G.R. No.

171068             September 5, 2007

HEIRS OF MARCELINA ARZADON-CRISOLOGO, represented by Leticia C. del Rosario,

MAURICIA ARZADON and BERNARDO ARZADON, petitioners,
vs.
AGRIFINA RAÑON, substituted by SUZIMA RAÑON-DUTERTE and OTHELO
RAÑON, respondents.

FACTS
Records show that on 18 October 1995, Agrifina Rañon5 filed a Complaint6 against spouses Conrado
and Mila Montemayor (spouses Montemayor) with the MCTC of Badoc, Ilocos Norte, claiming
ownership over an unregistered residential lot.

According to Agrifina Rañon, her family had enjoyed continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted
possession and ownership over the subject property since 1962, and had religiously paid the taxes
thereon. The spouses Montemayor, for their part, alleged that they acquired the subject lot by
purchase from Leticia del Rosario and Bernardo Arzadon who are the heirs of its previous owners
for a consideration of P100,000.00.

On 22 October 1999, the MCTC issued an Order11 dropping the name of the spouses Montemayor
from the caption of the case on the ground that sometime in 1996, Leticia del Rosario and Bernardo
Arzadon had repurchased the subject property from the spouses Montemayor for the consideration
of P100,000.00. As a result, the spouses Montemayor had no more interest or claim whatsoever on
the property in litigation.

First, the MCTC ruled that while the adverse claims of Agrifina Rañon on the subject lot against the
spouses Alcantara may have started in 1962, this adverse possession was interrupted in the year
1977 due to the filing of an adverse claim by petitioner Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo with the Office
of the Assessor.

In its findings, the RTC declared that a more circumspect scrutiny of the evidence showed that for a
long time from the death of the spouses Alcantara, no one adjudicated the subject property unto
themselves. Although petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest claimed to have successional
rights over the subject property, they did not take action to have the same adjudicated to themselves
or, at least, to have the same declared for taxation purposes. The RTC ruled that petitioners had
slept on their rights.

The Court of Appeals held that when Valentin Rañon executed the affidavit declaring himself to be
the true and lawful owner of the subject property in 1962, the same was a repudiation of petitioners’
legal title over it. The repudiation, coupled with the payment of realty taxes, was made with the
knowledge of petitioners, who failed to act against it. Thus, from 1962 up to the filing of the action in
1995, respondents continued to adversely occupy the property.

Ruling

The open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by respondents of the subject property
for a period of more than 30 years in repudiation of petitioners’ ownership had been established.
During such length of time, respondents had exercised acts of dominion over the subject property,
and paid taxes in their name. Jurisprudence is clear that although tax declarations or realty tax
payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia
of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.41 They constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property.42 As is well known, the payment of taxes
coupled with actual possession of the land covered by the tax declaration strongly supports a claim
of ownership.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 169898             October 27, 2006

SPOUSES ANITA AND HONORIO AGUIRRE, petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF LUCAS VILLANUEVA, NAMELY: JOSE T. VILLANUEVA, PABLO T. VILLANUEVA,
PEDRO T. VILLANUEVA, RODOLFO T. VILLANUEVA, DELIA V. DELA TORRE, JUANITA V.
INGLES, & SABELITO V. GELITO, respondents.

FACTS

A complaint for annulment or declaration of nullity of deed of exchange, tax declarations and
recovery of ownership and possession with damages was filed by private respondents against
petitioners.

Private respondents alleged that they are the legitimate children and grandson of the late spouses
Lucas Villanueva and Regina Tupas Villanueva.

In their Answer,4 petitioners claimed that petitioner Anita S. Aguirre is the lawful owner and actual
possessor of the land in question, it being a portion of a bigger parcel of land she inherited from her
deceased parents Eutiquiano Salazar and Regina Supetran Salazar who bought the land from
Ciriaco H. Tirol per Deed of Exchange of Real Property.

The trial court noted that the tax declarations in the name of Trinidad vda. de Tirol and the survey
plan did not establish the fact that Ciriaco Tirol is the owner and possessor of the land in question,
thus, he has no right to transfer ownership of the same to Eutiquiano Salazar; that petitioners were
not possessors in good faith since they knew as early as 1954 that private respondents were in
possession of the land; that petitioners did not acquire the land via extraordinary acquisitive
prescription considering that their possession only lasted for 26 years from 1971 up to 1997 when
private respondents first instituted the complaint.

Court of Appeals rendered a decision denying petitioners’ appeal and affirming in toto the trial
court’s decision.

Ruling: We find merit in the petition.

Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights through
the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession
should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive
prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession
in good faith and with just title for 10 years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription
can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for 30
years. In the instant case, we find sufficient evidence to support petitioners’ claim that the
requirements for ordinary prescription are present.

To prove their ownership, petitioners presented Tax Declaration No. 1264 for the year 1974 (Exhibit
"4-B") and other tax declarations (Exhibits "4-C, "4-D", "5" and submarkings) for the year 1980 to
1994, in the name of Eutiquiano Salazar declaring the subject land for taxation purposes. While tax
declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land,
nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and
can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription.

In the instant case, private respondents knew as early as 1981 that petitioners are building fences in
the perimeter of the disputed land but did not take action to assert their rights over the subject parcel
of land. They waited 16 long years to oust petitioners from the possession of the land. Definitely,
laches had already set in.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

 [ G.R. No. 248306, June 28, 2021 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SCIENCE PARK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

INC., REP. BY ITS EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT AND GEN. MANAGER, MR. RICHARD
ALBERT I. OSMOND, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Respondent essentially alleged that it is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land. It acquired the
property from one Antonio Aranda through a Deed of Absolute Sale.  It has been, by itself or through
its predecessors-in-interest, in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Finally, the property is within the alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain.

On the other hand, petitioner Republic of the Philippines entered its appearance through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG). The MCTC, however, issued an Order of general default dated April
26, 2016 as no oppositor allegedly objected to respondent's application.

Meanwhile, witnesses from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), DENR-
City Environment and Natural Resources (DENR-CENRO), Batangas City and the National Mapping
and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) all testified that the property was within the alienable
and disposable portion of the public domain.

Respondent offered the following documentary evidence: Technical Description for Lot
3394;17 Sepia copy of Plan, Lot No. 3394, Psc-47, Malvar Cadastre;18 Land Classification Map No.
3601,19 and tax declarations, among others.

MCTC granted respondent's application. Court of Appeals affirmed (At any rate, it complied with
Section 1 4(1), thus: first, Land Classification Map No. 3601 and DENR Administrative Order No. 97-
37 proved the alienable and disposable character of Lot No. 3394; second, Eliseo Garcia, an
octogenarian resident of Malvar, Batangas, testified on how respondent's predecessors-in-interest
enjoyed open, exclusive, adverse, continuous and notorious possession of the property; finally, the
transfer of ownership of the property from Segunda Kalaw in 1944 to the present was traced through
documents kept intact at the Assessor's Office of Malvar, Batangas.)

Ruling: REVERSED
In fine, an applicant invoking Section 14(1) of PD 1529 needs to prove the following elements: (a) the property forms
part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain at the time of the filing of the application for
registration; (b) it has been, by itself or through its predecessors-ininterest, in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the property; and (c) the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

On the other hand, an application for registration based on Section 14(2) of PD 1529 must establish the following
requisites: (a) the land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of the public domain; (b) the applicant
and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just
title, or for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just title; and (c) the land had already been converted to or
declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of the said 10-year or 30-year period of possession.

To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject land since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, SPPI presented, among others, the testimony of Nelia Linatoc-Cabalda (Nelia). Nelia, who
was born in 1936, claimed to have known of Gervacio's ownership and cultivation of the subject land when she was
about seven (7) years old, xxx However, such testimony was insufficient to establish possession in the nature and
character required by law that would give right to ownership. In a number of cases, the Court has repeatedly held that
to prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of owner, the claimant
must show the nature and extent of cultivation on the subject land, or the number of crops planted or the volume of
the produce harvested from the crops supposedly planted thereon; failing in which, the supposed planting and
harvesting of crops in the land being claimed only amounted to mere casual cultivation which is not the nature of
possession and occupation required by law. Consequently, SPPI failed to satisfy the requisite exclusivity and
notoriety of its claimed possession and occupation of the subject land because exclusive dominion and conspicuous
possession thereof were not established.

ACCORDINGLY the petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 172804               January 24, 2011

GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented by his heirs,3 sued respondents,

spouses Froilan and Leonila Branoco (respondents), in the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran
(trial court) to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land in Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte (Property)
and collect damages. Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July 1971
from Casimiro Vere (Vere), who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo (Rodrigo) in
August 1970. Petitioner declared the Property in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it.

In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July
1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May 1965.

The trial court rejected respondents’ claim of ownership after treating the Deed as a donation mortis
causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the Property to Vere in 1970.6 Thus, by the time
Rodriguez sold the Property to respondents in 1983, she had no title to transfer.

The CA granted respondents’ appeal and set aside the trial court’s ruling. While conceding that the
"language of the [Deed is] x x x confusing and which could admit of possible different
interpretations,"7 the CA found the following factors pivotal to its reading of the Deed as
donation inter vivos

Ruling: We find respondents’ title superior, and thus, affirm the CA.

Alternatively, petitioner grounds his claim of ownership over the Property through his and Vere’s
combined possession of the Property for more than ten years, counted from Vere’s purchase of the
Property from Rodrigo in 1970 until petitioner initiated his suit in the trial court in February
1986.27 Petitioner anchors his contention on an unfounded legal assumption. The ten year ordinary
prescriptive period to acquire title through possession of real property in the concept of an owner
requires uninterrupted possession coupled with just title and good faith.28 There is just title when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law
for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.29 Good faith, on the other hand, consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom the possessor received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership.30

Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having successively acquired the Property
through sale, neither was a good faith possessor. As Rodrigo herself disclosed in the Deed,
Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the Property "in the concept of an owner" ("como tag-
iya"31) since 21 May 1962, nearly three years before Rodrigo’s donation in 3 May 1965 and seven
years before Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo. This admission against interest binds Rodrigo
and all those tracing title to the Property through her, including Vere and petitioner. Indeed,
petitioner’s insistent claim that Rodriguez occupied the Property only in 1982, when she started
paying taxes, finds no basis in the records. In short, when Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo in
1970, Rodriguez was in possession of the Property, a fact that prevented Vere from being a buyer in
good faith.

Lacking good faith possession, petitioner’s only other recourse to maintain his claim of ownership by
prescription is to show open, continuous and adverse possession of the Property for 30
years.32 Undeniably, petitioner is unable to meet this requirement.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.

G.R. No. 179987               September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS

On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an
application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite,
claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation
of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.

RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land registration. CA promulgated its decision reversing
the RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto
(Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession
prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had
been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could
not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of possession.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement
that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As
such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12,
1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber,
or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act.
What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits
the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the
following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation
of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural
land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is
inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may run
against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title
that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with
through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant
by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be
sanctioned by the courts.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period
of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration
of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law
or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.1âwphi1