A Response to Damien Keown's "Suicide, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: A Buddhist

Perspective"
Author(s): R. E. Florida
Source: Journal of Law and Religion , 1998 - 1999, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1998 - 1999), pp. 413-
416
Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1051474

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 A RESPONSE TO DAMIEN KEOWN'S
SUICIDE, ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA:
A BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVE

R.E. Florida t

Keown is clear that the Buddhist tradition is remarkably div

and that his paper presents only one Buddhist perspective, one ba
his interpretation of relevant passages from the Pali canon. Howe
there is a real danger that those readers who are perhaps not br
read in Buddhism could be misled to think that the position present
Keown's paper is the Buddhist view rather than a Buddhist view.
fact, he sometimes seems to slide rather far in that direction himse
states on page two that "an accurate understanding of basic Budd
values does generate an authentic Buddhist ethic about end-of-life
decisions; [and]... suicide, assisted suicide and euthanasia are all
contrary to Buddhist ethics." This claim tends to imply that there is only
one normative Buddhist view on these issues. Starting with his premise
that "Buddhisms" rather than Buddhism is the more accurate way to
speak, it is more likely that there are plural systems of Buddhist ethics
rather than a single one, and thus there could be variable authentic
Buddhist views on end-of-life issues.
Keown's reasons for operating from Pali sources alone are
carefully laid out, and he does a very fine job indeed in his exegesis and
analysis. However, there are also persuasive reasons in some Buddhist
contexts for ignoring Pali texts, or rather for developing one's position
from altogether different sources, both scriptural and anthropological.
For example, Mahayana Buddhists, who dominate in East and North
Asia, may or may not recognize Pali texts as authoritative, and most
never refer to them at all. In China and Japan, where there has been a
tradition of religiously motivated suicides by Buddhists, the Lotus Sara,
which is not found in the Pali canon, is the most influential Buddhist
scripture. Chapter 23 of that sitra describes how a Bodhisattva, a
person who is on the way to becoming a perfectly enlightened being,
treats his body with expensive fragrant oils and then offers his fingers,
arms, and entire body as fire offerings in reverence to the Buddha. This
practice has been emulated by devotees in China and Japan right up until
the present day,1 and the Lotus Sutra might have provided some

t Dean of Arts, Brandon University, Brandon, Manitoba R7A 6A9 Canada.

1. Donald S. Lopez, Buddhism in Practice ch 36 (Princeton U Press, 1995); Paul

413

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414 JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION [Vol. XIII

inspiration to the Vietnamese monks who immolated themselves to

protest the war in their country.
The Bodhicaryivatara, a non-canonical Mahayana text that has
been very influential in Tibetan and Far Eastern Buddhism, expresses
how the Bodhisattva should give him or herself up for the sake of others.
See, I give up without regret my bodies, my pleasures, and my
good acquired in all three times, to accomplish good for every
being.

I make over this body to all embodied beings to do with as they

please. Let them continually beat it, insult it, and splatter it with
filth.

Let them play with my body; let them be derisive and amuse
themselves. I have given this body to them. What point has this
concern of mine?2

No wonder then that in Mahayana Buddhism, suicide has

sometimes been seen as valid, provided that it is done for unselfish
motives; that is, for the well being of others or for spiritual
advancement.
Although Keown's view is not universally accepted by all
Buddhists, it is nonetheless a very skilful presentation of the Pali texts
on the issue of suicide. To illustrate how good it is, let me refer to a
little known incident in Thai Buddhist history.3 Around the end of the
eighteenth century (CE) and in the first decades of the nineteenth, in
Bangkok there were a number of religiously inspired suicides. Devout
Buddhist laymen, in order to advance their progress toward
enlightenment, burned themselves alive in a manner reminiscent of that
described in the Lotus Satra.4 King Mongkut, cruelly caricatured in
Anna and the King of Siam, was in fact a great monarch and
distinguished scholar of Pali texts, who undertook to reform Thai
Buddhism in light of those scriptures and who successfully defended his
country against European imperialism. He issued a decree in 1858 to

Williams, Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations 154 (Routledge, 1989). In the
introductory chapter to the Lotus Stira, it is noted with approval that Bodhisattvas give their own
flesh, hands, and feet as offerings.
2. Santideva, The Bodhicaryavatara 20 (Oxford U Press, K. Crosby and A. Skilton, trs,
1995).
3. R. Lingat, Les suicides religieux au Siam reprinted from 1 Felicitation Volumes of
Southeast-Asian Studies presented to his Highness Prince Dhaninivat Kromamun Bidyalabh
Bridhyakorn on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday (Siam Society Press, 1965).
4. I wonder if these suicides might indeed have been directly inspired by Mahayana
practice as they occurred during a period of Chinese immigration to the capital of Thailand.
Lingat does not discuss the ethnic origins of those who immolated themselves.

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413] FLORIDA. RESPONSE TO DAMIEN KEOWN 415

suppress religiously inspired suicides and similarly inspired mutil

Penalties were assigned to any witnesses to such events who did n
to stop them. His arguments, drawn from Pali sources, closely pa
those developed by Keown. In spite of the regal and script
condemnations of these suicides, they still capture the imaginati
some Thai worshippers. The two monuments that commemorate 1791
and 1817 immolations in Wat Arun (one of Bangkok's most visited
temples) are regularly covered with flowers, candles, and other
offerings.
Keown's detailed explication of texts on assisted suicide is
altogether convincing. Although in an earlier paper5 cited by Keown, I
took the position that Buddha condoned assisted suicide in several
incidents in the Pali canon,. Keown's textual arguments6 on pages 7-11
convince me that what Buddha actually did was to exonerate the monks
involved from their guilt rather than to condone their acts, and I accept
his correction gratefully. However, I believe that his general argument
that there is something intrinsically and objectively wrong with suicide
is not quite definitive in Buddhist morality. Indeed, I would argue that
the only fixed principle in Buddhist thought is that there are no fixed
principles, including no absolute prohibition against taking life. This
comes from the fundamental insight of the Buddha that all phenomenal
events (including body, speech, and mental events) are interrelated and
co-produced (pratatyasamutp,da).
In the context of assisted suicide, I would think that Becker's
position, which Keown rejects7 (p. 8), is closer to being a "right view" of
this issue than Keown's. In Becker's view, the ethical nature (karmic
consequence) of any deed is a function of the will of the doer. If the
deed is motivated by passion, aggression, or ignorance (the three root
poisons of unenlightened existence), then the deed is unskillful and to be
rejected and avoided by the woman or man who is trying to tread the
Buddhist path. In the cases of suicide, assisted suicide, and euthanasia
as defined and analyzed by Keown, it would not be the killing, per se,
that is unskillful; it is the unskillful motivation. Murder, contrary to his
argument, on page 8, is wrong in Buddhist thought precisely because of
the motivation of the actor. If the motivation is correct, then the act is
not murder at all, but rather some sort of justifiable homicide. From this
point of view, the self-immolations in the Lotus Satra could be justified,

5. R.E. Florida, Buddhist Approaches to Euthanasia in 35 Studies in Religion/Sciences

Religieuses 22/1 (1993).
6. These are found in section II of his article.
7. Seep 12f.

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416 JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION

and perhaps some instances of suicide, assisted suicide, and euthana

Of course, one has to be very, very cautious, given our near limit
capacity for self-deception, in making these judgements.
Again, similarly, I believe Keown has gone a little too far in
declaring that Buddhism posits an absolute value to the inviolability of
life8 (p. 13). Rather, I would argue that life itself, including particular
personal instantiation of it, like everything else, has only relative value,
following the insight of conditioned co-production (pratJtyasamutpda).
In Buddhism, both clinging to life and seeking annihilation are
identified as errors; and the way that Buddha himself passed from this
life is a noble example of avoiding both extremes.
In focussing exclusively on the Vinaya or monastic rules for his
discussion of precepts9 (pp. 13ff), Keown misses the relative nature of
the prohibitions against killing. The rules of morality were interpreted
much more strictly in its interpretation for monks and nuns than for lay
people in the lifetime of the Buddha and in all subsequent Buddhist eras.
In fact, the ideal Buddhist monarch is one who maintains and uses both
an army and a judicial force for the good of the people and for the
dharma. Of course, he will use such force (which may include killing)
only when absolutely necessary and without personal animosity. Non-
violence is the ideal, and following the Vinaya is the way for monks to
realize it as much as possible. The Buddhist ruler is also enjoined to
avoid violence and destruction as much as possible; however, the
tradition recognizes that those who live in the world cannot be held to
the strict rule of the monastics.
In conclusion, I would like to particularly commend Keown's
discussion of autonomy (p. 14) and his concluding section on the Middle
Way, both of which very well capture the flavor of Buddhist moral
thinking. Also his warnings against euthanasia are very well taken
Although it may be possible in theory to kill another with perfect
motivation, without a trace of the three poisons of passion, aggression,
and ignorance, it is difficult to imagine it in practice. My differing
views probably reflect the fact that my Buddhist training has been in the
Mahayana while his background is in Pali text Buddhism. From my
point of view, he has taken a somewhat overly "uncompromising and
extreme" position in relying on "moral absolutes" (p. 17), which does
not, however, fundamentally compromise the excellence of his paper.

8. See section III of his article.

9. See section III, pp 24-27.

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