A.M. No.

276-MJ June 27, 1975

HADJIRUL TAHIL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARLITO A. EISMA, Municipal Judge of Parang, Sulu, respondent.

RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J.:

Respondent Municipal Judge Carlito A. Eisma, of Parang, Sulu, is charged by complainant Hadjirul
Tahil with dishonesty in not reporting regularly to his office, contrary to the recitals of his daily time
record. In his "Investigation, Report and Recommendation" dated February 29, 1973, Judge Felix V.
Barbers of the Court of First Instance of Sulu, Branch III, 16th Judicial District, who investigated the
case, recommended the dismissal of the charge.

According to the findings of the Investigating Judge:

... respondent has been regularly reporting to his office except on certain days when
he marked himself absent during which he explained, his salary was correspondingly
deducted therefrom.

The filing of this complaint, the respondent declared, is motivated by hatred, anger
and revenge on the part of the complainant. This is occasioned by the fact, when
complainant brought the bail bond of his nephew Bakkal Ilahal charged in Criminal
Case No. 241-N before the Court of respondent, for approval of the latter. Because
of the failure of the bondsmen to appear before him, respondent did not approve of
the bail bond. Again on another occasion, complainant filed in the Court of
respondent a motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. 372-N, wherein the same nephew
of the complainant, Bakkal Ilahal, is also charged with the crime of illegal possession
of firearms. A scrutiny of the motion to dismiss and its annexes, offered in evidence
by respondent, will show that the same is based on documents merely certified to by
the clerk of the counsel of Bakkal Ilahal. Respondent in his order denying this motion
to dismiss ruled:

"After a thorough perusal and study of the issues involved in the

motion to dismiss and the opposition, thereto, the Court finds that the
reasons of Lt. Rodialo Gumtang in his oral opposition are more
logical and justifiable because the evidence upon which accused thru
counsel relies in their motion to dismiss are documentary in nature
and the Court is not in a position to accept this kind of evidence
without confronting persons who executed and prepared the
documents in question. Furthermore, some of the documents
presented by accused thru counsel are merely certified true copies,
the validity and originality of which are subject to question.

"Accused thru counsel can have all the opportunity to present all their
evidence during the trial of the case, hence, to pass and decide upon
the validity of the documents attached to the motion to dismiss is
premature and the proper subject of a trial on the merits.
 "WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this Court
denies the motion to dismiss of accused and orders that this case be
set for trial on April 15, 1971. Let copy of this order be issued to the
parties with the warning that no postponements shall be entertained.

"SO ORDERED."

Without going to the merits of the abovementioned two cases, this Court finds that
respondent acted judiciously on the matter. His disapproval of the bail bond without
the bondsmen appearing before him in the first case (murder) is correct, because as
the approving officer he must satisfy himself that those who made, the undertaking to
bail the accused are the same persons whose names appear on the bail bond and
whose signatures are affixed thereto, otherwise, if only for the sake of friendship to
accomodate the complainant, would make the bond a useless scrap of paper, and
which respondent can be held responsible.

A scrutiny of the bail bond (Exhibit 1) which we believe is the original thereof, the
same is not even signed by the principal, who is the accused to be bailed. Neither
has it been shown that the current taxes of the real properties offered as bond had
been paid. The receipts of payment or a certificate of the municipal treasurer to this
effect is not even attached, which are requirements to be accomplished pursuant to
existing circulars of the Department of Justice.

As to the order denying the motion to dismiss in the other case (illegal possession of
firearm), this Court finds and is convinced that respondent acted legally. A scrutiny of
the motion to dismiss and the grounds thereof, are grounds that could be taken and
proven during the trial on the merits of the case. Respondent not having been
satisfied with the documents annexed to the motion which are purely certified copies
made by the clerk of the accused's counsel, respondent acted correctly and legally.

On this score, complainant has all the reasons to be angry at respondent taking into
consideration their previous friendship, and now respondent has failed to
accomodate him as hereinabove described. A lot of persons, because of friendly
relations they have with judicial authorities, consider that when their wishes are not
complied with or accomodated in cases pending before the courts of which they have
an interest, it is the end of such friendship and to their eyes the judge is not a friend
but a foe. Their nearsightedness on these matters could be like a poison to their
mental faculties so that they would like the judge who failed to accomodate them,
face their wrath and displeasure. Complainant became wrathful, but wrath must be
properly channeled or it may work out a grave injustice. But, certainly, a judge in the
exercise of his judicial function, does not see whether one is a friend or foe, whether
one is influential or not, but rather, whether he acts within the law he is to apply,
whether his actuations are prescribed by the rules of court and whether he has acted
judiciously.

As to the alleged falsification of the respondent of his daily time record and the
allegation that he only reports to his office during Mondays and Thursdays, do not
find credibility, and naturally should not be given weight.

It appears, however, that in the aforementioned Criminal Case No. 241-N for murder, respondent
admitted having granted bail to the accused upon the request of a congressman, despite his belief
that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong. On the basis of this admission, the
Judicial Consultant recommends that the respondent Judge "be fined in an amount equivalent to his
salary for one (1) month and warned that a repetition of such a breach of integrity will be dealt with
more sternly."

Under the Constitution, all persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except
those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. The discretion of the court to
grant bail in a capital offense, before conviction, must be based upon the Court's determination as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may only be exercised after the
evidence is submitted at the summary hearing conducted pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 114 of the
Rules.1äwphï1.ñët

Respondent's admission that he granted bail because of the request of a congressman, despite his
belief that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, is indeed reprehensible. But it is not
clear from the record whether or not a summary hearing was conducted by respondent Judge in
Criminal Case No. 241-N for the purpose of bail and, on the basis of his appreciation of the evidence
submitted, granted bail to the accused. Moreover, respondent was not specifically charged and
investigated in this regard, and in the absence of any specific finding that respondent gravely abused
his discretion in granting bail to the accused in said case, this Court has no basis to impose a fine
upon respondent.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the charge against respondent is DISMISSED.
Considering his admission, however, he is hereby admonished to demonstrate a greater degree of
competence, intellectual courage and independence in the discharge of his judicial duties, for only in
that manner can he merit the judicial position that he occupies and the support and confidence of the
people.

Fernado (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.