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1 Definition nature and scope of strategic studies

Strategic studies is an interdisciplinary academic field centered on the study of conflict and peace strategies, often devoting
special attention to the relationship between military history, international politics, geostrategy, international
diplomacy, international economics, and military power.
Aim & Scope of strategic studies
In the scope of the studies are also subjects such as the role of intelligence, diplomacy, and international cooperation for
security and defense. The primary aim of Strategic Studies is to contribute in the field of scholarly research pertaining to
foreign policy, security and strategic stability of relevance to Pakistan, the South Asian region and the international
community. The Strategic Studies is a broad based double blind review academic research journal. The journal encourages
submissions that focus on all perspectives and all subjects pertaining to International Relations, Political Economy, Strategic
Studies, Climate Change, Military Strategy, Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Nuclear Studies, Foreign Policy, and so on,
especially having relevance to Pakistan and South Asia. Original research manuscripts that combine rigour and relevance to
advance the mainstream conceptual work, set future research agendas and policy analysis are of particular interest. Our
mission is to provide quality policy inputs through informed research, objective analyses and dialogue on global and regional
issues affecting peace, security and development of Pakistan and South Asia.
Nature of Strategic Study
The discipline of Strategic Studies concerns itself with the useof force as an instrument of state policy, and remains an
extremely Clausewitzian entity, deriving from the Clausewitzian notion of strategy as “the use of engagement for the purpose
of the war”.
As an academic discipline the early focus was on how warsstart, how they can be avoided, or if not avoidable, then fought in
the most efficient manner possible.
To this end, the focus of traditional strategic studies has been the military means that actors in the international system
employ to gain their political objectives or ends.
Strategic Studies is an inter-disciplinary field of study, which at its core examines the ways in which military power and other
coercive instruments may be used to achieve political ends in the course of a dynamic interaction of (at least) two competing
wills. Since the subject matter is so broad, numerous insights from a variety of academic disciplines have been incorporated
in order to enrich the study of strategy, including major insights from the sciences, arts, humanities, and the social sciences
(especially International Relations, Political Science, Sociology, Psychology and Anthropology, among others).
What is Strategy Evaluation
Strategic evaluation constitutes the final stage of strategic management and is considered one of the most vital steps in the
process.
Strategy Management Process
Strategy evaluation is the process by which the management assesses how well a chosen strategy has been implemented
and how successful or otherwise the strategy is. To simply put, strategy evaluation entails reviewing and appraising the
strategy implementation process and measuring organizational performance.
In the instance, the implementation of the strategy is not taking place as planned, say due to the limitations in the strategy
that are blocking the achievement of organizational goals, necessary corrective actions should be identified and applied.
At the end of the evaluation, you’ll have gathered insight to either reformulate the strategy or to plan and develop new ones.
Evaluating the strategy helps improve it, distinguish between what works and what doesn’t, and contribute to the ongoing
development and adaptation of the strategy to the changing conditions and complexities in the industry.
Strategy evaluation operates at two levels; strategic and operational. At the strategic level, the focus is given to the
consistency of the strategy with the environment, and at the operational level, how well the organization is pursuing the
strategy is assessed.
Through the process of strategy evaluation, strategists can make sure that the,
 Premises made during strategy formulation are correct
 Strategy is guiding the organization towards accomplishing its objectives
 Managers are doing what they are supposed to be doing to effectively implement the strategy
 The organization is performing well, schedules are being followed, and resources are being properly utilized
 Whether there’s a need to reformulate or change the strategy.
2 Role of Force in International System
The use of force has been a long-standing phenomenon in international relations and has been considered to be
directly linked to the sovereignty of states-the limitless power wielded by states to use all possible means to guard
and protect their interests.
In international law the notion of “use of force” has always been concerned with the relationship between states, not
regarding the purely domestic use of force by a state’s authorities against its civilians (see International Law Regarding the
Conduct of War). In international law, acts such as the latter may be ruled by treaties on human rights and on the rights of
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minorities. Thus, dealing with the use of force in international law relates only to a very specific sector of perils to human
life. In the twentieth century, war became a threat not only to combatants but also to humankind as a whole. Technological
development has led to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons with potentially devastating effects, thus not only erasing
the line drawn by international humanitarian law between military and civil objectives but also endangering all humankind.
For a long time the East–West conflict inserted this potential of mass destruction even into small armed conflicts.
Although at first glance developments in the last decade of the twentieth century seem to have diminished these perils, they
continue to exist. With the dissolution of the communist bloc, regional limited wars are less likely to become the nucleus of
a new world war. However, they may bear the same dangers for the population concerned, since several states seek to gain
weapons of mass destructions. Moreover, rather small regional conflicts have made the world witness to massive killings
under the label of socalled “ethnic cleansing” aiming at the destruction of whole groups of people or at least their expulsion
from the area they lived in. In contrast, the development of high technology weapons promises to wage so-called “clean
wars” restricted to military personnel and objectives. This has increased the willingness of states to deploy armed forces in
the framework of collective state measures in reaction to armed challenges to the current legal order. Still, practice shows
the lack of any safeguard to civilian lives in times of war. This leaves the prevention of war as one of the most important tasks
of the twenty-first century.
Historical Development.
The Hague Peace Conferences The medieval theory of a just war (bellum justum) developed by theologians tried to establish
barriers to war but was never effective in practice. The lack of agreement on what may be a just cause to wage war led to
the interpretation of war as a trial of ordeal and later to the theoretical variation that recourse to war could be just for either
side. With the loss of the common religious ground of these theories, international legal scholars could not find any legal
restrictions to war (jus ad bellum).
The League of Nations Covenant In response to the experiences of World War I, the League of Nations Covenant of 1919
was the first attempt to create a collective security system whose main task was to ensure peace (Article 11). It elaborated
on the formal approach of restrictions on the resort to war. Members of the League of Nations were first and foremost
obliged to submit a dispute to inquiry, arbitration, or to the Council of the League. Any war had to be postponed until three
months after the arbitrators’ award or the Council’s report and it was definitely prohibited in the case of a state complying
with these statements.
The Charter of the United Nations After World War II, with the creation of the United Nations Organization (U.N.), member
states attempted anew to prevent war by a system of collective security and to avoid old deficiencies. Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter establishes a ban on “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N.” The approach comprises not only war but also measures
short of war and has been confirmed by several international treaties since.
Enforcing International Law by the Use of Force Strengthening human rights and the rights of minorities in the last decades
of the twentieth century has enlarged the common ground of the global community, thus reducing the potential for
international disputes. At the same time, this has become a basis for the use of force by the S.C. in order to enforce its
resolutions, not only to preserve international peace. In the 1990s, the S.C. authorized on several occasions the use of force
by member states, not only in cases of self-defense but also of the protection of the rights and lives of the people of other
states or even, as in the case of Haiti, to implement a government democratically elected.
3 The phenomenon of War and its kinds; the changing nature of warfare
Phenomenon of War. War is an ancient human phenomenon, as old as man. Although it is historically destined to halt, its
flames nevertheless have not always been put off and man has not been spared from its consequences. By reviewing human
history, we find that times of war have overcome times of peace. Wars and armed conflicts on this planet were affected by
the periods of time and the prevalent international conditions, and they differ from one region to another. More significantly,
features of war changed during the post-bipolar international era with the collapse of the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet
Union. It has become more sophisticated and deadly on civilians in addition to its devastating effects on military personnel
and installations. The methods and mechanisms of warfare have also changed in the post-Cold War era; an era in which the
so-called international unipolarity prevailed and in which the United States of America dominated as a superpower. The post-
Cold War era witnessed an active role for mercenaries and warlords; occasionally referred to as shadow soldiers, establishing
insurance companies comprised of mercenaries to provide protection on demand. This is ultimately against the United
Nations Conventions which stipulate the prohibition of the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries.
Types of War
 Cold War. The Cold War was a period of geopolitical tension between the United States and the Soviet Union and their
respective allies, the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc. The term cold war is used because there was no large-scale fighting
directly between the two superpowers, but they each supported opposing sides in major regional conflicts known as proxy
wars. The conflict was based on the ideological and geopolitical struggle for global influence by these two superpowers,
following their temporary alliance and victory against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in 1945.[2] Aside from the nuclear
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arsenal development and conventional military deployment, the struggle for dominance was expressed via indirect means
such as psychological warfare, propaganda campaigns, espionage, far-reaching embargoes, rivalry at sports events, and
technological competitions such as the Space Race.
 Colonial War. Colonial war is a blanket term relating to the various conflicts that arose as the result of overseas territories
being settled by foreign powers creating a colony. The term especially refers to wars fought during the nineteenth century
between European armies in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean; imperial war; when subject people struggle to get their
independence, they fight wars of national liberation or decolonization.
 War of independence. The War of Independence is an important landmark in the history of Sub-Continent. This War was
fought in 1857 by Indians against the British in order to get rid of their domination. It is also given names as Indian Rebellion,
Indian Mutiny as well as Indian Revolt. The main causes of the War were political, social, economical, military and religious.
It was an extreme effort made by Indians, but they failed due to certain reasons including mutual jealousies, disunity, and
lack of central leadership etc.
This war was not spread throughout India but it was limited to few areas mainly Meerut, Delhi, Kanpur, Lucknow etc. The
main event which became the immediate cause of the war was the refusal of the Sepoys to use the grease covered cartridges
(greased with fat of pig and cow) on January 23, 1857. At the same time, an Indian sepoy killed two British officers at
Barrackpore, when he was forced to use greased cartridges. He was arrested and hanged to death on April 8, 1857. This news
spread as fast as jungle fire.
War of liberation. The began on 26 March 1971 and ended with the liberation of Bangladesh on 16 December 1971. The
armed struggle was the culmination of a series of events, situations and issues contributing to the progressively deteriorating
relations between East and West Pakistan. The questions of land reforms, state language, inter-wing economic and
administrative disparities, provincial autonomy, the defense of East Pakistan and many other consequential questions had
been straining the relations between the two wings of Pakistan ever since independence of the country from Britain in 1947.
The general elections of 1970 had made Bangabandhu SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN, chief of AWAMI LEAGUE which bagged 167 seats
out of 169, the sole spokesman of the people of East Pakistan and majority leader in the Pakistan National Assembly. But the
Pakistan civil and military ruling clique had refused to transfer power to the majority leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his
party. Sheikh Mujib also refused to yield to the pressure put on him for undue accommodation. Sheikh Mujib's historic
address on 7 March 1971 made this point quite clear to the Pakistani military junta. Then began the civil disobedience
movement. Meanwhile talks started between Sheikh Mujib and President Yahya Khan to resolve the outstanding issues.
Civil war. A violent conflict between a state and one or more organized non-state actors in the state’s territory. Civil wars
are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving
states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an
organized or cohesive group, including genocides, and similar violence by non-state actors, such as terrorism or violent crime.
The definition of civil war clearly encompasses many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars
in which insurgents seek territorial secession or autonomy and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central
government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the center or state apparatus,
as in military coups, or challengers from outside the political establishment.
4 The changing nature of warfare
Warfare enjoys a pre- eminent position in statecraft and diplomacy. Most of the decisions related to foreign relations and
diplomacy are centred around warfare. This is evident from the fact that decisions of the individual countries at the
international level are either to avoid war, or to prepare for war. This can be elucidated with events like:
 The formation of the United Nations with the main objective of avoiding the scourge of war
 The relations between India and Pakistan or India and China
 Sino- U.S rivalry for supremacy
 Dispute among Russia and the west
The Possible reasons for changing nature of Warfare
 Technological Progress: The rapid progress in technology with the emergence of Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, Big
data and their incorporation in military hardware has increased the uneasiness of countries.
 Political Changes: Emergence of powerful and populistic leaders and cut throat politics where no leader can appear
to be weak.
o Interference in the domestic politics of other countries to destabilize the government.
 Rise of Proxies: There has been a rise in proxies, with complicated interests and relations to their “patrons.” Proxies
are sometimes not acknowledged, but the secret usually is an open one.
 Soldiers and Citizens: The density of soldiers on the battlefield has been declining. More recently, in its 2006 war
against Israel, Hezbollah used civilians and civilian facilities, like hospitals, to provide havens for their fighters.
 Information Flow: By enormously increasing information flow around the world, the Internet, small satellites,
drones, improved sensors, cell phone video cameras and broadband connectivity, are transforming both war and
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politics. These technologies allow military forces to find targets and strike them with great precision from long
distances.
 Insurgent movements and terrorist organizations: Such movements and organizations have been able to keep
fighting under circumstances that would compel a conventional army to surrender. They use information – both
truthful and false – as an invaluable weapon of war.
5 Military Alliance
A military alliance is a formal agreement between nations concerning national security. Nations in a military alliance agree
to active participation and contribution to the defense of others in the alliance in the event of a crisis. In the event a nation
is attacked, members of the alliance are often obligated to come to their defense regardless if attacked directly. In the
aftermath of the Second World War military alliances usually behave less aggressively and act more as a deterrent.
Military alliances can be classified into defense pacts, non-aggression pacts, and ententes. Alliances may be covert (as was
common from 1870 to 1916) or public.
According to a 2002 dataset of military alliances, there have been 538 alliance treaties from 1815 to 2003. The vast majority
of the alliances involve commitments to come to the military support of one ally involved in war. The vast majority are
defensive in nature.
6 Alliances in International Relations
alliance, in international relations, a formal agreement between two or more states for mutual support in case
of war. Contemporary alliances provide for combined action on the part of two or more independent states and are generally
defensive in nature, obligating allies to join forces if one or more of them is attacked by another state or coalition. Although
alliances may be informal, they are typically formalized by a treaty of alliance, the most critical clauses of which are those
that define the casus foederis, or the circumstances under which the treaty obligates an ally to aid a fellow member.
Alliances arise from states’ attempts to maintain a balance of power with each other. In a system composed of a number of
medium-size countries, such as that in Europe since the Middle Ages, no single state is able to establish a
lasting hegemony over all the others, largely because the other states join together in alliances against it. Thus, the repeated
attempts by King Louis XIV of France (reigned 1643–1715) to dominate continental Europe led to a coalition in opposition to
France and eventually to the War of the Grand Alliance; and the ambitions of Napoleon were similarly thwarted by a series
of alliances formed against him.
Although typically associated with the Westphalian states system and the European balance of power, alliances have taken
shape on other continents and in other eras. In his classic work Artha-shastra (“The Science of Material Gain”), Kautilya, an
adviser to the Indian king Chandragupta (reigned c. 321–c. 297 BCE), argued that in pursuing alliances countries should seek
support and assistance from distant states against the menace of neighbouring ones (according to the logic that the enemy
of one’s enemy must be one’s friend). The legacy of colonialism in Africa retarded the development of collective-defense
schemes there, but elsewhere in the developing world alliances played a critical role in the evolving regional balance. For
example, in the 1865–70 Paraguayan War, the Triple Alliance of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay devastated Paraguay,
reducing its territorial possessions as well as its population by about 60 percent. Until the Cold War in the last half of the
20th century, ideology was not usually a significant factor in the formation of such coalitions. For example, in 1536 Francis I,
the Roman Catholic king of France, joined with the Ottoman sultan Süleyman I, who was a Muslim, against the Holy Roman
emperor Charles V, another Catholic, because Charles’s possessions almost encircled France. Similarly, in World War II (1939–
45) Great Britain and the United States allied themselves with the communist Soviet Union in order to defeat Nazi Germany.
A new level of alliance building in Europe was reached in the late 19th century, when enmity between Germany and France
polarized Europe into two rival alliances. By 1910 most of the major states of Europe belonged to one or the other of these
great opposing alliances: the Central Powers, whose principal members were Germany and Austria-Hungary, and the Allies,
composed of France, Russia, and Great Britain. This bipolar system had a destabilizing effect, since conflict between any two
members of opposing blocs carried the threat of general war.
7 Military Role in peace and war
The military performs an essential role in all peace-building, whether the military of the host country or a foreign military
presence attempting to nurture a re-built society in another country. From Haiti and Panama to Somalia, Bosnia, Macedonia,
East Timor, The Solomon Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq, militaries have been engaged in post-Cold
War peace-building that has demonstrated relative success, total failure, and most stages in between. On even a cursory
count of significant military interventions since 1989, it is possible to identify at least 21 distinct cases. Of these, 11 were
explicitly peace-keeping operations from Somalia through the former Yugoslavia to the Solomon Islands and Darfur. All of
these cases became peace-building operations very quickly after initial deployments and 4 more cases began as different
types of intervention (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Côte d’Ivoire and also then transformed into peace support and peace-
building operations. 21 cases in 20 years indicates the prevalence of military interventions in the postCold War world and 15
out of 21 cases either began as, or migrated towards, being peace-building operations. Though it is entirely possible that the
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wheel of history will continue to turn and militaries will become involved in more traditional interstate conflicts in the future,
the fact remains that current trends are in the opposite direction. Sensible defence planning assumptions should therefore
be based upon the expectation of more such peace-building operations.
There is, therefore, a great deal of existing history from which we can draw perspectives and lessons over the last 20 years.
There is no shortage of ‘lessons learned’ literature, certainly in the United States, at the United Nations, and throughout
European defence establishments, as well as within the global NGO community. The problem is not so much drawing lessons
from all these cases as institutionally learning from them and integrating our knowledge into policy action.
Nevertheless, much of this literature has a consensus at its core regarding the characteristic problems of deploying the
military in peace-building operations. We speak constantly about learning the lessons from these cases. We know that
military involvement tends to create an international response vacuum; the military ends up doing too much because other
organisations leave it to do so. We know from experiences in former Yugoslavia and in Iraq and Afghanistan that UN political
mandates may be very wide, but the capacity of the UN to implement such mandates is extremely limited.
8 The logic and debate of defense expenditure and its implications for Third World Countries
Developing countries should seek to reduce their military expenditures, as a percent of GDP, by 50 percent during this
decade
Military expenditures in the developing countries in 1988 approximated $170 billion, 4.3 percent of GNP. They were only
slightly less than total expenditures for health and education and they have quintupled in constant dollars between 1960
and 1988, increasing at a rate twice that of income per capita. Can such large outlays, in countries so drastically in need of
capital to accelerate the rate of economic and social advance of their five billion inhabitants, be reduced? My answer is: Yes.
This article will put forward the proposition that a combination of the following actions:
United Nations Security Council guarantees of territorial integrity;
• Continuing reductions in both conventional and nuclear arms by the Great Powers;
• Tight control of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them;
• Substantial limitations on arms exports from arms producing nations; and
• The tying of financial aid in developing countries to reductions in military expenditures by these countries
World nations and lead to cuts in their military expenditures, as a percent of GNP, of more than half by the end of the decade.
The end of the Cold War offers dramatic opportunities for the nations of the world to move in this direction. The international
organizations, including financial institutions such as the World Bank, can catalyze the process thereby accelerating economic
and social development without reducing security.
A world of conflict
The past 45 years have seen some 125 wars and conflicts in the Third World, leading to 40 million deaths. It is often suggested
that the Third World has been turned into an ideological battleground by the Cold War and the rivalries of the Great Powers.
That rivalry has undeniably been a contributing factor and some of the most costly wars have directly involved one or more
of the Great Powers. Others grew out of the decolonization process. Many of these conflicts, however, including some of the
most costly in terms of human lives, have had their roots in historical enmities within and among developing countries. They
have resulted from the desire for regional dominance on the part of some Third World governments, attempts by developing
governments to alter their social order, and the persistence of substantial inequities within developing nations.
In view of the diverse reasons countries have for going to war, we must conclude that in the world of the future, conflicts
within and among nations will not disappear even though East and West cease to fight their proxy wars in the South. But a
different world would emerge if the Great Powers and their allies agreed on and adjusted their foreign and defense policies
in accordance with the conditions stipulated above.
Reducing military budgets
As we move to limit both nuclear and conventional forces, while providing for collective action against military aggression
wherever it may occur, military budgets throughout the world—in both developed and developing countries—can be
reduced substantially.
Over 1978-88, the Third World imported $371 billion of arms (nearly $450 billion in 1988 prices), more than three quarters
of the arms traded internationally. While these fig ures reflect the relative lack of domestic production capability in the Third
World and a legitimate concern to protect national sovereignty, there is clearly great scope for reducing Third World military
expenditures by reducing arms imports.
Both supply and demand for arms must be addressed. The United States and the Soviet Union have tended to use arms
transfers as a means of maintaining political support in strategically located Third World nations. For many of the Western
European and some emerging Third World suppliers (in particular, China and Brazil), economic considerations have been
paramount. The sale of weapons and arms production technology has helped to make the domestic defense industries of
these smaller producers economically viable and has opened the door to nonmilitary exports. Over the last decade or so,
economic considerations have become increasingly important for the Soviet Union as well.
9 The strategy of Nuclear Deterrence
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Nuclear strategy involves the development of doctrines and strategies for the production and use of nuclear weapons.
As a sub-branch of military strategy, nuclear strategy attempts to match nuclear weapons as means to political ends. In
addition to the actual use of nuclear weapons whether in the battlefield or strategically, a large part of nuclear strategy
involves their use as a bargaining tool.
Some of the issues considered within nuclear strategy include:
 Conditions which serve a nation's interest to develop nuclear weapons
 Types of nuclear weapons to be developed
 How and when weapons are to be used
Many strategists argue that nuclear strategy differs from other forms of military strategy. The immense and terrifying power
of the weapons makes their use, in seeking victory in a traditional military sense, impossible.
Perhaps counterintuitively, an important focus of nuclear strategy has been determining how to prevent and deter their use,
a crucial part of mutual assured destruction.
In the context of nuclear proliferation and maintaining the balance of power, states also seek to prevent other states from
acquiring nuclear weapons as part of nuclear strategy.
Nuclear deterrent composition
The doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) assumes that a nuclear deterrent force must be credible and survivable.
That is, each deterrent force must survive a first strike with sufficient capability to effectively destroy the other country in
a second strike. Therefore, a first strike would be suicidal for the launching country.
In the late 1940s and 1950s as the Cold War developed, the United States and Soviet Union pursued multiple delivery
methods and platforms to deliver nuclear weapons. Three types of platforms proved most successful and are collectively
called a "nuclear triad". These are air-delivered weapons (bombs or missiles), ballistic missile submarines (usually nuclear-
powered and called SSBNs), and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), usually deployed in land-based hardened missile
silos or on vehicles.
Although not considered part of the deterrent forces, all of the nuclear powers deployed large numbers of tactical nuclear
weapons in the Cold War. These could be delivered by virtually all platforms capable of delivering large conventional
weapons.
During the 1970s there was growing concern that the combined conventional forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact could overwhelm the forces of NATO. It seemed unthinkable to respond to a Soviet/Warsaw Pact incursion into Western
Europe with strategic nuclear weapons, inviting a catastrophic exchange. Thus, technologies were developed to greatly
reduce collateral damage while being effective against advancing conventional military forces. Some of these were low-yield
neutron bombs, which were lethal to tank crews, especially with tanks massed in tight formation, while producing relatively
little blast, thermal radiation, or radioactive fallout. Other technologies were so-called "suppressed radiation devices," which
produced mostly blast with little radioactivity, making them much like conventional explosives, but with much more energy.
10 Obstacles to crisis management
Creating a crisis management plan can be among the hardest tasks a crisis communications team has to perform. Not only
because the risks are so high – potentially including everything from reputation damage to loss of human life – but because
it’s impossible to create a detailed communication strategy before knowing exactly what you’re planning for.
As with anything, the first step towards improvement is acknowledging what it is you’re facing. By recognizing the five most
common challenges of crisis communications, you can then start to overcome them, one by one.
1. Too Much Information
Often, when an emergency strikes (like a natural disaster for example), the floodgates of communication swing open. It is
common for high-level management (or whoever the crisis manager is within your organization) to become overwhelmed
with the amount of information flying at them from all angles.
And it’s not just the quantity of information that can be problematic. It’s also the quality. Before the proverbial dust clears,
it’s easy for emergencies to become even more muddled. It’s also just as easy to miss the thread of truth that (hopefully)
runs through any messaging. To mitigate the chances of information wipe-out, the best practice is to think in advance about
how you’ll get your information out to team members and external audiences, as well as who you’ll be getting it from.
2. Too Little Information
It’s the Catch-22 of crises: when you don’t have too much information, you have too little. Even in day-to-day business
communications, reliance on just one channel can lead to trouble.
But in crisis scenarios, the importance of real-time visibility becomes a hurdle you don’t want to stumble over. We live in a
connected world, and there’s no longer any excuse for relying exclusively on email to get information out. Particularly when
the information you’re distributing carries such high stakes for your business, you need to direct it through multiple
communication channels, thinking about which ones are most likely to be seen first. In the vast majority of cases, SMS will
win the race.
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3. No Contact Data
But what use is instant, multi-channel messaging if you don’t have anyone to send it to? Contact information is one of the
easiest things to plan before a crisis because all of the important stakeholders are known well in advance of an emergency
situation.
For most companies, the main challenge has to do with properly storing their details. The days of paper address books are
over. These days, most organizations will have their contacts stored digitally. But many will not have them stored all in one
place – or in the right place, for that matter. And the fact that not all stakeholders will be relevant to all crisis situations only
compounds the challenge.
4. Unpredictable Situations
By its very nature, a crisis is hard to plan for. You don’t know when they’re coming, or what they’re going to be, but you know
they’re always there, looming like a dark cloud in your potential future. This leads to the second Catch-22 of crisis planning:
it’s difficult to plan a message without knowing in advance all the additional information you need, like what the next crisis
might be.
5. No Visibility
Its one thing to have a message prepared, and quite another to know what’s happened to it after you’ve hit send.
Unfortunately, it’s not enough in crisis communications to have an up-to-date contact list and message templates sitting
ready for deployment.
Fast action depends on the right people opening the message in time, and on you being aware that they’ve opened it. And if
they haven’t, it’s no good sitting around blindly awaiting a response. With the right communications technology set up in
advance of a crisis, you’ll be able to monitor who has received your message and who has not with real-time tracking
software. And if key internal and external stakeholders haven't received a message or have opened it but not responded,
you’ll be able to escalate your actions immediately, without wasting any time.
11 Crisis Management Crisis Management is an organization’s process- and strategy-based approach for identifying and
responding to a threat, an unanticipated event, or any negative disruption with the potential to harm people, property, or
business processes. Being prepared for any event to become a crisis requires a crisis management plan.
Crises can occur at any moment with or without warning, and can take many forms: natural disasters, active shooter
scenarios, terrorist events, mass violence occurrences, and even global pandemics. Beyond any immediate threat to people,
property, and processes, crises and critical emergency events often yield unpredictable and cascading effects on employee
morale, brand reputation, customer satisfaction, and even the supply chain.

Proper planning for critical events includes establishing a crisis management team and developing a crisis management (CM)
plan to keep people from harm, maintain business continuity, enable recovery from disaster, and protect assets before,
during, and after a critical event occurs. Further, it is imperative that every organization validates and tests its CM plan and
deploys the right emergency communications technology to support crisis response across the organization.
12 nuclear proliferation, the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons technology, or fissile material to countries
that do not already possess them. The term is also used to refer to the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons
by terrorist organizations or other armed groups.
During World War II the prospect of a nuclear-armed Nazi Germany led the United States to intensify its efforts to build a
nuclear weapon. The U.S. program, known as the Manhattan Project, produced the first atomic bomb in July 1945. Only three
weeks after the first test of an atomic bomb in the U.S. state of New Mexico, a uranium-based atomic bomb was dropped
on Hiroshima, Japan; a second, plutonium-based bomb was dropped on Nagasaki three days later. The United States
remained the sole nuclear power until 1949, when the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb, code-named First Lightning,
in a remote area of Kazakhstan. Klaus Fuchs, a German-born British physicist who was involved in the Manhattan Project,
was later convicted of passing secret information on the theory and design of atomic bombs to the Soviet government. The
intense competition of those two countries during the Cold War led them to develop the more-powerful thermonuclear
bomb (also known as the hydrogen bomb, or H-bomb) and to enlarge their stocks of nuclear weapons. At the height of this
competition, the United States and the Soviet Union together possessed many thousands of nuclear warheads, enough
to eradicate all life on Earth many times over.
The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
New political science literature on the causes of nuclear weapons proliferation consists of seven parts. The first section briefly
presents what we know about which states developed nuclear weapons and which states started but abandoned weapons
development programs. I highlight the problems that result from uncertainty about the accuracy and completeness of the
data. The second and third sections review the literature on the spread of the technical capability to develop nuclear
weapons. We still lack robust knowledge about the relationship between the development of civilian nuclear power
programs and nuclear weapons acquisition. The next two sections review the literature on the demand for nuclear weapons.
Comparative case studies and statistical studies have improved our understanding of the diversity of motives for weapons
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development and restraints, but serious gaps in our knowledge remain. The sixth section outlines alternative theories about
the potential impact of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on nuclear weapons programs decisions. Finally, I lay out
a future research agenda to address the weaknesses in our current understanding of the causes of nuclear proliferation.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS
Figure 1 presents a familiar graph of when different states acquired nuclear weapons, from the first U.S. nuclear test in 1945
through the North Korean test in 2006. It shows a steady but slow increase. One new nuclear weapons state has emerged
about every five years, and— with the exceptions of South Africa and the three former Soviet Union states that inherited the
weapons (but never had operational control over them)—each state has kept its nuclear weapons once it has them. There is
virtually no disagreement about what states have acquired the bomb, although there are still uncertainties about the precise
year in which “second-generation” nuclear weapons states—Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea—first acquired an
operational nuclear weapon.
We are not only interested in which states eventually acquired nuclear weapons, however, but also need to study what
governments have taken preliminary steps to develop nuclear weapons and then stopped such efforts, and what
governments had serious and sustained nuclear programs but nevertheless failed to develop the bomb. Scholars have thus
usefully divided nuclear proliferation into phases (explore, pursue, and acquire), even though in practice it can be difficult to
determine when a state actually falls into these categories.
THE SUPPLY-SIDE LITERATURE Ever since John F. Kennedy predicted in 1963 that there might be as many as “fifteen, twenty,
or twenty-five nuclear weapons powers” in the 1970s, statesmen and scholars alike have been surprised that the pace of
nuclear proliferation has been so much slower than predicted (Potter & Mukhatzhanova 2010). Indeed, Hymans (2010, p.
13) argues that “the basic puzzle facing the study of nuclear proliferation is why there is such a large and persistent gap
between the technically nuclear weapons– capable states—at present there are perhaps as many as fifty—and the small
number of actual nuclear weapons states.” Much of the new supply-side literature has been obsessed with this puzzle. The
underlying assumption here, that more and more states have become “nuclear weapons capable,” however, depends
crucially on how one defines and measures nuclear weapons capability.
NEW SUPPLY-SIDE RESEARCH: BRINGING BACK THE FUEL Two new contributions have helped improve the literature by
focusing precisely on the technologies needed to link nuclear power to nuclear proliferation: nuclear exports and technology
agreements regarding nuclear fuel production, reprocessing technology, nuclear engineering training, and power and
research reactors. First, Kroenig (2009a,b, 2010) argues that international sensitive nuclear assistance contributes to the
spread of nuclear weapons. Kroenig defines sensitive nuclear assistance as giving information on weapons design or
construction, providing large amounts of weaponsgrade fissile material, or assisting in the construction of facilities for
uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing that could be used to produce weapons-grade fissile material. He tests his
theory both statistically and through three case studies of countries that acquired nuclear weapons after having received
sensitive nuclear assistance: Israel, China, and Pakistan.
THE DEMAND-SIDE LITERATURE Different studies of why states are interested in acquiring nuclear weapons examine
different incentives and often focus on different actors who influence government decisions. Early work on the demand for
nuclear weapons focused on the utility of using international relations theories to derive alternative testable hypotheses.
Solingen’s 1994 article “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint” contrasted neorealist predictions about the importance
of threats to her own prediction that “ruling coalitions pursuing economic liberalization are more likely to embrace regional
nuclear regimes than their inward-looking, nationalist, and radical-confessional counterparts” (p. 136). Sagan’s 1996 article
“Three Models in Search of a Bomb” compared the influence of security threats, domestic political interests, and
international norms on nuclear proliferation decisions. The first of the three models focused on military security motivations;
the second emphasized domestic political actors or bureaucratic coalitions that form to support or oppose nuclear weapons
for parochial reasons; and the third focused on norms and prestige considerations that can encourage or discourage
acquisition of nuclear weapons (Sagan 1996/1997, 1999). Sagan found strongest support for the security model, but he
argued that domestic interests and normative concerns about prestige were “sufficient, but not necessary” conditions for
proliferation in a limited number of cases.
NEW DEMAND-SIDE RESEARCH: BRINGING BACK LEADERSHIP Three recent case-study works by Abraham, Hymans, and
Solingen have added significantly to our understanding of specific national and regional cases of proliferation and
nonproliferation by developing new theoretical constructs. Each of these scholars focuses attention on the interests and
strategic preferences of government leaders and tests his or her theories against a limited set of cases. It will be especially
valuable, therefore, for future researchers to test these theories more broadly. Abraham has not only written one of the best
studies of the Indian nuclear power and weapons program but has also introduced the important concept of “nuclear
ambivalence” to the subfield (Abraham 1998, 2006, 2009).
THE NPT, REGIME TYPE, AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION Despite this lack of consensus about the central causes of nuclear
proliferation, there are two specific agreements in both the case-study and the quantitative political science literature: (a)
the NPT does not have significant effects on the likelihood of proliferation and (b) regime type has only a minimal effect on
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proliferation. Because of the (false) consensus that the capability to build nuclear weapons is already widely available, most
political scientists studying proliferation are highly skeptical of the potential effect of efforts to control the supply of nuclear
technology. Hymans (2006, p. 220) argues that “given the widespread diffusion of nuclear capacities, supply-side control
measures against potential proliferant states are clearly of declining utility.”
Horizontal proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries by banning the trade of nuclear arms and to
stop any capability of producing nuclear weapons. From the first successful nuclear detonation in New Mexico in 1945 the
spread of nuclear weapons has posed a serious threat that America sought to stop to best of their ability, with refusing to
share this new technology in contrary to their previous agreement even with their close allies in Great Britain as they felt it
was too much power. However, it can be seen earlier on that although they did not share this new technology it wasn’t till
the 1960’s that they began to start to realise that they needed to come to an agreement with the rest of the world on how
to stop proliferation. This came with the form of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty of 1968 banning the trading of nuclear
weapons with states that did not have them, and to focus efforts towards finding sustainable energy resources rather than
weapons. With all the countries in the world that had nuclear weapons at the time the signing the agreement it seemed like
a success.
Vertical proliferation refers to the advancement and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. During the Cold War both America and
Russia were competing to create the largest and most destructive bombs and create large stockpiles to create a large arsenal
of these destructive weapons. While vertical proliferation was seen as one of the main threats throughout the Cold War
years. It can still be seen today with the U.K. recently replacing it submarines and renewing its Trident programme costing
around £20 billion, and the U.S. with its focus on creating new “mini-nukes” and battlefield weapons it is clear that it is to
this day a vertical proliferation is still prominent.
14 Nuclear Strategy. The formation of tenets and strategies for producing and using nuclear weapons.
Nuclear strategy is no different from any other form of military strategy in that it involves relating military means to political
ends. In this case, however, the military means in question are so powerful and destructive that it has been doubted whether
any worthwhile political purpose could be served by their use. On the one hand, it has been questioned whether any country
with pretensions to civilization could unleash such a devastating force as nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it has been
noted that their use against an opponent similarly endowed would result in an equally ruinous retaliation. The central issue
for nuclear strategy, therefore, is less how to win and wage a nuclear war than whether by preparing to do so it is possible
to create a deterrent effect. The minimum objective would be to deter another’s nuclear use, and the maximum would be
to deter any aggression, on the grounds that any hostilities might create the extreme circumstances in which the restraints
on nuclear use would fall away.
A 21st-Century Military Doctrine for America
The United States emerged from World War II as a superpower with the doctrinal luxury of not having to come to grips with
the limits of our military power for many decades. During that time, our open-ended approach to the construction and use
of force has led the Nation astray and taught us some difficult lessons. Reality has begun to reveal the limits that we have
been reluctant to recognize.
Realities The new environment for nuclear strategy includes the erosion of intercontinental nuclear power, basic changes
to past thinking about nuclear escalation, and increased possibilities for the use of force at all levels of conflict, nuclear and
nonnuclear. A communications and technical revolution has altered the entire context for international relations, including
the spectrum of potential and actual conflict and the options for building appropriate forces for the kinds of conflict that are
likely.
The luxury of separating foreign and domestic threats has ended, and the Nation faces a pressing need to rediscover the
geopolitical facts of life. We have forgotten the “militia” focus of our ground forces, but a new awareness of domestic
vulnerabilities, especially at our borders, is beginning to rekindle thinking about the core purpose of the Army.

A Word to Reality Deniers

Some will argue that the price is high and that unfriendly forces will fill any vacuum. Those who argue this are serious people
with serious concerns that contain an element of truth and must not be dismissed.
There is no doubt that a reduced U.S. police role has left a vacuum. The price in a given region may indeed be high, the need
for America to shore up its coalitions may be strong, and the necessity to endure regimes we loathe may be distasteful. The
laudable American instinct to export our democratic values and great good fortune will suffer.
But accepting these realities is not the end of the world, just the end of a world we dominate every day in every way. Those
who would dispute the effect of these realities and oppose attempts to modernize our doctrine to meet them might complain
that they imply domestic policy isolationism and American foreign policy tentativeness. In making such an assertion,
however, they would be wrong. A realistic, common sense military doctrine compatible with the will of the American people
does not have to relinquish the U.S. leadership role in international affairs. There is plenty to do both at home and abroad.
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Doctrinal Priorities and Directions

A realistic military doctrine requires a basic reordering of resources dedicated to our military posture. Significant resources
will continue to be needed for limited but decisive projection forces and for beefed-up and reorganized domestic security
forces. Doctrinal priorities must be shifted in these directions and away from maintaining ground forces capable of deploying
thousands of miles away and dominating distant battlefields for long periods of time.
Military budgets may suffer as the Nation, adjusting to the post-industrial and changing global economic power balances,
finds that it cannot maintain a defense budget larger than several other major countries combined. It is essential that our
economic and political decisionmakers think decades ahead about the role of the United States as they adjust doctrine,
defense budgets, and postures. There will probably be enough resources for a thoughtful future military, but not enough to
keep rebuilding the past.
Force Implications
The implications for nonprojection U.S. forces are profound. Realities require an American force structure different from
what we were used to maintaining in the second half of the 20th century. Given the realities that have emerged, resources
must be shifted to match the will of the people to use force, the contingencies in which force makes sense, and the resources
that can realistically be devoted to the military.
No nation is better positioned geographically and economically to defend itself. Reagan was correct: the Shining City Upon
the Hill is what America is really about and how we can best be the model for the world. Our very existence is the best answer
to those who choose not to be like us. This is what American exceptionalism really means. Protecting the Shining City is what
our Army should be about.
A Realistic Timeline
Clearly, the context for the exercise of American leadership has changed. Also changed is the relationship of nuclear and
conventional forces at all levels of conflict, the technical and communications environments, and the interplay between
domestic and foreign military challenges. It is a changed world both at home and abroad. New realities demand new
approaches to the missions, construction, and operation of U.S. military forces.
Strategic doctrines of China
China’s nuclear doctrine is the product of four different schools of thought: the self-defensive nuclear doctrine, the minimum
nuclear deterrence doctrine, the counter-nuclear coercion doctrine, and, finally, a doctrine of limited deterrence. These
schools of thought have influenced the creation of a doctrine focused on, among other things, committing to no first use,
building a lean and effective arsenal, and maintaining a second-strike capability.
The first school of thought in China is the self-defensive nuclear doctrine. Sun Xiangli, a senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic Studies at Beijing’s Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, argues that China’s nuclear
strategy is basically characterized by a no-first-use policy, a limited but effective nuclear force, and support for nuclear
disarmament.
Chinese and U.S. nuclear experts have had problems communicating in their exchanges about nuclear doctrines, so some
Chinese scholars and experts now try to explain China’s nuclear doctrine in terms of U.S. deterrence. For example, Major
General Yao Yunzhu of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Science said that China maintains a minimum
nuclear arsenal (which can be regarded as minimum nuclear deterrence), pursues a nuclear doctrine of retaliatory deterrence
and pledges not to use nuclear weapons first, never intends to use nuclear weapons as an offensive capability, and does not
extend its own nuclear umbrella to any other nation or seek one from another country.
In 2006, the Chinese government published China’s nuclear strategy for the first time, in the December 2006 white paper
titled “China’s National Defense in 2006.” According to the white paper, China is:
Pursuing a self-defensive nuclear strategy. China’s nuclear strategy is subject to the state’s nuclear policy and military
strategy. Its fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against
China. China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any
circumstances. It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon
states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for the comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear
weapons. China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons,
and aims at building a lean and effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs. It endeavors to ensure
the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force. China’s nuclear force
is under the direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC). China exercises great restraint in developing its
nuclear force. It has never entered into and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.
MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC STABILITY
“The framework of strategic stability between major powers is the foundation of global strategic stability.”40 During the Cold
War, strategic stability between major powers mainly meant stability, or lack thereof, between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold War, both the United States and Russia have reduced their strategic nuclear weapons
such that it is possible to avoid a nuclear arms race. All the while, major powers must still make serious efforts to avoid a
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security dilemma, which would lead to a renewed nuclear arms competition. Not only should major powers maintain
international strategic balance and stability, they should also vigorously advance nuclear disarmament.41 China and the
United States in particular should establish a nuclear relationship of both deterrence and cooperation. On one hand, the lack
of strategic trust between the two countries created by tension over Taiwan means that they will form some kind of mutual
nuclear deterrence. On the other hand, China and the United States have many common (or at least parallel) interests, so
they will have to cooperate on issues including nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran, and international nuclear
security and safety more generally.
U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM
The missile defense program being built by the United States will be detrimental to international strategic stability and
security, and will have a negative impact on the process of nuclear disarmament. For example, if the United States increases
the number of interceptors in its strategic missile defense system, China has to increase its arsenal of intercontinental ballistic
missiles in order to maintain parity and an assured second strike. Effective second strike requires that China have a surviving
arsenal of nuclear warheads that can penetrate the U.S. missile defense system in order to hit the United States in response
to a U.S. first strike. Missile defense increases the stakes of second-strike capacity, because China has to have enough nuclear
warheads to sustain the losses incurred by a first nuclear strike by the United States, and still have remaining missiles that
can penetrate U.S. missile defense systems to hit the United States with at least one warhead. The United States will not be
willing to be struck by a nuclear bomb in order to protect Taiwan, Japan, or the Philippines.
The Russian doctrine defined after the fall of the Soviet Union is called Deep Battle. It anticipates Russian combat at any
level of warfare. The goal is to go as deeply and quickly into the enemy as possible. To do this, there must be intense
coordination at all levels of the battle and also between levels.
The military doctrine of the Russia is a strategic planning document of the Russia and represents a system of officially state
adopted views of preparation for the armed protection of Russia. The most recent revision of the military doctrine was
approved in 2021.
Numerous successive revisions of military doctrine have been promulgated since 1990. These have included the military
doctrines of May 1992 (in draft form), November 1993, and January 2000, as well as the two National Security Concepts of
December 1997 and October 1999. Military doctrine in the Russian sense, however, extends beyond discussion of potential
threats. In Christopher Donnelly's words, it forms part of "a set of views, accepted in a country at a given time, which cover
the aims and character of possible war, the preparations of the country and its armed forces for such war, and the methods
of waging it."
Russia’s military doctrine also focuses on the initial period of war. In the event of large-scale war, Russia fears surprise attack,
a fear reinforced by its experience in World War II. The Russian government perceives its own demographic, economic, and
technological limitations in any long-term conflict—such as one potentially initiated by the United States and NATOusing
long-range precision strike capabilities from both air- and sea-based platforms.These capabilities present a serious threat to
Russia’s command and control capabilities and critical infrastructure.
In response to Western capabilities, and recognizing that modern warfare is defined by speed and technological
sophistication, the Russian military is heavily influenced by an offensive doctrine that guidesits concepts of deterrence and
defense. As a result, Russian military doctrine seeks to decisively engage and resolve conflicts on terms favorable to Russia.
The goal is not to seek to deny area access by an adversary (which some analysts compare with China’s defensive capabilities
and doctrine, commonly known as Area Access and Air Denial, or A2AD). Rather,Russian doctrine focuses on integrated
defenses (especially aerospace defense forces) that treat the enemy as a system. It seeks to disrupt, deflect, and eventually
punish an attacker in the initial stages of a conflict.
15 Strategic importance of the Indian Ocean and Gulf Region in the changing pattern of world politics
The geopolitical analysts have viewed the configuration of earth on the bases of arrangement of lands and waters and
interconnecting lines of these two phenomena. Most of the geopolitical concepts date back to more than hundred years ago,
and analyzed the reciprocal relations between men and the state and natural environment. The division of earth has based
upon: (i) The Land Continental hemisphere and (ii) the water hemisphere (oceanic).Indian Ocean over the time has become
one of the most important Oceans of the world with respect to the growing economic activity of this globalized world. It is
the third largest Ocean of the world being neighbored to Asia in its north, Africa to its west, Indo China to its east while
Antarctica lies in its south. It ranges from north to south from the Bay of Bengal to Antarctica with estimated area of 9600
kilo meters, while it extends from west to east from Southern Africa to Western Australia with the range of 7800 kilo meters.
Indian Ocean covers almost 20 per cent of the world’s water. Its total area is about 68.556 million square kilo meter and it is
almost 5.5 times larger than the United States. The ocean total area includes Andaman Sea, Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal,
Flores Sea, Great Australian Bight, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Java Sea, Mozambique Channel, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Savu
Sea, Strait of Malacca, Timor Sea, and other tributary water bodies (Debee, 2011). It also has several small island nations
such as the Madagascar, The Seychelles, Reunion Island, Maldives, Mauritius and Sri Lanka. While a cluster of islands forming
Indonesia borders the ocean in east. Indian Ocean got its name after the huge Indian subcontinent in its north.
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Geographical Setting of Indian Ocean Following are the vital global shipping routes and choke points of Indian Ocean
discussed individually in detail:
1. Strait of Hormuz Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important waterways or chokepoints. It is the strategic link
that connects the oil fields of Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. The strait is 48 to 80 km wide but navigation
is limited to two 3 km wide channels, both which are exclusively used for inbound and outbound of vessels. It is the only
waterway which gives an outlet to the largest oil producing states of the Persian Gulf to an open ocean. According to an
estimate the strait carries almost 88 per cent of the Persian Gulf oil to the world (Asia, USA, Western Europe), and almost 20
per cent of the world oil, which makes it to carry nearly 35 per cent of all seaborne oil shipments (Lehman, 2008). On an
average day, the Strait of Hormuz carries 3,000 vessels that include oil tankers plus fishing boats. Furthermore, on an average
day in 2011 for about 14 tankers carrying 17 million barrels of crude oil and almost 2 million barrels of petroleum products
pass out from the Persian Gulf through this strait
2. Strait of Malacca Strait of Malacca is a strait that lies between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. It connects the Indian
Ocean with the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, this strait serves as the shortest route between the Persian Gulf and
its markets in Asia. It remains one of the world’s most important routes because of the fact that it allows almost 50,000
vessels to move through the passage every year. Although it has a large capacity to cater a large amount of vessels, it is its
narrow channel, the tiny islands and shallow reefs that brings it to the centre of the risk of collision (Massey, 2008).
3. Bab-el-Mandeb Bab-el-Mandeb is the third most busiest and important waterway after -Strait of Hormuz and Strait of
Malacca. The strait of Bab-el-Mandeb connects the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea by way of Gulf of Aden. It is 20 miles wide
and is divided into two channels; the western channel is 16 miles wide while the eastern channel in 2 miles wide. This strait
carries most of the European crude oil imports as it allows the tankers to carry oil from the Persian Gulf through the Suez
Canal and then from a pipeline to Europe and United States of America.
The strait has the capacity to cater 3.3 million barrels of oil per day from the Persian Gulf. On the other hand the approximate
flow of oil passing through the Suez Canal to Europe and America accounts for some 2.1 million barrels per day (Rodrigue,
2004.
4. The Sunda and Lombok straits. The strait of Sunda and Lombok are usually counted as the alternative routes in the event
of closure of the Strait of Malacca. The Sunda strait lies between the two Indonesian Islands of Java and Sumatra while
connecting the Java Sea with the Indian Ocean. However, the strait is very much shallow and narrow at certain points which
make it less significant to be used for carrying heavy oil tankers. On the other hand there are other several problems for
navigating in the strait such as the heavy tidal waves, the oil drilling platforms, volcanoes as well as the tiny islands. The
Lombok strait which is another alternative route to the Strait of Malacca lies between the two islands of Bali and Lombok.
5. Mozambique Channel Mozambique Channel is another waterway within the India Ocean that lies between the island
nation of Madagascar and South east Africa. The waterway is almost 1600 km long while its width varies from 400-950 km.
It is highly strategic waterway which carries almost 30 per cent of the world’s oil trade and almost 100 per cent of the South
Africa’s maritime trade. Thus, one of the most serious concerns is the frequent attacks by Somali pirates in this part of the
Indian Ocean. Although Mozambique borders this essential and second longest coastline after Somalia, it lacks resources to
police the channel on its own. Therefore, the states like South Africa and France have a vital role in these regional waterways.
(Luke, 2011).
6. Ten Degree and Six Degree Channels Ten Degree and Six Degree Channels are the two channels in Indian Ocean that are
ten degrees and six degrees above from the equator respectively. Ten Degree Channel generally lies between the two Indian
Islands of Andaman and Nicobar while the Six degree channel lies between the Indian Island of Nicobar and Indonesian Island
of Sumatra. As these two channels are close to Indian territories in the Indian Ocean, their significance to India is of great
deal. All these waterways and choke points or in other words the strategic Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) are
important for the concerned states within Asia, Europe and Americas. For the South Asian states three themes that dominate
Indian Ocean and its SLOCs revolve around China, India and Economics.
16 strategic impact of the two Gulf Wars
The Gulf War is often remembered as a “good war,” a high-tech conflict that quickly and cleanly achieved its objectives. Yet,
new archival evidence sheds light on the extended fallout from the war and challenges this neat narrative. The Gulf War left
policymakers with a dilemma that plagued successive U.S. administrations. The war helped create an acute humanitarian
crisis in Iraq, and the United States struggled to find a way to contain a still recalcitrant Saddam Hussein while alleviating the
suffering of innocent Iraqis. The failure of American leaders to resolve this dilemma, despite several chances to do so, allowed
Saddam’s regime to drive a wedge into the heart of the American-led, post-Cold War order. While in the short term the war
seemed like a triumph, over the years its afterlife caused irreparable harm to American interests.
In June 1991, nearly 5 million onlookers enthusiastically welcomed American troops returning home from the Gulf War as
they marched in a ticker-tape parade through New York City’s “Canyon of Heroes.”1 This image of the Gulf War as a triumph
has proved enduring. As two historians of the war wrote a decade later, the Gulf War was “one of the most successful
campaigns in American military history.”2 For many Americans, the war exorcised the demons of Vietnam.3 Others have
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contrasted the success of the 1991 Gulf War with the failure of the 2003 Iraq War.4 Such praise has transcended domestic
American politics. Both the Clinton and Obama administrations admired the way President George H. W. Bush handled the
conflict.5 Despite some handwringing about Saddam Hussein remaining in power and the fact that there was no World War
II-style surrender, the conflict is still remembered as a “good war” or, as one Marine Corps general described it, a “beautiful
thing.”6 Unsurprisingly, it has had an outsize impact on the way Americans think war should be conducted.
Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988
Iraqi president Saddam Hussein ordered the invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980
The Iran-Iraq War permanently altered the course of Iraqi history. It strained Iraqi political and social life, and led to severe
economic dislocations. Viewed from a historical perspective, the outbreak of hostilities in 1980 was, in part, just another
phase of the ancient Persian-Arab conflict that had been fueled by twentieth-century border disputes. Many observers,
however, believe that Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iran was a personal miscalculation based on ambition and a sense
of vulnerability. Saddam Hussein, despite having made significant strides in forging an Iraqi nation-state, feared that Iran's
new revolutionary leadership would threaten Iraq's delicate Sunni-Shia balance and would exploit Iraq's geostrategic
vulnerabilities--Iraq's minimal access to the Persian Gulf, for example. In this respect, Saddam Hussein's decision to invade
Iran has historical precedent; the ancient rulers of Mesopotamia, fearing internal strife and foreign conquest, also engaged
in frequent battles with the peoples of the highlands.
The Iran-Iraq War was multifaceted and included religious schisms, border disputes, and political differences. Conflicts
contributing to the outbreak of hostilities ranged from centuries old Sunni-versus-Shia and Arab-versus-Persian religious and
ethnic disputes, to a personal animosity between Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini. Above all, Iraq launched the war
in an effort to consolidate its rising power in the Arab world and to replace Iran as the dominant Persian Gulf state. Phebe
Marr, a noted analyst of Iraqi affairs, stated that "the war was more immediately the result of poor political judgement and
miscalculation on the part of Saddam Hussein," and "the decision to invade, taken at a moment of Iranian weakness, was
Saddam's".
Iraq and Iran had engaged in border clashes for many years and had revived the dormant Arvand-Roud (Shatt al Arab)
waterway dispute in 1979. Iraq claimed the 200-kilometer channel up to the Iranian shore as its territory, while Iran insisted
that the line running down the middle of the waterway negotiated last in 1975, was the official border. The Iraqis, especially
the Baath leadership, regarded the 1975 treaty as merely a truce, not a definitive settlement.
Iraqi Offensives, 1980 – 1982
Despite the Iraqi government's concern, the eruption of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran did not immediately destroy the
Iraqi-Iranian rapprochement that had prevailed since the 1975 Algiers Agreement. As a sign of Iraq's desire to maintain good
relations with the new government in Tehran, President Bakr sent a personal message to Khomeini offering "his best wishes
for the friendly Iranian people on the occasion of the establishment of the Islamic Republic." In addition, as late as the end
of August 1979, Iraqi authorities extended an invitation to Mehdi Bazargan, the first Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, to visit Iraq with the aim of improving bilateral relations. The fall of the moderate Bazargan government in late 1979,
however, and the rise of Islamic militants preaching an expansionist foreign policy soured Iraqi-Iranian relations.
The principal events that touched off the rapid deterioration in relations occurred during the spring of 1980. In April the
Iranian-supported Ad Dawah attempted to assassinate Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz. Shortly after the failed grenade attack
on Tariq Aziz, Ad Dawah was suspected of attempting to assassinate another Iraqi leader, Minister of Culture and Information
Latif Nayyif Jasim. In response, the Iraqis immediately rounded up members and supporters of Ad Dawah and deported to
Iran thousands of Shias of Iranian origin. In the summer of 1980, Saddam Hussein ordered the executions of presumed Ad
Dawah leader Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqr as Sadr and his sister.
In September 1980, border skirmishes erupted in the central sector near Qasr-e Shirin, with an exchange of artillery fire by
both sides. A few weeks later, Saddam Hussein officially abrogated the 1975 treaty between Iraq and Iran and announced
that the Arvand-Roud (Shatt al Arab) was returning to Iraqi sovereignty. Iran rejected this action and hostilities escalated as
the two sides exchanged bombing raids deep into each other's territory, beginning what was to be a protracted and
extremely costly war.
The first day of the war. On September 22, 1980, formations of Iraqi MiG-23s and MiG21s attacked Iran's air bases at
Mehrabad and Doshen-Tappen (both near Tehran), as well as Tabriz, Bakhtaran, Ahvaz, Dezful, Uromiyeh, Hamadan,
Sanandaj, and Abadan. Their aim was to destroy the Iranian air force on the ground--a lesson learned from the Arab-Israeli
June 1967 War. They succeeded in destroying runways and fuel and ammunition depots, but much of Iran's aircraft inventory
was left intact. Iranian defenses were caught by surprise, but the Iraqi raids failed because Iranian jets were protected in
specially strengthened hangars and because bombs designed to destroy runways did not totally incapacitate Iran's very large
airfields. Within hours, Iranian F-4 Phantoms took off from the same bases, successfully attacked strategically important
targets close to major Iraqi cities, and returned home with very few losses.
Iran-Kuwait (1990)
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On August 2, 1990, at about 2 a.m. local time, Iraqi forces invade Kuwait, Iraq’s tiny, oil -rich neighbor. Kuwait’s
defense forces were rapidly overwhelmed, and those that were not destroyed retreated to Saudi Arabia. The
emir of Kuwait, his family, and other government leaders fled to Saudi Arabia, and within hours Kuwait City
had been captured and the Iraqis had established a provincial government. By annexing Kuwait, Iraq gained
control of 20 percent of the world’s oil reserves and, for the first time, a substantial coastline on the Persian
Gulf. The same day, the United Nations Security Council unanimously denounced the invasion and demanded
Iraq’s immediate withdrawal from Kuwait. On August 6, the Security Council imposed a worldwide ban on
trade with Iraq.
On August 9, Operation Desert Shield, the American defense of Saudi Arabia, began as U.S. forces raced to the
Persian Gulf. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, meanwhile, built up his occupying army in Kuwait to about
300,000 troops. On November 29, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution authorizing the use of force
against Iraq if it failed to withdraw by January 15, 1991. Hussein refused to withdraw his forces from Kuwait,
which he had established as a province of Iraq, and some 700,000 allied troo ps, primarily American, gathered
in the Middle East to enforce the deadline.
At 4:30 p.m. EST on January 16, 1991, Operation Desert Storm, the massive U.S. -led offensive against Iraq,
began as the first fighter aircraft were launched from Saudi Arabia and off U.S. and British aircraft carriers in
the Persian Gulf. All evening, aircraft from the U.S. -led military coalition pounded targets in and around
Baghdad as the world watched the events transpire on television footage transmitted live via satellite fro m
Iraq. Operation Desert Storm was conducted by an international coalition under the supreme command of U.S.
General Norman Schwarzkopf and featured forces from 32 nations, including Britain, Egypt, France, Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait.
During the next six weeks, the allied force engaged in an intensive air war against Iraq’s military and civil
infrastructure and encountered little effective resistance from the Iraqi air force or air defenses. Iraqi ground
forces were helpless during this stage of the war, and H ussein’s only significant retaliatory measure was the
launching of SCUD missile attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia. Saddam hoped that the missile attacks would
provoke Israel to enter the conflict, thus dissolving Arab support of the war. At the request of the United
States, however, Israel remained out of the war.
On February 24, a massive coalition ground offensive began, and Iraq’s outdated and poorly supplied armed
forces were rapidly overwhelmed. By the end of the day, the Iraqi army had effectively folded, 10,000 of its
troops were held as prisoners, and a U.S. air base had been established deep inside Iraq. After less than four
days, Kuwait was liberated, and the majority of Iraq’s armed forces had either surrendered, retreated to Iraq,
or been destroyed.
On February 28, U.S. President George Bush declared a cease-fire, and on April 3 the U.N. Security Council
passed Resolution 687, specifying conditions for a formal end to the conflict. According to the resolution,
Bush’s cease-fire would become official, some sanctions would be lifted, but the ban on Iraqi oil sales would
continue until Iraq destroyed its weapons of mass destruction under U.N. supervision. On April 6, Iraq accepted
the resolution, and on April 11 the Security Council declared it in effect. During the next decade, Saddam
Hussein frequently violated the terms of the peace agreement, prompting fur ther allied air strikes and
continuing U.N. sanctions.
In the Persian Gulf War, 148 American soldiers were killed and 457 wounded. The other allied nations suffered
about 100 deaths combined during Operation Desert Storm. There are no official figures for the number of
Iraqi casualties, but it is believed that at least 25,000 soldiers were killed and more than 75,000 were wounded,
making it one of the most one-sided military conflicts in history. It is estimated that 100,000 Iraqi civilians
died from wounds or from lack of adequate water, food, and medical supplies directly attributable to the
Persian Gulf War. In the ensuing years, more than one million Iraqi civilians have died as a result o f the
subsequent U.N. sanctions.