PRO GR A M ON N E G O T I AT ION

1. Assess your BATNA using a four-step process.

Adapted from “Accept or Reject? Sometimes the Hardest Part of Negotiation Is Knowing When to Walk
Away,” by Deepak Malhotra (professor, Harvard Business School), first published in the Negotiation
newsletter, August 2004.

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t was a classic case of a business partnership gone awry. After building a profit-
able construction company together over several decades, Larry Stevenson and

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have accepted or accepting one you’d have been wise to reject. In negotiation, it’s
important to have high aspirations and to fight hard for a good outcome. But it’s
just as critical to establish a walkaway point that is firmly grounded in reality.
Assessing your BATNA. To determine your BATNA in a given negotiation,
follow these four steps:
List your alternatives. Think about all the alternatives available to you if the
current negotiation ends in an impasse. What are your no-deal options?
Evaluate your alternatives. Examine each option and calculate the value of
pursuing each one.
Establish your BATNA. Choose a course of action that would have the high-
est expected value for you. This is your BATNA—the course you should pursue if
the current negotiation fails.
Calculate your reservation value. Now that you know your BATNA, calculate
your reservation value—the lowest-valued deal you are willing to accept. If the
value of the deal proposed to you is lower than your reservation value, you’ll be
better off rejecting the offer and pursuing your BATNA. If the final offer is higher
than your reservation value, you should accept it.
To assess his BATNA, Shapiro first should have obtained the following infor-
mation from his lawyers: estimated litigation costs, $500,000; his likelihood
of winning in court, approximately 70%; and the fact that if he won, he would
receive $10 million for his shares, whereas if he lost, he likely would receive only
$3 million.
Next, Shapiro should have used this formula to determine the actual value of
his BATNA:
(0.7 x $10MM) Value if he wins in court
+ (0.3 x $3MM) Value if he loses in court
– $500,000 Cost of litigation

$7.4MM

Shapiro should then have determined his reservation value for the negotia-
tion with Stevenson: What is the least he would accept? It’s worth noting that,
after the trial was well under way, Shapiro came to believe that he should not

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have rejected Stevenson’s offer. “I still think the offer should have been higher,”
he said, “but if I could go back, I’d accept it. Righteous indignation is worth
something, but it’s not worth $1.1 million.”

2. Take your BATNA to the next level.

Adapted from “Taking BATNA to the Next Level” by Guhan Subramanian (professor, Harvard Business
School and Harvard Law School), first published in the Negotiation newsletter, January 2007.

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f your current negotiation reaches an impasse, what’s your best outside option?
Most seasoned negotiators understand the value of evaluating their BATNA, or

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prices. His existing insurer—let’s call it Acme—had been raising its rates by 7%
to 10% annually for the past three years, and Larry wasn’t sure he was getting the
best deal. He then found a carrier that offered a policy for 30% less than Acme’s
renewal rate.
Delighted, Larry came very close to switching to the new insurer. But after
doing some digging (and receiving some self-interested guidance from Acme),
Larry identified important coverages and term definitions buried deep in the
legalese of the two policies. After going through a translation process to make
the prices comparable, Larry realized that Acme, his current insurer, was offering
him a better deal. The lesson: Rather than assuming that the deal on the table
matches your BATNA point by point, translate your BATNA to fully understand
what it means for the current negotiation.
2. Assess their BATNA with care. It may seem an obvious step, but even
the most sophisticated negotiators often fail to think through the other party’s
BATNA as carefully and objectively as they think through their own. Although
you can’t assess someone else’s BATNA as precisely as you can your own, asking
“What will he do without a deal?” provides valuable insight.
Consider the case of a Mississippi farmer in the early 1990s. The state legisla-
ture had just legalized riverboat gambling, and the farmer owned land along the
Mississippi River that was very attractive for the development of hotels, restau-
rants, and other businesses. Sure enough, an entrepreneur approached the farmer
about buying his land. Before meeting to negotiate a purchase price, the farmer
hired a professor of agriculture to estimate the land’s value. After conducting soil
tests and estimating cash flows, the professor concluded that the land was worth
approximately $3 million.
As the negotiation began, the farmer kept quiet and let the entrepreneur
frame the discussion. His opening offer: $7 million. Though ecstatic, the farmer
kept his composure and made a counteroffer of $9.5 million. Eventually they
reached a deal of $8.5 million.
You might view this tale as a success story for the farmer; after all, he got $8.5
million when he was only expecting $3 million. But what if the farmer had con-
sidered the entrepreneur’s perspective, perhaps retaining an expert in the gaming
industry to assess the land? He might have learned just how profitable casinos

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can be and that the benefit to the entrepreneur of securing the optimal location
rather than a second-best BATNA was worth much more than $8.5 million.
3. Think through two-level BATNAs. In most business negotiations, you face
two counterparts: the individual across the table and the organization he repre-
sents. This means you’re facing two BATNAs as well. Sophisticated deal makers
think through both BATNAs—the organization’s and the individual’s.
In one real-world case, a vacation resort was seeking to have certain equip-
ment installed on its property. The equipment manufacturer sent Frank, the
CEO’s newly hired lieutenant, to negotiate this major contract. The resulting deal
was extremely successful for both sides.
A few years later, the manufacturer held its annual meeting of top managers
at the resort to show off its installations and celebrate the deal. The two organiza-
tions held a panel discussion to reflect on the dynamics of their negotiation. At
one point, the moderator asked Frank to reveal his BATNA. He responded with
a textbook analysis: “Our BATNA was to look around for some other major
contract in which to powerfully demonstrate our capability.” When pressed, he
continued, “Well, my BATNA, as a new hire, was probably to look around for
another job if I didn’t get the deal.”
Most meaningful negotiations occur between organizations, not individuals—
yet individuals, not organizations, negotiate deals. Thus, it’s crucial to consider
the incentives of the individual across the table: How is she compensated? How
long has she worked for the company? What are her long-term aspirations? Only
by examining both pieces of the BATNA will you gain a complete picture of the
other side’s walk-away alternatives.

3. Track BATNAs in multiparty negotiations.

Adapted from “How to Cope When the Table Gets Crowded,” first published in the Negotiation
newsletter, August 2011.

N egotiations between just two sides can be tough enough to manage. Add
more parties to the mix, and things get a lot more complicated. Yet multi-
party talks are common: think of department heads dividing up scarce resources,

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family members debating the future of a business, or a group of consumers

launching a class-action lawsuit.
One of the issues that makes multiparty negotiations more complex than
two-party talks, according to Massachusetts Institute of Technology profes-
sor Lawrence Susskind and Harvard Law School professor Robert Mnookin, is
the fluctuating nature of each party’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement
(BATNA). By preparing for this complication, you will be well positioned to
thrive in your next round of multiparty negotiations.
As in a two-party negotiation, you should enter multiparty talks with a solid
idea of your BATNA—that is, what you will do if a deal fails to materialize.
Knowledge of your BATNA can help you stand firm in the face of offers that fall
short of your goals.
Suppose that Mark, an unemployed marketing professional, is preparing to
meet with his three siblings to discuss the future of their marginally profitable
family business. Mark’s preference is to dissolve the business and use his share
of the assets to start a consulting firm. However, he knows that one or two of his
siblings would prefer to keep the business running as is or sell it. If the negotia-
tion doesn’t work out as he would like, Mark decides that his BATNA is to move
to a city across the country where a colleague has offered him a job.
You should also attempt to analyze the BATNAs of the other parties at the
table. Roughly calculating the minimum you can offer someone to secure a
commitment will help you immensely. Mark, for instance, expects that his sis-
ter Leah, who has been involved in the business, will demand a large share of
the pie in exchange for agreeing to dissolve it. He estimates that she will ask for
50% of the assets but be willing to settle for about 40% and accept a position
with a client.
In negotiations among a large number of parties, determining each party’s
BATNA can be a daunting, even impossible, undertaking. At the very least, try
to foresee how parties may align and estimate the BATNA of each possible
coalition.
Once discussions begin, parties’ BATNAs will begin to fluctuate, according to
Susskind and Mnookin. For instance, imagine that Mark persuades his sister Jac-
lyn and brother Tom that the business should be dissolved. At this point, because

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Leah is outnumbered, her BATNA becomes a virtual nonissue. Yet to preserve

their relationship with her and each other, her siblings become focused on divid-
ing up the assets in a way that satisfies them all. A payoff matrix—a spreadsheet
that lists the names of the parties in rows, the issues to be discussed in columns,
and the parties’ priorities on those issues in the boxes that are formed—will help
you keep track of shifting BATNAs in addition to parties’ preferences.

4. Anticipate hidden hazards of BATNA research.

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you enhance your power, these investments in strengthening your BATNA can
have other, potentially unintended consequences. Your realization that invest-
ments you made and discarded represent irrecoverable costs may affect your
behavior in the current negotiation in ways you don’t expect.
Specifically, research I conducted with my Harvard Business School colleague
Deepak Malhotra shows that the extent to which decision makers invest directly
in outside options influences how entitled they feel in the current negotiation.
When you decided to forgo options that you invested time and money in creat-
ing, you may feel as though you wasted resources. This perceived loss creates a
desire for a counterbalancing gain. Thus, it is likely to trigger a sense of entitle-
ment: the feeling that you deserve a favorable outcome in the current negotiation.
Our research shows that the costlier a negotiator’s investment in developing a
strong BATNA is, the stronger those feelings of entitlement will be.
We found that this sense of entitlement causes the negotiator to have high
aspirations in the current relationship, and these aspirations fuel opportunistic
behavior.
Your sunk costs—and not simply the leverage provided by the outside options
you created—may lead you to exploit your counterpart in ways that could dam-
age your relationship going forward. So, for instance, you may find yourself lying
or misrepresenting information to your counterpart in an attempt to improve
your outcomes. You may feel entitled to use aggressive strategies to reach a better
deal for yourself. Without your realizing it, the foregone alternatives are influenc-
ing your behavior.
Since you likely are interested in maintaining a good relationship with the
supplier in your current negotiation, you should consider the effect that the
forgone options in which you invested might have on your expectations and
behaviors as you negotiate. Namely, your prior investments may compromise
your ethical standards. By remaining vigilant about negotiating in good faith and
reciprocating goodwill, you should be able to emerge from the shadow cast by
sunk costs.