EERA Sample

IDBC-TS-FRRSK-C00004
CPF Escape Evacuation and Rescue Plan 12 July 2013

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MPI: Not Classified Page 2 of 109
Revision Section Description
A All Issued for Review
B All Issued for Approval
C All Issued for Approval
D All Re-issued for Approval
E All Re-issued for Approval
IDBC-TS-FRRSK-C00004 Rev E (New FMP2)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABBREVIATION ...................................................................................................................................... 4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................... 5
1. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 7
2. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF WORK .................................................................................... 8
2.1 Objectives ................................................................................................................................... 8
2.2 Scope of Work ............................................................................................................................. 8
3. BASIS OF STUDY ...................................................................................................................... 9
3.1 Definitions of EER Goals............................................................................................................. 9
3.2 Methodology ................................................................................................................................ 9
3.3 Assumptions .............................................................................................................................. 11
4. DESCRIPTION OF EER FACILITIES ...................................................................................... 12
4.1 Fire and Gas Detection System ................................................................................................ 12
4.2 Alarm System ............................................................................................................................ 16
4.3 ESD System .............................................................................................................................. 17
4.4 Escape Routes and Field Muster Points ................................................................................... 17
4.5 Life Saving and Safety Equipment ............................................................................................ 18
4.6 Evacuation and Medical Rescue (MEDIVAC) ........................................................................... 20
4.7 Emergency Response Plan (ERP) ............................................................................................ 20
5. Results and Discussion.......................................................................................................... 21
5.1 Screening of MAE ..................................................................................................................... 21
5.2 Alarm Goal Analysis .................................................................................................................. 22
5.3 Escape Goal Analysis ............................................................................................................... 23
5.4 Muster Goal Analysis ................................................................................................................ 29
5.5 Decision to Evacuate Goal Analysis ......................................................................................... 33
5.6 Medical Rescue (MEDIVAC) Goal Analysis.............................................................................. 33
5.7 Evacuation Goal Analysis ......................................................................................................... 34
6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................... 36
6.1 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 36
6.2 Recommendations .................................................................................................................... 36
7. References ............................................................................................................................... 38
Appendix A: Assumption Register ..................................................................................................... 39
Appendix B: RADIATION AND TOXIC GAS RELEASE CONTOURS ............................................... 48
Appendix C: Overall Plot Plan ............................................................................................................ 70
Appendix D: Field Muster Points Location........................................................................................ 72
Appendix E: Type A & E Drainage ...................................................................................................... 74
Appendix F: ERP Flowchart ................................................................................................................ 76
Appendix G: CPF Zones ...................................................................................................................... 78
Appendix H: Escape Route Layouts .................................................................................................. 80
Appendix I: Fire & Safety Equipment Layouts ................................................................................ 100
Appendix J: PQ088 AND PQ102 ....................................................................................................... 106

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ABBREVIATION
ACGIH - American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
AGE - Acid Gas Enrichment
AGRU - Acid Gas Removal Unit
CCTV - Closed-circuit Television
CFF - Central Field Facility
CMPT - Centre of Marine and Petroleum Technology
CPF - Central Processing Facility
EEMR - Escape, Evacuation, Muster and Rescue
EER - Escape, Evacuation and Rescue
EERA - Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis

ERP - Emergency Response Plan
F&G - Fire and Gas Detection System
FMP - Field Muster Point
FSO - Floating Storage and Offloading
HVAC - Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
IDLH - Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
IF - Infrastructure Facilities
IR - Infrared
KO - Knock-out Drum
LEL - Lower Explosion Limit
LPG - Liquefied Petroluem Gas
MAC - Manual Alarm Call Point
MAE - Major Accident Event
MEDIVAC - Evacuation and Medical Rescue
OSHA - Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PA/GA - Public Address and General Alarm
PPE - Personal Protection Equipment
PPF - Production Processing Facilities
SCBA - Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
STEL - Short Term Exposure Limit
SRU - Sulfur Recovery Unit
TLV - Threshold Limit Value
TWA - Time Weighted Average
UV - Ultraviolet

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
MCL through its contractor, TRIPATRA-SAMSUNG Consortium has engaged GL Noble Denton to
perform an Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA) Study for Banyu Urip Project EPC1.
EPC1 includes three wellpads, CPF, sour crude processing, gas and water injection, produced water
treatment, utilities and other safety systems.
Based on the assessment performed, the main conclusion drawn from this study are as below:
• The Alarm Goal (Goal 1) is met and the other goals can be met by conditions. These goals
are the Escape Goal (Goal 2), Muster Goal (Goal 3), Decision to Evacuate Goal (Goal 4),
Medical Rescue Goal (Goal 5) and Evacuation Goal (Goal 6).
Drawing from the above conclusions, the following recommendations are made.
Escape Goal (Goal 2)
• Alternative escape routes and recommendations as presented in Table 6.1 are implemented
and shown on the Escape Route Layout.
Table ES.1: Escape Route Goal Recommendations
Zone Escape Route Assessments and Recommendations
To ensure that enclosed areas such as the Control Building, Laboratory, etc
1
are provided with more than one exit from the areas.
(Area C00100, C00200,
To ensure that two separate stairs are provided as far as possible in the
C00500, C01500, C00300,
enclosed areas, along with proper safety signs showing the exit points and
C00400, C00600 and C00700)
escape directions.
2
(Area C00800, C01000,
C01600, C01300, C01200,
C01400, C00900, and C01100)
escape directions.
To ensure all the normally-closed gates are locked to the outside, and opened
on the inside by a push-bar, ensuring they are readily accessible for personnel
Wellpad A working in Wellpad A.
To consider providing personnel emergency gate keys to all operations
personnel in Wellpad A.
on the inside by a push-bar, ensuring it is readily accessible for personnel
Wellpad B working in Wellpad B.
personnel in Wellpad B.
To ensure all the normally-closed gates at are locked to the outside, and
opened on the inside by a push-bar, ensuring they are readily accessible for
Wellpad C personnel working in Wellpad C.
personnel in Wellpad C.
• Emergency Response Team Leader announces the location of MAE to all personnel and to
advice the accessibility of escape routes.
• Emergency Response Team Leader informs personnel the requirement to stop work and to
don SCBA or escape pack and to muster at the allocated muster area.
• Conduct frequent training to familiarise the use of SCBA and Escape Pack.

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• SCBAs or escape packs are to be put on as soon as the alarm is triggered to assist personnel
escape.
• In the event of H2S leak, core personnel will retrieve portable H2S detector from the fireman
equipment cabinet. This is to check if muster point is safe to muster, or if personnel need to
muster further away from the muster point due to H2S impairment.
• Personnel may only remove the SCBAs or escape packs when they reach the FMP safely,
provided H2S is not detected by the portable H2S detector that the core personnel is carrying.
• Ensure that Type A and Type E drains, where human and vehicle access are located, are
covered.
Muster Goal (Goal 3)
advice the accessibility of FMP.
• Emergency drills to be conducted on a regular basis.
Decision to Evacuate Goal (Goal 4)
• Assign deputy in the chain of command in the event that the Emergency Response Team
Leader is incapacitated.
• Portable radios should be provided to all core personnel and one should be available to each
maintenance team.
MEDIVAC Goal (Goal 5)
• Emergency Response Team Leader informs MEDIVAC Team if H2S gas is detected.
• MEDIVAC Team to be equipped with SCBA/escape packs and portable H2S detector.
• Civil Engineer to provide detailed drawings of FMP.
Evacuation Goal (Goal 6)
• Core personnel to retrieve portable H2S detector from fireman equipment cabinet.

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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobil Cepu Ltd. (MCL), an ExxonMobil subsidiary is undertaking the development of the Banyu Urip
oil reserves to produce sour crude and associated gas from multiple wellpads located at Bojonegoro
Regency, East Java Province, Indonesia.
The Banyu Urip Project is located in East Java, consisting of the Central Field Facility (CFF), which
includes the Production Processing Facilities (PPF, also known as EPC1) and supporting
Infrastructure Facilities (IF, which also known as EPC5), export, storage and offloading facilities. The
facility is expected to produce sour crude and associated gas from multiple wellpads. The crude will
be sweetened in the Central Processing Facility (CPF) and sent via onshore and offshore pipelines to
a floating storage and offloading (FSO) vessel located off the north coast of Java near the city of
Tuban. Associated gas and water will be re-injected into the reservoir. Additional fresh water will be
injected into the reservoir. Sulfur as the side product will be sold through trucking operation.
MCL through its contractor, TRIPATRA-SAMSUNG Consortium has engaged GL Noble Denton to
perform an Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA) Study for Banyu Urip Project EPC1.
EPC1 includes three wellpads, CPF, sour crude processing, gas and water injection, produced water
treatment, utilities and other safety systems.
This report covers the methodology and findings of the EERA Study.

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2. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF WORK
2.1 Objectives
The objectives of the EERA study are to:
• Assess the provisions for escape, muster, and evacuation of personnel at the Banyu Urip
Production Processing Facilities, i.e. the EPC1 facility. The assessment is based on analysis
of the following six (6) goals:
o Goal 1 (Alarm);
o Goal 2 (Escape);
o Goal 3 (Muster);
o Goal 4 (Decision to Evacuate);
o Goal 5 (Rescue / Medical Evacuation); and
o Goal 6 (Evacuate).
• Identify Major Accident Events (MAEs) which may impair escape, muster, and evacuation of
personnel.
• Estimate the time required for personnel to escape to the allocated Field Muster Points
(FMPs).
• Confirm adequacy of the Escape, Evacuation, Muster and Rescue (EEMR) facilities and
recommend improvements to EEMR facilities where required.
2.2 Scope of Work

The EERA covers personnel escape, muster, evacuation and rescue during Normal Operation, based
on the maximum personnel on site at any point of time (Refer to Appendix A - Assumption Sheet A1):
• Central Processing Facility (CPF) – 55 personnel on day shift and 20 personnel on night shift;
• Wellpad A – 10 personnel on day shift and 5 personnel on night shift;
• Wellpad B – 10 personnel on day shift and 5 personnel on night shift; and
• Wellpad C – 10 personnel on day shift and 5 personnel on night shift.

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3. BASIS OF STUDY
The EERA study covers escape, muster, evacuation and rescue during representative MAEs. The
MAEs were identified based upon a screening of the findings from the CPF Fire Hazard Assessment
[1], CPF Explosion Study [2] and CFF Gas Dispersion Study [3] that have been performed for the
Banyu Urip EPC1 Facility.
3.1 Definitions of EER Goals

The EEMR goals are defined as follows:
• Goal 1 (Alarm): All personnel are made aware, in a timely manner that an incident has
occurred.
• Goal 2 (Escape): All personnel are able to escape to the Field Muster Point without
unacceptable risk.
• Goal 3 (Muster): The muster points remain safe for a sufficient time to enable muster,
communication and controlled evacuation for all foreseeable incidents.
• Goal 4 (Decision to Evacuate): All personnel are made aware, in a timely manner of the
decision to evacuate the installation.
• Goal 5 (Rescue / Medical Evacuation): Adequate means exist for the medical evacuation of
injured personnel and transport of injured personnel to a medical facility / hospital.
• Goal 6 (Evacuation): Suitable means of evacuation are provided to allow personnel to
evacuate the facility without unacceptable risk.
The definitions of terms used in this study are presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Definition of Terms [4]
Term Definitions
Acts of personnel moving away from a hazardous event to a place where its effects
are reduced or removed. Note that escape may only provide temporary protection
Escape
from the event and/or other hazards, from which subsequent evacuation and/or
rescue are necessary; e.g. escape to sea.
Designated area that is protected from hazardous events, where personnel will report
Muster Area
when required to do so in an emergency.
Evacuation Planned method of leaving the installation in an emergency.
Process by which persons who, in an emergency situation, have been injured or
unable to escape (e.g. due to blocked escape routes), or who have evacuated the
Rescue
installation by potentially unsafe means (e.g. to sea), are retrieved to a place of
safety.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 EER Analysis
The evaluation of the adequacy of the EEMR facilities and systems, as per current design, was
performed based on:
• Functionality: Examining the adequacy of EEMR facilities to meet the EEMR goals; and
• Survivability: Examining the capability of EEMR facilities to fulfill their intended functions in the
event of an MAE.

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The MAEs below were extracted from the CPF Fire Hazard Assessment [1], CPF Explosion Study [2]
and CFF Gas Dispersion Study [3] that have been performed for the Banyu Urip CPF:
• Fires;
• Explosions;
• Loss of containment (H2S gas release);
• Dropped objects; and
• Structural failure.
General requirements which are set out for the EEMR goals need to be achieved for the system and
facilities to be considered effective.
3.2.2 Impairment Criterion

Thermal Radiation
For the purpose of the survivability analysis, criteria are defined in order for conclusions to be made
on whether EEMR facilities are impaired or not. Table 3.2 indicates the effects of thermal radiation on
personnel. In the event of a fire, some escape routes may be impaired; i.e. may not be passable if the
routes are exposed to high levels of radiation.
Table 3.2: Pain Threshold and Second Degree Burns [1]
2
Radiation Heat Flux (kW/m ) Observed Effect
Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20 seconds.

4
However, blistering of skin (second degree burns) is likely; 0% lethality
6.3 Allowable radiant heat intensities for emergency flaring with appropriate clothing
37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment
Escape routes and muster points are considered to be impaired if exposed to radiation levels in
2
excess of 4 kW/m (refer to Appendix A - Assumption Sheet A2).
Explosion Overpressure
Equipment and structure may be damaged by explosion overpressure and falling structures may
obstruct escape routes. Hence, CMPT suggests that structures could be blown due to explosion
overpressure of more than 0.35 bar. The impairment criteria of 0.35 bar is utilised to assess the failure
of escape routes and muster points when subjected to explosion events [4].
The impairment criteria utilised to assess the failure of structures and buildings when subjected to
explosion events are presented in Table 3.3 below.
Table 3.3: Damage Due to Explosion Overpressure [4]
Overpressure (bar) Description of Damage
0.02 10% window glass broken

0.05 Personnel injury due to the breaking glass
0.10 Repairable damage to buildings
0.35 Heavy damage to buildings and plants
0.3 – 0.7bar is sufficient to cause to decks to be blown out. Assume 0.5 bar
0.50
for this study.

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Based on Table 3.3 above, 0.35 bar is taken as the minimum overpressure that could cause
impairment to the EEMR facilities.
Hydrogen Sulphide Toxicity Limit
Hydrogen sulphide (H2S) is an acutely toxic substance which is immediately lethal at relatively low
concentrations. The H2S occupational exposure limit according to Ministry of Manpower and
Transmigration Regulations No. 13 of 2011 is 1 ppm for 8 hours and 5 ppm for 15 minutes. Exposure
to a 1,000 ppm concentration of H2S in air produces rapid paralysis of the respiratory system, cardiac
arrest, and death within minutes.
Mobile Cepu Limited (MCL) has recommended a Threshold Limit Value (TLV) of 5 ppm for H2S [5].
Short-Term Exposure Limit (STEL) is set at 10 ppm.
The Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) for Hydrogen Sulphide is 100 ppm based on
acute inhalation toxicity data in humans [5].
For the EERA assessment, concentration of H2S at 10 ppm is taken as the impairment criteria that is
able to cause impairment to the Muster Areas and 100 ppm for the escape routes. Even though the
TLV for H2S is 5 ppm, 10 ppm is taken as the impairment criteria as the CFF Gas Dispersion Study [3]
has only results of H2S release at 10 ppm, 100 ppm, 500 ppm and 1000 ppm.
3.3 Assumptions
Refer to Appendix A for the list of assumptions made in this study. The assumptions are broken down
into:
Table 3.4: List of Assumptions
Assumption No. Description
A1 On Site Personnel
A2 Impairment Criteria
A3 Field Muster Point (FMP) and Egress Point
A4 Estimation of Time to Evacuate
A5 Emergency Response
A6 Portable H2S Detectors
A7 Medivac H2S Escape Pack

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4. DESCRIPTION OF EER FACILITIES
4.1 Fire and Gas Detection System

Fire and Gas (F&G) Detection System is provided for early detection of hazardous fire or
accumulation of combustible or toxic gas situation such that appropriate corrective actions can be
taken to make safe the situation. The F&G Detection System is designed to perform the following
functions in the event of detection of hazardous situation:
• Alert personnel at a permanently manned location the presence, location and nature of the fire or
gas emergency for appropriate protective actions;
• Allow activation of manual or automated protective actions to prevent escalation of the hazard by:
o Isolating the source of a leak;
o Safely removing hydrocarbon inventory;
o Minimizing potential of ignition;
o Activating water spray; and/or
o Extinguishing a fire.
• Activating automated Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) system to prevent smoke
or combustible or toxic gas from entering buildings.
It is assumed that both the F&G System and Safety Integrated System (SIS) are in good working
condition during emergency events, whilst carrying out the assessment.
The types of detectors expected to be installed on the Banyu Urip EPC1 Facility are presented in
Table 4.1 below [6]. These detectors are located at the CPF and the three wellpads, as listed in Table
4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 [7].
Table 4.1: Type of Detectors [6]
Type of Detectors Application
Flammable gas detectors will be provided around high leak potential equipment,
e.g. seals on rotating equipment.
Point and open path detectors will be positioned appropriately for the density of
gas that they are installed to detect.
The gas detection system provides two levels of alarm [6, 21]:
1. ‘Gas’ Alarm
o Single point detector : < 25% LEL; or
Flammable Gas o Single open path detector : 1 LELm; or

o Single ultrasonic detector.
2. ‘Confirmed Gas’ Alarm
o Single point detector : < 60% LEL; or
o Single open path detector : 3 LELm; or
o Two (or more) detectors (except two ultrasonic detectors) at ‘Gas’
Alarm level.
All detectors in the facility have the consistent set points for flammable gas
detection system [6].

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Type of Detectors Application
Toxic gas detector should be installed in high leak potential equipment, which
handles H2S concentration in vapor phase exceeding 1000 ppm; or where the
isenthalpic flash of H2S dissolved liquid at atmospheric pressure, produces vapour
with H2S concentration above 1000 ppm.
At least two (2) toxic gas detectors will be installed around the high potential
release points, e.g. pumps and compressors.
Toxic Gas The toxic gas detection system provides two levels of alarm [6]:
1. ‘Toxic Gas’ Alarm

o One detector is at short term exposure limit (STEL) concentration.
2. ‘Confirmed Toxic Gas’ Alarm
o One detector at the immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH)
concentration; or
o Two (or more) detectors at the STEL concentration.
Fire detectors are selected according to the types of fire expected.
For incandescent fires, optical fire detectors will be used, e.g. CCTV-based with
image processing, multi-band IR detectors, combination UV/IR detectors.
The fire detection system also provides two levels of alarm [6]:
1. ‘Fire’ Alarm
Fire/Flame
o Single UV/IR flame detector; or
o Single CCTV based flame detector; or
o Single smoke detector.
2. ‘Confirmed Fire’ Alarm
o A single pressurised/fusible loop/linea heat detection indication; or
o Any combination of 2 detectors.
Manual Alarm Call (MAC) points will be located throughout the facility as follows:
o Within 60 m of any point within a process unit or module. This distance

may need to reduce if equipment congestion in the module increases
travel time;
o At exit routes, especially on the floor landings of staircases and at exits to
Manual Alarm Call open air.
(MAC) Points
The MACs are designed to initiate audible and visible signals in a permanently
manned location. Alarms should indicate the area where the MAC was initiated.
MAC points will be protected from any inadvertent operation. MAC points will be
located to be easily operable from the level of the exit route on which they are
situated. The MACs will be easily operable by personnel wearing Personnel
Protective Equipment (PPE). MAC points will be clearly visible and labelled.

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Table 4.2: Locations of Detectors in CPF [7]
Type of Detectors Location
6 units in Area C00500 (Utility 2 Area)
6 units in Area C01000 (SRU Area)
10 units in Area C00600 (Power Generation Area)
34 units in Area C00900 (Compression Area & Primary Separation Area)

Flammable Gas
2 units in Area C01200 & C01600 (LPG Storage & Chemical Area)
5 units in Area C01300 (Production Manifold Area)
5 units in Area C01400 (Flare KO & Closed Drain Area)
2 units in Area C01500 (Steam Package Area)
33 units in Area C00800 (AGRU & AGE Area)
Toxic Gas 10 units in Area C00700 (Produced Water Treatment Area)
4 units in Area C00200 (Utility Area)
Fire 55 units in Area C00900 (Compression Area & Primary Separation Area)
3 units in Area C01100 (Compression Area)
Manual Alarm Call 1 unit in Area C00100 (Utility Area)

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(MAC) Points
2 units in Area C00200 (Utility Area)
2 units in Area C00300 (Water Treatment Area)
4 units in Area C00700 (Produced Water Treatment Area)
5 units in Area C01100 (Compression Area)
1 unit in Area C01300 (Production Manifold Area)
4 units in Area PB-12 (Power Generation Substation Building)
4 units in Area PB-23 (Utility Substation Building)
2 units in Area PB-39 (Raw Water Treatment Substation Building)
3 units in Area PB-34 (Compression Substation Building)
3 units in Area PB-18 (AGRU / AGE Substation Building)
3 units in Area PB-31 (SRU Substation Building)
Table 4.3: Detectors in Wellpad A [8]
Flammable Gas 19 units

Toxic Gas 20 units
Fire 16 units
Manual Alarm Call (MAC) Points 6 units

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Table 4.4: Detectors in Wellpad B [9]

Toxic Gas 24 units
Fire 16 units
Table 4.5: Detectors in Wellpad C [10]

Toxic Gas 30 units
Fire 16 units
4.2 Alarm System

The Public Address and General Alarm (PA/GA) system is designed to alert personnel to the
existence of abnormal process operating conditions and emergency conditions, including process and
fire/gas hazards, by means of audible signals and voice broadcast. Audible alarm notification
appliances will be installed to ensure personnel will be able to hear any alarm signal or voice
broadcast in any location on the facility. In areas with high noise levels, visual alarm notification
appliances (i.e. beacon lights) will be installed in addition to – and operate in unison with – audible
appliances. The PA/GA system is able to alert all working personnel within the CPF and the wellpads
with any of the following means:
• Visual alarm – high ambient noise areas;
• Audible alarm – Gas/heat/fire detection (which have been discussed in Section 4.1); and
• Manual Alarm Call Point (MAC) (which have been discussed in Section 4.1).
As the perimeter of the facility is wide, wind directions may vary at different locations. Personnel are
expected to observe the nearest wind sock and to evacuate in the cross-wind direction. Central
Control Room Operator would be expected to make announcement via the Public Address
Emergency Alarm System (PAEAS) of the type of detection event (toxic/combustible, fire/smoke),
location of detection event and the wind direction at the control room.
Apart from F&G detectors, explosion proof loudspeakers and beacon lights are provided on the CPF
and the three wellpads, as presented in Table 4.6, and 4.7.
Table 4.6: Quantity and Location of the PA/GA System in CPF [11]
Type of PA/GA Quantity Location
1 Area C00400
2 Area C00100, C00200, C01500, C01600, C01300, C00700
Explosion-Proof Speaker 3 Area C00500, C01000
4 Area C00900
5 Area C00800, C01400, C00300, C00600

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Type of PA/GA Quantity Location
6 Area C01200, C01100

1 Area C00200, C01200
Beacon Light 2 Area C00500, C00600, C00900
4 Area C01100
Table 4.7: Quantity of the PA/GA System in Wellpad A, B and C [12]
Type of PA/GA Quantity
Explosion-Proof Speaker 16
Indoor Speaker 2 (In substation)
Beacon Light 2
Outdoor Station 2
Indoor Station 1
4.3 ESD System

Emergency Shutdown System is triggered either manually from the Central Control Room or
automatically by confirmed incident in an area or zone.
In the case of H2S leak, ESD Level 1 will trigger the whole facility to shutdown, isolate and
depressurize. For process which is shut down, ESD Level 2 will trigger the process area to isolate and
depressurize. As for ESD Level 3, affected process or utility equipment / system are shutdown and
isolated without depressurization.
Typically, if ESD on Field is pushed, it will activate ESD Level 2. Within a process train or system,
ESD-2 shuts down and isolated individual BDV zones (same as ESD zones), and permits emergency
depressurizing. ESD-2 with in a process train also closes all dependent liquid containment valves in
ESD-3.
4.4 Escape Routes and Field Muster Points

All areas where personnel are expected to be present will be provided with readily accessible and
obstruction free access way leading to allocated Field Muster Points (FMP) via egress points out of
the CPF and wellpads. They will gather until further instructions are given.
The dimensions of the escape routes are as presented in Table 4.8 below.
Table 4.8: Escape Route Dimensions [13]
Minimum Clear Width (m) Minimum Head Clearance (m)
1.525 2.390
To assist the evacuation process, the escape routes will have the following features below [14]:
1. Clearly marked and illuminated.
2. Show exit points and directions to the muster points.
3. Location of Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) and Fire Fighting Equipment will be clearly
labelled and marked.
4. Signs will be suitable for the condition of emergency, such as smoke.

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The CPF is provided with two (2) Field Muster Points (FMPs). It is expected that personnel will escape
and muster at the nearest unimpaired FMP. For the EERA study, the CPF was divided into two (2)
zones to conduct the assessment systematically. The demarcated zones are presented in Appendix
G.0.
The two Field Muster Points (FMPs) for CPF are described in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9: Field Muster Points and Egress Points for Different Areas in CPF [15]
Field Muster Point Egress Points Accommodated Areas
Field Muster Point 1 (FMP-1) Zone 1

North side of Main Gate 1 of Main Gate 1 Area C00100, C00200, C00500, C01500, C00300,
CPF C00400, C00600 and C00700.

South East side of Main Gate 2 Main Gate 2 Area C00800, C01000, C01600, C01300, C01200,
of CPF C01400, C00900, and C01100.
The Medivac Team, Fire Team and Emergency Response Team are expected to muster at the central
control building or the emergency command center.
Egress points are vital for personnel to escape from the CPF, and hence, accessibility of personnel to
the egress points are analysed as the core in the Escape Goal Analysis, which is further discussed in
Section 5.3.
Upon sounding of the PA/GA alarm to muster, personnel at the affected area are expected to stop
work, go to and don SCBA or Escape Pack and proceed to muster at the allocated FMP outside the
CPF area.
Table 4.10 presents the Field Muster Points for the three wellpads.
Table 4.10: Field Muster Point for Wellpads A/B/C [15]
Wellpads FMP Location
A FMP-A Along road at southwest side of Wellpad A

B FMP-B Along road at southwest side of Wellpad B
FMP-C1 Along road at north side of Wellpad C
C
FMP-C2 West side of Wellpad C
4.5 Life Saving and Safety Equipment

In an event of emergency escape, muster and evacuation of personnel from the Banyu Urip EPC1
Facility, life saving and safety equipment will be provided on the facility area. The quantity and
location of these life saving equipment are presented in Table 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 for the CPF,
Wellpad A, B and C respectively.
These life saving and safety equipment are generally placed along the escape routes. Therefore, it is
easily accessible to all personnel during emergency.
Table 4.11: Quantity and Location of the Life Saving and Safety Equipment in CPF [16, 23]
Type of Detectors Quantity Location
1 Area C00100, C00200, C01600, C01300, C00400,

Safety & Eye Shower C00700 and C01100
2 Area C00500, C00800 and C00300

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Type of Detectors Quantity Location
3 Area C01000 and C01200

12 Area C00100 and C00200
4 Area C00700
12 Area C00800
Escape Pack (EP)
6 Area C00900
15 Area C01000
6 Area C01100
6 Area C00100 and C00200
1 Area C00600
2 Area C00700
SCBA
4 Area C00800
6 Area C00900
2 Area C01000
Area C00200, C00800, C01000, C01300, C00900,
Wind Socks 1
C01100 and C01400
Area C00800, C01000, C01200, C00600, C00700,
1
First Aid Kits C00900, C01100 and Outside Main Gate 1
2 Area C00100
Table 4.12: Quantity of the Life Saving and Safety Equipment in Wellpad A [17]
Type of Detectors Quantity
Safety & Eye Shower 2

Escape Pack (EP) 3
SCBA 2
Wind Socks 1
First Aid Kits 1
Table 4.13: Quantity of the Life Saving and Safety Equipment in Wellpad B and C [17]
Type of Detectors Quantity
Safety & Eye Shower 2

Escape Pack (EP) 3
SCBA 2
Wind Socks 1
First Aid Kits 1

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4.6 Evacuation and Medical Rescue (MEDIVAC)

The primary means of evacuation for the CPF and the three (3) wellpads are by road. FMPs are
located along roads, heading to the northwest and southeast side of the facility, as depicted in the
Banyu Urip CFF Wellpad – Overall Plot Plan. [Appendix C.01]
In the event of a medical emergency, an ambulance stationed at the Infrastructure Facilities (IF) area
will transport any injured personnel to the nearest hospital.
4.7 Emergency Response Plan (ERP)

An Emergency Response Team Leader will be assigned in the Banyu Urip EPC1 Facility. He will be
responsible to ensure suitable Emergency Response Actions are taken during an emergency event,
which cover the following:
• Provision of first-aid and facility medical support and medivac facilities;
• Emergency and contingency plans and procedures for site specific emergency situations,
including integration with emergency procedures on interfacing installations; and
• Emergency plans covering the interface between the facility and external facilities and
response centre which based in Jakarta.
The ERP comprises of procedures that involve injury, vehicle or equipment accident, fire and
explosion, oil spill, natural and other disaster, gas leakage and toxic gas release. The flowchart is
presented in Appendix F.01.

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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1 Screening of MAE

The EEMR Goals are assessed against MAEs, which could occur on the Banyu Urip EPC 1 Project.
The MAEs for this facility are listed below:
1. Fires;
2. Explosions;
3. Loss of containment (H2S gas release);
4. Dropped Objects; and
5. Structural Failure.
A preliminary screening of the potential effects of these MAEs on the EEMR facilities is presented in
Table 5.1. Any MAE assessed to have a potential impact on any EEMR system is further analysed in
the individual goal analysis sections. It should be noted that the screening in Table 5.1 does not
represent the conclusions on the impairment assessment. The conclusions on impairment are
presented in Sections 5.2 to Section 5.7 of this document.
Table 5.1: Matrix of MAEs versus EEMR Goals
Goal 5 – Rescue / Medical

Goal 4 – Decision to Evacuate
Goal 2 – Escape Goal
Goal 3 – Muster Goal

Goal 1 – Alarm Goal
Goal 6 – Evacuation
Major Accident Events
Evacuation
Process fire
Process explosions
Loss of containment (H2S gas release)
Dropped objects
Structural failure
Legend:
: Potential impairment of EEMR facilities due to MAE hence further impairment assessment is required. Assessment is
presented in Goal Analysis.
: No impairment of EEMR facility due to MAE. Reasons are provided in Section 5.1.1 to Section 5.1.4.
5.1.1 Fires
EEMR facilities may be impaired by fires from process facilities in a form of fire impingement or
2
thermal radiation exposure of more than 4 kW/m . The detailed fire impairment assessment was done
in the CPF Fire Hazard Assessment [1].

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5.1.2 Explosions
An explosion event is typically a delayed ignition event, which is preceded by fire and gas (F&G)
detection alarm system. On top of that, F&G systems are not vulnerable to explosion events, as they
would have fulfilled their intended function of sounding the alarm prior to explosion events.
During explosion, structures and equipment may fall and obstruct the escape routes. This may hinder
personnel from escaping to the muster point. However, alternative escape routes are available.
Explosion events, on the contrary, could potentially impair the muster areas, life saving and safety
equipment. Therefore, they are vulnerable to explosion.
Note that the detailed explosion assessment was conducted in the CPF Explosion Study [2]. Based
on the CPF Explosion Study report, explosion scenarios in the wellpads are not expected, and hence,
the wellpads EEMR facilities are not vulnerable to explosion.
5.1.3 Loss of Containment (H2S gas release)

Loss of containment may be from un-ignited hydrocarbon release or sour gas release from the
process facility. H2S release could potentially impair EEMR facilities, should it go undetected to
concentration of 100 ppm and above. The detailed loss of containment assessment was conducted in
the CFF Gas Dispersion Study [3].
5.1.4 Dropped Objects

Lifting activities on the Banyu Urip EPC1 facility will be carried out using mobile cranes, bridge cranes
and boom cranes. These cranes are primarily used for maintenance purposes [18] and are expected
to be restricted to permit-to-work system. From the HAZID findings, damage is expected to walkways
and stairwells due to dropped object [21]. The impact is very likely to be localised and be within the
crane arc radius. Thus, only localised damage to escape routes is expected.
5.1.5 Structural Failure

Structural failure for this study is related to crane/boom failure collapse. The collapse of a crane
and/or its boom can potentially result in obstruction of the escape route.
The impact of crane/boom failure collapse is likely to be localised, and hence, only localised damage
to escape routes is expected.
5.2 Alarm Goal Analysis

5.2.1 Goal Overview
Goal 1: All personnel are made aware, in a timely manner that an incident has occurred.
In the event of an emergency, it is important that personnel are made aware immediately to stop work
and proceed to the muster point(s). The vital systems in meeting the alarm goal are:
• Fire and Gas (F&G) Detection System;
• Manual Alarm Call (MAC) Points;
• PA/GA System (audible and visual); and
• Portable Radio. [14]
The F&G Detection System in the CPF and the wellpad areas will consist of various detectors widely
distributed across the facility, as presented in Section 4.1 and 4.2. They are expected to trigger the
alarm upon fire, combustible gas, toxic gas and heat detection. The MACs are designed to initiate
audible and visible signals in a permanently manned location upon activating by any personnel during
any emergency event. These MAC points will be installed in prominent locations along the main
escape routes and around the periphery of every module and wellpads [8, 9, 10]. Apart from that, all
emergency gates will be provided with a MAC located next to it as well. As such, the MACs are
adequately located at the proper place for personnel use during emergencies.

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Explosion-proof speaker will be installed in every module in the CPF as well as the three wellpads [8,
9, 10]. For high ambient noise areas, beacon lights are expected to perform their functions alerting
personnel of any emergency events.
PA/GA speakers will be installed throughout the CPF and the wellpads to alert personnel of any
emergency situations. The PA/GA system will automatically generate the appropriate preset audible
alarms for fire, flammable gas, H2S gas and etc.
Personnel can also be alerted about the need to muster, through their portable radios which will be in
their possession at all times [14].
5.2.2 Exposure of Fire and Gas Systems to Fires and Explosion

While Fire and Gas (F&G) Detectors are vulnerable to explosion events, the quantity and location of
detectors provided is expected to result in detection of significantly damaging flammable releases,
including initiation of protective systems, prior to potential failure as a result of the event. Therefore,
they are assessed as not vulnerable to fire and explosion events for EER survivability.
However, flame detectors, toxic gas detector and MAC are considered to be vulnerable to fires. In this
case, portable radio [14] will be available and unimpaired as long as the personnel carry their hand-
held portable communication kit at all times.
5.2.3 Assessment Conclusion

Based on the assessment, the alarm goal is met for the CPF and the wellpads.
5.3 Escape Goal Analysis

5.3.1 Goal Overview
Goal 2: All personnel are able to escape to the Field Muster Point without unacceptable risk.
The system which functions to meet this goal is the escape routes. ISO 15544 [19] is used to assess
the adequacy of the escape routes.
ISO 15544 states that where the means of access or egress may be impaired, alternative means
should be provided which are unlikely to be affected by the same incident. For this study, the
provision / design of escape routes at the CPF and the wellpads are deemed acceptable if either of
the following is available:
• Two independent escape routes to the Primary Muster Point; or
• One to the Primary Muster Point and one to the Secondary Muster Point.
With regards to the dimensions of the escape routes, ISO 15544 [19] requirement states that the
width of the escape routes should be greater than 1 m wide. For routes which are unlikely to be used
frequently (and then only by a small number of people), a reduction in this width may be acceptable.
In addition, the escape routes must be clearly illuminated at all times to aid personnel escaping to the
muster point(s).
According to the Escape Route Layout [13], the escape routes in the CPF and wellpads have the
minimum height of 2.390 m and width of 1.525 m. Therefore, these dimensions meet ISO 15544 [19]
requirement.
5.3.2 Adequacy Assessment of Escape Route

As discussed in Section 4.3, there are two (2) distinctive escape routes leading to the two (2) FMPs
located outside the CPF area. This strongly enhances the likelihood of personnel escaping
successfully from any area to reach the allocated FMPs. The general assessment of these two
escape routes for different Zones are discussed below with recommendations to further enhance the
functionality of the escape routes. Likewise, general escape route assessment was conducted and
presented in Table 5.3 for the 3 wellpads. Better illustration of the Escape Route Layouts [13] for CPF
can be referred to in Appendix H.

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Table 5.2: Escape Route Assessments For CPF Area
The escape routes are around the periphery of Zone 1. This provides
accessible escape route for personnel in this area. Personnel are able to
muster in FMP-1 after escaping from Zone 1 via Main Gate 1.
Based on the Escape Route Layouts [13], it can be seen that egress routes are
clearly marked to assist personnel in traversing from equipment areas, pipe-
ways, bunds and stairwells to the main escape routes while escaping.
Also from the Navis 3D Model drawings, no visible valves or piping can be
1 seen blocking the main escape routes. Moreover, the escape route is 1.525m
wide, which has sufficient space for personnel to escape.
(Area C00100, C00200,
C00500, C01500, C00300, In the event that the escape routes to egress point in Zone 1 (Main Gate 1) is
C00400, C00600 and C00700) impaired, an alternative option for personnel in Zone 1 is to escape through
Zone 2, via Main Gate 2 to FMP-2, or through Wellpad B.
Recommendations
escape directions.
The escape routes are around the periphery of Zone 2. This provides
accessible escape route for personnel in this area. Personnel are able to
muster in FMP-2 after escaping from Zone 2 via Main Gate 2.
Also, based on the Escape Route Layouts [13], it can be seen that egress
routes are clearly marked to assist personnel in traversing from equipment
areas, pipe-ways, bunds and stairwells to the main escape routes while
escaping.
Also from the Navis 3D Model drawings, no visible valves or piping can be
2
seen blocking the main escape routes. Moreover, the escape route is 1.525m
(Area C00800, C01000, wide, which has sufficient space for personnel to escape.
C01600, C01300, C01200,
In the event that the escape routes to egress point in Zone 2 (Main Gate 2) is
C01400, C00900, and C01100)
impaired, an alternative option for personnel in Zone 1 is to escape through
Zone 1, via Main Gate 1 to FMP-1, or through Wellpad B.
Recommendations
escape directions.
Table 5.3: Escape Route Assessments for Wellpads
Wellpad Escape Route Assessments and Recommendations
The primary escape route is through Gate 1 and Gate 2 at the east side of
Wellpad A. In the event this primary escape route is impaired, personnel could
escape via any emergency gate around the wellpad to escape to FMP-A.
Wellpad A Recommendations
It is recommended that the all normally-closed gates are locked to the outside,
and opened on the inside by a push-bar, ensuring they are readily accessible
for personnel working in Wellpad A. It is also recommended that all operations

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Wellpad Escape Route Assessments and Recommendations
personnel in Wellpad A hold the keys for all the personnel emergency gates.
The primary escape route is through Gate 1 at the southwest side of the
wellpad. In the event the primary escape route is impaired, personnel could
escape from the wellpad through any emergency gate, which are normally-
closed, including Gate 2 at the northeast side of the wellpad.
Wellpad B Recommendations
It is recommended that the normally-closed gates are locked to the outside,
and opened on the inside by a push-bar, ensuring it is readily accessible for
personnel working in Wellpad B. It is also recommended that all operations
personnel in Wellpad B hold the keys for all the personnel emergency gates.
The primary escape route is through Gate 1 and the normally-closed gates at
the north and east sides of the wellpad. In the event the primary escape route
is impaired, personnel could escape from the wellpad through any emergency
gate, which are normally-closed.
Wellpad C Recommendations
It is recommended that all normally-closed gates at are locked to the outside,
and opened on the inside by a push-bar, ensuring they are readily accessible
for personnel working in Wellpad C. It is also recommended that all operations
personnel in Wellpad C hold the keys for all the personnel emergency gates.
In the event of an emergency, personnel are expected to inform the location of the emergency to the
Emergency Response Team Leader. Subsequently, the Emergency Response Team Leader will
inform every personnel in the facility the location of the emergency. As such, personnel are expected
to avoid using the escape route, where the emergency event is located.
5.3.3 Exposure of Escape Routes to Fire, Explosion and Toxic Gas

Jet Fire Scenarios in CPF
Typically, escape route impairment due to fire is assessed against the fire thermal radiation contour.
2
For the case of the Banyu Urip Project EPC1 Facility, 4 kW/m is taken as the escape route
impairment criteria. However, the Fire Hazard Assessment report [1] only provided the thermal
radiation contour results for Isolatable Section 12-C and 12-F, which are located on Wellpad C. As
such, the escape route impairment assessment due to jet fire scenarios in the CPF was conducted
2
using the largest 4 kW/m thermal contour distance, which is 199.26 m for large hole release, and
70.49 m for medium hole release.
The assessment was conducted for jet fire scenarios with jet length of more than 100m in the CPF:
• Isolatable Section 2 in Area C00900.
Based on the thermal radiation contour size, only jet fire from Isolatable Section 19 could impair Zone
2 Egress Point (Main Gate 2). However, based on the Fire Hazard Assessment report [1], the fire
duration is approximately 3.2 minutes. In the event the primary escape route to Main Gate 2 is
impaired by jet fire radiation, personnel could wait for the fire to depressurize or to take alternative
escape route leading to Main Gate 1 to escape and muster at FMP-1. Personnel could also escape
through the escape routes leading to Wellpad B and muster at FMP-B.
Jet fires from Isolatable Section 2, 3 and 6 could cause localised impairment, i.e. impairment to
escape routes close to source of fire in Area C00900 and C01200, but not on any egress point. This
does not prevent personnel from escaping the CPF.

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Small to medium release jet fires could potentially cause localised impairment to escape routes close
2
to source of fire. However, the 4 kW/m thermal radiation contours from these fires are not expected
to impair any egress point, and hence personnel are expected to be able to escape the CPF in the
event of a small to medium release jet fires.
Jet Fire Scenarios in Wellpads
Similar to the jet fire assessment for the CPF, the escape route impairment assessment due to jet fire
scenarios in the wellpads was conducted with results from Isolatable Section 12-C and 12-F.
2
Due to the 4 kW/m thermal radiation contour size and depending on the direction of the jet fire, large
release jet fire could impair the primary escape routes in Wellpads A, B and C. However, personnel
could use alternative escape routes to escape to the muster points. Personnel in the affected area
could also take shelter at the substations before escaping to the muster points.
The substations in the wellpads are prefabricated. The exterior walls of the substations are
constructed with insulated crimped composite steel plate panels. The steel plate forming the panels
are not less than 2 mm thick. It is assumed that personnel could take shelter in the substation, where
2
they would be shielded from the 4 kW/m thermal radiation, until the fire depressurises and personnel
could proceed to escape. Moreover, the substations in the wellpads are provided with HVAC.
However, it is only personnel who are unable to escape to the muster area and are close to the
substations are expected to take cover in the substations. Otherwise, personnel are expected to
continue escaping and to muster at the nearest muster area.
Medium release jet fires in the wellpads could potentially cause localised impairment to escape routes
close to source of fire. However, small release jet fires are not expected to cause impairment to the
escape routes.
Pool Fire Scenarios in CPF
2
Pool fire thermal radiation of 4 kW/m is taken as the impairment criteria for escape routes (refer to
Appendix A - Assumption Sheet A2). Based on the pool fire thermal radiation generated from the Fire
Hazard Assessment [1], there will be sections that could impair egress points in the CPF, as
presented below:
Table 5.4: Potential Egress Point Impairment in CPF from Pool Fire Scenarios
Sect. Release
Section Description Representative Equipment Impaired Egress Point
No. Hole Size
Crude Storage – Area
5 Crude Oil Storage Tanks L Main Gate 2
C01200
6 Crude Export – Area C01200 Crude Oil Shipping Pumps L Main Gate 2
2
When the egress point is impaired by radiation of 4 kW/m , personnel are not able to escape the
facility as planned. As such, alternative escape routes as discussed in Table 5.2 in Section 5.3.2
could be used as there is no simultaneous impairment expected on the two (2) egress points.
Pool Fire Scenarios in Wellpads
Pool fire scenarios in the wellpads are not expected to impair the primary escape routes due to the
2
size of the 4 kW/m thermal radiation contour. Thus, the primary escape routes in the wellpads are
safe from pool fire thermal radiation.
Explosion Scenarios in CPF
The impairment criteria of 0.35 bar from explosion overpressure is utilised to assess the failure of
escape routes when subjected to overpressure. Based on the CPF Explosion Study report [2], the
worst scenario is liquid release from the HP Production Separator (Isolatable Section 2) from large
leak hole, which has a distance of 83.62 m radius of 0.35 bar overpressure, and this will only affect a
certain area of the facility. Personnel could escape to the FMPs via alternative escape routes.

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Toxic Gas Dispersion Scenarios in CPF

As the inventory in the CPF contains H2S, an unignited gas release could potentially impair the
escape route. Based on the Gas Dispersion Study report [3], there are isolatable sections identified
that could impair more than one egress point in the CPF. Some releases could reach the entire CPF
area, impairing both the egress points of the CPF. These releases are presented in Table 5.5 below.
Table 5.5: Sections Impairing All Egress Point in CPF
Failure Release Release

Sect. Representative
Case Section Description Hole Duration
No. Equipment
No. Size (mins)
HP Production
2 2 Primary Separation Unit (HP) – Area C00900 L 8.3
Separator A
HP Production
2 3 Primary Separation Unit (HP)– Area C00900 L 0.7
Separator A
8 13 Glycol Contactor System – Area C01100 Glycol Contactor A L 1.5
nd Gas Lift Compressor M 6.0

10 15 2 Stage Gas Lift System – Area C01100 nd
2 Stage L 2.0
Gas Injection M 2.9

11 16 Gas Injection System – Area C01100
Compressor A L 1.3
AGE Regenerator
14-B 22-B AGE Regeneration – Area C01000 L 1.4
Accumulator
15 23 Sulfur Recovery Unit – Area C01000 SRU Knock Out Drum L 0.3
Despite the severe consequences from toxic gas release in the CPF, wind direction factor has yet to
be taken into account. In other words, it is unlikely for the toxic gas to simultaneously impair all egress
points in the CPF. Furthermore, H2S release durations above are less than 15 minutes, which is less
than the duration of the Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) and escape packs can sustain
[20].
Should toxic gas release be detected, the Emergency Response Team Leader will be able to assess
the wind direction via the wind socks available, and announce the safest escape route available for
personnel to escape. Crosswind is always the initial escape direction until the location of the released
can be confirmed. However, upwind is the preferred escape direction only after the personnel is
already upwind of the release point.
Based on the Gas Dispersion Study results [3], H2S release at concentration of 100 ppm from the
CPF could reach as far as 3000 m towards Wellpad A, B and C. In that event, the Emergency
Response Team Leader will inform personnel in the affected CPF area and wellpads to don the
SCBAs or escape packs immediately to assist their escape. The SCBAs and escape packs that are
available in the facility are sufficient for all personnel. It is recommended to conduct frequent training
to familiarise the use of SCBAs and escape packs.
Note that SCBAs are also provided for use during line opening and sample taking activities. These
SCBAs will be connected to the Air Ringmain and Breathing Air Connection provided in the areas
below:
• Area S: Produced Water Treatment Area.
• Area V: Crude Oil Storage and Transfer Area.
• Area X: Flare Knock Out and Closed Drain Area.
Upon sounding of alarm, personnel are expected to disconnect their SCBAs from the air ringmain and
proceed to the nearest muster area.

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Toxic Gas Dispersion Scenarios in Wellpads

Table 5.6: Sections Impairing Egress Point in Wellpads

Sect. Representative
Case Section Description Hole Duration
No. Equipment
No. Size (mins)
12-B 17-B Lift Gas to Wellpad B Lift Gas Piping B L 0.4
12-E 17-C Cap Gas/Injection Gas to Wellpad A Lift Gas Piping A L 1.2
12-F 17-F Cap Gas/Injection Gas to Wellpad C Lift Gas Piping C L 4.3
H2S at 100 ppm in the wellpads could have downwind distance of more than 3000 m from the leak
source. Only large leak hole size releases contribute to radius of more than 3000 m. In that event,
similar to the CPF, the Emergency Response Team Leader will inform personnel in the affected areas
to don the SCBAs or escape packs immediately to assist their escape.
Despite the severe consequences from toxic gas release in the wellheads, wind direction factor has
yet to be taken into account. In other words, it is unlikely for the toxic gas to simultaneously impair all
egress points in the wellheads. The wind sock provided at each wellpad could assist personnel in the
affected wellpad to assess the wind direction, to enable personnel to take the safest escape route, i.e.
upwind from the leak source. Moreover, the H2S release duration is shorter than the duration of the
SCBA or escape pack can sustain.
Drainage System
Integrated drainage system is installed around the CPF and the wellpads for storm water. This
drainage system is properly covered unless it is outside the defined escape route [13]. Therefore, the
uncovered ditches pose a tripping/falling hazard to personnel.
The uncovered drain is of Type A and Type E. The widths of these drains are 300 mm and 700 mm
respectively; whereas the depth is between 500 mm and 1000 mm. The dimensions of these types of
drains are illustrated in Appendix E.01. Uncovered opening of 300 mm or 700 mm could potentially be
a hazard for personnel especially during an emergency event.
Drains within the CPF and the wellpads that are Type A and Type E are recommended to be covered
to prevent any unwanted injury.
Despite drains with large opening (width < 1500 mm) such as Type I, J and K exist, these drains can
only be found near the CPF fence. Due to the location of these types of drains, it is less likely for
personnel to fall into these drains. However, sign boards are proposed to be set up around these
drains to prevent any unwanted injury.

Based on the above assessment, the escape goal is met, on condition that:
• Emergency Response Team Leader informs and announces the location of the MAE to all
personnel and to advice the accessibility of escape routes.
• Conduct frequent training to familiarise the use of SCBA and escape pack.
escape.
• In the event of H2S leak, core personnel will retrieve portable H2S detectors from the fireman
equipment cabinet to check if muster point is safe to muster, or if personnel need to muster
further away from the muster point due to H2S impairment.

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covered.
5.4 Muster Goal Analysis

5.4.1 Goal Overview
Goal 3: The temporary refuge or muster station remains habitable for sufficient time to enable muster,
communication and controlled evacuation for all foreseeable incidents.
5.4.2 Adequacy of Muster Areas

Field Muster Points (FMPs) have been identified for the CPF as illustrated in Appendix D.01. The
FMPs for the CPF are located at both ends the CPF, providing sufficient and safe area for personnel
to muster in an emergency event.
FMPs are also provided for personnel in the wellpads. Similarly, these FMPs are located outside the
wellpads. Only Wellpad C is provided with two FMPs, whilst there is no alternative FMP for personnel
in Wellpad A and B. However, for Wellpad A and B, personnel could use the adjacent FMPs in the
CPF or in Wellpad C as the alternative FMP.
Designated FMPs must be sufficient to accommodate all personnel on site. Since all the FMPs are
strategically located in an open area, it is appropriate to draw the conclusion that all the FMPs are
sufficient to accommodate all personnel.
5.4.3 Estimation of Escape Time

The escape time is estimated for personnel to traverse from the farthest point to the respective FMPs.
The time is based on the following:
• The length of escape routes;
• Duration required for evaluation and decision making; and
• Allowance for delays in personnel mustering and evacuation due to injuries or fatalities.
The historical data from CMPT [4] and assumptions used for the calculations are listed in Assumption
Sheet A4. The summary of the evacuation times are presented in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Escape Time To Reach FMPs
Zone Escape Time To Reach FMPs (minutes)
1
47.6
(Area A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, O and Y)
2
49.9
(Area J, K, L, M, N, V, W and X)
Wellpad A 42.4
Wellpad B 46.3
Note 1
Wellpad C 40.6 and 41.3
Note 1: Escape time to reach FMP-C1 and FMP-C2 respectively.
Based on Table 5.7, personnel in Zone 2 require the most time to escape to the FMP-2. The farthest
point from Zone 2 to FMP-2 is from Area T (C00900). The total estimated escape time is 49.9
minutes.

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5.4.4 Exposure of Muster Area to Fire, Explosion and Toxic Gas

As the FMPs are located in an open area, impairment due to fire is assessed against the fire thermal
2
radiation contour. 4 kW/m is taken as the FMP impairment criteria.
Jet Fire Scenarios in CPF
Similar to the Escape Goal analysis, jet fire scenarios assessment in the CPF was conducted based
on the thermal radiation contour results from Isolatable Section 12-C and 12-F. The muster point
2
impairment assessment due to jet fire scenarios in the CPF was conducted using the largest 4 kW/m
thermal contour distance, which is 199.26 m for large hole release.
The assessment was conducted for jet fire scenarios with jet length of more than 100m in the CPF:
2
From the assessment, jet fire thermal radiation of 4 kW/m is not expected to impinge any of the
FMPs in the CPF.
Jet Fire Scenarios in Wellpads
Similar to the jet fire assessment for the CPF, the muster point impairment assessment due to jet fire
scenarios in the wellpads was conducted with results from Isolatable Section 12-C and 12-F.
Based on the assessment, the FMPs for Wellpad A and B are not expected to be impaired by jet fire
2
thermal radiation of 4 kW/m . However, both FMP-C1 and FMP-C2, in Wellpad C could potentially be
impaired simultaneously. As the durations for the large release jet fire scenarios in Wellpad C are less
than 5 minutes, personnel in Wellpad C could take shelter at the substation before mustering at the
FMP-C1 or FMP-C2.
The substations in the wellpads are prefabricated. The exterior walls of the substations are
constructed with insulated crimped composite steel plate panels. The steel plate forming the panels
are not less than 2 mm thick. It is assumed that personnel could take shelter in the substation, where
2
they would be shielded from the 4 kW/m thermal radiation, until the fire depressurises and personnel
could proceed to escape. Moreover, the substations in the wellpads are provided with HVAC.
However, it is only personnel who are unable to escape to the muster area and are close to the
substations are expected to take cover in the substations. Otherwise, personnel are expected to
continue escaping and to muster at the nearest muster area.
Pool Fire Scenarios in CPF
Based on the Fire Hazard Assessment [1], FMP-2 could be impaired by pool fire (from large release)
2
from Isolatable Section 6 (Crude Export section), as the 4 kW/m thermal contour could extend as far
as 374 m from the pool fire source. Nonetheless, as pool fire is a delayed event, personnel are
expected to be notified of the location of the un-ignited pool by the Emergency Response Leader, and
hence will muster at alternative FMP provided in the CPF.
Pool Fire Scenarios in Wellpads
2
Based on the Fire Hazard Assessment [1], although pool fire scenarios are probable, the 4 kW/m
thermal contour from these scenarios are not expected to impair the wellpads FMPs.
Explosion Scenarios in CPF
The impairment criteria of 0.35 bar from explosion overpressure is utilised to assess the failure of
FMPs when subjected to explosion events. Based on the Explosion Study [2], there are no explosion
events that could impair the FMPs.

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Toxic Gas Dispersion Scenarios in CPF

H2S could impair the FMPs at concentration of 10 ppm and above. Based on the Gas Dispersion
Study [3], there are potential releases from the CPF that could impair the FMPs in the CPF and the
wellpads. Table 5.8 below presents the scenarios stated above.
Table 5.8: Summary of FMP Impairment due to H2S release from CPF

Sect.
Case Section Description Hole Impaired FMP Duration
No.
No. Size (mins)
Primary Separation Unit (HP) – FMP-1, FMP-2, FMP-A,

2 2 L 8.3
Area C00900 FMP-B
Primary Separation Unit (HP)– Area
2 3 L FMP-1, FMP-2, FMP-B 0.7
C00900
Primary Separation Unit (LP) – Area FMP-1, FMP-2, FMP-A,
3 4 L 14.7
C00900 FMP-B
Primary Separation Unit (LP) – Area FMP-1, FMP-2, FMP-A,
3 6 L 0.7
C00900 FMP-B, FMP-C1, FMP-C2
st
1 Stage Gas Lift System – Area FMP-1, FMP-2, FMP-A,
7 12 L 3.8
Glycol Contactor System – Area FMP-1, FMP-2, FMP-A,
8 13 L 1.5
Glycol Regeneration Unit – Area FMP-1, FMP-2, FMP-A,
9 14 L 0.4
C01100 FMP-B
FMP-1, FMP-2, FMP-A,
M 6.0
nd
2 Stage Gas Lift System – Area FMP-B
10 15
C01100 FMP-1, FMP-2, FMP-A,
L 2.0
FMP-B, FMP-C1, FMP-C2
M 2.9
Gas Injection System – Area FMP-B
11 16
L 1.3
AGRU Regeneration – Area FMP-1, FMP-2, FMP-A,
13-B 20 L 6.7

M 25.0
FMP-B
14-B 22-B AGE Regeneration – Area C01000
L 1.4
M 5.5
Sulfur Recovery Unit – Area FMP-B
15 23
L 0.3
Personnel would not be able to muster at the allocated FMPs should H2S leak from the sections listed
above. Despite it possible to have both FMP-1 and FMP-2 impaired simultaneously, the possibility is
rare if wind directional factor is taken into account. Moreover, H2S release durations above are less
than 15 minutes, which is less than the duration of the Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)
and escape packs can sustain [20]. Personnel will continue to evacuate until a safe, gas-free area is
reached.

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The provision of wind socks in the CPF could also assist the Emergency Response Team Leader to
determine the wind direction and to advice personnel to escape and muster in the upwind direction of
the release point. However, evacuating personnel are expected to observe the wind direction and
make correct evacuation decision based on local conditions.
Note that H2S release at concentration of 10 ppm from the CPF could reach as far as 14000 m
towards Wellpad A, B and C. In that event, the Emergency Response Team Leader will inform
personnel in the affected wellpads to don the SCBAs or escape packs immediately to assist their
escape and muster.
Toxic Gas Dispersion Scenarios in Wellpads
Table 5.9: Summary of FMP Impairment due to H2S release from Wellpads

Sect.
Case Section Description Hole Impaired FMP Duration
No.
No. Size (mins)
1-A 1-A Flowline from Wellpad A L FMP-A, FMP-2 5.8

1-B 1-B Flowline from Wellpad B L FMP-B 4.1
1-C 1-C Flowline from Wellpad C L FMP-C1, FMP-C2 27.6
M FMP-A, FMP-2 2.6
12-A 17-A Lift Gas to Wellpad A FMP-A, FMP-B, FMP-C1,
L 1.1
FMP-C2, FMP-1, FMP-2
M FMP-B 1.0
12-B 17-B Lift Gas to Wellpad B FMP-A, FMP-B, FMP-C1,
L 0.4
M FMP-C1, FMP-C2 9.8
12-C 17-C Lift Gas to Wellpad C FMP-A, FMP-B, FMP-C1,
L 4.0
M FMP-A, FMP-B, FMP-2 2.4
12-E 17-E Cap Gas/Injection Gas to Wellpad A FMP-A, FMP-B, FMP-C1,
L 1.2
M FMP-C1, FMP-C2 8.9
12-F 17-F Cap Gas/Injection Gas to Wellpad C FMP-A, FMP-B, FMP-C1,
L 4.3
Concentration of H2S at 10 ppm could reach downwind distance of more than 14000 m from the leak
source. In that event, similar to the CPF, the Emergency Response Team Leader will inform
personnel in the affected areas to don the SCBAs or escape packs immediately to assist their escape
and muster.
Although the results in the table above indicate that several FMPs could be impaired simultaneously
by H2S release from the wellpads, wind direction factor has yet to be taken into account. It is unlikely
for the toxic gas to simultaneously impair all FMPs in the wellheads. Personnel will continue to
evacuate, while observing the wind direction and escape and muster in the upwind direction of the
release point, until a safe and gas-free area is reached.

Based on the above assessment, the muster goal is met, on condition that:
• Emergency Response Team Leader informs and announces the location of the MAE to all
personnel and to advice the accessibility of the FMPs.

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5.5 Decision to Evacuate Goal Analysis

5.5.1 Goal Overview
Goal 4: All personnel are made aware, in a timely manner of the decision to evacuate the facility.
5.5.2 Decision to Evacuate

The Emergency Response Team is the core element in fulfilling the ‘decision to evacuate’ goal. In an
event of emergency, the Banyu Urip EPC1 Emergency Response Team Leader will be the personnel
in charge to ensure that escape and mustering is performed in a controlled manner. If the emergency
escalates beyond control, the Emergency Response Team Leader will need to make a decision on
the necessity of evacuating the facility. In the event that personnel are unable to muster in the
allocated area due to inaccessible escape routes, personnel can receive instruction from the
Emergency Response Team Leader through portable hand-held radio. Note that spare radios and
charging stations are located at the telecommunications building (PB-38) or the Operations
Warehouse.
It is recommended that portable radios should be provided to all core personnel and one should be
available to each maintenance team.
In the absence or incapacitation of the Emergency Response Team Leader, the deputy or other
personnel in the chain of command will take over the duties of the Leader to ensure mustering and
evacuating are carried out in a controlled manner (refer to Appendix A - Assumption Sheet A5).

On the basis that a proper line of command and detailed procedures for emergency response is
outlined, the ‘Decision to Evacuate’ goal is assessed to be met. Recommendations are proposed in
Section 6.2 for enhancement of the goal.
5.6 Medical Rescue (MEDIVAC) Goal Analysis

Goal 5: Adequate means exist for the medical evacuation of injured personnel and transport of injured
personnel to a medical facility / hospital.
5.6.1 Exposure of Rescue Facilities to Fire, Explosion and Smoke

In the event of a medical emergency, an ambulance stationed at the IF area will transport any injured
personnel to the nearest hospital. Ground preparation from the FMPs to the entry or exit points from
the main road are constructed for wheeled vehicles to allow unimpeded access for ambulance.
Detailed drawings of the FMPs shall be provided by Civil Engineer.
In the event of a toxic or flammable gas release, ambulance will not attempt to enter the facility as it
may be a potential ignition source. The ambulance crew will only respond only after a fire is under
control or a gas release has dissipated to a safe level.
As the ambulance is expected to pick up injured personnel away from any gas releases or fire
scenario, MEDIVAC is considered not vulnerable to fire, explosion and smoke.
Nevertheless, it is recommended that the Emergency Response Team Leader informs the MEDIVAC
Team as soon as toxic gas release is detected. This is to ensure that the MEDIVAC Team is aware of
the presence of H2S gas and subsequently to prepare for H2S situation, i.e. to bring along portable
H2S detector and SCBA to assist MEDIVAC Team in carrying out their tasks (refer to Appendix A -
Assumption Sheet A7).

Based on the above assessment, the MEDIVAC goal is met, on condition that:

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5.7 Evacuation Goal Analysis

Goal 6: Suitable means of evacuation are provided to allow personnel to evacuate the facility without
unacceptable risk.
5.7.1 Exposure of Evacuation Facilities to Fire, Explosion and Smoke

In the event that evacuation is necessary, personnel will evacuate the facility by road upon instruction
from the Emergency Response Team Leader. Roads are connecting the CPF, Wellpad A, B and C
and the EPC5 towards the northwest and southeast side.
Only large fires are expected to impair the roads. However, duration of these fires are less than 5
minutes. Toxic gas could impair evacuation via roads. 100 ppm of H2S could reach as far as 3000m
from the leak source. Therefore, in the event of a large toxic gas leak, personnel would not be able to
evacuate by road.
Table 5.9 below presents the summary of potential leaks that could impair the evacuation means in
the Banyu Urip EPC 1 Facility. The release durations reported in the Gas Dispersion Study [3] are
less than 10 minutes. Based on the estimated escape and muster time calculated in Section 5.4.3,
potentially it could take more than 10 minutes for personnel to muster at the allocated FMPs. By then,
H2S could potentially be dispersed by the wind, enabling personnel to evacuate safely.
However, it is recommended that the Emergency Response Team Leader informs all personnel as
soon as toxic gas release is detected. This is to ensure that the personnel are aware of the presence
of H2S gas and subsequently to prepare for H2S situation, i.e. to don on the escape packs, which can
sustain them for 15 minutes and to observe the wind direction via the wind socks available.
Table 5.10: List of Potential Leaks That Could Impair Roads
Sect. No. Section Description Release Hole Size Release Duration (mins)
3 Primary Separation Unit – Area C00900 L 0.7

8 Glycol Contactor System – Area C01100 L 1.5
9 Glycol Regeneration Unit – Area C01100 L 0.4
nd
10 2 Stage Gas Lift Sytem – Area C01100 L 2.0
11 Gas Injection System – Area C01100 L 1.3
13-B AGRU Regeneration L 6.7
14-B AGE Regeneration L 1.4
15 Sulfur Recovery Unit L 0.3
12-A Lift Gas to Wellpad A M 2.6
12-A Lift Gas to Wellpad A L 1.1
12-B Lift Gas to Wellpad B L 0.4
12-C Lift Gas to Wellpad C M 9.8
12-C Lift Gas to Wellpad C L 4.0
12-E Cap Gas/Injection Gas to Wellpad A M 2.4
12-E Cap Gas/Injection Gas to Wellpad A L 1.2
12-F Cap Gas/Injection Gas to Wellpad C M 8.9
12-F Cap Gas/Injection Gas to Wellpad C L 4.3

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Emergency Response Team Leader is recommended to inform all personnel during evacuation in the
event H2S gas release is detected. As personnel are carrying their individual H2S detectors, SCBAs or
escape packs will be donned as soon as H2S is detected (refer to Appendix A - Assumption Sheet
A6). And since large toxic release duration is less than 10 minutes, escape packs are sufficient to
keep them safe while they are evacuating the facility. This enhances the survivability of personnel
during evacuation.

Based on the above assessment, the evacuation goal is met, on condition that:

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6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Conclusions
Based on the assessment performed above, the conclusion could be drawn as below:
• The Alarm Goal (Goal 1) is met and the other goals can be met by conditions. These goals
are the Escape Goal (Goal 2), Muster Goal (Goal 3), Decision to Evacuate Goal (Goal 4),
Medical Rescue Goal (Goal 5) and Evacuation Goal (Goal 6).
Recommendations are proposed to further enhance and meet the goals.
6.2 Recommendations
Escape Goal (Goal 2)
• Alternative escape routes and recommendations as presented in Table 6.1 are implemented
and shown on the Escape Route Layout.
Table 6.1: Escape Route Goal Recommendations
1
(Area C00100, C00200,
C00500, C01500, C00300,
C00400, C00600 and C00700)
escape directions.
2
(Area C00800, C01000,
C01600, C01300, C01200,
C01400, C00900, and C01100)
escape directions.
on the inside by a push-bar, ensuring they are readily accessible for personnel
Wellpad A working in Wellpad A.
personnel in Wellpad A.
on the inside by a push-bar, ensuring it is readily accessible for personnel
Wellpad B working in Wellpad B.
personnel in Wellpad B.
To ensure all the normally-closed gates at are locked to the outside, and
opened on the inside by a push-bar, ensuring they are readily accessible for
Wellpad C personnel working in Wellpad C.
personnel in Wellpad C.
advice the accessibility of escape routes.
• Conduct frequent training to familiarise the use of SCBA and escape pack.

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escape.
• In the event of H2S leak, core personnel will retrieve portable H2S detector from the fireman
equipment cabinet. This is to check if muster point is safe to muster, or if personnel need to
muster further away from the muster point due to H2S impairment.
covered.
Muster Goal (Goal 3)
advice the accessibility of FMP.
Decision to Evacuate Goal (Goal 4)
• Assign deputy in the chain of command in the event that the Emergency Response Team
Leader is incapacitated.
• Portable radios should be provided to all core personnel and one should be available to each
maintenance team.
MEDIVAC Goal (Goal 5)
• Civil Engineer to provide detailed drawings of FMP.
Evacuation Goal (Goal 6)

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7. REFERENCES
1. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), CPF Fire Hazard Assessment, Document Number : IDBC-TS-FRRSK-
C00003, July 2012, Rev C.
2. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), CPF Explosion Study, Document Number : IDBC-TS-FRRSK-C00001,
August 2012, Rev 0.
3. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), CFF Gas Dispersion Study, Document Number : IDBC-TS-FRRSK-
C00002, September 2012, Rev 0.
4. The Centre of Marine and Petroleum Technology (CMPT), A Guide to Quantitative Risk
Assessment for Offshore Installations, John Spounge, 1999.
5. Project Query: Definition of H2S Alarm Levels, Document Number: PQ-MHJK-TSJK-088, May
2012, Rev 0.
6. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), Fire and Gas Detection Layout Specification, Document Number:
IDBU-ED-FSPDS-000013, October 2008, Rev C.
7. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), Central Processing Facility Area Layout of F&G Detectors Location,
June 2012, Rev C.
8. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), Central Processing Facility Area Layout of F&G Detectors Plotplan At
Wellpad “A”, June 2012, Rev C.
Wellpad “B”, June 2012, Rev C.
Wellpad “C”, June 2012, Rev C.
11. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), PAEAS Equipment Plot Plan At CPF Area (Outdoor Speakers &
Beacons List), August 2012, Rev B.
12. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), PAEAS Equipment Plot Plan For Substations, October 2012, Rev B.
13. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), Banyu Urip CFF Central Processing Facility – Escape Route Layout,
Rev X.
14. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), Evacuation Procedure, Document Number: IDBU-TS-XXXXX-
XXXXXX, October 2012, Rev A.
15. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), Banyu Urip CFF – Wellpad Overall Plot Plan, Document Number:
IDBC-TS-LDLAY-W00001, Rev C.
16. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), Banyu Urip CFF Fire & Safety Equipment Layout, Rev X.
th
17. Client Correspondence, dated 17 October 2012.
th
18. Client Correspondence, dated 11 October 2012.
19. International Organisation for Standardisation, ISO 15544 Petroleum and Natural Gas
Industries – Offshore Production Installations – Requirements and Guidelines for Emergency
Response, September 2000.
20. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), Safety and Fire Protection Design Criteria, Document Number: IDBC-
CW-FBDES-000008, September 2010, Rev D.
21. Project Query: Flammable and Toxic Gas Detection Requirements, Document Number: PQ-
MHJK-TSJK-102, July 2012, Rev 0.
22. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), Material Handling Study Report, Document Number: IDBC-TS-
LMZZZ-000001, Rev E.
23. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), Safety Equipment List, Doc No: IDBC-TS-FLMEL-C00001, Rev 1.

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APPENDIX A: ASSUMPTION REGISTER
Table A.1 : List of Assumptions
Assumption No. Description
A1 On Site Personnel
A2 Impairment Criteria
A3 Field Muster Point (FMP) and Egress Point
A4 Estimation of Time to Evacuate
A5 Emergency Response
A6 Portable H2S Detector
A7 MEDIVAC H2S Escape Packs

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BANYU URIP EPC1 EERA STUDY ASSUMPTION REGISTER
A1 On Site Personnel Revision Number 0

Assumption
The maximum personnel on site during normal operation is presented in the below table.
Table A1.1: Maximum Personnel Onsite During Normal Operation
Area CPF Wellpad A Wellpad B Wellpad C
No. of Personnel
on Day Shift
55 10 10 10
(8 hours / Monday-
Friday)
No. of Personnel
on Night Shift
20 5 5 5
(8 hours /
Weekends)
Reference
st
1. Client Correspondence, dated 31 January 2013.
Prepared by GL Noble Denton Approved by Tripatra-Samsung Consortium
Date: Date:

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A2 Impairment Criteria Revision Number 0

Assumption
• Escape routes and Field Muster Points are assumed to be impaired when exposed to radiation
2
level over than 4 kW/m [1]. Personnel exposed to this level of radiation may experience
significant injury to unprotected skin within 20 seconds of exposure [1].
• Equipment and structure may be damaged by explosion overpressure and the falling structures
may obstruct escape route. An overpressure of 0.35 bar is used as the impairment criteria to
assess the failure of escape routes and muster areas when subjected to explosion overpressure
[1].
• H2S concentration of 100 ppm [2] and above is assumed to be able to impair the escape routes.
• Even though the TLV for H2S is 5 ppm, 10 ppm is taken as the impairment criteria for muster
points as the CFF Gas Dispersion Study [3] only provides the results of H2S release at 10 ppm,
100 ppm, 500 ppm and 1000 ppm.
Reference
1. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), CPF Fire Hazard Assessment, Document Number : IDBC-TS-
FRRSK-C00003, July 2012, Rev C.
2. Project Query: Definition of H2S Alarm Levels, Document Number: PQ-MHJK-TSJK-088,
May 2012, Rev 0.
3. Mobil Cepu Ltd (MCL), CFF Gas Dispersion Study, Document Number : IDBC-TS-FRRSK-
C00002, September 2012, Rev 0.
Date: Date:

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A3 Field Muster Points and Egress Points Revision Number 0

Assumption
There are two (2) Field Muster Points (FMPs) in the Central Processing Facility (CPF) [1]:
Table A3.1: Field Muster Points in CPF
Field Muster Point Egress Points Accommodated Areas

North side of Main Gate 1 of Main Gate 1 Area C00100, C00200, C00500, C01500, C00300,
CPF C00400, C00600 and C00700
South East side of Main Gate 2 Main Gate 2 Area C00800, C01000, C01600, C01300, C01200,
of CPF C01400, C00900, and C01100
There are three (3) Field Muster Points (FMPs) in the wellpads [1]:
Table A3.2: Field Muster Points in Wellpad A/B/C
Wellpads FMP Location
A FMP-A Along road at southwest side of Wellpad A

B FMP-B Along road at southwest side of Wellpad B
C FMP-C1 & FMP-C2 Along road at north and west side of Wellpad C
Reference
1. Mobil Cepu Ltd. (MCL), Evacuation Procedure, Document Number : IDBU-TS-XXXXX-
XXXXXX, October 2012, Rev A.
Date: Date:

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A4 Estimation of Time to Evacuate Revision Number 0
Assumptions
1. Time to sound the alarm & make work place safe

The Centre of Marine and Petroleum Technology (CMPT) 1 states that “Previous studies have
assumed that the muster alarm is sounded on ignition or 120s (2 minutes) after the release, based
on various detailed evacuation scenarios”. For this study, the following has been assumed:
Time to sound the alarm : 120s (2 minutes)
Time to make work place safe (GL Noble Denton assumption) : 60s (1 minute)
2. Time to muster
i. Average speeds of traverse:
(The Centre of Marine and Petroleum Technology (CMPT) [1])
On level walkways/ corridors : 1 m/s
ii. Decision Time

Based on discussion in The Centre of Marine and Petroleum Technology (CMPT) [1]
Decision Time for working personnel : 0s
iii. Effects of Stress : 0s

The Centre of Marine and Petroleum Technology (CMPT) [1] states that :
• There are no known reports of any adverse effects of stress on mustering.
iv. Effects of Fatalities and injuries

Delay due to fatalities and injuries : 60s (1 minute) per fatality/ injured person
It is assumed that 10% of the personnel are fatal/injured personnel [2].
v. Effects of Management Factors : 30 minutes [3]

Delay due to assessment of situation : 900s (15 minutes)
Time taken to execute rescue : 900s (15 minutes)

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A4 Estimation of Time to Evacuate Revision Number 0
Reference
1. The Centre of Marine and Petroleum Technology (CMPT), A Guide to Quantitative Risk
Assessment for Offshore Installations, John Spouge, 1999.
2. GL Noble Denton Assumption.
3. Input from MCL in Comments Response Sheet for Revision C.
Date: Date:

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A5 Emergency Response Revision Number 0

Assumption
• In the event of an emergency, the Emergency Response Team Leader will be the personnel in
charge to ensure that mustering is performed in a controlled manner.
• In the absence or incapacitation of the Emergency Response Team Leader, the deputy or other
personnel in the chain of command will resume the duties of the Emergency Response Team
Leader to ensure that personnel mustering and evacuating, if required, takes place in a controlled
manner.
• As the perimeter of the facility is wide, wind directions may vary at different locations. Personnel
are expected to observe the nearest wind sock and to evacuate in the cross-wind direction.
Central Control Room Operator would be expected to make announcement via the Public Address
Emergency Alarm System (PAEAS) of the type of detection event (toxic/combustible, fire/smoke),
location of detection event and the wind direction at the control room.
Reference
Date: Date:

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A6 Portable H2S Detectors Revision Number 0

Assumption
• It is assumed that core personnel will retrieve portable H2S detectors from the fireman equipment
cabinet [1].
• The detection criterion is assumed to be 3 ppm for 8 hours and 5 ppm for 15 minutes [2].
Reference
th
1. Client Correspondence, dated 11 March 2013.
st
2. Client Response Sheet, dated 31 of January 2013.
Date: Date:

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A7 MEDIVAC H2S Escape Pack Revision Number 0

Assumption
• It is assumed that all MEDIVAC Team is equipped with own SCBA.

• MEDIVAC Team will don the SCBA for rescue operations should there be personnel reported
missing by Emergency Response Team Leader.
Reference
Date: Date:

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APPENDIX B: RADIATION AND TOXIC GAS RELEASE CONTOURS

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IDBC-TS-FRRSK-C00004

CPF Escape Evacuation and Rescue Plan 12 July 2013

Revision Section Description

A All Issued for Review

B All Issued for Approval

C All Issued for Approval

D All Re-issued for Approval

E All Re-issued for Approval

IDBC-TS-FRRSK-C00004 Rev E (New FMP2)

IDBC-TS-FRRSK-C00004 Rev E (New FMP2)

AGE - Acid Gas Enrichment

AGRU - Acid Gas Removal Unit

CCTV - Closed-circuit Television

CFF - Central Field Facility

CMPT - Centre of Marine and Petroleum Technology

CPF - Central Processing Facility

EEMR - Escape, Evacuation, Muster and Rescue

EER - Escape, Evacuation and Rescue

EERA - Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis

IDBC-TS-FRRSK-C00004 Rev E (New FMP2)

Zone Escape Route Assessments and Recommendations

IDBC-TS-FRRSK-C00004 Rev E (New FMP2)

IDBC-TS-FRRSK-C00004 Rev E (New FMP2)

IDBC-TS-FRRSK-C00004 Rev E (New FMP2)

2. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF WORK

2.2 Scope of Work

IDBC-TS-FRRSK-C00004 Rev E (New FMP2)

3.1 Definitions of EER Goals

IDBC-TS-FRRSK-C00004 Rev E (New FMP2)

3.2.2 Impairment Criterion

Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20 seconds.

Overpressure (bar) Description of Damage

0.02 10% window glass broken

IDBC-TS-FRRSK-C00004 Rev E (New FMP2)

Assumption No. Description

IDBC-TS-FRRSK-C00004 Rev E (New FMP2)

4. DESCRIPTION OF EER FACILITIES

4.1 Fire and Gas Detection System

Type of Detectors Application

Flammable Gas o Single open path detector : 1 LELm; or

IDBC-TS-FRRSK-C00004 Rev E (New FMP2)

Type of Detectors Application

1. ‘Toxic Gas’ Alarm

Fire detectors are selected according to the types of fire expected.

o Within 60 m of any point within a process unit or module. This distance

IDBC-TS-FRRSK-C00004 Rev E (New FMP2)

Table 4.2: Locations of Detectors in CPF [7]

Type of Detectors Location

6 units in Area C00500 (Utility 2 Area)

6 units in Area C01000 (SRU Area)

10 units in Area C00600 (Power Generation Area)

34 units in Area C00900 (Compression Area & Primary Separation Area)

5 units in Area C01300 (Production Manifold Area)

5 units in Area C01400 (Flare KO & Closed Drain Area)

2 units in Area C01500 (Steam Package Area)

8 units in Area C00500 (Utility 2 Area)

21 units in Area C01000 (SRU Area)

33 units in Area C00800 (AGRU & AGE Area)

Toxic Gas 10 units in Area C00700 (Produced Water Treatment Area)