ajatafatru
7. Only if he knows that the various deluded notions do not
(Brh. Up. II,l,18. See note 10 above). When the person consisting of consciousness
(vijiianamaya) ( = atman) is in the dreaming state, he becomes, as it were, a great king belong to the Seeing, is he beyond doubt the best of Yogins. No
(mahiiriijan), a great Brahmin (mahiibrii.hmar;ia), and the like. To be, as it were, a great one else can be.
king-to be, as it were, a great Brahmin, and so forth-are his worlds (loka) which 8. "Understander of understanding"5 is what is meant bv the
are consequences (of his action) (karmaphala), according to Sankara's commentary.
12cr. Upad I,2.2. word "Thou" [in the sentence, "Thou art That" (Chand. Up'. VI,
13Cf. Brh. Up. I,4,8 and II,4,5. 8,7, etc.)J. 5 Therefore this is the [right] apprehension of this word·
any other apprehension is false. '

129
 I, 12] METRICAL PART 131
130 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 12, 9-19
Notes
9. Since I am always of the nature of the Seeing and constant,
how is it possible for Me [sometimes] to see and [sometimes] not 1 ln Sankara's writings the terms buddhi, manas, citta, and dht are used synonymously

to see ?7 Therefore any apprehension [of the word] different from in most cases. See Introduction, III,B,l pp. 30-31.
2 This illustration, which is employed by Sankara and his followers to show how peo-
that is not accepted.
ple are deluded, and how they realize that they are Brahman-Atman, is probably based
10. Just as the body, the site of the sun's heat, is an object to the upon folktales. One ofa group often boys, who had swam across a river, counted their
Seeing, so the intellects here is the site [of pain-corresponding to number. Failing to count himself who was the tenth, he counted only nine boys
heat in the example]; therefore, the intellect is the object to the and thought that one boy was missing. But when he was told, "You are the tenth," he
realized immediately that he was the tenth. See Upad I 18 170· 172· 173· 174· 187·
Seeing. 190; 199; Sankara ad Brh. Up. I,4, 7; Sankara ad Tai;t. Up. II,l: Na·i; III,64-71;
11. The Knower whose "this"-portion 9 has been negated is SaT['bandhaviirtika, 206-216; Paiicadasi VII,57 ff. and VII, 247 ff. For parallel stories in
homogeneous like ether, non-dual, ever-free and pure. He is Indian folktales, see S. Thompson and W. E. Roberts, Types of lndic Oral Tales (FF
Communications No. 180), Type No. 1287: Numskulls Unable to Count Their Own Number.
Myself; I am Brahman, alone. 3 This is based upon "tat tvam asi" (Chand. Up. VI,8,7, etc.).
12. There can never be another understander superior to the 4 AtmiJn is described as bodiless. Cf. Chand. Up. VIII, 12, l; Upad I, 15,6; 15,7; 18,

Understander; therefore, I am the highest Understander, being 164.

5 This is based upon Bi;h. Up. IIl,4,2.
always released in all beings.
6for a detailed explanation of the sentence "tat tvam asi," see Introduction, III,C,
13. He who knows that Atman's Seeing is undiminished and that 2-5, pp. 49-57.
[Atman] is not a doer, abandoning the [very) notion that he is a 7Cf. Upad I,13,2 and 5.
8 The term sattva is a synonym for buddhi in Sankara's works. Cf. Upad l, 15,2.
knower of Brahman, [he alon.e] is a knower of Atman and no one
else. 10
scr. Upad l,2,2; 5,5; 6,5; 6,6.
1 0Stanza l2,l3cd is quoted in Vediintasiira [XXXVI) 236.
14. The discriminating notion, "I am the Knower, not the ob- 11See Upad I,l,14.
ject of knowledge, pure, always released," also belongs to the
intellect, since it is the object of cognition and perishable.
15. Since Atman's Seeing is undiminished and not produced by
factors of action, 11 the false assumption that this Seeing can be
produced is made by another seeing which is [Its] object.
16. (The notion that] Atman is a doer is false, since [it] is due to
the belief that the body is Atman. The belief, "I do not do any-
thing," is true and arises from the right means of knowledge.
17. [The notion that Atman] is a doer is due to factors of action
[whereas the notion that It] is not a doer is due to Its own nature.
It has been fully ascertained that the understanding, «[I am] a
doer," "[I am] an experiencer," is false.
18. When one's own nature has thus been understood by means
of the scripture and inference, how can this understanding, "I
am to be enjoined [to act]," be true?
19. Just as ether is within all, so am I within even ether itself;
I am always changeless, motionless, pure, free from old age, re-
leased, and non-dual.
 I, 13, I 0-20] METRICAL PART 133
because of the absence of discriminat ing knowledge with regard
to It. Similarly, I experience pleasure and pain through [a seeing]
CHAPTER 13 which is the object and adjunct [of the Seeing].
EYELESSNESS 1 10. Through deluded [seeing] all people think, "[I am] delud-
ed," and again through a pure [seeing] they think, "[I am] pure" ;
for this reason they continue in transmigrat ory existence.
11. If one is a seeker after final release in this world, he should
always remember Atman which is ever-free, described in the scrip-
ture as eyeless, etc. 7 [which] includes the exterior and the interior,
and is unborn.8
12. And as the scripture says that I am eyeless, etc., no senses
at all belong to Me. And there are the words in the [Mu:r:ic;i. Up.
1. As I am eyeless, I do not see. Likewise, as I am earless, how (II,1,2)] belonging to the Atharvaveda, "[He is . . . ] breathless,
shall I hear? As I have no organ of speech, I do not speak. As I mindless, pure."
am mindless, how shall I think? 13. As it is stated in the Kath. Up. (I,3,15) that I do not have
2. As I am devoid of the life principle, 2 I do not act. Eeing sound, etc., and [in the MuI,J.c;L Up. (II, 1,2) that I am] "without
.
without intellect , I am not a knower. Therefore I have neither
knowledge nor nescience, having the light of Pure Consciousness
breath, without mind," I am indeed always changeless.
14. Therefore, mental restlessness9 does not belong to Me.
only. Tb.erefore, concentrati on does not belong to Me. Both mental
3. Ever-free, pure, transcenden tally changeless, 3 invariable, restlessness and concentrati on belong [only] to the changeable
immortal, imperishabl e, and thus always bodiless. 4 mind.
4. [All- ]pervading like ether, I have neither hunger nor thirst, 15. As I am without mind and pure, how can those two ( = rest-
neither sorrow nor delusion, neither decay nor death, since I am lessness and concentrati on) belong to Me? Freedom from mind
bodiless. and freedom from change belong to Me who am bodiless and
5. As I have no sense of touch, I do not touch. As I have no [all-] pervading.
tongue, I do not perceive taste. As I am of the nature of constant 16. Thus, as long as I had this ignorance, I had" duties to
knowledge, I never have [either] knowledge or ignorance. perform, though I am ever-free, pure, and always enlightened .
6. The modificatio n of the mind, 5 which is caused by the eye 17. How can concentrati on, non-concen tration, or anything
and takes on form-and-co lor [of its object], is certainly always else which is to be done belong to Me? For, having meditated on
seen by the constant Seeing of Atman. and known Me, they realize that they have completed [all] that
7. In like manner the modificatio ns [of the mind] which are had to be done.
connected with the senses other [than the eye] and are colored by 18. "I am Brahman" (Brh.Up. I,4,10). I am all, always pure,
[external] objects; also [the modificatio n of the mind] in the form enlightened and unfettered, unborn, all-pervadin g, undecaying ,
of memory and in the forms of passion and the like, which is immortal, and imperishabl e.
unconnecte d [from the senses], located in the mind 6 ; 19. In no being is there any Knower other than Myself; [I am]
8. and the modificatio ns of the mind in the dreaming state the Overseer of deeds, the Witness, the Observer, constant, attrib-
are also seen to be an other's. The Seeing of the Seer is, therefore, uteless, and non-dual.w
constant, pure, infinite, and alone. 20. I am neither existent nor non-existen t 11 nor both, being
9. The Seeing is [wrongly] taken to be inconstant and impure

132
134 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 13, 21-27 I, 13) METRICAL PART 135
alone and auspicious. To Me, the Seeing, there is neither twilight aprakamp_ya (not to be caused to tren;ble or shake) in his commentary on the BhG (VI,
nor night nor day at any time. 8). In another place (BhG XII,3) Sankara interprets "kufa" as indicating avii{ya and
the many other seeds of sa'!!sara, and so "kufastha" means "stand~ng on this kufa" (see
21. Just as ether is free from all forms, is subtle and non-dual, so S. Mayeda, "The Authenticity of the Gitabha§ya Ascribed to Sankara," WZKSO,
am I devoid even of this [ether], I am Brahman, non-dual. vol. IX, 1965, pp. 182-183). In Pali the word "kfifaf!ha" is used in the sense of"not
22. My separatedness, i.e., in the form "my atman," "his atman," subject to change" or "immovable" and interpreted as "pabbatakufarp. viya /hita" (see
The Pali Text Sociery's Pali-English Dictionary, p. 53). Cf. F. Edgerton (tr.), The Blza-
and "your atman," is what is falsely constructed [on Me], just as
gavad Gita (Harvard Oriental Series vol. 38. Cambridge:,Harvard University Press,
the difference of one and the same ether arises from the difference ! 952), vol. 1, note 2 on BhG VI,B, p. 183. In the Upad, Sankara uses "kiifastha" as
of holes [in various objects]. an antonym of"vikr!Jliivat" (Upad II, 2,74) and "pariryiimin" (Upad II,2,75). See note
23. Difference and non-difference, one and many, object of 22 ofUpad II,2.
4See note 4 of Upad I, 12.
knowledge and knower, movement and mover-how can these 5See Upad I,11,3.
[notions] be falsely constructed on Me who am one alone? 6According to Sankara, desire and other psychological facts are perceived as objects
24. Nothing to be rejected or accepted belongs to Me, for I am just as a jar and other external objects are perceived as objects (see Upad II,2,70).
There is no essential difference between external and internal perception, since in the
changeless, always released and pure, always enlightened, at-
process of perception objects of external perception are transformed into pratyaya
tributeless, and non-dual. (notion) or vrtti (modification) of the buddlzi (or manas) which are in the form of external
25. Thus, with concentrated mind, one should always know objects, and objects of internal perception are also transformed into those which are in
everything as Atman.1 2 Having known Me to be abiding in one's the form of pleasure, pain, and other objects of internal perception. For a fuller account
of perception, see Introduction, III,B,2-4, pp. 33-43.
own body, one is a sage, rel<'iased and immovable. 7Cf. Brh. Up. IIl,8,8; Svet. Up. III, 19.
26. If a J"ogin thus knows the meaning of the truth, he is one BCf. MuJ.1<). Up. II,1,2; Upad I,14,18; II,1,7.
9 In later Advaitins' works the term viktePa has the technical sense of projection and
who has completed all that was to be done, 13 a perfected one and
avil[yii (or miiyii) is said to have the projective power (vikfepafakti) and the obscuring pow-
knower of Brahman. [If he knows] otherwise, he is a slayer of er (iivaral!afakti). Cf. T. M. P. Mahadev~n, The Philosophy ef Advaita (Madras: Ganesh
Atman. 14 & Co., 1957), pp. 240-242. However, Sankara's concept of avidya (or mtiya) does not
27. The meaning of the Veda herein determined, which has have such attributes. The term vikfepa here means "moving about" or "restlessness"
of the mind. This us~ge of the term is in accordance with that in rogasfitra I,3-0 and 31
been briefly related by me, should be imparted to serene wander-
(citttJvikfepa), which Sankara interprets as "citta1{1 vikfipanti vifayefV iti cittavikfePii~" in
ing ascetics by one of disciplined intellect. 15 his 1"ogasiltrabhiifyavivara~a (Madras Government Oriental Series, XIV), p. 82. It also
agrees with that in Buddhist texts. For example, Abhidharmakofabhii.fya (ed. by P. Pra-
dhan. Tibetan Sanskrt Works Series vol. VIII. Patna, 1967), p. 56, line 13; p. 339, line
21; p. 340, line I. Cf. U. Wogihara: Sanskrit-Chinese-Japanese Dictionary (Tokyo: Suzuki
Notes Research Foundation, 1940-1974), p. 1202; Mayeda Upad, p. 29.
IOThis stanza is probably based upon Svet. Up. VI, 11. See Upad I, 11,6.
lSee Upad II,3, which is entitled "Parisa1]1khyana" and is similar to this chapter. Cf. ncr. Upad I,19,19.
Unters, p. 1925, ~· 2. 12Cf. Brh. Up. IV,4,23: iti tasmad eva1{1vit, . . . samahito bhutvii, . . . sarvamatmiinarp.
2According to Sankara, the individual consists of the following six components: pa.iyati.
(1) the body, gross (sthula) and subtle (suk.rma), (2) the five senses (buddhindrefya), (3) 13 Cf. k1takrtya, BhG XV,20; Ait. Up. IV,4.
the five organs of action (karmendri,ya), ( 4) the internal organ (anta(lkarm:za), (5) the prin- 14Cf. ii.tmahan, l.ia Up. III.
cipal vital air (mukhya praiia), and (6) Atman. The termpra~a in its wider sense comprises 15As for the conditions for admission to Sankara's teachings, see Upad II,1,2. Cf.
(2)-(5), and the term is probably used here in this wider sense. In the first stanza, (2) Upad I,16,72; 17 ,53; I 7,86; 17,87; BSBh I,1,1; P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta,
(eye and ear), (3) (organ of speech), and (4) (mind) are referred to. See Introduction, pp. 60-82.
III,B,1, pp. 28-33. Cf. P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, pp. 324-332; Nakamura
II, pp. 451-463.
3The word "kii!astha," which is translated as "transcendentally changeless," is un·
known to the classical Upanifads but used in the BhG (VI,8; XJI, 3; XV, 16). Though
the precise interpretation of this word is not entirely clear, Sankara interprets it as
 I, 14, 9-19] METRICAL PART 137

result in the dreaming state. Since [the intellect] is also seen in the
same way in the waking state, the Seer is different from it.
CHAPTER 14 9. The intellect and so on arc non-Atman since they are by
DREAM AND MEMOR Y nature [objects] to be rejected or accepted. Atman is the agent
which rejects or accepts; [Atman] is neither to be abandoned nor
taken.
10. Since [Atman] includes the exterior and the interior,s is
pure and a homogeneo us mass of intelligence , how can there be
falsely constructed upon [It] an exterior, an interior, and anything
else to be rejected?
11. When the Brahman-kn ower realizes that the Atman has been
left through the exclusion of [every-]thin g else by saying, "Not
I. Since the form-and-co lor of a jar, etc., is seen appearing in thus! Not so!" (Brh. Up. II,3,6), then why should he make any
dream and memory, it is certainly 'to be inferred that the intellect forth er effort ?
has previously been seen in that form. . 12. Being beyond hunger, etc., 4 I am constantly Brahman; how
2. Just as one oneself is not the body which is seen wandermg can I have duties to perform? Thus one should rightly consider.
about begging alms in the dr,eaming state, so is he di~erent from 13. A knower of.Atman, if he wishes to perform some other duty
the body which is seen in the waking state, since he 1s the seer here, is like a man who has reached the further bank of a river and,
[of the body). on being there, wishes to go back to the other bank.
3. Just as [molten] copper appears in the form of the mold 14 If a knower of Atman were [an object] to be rejected or
into which it was poured, so it is certainly experienced that the accepted, he should not be considered to be worthy of final
mind, when pervading [the external objects] such as form-color, release. He is certainly thrown out by the mouth of Brahman.
appears in their forms. 1 .
15. As the vital air 5 is the universe including the sun, there is
4. Or, just as light, the illuminator, assumes the forms of what it
neither day nor night for a knower of the vital air. How can there
illuminates, so the intellect is seen to have the forms of its objects, be [day or night] for a knower of Brahman, since He is non-dual?
since it is the illuminator of all the objects. 2 16. Indeed Atman neither remembers nor forgets Itself, since
5. And the intellect in the form of [certain] o bj ec ts must have [Its] Pure Consciousne ss is not impaired. The knowledge that it
been seen by the [dreaming] man before [also]. If not, how is the mind that remembers has also its origin in nescience, the
could he see [these forms] in the dreaming state? Again, when a cause.
form is being recalled, whence would it come to him? 1 7. As it is said traditionall y that if the highest Atman is the ob-
6. [To say] that [the intellect] is an illuminator means that it ject of a knower, this [atman] would be something falsely con-
is seen in the guise of [illuminable objects such as] form-and-co lor. structed through nescience; when [this atman] has been excluded
In like manner [when we say] that the power of Seeing is the Seer, like a snake [falsely constructed ] on a rope, [the highest Atman]
it means that It pervades [the intellect] when the intellect is appear- is rion-dual.
ing [in the form of objects]. 18. Since there exists neither agent nor object nor result 6 and
7. Since all intellects in all bodies are illumined by Me, who since [Atman] includes both the exterior and the interior and is
have Pure Consciousness only as [My] light, I am therefore indeed unborn, 7 how can anyone have the notion about It (Atman), "This
the Atman of all. is mine" or "This is I"?
8. The intellect becomes instrument, object, agent, action, and 1 9. The notions "oneself" and "one's own" are indeed falsely
136
138 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 14, 20-31 I, 14, 32-42] METRICAL PART 139
constructed [upon Atman J through nescience. ·when there is ether, clear, stainless, of homogeneous intelligence, and non-dual
[the knowledge of] the oneness of Atman, these notions certainly ---what else, say, should such a one do?
do not exist. If the seed does not exist, whence shall the fruit arise? 32. He who sees Atman abiding in all beings and [yet] also [sees]
20. The Imperishable is the Seer, the Hearer, the Thinker, an enemy of Atman surely wants to make fire cold.
and the U nderstander. As It is not different from the Seer, etc., 33. Atman, which acts as the intellcct 11 and the life organs, is
I, the Seer, am the Imperishable. 8 like the reflection [of the sun in the water], 12 within the range of
21. As everything, whether stationary (inanimate) or movable sense-perception, etc., since it is said, "[He, remaining the same,
(animate), is possessed of seeing or some other activity, everything traverses both worlds,] appearing to think [, appearing to move
is the Imperishable. Therefore I, the Imperishable, am the about]" (.Brh. Up. IV,3,7), and is Itself pure and released.
Atman of all. 34. I am devoid of the life organs and mind, unconnected [with
22. Whoever sees Atman as devoid of duties remaining [undone], anything], the Seeing, [ all-]pervading like ether, how can there
devoid of action itself and of the result of the action, and free from be anything for Me to do?
the notions "mine" and "myself," he [really] sees [the truth]. 35. I never see non-concentration, nor anything else [needing]
23. If you have come to know that the notions "mine" and to be purified, belonging to Me who am changeless, the pure
"myself," efforts and desires are by nature void in Atman, continue Brahman free from evil.
to be self-abiding. What is the use of efforts? 36. [Nor do) I [see] anything to be pursued as belonging to
24. Whoever looks upon the Atman as the bearer of the "I"- [Mc] who am all-pervading and motionless, nor any upward,
notion and as the knower is ''not a knower of the Atman. He who downward, or oblique direction as belonging to [Me] who am
looks upon it as not so is a knower of the Atman. devoid of parts on account of being attributeless.
25. Just as Atman, though different, is thought to be identical 37. Being light of Pure Consciousness only, there is no darkness
with the body, etc., in like manner, since Atman is not recognized in It at all. I am ever-free; how is there now anything left for Me
as a non-agent, It [is thought to] consist of action and its result. to do?
26. Seeing, hearing, thinking, and undcrstanding 9 arc always '.38. Since [It] is mindless, what does [It] think? Again, since
experienced by people in the dreaming state. Since these are the [It] is devoid of organs [of action], what docs [It] do? The words
nature of Atman, therefore Atman is directly perceptible. of the Sruti, "[He is . . . ] certainly without breath, without mind,
27. To the knower of Atman there is no fear of the other world pure" (Mui:i~- Up.II, 1,2), 13 are true.
nor any fear of death; to him even gods like Brahma and Indra 10 39. As Atman is without time, without place, without direction,
are pitiable objects. and without cause,14 he who always meditates (on Atman] never
28. If his inauspicious desire, the cause of all afflictions, has depends upon time and the like.15
been completely destroyed, what use is it to him to be a god, to 40. Whoever bathes in that spiritual pilgrimage place, where
be Brahma and Indra? gods and Vedas and every purification unite, becomes immortal.
29. He to whom both "I," the notion of "oneself," and "my," 41. Sound and the other [external objects of knowledge] are
the notion of "one's own," have become meaningless, becomes not perceived by themselves, nor are they perceived by each
a knower of Atman. other. Since taste, etc., are perceived by something other than
30. For one who has come to know that Atman is the same, whe- themselves, they are objects of perception, and thereforr belong
ther adjuncts such as the intellect exist or not, how can there be to the bcdy.
anything which he ought to do? 42. In like manner, "I" -notion, "my" -notion, desire, effort,
31. Once one has understood that Atman is [Brahman]-[Iike] change, pleasures and the like are [perceived by something other
140 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS I, 14, 43-50] I, 14] METRICAL PART 141
than themselves] since [they are] objects of perception in ordinary at any time in th~ Seeing which is like ether, whether Its duality is
life. Moreover, since they are objects, they are not perceived by negated by the Srutis or not.
each other. It ( = their perceiver = Atman) is different from them.
43. Since every change such as the "!"-notion, etc. has its agent,
it is connected with the result of actions, and is illumined, as by Notes
the sun, on all sides by [Atman, which is] of the nature of Pure
Consciousness. Atman is therefore unfettered. 1 Thisstanza is quoted in Paiicadaii IV.28 .
. 2 Thisstanza is ;i.uoted in Paficadasi IV:29. Stanzas 14,3, and 4 are very important,
44. [Atman,] which is of the nature of Seeing, having pervaded,
smc~ they reveal Sankara's view of the psychology of perception. For a detailed dis-
like the sky, the minds ofallembodied beings, abides [there]. There- cussion, see Introduction, III,B,2, pp. 33-37.
fore, there is neither a knower lower than this one nor a [:knower) 3 Cf. Mur:icj. Up. II,l,2; Upad I,13,11; 14,10, etc.
4 Th: three corr:mentators Anandajfiana, Bodhanidhi, and Ramatlrtha, take afaniiyiidi
higher than this one. Consequently there is only one Lord.
as ~atfurmi (the six waves of existence), i.e., aianiiyii (hunger), pipasti. (thirst), foka
45. The body and the intellect being perceivable by something (grief), moha (delusion), jarii (old age), and mrryu (death). Cf. Brh. Up. III,5,1;
other than themselves, the doctrines that there is no Atman 16 have Upad I, 18,103; 18,206; 19,4.
been fully rejected by me, since it has been established that [At- 5 Cf. priir.zo 'sau loka.,, Brh. Up. I,5,4; priir.zo hy evaitiini sarviir.zi bhavati, Chand. Up. V,l,

man] is beyond action which causes impurity, is completely stain- 15 ( = yn, 15,4); prii~ii viiviidityiif1, Chand.Up. III, 16,5 and 6; iidityo ha vai prar.za.~, Pras.
Up. I,J and III,8.
less, all-pervading, unfettered, and non-dual. scr. stanza 8.
46. If, in your view, 17 t~.e mind in the form of a jar, etc., acti- 7 Cf. Mur;icj. Up. II,l,2;Upad I,13,11; II,1,7.
8 This stanza is based upon Brh. Up. III,8, 11.
vated variously by its own modifications, is not cognized [by Atman 9 Cf. Brh. Up. III,8,11; Upad !, 14,20.
different from the mind], [then] it would not be possible to pre- io·~he gods Brah~na, Vi11~u, and Siva constitute the Hindu triad and represent the
vent [It] from having faults--i.e., impurity, the nature of non- creative, preservative, and destructive principlt,s, respectively. However Brahma
e onsciousness and change---as the mind has. never. attaine,d.t~e p_opularity of the other two. Indra, an atmospheric god, i~ the most
prominent divm1ty m the ~g-Veda. He is often identified with thunder and wields a
47. Just as ether, being pure and uninterrupted, is neither
weapon named "vqjra''. which means thunderbolt. In the later Hindu mythology, how-
attached nor stained, 18 so is Atman indeed always the same to all ever, Indra has fallen rnto the second rank, being inferior to the triad.
beings and always free from old age, death, and fear. 11 Prajna is buddhi according to Ramatirtha.

12 Ramatirtha says: chiiyeva suryiidipratibimbam iva jale~u.

48. As the formless and the formed, actions and residual impres- t3Cf. Upad I,3,4; 13,12.
sions19 are through nescience falsely constructed upon Atman by 14 Cf. arya jagato . . . pratiniyatadefaktilanimittak riyiiphaliiirayasya . . . , BSBh I, 1,2,

those whose seeing is deluded; therefore, by saying, "Not thus!" p. 47.

1 ~Cf. BS IV,!, 11.
Brh.Up. II,3,6, etc.), they are excluded from [Atman], which is of
, is probably to refute the Buddhist tenet (niriitmaviida). It is of interest that
16 This
the nature of Seeing, and the Seeing [alone] is left unexcluded Sankara uses Buddhistic terms such as 1urrya (void, stanza 23) and trrl!ii (thirst, stanza
[by the Sruti]. 28) in this chapter.
49. The form of the mind in the waking state, which arises from 17 This interpretation is supported by all the three commentators. If the reading

"tena" is adopted in the first line instead of"tena," as Ramatirtha suggests in his com-
its connection with [external] objects, is seen at the time of memory
mentary, the following translation is possible: ''If the mind in the form of a jar, etc.,
and to a man in the dreaming state, as [external] objects [are seen activated variously by its own modifications, is perceived by this [Atman], it is not
in the waking state]. This is also the case with regard to the re- possible to prevent [1 t] from having the faults, i.e., impurity, the nature of non-
consciousness and change."
sidual impression of the body. The body and the mind are different
18 Cf. Kath. Up. V,11; Upad I,10,7; 10,14; 15,23; 16,58; 16,71; II,3,116.
from the Seeing since they are [Its] objects. 19 SeeUpad 1,ll,10; 13.
50. There are no distinctions in ether, which is by nature pure,
whether there is any impurity such as a cloud, or whether [such
impurity] has passed away; in like manner there is no distinction
 I, 15, 8-18] METRICAL PART 143
bodilessness is known to be a result which cannot be attained
through actions, why should one perform actions?
CHAPTER 15 8. Having completel y abandone d the cause of actions such as
ONE THING CANNO T BE ANOTH ER lineage, a wise man should remember from scripture his own na-
ture, which is incompat ible with the cause of actions.
9. Atman is one and the same in all beings and these beings are
in It as [they are] in the ether. 6 It is declared that like the ether [It]
has brightly and radiantly pervaded everything . 7
10. On account of the absence of any wound or sinew, one
should negate the gross body. As [Atman] is pure and free from
evils, [one should negate] impurity, and as the Sruti says, "[He is]
bodiless'' ( j§a Up. 8), [one should negate] the subtle body.s ·
l. As one thing cannot be another, one should consider that no 11. Just as Vasudeva ( = Kr~J).a) said [to Arjuna] that He him-
thing is anything else, since if one thing could be another, it would self was the same in the holy asvattha fig-tree and in his own body, 9
certainly perish. he wh<J knows himself to be the same is the best knower of Brah-
2. [The locus] where a thing which has previously been seen man.
is seen, like a picture pa~nted on a canvas, by him who is re- 12. Just as "I"- and "my"-not ions are not considere d to arise
memberin g [it] and [the agent of knowledg e] by whom it is seen with regard to other bodies, they do not arise with regard to this
to him should be known to be what are termed the intellect 1 and body either, since [Atman] is equally the Witness of the intellect
the Field-Kno wer2 ( = Atman) [respectiv ely]. [in both cases].
3. That which was connected with factors of action, such as 13. Passion and aversion have, and the latent impressio n of
agent, which ended with results [such as pleasure and pain], and form-and- color, a common substratum , [the intellect], and what
was perceive d-that is now remember ed as having been located is perceived as fear has the intellect as its substratu m; therefore, the
in the object ( = the intellect) [of the Field-Kno wer]. Therefore , Knower is always pure and free from fear.lo
it(= the intellect) was formerly the object [of the Field-Kno wer]. 14. One [comes] to consist of that upon which one fixes one's
4. And the object is different from the Seer, since it is always mind, if [one is] different from [it]. [But] there is no action in
the object like a jar. The Seer and the object are heterogen eous; Atman through which to become Atman. [It J docs not depend upon
otherwise [the Seer would be] like the intellect and not the Wit- [anything else] for being Atman, since, if [It] depended upon [any-
ness. thing else], It would not Itself be [Atman].
5. If one believes that one's own [lineage, etc. Jis identical with 15. Conscious nessll is homogene ous, undivided , free from old
Atman,3 lineage, etc., like a dead body, will prompt [one] to obey age and devoid of impurity, like the ether. Because of adjuncts
injunctiom .4 Therefore , lineage, etc., like a dead body i_:'. not such as the eye, etc., It is regarded as contrary [to what It is].
[identical with AtmanJ; otherwise [Atman J would be non-Atman . 16. On account of being an object like ajar, etc., the "!"-notio n
6. A> [the Sruti] says, "Pleasure and pain do not [touch one who is not an attribute of Atman. Other notions and faults should be
is bodiless]" (Chand. Up. VIII,12,1 ), bodilessness is not the result known in like manner. Atman is therefore devoid of impurity.1 2
of actions. The cause of [one's] connectio n with the body is ac- 17. As [Atman] is the Witness of all notions, It is changeless and
tiom. 5 Therefore a man of knowledg e should abandon actions. all-pervad ing. If the Seer were to change, He would be of limited
7. If Atman is independ ent with regard to actions, It should knowledg e like the intellect, etc. 13
also be thought to be so with regard to the cessation of actions. If 18. The Seeing of the Seer, unlike [that] of the eye, etc., is not

142
14-4 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 15, 19-28 I, 15, 29-40] METRICAL PART 145

interrupted, since [the Sruti] says, "For there is no [cessation of since [It] illuminates everything by Its own light. In like manner,
the Seeing of] the Seer" (B:rh. Up. IV,3,23). Therefore, the Seer as [It] is the cause of all actions, Atman is all-doing.
is al ways experiencer. 29. The ii.Iman thus described is [the atman] with adjuncts. [But]
19. One should examine thus: Am I a composite of the ele- the Atman without adjuncts is indescribable, without parts, attri-
ments [such as earth and water]? Am I a composite of the organs buteless and pure; neither mind nor speech reaches It.
[, internal and external]? Or am I any single one [of them] sep- 30. [Atman is conceived variously-] as intelligent or unintelli-
arately? Or who am I? gent, agent or non-agent, pervading or not pervading, bound or
20. I am neither an individual element nor all the elements; I released, one or not one, pure or in some other way.
am neither an individual sense-organ nor all the sense-organs, 31. Without attaining [It], words turn back together with the
since they are [respectively J objects of knowledge and instruments n-0tions [of the intellect], 1 9 since [It] is attributeless, actionlcss, and
of knowledge, as are the jar, etc. The Knower is different from devoid of distinction.
these. 32. Just as the ether pervades everywhere and is unconnected
21. The fuel of the fire of Atman is the intellect. Blazing up with with anything formed, so here [in the Vedanta] one should know
ncscience, desire, and action, 14 the intellect always burns through Atman. to be the pure and highest state. 20
the gates such as the ear, etc. 33. Just as the sun [drives away] the darkness, so the All-Seeing
22. When the intellect, inflamed by the oblation of objects, One endowed with light, having given up sense-perception [in
functions among [the sense-organs], which have the right eye the waking state] and its memory [in dream], drives away the all-
as their chief, the fire of Atman becomes the experiencer of gross devou ring darkness [in deep sleep].
objects. 15 34. That Atman, whose objects are the notions which have as
23. If, being devoid of passion and aversion, one remembers, at their ()bje<:ts form-'and-color [in the waking state], memory [in
the time of perceiving form-and-color, etc., that oblations are dream], and darkness [in the state of deep sleep], is the all-per-
being offered to the fire of Atman, one is not stained by faults in the vading Seer, the same in all beings.
waking state. 35. From the contact of Atman with intellect, mind, eye, objects,
24. The Atman, which [in the dreaming state] sees the memory- and light there arise the various notions of the intellect which are
imprcssions-which are caused by action due to nescience-mani- characteri:zed by ignorance. 21
fosted in the abode of the mind [and] illumined by the self-efful- 36. Distinguishing one's own Atman from the rest, one should
gent One, is called Ta~jasa. 16 know It to be the pure and highest state, the Seer abiding in all
25. When [in the state of deep sleep] neither [external] objects beings, the same, beyond all fears,
nor [their] memory-impressions are aroused by actions [to appear] 37. the whole, all-pervading, calm, devoid of impurity, existing
in the intellect, then Atman should be known to be Prajiia, 17 which firm like the ether, without parts, without actions, the all, constant
beholds nothing else. and free from duality.
26. The states of the mind, the intellect, and the sense-organs, 18 38. Having inquired, "Is the Knower, the Witness of all no-
which are aroused by actions, are illumined only by Pure Con- tions, Jmowa hie by me [or not]?", one should ascertain whether or
sciousness as a jar, etc., are illumined by the sun. not Brahman is known.
27. Since this is so, the Knower, which illuminates the notions 39. On account of teachings such as "[It is] the unseen Seer"
[of the intellect] by Its own light, and of which they are the objects, (Brh. Up. II I, 7,23) and "[If you think 'I know well,' you know]
is called the agent of those notions [of the intellect] only by the but little" (Kena Up. II, 1), the highest Brahman is not knowable by
deluded. me or others by any means.
28. [Only to the deluded], therefore, is [It] also all-knowing 40. [It] is my own nature, uninterrupted; [It] has the light of
146 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 15, 41-51 I, 15, 52-.'>4] METRICAL PART 147
knowledge as Its nature; [It] does not depend upon anything else from rejection and acceptance as described above, is truly never
for [Its] knowledge. Therefore [It] is always known to me. born [again].
41. The sun does not need any other light for its illumination; 52. He who has fallen into the rivers of births and deaths can
Knowledge does not require any other knowledge than its own never save himself from them by anything else but knowledge,
knowledge for its illumination. 53. because the Sruti says, "The knot of the heart is loosened, all
42. \Vhatever one's own nature may be, ,it does not depend doubts are cut off and one's actions are destroyed, when He is
upon anything else, since no light is to be manifested by anothrr seen" (Mur;i<;i.Up. II,2,8).
light. 54. If a man, having completely excluded "I"- and "my"-
43. Something destitute of light is manifested through its con- notions, has a firm belief in that ether-like state destitute of the
tact with something else which has light as its nature. It is, there- body, which has been declared according to well-studied scripture
fore, certainly false to say that light is an effect of the sun. and inference, he is released.
44. That which did not exist previously and comes into exist-
ence from something else is declared to be its effect. Because light
is the nature of the sun, it is not [the case] that light which did not Not:es
previously exist arises from the sun.
1 Upad I, 12, JO.
45. The sun and the like [, which have light as their nature], 2The hody is called the field (kfetra) and Atman. which knows it, is called the Field-
though they merely exist, are thought to be agents of light (illu- Knower (kretrajiia), Cf. BhG XIII.
mination), since jars, etc., are manifested [by them]. This should 3See a dialogue between the teacher and his pupil which starts at Upad II,l,9. Cf.

also be taken to be true of Atman which is [by nature] knowledge. 22 BSBh I,1,1, p. 24,
4According to the commentators Anandajiiana, Bodhanidhi, and Ramatirtha, this
46. Just as, when a snake comes out of its hole, the sun becomes means that on account of the belief that a dead hody is my mother or my father, th<"
[itsJ illuminator without any effort, so Atman becomes a knower dead body prompts one to perform purificatory rit<"S (sa1J7skii.ra).
since It has knowledge as Its nature. 5Cf. Upad I,J,3,
6Cf. lfa Up. VI; BhG VI,30.
47. Thus [fire], which is [by nature) hot, becomes a burner 1Cf. lfa up. v III.
merely by existing. This should also be taken to be true of 8The whole stanza seems to interpret lsii Up. VIIL

Atman which is [by nature] knowledge, when Its adjunct is known, 9Cf. BhG X, 19--42, especially X,26; 37. Vasudeva, or son of Vasudeva, is another

as [the sun becomes an illuminator] when a snake which has name for Kni:ia who is the chief speaker and expounds his philosophical doctrine to
Arjuna in tne BhG.
come out [of its hole] is known. WThis stanza is quoted in U pad 11, 1,35,
48. Just as the Knower becomes a knower even without any 11 In Sankara's GBh the highest Atman is called vijiiapti (III,29, p, 139), the nature of

effort, so It becomes a doer like a magnet. 23 Atman Itself, there- Atman is described as vijnaptimii.tra (II,17, p. 81), and Brahman is identified withjnapti-
miitra (III,33, p. !41). These are te9hnical terms characteristic of the Vijiianavadin
fore, is by nature neither knowable nor not knowable.
school of Buddhism. In the Upad, Sankara uses the term jiiapti three times. In this
49. As there is the teaching that It is different from the known stan:za he uses it in the sense of caitanya of Atman. But in Upad I,16,25, where he attacks
and the unknown,24 bondage, final release, and other states art" the Bahyarthavadins of Buddhism, he seems to treat it as a synonym of dhr (i.e., buddhi),
those which are falsely constructed upon Atman. and in Upad I, 18,55 he asserts that the term jfiapti is not applicable to Atman, since it
indicates "becoming" (bhiiva). CL Nakamura III, pp. 529-530; S. Mayeda, "On the
50. Just as there is neither day nor night in the sun, since there Author of the Mal)c;!fikyopani~ad- and the Gauqapiidiya-Bha$ya,'' The Ac[yar Library
is no distinction in the nature of light, so is there neither knowledge Bulletin, vols. 31-32, 1967-68, p. 92.
12This stanza is quoted in Nai~ IV,30.
nor ignorance in Atman, since there is no distinction in the nature
iacr. Upad II,2,75.
of knowledge. 14Cf. avidyii-kii.ma-karman, BSBh I,2, 17, p. 181. Klela (a psychic affection) is regarded
51. He who has come to know Brahman as described above, free as a wider concept to which avit{yii belongs. Avitfyii is the first and most dangerous mem-
148 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 15

ber of a series of kleias and it causes the other (cf. Yogasiltra Il,3). Cf. Eigen, p. 249;
Mayeda Upad, pp. 25-26.
15 According to GK I,2a, Vilva ( = Vaisvanara), i.e., Atman in the waking state, which

experiences things gross (slf•ilabhuj, GK 1,3), is in the right eye (dak1inak1imukhe vilvab). CHAPTER 16
Commenting on this line, Sankara says that though Viha exists equally in all the sense-
organs, it is especially referred to as existing in the right eye, for in the right eye is no-
CONSISTING OF EARTH
ticed the faculty of perception at its best (upalabdhipii {avadar lana, p. 2 7; dak~irzam akueve
mukhaT(t tasminpradhiinyena . . . vi.lva 'nubhilyate, p. 26). Cf. Kaui. Up. IV, 17; Brh. Up.
II,3,5; Nakamura III, p. 307, note I; R. N. Hurne, The Thirteen Principal Vpanishads
(4th impression. Madras: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 297, note 4.
16 See Introduction, III,B,5, pp. 43-45. Cf. Mai:ic;l. Up. IV; Vedantasara [XIV] 117.

17See Introduction, III,B,5, pp. 43-46. Cf. Mal).c;l. Up. V.

18 Ramatlrtha interprets the states of the mind, the intellect, and the senses as the

states of dreaming, deep sleep, and waking, respectively.

19 Cf. Taitt. Up. II,9; Ma1.i9. Up. III,l ,B.
20 The last line of this stanza appears again in stanza 36b.
l. It is said [traditionally] that the hard element in the body
21cr. Upad I,16,19.
22'fhe last line of this stanza appears again in stanza 47b. consists of earth and that the liquid element consists of water. Di-
23'fhe same simile is seen in Upad I, 17, 79. gestion, activity, and space have their origin in fire, air, and ether,
24 Cf. Kena Up. I,4; S. Mayeda, "Sankara's Authorship of the Kenopani!adbha!-
respectively.
ya," Inda-Iranian Journal, vol. X ( 1967), no. 1, p. 54, note 63.
'
2. [The five senses, i.e.,] olfactory [, gustatory, visual, cutane-
ous, and auditory, consist of earth, water, fire, air, and ether] and
their [five respective] objects of perception [namely, smell,
taste, form-and-color, touch, and sound] are qualities 1 of earth
and the other [four elements], since [each] sense is taken to have
as its object a thing of its [own] kind like light and color. 2
3. These [five senses] are [traditionally] said to be for the
purpose of perception and [the five organs or action] such as the
larynx and hand are said to be concerned with action. The mind 3
within, the eleventh, is for the sake of discriminating those [senses
and organs of action].
4. The intellect is for the purpose of determining [objects]. As
by its light, its own nature, Atman is always illumining the intel-
lect which perceives all objects, It is called the Knower. 4
5. Just as the illuminating light takes the forms of the objects
to be illuminated and, though [apparently] mixed [with its ob-
ject], it is not [really] mixed [with it], so the Knower, though [ap-
parently] mixed with notions, is not [really] mixed with thcrn° at
any time.
6. Just as a light on a stand can illumine without any effort
everything that its light reaches, so the Knower sees without any
effort the notions [of the intellect] in the forms of sound, etc.,
which It reaches.

149
150 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 16; 7-17 I, 16, 18-26] METRICAL PART 151

7. Pleasure, etc., differentiate the intellect which, being illu- and which is the impeller of transmigratory existence, one should
mined by the constant light of Atman, appears as atman in the com- know Atman to be the highest Brahman, which is released and
posite of the body and the senses. always fearless.
8. One with the feeling "I am suffering" does indeed regard 18. One should abandon as non-existent the triad of the states
Atman as suffering from headache, etc. The Seer is different from of waking, dreaming, and their seed called the state of deep sleep
Its object, which is suffering pain, and as It is the Seer, It is not and consisting of darkness 1 3; for when one [of them] exists, the
suffering pain. others do not.
9. One suffers pain because he mistakenly believes, "I am a 19. From the [apparent] mixing up of Atman with intellect,
sufferer of pain," and not because he perceives any [actual] sufferer mind, eye, light, object, and so on, 14 actions arise; therefrom
of pain. In the composite of the limbs, etc., one is the Seer of pain results the confused idea that Atman acts.
and never the sufferer of pain. 20. The shutting and opening of the eye in [its] place ( = the
10. If [you object, 6 ] "Like the eye [Atman] is both an object eye-socket) are related to the air and not to the eye, since [the eye
and an agent," [we reply:] No, [because] eyes are many and everJ shines [with the power of perception]. Similarly, [they] are
composite. Therefore, Atman cannot become the object, since neither in the mind nor in the intellect since [the mind and the
It is the Seer. intellect ever] shine.
11. If [you]7 think that Atman is also many on account of ]mowl- 21. Thinking and determination belong to the mind and the
edge, effort, etc., [we reply<] As [It] is homogeneous knowledge, intellect respectively, neither having the attributes of the other.
It, like light, is not an object. And everything is [falsely] constructed on Atman.
12. Though light is an illuminator, it does not illumine itself, 22. The perception of the senses is limited by the places [where
[since it has in itself no diff{~rence as between illuminator and they arc located in the body]. The intellect comes to be identical
illuminated] ; even if [it] had [such a] difference, it would not with those senses. When the Knower sees this intellect, it is felt to
illumine itself~ since [both the parts, illuminator and illumined, l)e, as it were, of the same size as the body.15
would be] the same [in nature].8 In like manner Atman [which has 23. [All] this 16 is indeed the mere dharma (element of life) 17
homogeneous knowledge] never sees Itself. which indeed perishes every moment and arises without intervals.
13. Nothing which has something else as its nature can become [Though all this is momentary,] there arises the recognition that
an object of the latter, as fire can neither burn nor illumine itself this [is that past one] because of similarity, just as a lamp [at this
14. For this very reason is refuted [the idea] that the intellect moment is recognized to be the same as it was at the previous
perceives itself by itself. 9 In like manner it is also unreasonable [to moment on account of similarity 18]. The cessation of [all] this is
assume] parts [of Atman], 10 since [both parts, viz. the cognizcr and the aim of life.19
the cognized] would be the same [in their nature and Atman has 24. According to some [.Buddhists] ,20 there exist [the external
in Itself] no difference. objects] such as form-and-color, the forms of which are manifested
15. Similarly, it is also unreasonable [to assume] that [Atman] by one other than themselves. According to other [Buddhists] 21
is empty. 11 For this reason has it been said that the intellect, like nothing else exists but this [consciousness]. [Now] the improba-
a jar, is seen by [Atman] as other than [Itself], since [Atman] is bility of the former [theory] is explained.
established before the discrimination 12 of that [intellect]. 25. As [in their view J consciousness takes the forms of external
16. Whatever may exist before the discrimination [of the intel- objects and perishes every moment, it [will] never have memory.
lect], if it is the cause [of the discrimination], it is free from discri- And as the intellect itself perishes every moment, it [will] have
mination, since it is the cause of the rise of the discrimination. nowhere to store any impression [of the past].22
17. Abandoning ignorance, which is the root of false assumption 26. As not even a receptacle [for the impression and memory]
152 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 16, 27-35 I, 16, 36-45] METRICAL PART 153

exists, there will be no instrument [with which to ascertain] the also says, "(For this is .. ] my miraculous power [which is hard
similarity [of a thing at this moment to what it was at the previous to go beyond]" (BhG VII,14).
moment 23]; therefore, [the former theory is unreasonable]. If there 36. So Atman is pure, since [It] is different in nature from false
were a receptacle [for the impression and memory], there would assumptions. Therefore, [It] is neither to be accepted nor rejected.
be abandonment [of the theory] that [everything] is momentary. Atman is not what is falsely assumed by something other than
[But] that is not acceptable [to them]. [Itself].
27. And since cessation [of all this] is accomplished without any 37. Just as darkness docs not exist in the sun, since it has light
effort, it will be useless to teach means for achieving it. As [all as its nature, so there is no ignorance in Atman, since It has con-
this] comes to an end at every [moment], cessation does not stant knowledge as Its nature.
depend upon anything else [for its accomplishment]. 38. Likewise, as the nature of Atman is changeless, It has no
28. Even if they seek to say that [cessation] should depend upon change of sta.tc, 28 for if It had any change of state, Its destruction
another stream of existence, though different [in essence there- would certainly occur.
from ], if everything is momentary, it does not depend upon 39. To him who [asserts that] final release is a change of state,
anything else. final release is something produced; therefore it is perishable. It
29. Because [if] the two exist at the same time and are con- is by no means reasonable that final release is a union [of Atman
nected with each other, each (of them], having been established with Braitman] or disunion [from Prakrti],
through the connection [with the other], will depend upon the 40. since [any] union [with Brahman] or disunion [from Prakrti]
other. is not permanent. And [it is by no means reasonable that final
30. It is our opinion that where there is false superimposition24 rekase is for Atman] to go [to Brahman, or for Brahman] to come [to
there is [also) annihilation ofit. Tell me to whom final release as Atman]. But one's own nature is never lost,
the result belongs, if everything perishes.25 41. since one's own nature has no cause, whereas the others
31. Truly [It] exists Itself; It may be called Knowledge, At- (=a change of state, etc.) 29 indeed have their causes. One's own
man, or something else. As It is the Knower of the existence and nature is indeed neither acquired nor lost by oneself [or by any
non-existence [of things], it is not accepted that It is non-existent. 26 others].
32. It is Being by which the non-existence [of things J is accept- 42. As [lt] is the nature of all, It cannot be abandoned nor
ed. If It were not Being, people would not become aware of the grasped, since [It] is not different [from anything]. Therefore
existence and non-existence [of things]. And this is not acceptable. it is eternal, since [It] is not an object and not separated [from
33. That which is taken to exist before the false assumptions of anything].
"being," "non-being," and "being and non-being" is non-dual, 43. As everything exists for Atman's sake, Atman is eternal and
since It is the same [in all]; It is eternal and different from what is isolated. Therefore the knower of final release should a band on all
falsely assumed. actions along with their accessories.30
34. Duality should be taken to be unreal like the object of a 44. The attainment of Atman is the supreme attainment3 1 accord-
dream, since it comes into being through false assumptions and ing to the scriptures and reasoning. But the attainment of Atman
does not exist before the false assumptions of "being," "non- is not attaining something other [than Atman]. Therefore one
being," and the like. should [simply] give up [the misconception of Atman] as non-
35. On the authority of the scripture, which says that modifi- .Atman.
cations are a verbal handle, 27 they arc indeed unreal, since [the Sru- 45. The loss of equilibrium of the [three] guras is not possible,32
tis] say, "Death after death does he attain [who thinks he sees since nesciencc, etc., are inactive [in this state], and no other cause
manifoldness in this world]" (Brh. Up. IV,4, 19), and the Smrti is satisfactory [on the theory proposed].
154 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 16, 46-55 I, 16, 56-64] METRICAL PART 155

46. If one [of the three gur;as] were the cause of another [gu~a ], changeless according to you. [Even if atman, though changeless,
there would [either] always be activity or never activity at all. could have different qualities,] as [qualities and atmans are] differ-
There would not be any necessity for activity either in the gur;as ent [from one another], why [do not the qualities of one atman]
or in Atman ( = Puru~a) .33 belong to another or equally to the mind?
47. If[thesinglePrakrti ] existed for the [Puru,rns], 34 the distinc- 55. And if a cognition should become an object of cognition,
tion between released and bound [Puru,sas] would not be reasonable. a regressus ad infinitum would be inevitable. If some final [cognition]
And the relation of an object and its seeker [is not possible be- is admitted, the simultaneous origination [of all cognitions] is
tween Prakrti and Puru~a], [since] neither the Knower ( = Puru~a) accepted. 36
nor the other ( = Prakrti) is a seeker after an object. 5 7. And as Atman has no change of state, 37 there will be no bond-
48. Since in the Sarµkhya system Puru~a is changeless, even age in It. Nor is there any impurity, for [It] has no attachment
[there] it is not reasonable for Pradhana ( = Prakrti) to exist for an- according to the Sruti, "[It] has no attachment, for [It does not
other's(= Puru~a) sake. Even iftherewerechange s [in It],itwould get attached]" (Brh.Up.III,9,26).
still not be reasonable. 58. And [this is also] because [Atman] is subtle, one alone and
49. As no mutual relation between Prakrti and Puru~a is possible irnpercepti ble, according to the Sruti, "[The one ... J is not stained
and as Pradhana ( = Prakrti) is non-intelligent, it is not reasonable [bythesorrowofth eworld]" (Kath.Up. V,11 = II,2,11).[0bjec-
for Pradhana to exist for Puru~a's sake. tion: J "If that were so, there would be no final release at all, since
50. If any action took place [in Puru~a, It] would be perishable. there would be no bondage.
If [action took place] only in knowledge [of Puru~a, lt would be 59. Thus the scripture would be meaningless." [Reply:] No;
perishableJ in the same way. If [the functioning] of Pradhana has [becauseJ bondage is taken to be a confused idea of the intellect,
no cause, it follows that there is no final release. and :final release is the cessation thereof. Bondage is what has been
51. Just as heat [, a quality of fire,] is not to be manifested by mentioned before 38 and nothing else.
[light, another quality of fire], pleasure and other [qualities of 60. l3eing illumined by Knowledge, the light of Atman, the intel-
Atman] are not to be cognized by cognition [i.e., a quality of lect thinks that there is Knowledge in Itself and that there is no
Atman], as held by the followers of Kai:iada 35 and others, since they other knower. This is indeed the confused idea which is in the
have one and the same [substance ( = Atman)] as their basis. intellect.
52. Pleasure and cognition cannot inhere [in Atman] at the same 61. As Knowledgeistheve rynature of Atman, Itisconstantlyap-
time, since a [single) contact of the mind [with atman] causes one plied figuratively to the intellect. And the absence of discriminat-
[quality only]; therefore, pleasure is not to be cognized by cogni- ing knowledge is beginninglcss; this and nothing else is taken to be
tion. transmigratory existence.
53. And since the other [qualities] are different [from one 62. Final release is its cessation and nothing else, since [every
another, their] simultaneous origination is not to be accepted. If other vie-w] is unreasonable. But final release is thought to be the
[you say,] "It is the cognition of qualities that [they] are inherent destruction [of Atman] by those according to whom final release
[in atman," we reply,] "No; because [cognition] distinguishes is to become something else.
[qualities]. 63. Similarly, it is also unreasonable that [final release] is a
54. [Qualities] are to be apprehended by cognition, for [they change of state [in Atman], 39 since [It] is changeless. If there were
are] to be distinguished by cognition, and there is memory, [e.g.,] change [in Atman], [It] would have parts; consequently [It] would
"Pleasure was perceived by me"; [and,] according to you, [atman] perish, like a jar, etc.
does not have cognition as its nature. 64. Therefore, assumptions concerning bondage, final release,
55. Pleasure and so on will not be qualities of atman, since it is etc., [which are] other than this are indeed confused ideas. The
156 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 16, 65-73 I, 16, 74] METRICAL PART 157
assumptions of the Sarpkhyas, of the followers ofKai;iada, and of the oneself or one's own], so having observed the highest truth and
Buddhists are lacking in profound consideration. having attained this absolutely pure knowledge, he will then be
65. As [their assumptions] contradict the scriptures and reas- released in all respects.
oning, they should never be respected. Their faults can be pointed 74. Certainly in this world there is no attainment more excellent
out hundreds and thousands of times. than that of one's own nature, 46 since it comes from nothing else
66. And since it might also involve being culpable [under the than this [Vedanta]. :But the attainment of one's own nature,
text] "any other [of the manifold scriptures in the world] than which is superior even to the kingdom of Indra, should not be
this [should verily be doubted by the wise who wish for correct given without examining [one's pupil] carefully.
knowledge of the law] ,"40 [they should not be respected at any
time]. Therefore, having abandoned the teaching of other scrip-
tures, a wise man should make firm his understanding Notes
67. of the true meaning of the Vedanta ( = Upanifads) and also
ofVyasa's thought,41 with faith and devotion 42 and without any IBodhanidhi takes "gu~a" as "pariT}il.maviie{a" and Ramatirtha as "kiirya." Both of
them think that the five senses and their objects are special transformations or pro-
crookedness. ductions of the five elements. J agadananda follows Ramatirtha's interpretation. But
68. Thus both the false assumptions based upon dualism and such usage of the word "gu1Ja" is unusual. Moreover, like the Nya ya and the Mimaiµsa,
the views that Atman does not exist have been rejected through the Vedanta holds that the senses are constituted by earth and the other elements, to
which smell, taste, etc., belong as qualities. Cf. S. Chatterjee, The Nyii_ya Theory of
reasoning; seekers after finaJrelease, beingfreefrom doubts which
Knowledge (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1950), pp. 131-138; D. M. Datta, The
arise from the views of others, become firm in the path of knowl- Six W<rys of Knowing (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1960), pp. 39-40. Taking into
edge. consideration the above facts and the previous stanza, I have translated the word
69. If one has attained the absolutely pure and non-dual "gu7Ja" as "quality.''
'The commentators explain this simile as meaning that when there is brightness of color,
Knowledge, which is self-witnessed and contrary to false assump- it is ,because its illurninator (such as a larnp) is also bright.
tions, and rightly holds a firm belief, he will go to eternal peace, 3Sati kara's concept of manas is not clear. In most cases in his works the manas is mere-
unaccompanie d [by anything]. ly another name for the buddhi, or at least it is indistinguishable from the latter. It is a
controversial problem for later Advaita philosophers whether or not the manas is a sense
70. Having thoroughly examined this esoteric teaching, the
(indriJ;a ), but Sankara does not give any answer to this problem. See Introduction,
supreme goal, people who are free from faults and devoid of III,B,l, pp. 30-33. Cf. T. M. P. Mahadevan, Tlie Philosophy ef Advaita, pp. 29-31; D.
any misconception [about AtmanJ should always set their minds M. Datta, The Six Wa;•s of Knowing, pp. 53-59.
on rectitude. 43 Indeed, nobody who thinks himself different 4J\nandajnana and Ramatlrtha consider that this stanza is meant to refute Bud-
dhism.
[from Brahman] is a seer of the truth. 5Cf. BS II ,3,30--31 and Sankara's commentary on it.
71. Having come to know this highest means of purification, &This probably refers to a tenet of the Vijiianavadins. See note 10.
a man is released from the sins caused by nescience and accum- 7This probably refers to the Vaifoiika sys tern, according to which iitman has qualities
such as cognition (buddhi), pleasure (suk~a), pain (dubkha), desire (iccha), aversion (dve-
ulated in many other births; like the ether, he is unstained by
ra), and effort (prcryatna). According to Sankara knowledge is the nature of Atman and
actions 44 in this life. not Its quality. Cf. Upad I,16,51-56.
72. This [highest means of purification] should be always scr. Upad I, 16, 14.
9Stanzas 12-14 are probably meant to refute the Vijiianavadins.
taught to the seeker after final release whose mind has been See note JO below.
IOJn Upad I, 18,142 Sankara quotes a stanza from Dharmakirti's Pramii7J.avini1caya
calmed, whose senses have been controlled, whose faults have been which refers to the theory of the threefold part of consciousness, i.e., the object (griihya ),
abandoned, who is acting as prescribed [in the scriptures], who She subject (grahaka), and consciousness (sa1f1vitti). It is, therefore, very likely that here
is endowed with virtues, and who is always obedient [to his Sankara refutes the above theo;y which was advocated by Vijiianavadins, Dignaga,
and Dharrnakirti. According to Sankara the Madhyamakas consider the consciousness
teacher]. 45 (vijiiiina) to be free fr9m the parts of subject and object (grahyagrahakarrzsavinirmukta)
73. Just as one does not falsely think that another's body [is and empty {Sfi1tJ1a) (Sankara ad Brh. Up. IV,3,7, p. 567).
158 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 16 I, l6] METRICAL PART 159
llStanzas 15-16 arc probably meant to refute the Sunyaviidins. 36The last two lines are not clear.
12The function of vikalpa is attributed to the manas in other places. (Upad I, 16,3. 37Cf. stanzas 38; 39; 63.
Cf. Upad I,16,21 ;GBh V,13, p. 257) but here it is regarded as belonging to thebuddhi. 38Stanza 30 and note 24.
13Cf. Upad I,17,26; GK I,13. 39Stanzas 38; 39; 57.
14Cf. Upad I,15,35. 40The three commentators quote a stanza, the source of which is not known:
15 Refutation of the Jain tenet. Cf. U pad I, 16,22; 17 ,56; BSBh II,2,34, pp. 484-485. yanyato 'nyani Iastra~i PrthivyaTfl vividhani vai I
16Refutation of Buddhism starts here. Stanza 24 suggests that stanza 23 may intro- fankanfyiini vidvadbhir dharmaf,uddhim abhipsubhi~ //
duce doctrines which are commonly held by the Bahyiirthaviidins and the Vijiiana- 41See Mayeda Upad, pp. 40--41. In Sankara's works Vyiisa indicates the author of
vadins. Cf. stanza 24 and notes 20 and 23. Anandajniina, Bodhanidhi, and Riimatirtha the Smrtis and not BadarayaI).a, the author of the BS.
interpret "this" as knowledge (jiiiina) and the object ofknowledge (jiil!Jla). "It is not certain in what sense the word bhakti is used here. In Upad II ,3.116 "those who
l?"Dharma" here is used in a Buddhist technical sense. Riimatirtha interprets it as arc devoted to Me"' (madbhakta) are criticized. The word bhakti does not occur in the BSBh
vastumii.tra. in the sense of "devotion," bnt only in the meanings of (I) "portion" or "division" (BSBh
lBSee Upad I,16,25 and 26; Sankara ad Brh. Up. IV,3,7, pp. 574-575; BSBh II, III,3.7. p. 682 and p. 683; III,3,9, p. 688) and (2) "figuratively" or "in a secondary sense"
2,25, p. 462. ' (as bJiaktyti, BSBh 1,3, 14, p. 224; Il,3,.5, p. 502; HI,2,4, p. 627). When Saiikara comments
l9See Upad I,16,27; Sankara ad Brh. Up. IV,3,7, p. 567 and pp. 576-577. on the BhG, he treats it as almost synonymous withjnana. Cf. GBh VIII,22, p. 273; XVIII,
20According to Anandajiiana and Bodhanidhi, these are ~he Bahyarthavadins or 54, p. 512; XVIII, 55, p. 513- 514; 0. Lacombe, L'Absolu selon le Vedanta (Paris: Librairie
those who assert that there exist external objects. By this word Sankara probably means Orientalist.e Paul Geuthner, 1937), p. 353.
both the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhaiikas of the Theravada Buddhjsm in his BSBh 43Cf. Chand. Up. lll, 17,4; BhG XIII,7; XVI.I; XVII,14; XVHI,42.

(II,2,31, pp. 478-479) where he points out that both the Bahyiirthavadins and the Vi- 44Cf. Upad I, 10, 14.
jfianavadins hold the tenet of general momentariness (kfat:zikatva) in common. Cf. Y. "This stanza is quoted in Vedantasiira [IV] 27n and Ramatirtha ad Maitri Up. Vl,29
Kanakura, A Study of the Vedanta Philosophy (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1932), p. 138, (Anand.a5rama S.S. p. 476).
p. 153, p. 179, and p. 20 I. '"Cf. Upad 1,16,44; 17,4.
21According to Aanandajiiana, these are the Jiianamatraviidins; according to
Bodhanidhi, they are the Vijfianaviidins.
22cr. BSBh II, 2,25, pp. 461-464.
~3Cf. stanza 23.
24Cf. Upad I,16,59; 17,7. Sankara's concept of final release (mokfa), which is the ces-
sation of false superimposition (m!{iidfryasa), is very similar to Candrakirti's, according
to which nirvana is of the nature of cessation of all false assumptions (sarvakalpanii.kfaya-
riipa, Prasannapadii, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV, p. 524, line 6, etc.). Cf. Introduction, IV,
B, pp. 73-75. , ,
25 Anandajii.ana and Ramati rtha attribute this tenet to the Sun ya viidins. Cf. Sankara

adBrh. Up. IV,3,7, pp. 576-577.

26Cf. stanza 16.
27Cf. Chand. Up. VI, 1,4.
2BCf. BSBh II,2,20, p. 457; stanzas 57; 63.
29See commentaries ofBodhanidhi and Ramatirtha.
30See Upad II,1,32.
31See Apastamba Dharmasiltra I,8,22,2. Cf. Upad I,16,74; 17,4.
32Stanzas 45-50 are meant to refute the Sarµkhya system. In contrast with the Ve-
danta, theSiirµkhya advocates dualism, recognizing the two ultimate causes of the uni-
verse, namely Purufa (spirit) and Prakrti (matter). Prakrti ( = Pradhiirw) is nothing but
the equilibrium of the three gu~as, namely sattva, rajas and lamas. When their equilib-
rium is broken, the evolution of the universe takes place. Cf. Sii1[lkhyakarikii 16 and
Gaw;!apada's commentary on it.
33Cf. note 32.
34Cf. Sat?Zkhyakiirika 17; 31; 56; 57.
35Refutation of the Vaisqika system starts here and seems to end with stanza 56.
Kal).iida or Uluka ( 150-50 B.C. ?) is the founder of the VaiSeJ?ika school of philosophy.
For the qualities of iitman, see note 7.
 1, 17, 9-18] METRICAL PART 161

9. As (the Vedas] are devoted to one object [only], i.e., the

knowledge [of Brahman], [the wise] know that they [consist of]
CHAPTER 17 one sentence [only]. The oneness of Atman [and Brahman] should
RIGHT THOUGHT indeed be known through the understanding of the meaning of
[this one] sentence.
10. Eu t difference between Atman [and Brahman] is falsely as-
sumed on the ground of difference of [meaning] which is under-
stood [in the two different words, Atman and Brahman]; even [the
meaning] which is referred to is [falsely understood] on hearing
[the word) Atman. Therefore, this triad, viz. form, n':me, and
action, is mentioned [as constituting the world in the Sruti]. 8
I. Since nothing else exists, it is certainly the highest Atman, 11. As this triad is falsely assumed to be interdependent, it is
all-knowing, all-seeing, and pure, which is the Atman to be known.
unreal like a figure which is described in word and painted
Salutation to this Atman which one should know.
elsewhere outside of the intellect.
2. I ever bow down to those who, by their knowledge of words,
12. And just as the form-and-color, which is seen [located out-
sentences, and means of knowledge, have like lamps illumined
side of the intellect], is expressed in word through the intellect,
Brahman the secret doctrine of the Vedas. so this whole is falsely assumed by the confused intellect.
'
3. Paying homage to those teachers whose words have _reached 13. Therefore it is reasonable that this triad is unreal; [Atman
[me] and destroyed [my] sins as the sun beam reach mg and
which is] nothing but Being-Pure Consciousness only is not what is
destroying the darkness, I shall state the conclusion about the
falsely assumed. Atman is at once the primal knowledge and the
knowledge of Brahman. 1 _ object of knowledge, 9 but everything else is falsely assumed.
4. There is no other attainment higher than that of Atman, 2
14. That [atinan] by which one knows everything in the dream-
for the sake of which [attainment] exist the words of the Vedas 3
ing state is knowledge but that [knowledge] is due to its maya. 10
and of the Smrtis as well as actions. That by which one sees and hears [in the dreaming state] is called
5. Whatev~r attainment may be desired for the sake of happi-
the eye and the ear respectively.
ness, even though it be for one's own sake, is contrary [t.o hap-
15. That by which one speaks in the dreaming state [is called]
pinessJ. So the knowers of Brahman have declar.ed the a.tta~1ment
speec11, and likewise, [it has the names J nose, tongue, sense of
of Atman to be the highest one on account of its etermty.
touch, other organs, and the mind.
6. And as Atman is by nature self-attained, attainment oflt does
16. Ou account of the limiting adjuncts which are falsely con-
not depend upon anything else. But any attainment which de-
structed [on Atman], this very know ledge is different in many ways,
pends upon something else arises from seeing a difference [be-
just as difference appears in one and the same gem on account of
tween Atman and Brahman]. difference of limiting adjuncts [such as blue and yellow ]. 11
7. Seeing differnce is nescience. Its cessation is call~d final
· I 7. In like manner the knowledge of one when in the waking
release. 5 And this cessation can arise not through act10n but
state is falsely assumed to have difference. [Atman in the waking
through knowledge alone, since [that] is incompatible [with
state) makes manifest the object in the intellect, 12 and be-
nescience]. cause of this confused idea performs actions which arise from
8. A result of action is inconstant, since it has nescience and de-
desire.
sire as its cause. s It is said that the Vedas alone are the right means
- 7 18. As in dream so in waking, something external and internal
to acquire knowledge with regard to Atman.
is produced by the notion of interdependence, just as a thing
160
162 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, I 7, 19-29 I, 17, 30-38] METRICAL PART 163

written and the reading [of it come from the notion of their the magician different [from them], [so] there are neither vital air
interdependence] : and the like, nor a seer of them, but the Knower, the Seeing,
19. His [atman] falsely constructing the difference, desires it, different [from them J, always exists.
and then wills [to obtain it]. Willing its desires, 13 it obtains [the 30. Neither for one whose sight is not bound, nor for the magi-
results of] what it has done.1 4 cian, is there any magical illusion. This magical illusion exists
20. Everything comes from nescience. This world is unreal, only for him whose sight is bound. Therefore in fact there is no
for it is seen by one who has nescience and is not perceived in the magician at all.
state of deep sleep. 31. Atm~n should be directly known according to the Sruti which
21. It is indeed declared to us in the Sruti that knowledge is sa)'S that Atman is directly present, 25 for the Srutis say, "The knot

the notion of the oneness [of Atman and BrahmanJ and nescience of the heart is loosened . . . [when He is seen]" "(Mm)<;l.. Up.
is the notion of the difference [of Atman from Brahman]. Therefore Il,2,8), "If[here he]does not[know It, there is great loss]" (Kena
knowledge is affirmed in the scripture with all vigor. Up.II,5), and the like.
22. When the mind becomes pure like a mirror, knowledge 32. Because ofits being soundless, etc., 26 It cannot be perceived
shines forth; therefore [the mind should be purified]. The mind is by the sense-organs. Likewise, as [It] is different from pleasure,
purified by abstention, 15 the permanent rites, 16 sacrifices,17 and etc., how can [It be perceived] by the intellect?
austerities. 33. Just as Rahu, though he is invisible, [is perceived] in the
23. The best austerities'ofthe body, etc., 18 should beperformed moon [during an eclipse]27 and just as a reflection [of the moon,
to purify the mind. The concentration of the mind, etc. 19 and the etc., is seen] in the water, so Atman, though all-pervading, 1s
emaciation of the body in this and that [season]2° [should be per- perceived there in the intellect.
formed]. 34. Just as the reflection and heat of the sun arc perceived in
24. Sense-perception should be known as the waking state, mem- ~he wat:r but do not belong to the water, so knowledge [,though]
ory as the dreaming state, the absence of both as the state of deep m the mtellect, is not a quality of it, since [it] differs in nature
sleep, and one's own Atman as the highest state.21 [from the intellect].
25. The darkness called deep sleep is ignorance and [it is] the 35. Atman, whose Seeing never fails, sees a modification of the
. the .eyes, and is the ~eer of seeing and
. 11. ect 28 connecte d with
m::e
seed of the dreaming and waking states. If it is burned up by the
knowledge of one's own Atman, like a seed that has been scorched [s1m1larly] the Hearer of heanng--so says the Sruti.29
it has no power of germinating. 22 36. ·Seeing a modification of the mind which is isolated [from
26. That single mqya seed is to be known as repeatedly and the senses), [It J is the Thinker of thinking, unborn. Likewise,
successively [changing] in [these] three ways. Atman, though one [It is] the Understand er [of understanding]30 since [It] has un-
and changeless, is as the bearer of may a [knowable Jin many ways, failing power. Therefore the scripture says, "For there is no
like the sun in the water. [cessation of the Seeing of the Seer)" (Brh.Up.IV,3,23-30).
27. Just as one and the same seed becomes different in ac- 37. [It] is changeless, [from the Sruti,] "[It appears to] medi-
cordance with [differences of] vital air, 23 dreaming state, etc., tate"(Brh.Up.IV,3,7) and "[It apP_ears to] move about" (Brh.
so Atman like the moon on the water becomes different in bodies lJp.IV,3,7). [It] is pure, from the Sruti, "There a thief is [not a
in the dreaming and waking states. ~hief]" (Brh. Up. IV,3,22) and "[It is] not followed [by good, It
28. Just as a magician comes and goes riding on an elephant is not followed by evil]" (:Brh. Up.IV,3,22).
created by his magic, so the Atman, though motionless, is related to 38. As [Its] power never fails, [It] is the Knower in the state
vital air, dreaming state, and the like. 24 of deep sleep as well as in the waking state, for it is changeless. But
29. Just as there is neither elephant nor rider, but there stands the distinction is supposed only as regards the object of knowledge
164 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 1 7, 39-48 I, 17, 49-59] METRICAL PART 165

since the Sruti says, "Where there [seems to be another, there the 49. Actions result in things being produced, obtained, changed,
one might see the other]" (Brh.Up.IV,3,31). or purified. There are no results of action other than these.
39. As mediated (by time, space, etc.], the ordinary seeing by Therefore one should abandon [actions] together with [their]
non-Atman [such as the eye J is indeed indirect. As Seeing is requisites. 37
the nature of Atman it has been said that Brahman is directly 50. Concentrating upon Atman the love which is [now set) on
known. 31 external things---for they end in suffering, are inconstant and
40. No second lamp is necessary for illuminating a lamp; sim- exist for Atman-a seeker after the truth should resort to a teacher
ilarly no knowledge other [than Atmun] is required [for knowing 51. who is tranquil, wise, released, actionless, and established
Atman], since Knowledge is the nature of Atman. in Brahman, since the Sruti says, "One who has a teacher knows
41. It is not accepted that [Atman] is an object, or changeable, ... " (Chand. Up.VI,14,2) and the Smrti also says, "Learn to know
or manifold. Therefore Atman is not to be discarded or accepted this [by obeisance, by questioning, by serving]" (BhG IV,34).
by something other [than Atman]. 52. If a student is disciplined and properly qualified, the teach-
42. [Atman] includes the exterior and the interior, 32 is un- er sbould immediately transport him over his great interior
scathed, and beyond birth, death, and old age. What does one ocea.n of darkness in the boat of the knowledge of Brahman.
fear who knows, "I am Atman"? 53. Seeing, touching, hearing, smelling, thinking, knowing, and
43. There is action (karman) only until injunction[to attain] other powers, though they are of the nature of Pure Conscious-
Atman, since notions of belonging to a caste, etc., are [then] re- ness, are differentiated by limiting adjuncts. 38
moved; their removal results from the conclusion"Thou art That" 54. As the sun always shines, without destroying or creating
(Chand. Up. VI, 8, 7, etc.) based on the scriptural teaching [anything by its rays], so does [It] always know all, being all-
"[It isJ neither gross [nor subtle]" ( Brh. Up. III,8,8), and the Like. pervading, all-seeing, and pure.
44. Since in abandoning the body in the previous life one has 55. Through nescience [Atman] abiding in the body is regarded
given up lineage and the like, lineage and the like belong to the as the Seeing of something other [than Itself], and as being the
body. Thus the body is also non-Atman. same size as the body 39 and possessed of the qualities of the
45. Therefore the notions of "mine" and "I" which apply to body, by such comparisons as that of the moon in the water and
the non-Atman such as the body, etc., is nescience. It ( = ncscience) the like. 40
should be abandoned by means of knowledge of Atman since the 55. Having seen an external object, one shuts the eyes and
Sruti says, "[For this is the doctrine] of the demons" (Chand. remembers it [in the dreaming state] and [then] abandoning it
Up. VIII,8,5). [in the state of deep sleep], one opens up the Seeing of Atman,
46. Just as the duties of observing ten-day periods ofimpurity 33 reaches Brahman, and does not travel along any path.
come to an end at the time of entering the life of a wandering 57. He who has thus given up the triad, viz. the vital air ( = the
ascetic, the actions based upon lineage and the like come to an end state of deep sleep )41 goes across the great ocean of ignorance,
at the time of attaining knowledge. for he is by nature abiding in his own Atman, attributeless, pure,
47. But, willing his desires, an ignorant man obtains (the re- awakened, and released.
sults of] what he has done. 34 When desires are cast off by him who 58. When he has realized, "I am unborn, undying, deathless,
sees his own Atman, he becomes immortal. 35 free from old age, fearless, 42 all-knowing, all-seeing, and pure,"
48. The injunction [to attain] the nature of Atman results in the he is not born again.
cessation of actions and the like. Atman is neither an object to be 59. He who knows the oneness of [Atman and] Brahman con-
accomplished nor a means of accomplishment; It is held to be cludes that the above-mentioned darkness-seed 43 does not exist.
eternally content as the Sruti3 6 says. How should he be born [again] when it does not exist?
166 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 17, 60-70 I, ! 7, 7 1-81] METRICAL PART 167

60. Just as clarified butter, extracted from milk, does not the unknown [Knower)" (Brh.Up.III,8,11), [It] should not be
become the same as before if thrown back into it, [so] the Knower known in any way other than that.
[once discriminated] from the untrue such as the intellect never 71. If one has come to know the supreme Brahman realizing,
becomes the same embodied Atman as before. "I am the Atman of all," one becomes the Atman of all beings,
61. One becomes free from fear realizing, " 'I am Brahman' since the Sruti says, "[Whoever thus knows 'I am Brahman' be-
(Brh. Up.I,4,10), which is 'the real, knowledge, and the infinite' comes this all; even the gods have no power to prevent his be-
(Taitt.Up.II,l), which is superior to the fivefold iitman such as coming thus,] for he is their Atman" (Brh. Up. I, 4,10).
[the iitman consisting of] the essence [of food], etc., 44 and which 72. If a living being clearly [knows J his Atman as the highest
is declared in the scripture to be 'invisible' (Taitt. Up.II,7)." Atman, as God, 54 he is to be worshipped by the gods and ceases
62. A man who knows the truth, i.e., the bliss of that Atman, to be [domestic J animal for the gods. 55
from fear of which speech, mind, fire, and the like carry out their 73. As a killer of the unreal thus covers himself with the truth, 56
functions, 45 does not fear anything at all. 46 "I am the Real-Atman and the Knower, but, like ether, I am empty
63. If a knower of Atman abides in his own infinite and non-dual of anything else," he is not bound [again].
kingdom, which is superior to name and the like, 47 then whom 74. They are pitiable who know the supreme Brahman differ-
should he salute? Then, there is no need for action. ently from this. "The gods would be under the power of him"
64. When [Atman] is external [It is called] Viraj or Vaifvanara. (Taitt. A. 3, 13,2d; Vajasaneyi-Sal!lhita, 31,2ld) who is a self-ruler,
When [It] remembers within, [It is called] Prajapati. But when a seer of non-difference and abiding in himself. 57
everything vanishes [It J is called Prajfia or Al!Jiikrta.48 75. Abandoning your relationship with lineage, etc., and other
65. As they are merely verbal handles, 49 however, the triad, words along with actions and [saying,] "Om," you attain your
namely, the state of deep sleep, etc., are unreal. A man who thus own Atman, which is all, pure,58
covers himself with the truth, "I am the True and the Knower," 76. the bulwark of all that is established,59 devoid of day,
is released. 50 night, and the like, 60 and is to the sides, above, below, all, ever-
66. As the sun has light as its nature, it has neither day nor shining, and free from disease.
night. 51 In like manner I have neither knowledge nor ignorance 77. One should know one's Atman to be the highest One which
since I have Pure Consciousness as my nature, without distinctions is devoid of merit and demerit, free from past and future, free
[in It]. from cause and effect 61 and free from all bondage.
67. As the scripture is not to be doubted, one should remember, 78. While being pure and not acting, [Atman] does all; while
"I am always Brahman; as I am Brahman, I have nothing to reject standing, [It Jgoes past those who are running. 62 As It is almighty
or to accept." through Its mlijii, It is thought to be manifold, though [really It
68. He is not born [again] who sees thus, "I am the One in all is] unborn. 63
beings just as the ether and all beings arc in Me."52 79. While causing the world to turn around,64 I, Atman, am ac-
69. There is nothing else but one's own [Atman J anywhere, out- tionlcss, norr-agent and non-dual for, like a king, I am merely
side, within or inside, since the Sruti says, "[This Brahman is . . . ] the Witness [of the world], and like a magnet,65 [merely] close
without an outside, without an inside" (B:rh.Up.II,5,19); [It] [to it].
is therefore pure and self-effulgent. 80. One should bear in mind, "I am that Brahman which is
70. According to such scriptural passages as, "Not thus! Not attri buteless, acti onless, eternal, free from the pairs [of opposites],
so!" (Brh. Up.II,3,6, etc.), [Atman] is "the quiescence of the free from disease, pure, awakened, and released."
pluralistic universe and non-dual"(GK II,35).53 And accord- 81. Having properly known bondage, final release, and all
ing to such scriptural passages as, "[That Imperishable .. .is] [the causes] from which [all] this and both [bondage and final
168 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 17, 82-BB I, 17] METRICAL PART 169

release] result; the one ( = the state of deep sleep) and the two &See Upad I,15,21.
70£: BS I,1,3.
(= the dream and waking states) 66 which are to be rejected; and BSee Brh. Up. 1,6,1.
the only, pure, and highest Truth which transcends the knowable 9Cf. GK III,33; IV, l; Upad I, 19,9. This idea is very similar to a tenet of the Vijiia-
and the unknowable, which has been studied and which is spoken naviidins.
of by the Srutis and sages, -[having known all this] one would 1orn stanza 27 Atman is compared to a magician (miiyiivin). Cf. GK II, 12; 19; IlI,24.
11This simile is employed here and there in Sankara's works in order to illustrate the
become a knower of Brahman who has transcended sorrow and relation between Brahman and the phenomenal world. Cl: Upad I,7,4; 17, 16; 18,122;
delusion, who is all-knowing, all-doing, free from the fear of :BS:Bh I,3,19, p. 235; III,2,11, p. 641, etc. The simile is also used in Bhartrhari's Viikya-
existence, and who has completed all that has to be done. padiya IJI,3,41.
12See Introduction, III,B,5, p. 44. Cf. GK II,13; 14; 15; 16.
82. Atman Itself does not become something to be rejected nor 13Cf. stanza 47.
is It to be accepted by Itself or anything else. Nothing else becomes HCf. stanza 17.
something to be rejected or to be accepted by Itself; this is true HAbsten tion (yama) consists of non-injury (ahit'[lsii), non-lying (sarya), non-theft (a-
stiya), non-incontinence (brahmacarya), and non-possession (aparigraha). See Yogasiltra
thought as has been mentioned [above, stanza 67].
II,30; Vedantasiira [XXXI] 214; Upad II, 1,4.
83. This true thought leads [people) to understand Atman and 16Ramatirtha treats "nitya" as "niJ;ama" while Bodhanidhi interprets it as "avaryii-
has all the Upanifads as its field; so, having come to know this, nur!hrya," which suggests that he treats it as "niryakarman" or "permanent rite." The
they are released from all the bonds of transmigratory existence. reading "n0ama" for "nitya" is not supported by manuscripts. In Vedantasii.ra [IV] 7
"permanent rites" are defined as the rites which lead to disquiet (pratyavii.yasiidhana)
84. As it is the supreme means of purification that is the secret when they are not performed. The ultimate object of the permanent rites is the puri-
doctrine of all the Vedas an9 is the highest [secret doctrine J even fication of the intellect (buddhisuddhi, Vediintasiira [IV] 11) and their result is the attain-
for the gods, it has been expounded here. ment of t~e world ofancestors (pitrloka, Vedantasara [IV] 13).
17 For Sankara's view of actions including sacrifice, see Introduction, IV,F, pp.
85. This secret and supreme knowledge should not be given to
88-94.
[a student] who is not tranquil but should be taught to a student 18The BhG mentions the threefold austerity (tapas): (1) the austerity of the body

who is dispassionate and obedient. (farira, XVII, 14), (2) of the speech (vaizmaya, XVII, 15) and (3) of the mind (miinasa,
86. And there is no actionless one other than (the teacher] XVII,15).
1 9According to Ramatlrtha the senses are implied by the term "etc."
who is offering the knowledge of Atman. Therefore, [a student] 2 0Ramatirtha interprets" tattaddehavifo,ra(lam" as "te{U te{V [IU§U dehauifofatta'!' .
who is seeking after knowledge should always qualify himself with 21see Upad I,I0,4.
the qualities of a student. 67 22This stanza is quoted in Nai~ IV,43. Cf. Upad I, 16, !B.
22The word "pral}a" here may also imply the state of deep sleep. See stanza 57
87. Salutation to that knowledge-Atman which is all-knowing
hel<Jw.
and almighty and besides which there is nothing else, neither 24With regard to stanzas 28-.. 30, see Mayeda Upad, pp. 36-37.
knowledge, nor object of knowledge, nor knower. 6 8 25Cf. Brh. Up. III,4,1; 4,2; 5, 1.
88. Salutation to the all-knowing teachers by whom through 26Cf. Kath. Up. III,15.
2 7According to an Indian tradition Rahu is a demon who is supposed to seize the
knowledge we have been led across the great ocean of birth and sun and the moon and swallow them, thus causing eclipses. \Vhen the gods had once
death filled with ignorance. produced the amrta, water of life, by churning the ocean, he assumed a disguise and
drank some of it. The sun and the moon detected him and informed Vigrn, who cut
off his head. Thus Rahu wreaks vengeance on the sun and the moon by occasionally
swallowing them. Cf. Upad I, 18,39-40 and note 26.
Notes 2BSee 1Jpad I, 11,3; 4.
29Brh. Up. III,4,2.
icr. BhG V,16; 17. aoBrh. Up. III,4,2.
2See Upad I,16,44; 74. a1cr. Upad I,14,26.
3Sankara interprets "vedaviida" (BhG II,42) as "vedavakya." 32Mur;i.<;L Up. II,l,2; Upad I,13,11; 14; 18.
4Cf. the above note 2. 33 It is believed that birth (jana.iauca) and death (mrtaka.iauca) cause impurity to the

5See Upad I,16,30; 59. members of the family or to relatives. The periods of impurity depend on many
170 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 17 METRICAL PART 171
I, 17]
circumstances. For a detailed explanation, see P. V. Kane, History ef Dharmaliistra, s4See Brh. Up. IV,4,15.
vol. IV, pp. 267 ff. s5Sec Brh. Up. I,4, 10.
34Cf. Stanza 19. &6See stanza 65.
35The author seems to have Brh. Up. IV,4,7 (Kath. Up. VI,14) in mind. S7Cf. Chand. Up. VII,25,2.
36Ramatirtha quotes Brh. Up. IV,4,7 (eta.ryaiviinandasyiirryiini . .. upajlvanti) and sacr. Mui)<;!. Up. II,2,5; 6.
another passage, "nitya;rpto niraiijanafy," the source of which is not known, but Riirna- :>9Cf. Brh. Up- IV,4,22.
tlrtha says that it is a Sruti passage. Bodhanidhi quotes Brh. Up. III,9,28 (vijiiiinam eocf. Chand. Up. V!Il,4,1; Upad I,14,15; 17,66.
iinandam). It is, however, to be noted here that BhG IV,20 reads "nityatrpto niriilayab" 51The first two lines seem to be based upon Kath. Up. II,)4. Hence the compound
and that there is a variant reading of smrter mataf:i instead of fruter matab. "krttikrta" is translated as "cause and effect" according to Sankara's commentary on
37See Upad II,l,32. K~;h. Up. II, 14, where he interprets krta and akrta as karya and kiirar;a respectively.
3SSee stanzas 14-16. s2cf. lfa Up. 4.
39A tenet of Jainism. See Upad I,16,22. 63Cf. Viijasaneyi-Sal!ihitii 31,19b; Taitt. A. 3,13,lb.
40See stanzas 26, 33. s4Cf. BhG XVIII,61.
41In the state of deep sleep the mind and the senses enter into the vital air and sssee Upad I, 15,48.
ii.Iman is submerged in the Brahman. In the waking state iitrnan, connected with the 66What ''ekal"[I dvqya'!l ea" means is not certain. According to Ramatirtha and Anan-
mind, exercises its influence throughout the body by means of the senses; in the dream- dajiiana, "ekam" denotes "anuvrttarri kii.rar;am," and "dvayam" denotes "uyavrttarrz kiir-
ing state, the senses are absorbed into the mind, and their functions are extinguished. yam." But stanzas 24-30, 56, 57, 64, and 65 suggest that "ekam" denotes the state of
.P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, p. 346. The expression "prii?J.ii4J . .. trikaTfl" in deep sleep "Which is the only seed of the state of dream and waking (stanzas 25-26). If
question parallels "su!uPtiiditrika1(1" in stanza 65. It is, therefore, very probable that, so, "dvaya" indicates the two states of dream and waking. In stanzas 57 and 65 these
as Ramatirtha interprets, "the vital air, etc." denotes "the states of deep sleep, dream, three states are called "triko." or triad.
and waking." 67See stanzas 50--52.
4 2 Cf. llrh. Up. IV,4,25.
sscf. stanza 1.
43Cf. stanza 25.
44Taitt. Up. II,l-5 mentions the so-called fivefold sheath (kosa) in which Atman is
manifested as theindividualiitman: (l) the sheathconsistingofthe essence of food (ari-
narasamaya), (2) consisting of vital air (prii?J.amaya), (3) consisting of mind (manorn9a),
(4) consisting of consciousness (vijfiiinamaya), and (5) consisting of bliss (tinandam9a).
Cf. BSBh 1,1, 12--19; P. Deussen, The System of the Ved8nta, pp. 137-138.
45Cf. Taitt. Up. II,8,1; Kath. Up. VI,3; BhG II,23; XV,6. Ramatirtha points out
another reading: vii_vvinau pii.vakiidayab for vii.nmanabpiivakiidayaf:i.
46See Taitt. Up. II,9,1: yato viico nivartante aprapya manasa saha iinandam brahrna1fo
vidvii.n na bibheti kutofcana (cf. Taitt. Up. II,4, 1).
47See Chand. Up. VII,1-26, where name (niiman), speech (viic), mind (manas), etc.,
are enumerated as objects of meditation.
48See Upad I,10,4 and note 4.
49Chand. Up. VI,1,4.
50'fhis is based upon a famous dialogue between a Upani~adic thinker Uddalaka and
his son Svetaketu in which Uddiilaka uses an illustration of the ordeal. When a man
is seized on a charge of theft and put into an ordeal by a heated axe, he will be burned
and killed by the axe if he is guilty and covers himself with untruth, but he will not be
burned, and will be released, if he is innocent and covers himself with truth (Chand. Up.
VI, 16,1-3). Cf. stanza 73.
oICf. Upad I, 14,15.
52Cf. lfa up. 6; BhG VI,30.
53'fhe words "prapaiicopafama" and "advaya" are both Buddhistic. Nevertheless, pra-
paiicopasama, which already appears in the A1 iidfryamikakarika (benedictory stanza and
XXV,24), is used in Mai:i<;I. Up. VIL In the Mai:i<;l. Up. the term "aduaya'' is not used
but advaita, which is a Vedantic term, occurs twice, whereas in the GK the two terms
are synonymously used at almost the same frequency. See Nakamura III, pp. 297-298,
note 8; p. 510. In the Upad Sankara uses advaya more frequently than advaita.
 METRICAL PART 173
. 8.
Jn] fallacious [means o~ kno:wledg.e J such as sense-perception is
"negated like a mistake m onentat1on.
CHAPTER 18 . 8. \'\Then the scripture says, "[I am] a doer," 9 "[I am] an ex-
THOU ART THAT ·. erienccr,"lO that conforms to ordinary people's belief [con-
fcrning Atman ]. 11 The notion, "I am the Existent," arises from
the Srutis; the former notion is negated by it.
9. [Objection:J 12 "Even when one is told, 'You are indee_? the
E:xistent,' one does not attain immovable final release of Atman.
TJ1erefore, one should take up prasa1'{lcak~a meditation 13 as well
as reasornng.
10. "Even one who understands the meaning of the sentence
does not grasp it from a single utterance. Therefore he needs fur-
l. Salutation to that Atman, the Constant Awareness, 1 Atman ther things; they are two, [prasar(lcak~ii meditation and reason-
of the notions of the intellect, through which the modifications ing],1~ as we have said [above].
[of the intellect] disappear and arise. 11. "Since [the sentence] is not understood [immediately],
2. Salutation to an Indra among ascetics, teacher of the teach- there has to be an injunction to perform [Vedic] actions. Likewise
er, 2 a man of great intrllcct, who defeated hundreds of ene- the injunction [to meditate by prasarµcak~a] is not incompatible
mies of the Srutis by means of sword-like words supported by [with .knowledge] as long as [that] is ~ot firmly grasped.
thunderbolt 3-like reasoning and protected the treasure of the 12. "And [if] 15one did attain [Atman] spontaneously, that
meaning of the Vedas. activity would [it is true] be meaningless, [but as one does not]
3. If the understanding, "I am ever-free, the existent," could prasar{lkhyiina meditation should accordingly be performed until
not arise, for what purpose does the Sruti teach thus zealously Ii.kc Atman is grasped.
a [devoted] mother? 13. "Aud the firm impression which arises from sense-percep-
4. From this [self"]established [Atman which is indicated by the tion certainly negates the knowledge, 'I am the Existent,' which
word] "I" the attribute "you" 4 is excluded-just as the notion arises from the Sruti. And on account of faults one is attracted
of a serpent [is excluded) in application to a rope 5-by meam towards things external.
of reasoning and such teachings as "Thou art That" (Chand. 14. "[This is] because [the notion] which arises from sense-
Up. VI, 13,3, etc.) and so forth. perception and has particulars (vi.fe~a) as its objects would neces-
5. Just as the existence of merit, etc., is to be known on the sarily hinder the notions which arise both from the verbal testi-
evidence of the scriptures, [so is the existence of Atman]. Just as monyl6 and from inference, which have universals (siimanya) as
poison is counteracted through meditation, 6 evil will be destroyed their objects.
[through the scriptural sentence]. 7 15. "Nobody, even if he knows the meaning of the sentence,
6. The two [contradictory] notions, "I am the Existent-Brah- is found to be free from pain. If anybody is seen to become free
man" and "I act," have Atman as their Witness. It is considered from pain merely by hearing the meaning of the sentence,
more reasonable to give up only [that one] of the two [notions] 16. "it is inferred that he must have performed [prasarµkhyana
which arises from ignorance.
meditation] in past bodies. [If an injunction for prasarµkhyana
7. The notion, "I am the Existent," arises from right means of meditation were not accepted,] the scripture would not be
knowledge [while] the other notion has its origin in fallacious the authority for [right) conduct. If this be so, it is not desira-
means of knowledge; moreover, [the notion which has its origin ble.
172
174 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 18, 17-26 I, 18, 27-34] METRICAL PART 175

l 7. "After stating an end, 'You are the Existent,' the means nally existing and actionless. (It] is the Witness which is directly
[to it] should be enjoined. So it is prasarµkhyana meditation that is cognized and in the interior of all, and the Observer which is
the means, and nothing else; the object of [prasarµkhyana medita- constant, attribu teless, and non-dual.19
tion] is taken here to be the well-established [Atman]. 27. The bearer of misconception [about Atman] (=the intel-
18. "Therefore, for the sake of apprehending [Atman J one lect), because it is always near to Atman, appears to be Atman.
should perform prasal{lkhyana meditation diligently, being endowed Frorn this arise the two [notions], "oneself" and "one's own,"
with tranquility, etc., and abandoning anything incompatible which are indicated by [the words] "I" and "my."
with [this] means and its object." 28. As this bearer of the "I"-notion has a universal, and is pos-
19. [Reply:] That is not so, for the secret doctrines ( = Upani- sessed of action, etc., 20 it can be referred to by words. One's own
~ads) end with "Not thus! Not so!" (Brh. Up. II,3,6, etc.). Ends Atman cannot be referred to by any word since [It] neither has a
to be attained by actions should be stated in the scripture before universal nor is possessed of action, etc.
[these Upani~adic doctrines] and final release is not [an end to be 29. In the [bearer of the "I"-notion] there is the reflection21
attained by actions], since it is ever-existing. [of the internal Seeing], and words referring to the former could
20. Just as the pain of a son is superimposed upon himself by a indicate the internal Seeing indirectly, [but] never designate It
father, though himself suffering no pain, so [painJ is superimposed directly.
by the bearer of the "I"-notion (=the intellect) upon its Atman 30. [This is J because that which is not a member of any genus
which is ever free from pain. and so on cannot be indicated by words. As the bearer of the
21. This superimposition is negated, as if it were a thing ac· ·:"-notion has the reflection of Atman [in it and appears to be
quired, by the words, "Not thus! Not so!" (Brh. Up. II,3,6). Atman] ,22 it is the intellect that is referred to by the words for
Moreover no injunction based upon superimposition is at all Atman.
reasonable. 31. Just as [words] which mean fire are only indirectly used in
22. As superimposition is [made] upon Atman, so [its] negation the sense of a torch, etc., 23 since they mean something different
is [made from Atman], just as the superimposition of dust upon {from a torch, etc.].Just as the reflection ofa face is different from
the sky and its negation therefrom are made by the unwise. the face since it conforms to the mirror
23. If a thing were [reallyJ acquired and then negated, final 32. so the face is [different] from the' reflection since it does not
release would certainly be [merely] temporary. Therefore this conform to the mirror. The reflection or Atman in the bearer of the
[negation of superimposition] is a negation of what has not been "'I "-notion is thought to be like the reflection of a face [in a
[in fa~t] acquired, like (the prohibition against] the building of mirror]. .
a fire m the sky 17 [which is in fact impossibleJ. 33. Atman, like the face, is always different [from Its reflection];
24. It is possible [to apply] a word or a notion to its object but but as in the case of the face these two [Atman and its reflection]
not somethi~g else. It is not possible [to apply] either word or are not discriminated [from each other]. Some there are who
notion [to Atman] since [It] is their own Atman as well as the say that the reflection in the bearer of the "I"-notion is the trans-
Atman of the bearer of the "I"-notion. migrator24;
25. [The Sruti,] "Not thus! Not so!" (Brh. Up. II,3,6, etc.) ne- 34. a s-~~dow is a real substance according to [th~ aut.hority of]
gates all thin~s, including the notion of agency which is superim- the Smrtz, and there are further reasons [for takmg 1t to be a
posed upon Atman, Pure Consciousness, by the bearer of the"!"- r:-al substance]; for example, [the reason] that [one feels] cool
notion, and it negates also the bearer of the "I"-notion. [in a shadow]. 26 [Some say that the transmigrator is] a part of the
26. [Atman] is the self-effulgent Perception, 18 the Seeing, inter- Knower27 or a modification oflt. 28 Others [think that the transmi-
176 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, !B, 35-43 I, 18, 44-52] METRICAL PART 177

grator) is [the bearer of the "I"-notion, viz.,] the locus of the re- corn parable to the face, [its] reflection, and [itsJ locus ( = the
flection of Atman.29 rn.irror). And the unreality of the reflection is understood by means
35. Some others say it is the independent bearer of the "!"- of the scripture and reasoning.
notion alone that is the transmigrator. 30 That transmigrator is the 44. [Objection:] "As the Seeing is changeless, [It] is not [the
individual continuity of the "I"-notion and the like, and that transmigrator], nor is the reflection [the transmigrator], for the re-
there is no continuity apart [from that],- flection is unreal. Nor is the bearer of the "I"-notion [the trans-
36. so say the Buddhists. 31 It must be examined whether there rnigrator], since it is not conscious. Who could be the transmi-
is any truth among these [doctrines]. .But an end should be put grator ?"
[for the time being] to the debate on what it is that transmi- 45. [Reply:] Therefore let transmigratory existence be nothing
grates.32 The topic of [the nature of the nfiection] in question but nescience due to the absence of discriminating knowledge.
will now be discussed. Because of [the existence of] the immovable Atman, transmigratory
37. The reflection of the face in the mirror is not an attrib- existence is always existent in Atman as it were.
ute either [of the face or of the mirror.] If it were an attribute 46. Just as a snake, [although not real], exists in a rope because
of either of the two, it would remain even if the other one were of[the existence of] the rope until [the two Jare discriminated, so it
removed. is because of [the existence of] the immovable Atman that transrni-
38. If it is proposed [by an objectorJ that [the reflection of the gratory existence, although not real, [exists in It, but only until
face is an attribute] ofth~,face, since [it J is given the same name as the two are discriminated).
the face, [we answer:] No, because [the reflection of the face] 47. Some people think that .Atman is the locus of a reflection of
conforms to the mirror and because even when the face is there, Atman which changes according to Its notions of Itself, and that
no [reflection of it] exists [unless there is also a mirror], It is [thus] a permanent transmigrator which experiences pleasure
39. If [you say] that [the reflection] is [an attribute] of both and pain.
[the face and the mirror], [we answer:) That is not right since [it] 48. These people, unguided by scripture, are deluded because
is not seen even when both [are present unless they are properly they do not fully know Atman and [Its] reflection as they really
placed]. [If you say that] Rahu, 33 who is real though invisible, is are, and think that .Atman is a bearer of the "!"-notion.
seen against the sun and the moon, 49. Their view is that transmigratory existence exists as a real
40. [we answer:] Even before [he is seen in the sun and the su bstance 39 characterized by acting and experiencing. They
moon] it has been established from the authority of the scriptures34 undergo transmigratory existence since they do not know Atman,
that Rahu is a real substance. However, if [you are of] the opinion [Its] reflection and [Its] locus, on account of their lack of dis-
that [he] is [merely] a shadow, then on the basis of the previous criminating knowledge.
reasoning he would not be a real substance. 35 50. If the intellect [, though appearing to be Pure Conscious-
41. The Smrti [referred to in stanza 34] is a prohibition against ness], has the reflection of Pure Consciousness, while .Atman has
stepping on the shadow [of a teacher, etc.] 36 but does not prove Pure Consciousness as Its nature, the Vedas are right to teach At-
that [it] is a real substance, since a sentence cannot [be taken to] man by means of words like "knowledge" (jfiana).
express any other meaning than the one which it intends. 37 51. [Objection:] "The meaning of verbal root and verbal
42. It is from not using anything warm, etc., but not from the su:ffix,4' 0 though different [from each other], are seen to have one
shadow that a feeling of coolness, etc. result, 38 for [coolness] is and the same subject as in 'karoti' (he does), 'gacchati' (he goes),
not observed [to be a property of shadows] though it is observed etc., according to universally accepted opinion.
to be a property of water. 52. "Neither in ordinary life nor in the Smrti is it seen that there
43. Atman, [Its] reflection, and [Its] locus(= the intellect) are are two separate subjects for these two [verbal root and verbal
178 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 18, 53-62 I, 18, 63--72] METRICAL PART 179

suffix]. Explain why in construing 'janati' (he knows) there should as before. 49 This Veda which is the authority does not make any
be two subjects." useless [word]. 50
53. [Reply:] It is the reflection of Atman that is expressed by the 63. The face is indeed thought by men to be the same as the
verbal termination whereas the meaning of the root is the action face in a mirror, for the reflection of the face is seen to be of the
of the intellect. 4 1 And it is on account ofthe absence of discriminat- form of the face.
ing knowledge that the two [Atman and intellect] are wro)}gly said 64. And because they do not discriminate between this [Atman]
to "know" (janati). 42 which becomes falsely manifest in that [intellect] and that [intel-
54·. Knowledge does not belong to the intellect and Atman has lect] in which this [Atman] becomes falsely manifest, all people
no action. Therefore "to know" is not applicable to either of them. naturally use the verb "fanati."51
55. Therefore the word "consciousness" (jnapti), 43 which im- 65. Superimposing the agency of the intellect [upon Atman],
plies action, has no application [to Atman] either. For It is not [they] say that the Knower(= Atman) "knows" (janati). In like
anything changing, the doctrine being that Atman is constant. 44 manner superimposing the Pure Consciousness [of Atman upon
56. It is the intellect but not [,4tman] that is expressed by [the the intellect], [they] say in this world that the intellect is knower.
word] "intellect" (lmddhi) [which is an instrument], since [if Atmam 66. As Knowledge is the nature of Atman and is eternal Light,
were expressed by the word "intellect" which denotes an instru- as the Sruti says, 52 It is never produced by the intellect, by Atman,
ment, Atman would Itself be an instrument and there would be or by anything else.
no agent remaining, but] there can be no instrument without an 67. Just as the "I"-notion arises with regard to the body and
agent. Nor again is [Atman] expressed by words denoting an ob- ordinary J)eople say that [the body, i.e., "I"] knows, so the intel-
ject, by saing [of It] "it is known" (jnayate). lect, and Atman as well, are [regarded as] producers of knowledge.
5 7. Atman is never taken to be expressible by words or cogniz. 68. Deluded thus by the notions of the intellect which are
able, according to those who [realize that] Atman is only one, produced and appear to be Pure Consciousness, logicians say that
free from pain and changeless. knowledge is produced.
58. If the bearer of the "I" -notion were Atman, then [Atmmz] 69. Therefore [the very existence of] a word like "janati," the
would be the primary meaning of a word. 45 But as [the bearer of notion [of it], and memory ofit are from the absence of the discrim-
the "!"-notion] has hunger, etc., it is not in the Sruti 46 taken to be inating knowledge of the Knower, [Its] reflection and the intel-
Atman. lect.
59. [Objection:] "Unfortunately then there is no primary 70. The nature ofthe reflection [of the face], viz. conformity to
meaning [of the word] and neither is there any secondary mean- the mirror, is superimposed upon the face. In like manner, the
ing.47 Nevertheless, the application of words like 'fanati' has to be natme of the reflection of the Knower, viz. conformity to the at-
accounted for. tributes of the intellect, is taken to be [superimposed upon the
60. "If words were false, the Vedas would not be an authority Knower].
either. And this is not acceptable. Therefore the application of 71. The notions of the intellect, therefore, on being illumined
this word has to be taken according to the generally accepted by the reflection of Atman, appear, as it were, to be perceivers,
way." just as torches, etc., appear to be burning [though in fact it is the
61. [Reply:] If what is generally accepted by deluded people fire in the torches, etc., that is burning]. 53
is taken, it would entail the non-existence of Atman, that is, the 72. Saying that [the notions of the intellect] are manifest of
settled doctrine of the Lokayatas, 48 and this is not acceptable. themselves alone, and that [they] arc of themselves alone per-
62. If what is generally accepted by the learned [is taken], ceivers, the Buddhists 54 deny the existence of a perceiver [other
failure to discriminate [between Atman and the intellect follows] than the notions themselves].
180 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [l, 18, 73-82 I, 18, 83-92] METRICAL PART 181

73. If thus these notions of the intellect were not to be seen by scripture, [we answer:] No, because that would entail the three-
anything else, tell [me] how are those Buddhists to be rcfuted? 55 fold defects given already 61 ; or else it would be an understanding
[Even if it be said that] although their existence and non-existence of [the Overseer] as "mine" and [not the understanding of their
are never perceived by anything else, identity].
74. they have [among themselves] a continuous perceiver [a- 83. While the intellect, [though] non-Seeing, is always appear-
part from Atman], [we reply:] It is also no more than a notion, ing in the form of the Seeing ( = Atman), then from the intellect
since even if there is another perceiver, [it and the notions] are notions too appear, as sparks from a red-hot iron. 6 2
equally non-intelligent. 84. It is [only on the assumption of] the ultimate Seeing that
75. If [you] think that in the presence of the Overseer [the no- one can reasonably [account for the fact] that people [perceive the
tions] would be established, [we answer:] No, because it would intellect's] false appearance [in the form of the Seeing of waking
follow that even if [the notions were in the presence of] anything and dream, and] its disappearance [in deep sleep], and not other-
other [than the Overseer-for example, wood and day-they wise [t11an on that assumption]. And as this is [in fact] the case,
would be established], since the Overseer, even though [they were [the intellect] takes [itself] to be the Seeing.
in Its presence], does nothing to help establish them J. 55 85. [Objection:] "Can it not be that the Seeing enters [the in-
76. Is the hearer who is suffering from pain and seeking after tellect] as fire into a lump of iron?" [Reply:] That [contention]
[final release] the Overseer or something else? It is not your view has been refu tcd by the illustration of the face and [its] reflection
that it is the Overseer whp is suffering from pain and seeking in a mirror. 63
after [final release]. 86. 'When the black iron appears red, that is considered to be an
77. It can never be right to take it that I, a doer, am the an ology 64 [of the intellect appearing to be the Seeing]. 65 An
Overseer and the Existent. Nor further is it proper that the analogy, however, can never correspond in every detail.
statement of the Sruti, "You arc the Existent," should also be false. 87. In like manner, with the reflection of Pure Consciousness
78. If the Sruti were making its statement [on the basis of] not [in it], the mind appears to be Pure Consciousness. The reflec-
discriminating the two ["I" ( = Atman) and "you" ( = non-At- tion has been said to be false like the reflection of the face in a
man) ], it would be comprehensible. 57 But if [the Sruti] were to mirror.
say, "You [are the Existent]" [on the basis of] discriminating 88. It is not supported by the scriptures or reasoning that the
["you"] from "I,'' mind is conscious. [If the mind were conscious,] it would follow
79 & 80. [and "you"] refers to the continuum of the notions, that the body and the eye, etc., would also be so.
there would be the defect already mentioned. 58 If [you 59 say that] 89. If [you say,] "I,et them also be so," [we answer:] No, be-
"you" refers to the Overseer, [you] should explain here how any cause [if it were so, you would have] become a materialist. And if
relation between the "I"-notion and the Overseer could exist there were no reflection in the mind, the notion that I am the
through which "you" could indicate [the Overseer] indirectly. Seeing would not arise."
If [you say that] there is a relation of being seer and the object 90. If there were no notion, "I am the Existent," [the sentence],
seen, how can there be [such a relation between the "!"-notion «Thou art That" (Chand. Up. VI,8,7, etc.) would also be
and the Overseer], when the Overseer is actionless? meaningless. To him who knows the distinction between "you"
81. If [you sayJ, let the Overseer, though actionless, be in essence and "I" this sentence will be meaningful. 66
identical [with the "!"-notion], [we answer:] Unless it is grasped 91. It should be known that the two notions "my" and "this"
that the relationship is that the Overseer is the essence of "mine" inevitably denote "you" (=non-Atman). [The notion] "I" is
(= the "I"-noton), 60 there will be no realization [of the identity thought to denote "I" ( = Atman) and [the notion J "I am this"
of the "I" -notion and the OverseerJ. denotes both ["I" and "you"].
82. If you think that the relationship can be grasped from the 92. In regard to each other, a relation of principal and subordi-
182 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 18, 93-102 I, 18, 103- Il 2) METRICAL PART 183
nate is assumed, and it is reasonable that a relation of qualifying tence ], then there would necessarily be some duty to be fulfilled.
and qualified between them should be accepted. It is accepted that even before the verbal expression, 74 Atman
93. These two [notions], "my" and "this," are both qualifying exists by Itself.
attributes of the [notion "I"] which is mentioned in the middle 103. Right knowledge arises at the moment of hearing, 75 re-
[of Upad I, 18, 91 ], just as [the wealth and cows are qualifying sulting in freedom from hunger, etc. 76 There is no doubt about the
attributes of a man in the case of] "a man possessed of wealth" meaning of the sentences like "Thou art That" (Chand. Up.
and "a man possessed of cows" : and similarly the body is [a q uali- VI,8,7, etc.), in the past, present, or future.
fying attribute] of the bearer of the "I"-notion. 104. As the Awareness-Atman is by nature free from obstacles,
94. Everything seated in the intellect, 67 as well as the bearer the right knowledge of one's own Atman infallibly arises at the
of the "I"-notion, is [a qualifying attribute] of the Witness. time of hearing.
Therefore the Knower makes everything manifest, though touch- 105. Does one understand [at the time of hearing], "I am the
ing nothing. Existent" or, "I am something else"? If [one understands , "I am]
95. All this, which has been set forth according to popular con- the Exjstent," the principal meaning of the word "I" should be
viction, is inverted [thinking]. [Though] for those who are not regarded as being "the Existent."
intent upon discriminati on, everything exists, [yet] it does not 106. If [one were to understand , "I am] something else," then
exist for those who have discriminat ing knowledge. it [would J be wrong to attain the knowledge, "I am the Existent."
96. The logical means by which to ascertain [the meanings of] If the principal meaning is grasped, there is therefore no obstacle
"this" [and] "I" should indeed be the method of agreement and to the realization here.
difference 6 8 of the words and of the meanings of the words. 5 9 107. The notion and its bearer ( = the intellect), which have
97. In thinking, "I did not see anything else at all in this state the reflection of [Atman and appear to be Atman], exist for Its sake.
of deep sleep," one does not deny his own Seeing but negates his And since both are non-conscio us, the result ( = final release) is
own notions. 70 assumed to be in Pure Consciousness. 77
98. [The scripture itself declares] the existence of Consciousness 108. The result(= final release) is proper to [Atman] though
and Its immovabili ty, saying, "[Then this person becomesJ self- [It is J immovable , just as victory, etc. are proper to a king, 78 since
illumined" (Brh. Up. IV,3,9) [and] "For there is no [cessation that result (i.e., final release) is neither the nature nor the cause
of the Seeing of] the Seer [because of Its imperishabi lity]" (B:rh. of either action or the notion.
Up. IV,3,23), but [declares] the perishabilit y of the notions. 109. Only in the sense that the mirror which has the reflection
[Thus] the scripture itself separates notions from Awareness. of a face and appears to be the face is the face, can the mirror of
99. When one has thus come to know, from the Sruti and from the intcll ect's notion which has the reflection of Atman [and ap-
universally accepted usage, the meaning of the sentences, the pears to be Atman be what is called atman]. In that sense the "I"
Sruti says, "Thou art That" (Chand. Up. VI,8, 7, etc.) in order is indeed [atman but not in the true sense].
to remove the delusion of a hearer, 71 ] l(). This is the way of realization that "[I] am the Existent."
100. just as Brahma removed the ignorance of Dasaratha's son And [if] it were not so ( = if there were no reflection), it would not
(=Rama) merely by means of the declaration [, "You are the God be [realized]. If there were no medium, the teaching "Thou art
Narayal).a," and] did not mention any other effort whereby he was That" (Chand. Up. VI,8,7, etc.) would moreover be meaning-
to know that he was Vieyl).u. 72 less.
101. [The sentence] that you are the Existence expresses only 111. Thus, teaching is useful [only] when it is directed to a
the basis of the word "I," which [rests] on the Light, i.e., the inner hearer. If the Overseer is not taken as the hearer, who would be
Atman. Thus the result of it is final release. 73 the hearer?
102. If the result should not arise by merely hearing [the sen- 112. If [you] suggest that in the presence of the Overseer the
184 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 18, 113-122 l, 18, 123-131] METRICAL PART 185

intellect will be [a hearer], [we answer:] The Overseer does not changes of the Awareness ( = Atman) are due to the notions [of
do anything for [the intellect], any more than a piece of wood the intellect].
can be taken [to do anything for it]. 79 123. The manifestation, perception, and establishment of the
113. If the Overseer were to do anything for the intellect, would notions here [in this world] are due to another ( = Atman), since
It not be subject to transformation? And what is wrong with [ac- [it is Atman that is] directly cognizable like a lamp. This is the
cepting] the reflection [theory] since it is supported by the Sruti 80 inference which is being statcd.89
and other authority? 124. Should one let the man ignorant [of It] grasp [Atman]
114. If [you say that to accept] a reflection entail changes (in by some [accepted J means of knowledge, or [should it be] by
Atman], [we answer:] No, as already said, [it is unreal] just as a negating [non-Atman] so that [only] the other(= Atman) re-
snake and so forth appears to be a rope 81 and so forth and just mains,90 without [using] any [of the accepted] means of knowl-
as a mirror [appears to be] a face. 82 edge?
115. H [you say that] unless the appearance of [the intellect] 125. If it is now said that [the method is that non-Atman] is
as atman is established apart from the perception of Atman, there negated by verbal testimony which is a means of knowledge, it
would arise the fallacy of mutual dependence, 83 [we answer:] would follow that [.4tman] would be a void, since no Overseer
The face and so on are established apart from [the appearance would have been established.
of the mirror as the face and like] . 126. If [you argue,] "You are a conscious being. How [can you
116. [You may say that] if the Overseer is established apart be] the body?", [we answer:] Not [conclusive], because [it is J not
from [Its reflection], the reflection belongs to It, and ifthe reflec- established [through the mere negation that the conscious being
tion does belong to It, [the reflection] is distinct from the Overseer. is different from the body]. [Only J if a conscious being different
117. That is not so, since the notion [of the intellect] and the [from anything else] had been established, would [the Overseer]
Seeing are in dream established each separately; since no chariot be [established] in that way by abandoning something else."
or other [external objects]84 exist in the dreaming state, [it is sim- 127. [Objection:] "The Overseer simply exists of Itself and
ply that] the notion [of the intellect] is being perceived by Atman. [our argument holds] since the conscious being is directly cogniz-
118. Pervaded by Awareness ( = Atman), the notion [of the in- able." [Reply: J Then the understanding of a man ignorant
tellect] assumes the form of an object [of perception]. The object [of It] ought to be the same as [that of] the one [skeptic]91 who
[of perception] is taken to be that in whose form the notion arises. positivelyJ asserts the non-existence [of Atman].
119. As [the object of perception] is most desired, it is the ob- 128. [Objection:] "By the fact that people in ordinary life have
ject of an action. 85 One who is desirous of obtaining it is enjoined t11e memory 'I knew this,' we may say that the instrument, ob-
to perform the action. And that [notion of the intellect] to which ject, and agent are established simultaneously."92
the form [of the object] should be given is called an instrument. 129. [Reply:] Even if[we admit for the sake of argument] that
120. That [Atman] is called Knower 86 by the reflection of memory is a right means of knowledge,9 3 it [only] appears to be
which [the notion of the intellect] is pervaded. He is a knower of simultaneous on account of its swiftness. The perceptions [of in-
Atman who, having examined these three, 87 knows [which is At- strument, object, and agent arose originally] one after another
man] among them. before the memory [was laid down], and [now], after the memory
121. Since they are judged to be "right," "doubtful," or [has been recalled, they come up] in the same manner.
"false," the notions [of the intellect] are changeable. There is only 130. One certainly assumes [distinctions like] "I knew this ( =
the one Awareness in them but distinctions are made [in It] by the the object)" and "I knew me ( = the agent)." Where distinctions
0

notions. are assumed there is no simultaneity.

122. Just as the distinctions [in color, etc.] of a jewel are due to l 31. And [a regressus ad infinitum follows] since the three [in-
the distinctions of the limiting adjuncts, 88 so impurity and all strument, object, and agent] arise at the time of perceiving the na-
186 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 18, 132-141 I, 18, 142-149] METRICAL PART 187

ture even [of one of them alone]; the agency associated with [the ing] the dependence of knowledge upon something else ( = At-
perception of] the nature [of the agent] is not [associated with the man) ? [If you say,] '[The dependence of knowledge] upon the
perception of the nature] of the instrument and the object. kn()wer is accepted,' [we answer:] In our view the knower too is
132. The object of an action is declared to be that which it is nothing but knowledge."
intended should be always affected by the action of some agent. 94 142. "It is certain that the nature of knowledge is devoid of dis-
Therefore it is accepted that the object of an action depends upon tinction but yet is seen by those of distorted vision as if it had the
the agent [and] not upon anything else. distinction of object, knower, and consciousness."101
133. It is by verbal testimony, inference, or a means of know}. 143. ["In our view knowledge is declared to be action and
edge other than these that anything becomes established for the agent."] 1 02 [Reply:] If [you admit that] knowledge is existent
man ignorant [of It], and not otherwise. and perishable, [you should also J accept that it has a bearer.
134. [Question:] "Is the Overseer too established by a means of If [you say that] you accept no attribute [of knowledge], [you]
knowledge, or without any?" [Reply:] One's own [Overseer] is give up [your own] position [that knowledge is existent and
[in fact] established without any [means of knowledge]; but this perishable] .
is not sufficient for the man ignorant [of It]. 144. [Objection:] "Surely an attribute such as existence is [re-
135. If the Overseer be taken to be the man ignorant [of It], ally simply] the exclusion of non-existence, and so on?" [Reply:]
there ought to be some evidence other than [Itself] for [It to be] Even then knowledge should not be perishable, for you hold that
known. And if anything other [than It J is the man ignorant [of [it] has specific individuality.103
It], there ought certainly to be [evidence other than Itself] for 145. Destruction goes only up to specific individuality ( = At-
knowing [It]. man) [in our view. Eut you hold that] destruction is the exclusion
136. Does "establishment" 95 mean "the state of being of non-destruction. You say that sameness [perceived] as cow is
known," 96 "coming into existence," 97 or something else?98 If [it the non-existence of non-cow, but that is not the specific indi-
means] "the state of being known," you must remember the two viduality of a cow.
alternatives just mentioned [in the previous verse]. 146. You say that the meaning denoted by the word "momen-
137. If "establishment" means "coming into existence," no tary" is also nothing but the non-existence of something else [than
effort would be of any avail for that, since it is well known to the momentary]. [Objection:] "Though non-existence is devoid
everyone that a thing [comes into existence] from its own causes. of distinction, we take it that distinction arises because of
138. In the doctrine, therefore, which accepts knowledge, ob- names."
ject of knowledge, etc., "establishment" is said to be "the state of 14 7. [Reply: J How in your view can one become many because
being known." The Overseer and the overseen are "established" of differences in names? If exclusion 104 is concerned with things
[and] are "the object to be known," but they do not "come into other [than a cow], how docs this [exclusion of them] indicate a
existence." cow?
139. If [you] assume that "establishment" means "distinct- 148. Neither non-existences (negations) nor any particularities
ness"99 of the object, agent, etc., [we say that] "distinctness" and [could] ever distinguish [a cow from a non-cow], any more than
"indistinctness" belong only to [the Overseer] different (from ob- names, generic properties, and the like [could distinguish] con-
ject, agent, etc.] and not to them. sciousness, since on your view [consciousness] is devoid of partic-
140. And a jar does not become "distinct" to a blind man, an ularities.
agent who has no faculty of seeing. If "distinctness" be supposed 149. If you accept sense-perception or inference 10 5 [as means of
to belong to the agent, etc. [which have no faculty of seeing], the knowledge] in daily life, it must necessarily be admitted that it
faculty of sight must have a bearer-the Overseer. (sense-perception or inference) arises on the basis of differences
141. [Objection:]100 "Tell [us] what do you gain by [postulat- between action and the agent.
188 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 18, 150-159 I, 18, 160-169) METRICAL PART 189

150. Therefore blue and yellow or a jar and the like are quali- that final release from pleasure and pain should take place in the
fying attributes of consciousness; and so the [perceiver] which bearer of the "I"-notion ( = the intellect).
perceives [it] should be admitted. 160. The notion "[I am] suffering pain" must arise from a mis-
151. There is the perceiver of form-col or and other [external conception [of Atman] as the body and so forth, like the notion that
objects], which is different from them, since [they) are objects of " [I am] owner of an earring." It is by the notion "I am the
perception. Likewise there is [the perceiver] of the notion [of the inner Atman,''
intellect] which is similarly different [from that notion], since [the 161. namely by discriminating knowledge here [in our doc-
perceiver] is the illuminator [of the notion], like a lamp. 1 06 trine], that [the notion] devoid of discriminating knowledge is
152. What kind of relationship other than that of the seer and sublated. In the inverted view, [everything] would become non-
the object of seeing will be possible between the Overseer who is existent in the end since the valid means of knowledge would be-
the seeing and the object of the Overseer, which is the object of come invalid.
seeing ?107 162. If [I,] Atman, were burnt, cut, and destroyed, [I, Atman]
153. Being effected by the Overseer, seeing pervades the object would suffer pain, but otherwise not; for though one [man] may
of seeing, or rather, some help is given to the intellect by the be burnt, [cut, or destroyed], a different [man] never suffers the
permanent Overseer.108 pam.
154. It has previously been said 109 that the help is [for the in- 163. Being without touch and body, 111 I (=Atman) can there-
tellect] to become OverseePlike [because of the reflection of the fore never be burnt. Therefore [the notion "I suffer pain"] arises
Overseer in it] and since the intellect [thus] becomes an illumina- from false conception just as, when [one's] son is dead, [the notion
tor, [it] pervades a jar and other [external objects], as light and "I am] dead" [arises from false conceptionJ.11 2
the like pervade [their objects]. 164. [The notion] "I am owner of an earring" 113 is certainly
155. Just as ajar [when pervaded by light) becomes something sublated by discriminating knowledge. Likewise the notion "[I]
situated in the light, so does it [when pervaded by the intellect] suffer pain" [is] always [sublated] by the notion "I am apart."
become something seated in the intellect. 110 It is the intellect's 165. If it be established that [Atman] suffers pain, it should be
pervasion [of the jarJ that is the jar's being seated [in the intellect J. admitted that Atman is always capable of suffering pain [but this
In the pervasion by the intellect there would be sequence [of is not the case]. [Therefore the notion "I] suffer" results from the
stages]. false conception whereby the object [i.e., pain] is produced and
156. First the notion [of the intellect] pervades [objects]. Then destroyed.
there is the help of Atman. [However] this sequence is not appli- 166. Just as, though [Atman is] without touch and motion, [one
cable to the Overseer of all, any more than to time, space and the feels] touch and motion, etc. [to be located in Atman], so also
like. because of lack of discriminating knowledge one feels pain to be
157. Something which, like the mind, perceives obje<:ts with I ocated in Atman, though it belongs to the mind.
the help of some factors, leaving some o~jects unperceived, is sub- 16 7. By discriminating knowledge, namely the [right] notion
ject to transformation. of Atman, pain is removed like motion, etc. Since the mind is by
158. The knowledge "I am the Overseer" is merely a convic- nature devoid of discriminating knowledge, it roams without
tion pertaining to the intellect [but] not to the Overseer, since desirfog [to do so].
That is free from distinction, having no other [Overseer above 168. Then pain is experienced; [but it is] not [experienced]
It]. when the mind has become motionless. Therefore it is not reason-
159. Even if the bearer [of the "!"-notionJ were to realize final able that pain is located in the inner Atman.
release, thinking thus, "I am [the Overseer]," it is not reasonable 169. Since [in the sentence "Thou art That" the words]
 190 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 18, 170-178 I, 18, 179-187] METRICAL PART 191

"Thou" and "The Existent" ( = That) have the same referent, for nobody can know the meaning of a sentence without remem-
this [sentence] is comparable to [the sentenceJ "The horse is bering [the meanings of words].
black." Since the word "Thou" is [used] in apposition to [a 1 79. In such sentences as "Thou art That,'' the meaning of sen-
word-"Existent"-which] refers to the Painless One (=Brah- tences-[ namely] "I am ever-free"-is not manifested from them
man), it [too] refers to that [Painless One]. because the meaning of the word "Thou" has not been analyzed.
170. Likewise, since the word "That" is [used] in connection 180. The method of agreement and difference has been men-
with [the word which] denotes the inner Atman, [it refers to the tioned for the purpose of analyzing out the [meaning of the word
inner Atman]. [Just like the sentence J "You are the tenth, "114 the «Thou''] and for no other purpose; for [it is only] when the mean-
sentence ["Thou art That"] means the inner Atman. ing of the word "Thou" has been discriminated, like a vilva fruit 120
171. Without abandoning their own meanings [the words placed on the palm [of the hand],
"Thou" and "That"] convey a special meaning and result in the 18]. the meaning of the sentence becomes manifest. And thus
realization of the inner Atman. Therefore there is no other mean- [the meaning of the sentence] is the One Apart, 121 since the inner
ing contradictory to this meaning. Atman is ascertained by the exdusion 122 of the [meaning] "exper-
172. Since [the tenth boyJ is included in the notion ["he must iencer of pain" from the meanings of the word "I."
be among] the nine [others]," 115 [he] tries to know [which is the 182. Such being the case the [above-mentioned] meaning .ls
tenth boyJ, not counting himself as making up the ten. Similarly possible; thus it is not reasonable for those versed in the meanings
people [try to know] their dwn Atman.116 of words and sentences to abandon the [meaning] which is ex-
173. Because their eyes are bound by nescience those people pressed in the Srutis and to understand a meaning which is not
whose intellect is seized by desire do not clearly realize themselves expressed in the Srutis.
to be the Seeing, just as [the tenth boy] does not realize himself 183. [Objection: J123 "Sense-perception and other [means of
to be the tenth.117 knowledge] do sublate [knowledge arising from sentences], as
174. [Just as the boy knew himself to be the tenth through the [they do in the case of the sentence describing] cooking as applied
sentence] "You are the tenth," so through such sentences as "Thou to grains of goid 124 and so on." [Reply:] How can [knowledge
art That" one knows one's own Atman, the Witness of all the arising from] sentences be sublated by that erroneous [knowledge]
internal organs. which arises from sense-perception and other [means of knowl-
175. There is no fixed rule in the Veda to the effect that in a sen- edge]?
tence one [word] should be placed first and another word should 184. [Objection:] "As long as there is the knowledge 'I suffer
be placed next; the syntactical relation of words is based upon pain' [the knowledge] '[I am] free from pain' does not arise from
[their] meanings. us the sentence, although [the former] is erroneous knowledge due
176. For when the meanings of the words in a sentence, while to perception and other [means of knowledge]." [Reply:] Not
they are being listened to, are remembered by the method of so, because there are exceptions.
agreement and difference, 119 then the meaning of the sentence is 185. In the dreaming state I suffered pain today on account of
understood. burning, cutting, and the like [but the pain was sublated by the
177. When the meanings of words in eternal sentences are sentences]. Even if [the pain] be not sublated by the sentences
clarified in order to convey the knowledge of the meaning of the in the dreaming state,
sentences [to a pupil], then the question ["How am I Brahman?"] 186. still it should be admitted that [pain] is sublated before
is out of place. [the beginning] of, and [after] the end of, the pain, since the
178. The method of agreement and difference has been men- persistence of pain or delusion is not seen anywhere.
tioned for the purpose of remembering the meanings of the words, 187. If one knows that the inner Atman is the [highest] Atman
192 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 18, 188-197 I, 18, 198-207] METRICAL PART 193

by sublating the [knowledge] that I suffer pain, just as [the boy tence J; so [it] should not be accepted since [it is] not stated in the
knew he was] the tenth by sublating the knowledge that he was Srutis. And there [would] also [be] the meaningless abandon-
among the nine [others], 125 there is no contradiction. ment of that which is stated in the Srutis. 133
188. The knowledge that one is ever-free arises from the sen- 198. [Objection:] "Satisfaction is felt from eating, but it is not
tence and not from anything else. The knowledge of the meaning experienced from the sentence. This analysis of the sentence is
of the sentence is also preceded by recollecting the meaning of the like [trying to] get boiled milk-rice from cow-dung."
words. 126 199. [Reply:] It is true that [only] indirect knowledge arises
189. By the method of agreement and contrariety the meaning frorn sentences referring to things other than Atman. But it cannot
of words is certainly recollected. Thus one realizes that one is one- be doubted that [direct knowledge arises from the sentenceJ which
self free from pain and actionless. 127 refers to the inner Atman, just as the [true] number [ten] was
190. Through such sentences as "(Thou art] the Existent,'' obtained [from the sentence, "You are the tenth"J.134
like the [sentence] "You are the tenth," right knowledge con- 200. It has to be accepted that [the inner Atman] is "self-evi-
cerning the inner Atman will become clearer. 128 dent," which is synonymous with "self-knowabl e." And the
191. Just as all pain in the dreaming state ceases by awakening Awareness of one's own Atman is established at the time of the
so [the notion] that one suffers pain oneself is always [destroyed] by cessation of the "!"-notion.
the [right] notion that the inner Atman [is the highest] Atman. 129 201. Pain is the object to intellects. How can this inner Atman,
192. In the case of grain,s of gold, etc., right knowledge does not the Seeing, have any connection with pain, when those [intellects
arise since [grains of gold, etc.,] to which something other than themselves are in turn properlyJ taken to be merely objects to It?135
[cooking] pertains, do not become soft. 130 But this is not true of 202. It is only Itself that is aware of the Seeing, for Its nature is
such sentences as "Thou art That" since there is no contradiction. Awareness. The Awareness of this [inner Atman] is described as
193. In the sentence "Thou art That" the meaning of the two the intellect's coming into being as a possessor of Its reflection.
[words] "That" and "art" are already known. Because of the 2 03. You here and now are final release, [self-]establish ed and
absence of any assistance to recollect the meaning of [the word] free frorn hunger, etc. 136 How can such a contradictory statement
"Thou," the sentence will not produce right knowledge. be made [in the Sruti] that [Atman] is to be heard, etc., by you ?137
194. This word "art" means that [the words] "That" and 2 04. If [you say] that [final release] has to be established, it
"Thou" have the same referent. 131 The word "That" means inner might be so; then hearing and so forth would be necessary [to es-
Atman and [the word] "Thou" has the meaning of the word tablish final release]. In that case final release would be non-eter-
"That." nal. Otherwise (i.e.,ifitwere eternal), the [injunctive] sacred word
195. The two [words] will remove [the notions] that [the word would be contradictory.
"Thou" ( = the inner Atman) means] a sufferer of pain and that 205. 1f the difference between a hearer and the object to be
[the word "That" (=Brahman) means] non-inner Atman. And heard ( == Atman, or final release) were accepted, this [hearing,
thus [the two words] will mutually convey the meaning of [the etc. J would be necessary. In that case, there would be a contra-
sentence J "Not thus! Not so!" diction of the desired meaning [which is the identity of Brahman
196. When the result of the [sentence] "Thou art That" is un- and Atman]; the sacred word would be quite incoherent.
derstood in such a way, how is it said that this [sentence] is nqt 205. Once having known himself as "I am the [ self-]establishe d
the means of knowledge and that it depends upon action ?13 2 final release," any man who desires action would be foolish and
197. Therefore in the beginning, in the middle and in the end, would also betray the scripture.
the [injunction] "Perform action" is contradictory [to the sen- 207. For he who is [sdf-]establish ed has no duty to perform;
194 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, JB, 208-218 I, 18, 219-228] METRICAL PART 195

he who has any duty to perform is not [self-]established. One who It" (Kena Up. II,3) [and] "[By what, my dear, should one know]
maintains both [ideas together] deceives himself. the knower?" (Brh. Up. II,4,14).
208. [Objection:] "Only [the bare fact of] this reality is taught 219. The renunciation of all actions becomes the means for dis-
by the words, 'You are the [self-]established final release.' [But] criminating the meaning of the word "Thou" l38 since there is an
what is the hearer to do so as to know that he is thus? [U pani~adic] teaching, "Having become calm, self-controlled,
209. "It is experienced by means of per:ception that I am an [ . . . , one sees Atman there in oneself]" (Brh. Up. IV, 4, 23).
agent and a sufferer of pain. Therefore there would be an effort 220. In oneself should one see Atman, the inner Atman which is
[to know J that I am neither an agent nor a sufferer of pain. denoted by [the word] "Thou." Thence one sees all to be Atman-
210. "The Sruti has repeatedly affirmed agency, etc., when say- that is, the One Apart which is meant by the sentence ["Thou art
ing that reasoning, etc., should be employed in order to know that That"].
['I must be neither an agent nor a sufferer of pain'] and to 22 1. When the meaning of the sentence, viz. that all is Atman,
experience ['I am self-]established.' " has become known to one through the right means of knowledge,
211. [Reply:] Once having understood "I am final release, how can any injunction enjoin him to perform [any action], since
painless, actionless, desireless, and [self-] established," how can one the other means of knowledge are untrue?
still accept such a contradictory meaning? 222. Therefore after the knowledge of the meaning of the sen-
212. [Objection:] "You have to explain how it is that I experi- tence [has been realized], there cannot be any injunction to action,
ence that [I] have desire and action, and am not [self-]established, since two contradictory notions, "I am Brahman" and "I am
although I am not so." an agent," do not [co-] exist.
213. [Reply:] That [point] may indeed bequestionedabout[but] 223. The knowledge "I am Brahman" is not sublatcd by [the
not the experience that [one is] in final release. It is a thing which knowledge] "[I am] an agent" [and] "[I] have desire and am
is contradicted by means of valid knowledge which is questionable. bound'' which is derived from the fallacious means of knowledge.
214. The [experience] that I am in final release results from 224. When on the basis of the scripture the conviction "I am
means of knowledge other [than perception, namely the sentence] Brah1nan and no other" becomes hrrn, then the [above-mentioned
"Thou art the Existent." It is [the experience] that [I] suffer pain erroneous] notion, like the notion that the body is Atman, will
which deserves to be questioned, arising as it does from fallacious become untenable.
perception. 225. Neither one who has come out to fearlessness from a state
215. One should be told what he asks and hopes for. The ab- of fear, nor he who is still making efforts to do so, would seek, if
sence of pain is being asked for. How does this pain disappear he is independent, to go back to the state of fear.
from mind completely? 226. Having been awakened from the ignorance as to the
216. To meet this question, it must be stated what it is that meanings of the words, and seeking for the realization of the
removes pain. Since the Srutis are the means of knowledge there meaning of the sentence, how should one come to follow his de-
is no doubt of one's own Atman. sires, when renunciation, etc., have been enjoined [on such a
217. Therefore the sacred word of the Srutis brings about the man]?
realization that one's Atman is in final release. It should be accept- 227. 189Therefore everything has been established which we
ed that [this sacred word] has this meaning, since there is no nave said a hove.
evidence to the contrary. 228. Certainly nobody strives towards something in which he
218. No Awareness of Atman other than this is possible, since has no interest. Why should a seeker of final release make any
the Sruti says, "It is not known by those who [say they J understand effort, since he has no interest in the three worlds ?140
 196 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 18, 229-230 I, lfl] METRICAL PART 197

229. Even if suffering from hunger, one certainly does not want Ma!)c;lanami5ra does not explicitly advocate the doctrine of prasal{lkhyii.na. However, he
uses the expression "prasa1?1klzyiitiini karmii.~i" (Brahrnasiddhi, p. 33, line 11) and seems
to take poison. Nobody whose hunger has been appeased by
to hold the same idea, calling it upasanii (see Brahmasiddhi, p. 35, and p. 134). It is said
sweet food knowingly wants to take poison unless he is a fool. 141 that the doctrine of prasa1J1khyiina is one of the instances in which Vacaspati, who is the
230. Salutation to this good teacher who, like a bee, has col. author of the Bhiimatl, commentary on the BSBh, is made responsible by later Advaitins
lected for us from the flowers of the Upanil?adic sentences the best for a view whigh was originally set forth by Mai:i<;lanamisra, which he simply revised
and read into Sankara's BSBh. See Brahmasiddhi, pp. xxvii-xxxi; S.S. Suryanarayana
honey of the nectar of knowledge. 142 Sastri and C. Kunhan Raja, The Bhiimati of Vii.caspati (Madras: Theosophical Publish-
ing House, 1933), pp. xxxix-xli and i tsfootnote; A.]. Alston (tr), The Naifkarmy,a Siddhi
0J .<irl Surefvara (London: Shanti Sadan, 1959), p. 197. As is clear in the Upad, Sankara
Notes rejectspraSaT[lklryii.na, but he recommends parisaT(lklryiina, though how they differ from
the former is not known; and an illustration of the latter appears in Upad II,3. Cf. PBh
lCf. Upad II,2,95 f. 1,5,29, p. 24.
2Ramatirtha interprets "guror gariyas" as "paramagurave." The epithet "paramaguru" HAnandajiiana interprets "two" (duaya) as" Jabdiinucintana" and ''yuktyanucintana";
is traditionally a1;plied to Gaw;lapada, the author of GK, whom the tradition regards ]lodhanidhi, as ''yuktiSabdasiimarthJ,a"; Ramatirtha, as "viikyiinucintana" and ''yuktyalo-
as the teacher of Sankara's teacher Govinda. Bodhanidhi interprets ''guror gariyas'' as cana." Cf. the previous stanza. Sankara recognizes the necessity of reasoning and
"sarvaguror api gariyase," which does not indicate any particular person. Vedic teachings (see stanza 4) but not of prasal!'-khyana.
3"Vqjra" (thunderbolt) is a weapon ofindra who stands in the first rank among the isAnandajiiana and Ramatirtha supply "ced" after "pratipadyate," but Bodhanidhi
gods in the Veda. Nearly one-fourth of the total number of hymns in the ~g-Veda are reads ''yato'' for' 'tathii ."
dedicated to him. Having drunk soma juice, he overcomes Vrtra, the demon of 16"\Vhat has been heard" (fruta) may stand for "fabda" (verbal testimony, especially
drought and inclement weather, with his thunderbolts and forces the rain to pour Sruti), which constitutes one of the means of knowledge (pramiiTJa).
down. Cf. A. A. Macdonell, The Vfdic Mythology (Reprint ed. Varanasi: Indological l7See Taitt. Sarµ. 5,2,7.
Book House, 1963), pp. 54--66. The word vajra seems to be connected with the word HJn the Nyaya-Vaisesika system "upalabdhi" (perception) and "jiiiina" (knowledge)
yatindra (an Indra of ascetics) in the present stanza (pada d). are synonyms for "buddhi" and "pratyaya" ()Vyiiyasiitra I, 1, 15; Vailefikopaskii.ra 8,1,1).
4"You" (;•ufmad) denotes the object, viz. non-Atman, in contrast with "I" (aham, According to them knowledge is a quality of ii Iman-substance. The B~ddhist and the
asmad), namely the subject, .4tman. See note I to Chap. 2, p. 108. Mimal]1sa systems commonly characterize knowledge as an activity. Sankara rejects
°Cf. Upad I,14,17; 18,46; 18,114; II,2,109. both the<Jries and asserts that knowledge or perception is Atman Itself or the nature of
6Ramatirtha interprets df!,yiiniit as garu!fii.dimantrabijasmara~iit; Anandajiiana, as man- .Atrnan. See In.trodaction, Ill,B,3, pp. 38--40.
trabijiider giiyatryii japiit; Bodhanidhi, as mantrabijiikfaradhyii.niid yathti. gii.yatryii.dijapiit. HCf, Svet. Up. VI, 11; U pad I,)1,6; 13, 19.
7 Ramatirtha supplies here: vii.kyii.d iitmatattviivagamamii. tre IJO; Anadajnana, vii.kya.lakti- 20JnGBhXIII,12, p. 553(cf. SankaraadMai:i<;l. Up. 7 [Gita Press, n. d.], pp.
vifesat. 50-·51) Sankara mentions "quality" (gu~a) and "relation" (saTflbandha) in addition to
8.Sankara recognizes the significance of the means of knowledge (pramii1Ja) but "universal" (jati) and "action" (kriyii), a~d he styles them "sabdapravrttihetu" in his
stresses that the knowledge of Brahman-Atman is attained only through the Sruti corrnnentaryou Taitt. Up. II,!, p. 234 ( cf. Sankara ad Brh. Up. II,3,6, p. 334). But he
(Upad I,11,9; 18,217, etc.). The .§ruti is infallible, but any other means of knowledge enumerates "narne" (rziima), Hforrn~and-colorn (riipa), "action" (karman), "distinction"
than that is fallacious (pramii1Jiibhiisajiita, Stanza 223; pratyakfiibhasajanyatva, Stauza. (bheda), "ur1iversal" (jati), and "quality" (gu~a) in his commentary on Brh. Up.
214). See Introduction, III,C,l, pp. 46-49. II,3,6, p. 334. Cf. Nai! III,103; Unters, p. 1962.
9Cf. Brh. Up. IV,3,10. 21Jn the Upad the word ii.bhiisa is used in the three meanings: (!) a fallacy (praty-
lOCf. Kath. Up. 111,4. akfiJ.bhasa-, Upad I, I8,214;prarnii~·uzbhiisa-, Upad I, 18,223); (2) false appearance (Upad
llCf. Upad I,12,17. I,14,l; 18,84; 13,86, etc.); and (3) reflection (Upad I,18,43; 18,63, etc.). For a de-
12This objection, which ends at stanza 18, seems to be made by the Mlmarµsakas. tailed dismssion, sec S. J\.fayeda, "The Meaning of Abhi'isa in Sankara's Upaddasa-
See the next note. Cf. Upad I,1,8-11; 18,183. hasri'' (in Japanese. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, vol. 6, no. 1, 1958), pp. 174-
13'fhe word prasal{lcak§ii. is used as a synonym of prasa'!'kf~yfina (see stanza 12). In his 177; .Introduction, III,B,2, pp. 36-37.
work Surdvara makes an opponent define prasal{lkhyiina as: "Mentally going over the 22Cf. Introduction, III,B,2, p. 36-37.
meaning of such ,~ruti sayings as 'Thou art That' and the reasoning based on the method 23See stanza 71.
of agreement and contrariety'' (tattvamasyddilabdiirthii.nuvayavyatirekayuktivifayabuddhyiim- 24See Introduction, IV,C, pp. 75--76.
reganam, Nai! III,90). It is also said that when properly performed,prasaTJ)khyiina gener- 25See l\fanu IV,130; rajfiavalkyasmrti I,152. This view is refuted later at stanza 41.
ates perfect knowledge through the increase of knowledge (ibid). Like Sankara Surc- 26This view is refuted at stanza 42. See Introduction, IV,C, pp. 75-76.
svara rejects pras1J1khyiina. Cf. Nai! I,67; III,88-93; 123-126; Brh. Up. Varttika 1,818- 27Cf. BS II,3,43; BhG XV,7. It is reported that Bhartrprapanca held this view. Cf.
848; III,796-961; Unters, pp. 2005-2006; T.M.P. Mahadevan,Sa1?1bandlw-Vartika ef Nakamura III, p. 172. This theory is rejected in GK III, 7. See Introduction, IV,C, pp.
Suresvariicii.rya (Madras: University of Madras, 1958), pp. xxi-xxiii. In his Brahrnasiddhi 75--75.
 198 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 18
I, 18] METRICAL PART 199
2BThe idea that the individual atman is a modification (vikiira) of the highest Atman
55Anandajfiana and Ramatirtha take this objection as addressed to other Vedan-
is said to haye be~n held generally by early Vedanta philosophers such as Bhartrpra-
tins (svayiithya).
paiica (sec Sankara ad Brh. Up. IV, 3, 7, p. 560). See Nakamura III, PP· 632-633.
56See stanza 112; Sii1"(lkhyakarikii 60.
Sec Introduction, IV,C, pp. 75-76. This theory is refuted in GK III,7.
57The first two lines are quoted in Nai~ IV,20.
29This opinion is refuted at stanzas 45, 47, and 48.
SBStanzas 76 and 77.
ao.Anandajiiana and Ramatirtha attribute this opinion to the Bha(ta school of
59According to Jagadiinanda this is the refutation of the SaJl1kya. Cf. stanza 152.
Mimamsa.
60The word "tiidiitm~a" which means identity is an abstract noun derived from a
31Ac~ording to Anandajiiana and Rarnatirtha this is the theory of the Prasangikas.
bahuvrihi compound ,;tad-atman" which means "what has this (tat) as its essence".
32This problem is taken up again in stanzas 44 f.
Therefore the identity of A and B means that B has A as its essence or that A is B's
33See Upad I,17,33.
essence. For this reason, without knowing the relationship that A is B's essence, nobody
34Rahu is said to be first referred to in the Atharnaveda (XIX,9, 10). Chand. Up.
can tell that A is identical with B.
VIII, 13 refers to the eclipse of the moon. This legend (see Upad I,17, 33) was devel-
61See stanzas 74-80.
oped especially in the Purar;as.
62As for this simile, see, for example, Brh. Up. II,1,20; Kau~. Up. III,3; IV,20;
35See stanzas 33-39.
Mul)g. Up. II,!, 1; Maitri Up. VI,26; Yiijiiavalkyasmrti III,67.
36Sce stanza 34.
63See stanzas 33 and 43.
37This statement probably refers to the principle of11akyabheda (split of the sentence,
64All the commentators take "dtf!a" as "d!f/linta."
or syntactic disunity), which is a fault (dora) emphatically disapproved in MirniiJµsa
GS See stanza 83.
as well as in Dharmasastra. According to this principle, one and the sa,rne sentence
66The last half stanza is quoted in N ai~ IV,21.
cannot be construed as laying down two separate injunctions (vidhi). Sankara also
B7See Upad I,7,1 and note l; Introduction, HI,B,2, p. 36.
refers to this principle in his BSBh III,3, 14, p. 693; III,3,24, p. 711; II I,3,42, p. 753.
6BAnvayazryatireka. For a detailed discussion, see Introduction, III,C,3, pp. 50-57.
Cf. P. V. Kane, History ef Dharmaliistra, vol. V, pt. II, pp. 1299-1303; F. Edgerton,
69This stanza is quoted in Nai~ IV,22.
The Mimiirp.sti Nyiiya Prakala (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), p. 46 and p.
WThis stanza is quoted in Nai~ IV,23.
293.
71This stanza is quoted in Nai~ IV,24.
38See stanza 34.
72According to Ramiiyar;a (Madras: M.L.J. Press, 1958), VI,120, !Off., in reply to
39Bodhanidhi reads "vastutas" for "vastusarp.s." Cf. "avastusan," stanza 46. Ramatir-
Rama (who has previously said that he considers himself to be merely a man, namely
tha interprets· "vastusat" as "paramiirthasat."
Dasarath.a's son), Brahma tells him, "You are the god Narayal)a" (bhaviin nariiya~o
40See Upad I, 18,53; II,2, 77-83. Cf. Introduction, III,B,3, pp. 38-40.
deva~, VI ,120, 13). Narayal)a is another name for Vi gm.
4ISee note 40 above.
73This stanza is quoted in Nai~ IV,25.
42Cf: stanzas 64--67.
MAccording to Bh.artrhari, all verbal expressions of Brahman are nothing but limiting
43Cf: Upad I, 15, 15 and note 11.
adjuncts (upiidhi) to the Absolute. Cf. Vakyapadiya III, 1,20; Nakamura IV, p.185.
44Cf. Kath. Up. p,18; V,13; Mul)c;l. Up. I,6. .
75See the previous stanza.
45See stanza 29. Sankara accepts two functions of words, primary (mukhya) and
76Cf. Up:ad I, 14, 12 and note 4.
secondary (gu'f}a, upaciira), but does not give a full account of them. It may be Sarva-
?7'fhere is a similar problem in the Sii!!1khya system: To which does final release
jiiatman who first set up a theory thereof in the Advaita Vedanta. See Sarp.k{epafariraka
(molcfa) belong:, Puru!a or Prakrti? Cf. Shinkan Murakami, "Mok~a in the Sarµkhya
I !04· 154-157· T Vetter Sarvajiiiitman's Samksepafiirlrakam. 1. Kapitel. Einfiihrung,
Obers:tzung und Anm~rkungen' (Wien: Kommissi~ns~erlag der os terreichischen Akademie
Philosophy" (in Japanese. The Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, vol. XXI, no. I,
1972), pp. 74-79.
der Wissenschaften, 1972), p. 19; N. Veezhinathan, The Samkfepasar'iraka of Sarvajfiat-
78 Atman is compared to a king who, without acting himself, makes others act by his
man, Critically Edited with Introduction, English Translation, Notes and Indexes (Madras:
mere presence. Cf. BSBh I,1,4, pp. 95-96.
University of Madras; 1972), pp. 9-12; K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning,
795ee stanzas 75; 154.
pp. 19-94 and pp. 231-273.
SOJagadiinanda refers to Brh. Up. II,5,19, but in fact the idt;a of"iibhasa" (reflection)
46Cf. Brh. Up. III,5,1.
of Atman is not mentioned at all in the .~rutis. This is a case of Sankara's discovering au-
47This is similar to Bhartrhari's idea (Vakyapadiya III,8, 13, p. 313). Cf. Nakamura
thority in the Srutis, especially the Upani1ads, for something which is not there. See S.
IV, pp. 111-113.
Mayeda, "On the Author ofMiiQ.Qlikyopani~ad· and the Gauc)apadiya-Bha~ya," pp.
48Lokayata (or Carvaka) is the materialism of India.
92-93.
49See stanza 51 and following.
81 The usual example is a rope appearing to be a snake. But it seems to be grammati-
50Cf. stanza 60.
cally difficult to translate in this manner.
5ISee Introduction, III,B,3, pp. 38-40.
82See stanza 109.
52Cf. Brh. Up. IV,4,16; IV,3,6; IV,3,9.
53 See stanza 31. B3'fhis probably means the vicious circle that the intellect's appearance as iitman
depends upon Atman's perception while the latter depends upon the former.
54Probably the Vijnanavadins.
84See Erh. Up. IV,3, 10.
200 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 18 I, 18] METRICAL PART 201
85See Pai;iini I,4,49. Cf. stanza 132 below. I, 16,23) perishes momentarily and is separate in its existence, and carries its own
sacr. Upad I,15,48; 16,4; 18,65. specifif individuality (svalak-ea~adhii.ra~a. Cf. Prasannapada., xvii, 304; xxiii,456, etc.).
B7The object of perception (vi~aya, stanza 118), the instrument (kara7Ja, stanza 119), Here Sankara, however, seems to understand sviitman by the term svalaksana.
and the knower (jiiiitr, stanza 120). 104Cf. stanza 144. The theory of exclusion (apoha) was first maintained by Dignaga,
88As for this simile, see Upad I,17,16. a Buddhist logician, in the fifth chapter of his Pramii~asamucca)Ja. There are three main
89See stanza 151. views of the universal (jiiti or stimtinya) in Indian philosophy: (1) the realistic view, (2)
90<::f. the second and sixth chapters of the Metrical Part. , the conccptural view, and (3) the nominalistic view. According to ( 1), which was held
91Anandajiiana and Ramatirtha regard this as referring to the Sunyaviidins. bv the Nyaya-Vaisesika, the universal is a real entity which is distinct from, but inheres
9 2A. J. Alston suggests that this is a reference to Prabhakara or his school in his i~, many individuals. The Jains and the later Advaita Vedantins adopt (2) and reject
"That Thou Art," pp. 74-75. the concept of the universal as a real, independent, and objective entity over and above
93Apart from the Jaina, the Vaisesika, and the Advaita Vedanta system, all the the individuals; they assert that it is constituted by the essential common attributes
schools of philosophy are definitely opposed to memory (smrti) being regarded as a dis. of the individuals, and has existence not only in our mind but also in the particular
tinct source of knowledge. Cf. Chatterjee, The J\ljii.ya Theory rif Knowledge, pp. 371-376. objects of experience. The Buddhists hold the third view and also deny the existence of
94Stanza 119. any independent reality of the universal. According to them universality attaches to
95Siddhi. Cf. stanzas 133, 134. names, and has no objective existence. Only the particular at a time point (svalak{arJa;
96Jfiii.tata. See stanza 135. see note 103) is ultimately real. There is no similarity between two particulars, such as
97Svii.tmaliibha. Cf. stanza 137. two cows. They are, however, identified by disregarding the difference between them
9BCf. stanza 139. and attending to the contrast with, for example, horses; in this way "cows" are speci-
99 Rarnatirtha attributes this theory to the Bhan a school of the Mlmiirµsii. fied as non-horses, etc. The sameness as cow (see stanza 145) is really simply exclusion
100 The Vijiianavadin's objection. K. B. Pathak takes this stanza, as well as the of all the non-cows (apoha). Cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, vol. I, pp. 444-456;
next one, as a quotation from a work of "Vijiianavadin Bauddha" (see "Dharmakirti vol. II, pp. 405--432; K. Kunjuni Raja, Indian Theories qf Meaning, pp. 317-318; S.
and Sarpkariicarya," Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asia~ic Society, XV III, Chatterjee, The .Nyii.ya Theory of Knowled,ge, pp. 165-175; M. Hattori, "A Study of
1890--1896, p. 94). D. V. Gokhale also recognizes the possibility (Shrl ShankfiracMrya's Mimiif1lsaslokaviirttika, Apohaviida [I]" (in Japanese. Kyotodaigaku Bungakubu Kenkyfl
Upadeshasahasrt with the Gloss Padayojanika by Shri R/imatirtha. Bombay: The Gujarati Kiyii, No. 14, 1973), pp. 1-44; [II] (ibid, No. 15, 1975), pp. 1-63.
Printing Press, 1917, p. 385, note (1)). But the point cannot yet be conclusively 105from the time of Digniiga Buddhists have accepted two different means of
settled. Cf. Nakamura I, p. 103. knowledge, sense-perception (pratyakfa) and inference (anumii.na).
101 This is a quotation from Dharmakirti's PramiirJavii.rttika II,354. This stanza is so masee stanza 123.
famous that it is often quoted, with slight difference in reading, by other texts, for 107Cf. stanza 80.
example, Sarvadar1anasa1"f'graha II, lines 206-7; Prakara7Japancika, p. 141; SartJasiddliiin· rnssee stanzas 75, 87, 112-114, 154, and 156.
tasarµgraha IV,4; Sii.rµkhyapravacanabhii.fya I,20; JVjii.yaratnii.kara (ad Slokavii.rtika ), p. 272; J09See note 108.
Nyayamaiijarl, p. 540; Brh. Up. Varttika IV,3,476; Tattvavaifiiradl lV,23, p.198. How- nosee Upad I,7,1 and note l; 18,94; Introduction, III,B,2, p. 36.
ever, it seems to me that this stanza is a later interpolation or that, as Bodhanidhi's 111cf. Ka1;h. Up. III,15; Chand. Up. VIII,12,1; Upad I,15,6; 15,7.
commentary suggests, copyists incorporated by mistake into the miila text the stanza 11.2Cf. stanza 20.
which a commentator originally quoted in his commentary for the purpose of clarifying ll.3Cf. stanza 160; BSBh I,1,4, pp. 94-95.
stanza 141. This may also be true of half a stanza ( bhutir yefff.m kriya saiva kiiraka 1fl saiva 114See Upacl I, 12,3.
cocyate) which, in some manuscripts and printed editions (see variant readings of ll.5See note 114.
Mayeda Upad), constitutes the first two lines of the succeeding stanza, and which is lU'fhis stanza appears as Naii IV, 34.
also often quoted by other authors, for example, Brh. Up. Varttika IV,3,494; Bhiimatl l1-7This stanza appears as Naii IV, 35.
II,2,20; Tattuavaifii.radz IV,20, p.195; Bodhicaryiivatiirapaiijikii. IX,6 (cf. Louis de la Val· 11.SSee Introduction, III,C,3, p. 50-53.
lee Poussin, Mu larnadhyamakii.rikiis de .Nii.gii.rjuna, St.-Petersbourg, 1913, p. 116, note I ; U.9See stanza 96.
D. V. Gokhale, Shri Shankar/ichfirya's Upadeshasfihasri, pp. 386-387, note 7). In this 120Vilva or Bil'!a is Aegle marmclos, the wood-apple tree. Its delicious fruit when
context the following two points should be noted here: (I) Manuscripts G4 and G8 unripe is used medicinally.
(see Mayeda Upad) have between the stanzas 11and12 of Chapter 15 an additional i21cr. Upad I,17,9; 18,170; 18,172.
stanza which in his commentary Bodhanidhi quotes from the Vi~i;iu Purai;ia (VI,5,80); 122cr note 104.
(2) Some manuscripts and printed editions (see variant readings of .lvfayeda Upad) 123Cf. stanzas 9-18; 192; Nai~ II,5.
have between the stanzas 23 and 24 of Chapter 17 an additional stanza which is a 124Krr7Jala (gunjii or raktikii) is the black berry of the plant Abrus precatorius used as a
quotation from Mahiibhii.rata 12,242,4 and which appears as a part of the mfila text in weight. It also means a piece of gold of the same weight, which correponds to 0.122
Ramatirtha's commentary and as a part of the commentary in Bodhanidhi's. grams or I,8i5 grains. Cf. Manu VIII, 134-136; Vi-e~udharmasil.tra, IV,6-10; VI, 11-
102 See note I 01. 12; Yajiiava lkyasmrti I,363-365; P. V. Kane, A History qf Dharmafastra, vol. II, pt. II,
1 0 3 Sviilak{a1}ya. According to Buddhism every element of existence (dharma. Cf. U pad p. 1209; III, pp. 120-121 and footnote 162; G. Buhler, The Laws of Manu (SBE vol.
202 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 18

XXV, 1964), p. 277, note 134. According to Jagadananda (p. 273, note 5) gold
particles are cooked in order to sanctify them for use in certain sacrifices. Ifs tanza 192
is taken into consideration, this simile probably means that even after cooking gold CHAPTER 19
particles we do not perceive them as cooked, since they have not become soft; and so
sense-perception denies the fact that they have been cooked. Cf. Mimii'!'siisiitra X, I, 1- ANNIHILATION OF FEVER
3; 2, 1-2; Sabara's commentary on these siltras.
125See Upad I,12,3.
126This stanza appears as Nai~ IV,31. See stanza 178; Introduction, III,C,3, p. 50-
53.
127This stanza appears as Nai~ IV,32.
12B'J'his stanza appears as Nai~ IV,33.
129Cf. stanza 187.
130See stanza 183.
131Cf. stanza 169.
132See stanzas 9-18. l. Having taken the treatment by the medicines of knowledge
133See stanza 182. and dispassion, which brings about the annihilation of the fever of
134See Upad I,12,3; 18, 187. desires, one does not [again] come to suffer pain from the delir-
135See Upad II,1,33-35.
l36Cf. Upad I, 14, 12; 18,103.
ium of that fever of desires and the connection with the series of
137This probably refers to Brh. Up. II,4,5, according to which Atman should be seen hundreds of bodies.
(draffavya), heard (1rotal!)!a), reflected on (mantavya), and meditated upon (nididqy- 2. You [O My Mind] seek to obtain valueless things, such as
iisital!Ya). Cf. stanza 205. ' the notions of "I"- and "my"-notions. Other people 1 realize
138The first two lines of this stanza are cited in Bhiiskara's commentary on the BhG
III,4 as quoted from the Upadeia Grantha. See Mayeda Upad, pp. 50-51 ; V. Raghavan, that your effort is for the sake of one other than yourself. You
"Bhaskara's Gitabha~ya", WZKSO, vols. XII-XIII (1968-1969), p. 283 and p. 287. indeed have no knowledge of the objects, and I [who have it] have
It is reported by D. V. Gokhale in his edition of the Upad (Bombay: The Gujarati no desire to possess them. Therefore it is proper for you to be calm,
Printing House, 1917), p. 415, note (3) that the first half stanza is quoted in Vidvanmii-
0 Mind!
noraiijani/ikii 4 (viciiriiya for vivekiiya), Madhusi1danasarasvat!'s Gu</.iirtkadipikii 3,6 and
Visvdvarasarasvati's Yatidharmasa'!lgraha, p. 72 an<l p. 156. 3. As] am none other than the supreme and eternal One I am
139Manuscripts of the text with the commentaries of .Anandajiiana and Bodhanidhi always satisfied [and] I have no desire. And being always released,
(see variants of Mayeda Upad) lack stanzas 227-230, and the two commentators do
1 do not wish [My] welfare. 0 Mind, make more efforts for your
not refer to them at all. But stanzas 228 and 229 appear as Nai~ IV,65 and 66. No con-
clusive evidence is available for any explanation of these facts. tranquilization !
140This stanza appears as Nai~ IV,65. See note 139. 4. According to the Sruti it is the Atman of both the world and us
141This stanza appears as Nai~ IV,66. See note 139. that transcends a series of the six waves of existcnce 2 ; it is also
142This prakaral}a and the seventeenth open and end with benedictory stanzas.
For a fuller discussion of the formation of the text, sec Mayeda U pad, pp. 65-68.
.known by Me from the [other] means of knowledge 3 as well.
Therefore, 0 Mind, you make useless efforts.
5. When. you have been calmed there is indeed no notion of
difference, on account of which people fall into delusion through
illusion, since the perception [of difference J is the cause of the rise
of ill us ion; at the time of release from the perception [of differ-
ence], nobody has any illusion at all.
6. I am not deluded by your activity since I am by true nature
enlightened, unfettered, and changeless. There is indeed no
difference in our nature at an earlier and later time. Therefore,
0 Mind, your effort is useless.

203
204 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 19, 7-14 I, 19, 15-20] METRICAL PART 205

7. As I am constant I do not become other [than I am]; if (I vestigation [is accepted as the cause of a conclusion], so the Non-
were] connected with changes, [I] would indeed be inconstant. I Dual and Existent [Atman is to be accepted as the cause of the false
am always shining and therefore I am non-dual. Certain it is that assumption].
what is falsely assumed is unreal. 15. Since [It] is the cause of [yourJ investigation, the Existent
8. In essence you are non-existent in this world, 0 Mind, since is [in fact] accepted by you and supposed to exist. And if It were
when scrutinized through reasoning [you] are [found to be] non. non-existent the investigation would be given up; so [It] would
existent. Now there is no destruction of what is existent, and there remain as such. I fit is not desirable [that the investigation be given
is no origination of what is non-existent. 4 Both [destruction and up] the Existent should by all means be accepted.
origination] 5 belong to you. Therefore you arc not accepted as the 16. [Objection:] 11 "Even if [we admit for the sake of argument J
existent. that there be the Existent I would be the same as the non-existent,
9. The subject of seeing, the object of seeing, and seeing-all since It has no practical cfficiency, 12 any more than the [fabled]
this is an error, since it is what you have falsely constructed. The donkey's horn." [Reply:] But the absence of practical efficiency
object of seeing is not considered to be different from the Seeing. does not constitute a criterion of the non-existence [of a thing].
[The atman] in the state of deep sleep is not different [from iltman] [The existence ofa thing] is not [established] through [the fact]
in the waking state. that [it has practical efficiency]. Conversely, [if a thing has no
10. And similarly false construction is also dual, 6 since it is not practical efficiency], it is not [therefore established] that [it] is
a real substance, 7 as in the familiar case of the torch circle.& As otherwise [than existent].
there is no difference of powers [of iltman such as seeing, etc.]9 nor 17. Moreover, [that is] because [your argument, viz. that the
of atman [in different bodies], non-duality [of atmarz] is ascertained Existent has no practical efficiency] is not established, since [the
to be as the Srutis 10 say. Existent] is the [very J cause of [your] investigation13 and duality
11. And if these conscious [ atmans J were different from one an- is emitted from lt through [Its] Maya. 14 [The Existent] is thus
other, their destruction would certainly come about, since they established through the Srutis, the Smrtis, and reasoning. But other-
would be limited and things which have differences are seen to be wise [It] is not reasonably [established].1 5
destructible. Moreover, the destruction of the world results from 18. Furthermore, as the Srutis say, the Non-dual is different in
the final release of all. Its nature from any false assumption, and [that is also] because
12. Nobody belongs to Me and I do not belong to anybody, for lt is established before [there is any] false assumption. And simi-
I am non-dual and nothing that is falsely constructed exists. And I larly what has been falsely assumed is also negated here [in this
am not that which is falsely constructed but am established before sentence], "Not thus! Not sol'', in order to establish the remainder
the false construction. It is only duality that is falsely constructed. (=Atman).
13. Moreover, there is no false assumption of "being" or "differ- 19. Though [It] is thus not what is falsely assumed, [but is]
ence" in regard to the Unborn ( = Atman); so [It J is not non- urrborn, non-dual, and non-perishable, people always undergo
existent. Furthermore, that [Atman] from which your false as- birth, old age, and death, which arise from the illusion of their
sumption proceeds is not falsely assumed since [It] was already ()Wn mind, 16 falsely assuming [It] to be "being" and "non-being."
established. 20. 1f the birth [of a thing] were not [itself] without birth, there
14. Whatever duality may be seen by you is certainly non-exist· would be regressus ad infinitum; [in other words] this [brith] would
ent. That [Atman] is not seen by you by no means shows [Its] have another [ arrd that one yet another . . . ]. Otherwise, there
non-existence. That from which the false assumption of "being" is no birth [at all], since [if the existent were to have been born,]
or "non-being" proceeds [must itself] exist. And just as an in- the existent would have been non-existent, and [if the non-existent
206 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, 19, 21-26 I, 19, 27--28] METRICAL PART 20'7
were to be born] the non-existent would be existent. And there is delusion since he is released from the fault of being possessed [by
neither action [of birth] nor [its] agent. Therefore [everything] is the attributes].
unborn. 17 27. It is not acceptable that [the fault of] being possessed [by
21. If the agent [of birth] is taken to be [something] devoid of attributes] is destroyed in no other way than this. Only [the fault
action [and] no more than that, [then] there is surely no[thing] of] being possessed is the cause of the notion due to delusion. Just
which is not an agent of [birth]. [But in fact] there is no [agent at as fire with no more fuel, so also [the fault of] being possessed,
all], because [if the agent were the existent, it would create every- which is without cause, comes to the ultimate extinction.
thing] since the [merely] existent has no particularity, and [if the 28. Salutation to the teachers who churned out from the ocean
agent is the non-existent, then too it would create everything] since of the Veda what they held to be supreme, this knowledge, as the
the non-existent [has no particularity] if [the non-existent is taken gods, the great souls, [churned] out from the great ocean the
to be] the destruction of the existent, and because no [cause and elixir of immortality. 20
effect relation] is determinable, as in the case of the two ends of
a balance beam [moving up and down).
22. If it is unacceptable that the existent becomes the non- Notes
existent and vice versa, how could birth take place, when the
existent and the non-existent are [firmly] fixed? These two are lAll tne commentators consider tnis the view of the Sarµkhya and interpret "para" as
purura- Cf.Siil!'khyakarikii 31; 36; 37; 56; 57; 58; 60.
fixed in isolation [from ea<;;h other]. Therefore, 0 Mind, nothing 'See Upad 1, 14, 12; 18, 103; 18,203.
is born. 3Th.e Smrti and 12yilya1 according to the three commentators.
23. Even if I should, at your desire, admit your birth, I still de- 4See BhG II,16 and Sankara's commentary on iL Cf. GK HI,28.
0 "Dvaymn" here rnay rneans "duality." Cf GK III,29.
clare that your activity is of no use to Me. There is neither loss nor SMy text reads tathiidvayii, but it should be corrected to tathii. dvayii..
gain [for Me] since what is non-existent is born neither of itself ?See GK IV,50; dravyatvii.bhiivayogatah, which Sankara interprets as vastutviibhiiviil
nor of something else. Even if there were both [loss and gain your in his GKB-h.
BThis (aliitacakro) is a circle which is seen when one whirls a torch in the air. In
activity would still be of no use to Mc].
Buddhist texts (e.g.Lankavatara fed, by B. Nanjio. Bibliotheca Otaniensis, vol. I, Kyoto,
24. Things constant are not connected with things inconstant; 1923], p. 92, etc.) this simile is used to illustrate the unreality of the phenomenal
neither things constant nor things inconstant are connected with world. The fou.rth chapter of the GK is entitled "Quenching of the Torch" (Aliitasanti)
each another. Therefore it is not reasonable that there is any effect and it is an important idea in the GK. The simile is also used in the Maitri Up. (VI,
24) and the Mahiibharya (lII,2, 124; 125) but in a different sc-nse.
of one upon another, and so it is to be accepted that nothing be· 9Cf. Brh. Up, I,4,7; IV,3,23-30; Upad I,17,14-17.
longs to anything else. And the Truth Itself is not within the range IORamatirtha quotes Taitt. A 3,l 4; /!.g-Veda X,l 14,5; Ka\h. Up. V.9 in this con-
of etymological explanation of words. text.
ll"fhc Buddhist.
25. Therefore the wise man, examining by means of reasoning 12The word anarthavattva is interpreted as arthakriyasunyatva by Anandajiiana,
and the Srutis [the Atman] which is the same [in all beings], ever as arthakrbiikiiritviibhiiva by Bodhanidhi, and as arthakriyarahitatva by Riimatirtha. The
radiant, and free from duality which is falsely assumed to be Sautriintikas and Vijiianaviidin logicians such as Digniiga and Dharmakirti regard
"being" or "non-being," goes to the perfect .Nirva'(l.a18 (extinction) arthakriyiikiiritva (practical efficiency) as a criterion of existence. See, for example,
Jlfyiiyabindu I,12~15, According to the Advaita Vedanta Atman is actionless (akrrya),
as a lamp [is extinguished]. changeless, and eternal (kil/asthanitya). Therefore Buddhists assert that that Atman is
26. A man who is not possessed by the attributes [of Brahman], not existent, since It has no practical efficiency. Cf. S. Dasgupta, A Histo~y of Indian
scrutinizing in the above manner the One, the Attributeless, whic11 Philosophy,, vol.l,pp.117-118; p. 154, note l; Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, vol.
U (Reprint ed. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962), P- 7, note 2; pp. 120-
is not seen by those who know the identity [of Atman with Brak· 121, note 6.
man] but is easily seen by the bad logician, 19 does not undergo 13See stanzas l4 and 15.
208 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [I, l 9

14Cf. GK III,19; Mayeda Upad, p. 38.

15 The three commentators interpret this line quite differently. Ifodhanidhi takes
"vastu" viz. Atman as the subject of the sentence: prasiddhyati . . . y'!}yate . . . .
Anandajiiana· takes "brahmar;.o jagaddhetutvam" as the subject of the sentence with the
verb prasiddhyati; and "brahmar;.o jagaddhetutvaYfl hitvii." as anyathii.; and' 'pradhiiniider jagad-
dhetutvam" as the subject of the verb yujyate. Ramatirtha takes' 'ittharµ kii{asthasyiipy artha-
kriyiikii.ritvarµ" as the subject of the verb prasiddhyati; "paramiirthatab" as anyathii; and
PART II. THE PROSE PART
"arthakrryiikiiritvaT(I sthirasya kya11ikasya vii" as the subject of the verb yujyate.
1 6Cf. GK IV, 61-66; Nakamura III, p. 652; Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy,

vol. I, p. 145 f.
l 7The idea that nothing is born (ajiiti) constitutes a central theme of the third and
the fourth chapters of the GK, which often depends upon arguments of the Madhya.
mikas and the Vijiianavadins. Cf. Nakamura III, pp. 63' --654; T. M. P. Mahadevan,
Gaurfapiida (Madras: University of Madras, 1952), pp. 128-147. Stanzas 20--22 here
seem also to prove this theory by means of arguments similar to those in the GK, but
they (especially stanza 21) are so brief and obscure that my translation has had to be
largely based upon the commentaries, which themselves differ in the interpretation of
these stanzas.
18The term '"nirvar;.a," which is important in Buddhism but does not occur in the

early Upani~ads at all, is used as "sanirvar:a" in GK III,47.

iscf. Kena Up. II,3.
20 This is a famous legend (amrta'manthana) which is narrated, with some variations,

in the Ramaya1}a, the Mahiibhii.rata and the PurU.tJas. Cf. Upad I, 17 ,33 and note 27; K.
Ru ping, Amrtamanthana und Kurma-Avatiira (Wiesbaden, 1970).
 CHAPTER I
HOW TO ENLIGHTEN THE PUPIL

1. Now we shall explain how to teach the means to final release

for the benefit of seekers thereafter with faith and desire.
2. The means to final release is knowledge [of Brahman]. It
should be repeatedly related to the pupil until it is firmly grasped,
if he is dispassionate toward all things non-eternal which are at-
tained by mea.ns [other than knowledge ] 1 ; if he has abandoned the
desire for sons, wealth, and worlds 2 and reached the state of a pa-
ramakarrisa wandering ascetic 3 ; if he is endowed with tranquility,
self-control, compassion, and so forth 4 ; if he is possessed of the
qualities of a pupil 5 which are well known from the scriptures; if
he is a B:rahmin6 who is [internally and externally] pure 7 ; if he
approaches his teacher in the prescribed manner 8 ; if his caste,
profession, behavior, knowledge [of the Veda], 9 and family have
been examined.
3. The S7uti also says:
"Having scrn tinized [the worlds that are built up by action, a
Brahmin should arrive at indifference . . . . For the sake of
this knowledge let him go, with fuel in hand, to a spiritual
teacher who is learned in the scriptures and established in
Brahman. To him who has approached properly, whose thought
is calm, who has reached tranquility, the man of knowledge
teaches J in its very truth that knowledge of Brahman [by which
he knows the Imperishable]" (Mm;1q. Up. 1,2,12-13);
for when .knowledge [of Brahman] is firmly grasped, it is conducive
to one's own beatitude and to the continuity [of knowledge of
Brahman]. And the continuity of knowledge [of Brahman] is help-
ful to people, as a boat [is helpful] to one wishing to get across a
river. The scripture also says:

211
212 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [II, 1, 4-6 II, I, 7-8] PROSE PART 213

"[Verily, a father may teach this Brahman to his eldest son or to a nothing else-that is the Fullness]" (Chand. Up. VII,24,l);
worthy pupil, but to no one else at all.] Even if one should offer "Atman, indeed, is this all" (Chand. Up. VII,25,2);
him this [earth] that is encompassed by water anq filled with "Brahman, indeed, is this all" (Brh. Up. II,5,1 ?) 21 ;
treasure, [he should say,] 'This, truly, is more than that' " "Atman, verily, was this universe, one alone, in the beginning"
(Chand. Up. III,11, [5-]6), (Ait. Up. I, 1, 1);
since knowledge [of Brahman] is not obtained in any other· way "Verily, this all is.Brahman" (Chand. Up. III,14,1).
[than from a teacher] according to passages from the Sruti and the 7. And after teaching [these Srutis ], he should help [him] by
Smrti such as: means of the Srutis to grasp the marks indicative of Brahman, for
"One who has a teacher knows . . . " (Chand. Up. VI,14,2); example:
"The knowledge which has been learned from a teacher [best "Atman, which is free from evil . . . " (Chand. Up. VIII,7,1);
helps to attain his end" (Chand. Up. IV,9,3); "[Explain to me] what the manifest, unconcealed Brahman
"A teacher is a boatman; his [right] knowledge is called a boat is" (Brh. Up. III,4,1; 5,1);
here. " 10 "That which transcends hunger and thirst" (Brh. Up. III,5, l);
4. When [the teacher] finds from some indications that the pu- "Not Thus! Not so!" (Brh. Up. Il,3,6);
pil has not grasped [this] knowledge, he should remove the causes "[It is] not coarse, not fine" (Brli. Up. III,8,8);
which hinder his grasping it-demerit, worldly laxity, absence of "This Atman is [described as] 'not, not'" (Brh. Up. UI,9,26;
firm preliminary learning concerning the discrimination between IV,2,4; 4,22; 5,15);
things eternal and non-eternal, 11 care about what other people "[Verily, 0 Gargi, that Imperishable is] the unseen Seer" (Brh.
think, pride of caste and the like-by the means contrary to Up. III,8, 1);
those causes and enjoined by the Sruti and the Smrti, that is to "'[Brahman is] knowledge, biiss" (Brh. Up. IlI,9,28);
say, non-anger, etc., 12 non-injury and other abstentions, 13 and the "[He -who knows .Brahman as the real,] as knowledge, as the
observances 14 which are not contradictory to knowledge. infinite" (Taitt. Up. II, 1) ;
5. He should also let (him] properly achieve the virtues such as "[For truly, when one finds fearlessness as a foundation] in That
modesty 15 which are the means to attain knowledge. (=Brahman) which is invisible, bodiless, [ . . . then he has
6. And the teacher 16 is able to consider the pros and cons [of an reached fearlessness]" (Taitt. Up. 11, 7);
argument], is endowed with understanding, memory, tranquility, "'This, verily, is [the great, unborn Atman]" (Brh. Up. IV,4,22);
self-control, compassion, favor and the like 17; he is versed in the ~'[This Brahman is . . . ] breathless, mindkss" (l\foi;i~. Up. II,
traditional doctrine; not attached to any enjoyments, visible or 1,2);
invisible 18 , he has abandoned all the rituals and their requisites 19 ; "[This Brahman is] without and within, unborn" (Mul).c;l. Up.
a knower of Brahman, he is established in Brahman; he leads a JI,1,2,);
blameless life, free from faults such as deceit, pride, trickery, "'[This great Being . . . ] is just a mass of knowledge" (Brh.
wickedness, fraud, jealousy, falsehood, egotism, self-interest, and lJp. II,4,12);
so forth; with the only purpose of helping others he wishes to make "'[This Brahman is . . . ] without an inside and without an out-
use ofknowledge.20 side" (Brh. Up. II ,5, 19);
First of all, he should teach the Srutis which are concerned pri- "It is, indeed, other than the known and than the unknown"
marily with the oneness of Atman [with Brahman], for example: (Keno, UjJ. I, 4);
"In the beginning, my dear, this universe was the Existent only, "Verily, what is called 'Space' [is the accomplisher of name-
one alone, without a second" (Chand. Up. VI,2,1); and-form]"22 (Chand. Up. VIII, 14,1)
"Where one sees nothing else, [hears nothing else, understands 8. [He should] also [help him grasp the marks indicative of
214 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [II, l, 9-12 JI, 1, 13-18] PROSE PART 215

Brahman] by means of the Smrtis, if they are not incompatible with has been destroyed. Thus I am in beginningless transmigratory
the marks indicative [of Brahman] described by the Srutis and con- existence. I have been abandoning [old] bodies which have been
cerned primarily with teaching that the highest Atman is not sub- obtained one after another in the spheres of gods, animals, men,
ject to transmigration and that It is identical with all--for exam- and hells by force of my own karman and I have been getting other
ple: new bodies over and over again. I am forced by my own karman
"He is not born, nor does he ever die" (BhG II,20; Ka~h. Up. to rotate in the incessant cycle of birth and death as in a water-
II,18); wheel. I have obtained this body in the course of time. I am tired
"He does not receive [the effect of] any one's evil" (DhG V,15); of this rotation in the wheel of transmigratory existence, so I have
"As [the great Wind] constantly abides in space [ . . . so all come to you, Your Holiness, in order to end the rotation in the
beings abide in Me]" (BhG IX, 6); wheel of transmigratory existence. Therefore I am eternal and
"Know also that I am the Field-Knower ( = Atman)"23 (BhG different from the body. The bodies come and go like a person's
XIII,2); garments " 27;
"It is called neither existent nor non-existent" (BhG XIII, 12) ; 13. [then] the teacher shou Id say: "You are right. Your view
"Because [He] is beginningless and attribu teless" (BhG XIII, is correct. [Then] why did you say incorrectly, 'I am a Brahmin's
31); son belonging to such and such a family. I was a student--or, I
"[The supreme Lord, abiding] alike in all beings" (Bl1G XIII, was a householder--[but] now I am a paramaha'f!l-sa wandering
27); ascetic' ?" 28
"But there is the highest Puru~a ( = Atman)" (.BhG XV, 17). 14. If he says: "Your Holiness, how have I spoken wrongly?"
9. If the pupil who has thus grasped the marks indicative of the 15. [then] the teacher should reply to him: "Because, through
highest Atman according to the Srutis and the Smrtis wishes to get such statements as 'I am a Brahmin's son belonging to such and
out of the ocean of transmigratory existence, [the teacher] should such a family,' you have identified the Atman, which is free from
ask him: "Who are you, my dear?" caste, family, and purifying ceremonies,29 with the body, which
l 0. If he answers: "I am a Brahrnin's son belonging to such and has different caste, family, and purifying ceremonies."
such a family. I was a student24--or, 1 Vias a householder25_ 16. Ifhe asks: "How does the body have different caste, family,
[but] now I am a paramaharrisa wandering ascetic. 26 I wish to get a.nd purif-ying ceremonies?" or, "How am I (=Atman) free from
out of the ocean of transmigratory existence infested with great caste, famil-y, and purifying ceremonies?"30
sharks of birth and death"; 17. [then] the teacher should reply: "Listen, my dear, [this is]
11. [then] the teacher should say: "My dear, when you are how this body, different from you (~Atman), has different caste,
dead your body will be eaten by birds or will turn into earth right family and purifying ceremonies and how you ( = Atman) are free
here. How then do you wish to get out of the ocean oftransmigra- from caste, family, and purifying ceremonies."
tory existence? Because if you turn into ashes on this bank of the Thereupon [the teacher) should remind him: "You should re-
river you cannot get across to the other side of the river." member, my dear, that you have been taught31 that the highest
12. If he answers: "I am different from the body. The body is Atman, the Atman of all, is endowed with the marks described above
born, dies, is eaten by birds, turns into earth, is destroyed by according to such Sruti and Smrti passages as:
weapons, fire and so forth, and suffers from disease and so on. I '[In the beginning,] my dear, this universe was the Existent only,
have entered this body as a bird enters a nest, by force of the merit [one alone, without a second]' (Chand. Up. VI,2, 1)
and demerit accumulated by myself. Again and again by force and [that you have also been taught] the marks indicative of the
of the merit and demerit, when this body perishes, I shall enter highest Atman according to Sruti and Smrti passages." 32
another body as a bird enters another nest when its previous one 18. When [th.e pupil] has recalled to mind the marks indicative
 216 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [II, 1, 19-20 PROSE PART 217
II, I, 21-23]
of the highest Atman, [the teacher] should tell him [in answer to his elements are produced; from them, when they are eaten, blood
first question]: "This [highest Atman] which is called 'Space' 33 is and sperm are produced, related respectively to the bodies of
something different from name-and-form , 34 bodiless, 35 character- women and men. Both blood and sperm, produced by churning
ized as 'not coarse,' 36 etc., and as 'free from evil,' 37 etc. It is not with the churning stick of sexual passion driven by nescience 50
afHicted with any attributes of transmigratory existence; and sanctified with sacred formulas, 51 are poured into the womb
'[Explain to me] what the manifest, unconcealed Brahman is, at the proper time. 52 Through the penetration of fluid from. the
. . . . It is your Atman, which is within everything' (Brh. Up. womb, they become an embryo and it is delivered in the nmth
III,4,1). or tenth month. 53
It is 21. "When it is born it obtains its name-and-form , sanctified
'the unseen Seer, the unheard Hearer, the unthought Thinker, with sacred formulas by means of a birth ceremony 54 and other
the unknown Knower' (Brh. Up. III,7,23). [purifying ceremonies]. Again it obtains the name of a st.u~~nt
It is of the nature of eternal knowledge, through the performance of the purifying ceremony for m1trn-
'without an inside and without an outside' (Brh. Up. II,5, 19), tion. 55 This same body obtains the name of a householder 56
'just a mass of knowledge' (Brh. Up. II,4,12). through the performance of the purifying ceremony for union with
It is all-pervading like ether, possessed of infinite power, the a wife. 57 This same body obtains the name of an ascetic 58 through
Atman of all, free from hunger, etc., 38 and free from appearance the purifying ceremony of becoming a forest-dweller. This same
and disappearance . 39 This thighest AtmanJ is the Evolver of the body obtains the name of a wandering ascetic 59 through the
unevolved name-and-form merely by being existent since It is purifying ceremony which ends the ritual actions. Thus th: body
possessed of inconceivable power. The unevolved name-and- is different from you ( = Atman) and is possessed of different
form40 is different in essence from this [Atman] and it is the seed of caste, family, and purifying ceremonies.
the world, abiding in It, indescribable as this or something else, 4 1 22. "The mind and the sense organs consist only of name-and-
and known to It. form according to the Srutis such as:
19. "[Originally] unevolved, this name-and-form took the 'For my dear the mind consists offood' 60 (Chand. Up. VI,5,4;
name-and-form 42 of 'ether' in the course of its evolution from this
' ,
6,5; 7,6).
very Atman. And in this manner this element named 'ether' arose 23. "[The second question you asked me earlier was,] 61 'How
from the highest Atman43 as dirty foam from clear water. 44 :Foam is am I ( = Atman) free from caste, family, and purifying ceremo-
neither [identical with] water nor absolutely different from water nies?' Listen to what [I am going to say]. The Evolver ( = the
since it is not seen without water. But water is clear and different highest Atman) of name-and-form , by nature different i~ esser.1ce
from foam which is of the nature of dirt. Likewise, the highest from name-and-form , created this body in the course of evolvmg
Atman is different from name-and-form which corresponds to name-and-form . And [the Evolver] entered the name-and-form
foam; Atman is pure, clear, and different in essence from it. This [of the body], Itself being free from the duties of purifying cere-
name-and-form , [originally] unevolved, took the name-and-form monies. Itselfunseen by others, [the Evolver] is seeing; unheard,
of 'ether,' which corresponds to foam, in the course ofits evolution. It is hearing; unthought, It is thinking; unknown, It is knowin?. 62
20. "Becoming grosser in the course of evolution, the name-and- 'The wise one who having distinguished all forms and havmg
form becomes air 45 from ether, fire 46 from air, water47 from fire, created [their] names, sits calling' (Taitt. A. IU,12, 7).
earth 48 from water. In this order each preceding [element] entered There are thousands of Sruti passages which have this same mean-
each succeeding one and the five gross elements, [ether, air, fire, ing, for example:
water, and] earth, came into existence. Consequently earth is 'Having created it, It,indeed,ente red into it'(Taitt.Up.I! ,6,1);
characterized by the qualities of the five gross elements. 49 And 'The Ruler of the creatures entered into [them]' (Taitt. A. III,
from earth, rice, barley, and other plants consisting of the five 11,l);
 218 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [II, I, 24-26 II, I, 27-29) PROSE PART 219

'It entered here, [even to the fingertips]' (E:rh. Up. I,4,7); " 'So whoever worships another divinity [than his Atman],
'It is your Atman, [which is in everything]' (Brh. Up. III,4,1; thinking that He is one and I another, he does not know' (Brh.
5,1); Up. I,4,10);
'So, cleaving asunder this very top of the skull, It entered by that 'Brahmanhood has deserted him who knows Brahmanhood as
door' (Ait. Up. I,3, 12); different from Atman' (Brh. Up. II,4,6);
'Though It is hidden in all things, that Atman [does not shine 'He who thinks he sees manifoldness in this world attains death
forth]' (Kath. Up. III,12); after death' (Brh. Up. IV,4,19).
'That divinity thought, "Come! Let me [enter] these three '27. "These Sruti passages indeed reveal that transmigratory
divinities [(i.e., heat, water, and food) with this living Atman existence results from the understanding that [Atman] is different
and evolve name-and-form ]" ' (Chand. Up. VI,3,2); [from Brahman].
'[Atman which is] the bodiless among bodies' (Kath. Up. II,22). 23. «And thousands [of Sruti passages J reveal that final release
24. "There are also Smrti passages [which have this same mean- results from the realization of the identity [of Atman and Brahman].
ing], for example: [For example, through the statement,]
'Atman is truly all gods' (Manu XII, 119); 'That is Atman, Thou art That' (Chand. Up. VI, 8,7, etc.),
'The embodied Atman in the city of nine gates' (BhG V, 13); [the Srutis] establish that [Atman] is the highest Atman (=Brah-
'Know also that I am the Field-Knower ( = Atman) ' 63 (BhG man). Then [they] state,
XIIl,2); 'One who has a teacher knows' (Chand. Up. VI,14,2),
'[The supreme Lord abiding] alike in all beings' (BhG XIII, an.cl [they] show final release with the words,
27); 'He is delayed only until [he is freed from bondage of ignorance;
'The onlooker and consenter, [the highest Atman . . . is also therr he will a.rrive at his final goal]' (Chand. Up. VI,14,2).
declared to be the highest Purufa, in this body]' (BhG XIII, With the simile about the [man] who was not a thief and [there-
22); fore] not burned [in the ordeal of the heated axe, the Srutis] teach
'But there is the highest Puru~a, different [from this]' (BhG that he who c<Jvers himself with truth does not undergo trans-
xv, 17). migratory existence since he knows that [Atman] is identical [with
It is, therefore, established that you ( = Atman) are free from caste, Brahman]; [on the other hand], with the simile ~bout the[rnan]
family, and purifying ceremonies." who was a thief and was [therefore] burned, [the Srutis] teach that
25. If he says: "I am one [and J He 64 is anothcr6 5 ; I am igno- he who covers himself with the untruth undergoes transmigratory
rant, I experience pleasure and pain, am bound and a transrni- ex.istence since [he holds] the view that [Atman] is different [from
grator [whereas] He is essentially different from me, t11e god not Brahman]. 67
subject to transmigration . By worshipping Hirn with oblations, 29. "And with such [similes] as,
offerings, homage, and the like and through the [performance of] 'Whatever they are in this world, whether tiger or [lion . . .
the actions prescribed for [my] class and stage of life, 6 6 I wish to moscp1ito, they become That Existent]' (Chand. Up. VI,9,3),
get out of the ocean oftransmigrato ry existence. How am I He?" [the S:rutis] say that because of the view of the identity [of Atman
26. [then] the teacher should reply: "My dear, you should not with Brahman]
hold such a view since it is prohibited to understand that [Atman] '[he] rules himself' (Chand. Up. VII,25,2).
is different [from Brahman]." And with the words,
[The pupil may say:] "How is it prohibited to understand that 'But they who know otherwise than this arc ruled by another;
[Atman] is different [from Brahman]?" theirs are perishable worlds' (Chand. Up. VII, 25, 2),
Then the teacher replies : the Srutis [continue to] teach that on account of the contrary view,
 220 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [II, !, 30-32 II, I, 33-34] PROSE PART 221

viz. the view that [Atman] is different [from Brahman], he un- abandoned completely. Therefore, the seeker after final release
dergoes transmigrator y existence. This is what is taught in every should abandon the ritual together with its requisites since [they]
s~hool of the Veda. So you were indeed wrong in saying, '[I (= are contradictory to the view of the identity [of Atman] with the
Atman) am] a Brahmin's son belonging to such and such a fam- highest Atman. And [he] should realize that [his] Atman is the
ily68; [I ( = Atman) am] a transmigrator, essentially different highest [Atman] since It has characteristics stated [about Brahman]
from the highest Atman. '69 by the Srutis."
30. "For the above reason it is prohibited [by the Srutis] to hold 33. If [the pupil] says: ''Your Holiness, when the body is burned
the view that [Atman] is different [from Brahman]; use of the rit- or cut, I ( = Atman) evidently perceive pain and I evidently
uals is [made] in the sphere of [the view] that [Atman] is different experience suffering from hunger, etc. But in all the Srutis and the
[from Brahman]; and the sacred thread70 and the like are requisites Smrtis the highest Atman is said to be
for the rituals. Therefore, it should be known that the use ofrituals 'free from evil, ageless, deathless, sorrowless, hungerless, thirst-
and their requisites is prohibited, if the identity [of Atman] with less' (Chand. Up. VIII,1,5),
the highest Atman is realized, since [the use of] rituals and their free from all attributes of transmigratory existence. I ( = Atman)
requisites such as the sacred thread is contradictory to the reali- am different in essence from It and bound up with many attri-
zation of the identity [of Atman] with the highest Atman. [The butes of transmigratory existence. How then can I realize that
use of] rituals and their requisites such as the sacred thread is in- the highest Atman is [my] Atman and that I, a transmigrator, am
deed enjoined upon a transmigrator [but] not upon one who holds the highest Atman?-it is as if I were to hold that fire is cold!
the view of the identity [of Atman] with the highest Atman; and the Though I am [now] a transmigrator, I am entitled to the means
difference [of Atman] from It is merely due to the view that [At- of [attaining] all prosperity and beatitude. 71 How then should
man] is different [from Brahman]. l abandon the rituals and their requisites such as the sacred thread
31. "If rituals were to be performed and it were not desirable which lead [me] to prosperity and beatitude?"
to abandon them, [the Srutis] would not declare in such unambig- 34. [then the teacher] should answer him: "Your statement,
uous sentence as, 'When the body is burned or cut, I Atman) evidently perceive
'That is Atman, Thou art That' (Chand. Up. VI, 8,7, etc.), pain,' is not correct."
that the highest Atman, unrelated to the rituals, their requisites, "Why?"
and such factors of the rituals as castes and stages of life, should "The body, like a tree which is burned [or] cut, is the object
be re~lized to be identical with [the inner] Atman; nor would [which is perceived by the perceiver]. The pain of burning or
[the Srutis] condemn the realization that [Atman] is different cutting is perceived in the body, which is the object; so the pain
[from Brahman], [in passages] such as, has the same locus as the burning [or cutting), since people point
'This is the constant greatness of the knower of Brahman; [it out the pain of burning [or cutting] right there where [the body]
does not increase nor decrease by action]' (Brh. Up. IV,+,23); is burned or cut and not in the perceiver of burning [or cutting]."
'[He] is unaffected by good, unaffected by evil, [for then he has "How?''
transcended all sorrows of the heart]' (Brh. Up. IV,3,22); "When a man is asked, 'Where do you have pain?', he points
'In this state a thief is no thief [ . . . a mendicant no mendicant, to the locus where [the body] is burned [or cut] and not to the
an ascetic no ascetic]' (Brh. Up. IV,3,22). perceiver, saying, 'l have pain in the head' or 'In the chest' or 'In
32. "[The Srutis] would not declare that [Atman] is by nature the stomach.' If pain or the cause of pain such as burning and
unrelated to the rituals, by nature unconnected with the class cutting were located in the perceiver, he would point to [the
and other factors of the rituals, if it were not desirable that the perceiver] as the locus of pain just as [he points to a part of the
rituals and such requisites of the rituals as the sacred thread be body as] the locus of burning and so forth.
 222 A THOUSA ND TEACHIN GS [II, 1, 35-36 II, 1, 37] PROSE PART 223
35. "And [pain] itself would not be perceiv ed as the form-an d- 'Becaus e [He] is beginni ngless and attribut eless' (BhG XIII, 31);
color in the eye [are not perceiv ed by the eye]. Therefo re, pain
moreov er,
is perceiv ed as having the same locus as burning , cutting , and so on; 'Desire , aversio n' and so on are the attribut es of 'the Field,' 75
so pain is merely an object like burning and the like.
i.e., the object, and not those of Atman (BhG XIII, 6).
As [pain] is of the nature of'beco ming,' 72 [it] has its substra tum 37. "For this reason you ( = Atman) have no relation wi~h the
like the cooking of rice. The impress ion of pain [also] has exactly
impression.s of form-an d-color and the like; s~ you ( = Atmar'.)
the same substra tum as the pain, since [the impress ion of pain} are not differen t in essence from the highest Atman. As there is
is perceiv ed only simulta neously with the recollec tion [of pain]. no contrad iction to sense-p erceptio n and othe_: [means of
The aversio n to pain and its causes also has precise ly the same
knowle dge], it is reasona ble to re~lize that I ( = Atman) am the
substra tum as the impress ion.73 So it is said,
highest Atman accordi ng to such Sruti passage s as,
'Passion and aversio n have, and the latent impress ion of form- 'It knew only Itself, ["I am Brahm an!"] (Brh. Up. I,4, 10);
and-col or, a commo n substra tum [the intellec t], and what is "As a unity only is It to be looked upon' (Brh. Up. IV, 4,20);
perceiv ed as fear has the intellec t as its substra tum; therefor e,
'I, indeed, am below. [I am above . . . . ]' (Chand . Up. VII,
the Knowe r is always pure and free from fear' (Upad I, 15,13)."
25, 1);
36. [The student may ask:] "What locus do then the impres-
"Atman, indeed, is below. [Atman is behind . . . . ]'(Cha nd. Up.
sions of form-an d-color and the like have?"
VII, 25,2); _
[Then the teacherJ answers : "[The locus] where there are
'One should see everyth ing as Atman' (Brh. Up. ry,4,23 );
desire and so forth."
'Where truly everyth ing [has become ] one's own Atman, [then
"vVhere are there these desire and the like?"
whereb y and whom does] one smell?' (Brh. Up. II,4,14 );
"Right in the intellec t accordi ng to such Sruti passage s as,
'This all is what this Atman is' (Brh. Up. II,4,6);
'Desire, volition , doubt, [faith, lack of faith, steadfas tness, lack
'That ()ne [is withou t parts, immort al]' (Pras. Up. VI,5);
of steadfas tness, shame, meditat ion, fear--a ll this is truly mind]'
[This .Brahman is . . . ] withou t an inside and withou t an out-
(Brh. Up. I,5,3).
side' (Er h. Up. II,5, 19) ;
Right there are also the impress ions of form-an d-color and the
'[This is] withou t and within, unborn ' (Mui;iq. Up. II,1,2);
like accordi ng to the Sruti,
'Brahman indeed is this [whole] world' (Mrn:_iq. Up. Il,2,12) ;
'And on what are the colors and forms based? -On the heart'74
'[So, cleavin g asunde r this very top of the skull,] He entered by
(Brh. Up. III,9,20 ).
that door' (Ait. Up. I,3,12);
Impuri ty fsuch as desire and aversion ] is in the object and not
[All these, indeed, are] names of intellig ence' (Ait. Up. III,
in Atman [which is the subject] accordi ng to hundre ds of Sruti
passage s such as, 1,2);
'[He who knows Brahman as the real,] as knowle dge, as the
'The desires that are based on heart' (Brh. Up. IV,4,7; Kath.
infinite ' (Taitt. Up. II, 1) ;
Up. VI, 14);
'[Space ] arose indeed from this [Atman]' (Taitt. Up. II, 1);
'For [then] he has passed beyond [all sorrows of the heart]'
'Having created it, It indeed entered into it' (Taitt. Ur,. II,6,1);
(Brh. Up. IV,3,22 );
'The one God, hidden in all things, [all-per vading] ' (Svet. UP·
'This [person ] is withou t attachm ents' (Brh. Up. IV,3,16 );
VI, 11);
'Even this is His form that is beyond desire' (Brh. Up. IV,3,21 ),
'[Atman which is] the bodiless among bodies' (Ka!h. Up. II,22);
and accordi ng to Smrti passage s such as,
'[The wise one] is not born, nor dies' (Kath. Up. II, 18~;
'He is declare d to be unchan geable' (BhG II, 25);
'[Think ing on the great all-perv ading Atman, by which one
224 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [II, 1, 38-39 II, I, 40---41) PROSE PART 225
contemplates both] the dreaming state and the waking state, of actions are [either actually] experienced or stated in the Srutis?
[the wise man is not grieved]' (Kath. Up. IV,4); This is well-known in the Srutis and Smrtis and among common
'One should know that It is my Atman' (Kau~. Up. III,8); people, and is a matter which causes differences of opinion among
'Now, he who on all beings [looks as indeed in Atman and on hundreds of disputants";
Atman as in all beings-he does not shrink away from It]' (lsa 40. [then] the teacher should reply, "It is the effect ofnescience
Up. VI); that the object, means, and agent of actions are [either actually]
'It moves. It does not move' (lsi:i Up. V); experienced or stated in the Srutis; but from the standpoint of the
'Vena (the longing one?), seeing It, [knows all creatures, where highest tru th 80 Atman is one alone and [only] appears as many
all have the same nest]' (M.N.Up. II,3)76; through the vision [affected] by nescience just as the moon [ap-
'It is, indeed, Agni, [It is Aditya, It is Vayu . . . ]'(Taitt. A. pears] as many to sight [affected] by timira eye-disease.81 Duality is
X,1,2); the effect ofnescience, since it is reasonable [for the Srutis] to con-
'I was Manu77 and the Sun' (Brh. Up. I,4, 10; f!gveda IV,26, l); demn the view that [Atman] is different [from Brahman] by saying,
'The Ruler of the creatures entered into [them]' (Taitt. A III, "Verily, where there seems to be another, [there the one might
11, 1); see the other]' (Brh. Up. IV,3,31);
'[In the beginning,] my dear, [this universe was] the Existent 'For where there is a duality, as it were, there one sees another'
only, [one alone, without a second]' (Chand. Up. VI,2, l) ; (B:rh. Up. ll,4, 14);
'That is the Real, That is Atman, Thou art That' (Chand. Up. 'Death after death attains he [who thinks he sees manifoldness
VI,8,7, etc.). in this world]' (B:rh. Up. IV,4, 19) ;
38. "From Smrti passages as well it is established that, being 'But where one sees something else, hears something else,
one alone, you, Atman, are the highest Atman [and] free from understands something else-that is the small . . . . but the
all the attributes of transmigratory existence-for example: small is the same as the mortal' (Chand. Up. VII,24,1);
'[All] beings are the bodies of Him who lives in the hearts' ' [As, my d car, by one clod of clay everything made of clay
(Apastamba Dharmasutra I,8,22,4); may be understood;] the modification is a verbal distinction,
'Atman is indeed [all] gods' (Manu, XII, 119); a name' (Chand. Up. VI,1,4), [untrue]82;
'[The embodied Atman,] in the city of nine gates' (BhG V,13); '[So whoever worships another divinity than his Atman, thinking
'[The supreme Lord abiding] alike in all beings' CBhG XIII, that] He is one and I another, [he does not know]' (Brh. Up.
27); I,4,W).
'[The wise see the same thing] in a learned and well-behaved And [the same conclusion is reached] from Sruti passages which
Brahman, [in a cow, in an elephant, and in a mere dog, and in establish oneness, for example:
an outcaste]' (BhG V,18); '[In the beginning, my dear, this universe was the Existent only,]
'Unmanifold in the manifold' (BhG XVIII,20; cf. BhG XIII, one alone, without a second' (Chand. Up. VI,2,1);
16); 'Where, verily, [everything has become] one's own [Atman,
'Vasudeva (= Kr~:r:ia)78 is all' (BhG VII, 19)." then whereby and whom would one smell?]' (Brh. Up. II,4,14;
39. If [the pupil] says: "If, your Holiness, Atman is cf. Brh. Up. IV,5,15);
'without an inside and without an outside' (Brh. Up. IV,5,13), '[Then] what delusion, what sorrow is there [for him who
'without and within, unborn' (MUI,lQ. Up. II,1,2), perceives the oneness!]' (Isa Up. 7)."
'entirely a mass of knowledge' (Brh. Up. IV,5,13), 41. [The pupil may ask:] "If this be so, Your Holiness, for
like a mass of salt, 79 devoid of all the varieties of forms, and homo- what purpose is difference in object, means, etc., of actions as well
geneous like ether, then how is it that the object, means, and agent as origination and dissolution [of the world] stated in the Srutis?"
226 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [II, I, 42--44 II, l] PROSE PART 227

42. Then [the teacher J replies: "A man possessed of nescience, the effects of nescience, they should be abandoned by him who
being differentiated by the body, etc., thinks that his Atman is is established in the view of the highest truth."
connected with things desirable and undesirable; [and] he does
not know how to distinguish the means of attaining things desir-
Not:es
able from that of abandoning things undesirable, although he
desires to attain things desirable and to abandon things undesir- !According to the BSBh (1,1,l, pp. 36-37) the following four requirements are
able by some means. The scripture gradually removes his igno- referred to as conditicrns for the study of the Vedanta: (1) discrimination between
rance concerning this matter, but it does not establish the difference things eternal and non-eternal (nityiiniryavastuviveka), (2) dispassion toward the enjoy-
ment of the things here and in the other world (ihiimutrii.rthabhogaviriiga), (3) the attain-
in object, means, etc., of actions, since the difference [constitutes] ment of the means such as tranquility and self-control (Jamadamiidisiidlzanasampad), and
transmigratory existence which is undesirable by nature. Thus (4) being a seeker after final release (mumukfutva). The condition stated in the Upad
[the scripture] uproots nescience which is the view that [Atman] that one must be dispassionate toward all things non-eternal which are attained by
means other than knowledge seems to correspond to the first requirement mentioned
is different [from Brahman], the root of transmigratory existence,
above (cf. note 2), which is also referred to in Upad II,1,4. Such conditions for the
by showing the reasonableness of the oneness of the origination, studyofthe Vedanta are again mentioned in Upad I,13,27; 16,72; 17,52; 17,85; 17,86.
dissolution, etc. [of the world]. As for the qualifications of a teacher, see section 6, below, and also Introduction, IV,F,
43. "When nescience has been uprooted by means of the Srutis, pp. 90-91. Cf. Vediintasii:ra [IV] 4·-27; P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, pp.
79-82.
Smrtis, and reasoning, the only knowledge of one who sees the 2Brh. Up. III,5,1 reads: "Having known that Atman, Brahmins overcome desire for
highest truth 83 is established right in this [Atman] that is described sons (putraifa~ii), desire for wealth (vittaira~ii) a~d desire for worlds (lokaifat:zti) and live
as follows: the life of mendicants.'' Cf. Brh. Up. IV,4,22; Sankara ad Brh. Up. III,5, J; IV,4,22.
The compound tyaktaputravittalokaira~a is also used in GBh II,55, p. 65. Here "worlds"
'Without an inside and without an outside' (Brh. Up. II, 5, 19);
means three worlds, viz. the world 9f men (manu{yaloka), of the fathers (/>itrloka), and of
'Without and within, unborn' (Mul).<J. Up. II, 1,2); the gods (devaloka). According to Sankara the world of men is obtained by means of
like a mass of salt84; the son alone, that of the fathers by means of actions (karman), and that of the gods
by means of the lower knowledge, namely by means of meditation and worship of
'[Entirely] a mass of knowledge' (B:rh. Up. IV,5,13);
Brahman as a personal god. These three worlds are non-eternal and should be aban-
and the homogeneous Atman which is all-pervading like ether. doned by the seekers after final release. Cf. Brh. Up. I,5,16; Upad I,18,228; II,1,44.
It is not reasonable that [in Atman] even a trace of impurity should This condition seems to correspond to the second requirement for the study of the
arise from the difference in object and means of actions, origina- Vedanta (see note 1).
3Th.e life of a Rrahmin is divided into four stages (ii.lrama), namely that of the student
tion and dissolution [of the world], and so forth. (brahrrwciirin), of the householder (grhastha), of the forest-dweller (vanastlza), and of the
44. "A man who wishes to attain this very view of the highest ascetic (sa172nyiisin). In many works ascetics are classified into four groups, namely
truth should abandon the fivefold form of desire, vi;;:., desires for a kuficaka, bahiirlaka, harrisa, and paramaha'[lsa. Each succeeding one is higher than each
preceding one. The paramaharrisa ascetic always stays under a tree, in an uninhabited
son, wealth, and worlds, 85 which result from the misconception
house, or in a burial place. He begs alms from persons of all castes. He regards all as
that [his] caste, stage oflife, etc., [belong to his Atman]. And as this Atman. For a detailed description, see P. V. Kane, History of D!zarmastistra, vol. II-II,
misconception is contradictory to the right conception, the rea- pp. 930 f. Cf. notes 6; 26.
soning for negating the view that [Atman] is different [from Brah- 4Tne attainment of these virtues constitutes the third condition for the study of the
Vedanta (see note 1). This condition is based upon Brh. Up. JV,4,23, which reads:
man] is possible; for, when the conception that the sole Atman is "He who knows thus becomes tranquil, self-controlled, withdrawn, patient, and
not subject to transmigratory existence has occurred by means of collected . . . "
the scripture and reasoning, no contradictory conception persists I> What Sankara means by "the qualities of a pupil" is not certain. Cf. Upad I, 16,72;
17,52; 17,87. Anandajniina refers to BhG XIII,7, which mentions the following
[any more]; for a conception that fire is cold, or that the body is virtues: absence of pride ( amiinitva), absence of deceit (adamb!zitva), non-injury (ahirrisii),
not subject to old age and death, does not exist. Therefore, since patience (kfiinti), uprightness (iirjava), service to the teacher (iicaryopiisana), internal and
all the rituals and their requisites such as the sacred thread are external purity (lauca), steadfastness (stlzairya), self-control (ii.tmavinigraha). Ramatirtha
 228 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [II, I II, I] PROSE PART 229
quotes a stanza from an underterrnined source, which enumerates nrne virtues. honesty (akalkatii), non-injury (ahirJlsfi), non-theft (asttrya), swectne;;s (miidhurya), self-
Smrtis such as the Manu (II,109; 112) and Tiijiiavalkyasmrti (I,28) prescribe the quali- control (dama).
fications of a student who deserves to be taught. See P. V. Kane, History of Dharmaliis- 14According to rogasutra II,32, the observances (nbama) arc five: purity (iauca),
tra, vol. II-I, pp. 330--333. contentment (saf!ltora), self-mortification (tapas), study (sviidhyaya), and devotion to the
6 The
Smrtis are not in agreement with regard to whether the as,cetic life (sa1[1nydsa) is Lord (iivarapra~idhiina). According to the rogasfitrabhava on this siltra, purity means
open to all the upper three classe~ or only to the Brahrnins. In Sankara ad Brh. Up. both internal purity, which consists in washing away the blemishes of the mind, and
(III,5,1, p. 454; IV,5,15, p. 725) Sankara definitely states that only a Brahmin can be external purity, which is produced by earth, water, or the like, and by the consump-
a sarµnyii.sin. Here in the Upad he excludes all the classes except Brahmin. It is to be tion and other requirements with regard to pure sacrificial food, viz. the barley mixed
noted here that in his Vartt~ka(v.1651,p. 758) on his teacher's commentary of Brh.Up. with cow's urine and the rest (TattvavaiSiiradi II, 32). Ni:Jama constitutes the second
(III,5,1) Surdvara rejects Sankara's view and that in his commentary on Surdvara's limb of the eight-limbed practice of raga (Yogasfitra II,29). Tajfiavalkyasmrti III,313
Varttika (p. 759) Anandajiiana quotes passages from the MahabMrata to support that gives different niyama consisting of ten observances: bathing (snana), silence (mauna),
K~atriya can enter the ascetic life. Cf. P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, vol. II-II, fasting (upavasa), rite ('ijyii), study (svadl!)!ii.ya), restraint of sexual desire (upasthanigraha),
pp. 942-944. According to the BS (I,3,34-39) the upper three classes of people, exclud- obdience to one's guru (gurusufriifii), purity (.fauca), non-anger (akrodha), and attentive-
ing Sudras, are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, not only the sarµnyii.sin ness (apramiidatii).
but also the householder is accepted as qualified for it; and even a person who does not l.5See BhG XIII, 7-11. Cf. note 5.
belong to any state of life because of lack of means, etc., is regarded as qualified for HHere Sankara prescribes the qualifications of a teacher (iiciirya), which are not so
knowledge of Brahman (BS III,4,36-39). Cf. Nakamura II, pp. 402-404; pp. 470-475; different from those of a pupil (see section 2). The essential difference between the
P. Deusscn, The System of the VedOnta, pp. 60-64. It should be kept in mind in order to qualified pupil and the teacher seems to be in the fact that a pupil is a seeker after final
understand Sankara's doctrine that he accepts as qualified for his teaching a Brahmin release (mumuk{u) whereas a teacher is released (mukta). Cf. Upad I,17,50-52. For the
who is in the state of paramaha1]1sa wandering ascetic (see note 3). It may, however, qualifications of an dciirya who is to perform the upanayana (see note 55) and to teach
be interesting to note here that in the next chapter (section 45) it is a brahmaciirin who him the Veda, see P. V. Kane, History of Dharrnalii.stra, vol. II-I, pp. 324-325.
approaches a teacher in the prescribed manner. Cf. note 26. l 7Cf. section 2.
7 0ne of the observances (nryama). See note 14.
lBCf. section 2.
8What rules Sankara has in mind is not known. However, there are certain rules. l 9Cf. section 30.
For example, one should not approach empty-handed one's parents, dcii.rya, sacred 20Hindu law books direct a teacher to teach learning to a pupil without hiding
fires, houses, and the king, if the latter has not heard of him before. Another rule is not anything from him in all matters of duty (see Apastamba Dharmasutra I,2,8,25-28; I,4,
to pronounce the name of one's teacher without prefixing or affixing an honorific addi- 14,2-3). Cf. P. V. Kane, History of Dharmafiistra, II-I, pp. 329-330.
tion (such as iri, bhii.!!a, ii.ciirya). Smrtis prescribe rules about upasai12graha1}a, which con- 21The sentences "iitmaivedal{l sar11am" and "brahmaivedarµ sarnam" are also quoted in
sists in repeating one's gotra and name, saying 'I salute,' touching one's ears, and clasp- GKBh II,32, p. 91. The former comes from Chand. Up. VII,25,2, but the latter is
ing the feet of the teacher with one's hands, when one meets his teacher. See P. V. problematic. As far as 1 have investigate;d, the same sentence occurs only in the ."irsiTJ'l-
Kane, History ef Dharmalastra, pp. 333-346. Cf. Mm.ii.I. Up. I,2, 12-13 (see the nex:t hottaratapan~ya Up. (VII,3 ), from which Sankara cannot be expected to quote. As I have
sectjon); Brh. Up. IV,2,1; Chand. Up. VII,1,2. discussed elsewhere, I would think that this is a quotation from the Brh. Up. This
9Satikara presupposes the study of the Veda, which is required of a brahmaciirin, and quotation rnus t have originally been brahmedarµ sarvam which occurs in Brh. Up. II,5, l.
knowledge of it as indispensable condition. Cf. P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, :Furthermore, there is a possibility that brahmedarµ sarvam was assimilated to atmaivedarµ
pp. 77-78. sarvarn which occurs just before the quotation in question (see S. Mayeda, "On the
lOThe source of this quotation is probably Mahiibhiirata, Afokfadharma, 12, 313, 23ab Author of the Mii9-Qiikyopani~ad- and the Gauc;l.apadlya-Bhii~ya,'' The Adyar Library
(Poona Critical ed.): "ii.cfiryaf:z plavita ta.rya jfiii.narµ plava ihoi;yate." Some manuscripts Bulletin, vols. 31-32, 1967-68, p. 81, note 1).
(A4, As, As6, and 84) takes it as a quotation from a Sruti but it is not traced there as far 22Cf. section 18.
as I have tried. 23See note 2 ofUpad I,15.
llSee note 1. 241Jrahmaciirin, viz. the first of the four stages oflife. See note 3.
12Anandajiiana says that "etc." indicates "anugraha" and the like while Ramtlrtha 25G rhastha, viz. the second of the four stages oflife. See note 3.
explains it as denoting "akii.ma" and so on. if.pastamba Dharmasfitra I,8,23,6 reads: ak- 26There are three different opinions about the four stages of life: (-1) exclusion (bii.-
rodho 'har fO 'rofo 'lobho'moho 'darnbho 'drohah . . , ; SivopanifadVII,101 reads: akrodhiidyii dha), (2) orderly co-ordination (samuccaya), and (3) option (vikalpa). The first, exclusion,
niyama siddhivrddhikarab; BhG XVI,2: ahirµsii saryam akrodhas tyagab siintir apailurwTJ'I. which is held by the Gautama Dharmasiitra (II I, l and 35), is that there is really one stage
13According to ragasiltra II,30, the abstentions (yama) are five: non-injury (ahiTJ'lsd), of life, i.e., that of a householder; the other stages are regarded as inferior to it. The
non-lying (sa~ya), non-theft (asteya), non-incontinence (brahmacarya), and non-posses- Manu (IV, I; VI, l ; VI,33-37 ; VI,81-83) represents the second opinion, that a man
sion (aparigraha). Yama constitutes the first of the eight-limbed practice of Yoga (roga- should resort to the four stages oflife one after another in order without skipping any
siltra II,29). Butyama in Yiijiiavalkyasmrti III,312 has ten constituents: non-incontinence one of them. The third opinion, as seen in theJabalopanipd (4), is that there can be an
(brahmacarya), compassion (dayii.), patience (kfi'inti), giving (dii.na), non-lying (sa0'a), optiOYl after the stage of a student. In other words, a man may become a wandering
230 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [II, 1 II, I] PROSE PART 231

ascetic (parivriijaka) immediately after he finishes the stage ofa student or the stage ofa do, "The Study of Sankaracarya," Annals qf the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute,
householder. The BS suggests that Jaimini, founder of the M1ma1T1sa school, held the vol. 33 (1952), p. 7; Mayeda Upad, pp. 32-34.
first opinion (BS III,4, 18\ whereas Badarayar;ia, founder of the Vedanta school, might 42The name-and-form in this case means the effect of the unevolved name-and-form.
have peen a supporter of the second opinion (B~ III, 4,19, and 20). The Upad reveals See Eigen, pp. 259--261; Mayeda U pad, p. 32.
that Sankara may have held the third opinion. Sankara himself is said to have become 43See BS II,3,1-7; Taitt. Up. II,1,1.
a sa1J1nyii.sin without resorting to the life of a householder (cf. T. l\1. P. Mahadevan, 44As P. Hacker point~ out in his Upadeshasahasrl von Meister Shankara, p. 19, note 71,
Homage to Sankara, pp. 3-11). this simile shows that Sankara is at the transitional stage between the realistic view
27 BhG II,22 reads as follows: "Just as a man leaves aside worn-out garments and (pariiiamavada) of the BS and the remarkable illusionisrn (vivartavada) oflater Advaita.
takes other new ones, so the embodied Atman leaves aside worn-out bodies and goes See Introduction, III ,A,2, pp. 22-26.
to other new ones." 45See BS II,3,8.
28See section 10. 4°See BS II,3, 10; Taitt. Up. II,l.
29 The word sa7[!skara is sometimes translated as (Hindu) "sacrament." It generally 47See BS II,3, 11; Taitt. Up. II,l; Chand. Up. VI,2,3.
means religious purificatory rites and ceremonies for sanctifying the body, mind, and 4BSee BS II,3, 12; Taitt. Up. ll,l; Chand. Up. VI,2,4.
intellect of an individual so that he may become a full-fledged member of the Hindu 49There are two different theories which explain how the subtle elements lsuksma-

community. There is a great divergence of opinion among the law books concerning hhuta) are combined to produce the gross elements (sthulabhiita): one is the triv,rtka~ana
the number of sa7[!skiiras. The Gautama Dharmasutra gives a list of forty sal[lskiiras with and tl1e other is the paiicikaral}a. Sar1kara's description here seems to point to ;he pan-
eight virtues of Atman. It is, however, said that sixteen art~ the most popular samskiiras cikaralja. For a detailed discussion, see Introduction, III,A,3, pp. 26-27.
though the enumeration differs in different books. In the Upad Sar1kara refers. to sev~ 50 Nescience (avil[yii) is treated as a kind of psychic affection (klefa). See Introduction,

era! sa'{lskaras (see U pad II, 1,20, and 21) such as birth ceremony (jiitakarman) and ini- IV,D,l, p. 78.
tiation ceremony (upanayana). Cf. P. V. Kane, History of Dharmafastra, II-I, pp. 188- 51 Probably these sacred formulas (mantra) are those which are uttered when the gar-
267; Raj Bali Pandey, Hindu Sarhskiiras (Banaras: Vikarama Publications, 1949). hhiidhii.na sa~nskii.ra is performed. The garbhiidhana is the rite through which a man places
30See section 23. his seed in a woman. See Brh. Up. VI,4,l-"22; P. V. Kane, History of Dharmafastra, II-
31See section 6. I, pp. 201-213; R. B. Pandey, Hindu Samskii.ras, pp. 79-98.
32See sections 7 and 8. 52The garbhadhiina sal[lskiira (see note 51) should be performed at the time of rtu when
33 The whole section is based upon Chand. Up. VIII, 14,1 (iikafo vainiima niimarilpa_110r the wife is physically prepared to conceive. The proper time for conception is from the
nirvahitii) a11dBS I,3,41 (iikii/o 'rthiintaratvadivyapadefat). See Mayeda Upad, pp. 31-32. fourth to the sixteenth night after menstruation. See P. V. Kane, History if Dharmafas-
34 Here, as in the BSBh, Sankara uses the term name-and-form (namarupa) in the tra, II-I, pp. 204--20.5; R. B. Pandey, Hindu Sarhskaras, p. 79.
sense of the primary material of the universe, which correspo;ids to prakrti (or pradhiina) 53 For Indian medical views of conception, see Carakasa'!'hitii IV,2-3.
in the Sarp.khya system. This usage of the term is peculiar to Sankara. According to lat- 5 4A birth ceremony (jatakarman) is performed before the umbilical cord is cut lcf.

er Advaitins, the primary material of the universe is avil[yii or miiya and not nttmariipa. Manu II,29), but there is no agreement among writers. There is also great diverge~1ce
For a detailed discussion, see Introduction, III,A, 1, pp. 18-22. on the details which constitute the birth ceremony. According to Brh. Up. VI,4,24-28,
35Cf. Chand. Up. VIII,12,1. which gives fairly elaborate description of the ceremony, it consists of the following
3 6Brh. Up. III,8,8. Cf. Upad II, 1,7. parts: (1) a sacred fire (homa) of curds with ghce to the accompaniment of the sacred
37Chand. Up. VIII,7,1. Cf. Upad II,1,7. formula (Brh. Up. VI,4,24), (2) repeating in a child's right ear "Speech!" three times
38 Brh. Up. III,5,1. Cf. Upad II,1,7. (Bi:-h. Up. VI,4,25), (3) feeding him curds, honey, and ghee out of a golden spoon (Brh.
39Cf. Chand. Up. VII,26,1. Up. VI,4,25), (4) giving him a name, which becomes his secret name (Brh. Up. VI,
40See notes 33 and 34. 4,26), (5) putting him to the mother's breast to the accompaniment ofa sacred formula
41 By the exi;ression, "indescribable as this or something else" (tattvii.Tl)!atvii.bhyiim (Bi:-h. Up. VI,4,27), and (6) addressing the mother with sacred formulas (Brh. Up. VI,
anirvacaniya-), Sar1kara indicates, as in the BSBh, the unsteadiness of the primary ma- 4,28). See P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasiistra, II-I, pp. 228--237; R. B. Pandey, Hindu
terial namarupa (see note 34) which will be transformed into something. The expression Sarizskaras, pp. 116-129.
denotes the unstable condition of the unevolved name-and-form (avyakrte niimarilpe), 55The initiation (upanayana) is one of the purifying ceremonies, by which a boy is
of which we cap neither say, "It is this" nor "It is different from this." The expression taken to a teacher for learning the Veda. Later the performance of the ritual and the
is peculiar to Sankara. The term anirvacaniya appears as an attribute of avidya first in commandments for observing vows (vratiidefa) become more important than the study
Mai;iqanamisra's Brahmasiddhi (S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Brahmasiddhi by Acarya Ma1Jef· of the Veda. If a boy is aBrahmin, this ceremony is performed at the age of eight; if he is
anami!ra with Commentary ~y Sankhapiil}i. Madras: Government Press, 1937, p. 9, line 14. a K¥atriya, it is performed at the age of eleven; if he is a Vaisya, it is performed at the
Cf. S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 89; Eigen, p. 255, note I). The age of twelve. There are many other opinions about the age of initiation. This cere-
association of the term with avidya occurs in the thinking of all Advaitins except San- mony is called a second birth, and by virtue of its performance the initiated boy be-
kara, Surdvara, and Totaka. See Eigen, pp. 261--264; D. H. H. Ingalls, "Samkara on comes twice-born (dvija) and is distinguished from the Sudras (ekaja) who have only
the Question: Whose Is Avidya?", Philosophy East and West, vol. 3 (1953), no. I, p. 69; one physical birth. In the course of the ceremony he is invested with a sacred thread
 232 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [II, l II, l] PROSE PART 233
(yqjflopavita, see Upad 11,1,30). See P. V. Kane, History of Dharrnasiistra, II-I, pp. 268 Cf. Viijasaneyi-SaY[lhita XXXII, 8; Taitt. A. X,1,3; Atharvaveda ll,1,1; Saftkhiiyana
--415; R. B. Pandey, Hindu Samsktiras, pp. 187-240. Srautasiltra XV,3,8. The word ekanl<f.a is also used in Upad I,12,4; I,16,51.
56See note 3. 77 Manu is regarded as the first man, father of the race and the establisher of sacrifice.
57 The purifying ceremony for union with a wife (patniyogasa'!'skara) may mean the
Cf. A. A. Macdonell, The Vedic Mythology, pp. 138-140; A. B. Keith, The Religion and
marriage ceremony (vivaha). For a detailed description of the marriage ceremony, see Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads, vol. I (HOS, vol. 31. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
P. V. Kane, History of Dharmafastra, II-I, pp. 427-541; R. B. Pandey, Hindu Sa1[1skaras, versity Press, 1925), pp. 228--230.
pp. 261-406. 78See Upad I,15,11 and note 9.
58 Set; note 3. The word tapasa is used as a synonym of viinaprastha (forest-dweller).
79Cf. sa yathii saindhavaghana~ . . " , Brh. Up. IV ,5, 13.
\Vhen Sankara comments on BS III,4,20, he says that tapas (self-mortification) is a dis- BOBy accepting two standpoints, paramarthavastha (standpoint of the hi~hest trut~)
tinctive attribute of the forest-dweller whereas indri;yasawama (restraint of the senses) and vyauahiirauasthii. (standpoint of the daily life) or avidyavastha (standpomt of nesc1-
and so on are the distinctive attributes of the mendicants (bhikfu). The forest-dweller ence), Sankara tried to interpret consistently the mutually contradictory Upani~ads,
who may go to the forest with his wife has to keep fires and perform the daily and other BS and so forth, and to explain contradictions between daily experience> and the truth.
rites (yajfla), at least in the beginning. Cf. J>. Deussen, The .1Jis tem of the Vedanta, pp. 98-115; S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philos-
59See notes 3 and 58. ophy, vol. II, pp. 518-.520. The word paramiirtha (Pali: paramattha) is not found in the
60Cf. note 49. ancient Upanirads but appears in old Buddhist texts (cf. Suttanipata 68; 219; Saddharma-
61Section 16.
pu~r;iar"ikn (ed. by U. Wogihara and Tuchida), p. 92, line 23; p. 93, '.ine I; p. 122, li~e
62 Cf. Brh. Up. III,7,23; Upad II,l,18.
21; P· 257, line 3; Saundarananda XV, 19); it has come to be a very important term m
6 3 Cf. Upad I, 15,2.
Mahayana Buddhism. Such a conception of the highest truth was first introduced into
64 The pupil, who does not know the truth that he himself is Brahman, regards im-
the Vedanta system by the author of the Mar:ifukyakiirika (I,17; II,32; III,18; IV, 73;
personal Brahman as a personal god to be worshipped. 74), in wliich a Buddhistic distinction between the highest truth (parc;marthasatya) and
65The sentence "airya evaham. . a'!Yo 'sau" is based upon Brh. Up. I,4,10 (see sec- the conventional truth (sa1f1vrtisarya) is recognized (IV,73 and 74). Sankara adopted
tion 26).
it for his purpose. See Nakamura III, pp. 509-510.
56See note 3. BJ. Timi-Ta is a class of morbid affection of the coats of the eye.
67 This is based upon Chand. Up. VI,16,1-3. See Upad I,17,65 and 73.
B2See variant readings in Mayeda Upad. D. V. Gokhale suggests in his edition of the
68Section 13.
Upad (Bombay: Gujarati Printing Press, 1917) that this is a quotation from Chand.
sssection 25.
Up. VII,2,1, etc. It is, however, to be noted here that in his BSBh (II,1,14, p. 373)
70 The sacred thread (yajfiopavita), the composition of which is full of symbolism, con-
Sankara quotes the same sentence (yatha . . viicU.ra1[1bha1Jam vikaro namadheyarp. mrtti-
sists of three threads of nine strands and is worn under the right arm and over the left kety eva satyam) from the Chand. Up. and that he explains the sentence, interpreting
shoulder. It is prescribed that the sacred thread of a Brahmin should be made of cotton, • 'namadheya'' as "namadJieyarniitraY[l hy et ad anrtarr1o" Therefore, "anrtam" may not be a
that of a K~atriya of hempen threads, and that of a Vaisya of woolen threads (cf. quotation but Sankara's explanatory inst'rtion.
Manu II,44). But the option of cotton thread is available for all. It should reach as far sasee uote 80.
as the navel and is said to be spun by a virgin Brahmin girl and twisted by a Brahmin. B4Cf. note 79.
At the time of upana.yana (see note 55) the ii.carya invests the student with this sacred s ssee section 2 .
thread. It is also prescribed that a man must wear it when waiting upon teachers,
elders, guests, at the time of handling sacred fire (homa), in performingjapa (murmuring
prayer), in :aking meals and in sipping water (acamana), and at the time of daily Vedic
study (cf. Apastamba Dharmasfitra I,5,15,1). Cf. P. V. Kane, History of Dkarmafastra,
II-I, pp. 287-300; R. B. Pandey, Hindu Sarµskiiras, pp. 224-227.
71 Prosperity (abhyudaya) is the reward for worship of Brahman but belongs to trans-

migratory existence (sa1[1sii.ra). On the other hand beatitude (nibJreyasa) is generally a

synonym for final release (mokfa). Cf. P. Deussen, The System q/the Vedfinta, p. 104.
72 Bhavarupa is used as an attribute of aviqyii or ajfiana by later Advaitins. Here San-

kara uses it as an attribute of pain (dubkha). Cf. S. Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy,
vol. II, p. 105 and p. 114; Eigen, pp. 254-256; Mayeda Upad, p. 29.
73See Introduct~on, III,B,4, pp. 40-43.
74 According to Sankara's commentary on the Brh. Up. (III,9,20, p. 508), the word

';heart" (hrdaya) comprises both buddhi and manas (buddhimanasi ekikrtya nirdeial;).
Sankara probably understands it as a synonym of the internal organ (antab};ara~a).
75Cf. Upad I,15,2.

76 venas tat paJyan vifva bhw1aniini uidvanyatra vifvarµ bhavati ekanit/am, M. N. Up. II,3.
 II, 2, 50--53] PROSE PART 235

object ?4 And what is knowled ge, remover of nescienc e, by which

. my own na t ure.?"5
I can rea1ize . _
CHAPTE R 2 50. The teacher replied, "Thoug h you are the highest Atman
AWARENESS and not a transmig rator, you hold the inverted view, 'I am~ trans-
migrator .' Though you are neither. an agent.no r ,an expenen cer,
and exist [eternall y], [you hold the rnverted ~new, _J ~m] an. agen;;
an experien cer, and do not exist [eternall y] ·6--th1s Is nes~1ence.
51. The pupil said, "Even though I exist [et:rnall y], st1~l I am
not the highest Atman. My nature is tran~m1grat~ry ~xiste.nc·~
which is characte rized by agency and expenen cership, smce it is
known by sense-pe rception and other means ofknow~edge. [T~ans­
migrator y existence ] has not nescienc e as its cause, srnce nesc1ence
45. A certain student, 1 who was tired of transmig ratory exist- cannot have one's own Atman as its object. 7
ence characte rized by birth and death and was seeking after final Nescienc e is [defined as) the superimp osition of the qual.ities ~f
release, approac hed in the prescribe d manner2 a knower of Brahman one [thing] upon another. s For example , fully known silver is
who was establish ed in Brahman and sitting at his ease, and asked superimp osed upon fully known mother-o f-pearl, a fully known
him, "Your Holiness , how cap I be released from transmig ratory person upon a [fully knownl tree trunk, or a fully kn~wn trunk
existence ? I am aware of the body, the senses and [theirJ objects; upon a [fully known] person; but not an unknow~ [thmg] upon
I experien ce pain in the waking state, and I experien ce it in the [one that is J fully known nor ~ fully kno:vn [tlnng] upon_ one
dreamin g state after getting relief again and again by entering that is unknow n. Nor is non-Atm an superimp osed upon Atman
into the state of deep sleep again and again. Is it indeed my own because Atman is not fully known, nor Atman [superim posed] upon
nature or [is it] due to some cause, my own nature being different ? non-Atm an, [again] because Atman is not fully known." .
If [this is] my own nature, there is no hope for me to attain final 52. The teacher said to him, "That is not right, since there 1s
release, since one cannot avoid one's own nature. If [it is] due to an exceptio n. w1y child, it is not possible to make a general ~ule
some cause, final release is possible after the cause has been that a fully known [thing] is superim posed only upon a fully
removed ."
known [thing], since it is a matt:r of experien ce that [a '.ully known
16. The teacher replied to him, "Listen, my child, this is not thing] is superim posed upon Atman. [For exampl~,] if .o~e says,_
your own nature but is due to a cause." 'I am white,' 'I am dark,' this is [the supenmp osit10n] of
17. When he was told this the pupil said, "What is the cause? qualities of the body upon Atman which is the obj~ct of .t~e 'I'-
And what will remove it? And what is my own nature? When the notion.9 And if one says, 'I am this,' this is [the supenmp osit10n of
cause is removed , the effect due to the cause no [longer] exists; I Atman,] which is the object of the '!'-notio n, upon _the body."
will attain to my own nature like a sick person [who recovers his 53. The pupil said, "In that case Atman is indee~ f'ully kn~w~
health] when the cause of his disease has been removed ."3 as the object of the 'I' -notion; so is the body as 'this. If so,_ [1t is
48. The teacher replied, "The cause is nescienc e; it is removed only a case of] the mutual superimp osition ~f bod_r_ and Atman,
by knowled ge. \Vhen nescience has been removed , you will be both fully known, just like [the mutual supenmpos1t1011] ~f tree-
released from transmig ratory existence which is characte rized by trunk and person, and of mother-o f-pearl and silver. So, is t~ere
birth and death, since its cause will be gone and you will no a particul ar reason why Your Holiness said that it is not possible
[longer] experien ce pain in the dreamin g and waking states." to make a general rule that two fully known [things] are mutually
49. The pupil said, ""\Vhat is that nescienc e? And what is its superim posed?"
231
236 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [II, 2, 54--56 II, 2, 57-61) PROSE PART 237

_ 54. The teacher replied, "Listen. It is true that the body and connected with the body exists for another's sake since it is compos-
Atman are fully known; but they are not fully known to all people ite. [Therefore,] it has been first established that the highest
as the objects of distinct notions like a tree-trunk and a person." [Atman] is not connected with the body, is different [from it], and
"How [are they known] then?" is eternal.
"[They are] always [known] as the objects of constantly 57. [The pupil objected:] "Although [the Atman] is not compos-
non-distinct notions. Since nobody grasps the body and Atman ite, It is [regarded] merely as the body and superimposed upon
as two distinct notions, saying, 'This is the body, that is Atman,' the body; from this follow the results that [the Atman] does not
r:ople are deluded with regard to Atman and non-Atman, thinking, exist and that [It] is non-eternal and so on. Then there would
'Atman is thus' or 'Atman is not thus.' This is the particular reason arise the fault that [you will] arrive at the Nihilists' position that
why I said that it is impossible to make a general rule." the body has no Atman."
55. [The pupil raised another objection:] "Is it not experienced 58. [The teacher replied,] "Not so; because it is accepted that
that the thing which is superimposed [upon something] else Atman, like space, is by nature not composite. 12 Although Atman
through nescience does not exist [in the latter]? For example, exists as connected with nothing, it does not follow that the body
silver [does not exist] in a mother-of-pearl nor a person in a trec- and other things are without Atman, just as, although space is
trunk nor a snake in a rope; nor the dark color of the earth's sur- connected with nothing, it docs not follow that nothing has space.
face in the sky. Likewise, if the body and Atman are always mutual- Therefore, there would not arise the fault that [I shall] arrive at
ly superimposed in the form of constantly non-distinct notions, the Nihilists' position.
then they cannot exist in each other at any time. Silver, etc., which 59. "Your further objection-namely that, if the body does
are superimposed through nescience upon mother-of-pearl, etc., not ex:ist in Atman [although Atman exists], this would contradict
do not exist [in the latter] at any time in any way and vice versa; sense-perception and the other [means of knowledgc]1 3 : this is
likewise the body and Atman arc mutually superimposed through not right, because the existence of the body in Atman is not
nesciencc; this being the case, it would follow as the result that cognized by sense-perception and the other [means of knowledge];
neither the body nor Atman exists. And it is not acceptable, since in Atman--Iike a jujube-fruit in a pot, ghee in milk, oil in sesame
it is the theory of the Nihilists. lo and a picture on a wall 14-the body is not cognized by sense-
If, instead of mutual superimposition, [only] the body is superim- percepti on. and the other [means of knowledge]. Therefore there
posed upon Atman through nescience, it would follow as the result is no contradiction with sense-perception and the other [means of
that the body does not exist in Atman while the latter exists. This is knowledge]."
not acceptable either since it is contradictory to sense-perception 60. [The pupil objected,] "How is the body then superimposed
and other [means of knowledge]. For this reason the body and upon Atman which is not established by sense-perception and the
Atman are not superimposed upon each other through nescience." other [means ofknowledge], and how is Atman superimposed upon
"How then?" the body?"
"They are permanently connected with each other like bamboo 61. {The teacher said,] "That is not a fault, because Atman
and pillars [which are interlaced in the structure of a house].'' is established by Its own nature. A general rule cannot be made
56. [The teacher said,] "No; because it would follow as the that superimposition is made only on that which is adventitiously
result that [Atman is] non-eternal and exists for another's sakcll; established and not on that which is permanently established, for
since [in your opinion Atman] is composite, [Atman exists for the dark col or and other things on the surface of the earth are seen
another's sake and is non-eternal] just like bamboo, pillars, and so to be superimposed upon the sky [which is permanently estab-
forth. Moreover, the Atman which is assumed by some others to be lished]."
 238 A THOUSA ND TEACHI NGS [II, 2, PROSE. PART 239
II, 2, 71-74]

6.2: [The pupil asked,] _"Your Holine ss, is the mutua l superim - and a thorn are not for the sake of the sandal and the thorn, nor
is
pos1t1on of the body and Atman made by the compo site of the body sandal ~nd o~her
use made of a jar for the sake of the jar. So, the
and so on or by Atman?"15 things serve my purpos e, i.e., the purpos e of the~r perceiv er,. smce
63. The teache r said, "What would happe n to you, if [the mu- I who am differe nt from them perceiv e all the ob.iects seated m
the
and
tual superim positio n] is made by the compo site of the body intelle ct.' ' 18
by Atman? "
so on, or if [it] is made 71. The teache r said to him, "So, then, you exist for your own
. 64. Then the pupil answer ed, "If I am merely the compo site sake since you are conscio us. You are not driven [to act] by.
an-
for
of the body and so on, then I am non-co nsciou s, so I exist other. A consci ous being is neither depend ent on anothe r nor dnven
anoth_er's s~ke; conseq uently, the mutua l superim positio n of body [to act] by anothe r, for it is not reasonab~e that~ co~scious being
nt
and Atman Is not effecte d by me. IfI am the highes t Atman differe should exist for the sake of anothe r consci ous berng smce they
are
from tl~e compo site [of the body and so on], then I am conscio us, exist for the
equal like two lights.19 Nor does a conscio us being
so I exist ~or 1_11Y own sake j conseq uently, the superim positio n
[of
sake or a non-co nsciou s being since it is not reason able that a non-
d upon Atman
body] wluch is the seed of every calami ty is effecte consci ous being should have any connec tion with its ?wn object
by me who am consci ous." precise ly becaus e it is non-co nsciou s. Nor does exper~ence show
65. To this the teache r respon ded, "If you know that the false that two non-co nsciou s beings exist for each other, as for examp
le
superi mposit ion is the seed of [every] calami ty, then do not make a stick of wood and a wall do not fulfill each other's purpos es."
it !"16 '
72. [The pupil objecte d,] "Is it not experie nced th~t ~servant
66. "Your Holine ss, I cannot help [it]. I am driven [to do it] and his master , though they are equal in the sense of being con-
by anothe r; I am not indepe ndent. " scious, exist for each otber? " 20
67. [The teache r said,] "Then you are non-co nsciou s, so you 73. [The teache r said,] "It is not so, for what [I] n_1eant was
not
do not exist for your own sake. That by which you who are that you have conscio usness just as fire has heat and light. And
exists for its own 21
self-de penden t are driven to act is consci ous and [in this meani ng I] cited the rxamp le, 'like two lights._' This
sake; you are only a compo site thing [of the body, etc.]." being the case, you perceiv e everyt hing seated m your mtdlec t
I
68. [The pupil objecte d,] "If I am non-co nsciou s, how do throug h your own nature , i.e., the transce ndenta lly change less,
perceiv e feeling s of pleasu re and pain, and [the words] you have eternaJ,22 pure conscio usness which is_ equiva lent to th~ heat a~d
spoken ?''
light of fire. And if you admit that ~tman i~ ~lways withou t. d1.s-
69. '~he teache r said, "Are you differe nt from feelings ofplea sure tinctio ns, why did you say, 'After gettmg relict agam and agam
m
al
and pam and from [the words] I have spoken , or are you identic the state o:fdeep sleep, I perceiv e pain in the waking and dream
ing
[with them] ?"17 ..
states. Is tl:us mdeed my own nature or r· .
is it J due to some cause· ;»23

70. The pupil answer ed, "I am indeed not identic al." Has this delusio n left [you now] or not?"
"Why ?"
74. To this the pupil replied , "Your Holine ss, the delusio n has
eJ
."Becau se I pcr~eive both of them as objects just as [I perceiv gone thanks to your graciou s assistanc~! but I am in doubt as
to
ajar and other tlungs [as objects ]. If I were identic al [with them] how I am transce ndenta lly change less. ·
I cou~d not perceiv e either of them; but I do perceiv e them,
so I
"How ?"
am di~crent [from both of them]. If [I were] identic al [with "Soun d and other [extern al objects ] are not self-es tablish ed,
of the
them] it would follow that the modifi cations of the feelings since they are not conscio us. Bu tthey [are establi shed] throug h
pleasu re and pain exist for their own sake and so do [the words] rise of notion s which take the forms of sound and other [extern al
you h~ve spoken ; but it is not reason able that any of them exists 0 bjects] . 24 It is imposs ible for notion s to b~ self-es
tablish :d, since
for their own sake, for the pleasu re and pain produc ed by a sandal they have mutua lly exclusi ve attribu tes and the forms [of extern
al
 240 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS II, 2, 78-84] PROSE PART 241
[II, 2, 75-77

objects] such as blue and yellow. It is, therefore, understood that perception of Atman falsely appears [as perceiver]; thus the notion
[notions] are caused by the forms of the external objects; so, [no- of the intellect is figuratively indicated by the term, 'perception.'
~ions] are established as possessing the forms of external objects, For example, the cutting action results [in the static state] that
z.e., the forms of sound, etc. Likewise, notions, which are the modi- [the object to be cut] is separated in two parts; thus [the term,
fications of a thing ( = the intellect), 25 the substratum of the 'cutting,' in the sense of an object to be cut being separated in
'!'-notion, are also composite, so it is reasonable that they are two parts, J is used figuratively as [the cutting action] which is
non-conscious ; therefore, as it is impossible that they exist for meant by the verbal root." 28
their own sake, they, like sound and other [external objects], are 78. To this the pupil objected, "Your Holiness, the example
established as objects to be perceived by a perceiver different in cannot explain my transcendenta l changelessness."
nature [from them]. Ifl am not composite, I have pure conscious- "Why not?"
ness as my nature; so I exist for my own sake. Nevertheless, I am " 'Cutting' which results in a change in the object to be cut is
a perceiver of notions which have the forms [of the external ob- used figuratively as [the cutting action] which is meant by the
jects J such as blue and yellow [and] so I am indeed subject to verbal root; in the same manner, if the notion of the intellect,
change. [For the above reason, I am] in doubt as to how [I am] which is figuratively indicated by the term 'perception' and is
transcendental ly changeless." meant by the verbal root, results also in a change in the percep-
75. The teacher said to him, "Your doubt is not reasonable. tion of Atman, [the example] cannot explain Atman's transcenden-
[Your] perception of those n'otions is necessary and entire; for this tal changelessness ."
very reason [you] are not subject to transformation . It is. there- 79. The teacher said, "It would be true, if there were a distinc-
fore, established that [you] are transcendental ly changcl~ss. But tion between perception and perceiver. The perceiver is indeed
you have said that precisely the reason for the above positive nothing but eternal perception. And it is not [right] that percep-
conclusion--n amely, that [you] perceive the entire movement of tion and perceiver are different as in the doctrine of the logi-
the mind-is the reason for [your] doubt [concerning your trans- cians."29
cendental changelessness]. This is why [your doubt is not rea- 80. [The pupil said,] "How does that [action] which is meant
sonable]. by the verbal root result in perception?"
If indeed you were subject to transformation , you would not per- 81. [The teacher] answered, "Listen, [I] said that [it] ends
ceive the entire movement of the mind which is your object, just as with the result that the perception [of Atman] falsely appears [as
the mind [does not perceive] its [entire] object and just as the perceiver].30 Did you not hear? I did not say that [it] results
sens_:s [do not perceive] their [entireJ objects, 2 s and similarly you in the production of any change in Atman."
as Atman would not perceive even a part of your object. There- 82. The pupil said, "Why then did you say that if I am trans-
fore, you are transcendenta lly changeless." cendentally changeless I am the perceiver of the entire movement
76. Then [the pupil] said, "Perception is what is meant by the of the mind which is my object?"
verbal root, 27 that is, nothing but change; it is contradictory [to 83. The teacher said to him, "I told [you] only the truth. Pre-
this fact] to say that [the nature of] the perceiver is transcenden- cisely because [you are the perceiver of the entire movement of
tally changeless." the mind], I said, you are transcendental ly changcless." 31
77. [The teacher said,] "That is not right, for [the term] 'per- 84. "If so, Your Holiness, I am of the nature of transcendental -
ception' is used figuratively in the sense of a change which is 1y changeless and eternal perception whereas the notions of the
meant by the verbal root; whatever the notion of the intellect may intellect, which have the forms of [external objects] such as sound,
be, that is what is meant by the verbal root; [the notion of the arise and end with the result that my own nature which is per-
intellect] has change as its nature and end, with the result that the ception falsely appears [as perceiver]. Then what is my fault?"
 242 A THOUSAN D TEACHIN GS [II, 2, 85-9! PROSE PART 243
II, 2, 92--95]
85. [The teacher replied,] "You are right. [You] have no fault. ness, is self-esta blished; so It does not depend upon anything else,
The fault is only nescienc e as I have said before. "32 since It does not depart [from anybody ]." 35
86. [The pupil said,] "If~ Your Holiness , as in the state of deep 92. (The pupil objected ,] "Did I not point out that [It] does de-
sleep I undergo no change, how [do I experien ce J the dreamin g part [from me] when I said that in the state of deep sleep I do not
and waking states?" see ?" 36
87. The teacher said to him, "But do you experien ce [these 93. [The teacher replied,] "That is not right, for it is contra-
states] continuo usly?'' dictory. "
88.' [Th~ pupil answere d,] "Certain ly I do experien ce [them], "How is it a contradi ction?"
but mterm1t tently and not continuo usly." "Alth(m gh you are [in truth] seeing, you say, 'I do not see.'
89. The teacher said [to him,] "Both of them are adventit ious This is contradi ctory."
[and) not your nature. If[they] were your nature [they] would be "But at no time in the state of deep sleep, Your Holiness , have
self-esta blished and continuo us like your nature, which is Pure I ever seen Pure Consciou sness or anything else."
Consciou sness. Moreove r, the dreamin g and waking states are not "Then you are seeing in the state of deep sleep; for_ yo~ deny
your nature, for [they] depart [from you Jlike clothes and so on. 33 only the seen object, not the seeing. I said that your s.ecmg is Pure
It is certainly not experien ced that the nature of anything , what- Consciou sness. That [eternall y] existing one by which you deny
ever it may be, departs from it. But the dreamin g and waking [the existence of the seen object] when you. say that not~ing has
states depart from the state ·of Pure Consciou sness-on ly. If one's been seen, [that precisely is the seeing] that is Pure Consc10usness.
own ~ature were to depart [from oneself] in the state of deep Thus as [It] does not ever depart [from you] [Its] transcen ?ei:tal
sleep, It would be negated by saying, 'It has perished ,' 'It does not changele ssness and eternity are establish ed solely by Itself with-
exist,' since the adventit ious attribute s which are not one's own out dependi ng upon any means oi knowled ge. The knower,
nature are seen to consist in both [perishab leness and non-exis t- though self-esta blished, requires means of kno~kdge for the
ence]; for example , wealth, clothes, and the like are seen to discernm ent of an oqject to be known other [than itself]. And that
perish and things which have been obtained in dream or delusion eternal Discernm ent, which is required for discernin g somethin g
are seen to be non-exis tent." else (=non-A tman) which does not have Discernm ent as its
90. [The pupil objected ,] "[If] so, Your Holiness , it follows rrature- -that is certairily eternal, transcen dentally changele ss,
[either] that my own nature, i.e., Pure Consciou sness, is also ad ven- and of a self-effu lgent nature. The eternal Discernm ent does not
titious, since [I] perceive in the dreamin g and waking states but req_uire any mean~ of knowled ge in order to be _Itself the ~eans
not in the state of deep sleep; or that I am not of the nature of of knowled ge or the knower since the eternal Discernm ent is by
Pure Consciou sness." nature the means of knowled ge or the knower. [This is illustrate d
91. [The teacher replied,] "No, Look. Because that is not by the following] example : iron or water requires fire ~r sun [to
reasonab le. If you [insist on] looking your own nature, i.e. Pure obtain] light and heat since light and heat are not .their nature;
Consciou sness, as adventit ious, do so! We cannot establish it logi- but fire and sun do not require [anythin g else] for light and heat
cally even in a hundred years, nor can any other (i.e. non-con - since [these] are always their nature.
scious) being do so. As [that adventit ious consciou sness J is corn pos- 94. '"If [you object,] 'There is empirica l know 1e d ge 37 m
. f'
~~. a.r
ite, nobody can logically deny that [it] exists for another' s sake as it is not eternal and [there is] no [empiric al knowled ge], 1f it is
is manifold and perishab le; for what does not exist for its ow~ eternal,'
sake is not self-estab~ished, as we have said before.34 Nobody can, 9:'>. "[then I reply,] 'Not so; because it is impossib le to make a
however , deny that Atman, which is of the nature of Pure Consciou s- distincti on between eternal apprehen sion and non-eter nal ap-
 244 A THOUS AND TEACH INGS 245
[II, 2, 96-100 II, 2, 101-103] PROSE PART

ledge , such
prehe nsion ; when appre hensi on is empir ical know objec t is impos sible, the know er would not be appre
hende d,'
ledge is non-
distin ction is not appre hende d that empir ical know I 01. "not so; becau se the appre hensi on of tl~e appre
hende r
etern al appre hensi on and not eterna l one.' were to have
] is etern al has as its objec t the objec t to be apprehende~. If.[1t]
96. "If [you objec t,] 'Whe n [empi rical know ledge the appre hende r as its objec t, a regressus ad infinit um woul_d re~ult
when [empi ri-
[appr ehens ion, it] does not requi re the know er, but as before . And it has been prove d befor e that appreh
38 _ens10n: z.e.,
the transc enden ta11y chang eless and eterna l light ?f
ehens ion], appre hensi on re- Atman, is es-
cal know ledge ] is non-e terna l [appr
[the know er's] effort. .else ~s heat
quires [the know er], since it is media ted by tablis hed in Atman witho ut depen ding upon anyth mg
There would be the above distin ction , ' If appre hens1 0n, i.e.,
. the,
an d 1.1gl 1t are .1· n fire,, the sun , and so on.
97. "then , it is establ ished that the know er itself is self-estab- were not etern al m one s
1. l t of Atman which is Pure Consc iousn ess, ~ It s own
lished , since [it] does not requi re any mean s of know ledge . ig i - .
or
own Atman, it would be impos sible for Atman to exist
empir ical
98. "If [you objec t,] 'Even when [appr ehens ion or sake. as It would be comp osite like the aggre gate of the body and
requi re [any
know ledge ] does not exist, [the know er] does not
[my reply is,]
sens~s, It would exist for anoth er's sake and be posses sed of faults
mean s of know ledge ], since [the know er] is etern al,' as we have alread y said."
in [the know er] itself. Thus
'No; becau se appre hensi on exists only "How ?"
your opini on is refute d. not ~te~­
ledge ''If the Iigh t of Atman which is Pure Cons:-iousness were
99. "If the know er is depen dent upon the mean s of know by _re~e mbrance
belon g? It is nal in one's own Atman, it would be medi ated
for its establ ishme nt, where does the desire to know and the like and so it would be comp osite. ~nd as this
hght o~~ure
to know belon gs is 'indee d e Its ongm a-
admit ted that that to which the desire Consc iousn ess would theref ore not exist in Atman befor
the know er. And the o~ject of this desire to know is the objec t to exist for anoth er's. sake,
tion and after Its destru ction , It would
tl1e desire to
be know n, not the know er, since if the objec t [of since It would be comp osite like the eye and so 0~1. An~ if the
regar d to the .w~1ch ha~
know ] were the know er, a regressus ad infinitum with light of Pure Consc iousn ess ex_ists in Atman as somet_hrng
know er and the desire to know would result : there ~ould be a it is_ est.ah
secon d, and arisen , then Atman docs not exist for Its own sake, smce
secon d know er for the first one, a third know er for the absen ce of that light of
had the lishe<l accor ding to the existe nce and
so on. Such would be the case if the desire to know J>ure Consc iousn ess that Atman exists for Its own
sak~ and non-
be the objec t
know er as its objec t. And the know er itself canno t A-tman ex1s· t.s for anoth er's sake. It is theref ore establ
ished dthat ·
anyth ing]; what in this
to be know n, since it is never media ted [by Atman is the etern al light of Pure Consc iousn ess witho ut depen mg
, when it is
world is called the objec t to be know n is establ ished upon anyt h mg' el se. " ., . h
and mean s of
media ted by the rise of desire , remem branc e, effort , l 02. [The pupil objec ted,] "If so, [ ~n~] if the kno~?
r is not t e
way is ap-
know ledge which belon g to the know er. In no other subje ct of empir ical know ledge , how 1s 1t a knm: er.
. . .
objec t to be know n.
prehe nsion exper ience d with regar d to the 103. [The teach er] answe red, "Beca use there i~ n.o d1stm ct10n
And it canno t be assum ed that the know er itself is media
ted by any
branc e has as in the natur e of empir ical know ledge , wheth er it :s
etern al ~r
of the know er's own desire and the like. And remem non-e ternal since empir ical know ledge is appre hensi
on. There is
the subje ct
no distincti~n in the natur e of this [empi rical kno:v ledge
its objec t the objec t to be remem bered and not ] whet.her
t only t11e objec t
of remem branc e. Likew ise, desire has as its objec it be non-e terna l, prece ded by remem branc e, ~esne , and the. hke,
e and d~sire
desire d and not the one who desires. If remem branc or transc enden tally chang eless and eterna l, JUSt as th:;e is no
had as their objec t the su~ject of remem branc e and
the one who root ~uc~ a~
be inevit able distin ction in the natur e of what is mean t by verba l
desire s respec tively , a regressus ad irifinit um would by gomg
as before. stha (stand ) wheth er it is a non-e terna l result prece ded
and ~ther [for ms of action s], or an etern al result not prece de? [by
er as its
100. "If [you say,] 'If appre hensi on which has the know 'going ' or any other forms of action s]; so the same expre ssion is
 246 A THOU SAND TEAC HINGS PROS E PART
247
[II 2, 10~106 II, 2, 107-109]
.
found [in both cases ]: 'Peo I . t ' ' state it woul d
alth ple sl ankd, Th~ moun tains stand ,' and 107. [The teach er said, ] "Cer tainl y in the waki ng
so forth.40 Likew ise the body also
' oug l t 1e nowe .
r IS 0 f th natur e of eter-
e be so. But in the states of death and deep sleep
nal appre hensi on ' it Is · · s of know ledge for
' not contr ad1ct or
y
t d ·
o esign ate [It J as depen ds upon sense -perc eptio n and other mean
know er,, since the resul t is the same ." d and other [exter -
its estab lishm ent. This is true of the senses. Soun
104. Here the pupil said "At . of the body and
e' less man; ':'h~c h is of the natur e of eter- nal objec ts J are indee d trans form ed into the form
nal appre hensi on is ch.ang sense -perc eptio n
' b· · . · , so It Is Impo s s1"bl e ior r -
Atma n to be senses; so, [the body and the senses] depe nd upon
an agen t witho ut . eing conn ected with the b d estab lishm ent. And 'es-
. o y and the senses, and other mean s of know ledge for [their ]
just as a carpe nter4 1 and other [a tablis hmen t' (siddhi) is Appr ehen sion, i.e., the resul
t of the mean s of
and so on. And if that wh· ! .. ~ents are conn
ected ] with an axe
Appr ehen sion is
IC l is y natur e not comp osite were to know ledge as we have alrea dy said, and this
use the body and th by natur e the
But the carpe nter and th th e senses, a rel!,ressus ad . ,1: . um woul d result.
~ znpnzt trans cende ntally chang eless, self-e stabli shed, and
· the body and th e o er [agen ts] a re const antly conn ected light of Atman."
. adict ory to
with e senses; so when [the J IOS. Here [the pupil ] objec ted, sayin g, "It is contr
.
sus ad ;n,f; .t . .' . y use an axe and the
hke, no reares ~ • !:f•nz um occu rs." say that Appr ehens ion is the resul t of the mean
s of know ledge and
I 05. [1 he teach er said, ] "B t · h. _ eless and etern al
tub t at case [Atma n], whic h is by that It is by natur e the trans cend ental ly chang
natur e not comp osite can. In
t wl I
. ' no e an agen
. 1en t make s no use light of Atman."
of mtru ment s; [It] woul d have .
To this [the teach er] said, "It is not contr adict ory."
. to use an mstru ment [to be an
agent ]. [But] the use [of
.
becom mg an agen t wl. h an Instru ment ] woul d b e a cl iange ; so in "How then [is it not contr adict ory]" ?
[chan J [I. t J shoul d use chang eless and
. nc causes that . . ge ' "Alth ough [App rehen sion] is trans cend ental ly
anoth er mstru ment ' [a nd] JU · . n [form ing process] due
usmg this mstru
: . .
m t [.I ] shoul d also
en , t etern al, [It] appea rs at the end of the notio
use anoth er one. Thus if t1 le k· nowe ' ledge J since [the
. ,1: . . . r 1s mdep d
. en ent, a regressus ad to sense -perc eptio n and other [mea ns of know
znpnztum is inevi table . n due to sense-
notio n-for ming process] aims at It. If the notio
45
. non-e terna l, [ Ap-
And no actio n causes Atma n to act sin ce [the. act101.1] whic h lias perce ption and other [mea ns of know ledge ] is
not been perfo rmed d oes . h . '. if it were non-e terna l.
not ave Its own t I prehe nsion , thoug h etern al,] appea rs as
' A-t ] na '.:1re. · f [you objec t,]
Some thing other [than · man appro aches At Ther efore , [App rehen sion] is figur ative ly called
the resul t of the
, ' . man and causes It
to perfo rm an actio n' ' [I rep 1Y.,] 'N o · beca · · · · mean s of know ledge ."
·
anyth mg other [than A-tman] to b e self
i
' use It is impo ssible for Appr ehen sion is
.
t bl" h
-es a is ed, a non-o-bject ' 109. [The pupil said,] "If so, Your Holin ess,
and so forth . it is not expe nenc , d of the natur e of the
_ . ' ed that an th ·
y rng else. but Atman, trans cend ental ly chang eless , eternal., indee
berng non-c onsci ous ' is self- ev1"d,ent S ' ound 1 a ot11er [obje cts]
ar d 11 light of Atman, aud self-e stabli shed, siuce It does
not depe nd upon
are estab lished when th ey are k nown · ; every thing other
by a t' h'
no ion w ich ends with any mean s of know ledge with regar d to Itself
the resul t of appre hensi on. 42 er's sake, since it
than This is non-c onsci ous and exists for anoth
If appre hensi on were to belon .
_g to a_nythmg else but Atma n ' It acts toget her [with other s].
woul d also be Atman not ed as notio n
. ' comp osite exist' f I ts own sake and And becau se of this natur e of being appre hend
not for anoth er 43 A n d we cann ot ·' p· · · hmg dor ' Atman] exists for
· ... r a_ pre en that the body , the causi ng pleas ure, pain, and delus ion, [non-
senses, and their obiec t s exist . . ... very natur e non-A tman exists
J ior their own sak since Jt is exper i-
. . e, anoth er's sake; on acco unt of this
enced that they depe nd f.or t h cir estab lishm ent upon th e not10 . and not on acco unt of any other natur e. It
46 is there fore mere ly
. h . · ns
w h Ic resul t m appre hens· .ion.
"44 .
non-e xisten t from the stand point of the highe st
truth . Just as it is
IO
6 · [The pupil objec ted J "In a .
exper ience d in this world that a snake [supe rimpo
sed] upon a rope
depe nds upon any oth er .. ' . ppreh endm g the body nobo dy unless they are
. and the like,
not10ns due to sense -perc ept10
J ,, n and does not exist, nor wate r in a mirag e,
ot1ier [mea ns of kn owl e d ge. duali ty in the
appre hend ed [as a notio n], so it is reaso nable that
 248 A THOUSA ND TEACHI NGS
[II, 2, 110-11 l PROSE PART 249
II, 2]
~:~n~ ~n~ drca~ing states. also does not exist unless it is appre- other (smrtirfi pal) paratra purvadrr /iivabhiisab). Then he gives his
only definitio n of nesci-
ence: "The learned men regard this superimp osition thus defined
sion e. as a ~ot10n]: I_n this ?1anne r, your Holiness, Appre hen- Introduc tion, p. 19). In other words, nescienc e is superimp osition,
as aviqyii." (BSBh,
i.e., mutual super-
' z.e., the hght of Atman, is uninte rrupte d; so It is transce n- impositio n of Atman and non-Atm an such as the body, the senses,
and the internal organ.
fidental ly change
f less, .eterna l and non-du al ' since It i's n ever a b sent See Introduc tion, IV,D,1, pp. 76-79.
rom any o the. vanous notions . But variou s notion s are absent gAha'!'praryaya. Sec Introduc tion, III,B,3, pp. 38-40.
10' 'The Nihilists " ( Vaina.iika) indicates the Buddhis ts, especiall y ,
from the Sunyava dins (or
d'ffi Appreh f ens10n . Just as in the dream ing state th e no10n t'
s m. Madl1ya mikas) who hold the view that everythi ng is empty
(Sunya) and who have
t~a;~nt r orms .such as b~ue and yellow , which are absent Nagarju na (150-250 ) as their founder.
from llSii'!'khy akarikii 17 proves the existence of Puruea (Spirit) from
PP ehens10n, are said to be non-ex istent from th t d . several reasons, one of
which is that the composi te things exist for another' s sake (sa1f!ghii
of the
su h highes t truth, so in the waking state also the tapariirthatva). The
:s
bl d , variouan P?lllt
s notions Unmanif ost (avyakta) , the great (mahat), "l"-cons ciousnes s (ahal[lkiir
a), and so forth are
. c as ue an yellow, which are absent from this very Appreh en- all consider ed to be composi te of pleasure , pain, and delusion and
they are compare d to
sd1~, musft by na.ture be untrue . And there is no the bedstead , the chair, and other things ( cf. Vacaspa timisra on
Sii.1f!khyakii.rikii 17). And
appreh ender the "anothe r" (para) for which they exist is the non-com posite
Iueren
I t rom . this Appre h ens10n
: to appreh end It; therefo re It Atman. Cf. P. Hacker,
"Sankar a der Yogin und Sankara der Advaitin ," WZKSO ,
vols. XII-XII I (1968/
~tn t~elf nel1~her be accept ed nor rejecte d by Its own
nature since 1969), pp.142- 143.
1ere 1s not nng else." ' 12See section 56.
110. [The
the cause of tteache r. said,] "Exact .
ly so it is It . .
. is nesc1ence t hat is.
13Section 55.
14'fhe simile "a picture on a wall" is not intelligib le, but may
h . mean that in a dark
ransm1 gratory existen ce which is charac terized
~n: wakmg and dream ing states. The remov er of this nescience is
b place like a cave.
15This question , which is discusse d in sections 62-85, is a variation
of the question ,
wl~dge. And so you have reache d fearlessness.47 From "Whose is avidyii?" or' 'What is the locus ( a.lraya) of avidyii ?" Here
Sankara doc,s not
now o give any definite answer to it (see note 16). See Introduc tion,
you
You willa not perceiv
" e any pam · t h e wa k'rng and dream ing states.11
· m IV ,D,2, pp. 79-83.
16This answer is very characte ristic of Sankara 's attitude toward
the problem of the
en cc. ,,:se rele ..scd from the sufferings of transm igrator y exist- locus of aviqyii. See Introduc tion, IV,D,2, pp. 79-80.
17See Upad II,1,33-3 8.
111. [The pupil said,] "Orn." 1BSee Upad 1,7,l and note I; 18,155-1 57; Introduc tion, III,B,2,
p. 36.
l'!iA similar discussio n takes plac,e in BSBh U,1,4, p. 356.
2 0in reply to the same question Sankara gives elsewher e the following
answer: "This
analogy does not hold good because in the case of servant and master
also only the non-
Notes comciou s part of the former is subservi ent to the consciou s part
of the latter, for a con-
scious being subserve s another conscious being only with the
non-cons cious part be-
lBrahmac iirin. See notes 6 and 24 of Upad II I longing to it, such as the intellect , etc., but a conscious being itself
acts neither for nor
2 See note 8 of U pad II, l. against any other consciou s being" (BSBh II, 1,4, p. 356).
' .
3 A similar simile is used in GKBh
I
tii. tathii duhkhiitmakas'lliitmano duai't •~r ~ r_o .:c~10n, p. 6 (rogartasy
t d . _ 2 1Cf. Section 71.
eua roganiurttau svastha- 22 In the Siirµkhya system both Puru{a and Prakrti are eternal, without
4 · . " a,, a,,anco,,asame svasthatii ) either be·
Up:~~ ;p~~t;~~;, discussio n of auidya., see Introduc tion, IV,D, pp. 76-84; Mayeda
ginning or end. Eut the eternity of the Purufa is different from
former is describe d as "kufasthanirya" (eternal without change)
that of the Prakrti; the
and the latter as
5Comment .mg on BhG IV,34 "parii;ziiminitya" (eternal with change). Cf. Vijiianabhik~u on Sutra
te~
which ex lains how t 1,75; R. Garbe, Die
~tam knowled ge, ~fitµkhya-Philosophie (Leipzig : Verlag von H. Haessel, 1894), p. 289. Accordin g to
gives example s of question s to be put to · '
h . "H o Sankara
How does release come about? Wh t . c crs. ow oes bondage come about? Sankara 's non-dua lism eternity with change is not acceptab le, since
dha~1 kathal[l mokfa~ kii vidyii kii ;iividy:ti 1~ k2n3~~l~ge ?. W~at '.s nescienc e?" (kathaf[l ban- to change is non-eter nal; everythi ng, with the only exceptio n of
everythi ng subject
his pupil are going to discuss the sam~ t. . . I e_re m t : Upad is changele ss (kfi /astha), is non-eter nal. The word kil/astha is used
Brahman -Atman, which
as well the teacher and
primary importan ce in Sankara 's doctr::. cs. t is certam that
these four topics are of pari~arnin (Upad II,2,75) and vikriyilvat (Upad II,2,74). See note 3 as an antonym of
ofUpad 1,13 and
6 Auiqyami ina. This is a kind of
isting). the discussio n starting in section 74, below.
p 0 pu1ar etymolo gy: avufyii
, from avidyamiina (not ex:-
23Section 45.
7See Introduc tion, IV,D,2, pp. 79_8 3 . 24Introd uction, l!I,B,2, pp. 35-37.
Bfo BSBh, Introduc tion,
appearan ce, in the form ofpp. 10-13, Sankara d 25Rarna tirtha interpret s "a thing" (vastu) as the internal organ
(anta~kara~a).
f efine~ superunp os1t1on (adhyiisa) as the
reme b . . .
m ranee, o one thmg previous ly perceive d, in an- 26See Upad I,18,156 -157.
 250
A THOU SAND TEAC HING S
[II, 2
27Am ong India n gram maria n
Verba~ root (dhatvartha). Cf. R s'th~re are variouProble s opinio ns about the ..
j}fean ing in·L~~amn~ of the
_(Delhi: Motil al Banar sidass
mg of the verba l root is h .. '
19G3C . l andey a, The m of
), pp. 117-1 23. As in lvlahiibhas III
). cc .LyaR
t '
tanPhzlosop!ry
,84, the mean -
Grammatical du Sansk r't ere c]once1ved
to be "actio n" (kri,,a
'" · enou T, · CHA PTE R 3
',pp. 68-16 9 I h e Nyay a and "the Vaise sika "u' ermz_~~logie
PAR JSA MK HYA NA ME DIT AT ION
"·- • n t
Jniina ," which are consi dered t s'· rpalahdhi and
synon yms of"bud d'hz'" d" o be (the natur e of) Atman bY an:k ara ar t
" an. prat"a "( see
"
ovyaya siitra I J l.5· V. . , .,_ ' e reated as
JVyayakofa, pp. 6Qq.._ 608 "rya aisefzrwpaskara VIII ' l ' l.,
' ' '
28p • ).
or a detail ed d'1scuss10n,· uct'
see Introd
29J . i~n, IlI,B,.3, pp. 38-40 .
. n the Nyay a and the Vaises ik-
ce1ver.. The Siirpk11ya and the y~ a pe~cep '.1on is a qualit y (gu~a) of Atman .
. '':e., per-
(budd!n or citta). The Budd hi ga regard It as a modif icatio n (vrtti)
the Mlma rnsa system s . of the mteHe ct
ty. Cf. S Ch . • st and
activi
aosee sectio~ 77 atterJ ee, The J\'.jiaya Theory
ef Knowl~d comm 9only descri be it as an
· ge, pp. -20.
31 See sectio n 75.
32 See sectio ns 43_50
•
33 '!
c;r. BhG II,22; Upad II , 1' J 2. desc ribed for seek ers
112. This parismri-khyana mcd itati on is
1
NCf· sectio .
ns 56. 74. t c. selve s to destr oyin g their
3'C,
0
'
f. sectio ns 89; 93.
'e
after final relea se, who are devo ting them
wish to accu mula te new
36 Sectio n 90.
acqu ired meri t and dem erit and do not
ion and aver sion ); they
ones . N escience caus es fault s ( = pass
37 Prama · here transl ated ~
h' h lS •
. .
'' •

, . a, empin cal know ledge ' " gene1..all y indica tes the
r
. ' \V lC
. l
valid know ledge which . body ; and from these
resu ts from 'the mean s of k caus e the activ ities of spee ch, mind , and
prarniii:za for its :~:~1~s~em(pra~niii:za). T~~
wants to s pupil
eterna l. ay here that pramii requir es h [in turn ] the resul ts
ent, SO prama IS non- activ ities .are accu mula ted karmans of whic
.
For the sake of final relea se
arc desir able, unde sirab le, and mixe d.
38Cj' 2
. sectio ns 93-98 .
39See note 27. med itati on is desc ribed ].
s p. 1944; Nais III 19
from those karmans [this parisarri.kh]ctna
4DCf Unter r, taste , and odor are
41 Se BS II
. ' .e '
' .
,3,40 and Sanka ra's
' · 113. Now , soun d, touc h, forrn -and -colo
. comm entary on it. perc eive d by the ear and
the obje cts of the sens es; they are to be
42Acc ording to Ra -
•13f - , matir tha tl11s is a reii . . . of the Mimii ljisak as.
. .. _utah o" have any know ledg e of
Zama tirtha sugge sts that th. is
44Ra matir.. h a sugge sts that th.is . a 1efuta. . o t e
.
tion f h N''aiyay ikas. othe r [senses]. Ther efor e, they do not
t mere ly thing s evol ved 3
45Cf. sectio n 77. is is a refota t10n of the Lokay atika.
s. them selve s nor of othe rs, since they are
clay and the like. And
[from the unev olve d nam e-an d-fo rm J like
46R- - . .
amat1 rtha sugge sts h of the Samk hy
refuta tion
47Cf. Brh. Up. IV 2 4 t at tlns is a a. othe r [senses].
they are perc eive d thro ugh the ear and
',. .
u
This is the conclu sion of the. d'ISCUSS.!on which . is of a diffe rent natu re
.
. s t<1rted m sectio ns 48 and 49. And that by whic h they are perc eive d
are conn ecte d with one
since it is a perc eive r. Beca use they
senses] are possessed of
anot her, soun d and othe r [obje cts of the
ge of state , deca y, and
man y attri bute s such as birth , grow th, chan
n; appe aran ce and disa p-
dest ruct ion 4 ; conn ectio n and sepa ratio
chan ge; field ( = fema le?)
pear an.ce ; effec t of chan ge and caus e of
mon ly poss essed of man y
.and seed ( = male ?). They are also com
pain . The ir perc eive r is
[othe r J attri bute s such as plea sure and
bute s of soun d and the
diffe rent in its natu re from all the attri
use it is their perc eive r.
othe r [obje cts of the sense s], prec isely beca
by soun d and the othe r
114. So the wise man who is torm ente d
perc eive d shou ld perf orm
[obje cts of the senses] whic h are bein g
parisarµkhyana med itati on as follo ws:
251
 252 A THOUSA ND TEACHI NGS
[III, 3, ll5 III, 3, l 16] PROSE PART 253

l !5. I ( = Atman) am of the nature of Seeing , non-ob ject ( = 116. Moreo ver, whatev er sound and the other extern al [object
s
subject ) ,uncon nected [with anythi ng], change less, motion of the senses] may be, they are change d into the form of the body,
less,
endless , fearless, and absolu tely subtle. So sound cannot make and into the form of the ear and the other [senses ] which perceiv
me e
its object and ~ouch me, whethe r as mere noise in genera l them, and into the form of the two interna l organs 5 and
or as their
[sound ] of particu lar qualiti es-ple asant [sound s] such as the objects [such as pleasu re and pain], 6 since they are mutua lly
first con-
note of music or the desirab le words of praise and the like or nected and compo site in all cases of actions . This being the
the case,
~ndesi~able words of untrut h, disgust , humili ation, abuse, ~nd the to me, a man of knowle dge, nobod y is foe, friend or neutra l.
hk:--s mce I am unconn ected [with sound] . For this very reason In this contex t, if [anybo dy,] throug h a miscon ception [about
neithe r loss nor gain is caused [in me] by sound. Theref ore, Atman] due to false knowle dge, 7 were to wish to connec t [me)
what
can the pleasa nt sound of praise, the unplea sant sound of blame with [anyth ing], pleasa nt or unplea sant, which is charact~rist_ic
and so on do to me? Indeed a pleasa nt sound may produc e of the result of action, he wishes in vain to connec t [me] with
gain'. 1t,
an~ an unplea sant one destruc tion, for a man lacking since I am not its object accord ing to the Smrti passag e:
in discrim i-
natm~ knowle dge, who regard s sound as [conne cted with «Unma nifest he, unthin kable he, (uncha ngeabl e he is declar
his] At- ed
man smce he has no discrim inating knowle dge. But for me who to be]" (BhG II,25).
am endow ed with discrim inating knowle dge, [sound ] cannot Likewi se, I am not to be change d by [any of] the five elemen
ts,
produc e even a hair's breadt h [of gain or loss]. since I am not their object accord ing to the Smrti passag e:
In the very same manne r [touch ] does not produc e for me any "Not to be cut is he, not to be burnt is he, [not to be wet nor yet
change of gam and loss, whethe r as touch in genera l or as touch dried] " (BhG ll,24).
in .
particu lar forms -the unplea sant [touch ] of cold, heat, softnes Furthe rmore, paying attenti on only to the aggreg ate of the body
s,
hardne ss, etc., and of fever, stomac hache, etc., and any pleasa and the senses, [peopl e, both] devote d and advers e to me,
nt have
[touch ] either inhere nt in the body or caused bv extern al and the desire to connec t [me] with things, pleasa nt, unplea sant,
ad- etc.,
v~ntitious [objec ts]-sin ce I am devoid of tou;:h, just as a blow and therefr om results the acquis ition of merit, demeri t, and
the
WI tl~ the .fist ~nd the like [does not produc e like. It belong s only to them and does no; occur in me who _am
any change ) in the sky. free
L1kew1se ~form-and-color] produc es neithe r loss nor gain for me, from old age, death, and fear, since the Srutis and the Sm~tzs say:
wheth er as form-a nd-col or in genera l or as form-a nd-col or in "Neith er what has been done nor what has been left undon
par- e
ticular , pleasa nt or unplea sant, such as the female charac teristic affects It" (Brh. Up. IV,4,2 2);
s
of a woman and the like, since I am devoid ofform -and-c olor. "[This is the corrsta ut greatne ss of the knowe r of Brahman];
he
Simila rly, [t~ste] produc es neither loss nor gain for me who am does rrot increas e nor becom e less by action " (Brh. Up. IV,4,2 3);
by n~ture devoid of taste, whethe r as taste in genera l or as taste "[This is] withou t and within , unborn " (Mm;ic;I. ..Up. II'.1,2);
in
particu lar fo~ms [, pleasa nt or unplea sant,] such as sweetn "(So the one inner Atman of all beings] is not afthcte d with the
ess,
sourn:s s, saltmes s, pungen cy, bittern ess, astring ency which sufferi ng of the world, being outside of it" (Kath. Up. V,11);
are
perceiv ed by the dull-w itted. etc.
In like manne r [ odor] produc es neither loss nor gain for me who That is becaus e anythi ng other than Atman does not exist,-- -this
is
~m by ~1ature devoid ofodor , whethe r as odor in genera the highes t reason .
l or as odor
m particu lar forms: pleasa nt or unplea sant, such as [the odor] As <luality does not exist, all the senten ces of the UjH1.ni~,ads con-
of
flo~ers, etc., ~nd .mntmc nt, etc. That is becaus e the Sruti says: cernin g non-d uality of Atman should be fully contem plated ,
That which is soundl ess, touchle ss, formless, imperi shable should be contem plated. 8
,
also ~asteless'. consta nt, odorles s, . . . [-hav ing perceiv ed that,
one is freed from the jaws of death] " (Kath. Up. III, 15 ).
 ,_
254 A THOUS AND TEACH INGS [III,3
Notes

I I . , . .
!As far as I have investi gated this is the
samkhyiina medita tion P H k 1. on y p ace where Sankar a describ es the Pari-
tun " IND EX TO INT ROD UCT ION
f ud in f . : : ac er trans ates it as "Rekap ituliere nde Betrach
.. g g ron: Its d:scnpt 10n here given, it seems to be a kind ofmedi tatio wh. h g.
arrived at throu h n ' IC ~on­
s1sts m reca~itulatmg the conclus ion which has been . . , g one s previou s
study and discuss ion with a tea ch er. I t is. . ri is attach ed to San-
mteres tmg to note th S · k .
Note: An index of Sanskr it words in the Upade!iasahas
prasarµkhyiina medita tion (or prasamcaksii see Up~d I ' '
18 9 ff . dat an ara rejects the ction and Indices by Senga ku
d h . · · " · an note 13 ofUpa
h
d I I 8)
.' Jwra' s Upadef asahas ri, Critically Edited with Introdu
but recom 29 24) B
men s t e parzsarrzkfzyana medita tion (·cf. PBh I ' 5 ' • P· · ut t e d1ffer- Mayed a (Tokyo : Hokus eido Press, 1973).
ence betwee n them is not clear.
2See Upad I,1,3-5 .
asee Upad II,l,18 -20.
4 Accord ing to Nirukta I 2 th · d. . ):
(1) birth( ·a ate' .. ' ' ere.are six mo ificat1~ns of becomi ng (faifbhavavikara aharrzpratyayavi:i·aya (object of ahaT{l-
(2) ,'.x1sten ce (asti), (3) alterat1 0n (vzparir wmate), (4) growth ii-ardhat ) iibhasa (false appear ance), 37-39,
(5) d J(Y k!: \ e,, pratyaya), 40, 57
' , e~ay apa ftyate ), and (6) destruc tion (vinafya '
ti'i. 63n-64 n; (reflec tion), 37-39, 75
5Sankar a · t l Samkh ya system sa . h . d abhava (disap pearan ce), 37 ahiT{lsii (injury ), 88, 92
. pom s out a se f-contr adictio n in the · ' ymg l at lt e-
scribes the interna l organ as th .
place !BSBh II abheda (identi ty), 34 Aitareya, 6
b . rce 111 one place and as one in anothe r
2 10 42")
n clear with regard to th' . b er' abltihit anvaya theory , 50-51 aja (unbor n), 45
'd' P· ::> , ut he himsel f does not make his positio e nurn
an concep t of the m · t . l organ. S ee Introdu ction I II B I p 30--3 I abhinnavrtta (leadin g a blamel ess life), ajar/.a, 67n
_ erna
6 Rarnat1 rth · t h · · ' ' ' ' P· • ·
and pain. Cf. Upad I,15,13 ; 18,201; 93 ajahallakfa1Ja (ajahatsvartha lakfa1J.ii), 53
II,l,34- -35. a 111 erprets t e1robJ ectsasp leasure ajiiana (ignor ance), 45, 64n, 72, 74,
, ifcaryavijayacampil. See Param dvara
7 False knowle dge lmit~ · ·-- ) · . a's action (karman), 40, 57, 69, 71-72, 78, 79,81, 84,86
usage s M .d u' ryaJnana lS a synony m for nescicn ce (avitfya) in Sankar akiima (free from desire) , 45
'. ee aye a pad, PP· 24--25; Introdu ction IV D I p ·73
. .Up. and Svet U
' ''Kena 84-88, 91-92, 94; result of, 85
8A u . ' Up., akriya (action less ), 39
s m 'jJanifads such as Chand . Up., Ait. Up., Kaui. adhii7a, 83-84
See l\1ayed a Vpad, p. 66'. p., adha7ma (deme rit), 71 akrodha (non-a nger), 92
the Prose Part ends with a repetiti on of the last word.
adhifthana, 83-84 Arnala nanda, 26
adhyasa (super imposi tion), 24, 77- amanitva (mode sty), 92
78, 80, 83-84 a1JlSa (portio n), 12, 15n
Adhyatmapatala, 6, 97 anadi (bcgin ningles s), 83
adhyavasaya, 3I iinanda (bliss), 20, 27, 58n, 60n, 67n
Advai ta Vedan ta School , 7, 14, 19, Anand agiri (autho r of Sailkaravijaya),
25, 31, 33, 37, 43, 46, 62n, 63n, 7n
81, 82, 89, 93; illusion istic, 14 Anand anubh ava, l 7n
advaitaviida (non-d ualism ), 14, l 7n, Anant anand agiri (autho r of Guruvi-
49; of Sanka ra, 16n jaya), 7n
Advait ins, 4, 5, Bn, l 6n, 17n, 35, ananyadrs, 44
38, 40, 50, 51, 54-, 55, 64n, 78, 89 anatifoizkyatva (not to be doubte d), 47
advaya (non-d ual), 45 anekavrttika (havin g variou s modifi ca-
Agamasiistra, Sn tions of manas), 30
Agniifo ma, 87 anrta (falseh ood), 93
aham. See "I"-co nsciou sness antabkaral}a (intern al organ) , 28, 30-
«aham brahmasmi" ("I am Brahman"), 3 l, 35-43, 57, 74, 77
50, 57, 58 antabkara1Jadvaya (twofo ld antaMaraTJa),
ahaT[!dhi. See "!"-co nsciou sness 30
ahamk ara. See "I "-cons ciousn ess antabkara(lavr tti (modif ication of the
ahaT[!karadisarrt tiina (indiv idual con- antabkara1Ja), 4 I
tinuity of the "I"-no tion), 75 antabkaral}opahitam caitanyam (con-
aharrrkart ! (beare r of ahal/1-kiira), 40, sciousness having the antabkaralJa
57-58, 75, 78 as its limitin g adjunc t), 34
aha'f{fkriya. See "I"-co nsciou sness antarapratyakfa (intern al percep tion),
ahat'{lpratyaya. See ''I'' -consciousness 34

255
 INDEX 257
256 INDEX
Buddhism, 4--7, 11, 13, 16n, 28-29,
antinomianism, 92, 97 avakyiirtha (non-sentence-me aning), Bhartrprapanca, 75, 90
Bhaskara, [3-14, J6n, 49, 89-~90 38, 46, 48-49, 72, 75, 90, 97;
anugraha (kindness), 93 67n
Bhatta School, Sn, 50-51, 95n crypto-(pracchanna/Jaudda), 6, 16n
anumiina (inference), 46, 48, 52 iivararJa.iakti (obscuring faculty), 83
Bhat~acharya, Dinesh Chandra, 9n buddhyarudha (One which is seated in
anumiti (inference), 46 avasthiintara, 73
anupadhika (without limiting adjuncts), avibhiiga (non-division), 74 :Bhattacharya, V., l 5n the buddhi), 36, 43, 63n
45 avidya. See nescience bhavapradhana, 64n
bhavarupa (positive entity), 83 cai tarrya. See Pure Consciousne~s
anupalabdhi (non-cognition), 46 avidyadhyaropi ta( superimposed through
anuvyavasaya, 64n hhaya (fear), 40 caitanyapratibimba (reflection of Atman-
avid_ya), 2 5
anvaya method, 53, 56, 57 bheda (difference), 13, 35, 55, 67n; consciousness), 37
aviqyadhyasa (superimposition due to
anvayavyatireko method, 51-54, 56, 58, (mutual exclusion bywordmean- Cammann, K., 9n
aviqya), 24
66n--68n ings), 55 Candrakirti, 75
avidyadhyasta (superimposed through
anvitabhidhana theory, 50 bkedabheda ( difference-and-no n-dif- Cardona, G., 68n
avid_yii), 25
an;yonyadhyasa (mutual super impo- aviqyakalpita (falsely imagined through ference), 13-14, 15n-16n, 23, 44 Carvaka (Materialists), 46
bhoktr (agent), 57 ea turtha (fourth state of Atman), 43
sition), 81--83 aviqya), 24
bhokt l tva (e:xperiencership), 71 cetana (~odification of the antal;-
apahatapapman (free from evils), 45 aviqyakrta (made ofaviqya), 24
apana (inspiration), 29 aviqyarniitra (nothing but nescience), bhranti (confused idea), 74 kar~TJa), 41
Biardeau, M., 9n, 96 Chandogya Upanifad, 6, Sn, 20, 26-27,
aparigraha (abstinence from posses- 72
sions), 88 aviqyaprabhava (outcome of avidya), bodha (consciousness), 37 50
A pastamba-Dharmasutra, 6, 97 Boetzelear, J. M. van, 9n Chandrasekharan , T., !On
24
apaurufeya, 65n Buitenen, J. A. B. van, 68n chaya (reflection), 37
aviqyopasthapita (falsely constructed
apratyagatman, 53 bondage, 74, 77 Christianity, 92
by avic{yii), 24 cidabhasa (reflection of consciousness),
aptavacana (statement by an au- aviveka (absence of discriminating brahmacarin, 97n
thority), 46 knowledge), 72, 74 brahmacarya (abstinence from incon- 37
tinence), 88 Cidvilasa (author of Saiikariibhyudaya),
apoha, 53 avyakr:ta (unmanifest), 45
iirambhavada (theory of atomic agglo- avyakr te namarupe (U nevolved Name- brahmajijnasa (inquiry into Brahman), 7n
cinnibh~ (consciousness-like), 38-39
meration), 19-20 and-Form), 20-22, 25-26, 29, 12
artha (material gain), 73 78 Brahman (the absolute), 11-14, cit (Pure Consciousness), 19-20, 38
arthapatti (postulation), 46 15n, 18-23, 25-27, 39, 43, Citsukhacarya (author of Brhat-
Aryadeva, 48-49 45--47, 50, 52, 55, 5 7-58, 59n, fankaravij!{ya), 7n
Badarayal).a, 12, 14n, 15n, 58n
asatkaryaviida theory, 19-20 Badarinatha, 6 64n, 67n, 73-76, 78-79, 81, citta (alternate name for A trnan),
ascetics (sat[!nyasin), 4, 5, 97 83, 85-92; consciousness of, 37; 17n, 30-31, 36
hahirmukha (directed toward external
asmatpratyayavifaya (object of aha1[1- objects), 35 knowledge of as means to final ci ttavr tti, 35
release, 4, 11, 14, 88 codanatantra (depending upon Vedic
pratyaya), 40, 57 bahifprajfia (conscious of external
asrama (stage of life), 91 Brahmanandin, 90 injunction), 47
objects), 44
Brahmanical tradition, 6 composite of the body, 79-80
asraya (substratum), 39-40; as locus bahyapratyakfa (external perception),
of avidya, 79, 81, 83 Brahmasiddhi, 17n, 59n, 81, 89 consciousness, 34, 43
34-35, 42
asteya (abstinence from theft), 88 bauddha, 35 BrrzhmasiUra, 5-6, 8n, 12-14, 18-22, cosmological proof of the identity,
Atmabodha, 7n 26, 28-29, 33, 44, 46, 48-49, 18--21
Belvalkar, S. K., 15n cosmological theories, 18-20, 22-26
atmakrti (self-creation), 19 hhagalakfaT)a, 67n 74-75, 90
Atman, (individual self), 11-14, 16n, bhagatyagalakfaTJii, 67n 13rahmasutrabhafya, 6, 9n, 14n, 20, crypto-Buddhist (pracchannabauddha),
18-25, 27-31, 33-34, 36-48, Bhagavadgita, 12-13, 31, 41, 75, 79, 24, 26-28, 30-32, 77, 80 6, 16n
l3rahmins, 5, 97 cycle of transmigratory existence, 72,
50, 52-53, 55--58, 67n, 72-88, 88, 96
90--92; identity with Brahman, Bhagavat; Bhagavatpiida; Bhagavat- .BrhadararJyak:a Upanifrzd, 5, 6, 33, 84
18-58; with limiting adjuncts pujyapada (alternate appella- 40-41
(sopadhi) 45; without limiting 13rhatfonkaravijaya. See Citsukhacarya dama (self-control), 93
tions for Sankara), 9n
adjuncts (anupadhika) 45 Brown, W. Norman, lOn dambha (deceit), 93
bhakti movement, 5
Aw;lulomi, 15n buddhi. See intellect; perception darpa (pride), 93
bhaktiyoga (loving faith), 88
avabodha (perception), 39 Bharnati, 14n, 63n, B1-82 buddhindriya (senses), 28-29, 31, 35, 44 Dasgupta, S., 9n, 43, 97
avadhiirar]a (ascertainment), 51 buddhiparikalpita, 63n Datta, D. M., 32
Bhamati School, 5, 32, 82
 258 INDEX INDEX 259

daya (compa ssion), 93 fogalls , D. H. H., 3, !On kart rtva (doershi p)' 71
Gautf,apadzyakarika, 4, 6, 8n, 13 _ 14,
dehtibhimanin (thinki ng of "aham" as 16n, 44,66n intellec t (buddhi), 20, 30-31, 35-43, kart rtvabhoktr tvalak{a7Ja (charac terized
the body), 57 57, 74, 77 by agency and experie ncershi p),
ghanaprajna (mass of mere con-
dehavifo1a1Ja (emaci ation of the body) interna l percep tion (manasa- or 70
' ciousness), 45
88 Grtabha1ya, 89 iintara-pratyak1a), 34, 40 Ka5akr tsna, 15n
demeri t (adharma), 71, 88
Gotam a Buddh a, 80 i .!ii Upanifad, 6 Ka(ha Upani1ad, 6, 31
desire: iccha, 40; kama, 40, 73, 78 , 85 Govard hanam atha 6 Livara (Lord), 19 Kasi, 4
Deusse n, P., 7n, 30, 93 Govind a, 4, 8n · ' i.Svaraprar;idhiina (the lord), 92 Kedarn atha, 7
Deutsc h, Eliot, 89, g3 Kena Upani1ad, 6, 9n, 30
Govind anatha (author of Sankara- c affectio n), 78
Devada tta. 39 54 caryacarita), 7n jagadbijabhuta (seed of the world), klda (psychi
Devara ja, N. K., 35
grnhaka (percei ver), 36 20, 22 knowle dge, 38, 43, 86-88, 90, 92;
Devatakanda 8n jnana, 19, 46-47, 97n; vidya, 77;
grahya (percep tible objects ), 36 Jagrat (wakin g state), 43-45, 70, 72
dh-, 31, 4'o' ' j agratsvapnalak1ava (charac terized by act theory of 40; arising from the
Gramm arians, 55-56, 68n 34, 4·1-43;
dharma (merit) , 12, 15 n- 16n, 41 , 71, waking and dreami ng states), 70 senses (indriya janya),
.
" grea t sentenc e " (mahavakya ), 50, 56 the senses (in-
73 jahadajahallak1a7J.ii metaph or, 53-54, not arising from
guru, 54--55
Dharm araja, 26 56-57, 67n driyajan ya), 34, 42-43
Gururatnamiilii. See Sadasiv abrahrn en-
Dharm arajadh varindr a ' 31 -.32 ' 34, dra jahallak1a1Ja metaph or, 53 krtsnantaMaraTJ-ek$alJ.a (witness of all
36 , 41-43, 46, 48 the antabkaral}as), 30
Gurvamfakavya. See Vidvad bal akakasr - jahatsvartha lak{a7Jii metaph or, 53
Dharmasastra, 91, 97 kriyii (action ), 71
1ak~rna~1a Sastri Jaimin i, 15n, 90
dhatu (action of perceiv ing) 38 Jainism , 5, 11, 33 k1etra (the object of knowle dge), 41
' Guruva yur Templ e, 8n
dhrti, 58n jiiniimi ("I know") , 39-40, 57 kuhaka (tricker y), 93
Guruvzjaya. See Ananta nandag iri
differen ce: bheda J3 35 55, 6 7n; }iiniili ("He knows" ), 39-40, 57 Kurnar ila, 4, 55, 89-90, 96
. nana, 13;vai s:iya,'1 3' janmamaravalakfaTJ-a (charac teristic of kiltasth.a (transc endenta lly change -
Hacker , P., 7n-10n , 20, 25, 67n-68 n less), 36, 76
D1gnag a, 63n Hastam alaka, 5 birth and death), 70
do1a (faults) , 71-72 jati (generi c attribut es), 40, 57 kil/astha nitya (absolu tely change less
HastamalakaSloka!;z, 5
dreami ng state (svapna) ' 43 - 45 70 hetu, 56 Ja-yant a, 40 and constan t), 45
72 •' ,
Hindui sm, 4-5, 13, 16n 97 ,}iva (locus of auidya) , 81
dr.fi (=Atm an), 40 .Jivasaksin (consciousness having the Laghuvakyavrtti, I On
Hiriyan na, M., 8n-9n, 'I Sn, 96-97
efrfti Atman), 37 .antabk,ara!Ja as its limitin g ad- lakfalJ.ii (metap hor), 53--54
dualism , 12, 14, 22, 48, 82 86 . junct), 34 lakfa7Jikavrtti (transfe r), 54
"I" -consciousness : aham 40 50 ;
nonthe istic, 7 ' '
20
40 jna, 38-39, 75 lakualakfa'(Lasarribandha, 66n-67 n
aha1!ldhi, 40; ahamk;ra
duMhin; du~khitva (suffer erofpai n\ 53 57, 93; ahaT/lkriJ,a, 40; ~ham~ jf'iii.na (knowl edge), 19, 46-47 lfla (sport), 59n
gva~tadvaitavada of Nimba rka, 6n
1
i pratyaya, 40, 57 · jftanakaTmasamuccayav iida, 86-88, 90-92 limiting adjunc t: antaf:ikara7Jopahita11:1
va1tava da of Madhv a, 16n jftanapatha (path of knowle dge), 86 caitanyam, 34; vijiiana, 30-31;
"l"-not ion, 75, 76, 78. See also "I"-
Dvarak a, 6 jfteya (object of percep tion), 41 upadhi, 28, 44
consciousness
dve1a (aversio n), 40 iccha (desire) , 40 Jyotirrn at:ha, 6 linga (subtle body), 28-29
Lokayata (materi alism), 11, 87
~dentity judgme nt, 52, 54
Eckhar t, Meister , J4n, 93 Kala<;li, 4, Bn Lord (isvara), 19
ignoran ce (ajfiana) 45 64n 72, 74,
elemen ts, five gross, 21, 26-29 79,81 ,84,8 6,' ' kama (desire) , 40, 73, 78, 85
ether, 21-22, 27 illusion ism, 24 Kane, P. V ., 9n Madha va sect, 16n
karmamarga, 89 Madhy amika School , 49
India, 3, 7, 11, 19, 93
final release (mokia), 11, 14, 4 7, 71 , individ ual, 28 karman. See action magica l illusion , I 7n
73-77, 80, 84-88, 90, 92· means Indra's maya, 16n karmayoga (perfor mance of actions ), 88 Mahabharata, 14n
to, 84-86, 88; seeker aftc; 85-87 karmendriya (organs of action) , 28, 31 Mahad evan, T. ~f. P., 8n
indriya (sense), 31-33, 42
fourth state of Atman: c~turtha, kartt (agent) , 57 mahavakya ("great sentenc e"), 50, 56
indrryajanya (knowl edge arising from
turya, 43; turiya, 43, 48 kartradh iria (depen ding on an agent), Mahay ana Buddhi sm, 4, G, 16n, 79
the senses), 34, 41-43
87 mamatv a (self-interest), 93
irzdrryajanya (knowl edge not arising ("think ing"), 70
garva (object of aha'f!l.kiira), 31 kart rbhoktrt valakfa7J.a (charac terized manana
. from the senses), 34, 42-43 manas (mind) , l 7n, 20, 30-33, 41-42;
Gauda pada, 4, 8n, 13, 16n mferen ee, 4 7 ; anumana 46 ' 43 ' ....r.2 .' b-y agency and experie ncershi p),
·' modific ations in, 30
Gauef.apadiya-Bha1ya, 65n anumiti, 46 70
260 INDEX INDEX 261

manasapratyakfa (internal perception), nairghrnya (lack of compassion), 20, padasiil{lgatya (syntactical relation of prakara1}a (four chapters), 13
34, 40 59n words), 51 Prakiisiitman, 5, l 7n, 25, 43, 46,
Ma,1<;lanamisra, 4-5, 8n, 17n, 59n, Naifkarmyasiddhi, 5, 51 Padmapada, 5, 25, 36, 43, 54-55, 64n, 81
64n, 81, 83, 89-90, 96 Naiyayikas, 46, 55-56, 64n 64n, 68n, 83 prakrti (matter), 12, 19-20, 22, 25,
Ma1Jtf.ilkya Upani,rad, 6, 13, 44, 65n Nakamura,Hajime, 3,8n-l0n, 15n, 25 pain, 41 33, 39, 73
Ma1,1<;1Ukyakarikii, 8n ntimarilpa (name-and-form), 56, 59n pakf a (minor term), 49 pramii (valid knowledge), 46
Ma1Jtf.ilkyopani.ratkarika, 8n namarupatmaka (consisting of name- Palestine, 93 prama1J.a (means of knowledge), 46-
manodhar (attributes of the manas), and-form), 21-27, 32, 33 Paiicadafi, 36-37, 64n 48, 62n
41 Narnbudiris Brahrnins, 4, 7n-8n Paiicapadika, 5 pramii1J.acaitanya (consciousness limited
materialism (Lokayata), 11, 87 Name-and-Form (namarilpa), 21-27, Paiicapadikavivara1}a, 5 by the modification of the an-
Materialists (Carviika), 4·6 33 pancavedantasa7!1pradaya (five schools tabkara1Ja), 34, 43
matha (monasteries), 5-6 niina (difference from Brahman), 13 of Vedanta), l 6n pra1J.a: expiration, 29; lifo organ, 29, 31
matsarya (jealousy), 93 Nariiyai;ia, Sn, l 6n pancavrtti (five functions of principal prasaT[l.khyana meditation, 88
matter (prakrti), 12, 19-20, 22, 25, nescience (avidya), 14, 16n, 21, 24-25, vital air), 29 prasaT[l.khyanavada, 96
33, 39, 73 45, 48, 58, 59n, 72, 75-85, 87, 92 Paficikarar;a, 6()n prasaizga (reductio ad absurdum), 48
maya (synonym for avidya), 16n, nigamana (conclusion), 49 pane ikara?)a (cam pounding each gross Prasarigikas, 95
25, 59n, 78, 79, 83, 93; as used nihilism, 82-83 element from all five subtle Prasna Upanifad, 6
in the Gauqapadiyakarika, 16n - Nihilists, 82-83 elements), 26, 27, 60n prasthiinatraya (threefold canon), 12
17n; meanings of, 17n; theory of, nilafoa- ("the horse is black"), 52, 54- para (Highest One) , 1 9 pratibimba (reflection), 37, 63n
95 56 paramaguru: supreme preceptor, 8n; pratibimbavada, 37
mayavada (illusion theory), 78 nilotpala- ("the lotus is blue"), 54-55 teacher's teacher, Sn, 48 pratiGchaya (reflection), 37
Mayeda, S., 9n, !On, 16n Nimbarka sect, l 6n paramaharpsaparivrajaka ascetic, 90, pratijfia (thesis), 49
means to final release, 84-86, 88 nirdu(lkha (Painless One), 52 91, 97 pratityasamutpada (theory of dependent
merit (dharma), 12, 15n-16n, 41, 71, nirmala (clear), 24 parama1[1 /Javanam (supreme purifi- origination), 72
73; (pu1Jya), 88 Nirukta, 64n cation), 86 prat_yagatman (inner Atman), 11, 28,
Mimarµsii School, 4, 12, 15n, 31, 33, nirva1J.a, 75, 80 paramartha (highest truth), 14 52-53, 56--58, 76
38, 46, 50, 89--90, 95 nirvikalpa perception, 34 para.ma Iman, 19 pratyakfa (sense perception), 46-47
Mirnarµsakas, 29, 50, 65, 89, 91, 97 nifraya, 31 Paramdvara (author of Acaryavi- pratyaya (verbal suffix), 35---36, 38--
MimaT{lsasutra, l 5n, 64n nitya (constant), 36, 39, 76 jayacampil), 7n 39, 42, 62n
mind (manas), 17n, 20, 30-33, 41-42 nityakarman (regular rites), 88 pari1}iima (transformation), 19, 25- prayojaka (defining feature of percep-
mithyajilana (false knowledge), 78, 95 niyama (observances), 92 26, 34 tion), 34-
maha ( = avidya), 83 niyamaka (controller) 72 pari 1}iimavada (theory of transforma- primary material, 59n
mok.ra (final release), 11, 14, 4 7, 71, non-Atman, 56, 72, 74, 77-78, Bl-82, tion), 19-20 primary meaning, 53-54, 58
73-77, 80, 84-88, 90, 92 84, 87 f>arisal{lkhyana meditation, 56, 88, 96 pu:rJyapur_iya (merits and demerits), 88
monasteries (matha), 5-6;(vihiira), 6 non-dual (advaya), 45 Parisi.ffa, 7n Pu1J.ya.ilokamaiif':zrf. See Sarvajiia Sa-
monism, 22, 25, 78; illusionistic, 14; non-dualism (advaitavada), 14, 17n, parok.ratva (remoteness, otherness) ,67n d asivabodha
realistic, 14 49; of tile qualified One (vi.Sif- f>iirok.rya (otherness), 67n Purai;ias, 66n
muadhyasa (false superimposition), 75, fiidvaita), 16n Pathak, K. B., 3 Pure Consciousness, 22, 45, 64n, 78;
80 nyaya (logic), 47-48, 52 perception : avabadha, 39; buddhi, caitanya, 19, 27, 38-39; cit,
mugdha (state of swooning), 44 Nyayasiltra, 64n 29, 33-43, 80; upalabdhi, 38 19-20, 38
mukhyapriiT).a (principal vital air), 28, Nyaya-Vaise~ika, 20, 29, 31, 33-34, positive formulation method, 53 Puri, 5
29, 32 38, 41 Prabhakara, 4-5, 33, 50, 89-90, 96 Purufa (Spirit), 12, 19, 20, 25, 73
lvfu1Jtf.aka Upani,ad, 6 pracchanrwb auddha (crypto-B uddhist), pururatantra (dependent on man), 47
mutual superimposition of Atman and object of ahairipratyaya (ahaT(l.praty- 6, l 6rr Purva M!marpsa, Sn
non-Atman, 77, 81 ayavi1 aya, asmatpra tyayavif aya), 40, prajapati (Atman in the dreaming
mutual superimposition of the body 57 state), 44 Radhakrishnan, S., 62n, 89, 93
and Atman, 79-81 object of avidya, 79-81, 83 prajna (Atman in the state of deep raga (passion), 40
mysticism, 93 Otto, R., 14n, 93, 96 sleep) , 44--45 Raja, K. K., 7n-9n
prajfiana,:ghana (mass of mere con- RajacU<;liimanidiksita (author of
Nagarjuna, 48 Padabhtisya, 9n sciousness), 45 Satikarabhyudaya), 7n
262 INDEX INDEX 263

Ramanuja, 13, 16n, 49, 66n anything else), 34 fluences on, 4, 6; teachers of, Smr tis .• 14n, 21, 32, 46, 48, 66n, 86, 91
Ramatlrtha, 63n, 95 sarrzskara (impression), 40 811; various appellations for, 9n, fodhakavakya, 66n
Rarigacarya, M., Sn sarrzsaya, 31 60n; view of ethics of, 88-94; sopadhi (with limiting adjuncts), 45
reductio ad absurdum (prasaliga), 48 sarrzsmrti (recollection), 51 works of, 4-6, 30, 35 "so'yam," 54-56, 67n
reflection: abhasa, 37-39, 63n-64n, sat[! tof a (con ten tmen t), 92 Sankara-Acarya, 9n .irava7Ja (hearing), 70
75; chaya, 37; pratibimba, 37, sarrzvyii.pti (pervasion), 36 Sankara-Bhagavat, 9n, 67n .ireyas (beatitude), 94
63n;praticchaya, 37 sm71yoga (connection), 63n, 73 Sankara-Bhagavatpada, 9n Srivai~i:iava sect, J6n, 97
regular rites (nityakarman), 88, 92 sarriyukta (conjunction), 41 §ankara-Bhagavatpujyapada, 9n Sp\geri, 5
Renou, L., 3 Sankara: advice to teachers, 92-93; Sankara shrine, Sn Spigerimatha, 5, 9n
rituals, 84-85, 89-90 and abhasa, 37, 39; and Advaita Sankarabhyudaya. See Rajacoc;iarnani- Srutis, 18, 21, 30, 32, 41, 46-49, 74,
Roy, Amarnath, 9n Vedanta school, 5, 7, 8n, 12-14, dl"k~i ta 85-88, 91
16n-·17n, 19, 43, 62n, 89; and Sankaracarya, 9n, 60n, 67n SrutisarasamuddharaT}a, 5
Sabarasvamin, 90 anvayavyatireka method, 50-5 7; ,~ankaracaryacarita. See Govindanatha Staal, J. F., 8n
sabda (statement by an authority), and concept of internal organ, ~ankaradigvijaya, 3 _ suddha (pure), 24
46-47 28-33, 35-36, 41, 44; and defini- Sankaravijaya. See Anandagiri; Val- Suddhadvaitavada of Vallabha, l 6n
sac-cid-iinanda (Being-Consciousness- tion of avidya, 78-82; and de- llsahaya; Vidyafankara; Vyasa- sukhadipratyakfa (perception of pleas-
Bliss), 19 finition of superimposition, 77; cala ure, etc.), 34
Sadananda (author of Sankaravi- and definition of transmigrator, Sankaravijayasttra. See Sadananda sukhadu&khavedanii (feelings of pleas-
jayasara), 7n, 26, 50 75-76; and definition of trans- Sankaravijayavilasa. See Cidvilasa ure and pain), 40
sadasadbhyiim, 59n migratory existence, 71-72; Sarada shrine, Sn silkfma (subtle), 28
sadasadbhyamanirvacaniya (indescriba- and final release, 74, 84-88, ~aradama\ha monastery, 6 Surdvara, 5, 8n, 15n, l 7n, 51, 54-57,
ble as being or non-being), 16n, 92; and five gross elements, 26- Sariraka-Sutra, !Sn 66n-67n, 81, 83, 89, 94, 96-97
78 28; and means of knowledge, Sarvajna Sadasivabodha (author of su1upta (deep sleep), 43-45, 70, 72, 76
Sadasivabrahmendra (author of Gu- 46-49; and qualifications of a Pu1}yaslakamafijarf), 7n svadhyaya (study), 92
ruratnamala), 7n seeker, 90; and rituals, 84-85; Sarvajnatman, 17n, 54, 57, 81, 83-84 svapna (dreaming state), 43-45, 70, 72
sadhana (means), 33 and Unevolved Name-and- sarvajfiatva (all-knowingness), 54 svapramal)aka (self-evident), 47
sadhya (major term), 49, 56 Form, 22, 25-26; and "water sarvakalpanak1ayarilpa (destruction of svata&siddha (self-established), 4 7
s,ahacarya (constant occurrence), 56 and foam," 22-24, 26; as phi- false assumptions), 75 svatabsiddhyasa1[1bhava (not self-estab-
Saivism, 4 losopher, 6, !On, 16n; authen- Sarvasiddhan tasangraha, 1On lished), 35
fokti (cosmic power), 78 ticity of writings of, 6, 9n-!On, sastra (scriptural testimony), 48 svatmastha (abiding in Brahman), 22
Saktism, 4· 27, 60n, 65n, 67n; biographies Sastri, K. A. Nilakanta, 9n sviitmavilakfm:w (difference from Brah-
foma (tranquility), 93 of; 3, 7n; birth of, 3, 7n, 8n; Sastri, S. Kuppuswarni, 9n, 97 man), 22
samadhiina (concentration of the central doctrine of (Atman's sat (Being), 19-20; (Existent), 52 svayarriprabha (self-effulgent), 44
mind), 88 identity with Brahman), 11-14, sathya (wickedness), 93 svayarrivedya (known only to Brah-
samana (principle of digestion), 29 18-58, 86, 88, 90, 92 ; charac- satkara1}avada, 25 man), 22
samanadhikara7Jya (identity of ref- teristics of philosophy of, 7 ,11, 22, satkaryavada theory, 19-20, 22 Svetaketu, 50
erents), 66n 28, 37, 43, 4 7-48, 56, 6 In, 78, satya (truth), 88 SvetiiS:vatara Upanifad, 6
samavaya (inherence), 41 87-94; commentaries on, 5-6, fouca (purity), 92
sarrzkalpa, 31 13, 16n, 29, 33, 44, 65n, 97n; saugata (Buddl1ists), 7 5 taijasa (Atman in the dreaming state),
sarrzkalpavikalpa, 31 conflict with Mimal)lsii. school of, Saundaryalahari, 10n 44-45
Sarpkhyaschool, 7, 12, 14, 19-20, 22, 4, Sn, l 7n, 89; cosmology of, savikalj;a perception, 34 Taittiriya Upani1ad, 5, 6, 20, 22, 26 .
25, 28, 31, 33, 37, 43, 46, 60n, 20-27, 29; death of, 3, 7, 7n, Schmithausen, L., 9n tamas (darkness), 45, 72
63n-64n, 90 14; four monasteries founded by, senses, 28-43 Tar1ka, 90
S arrikhyakarika, 63n-64n 5-6; and interpretation of aham, sentence, meaning of, 50-52, 53 tapas (self-mortification), 88, 92
Sal[lksepasariraka, 54, 83 57; and interpretation of "tat Siddhantales asar[!gralw, 67n "tat tvam asi." See "Thou art That"
sarrznyasin (ascetics), 4, 5, 97 tvam asi," 50-52; 55-57, 67n; siddhi (established), 3 5 Tattvakaumudi, 63n
samsara. See transmigratory existence life of, 3--7; and theory of Siva, 4 tattvanyatvabhyam anirvacaniya- (not
sarrzsarga (mutual association of word perception, 33-43, 65n; pupils Sivaguru, 4 describable as "this" or anything
meanings), 55, 67n and disciples of~ 5, 15n, 25, 43, smarm;ia (recollection), 31, 51 else), 22, 59n
sar{lsargiinavagahin (unrelated to 54-55, 78-79, 89; religious in- smaryate (recollect), 51 ten boys, story of, 58, 87
 264· INDEX INDEX 265

Teri.galai, 97 vai.fi1tyavagahin (qualified by an at- vi1ayacai tanya (consciousness limited vyana (combina tion of expiratio n and
theory of perceptio n, 43 tribute), 34· by an object), 34, 43 inspiratio n), 29
theory of the means of knowledg e, 43 Vaiigiavism ,4, 79 vifesanavifosyatii (subject- predicate re- vyapnuvat (pervadin g), 36
"Thou art That" ("tat tvam asi"), vaifoanara (Atman in the waking lation), 66n vya pti (invariab le concomi tance), 56
50-52, 54-57, 66n-67n , 76,87, 92 state), 44--45 viSistadvaita (non-dua lism of the Vyasa, 4, 36, 65n ,
Totaka, 5 Vakyabhafya, 9n ..qualified One), 16n Vyasacal a (author of Sankaravijaya),
transmig ration, 70, 75, 91 Vakyavrtti, JOn, 67n Visi~tadvaitavada of Ramanu ja, 16n 7n
transmig rator, 75--77, 79, 91 Vallabha carya sect, I 6n Vi~(lU, 79
vyatireka method, 53, 56-57
transmig ratory existence (sa1f!siira) Vallisah aya (author of Saizkaravijaya), Vi varana school, 5, 37, 81 vyavasaya, 64n
11-12, 69--72, 74, 76--78, 80-81, 7n Vivaral}~prameyasarpgraha, 29
84, 91, 94; external, 70; internal, van Boetzele ar, .J. :tvI., 9n vivarta, 25 word-me anings, 50-51, 55
70 van Buitenen , J. A. B., 68n viuartavada (theory of false appear-
trivr tkara1J.a (compou nding each gross Varai;iasi, 4 ance), 19, 25--26 yajfza (sacrifice), 88, 92
element from all three subtle varayetar n, 53 viveka (discrim ination), 51 yama (abstenti on), 88, 92
elements ), 26 vasanii (residual impressio n), 44 vivekabuddhi, 31 Yaska, 64n
Trotaka, 5 vastutantra (dependi ng upon existing Vivekacilqamal}i. l On yathabhiltavz'~aya (having existing
tulyani<f.atva (identity of referents ), things), 47 viveki fJra tyayab (discrimi nating no- things as objects), 4 7
52, 67n vastvadhina (dependi ng upon the real), tion), 40 Yogasch ool,4,7, 28, 37,43, 52,64n,
turiya (fourth state of A Iman), 43, 48 87 viyoga (disconn ection), 73 74, 78, 91
turya (fourth state of Atman) 43 Vedas, Sn, 48--51 vr tti (modification), 31'34-35 , 41-43, rGgasiltra, 4, 35, 6'.ln, 64n
Vedanta philosoph y, 5-7, 8n, 12-14, 6211 Yogasiltrabha1ya, 62n, 65n
udana (faculty which brings about 16n, 20-22, 24-26, 28, 31-32, vrttibheda (differences in manas modi- Yogasiltrabhii 1yavivara1Ja_, 4, 6, 36, 62n
passing of Atman from body at 35, 43, 45-47, 49, 74-75, 87, fications), 30 Yogatariivali, Bn
death), 29 89-91 vr ttirupnjfian<J (knowledge taking on yukti (reasonin g), 48, 51, 52
U ddalaka Arw:1i, 50 Vediintaparibha~ii, 43, 46 the form of vrtti), 41
Unevolv ed Name-an d-Form (avyakrte Vedantic non-dual ism, 7
namarupe), 20-22, 25--26, 29, 78 Veda-Vy asa, 14n
universal positive judgmen t, 52 Vedic ritual, 71, 90
upadana (materia l cause), 78 verb, definitio n of, 64n
Upadefosahasri, 5-6, 14, 18, 20, Vetter, Tilmann , 9n, 96
22-24, 26, 28--29, 37, 49-52, vibhramafokti (projecti ng faculty), 83
69-70, 73, 75--76, 79, 81, 88, Vidvadba lakakasil aki?mai;i a Sastri
90-92 (author of CuruvaT[tsakarrya), 7n
upadlzi (limiting adjunct) , 28, 44 vidyii (knowled ge), 77
Upadhya ya, P. Baladeva , 7n Vidyarai;iya (author of Sankaradi-
upa-labh (to perceive ), 38 gvijaya), 3, 29, 35-37
upacara (figurativ e meaning ), 38 Vidyasag ara, PanditJi bananda , 7n
upalabdhi (percepti on), 38 Vidyafan kara (author of Salikara-
upalabdhisadhana (means of percep- vijaya), 7n
tion), 33 vihara (monaste ry system), 6
upamana (compari son), 46 vijfiana (internal organ), 30-31
Upani1ad, Sn, 12-14, 28, 43-44, 49 Vijiianabhik~u, 63n
Vijiianav adin, 47
viicilrambhalJa (verbal handle), 45 vikalpa, 31
Vacaspa timisra, 14n, 26, 29, 32, 51, vikara (modific ation), 75
63n, 81 Vimukta trnan, I 7n
vaifamya (unfairne ss), 20 Vimrya, 97
vaiSeua (differen ce), 13 viparyay__a (inverted knowled ge), 45
Vaise~ika, 33, 44, 46, 6ln, 64n viraj (Atman in the waking state), 44
Vaifesikasutra, 64n vi1aya (object), 41
 - ':j ....J
>
:;: v
2
~
.J~
~
-· r.; r.;

-" 2 -:;"' -:;"'

4 ~ --: cc,..,. re
-· re ...:..
- er: "'-
r;
::::- ::'.'.
:::... ~...
-·
~ 9 ::;;--
~ 9 ? """"'. ~
- f
r.: c
r. ~
c ·'ii
~·
~ ~

- 'r ;::'. ::: '-' ...........

ere= ~ z "'~
/

~ ~ /::; r. ;..- -;;; f.

:::
,,...: ... ;.;;
·r
,. -=- ;:-:
l
__,
r::· "'~'
;::,... :-;..·
,;;, 0
c
/
__..._
~
:r
f .
~

-:;
--'

~
..:
::::
f
z
~ '7
r.'

" "'
v
,..,.

"
r;

~
-·
,..,. 7;-'
::s.; - I:
-
J:
r:
~
:J
:J
.::
./0

2-
;;,..-
r.; ,. "~ VJ
>./O·

t"'

- >
--
:::;--
;.;.... ~
c. .;:: ~
-'.
c & f r.; "'
-l ;::;
r-5
- ...... c..
·~
('t
"'-
•,/
;::'.
~I
.::
;::'.

j-=.,'
J~ :;:(
-
c·
IC
--:::
;--!\

..., ,..,.
;::;
~ -11
c...., z
z:
"'
/ ...L
~

.tv
e: ;::;

::: - 2" ~

" ::: Z·

- 5.. ;,;... ~·~ 0

f ~
7
- - ::::-"
;;_,
,, :J.
--..: c;_
-3
:::: ;::::
-
~

~~ ~ .:: 8 :::.:.
~M
FC,
M
r.;
- c:....
:::...
G ~ =
::: :r. J 'O
)...
,..,. v r:

-c... L-
::: 0

- ~
'.:!'.
-=- - ·
~
~

CF:
;:;
J.
'.£ --'
J,

"
er
~ :::;
>
-r: f :;;::-- IC

---:
--· --
~ f ~

,- ,..,. 0
~__,
/ ~
:J 0 er, ""
/ J.
'£ \.. .J
~
-;:; fi.r. - ?
·s ~ -.:
_....
::i::
'° H
~ '"'.
r.;· ""
("\:
-· ,::.
- ,..,.
f
8 -::;"
r.;
r. :::: (;'

(.11
"""
00
0 IIJ
z
'........""
'° CJ
~ I
0 .......
...D
'°
~
.i:--
.....
~ -
N
I
0

'°
0
0
..D
.s:
.s:
I
..D