SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION

A. Who are entitled to constitutional protection

G.R. Nos. 95122-23 / 197 SCRA 853 (1991)

BOARD OF COMMISSIONER (CID) VS. DELA ROSA et al.,

A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority. If he is
disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the questionable right to resort to the courts for his
protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition.

FACTS:
William Gatchalian (Gatchalian), then a twelve-year-old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong with
Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. Gatchalian and his companions were
admitted as Filipino Citizens and were issued Identification Certificate by the immigration authorities
on August 16, 1961.The then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9, setting aside all
decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on
review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI). The same memorandum
directed the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that
the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William and others. Petitioner
Board reversed the decision of the BSI, admitting respondent Gatchalian as Filipino Citizen and a
mission order was issued to command the arrest of Gatchalian.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON the Board of Commissioner’s decision has satisfactorily proved the question on the
citizenship of William Gatchalian. (NO)
2. WON the warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of the Immigration for purposes of
investigation only is valid. (NO)

HELD:
1. Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners’ decision (dated July 6, 19620
finding respondent’s claim to Philippines citizenship not satisfactorily proved constitute res
judicata. For one thing, said decision did not make any categorical statement that
responded Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to
questions citizenship.

2. UNCONSTITUTIONAL- as stated in Sec. 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is clear

that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are
concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation
as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner
of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of
deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of
investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional.

G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and
respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently
enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523 for lack of
jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214 and
3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges are likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as
to costs.
B. Who are subject to constitutional prohibitions

U.S. Supreme Court

Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins
No. 79-289
Argued March 18, 1980
Decided June 9, 1980
447 U.S. 74

Freedom of Expression, First Amendment, Fifth Amendment 

FACTS:
The appellant, Pruneyard, is a public shopping complex. It has a policy that prohibits any visitor or
renter from participating in any activity that is not directly related to its business objectives, including
the distribution of petitions. A security guard informed the appellees that they would be required to
leave because their activity violated shopping center rules that forbid any visitor or tenant from
engaging in any publicly expressive activity that is not directly related to the center's commercial
purposes. This happened not long after the appellees started collecting signatures from onlookers in
the central courtyard of the appellant's privately owned shopping center for petitions opposing a
United Nations resolution. The appellees vacated the property right away and later filed a lawsuit in
a state court in California to prevent the shopping center and its owner (also an appellant) from
preventing the appellees from using the location to circulate their petitions.

The trial court held that the appellees were not entitled under either the Federal or California
Constitution to exercise their asserted rights on the shopping center property, and the California
Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the California
Constitution protects speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when
the center is privately owned and that such result does not infringe appellants' property rights
protected by the Federal Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellants’ “right to exclude others” a fundamental component of their protected
property rights, was violated. (NO)

HELD:

1. This case is properly before this Court as an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2). A state
constitutional provision is a "statute" within the meaning of § 1257(2), and in deciding that the State
Constitution gave appellees the right to solicit signatures on appellants' property, the California
Supreme Court rejected appellants' claim that recognition of such a right violated their "right to
exclude others," a fundamental component of their federally protected property rights. Pp. 447 U. S.
79-80.

2. State constitutional provisions, as construed to permit individuals reasonably to exercise free

speech and petition rights on the property of a privately owned shopping center to which the public is
invited, do not violate the shopping center owner's property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments or his free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 447 U.S.
88.

SEE: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/74/
NOTES:  US Constitution First Amendment “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”

State of California Constitution: Article I, section 9 of California's first constitution read: Every citizen
may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse
of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.

US Constitution, Fifth Amendment “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379, determined that Zionism is a form of racism and
racial discrimination. (Currently, as of 2023 is deemed revoked)

G.R. No. 149454. May 28, 2004.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs. CASA MONTESSORI INTERNATIONALE

and LEONARDO T. YABUT, respondents.

The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
individual—the Bill of Rights “is a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the
power of the State.”

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari and resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA). Casa
Montessori Internationale (CASA) opened an account with Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), with
CASA’s President as one of its authorized signatories. It was found that Leonardo Yabut, CASA's
external auditor, had used a fictional name to cash 9 checks under the name of Sonny D. Santos.
He willingly acknowledged using a fake signature to cash the checks. The RTC granted the
Complaint for Collection with Damages against BPI, and it ordered that the money in the account be
reinstated together with interest. Yabut was compelled to reimburse CASA and BPI after CA divided
the loss between them and took into account CASA's contributory negligence. BPI claims that the
language on the monthly statements it sends to its customers, which states, “If no error is reported
in 10 days, account will be correct” and as such, it should be considered a waiver.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Voluntary Admission of Yabut is Violative of his Constitutional Rights. (NO)

HELD:
The voluntary admission of Yabut did not violate his constitutional rights (1) on custodial
investigation, and (2) against self-incrimination. He was not under custodial investigation. His
Affidavit was executed in private and before private individuals. The mantle of protection under
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution covers only the period “from the time a person is
taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from
the time he is singled out as a suspect of a crime although not yet in custody.
Under these two constitutional provisions, “the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the
individual and the State.” Moreover, the Bill of Rights “is a charter of liberties for the individual and a
limitation upon the power of the [S]tate.” These rights are guaranteed to preclude the slightest
coercion by the State that may lead the accused “to admit something false, not prevent him from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth.”

The Petition in G.R. No. 149454 is hereby DENIED, and that in G.R. No. 149507 PARTLY
GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification: BPI is
held liable for P547,115, the total value of the forged checks less the amount already recovered by
CASA from Leonardo T. Yabut, plus interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum—
compounded annually, from the filing of the
complaint until paid in full; and attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%) thereof, subject to
reimbursement from Respondent Yabut for the entire amount, excepting attorney’s fees. Let a copy
of this Decision be furnished the Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulation Commission
for such action as it may deem appropriate against Respondent Yabut. No costs.

FUNDAMENTAL POWER OF THE STATE- SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

G.R. No. 166006. March 14, 2008.

PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner, vs. FERTIPHIL CORPORATION, respondent.

The power to tax exists for the general welfare, hence, implicit in its power is the limitation that it
should be used only for a public purpose—it would be a robbery for the State to tax its citizens and
use the funds generated for a private purpose.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with
modification that of the RTC in Makati City finding petitioner Planters Product, Inc. (PPI) liable to
private respondent Fertiphil Corporation (Fertiphil) for the levies it paid under the Letter of Instruction
(LOI) No. 1465. After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10
levy. With the return of
democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but
PPI refused to accede to the demand. Fertiphil questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for
being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial
of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned
corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry. RTC
rendered a judgment in favor of Fertiphil.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the P10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is an exercise of the power of taxation. (NO)
2. Whether the P10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is unconstitutional even if enacted under police power
as it did not promote the public interest. (YES)

HELD:

1. An inherent limitation on the power of taxation is public purpose. Taxes are exacted only for
a public purpose. They cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive
benefit of private persons. The reason for this is simple. The power to tax exists for the
general welfare; hence, implicit in its power is the limitation that it should be used only for a
public purpose. It would be a robbery for the State to tax its citizens and use the funds
 generated for a private purpose. As an old United States case bluntly put it: “To lay with one
hand, the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to
bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is
nonetheless a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation.

2. Even if the court considers LOI No. 1695 to be enacted under the police power of the State,
it would still be invalid for failing to comply with the test of “lawful subjects” and “lawful
means.” Jurisprudence states the test as follows: (1) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. LOI No. 1695 is invalid because it did not promote public
interest. The law was enacted to give undue advantage to a private corporation.

The court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the Court of Appeals decision.

G.R. No. 159796. July 17, 2007.

ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST CONSUMERS

NETWORK, INC. (ECN), petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
(DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC), NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
(NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.),
STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC.
(PECO), respondents.

That the taxing power may be used as an implement of police power.

FACTS:
Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi and company assail the validity of Section 34 of the Republic Act
9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 “ (EPIRA Law) and Rule
18 of its Implementing Rules and Regulation unconstitutional - for being an undue delegation of the
power of taxation. Section 34 provides for the imposition of a “Universal Charge” to all electricity end
users after a period of (1) one year after the effectivity of the EPIRA Law. For a period of no more
than three years, the universal charge to be collected would be used to pay off government debts,
missionary electrification, the equalization of taxes and royalties applied to renewable and imported
energy, the environmental charge, and a charge to account for all cross-subsidies. The ERC will be
responsible for the monthly collection of the universal fee from all end users. PSALM will
subsequently manage the universal charge by establishing a special trust fund.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax. (NO)
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.
(NO)

HELD:
The court held that the power to “regulate” means the power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the
utility and of its patrons.

The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the purpose for which
the charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely
incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is
incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.
In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State’s police power,
particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced
from Sec. 34, which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed and which
can be amply discerned as regulatory in character. From the mentioned purposes of the EPIRA, it
can be gleaned that the assailed Universal Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the
State’s police power. Public Welfare is surely promoted.

The Instant case is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

POLICE POWER

G.R. No. 169364. September 18, 2009.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL and KRYSTEL
KATE SAGARANO y MEFANIA, respondents.

The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature
and inherent in the sovereign power of the state to maintain social orders as an aspect of police
power.

FACTS:
Respondent Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to
Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. They file separate motions to quash on the ground of
unconstitutionality of the Article 202 (2) for being vague and broad. The MTC denied the motions
and declared the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to States’ police power.

Original petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC was filed by Siton and Sagarano directly
challenging the constitutionality of Article 202 (2). The Office of the Solicitor General argued that the
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply to freedom of speech cases. It also asserted that it must
be presumed valid and constitutional. The trial court declared the assailed Article unconstitutional.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Article 202 (2) of the RPC is unconstitutional. (NO)

HELD:
The court held that Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and constitutional. When confronted
with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must approach it with grave care and
considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable
doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this
presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a
becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of
Congress and the
President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.

It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined
as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and
pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the
general welfare.38 As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in
a constitutional light.

The petition is GRANTED. The TRC decision declaring Article 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code UNCONSTITUTIONAL is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the proceedings in Criminal
Cases Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 thus continue.

G.R. No. 199669 April 25, 2017

SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL

WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE WELFARE OF
DISABLED PERSONS, THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, and THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents

FACTS:
On February 26, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed R.A. No. 9257, amending
some provisions of R.A. No. 7432. The new law retained the 20% discount on the purchase of
medicines but removed the annual income ceiling, thereby qualifying all senior citizens to the
privileges under the law. Further, R.A. No. 9257 modified the tax treatment of the discount granted to
senior citizens, from tax credit to tax deduction from gross income, computed based on the net cost
of goods sold or services rendered.

On May 28, 2004, the DSWD issued the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
9257

On June 17, 2011, the CA dismissed the petition, reiterating the ruling of the Court in Carlos
Superdrug, particularly that Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 was a valid exercise of police power.
Moreover, the CA held that considering the same question had been raised by parties similarly
situated and was resolved in Carlos Superdrug, the rule of stare decisis stood as a hindrance to any
further attempt to relitigate the same issue. It further noted that jurisdictional considerations also
compel the dismissal of the action. It particularly emphasized that it has no original or appellate
jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality of the assailed laws, the same pertaining to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Even assuming that it had concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC, the
principle of the hierarchy of courts mandates that the case be commenced and heard by the lower
court. The CA further ruled that the petitioner resorted to the wrong remedy as a petition for
prohibition will not lie to restrain the respondents' actions because they do not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial duties relative to the issuance or implementation of the questioned
provisions. Also, the petition wanted the allegations of the specific acts committed by the
respondents that demonstrate the exercise of these powers, which may be properly challenged in a
petition for prohibition.

The petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated June 17, 2011 of the CA, but
the same was denied in a Resolution dated November 25, 2011.

ISSUE/S:
WON the 20% Sales Discount for Senior Citizens and PWDs is a valid exercise of police power.
(YES)

HELD:
In the exercise of police power, “property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State.” Even then, the
State’s claim of police power cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable. After all, the overriding purpose of
the exercise of the power is to promote general welfare, public health, and safety, among others. It is
a measure, which by sheer necessity, the State exercises, even to the point of interfering with
personal liberties or property rights to advance the common good. To warrant such interference, two
requisites must concur: (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably
necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of police power requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method.

The subjects of R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, i.e., senior citizens and PWDs, are individuals whose
well-being is a recognized public duty. As a public duty, the responsibility for their care devolves
upon the concerted efforts of the State, the family and the community. In Article XIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution, the State is mandated to give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power1
for the common good. The more apparent manifestation of these social inequities is the unequal
distribution or access to healthcare services. To: abet in alleviating this concern, the State is
committed to adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost, with priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children.