Case Digest Assignment
Case Digest Assignment
Case Digest Assignment
It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to
have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present
Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused
therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is
not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
(b) principal and interest on public debt,] & (LJ national government
guarantees of obligations which are drawn upon, are automatically
appropriated: Provided, that no obligations shall be incurred or payments
made from funds thus automatically appropriated except as issued in the form
of regular budgetary allotments. ”
ISSUES
RULING
4. MAYOR ALVIN B. GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ARTURO C. MOJICA, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas, VIRGINIA PALANCA-SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Director, Office of
the Ombudsman (Visayas), ALAN FRANCISCO S. GARCIANO, in his capacity as
Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), and JESUS
RODRIGO T. TAGAAN, respondents.
FACTS petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E.
Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The... news reports came out
regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the
contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.[1]
After his investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to
criminal and administrative cases... against petitioner and the other city
officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas, approved this recommendation.
the Office of the Ombudsman issued the questioned preventive suspension
order. On June 29, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said
order, which motion was denied... petitioner issued a memorandum informing
employees and officials of the Office of the City Mayor that he was assuming
the post of... mayor effective immediately. On July 23, 1999, respondents filed a
motion seeking clarification of our status quo order. Respondents claimed that
the status quo referred to in the order should be that where petitioner is
already suspended and vice mayor Renato Osmeñ a is... the acting city mayor.
ISSUES What is the effect of the reelection of petitioner on the investigation of acts
done before his reelection? Did the Ombudsman for the Visayas gravely abuse
his discretion in conducting the investigation of petitioner and ordering his
preventive suspension?
Assuming that the Ombudsman properly took cognizance of the case, what law
should apply to the investigation being conducted by him, the Local
Government Code (R.A. 7160) or the Ombudsman Law (R.A. 6770)? Was the
procedure in the law properly observed?
Assuming further that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction, is the preventive
suspension of petitioner based on "strong evidence" as required by law?... did
respondent Deputy Ombudsman commit a grave abuse of discretion when he
set the period of preventive suspension at six months?... can that... office hold
him administratively liable for said acts?
RULING when the Supreme Court has issued a status quo order which, as the very term
connotes, is merely intended to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and
uncontested state of things which preceded the controversy.
to resolve the present controversy, we must recall that the authority of the
Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is mandated by no less
than the Constitution. Under Article XI, Section 13[1], the Ombudsman has the
power... to:
"investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."
R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Law, further grants the Office of the Ombudsman
the statutory power to conduct administrative investigations.
Section 21 of R.A. 6770 names the officials subject to the Ombudsman's
disciplinary authority:
"SEC. 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of
the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed
only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary."(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner is an elective local official accused of grave misconduct and
dishonesty.[10] That the Office of the Ombudsman may conduct an
administrative investigation into the acts complained of, appears clear from
the foregoing provisions of R.A.
FACTS
•Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman,
the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under
preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during
the pendency of the OMB Cases. The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for
the preventive suspension of a public officer are present, finding that: (a) the
evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing
bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City
had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building
project; (2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and (3)
the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of
funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from
public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them
access to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses;
hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to
the OMB Cases filed against them. Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals: •
Binay contends: that he could not be held administratively liable for any
anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking
Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was
elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his
first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term
effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering
the administrative cases against him moot and academic. In any event, Binay,
Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show
that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he
did not participate in any of the purported irregularities. In support of his
prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and
unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide vote in the
2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well
as the lack of evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension from
office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person
they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office. •At noon of the same
day, the CA issued a Resolution (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s
prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting
Mayor earlier that day. • The OMB manifested that the TRO did not state what
act was being restrained and that since the preventive suspension order had
already been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain
Proceedings before the SC: • In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the
Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition before this Court, arguing that the
condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the
evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension
orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation
doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr.
before it during the administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is
no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB
Complaint after his re-election in 2013.
ISSUES Whether the Petition filed before the SC, without resorting to the filing of a
motion for reconsideration, was the
Ombudsman’s plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;
2. Whether the Court of Appeals (“CA”) has subject matter
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition;
3. Whether the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a
Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (“WPI”) enjoining the implementation of the
preventive suspension issued by Ombudsman against
Binay, Jr.;
4. Whether the CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion in issuing said TRO
and WPI; and
Whether the Petition filed before the SC, without resorting to the filing of a
motion for reconsideration, was the Ombudsman’s plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy; 2. Whether the Court of Appeals (“CA”) has subject matter jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the petition; 3. Whether the CA has subject matter
jurisdiction to issue a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (“WPI”) enjoining the implementation of the
preventive suspension issued by Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.; 4. Whether
the CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion in issuing said TRO and WPI; and
RULING
term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or
statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected
for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from
an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from
administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section
19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v.
Orbos to apply to administrative offenses…" The SC made it clear that Pascual
has no statutory basis at all. By abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC
would remove this defense oft-times used by elected officials, of which the SC
was aware of, as it made mention of the data brought forward by the
Ombudsman, to wit: “To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed
the Court that ‘for the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases
from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on
the ground on condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred
cases of alleged misconduct – involving infractions such as dishonesty,
oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct – were placed
beyond the reach of the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutorial
powers.’ Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of
repetition and must therefore, not evade review.
MARILYN GEDUSPAN and DRA. EVANGELYN FARAHMAND, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
FACTS An Information was filed in the Sandiganbayan alleging that MARILYN
C. GEDUSPAN, a public officer, being the Regional Manager/Director, of the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, Regional office in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and
mutually helping with DR. EVANGELINE C. FARAHMAND, a private individual
and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi,
Inc., Mandalangan, Bacolod City, release the claims for payments of patients
confined at L.N. Memorial Hospital with
ISSUES Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case
RULING Petitioner admits that she holds the position of Department Manager A of
Philhealth. She, however, contends that the position of Department Manager A
is