Case Digest – G.R. No.

131909 18 February 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.

Assailed before this Court is the August 1, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA GR. No. 42318 which affirmed the
March 24, 1995 and June 14, 1996 orders of the lower court granting accused-respondent's Motion for Bail and denying
petitioner People's Motions "to Recall and Invalidate Order of March 24, 1995" and "to Recall and/or Reconsider the
Order of May 5, 1995" confirming the hospitalization of accused-respondent.

FACTS:

Roderick Odiamar, Accused-Respondent, was charged with rape upon the complaint of Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to
secure temporary liberty, accused- respondent filed a motion praying that he be released on bail which petitioner by
presenting real, documentary and testimonial evidence. The lower court, however, granted the motion for bail on the
ground that the evidence is not strong.

Believing that accused-respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence against him was strong, the prosecution filed
the two abovementioned motions which the lower court dispose of. On appeal before the Court of Appeals, the petition
was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction in the
issuing the assailed decision and resolution despite a showing by the prosecution that there is strong evidence proving
respondent’s guilt for the crime charged.

RULING:

Yes. The grant or denial of an application for bail is dependent on whether the evidence of guilt is strong which the
lower court should determine in a hearing called for the purpose. In this case, Roderick Odiamar was being charges with
rape qualified by the use of deadly weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

As such, bail is discretionary and not a matter of right.

The 1987 Constitution in Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.

In view of the above exception to the constitutional guarantee on bail and in accordance with its rule-making powers,
the Supreme Court, in promulgating the Rules of Court, adopted the following provision:

Sec. 7. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial discretion. While the
lower court would never deprived of its mandated prerogative to exercise judicial discretion, this court would
unhesitatingly reverse the trial court’s findings if found to be laced with grave abuse of discretion.

Wherefore, petition is granted.

** Add ko po sa page 3 & 4, yung naging order ng lower court in favor of the accused and other circumstances pointed
out by the Solicitor General in favor of the petitioner, respectively. ** =)
The orders of the lower court granting used-respondent's application for bail which it justified through its summary of the
evidence presented during the hearing. Said order states, thus:

Now going over the evidence adduced in conjunction with the petition for bail filed by the accused through counsel, the court
believes that the evidence so far presented by the prosecution is not strong. This is so because the crime of rape is not to be
presumed; consent and not physical force is the common origin of acts between man and woman. Strong evidence and indication
of great weight alone support such presumption. It is the teaching of applicable doctrines that form the defense in rape prosecution.
In the final analysis, it is entitled to prevail, not necessarily because the untarnished truth is on its side but merely because it can
raise reasonable, not fanciful doubts. It has the right to require the complainant (sic) strong evidence and an indication of great
weight, and in the instant case, the reasonable doubt is on the evidence of the prosecution, more so, because the intrinsic nature
of the crime, the conviction or the acquittal of the accused depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant. Rightly
so, because in the commission of the offense of rape the facts and circumstances occurring either prior, during and subsequent
thereto may provide conclusion whether they may negate the commission thereof by the accused (People v. Flores, L-6065, October
26, 1986). If they negate, they do presuppose that the evidence for the prosecution is not strong. More so, because in the instant
case, the facts and circumstances showing that they do seem to negate the commission thereof were mostly brought out during the
cross-examination. As such, they deserve full faith and credence because the purpose thereof is to test accuracy and truthfulness
and freedom from interest and bias or the reverse (Rule 132, Sec. 6, Revised Rules of Evidence). The facts and circumstances brought
up are as follow, to wit:

1) Cecille Buenafe rode in the jeepney then driven by the accused Roderick Odiamar, the former knew that it was for a joy
ride. In fact, she did not even offer any protest when the said jeepney proceeded to the Pilapil Beach resort, where she and
Stephen Florece intended to go. And when the said jeepney was already inside that resort, Cecille even followed the
accused in going down from the jeepney also without protest on her part, a fact which shows voluntariness on the part of
the offended party and, therefore, to the mind of the court her claim of rape should not be received with precipitate
credulity.

2) In that resort, accused Roderick Odiamar and companions allegedly forced the offended party Cecille Buenafe to drink gin,
the latter, at first, refused and even did not swallow it but later on voluntarily took four (4) shots there shows that there
(was) no force. And as regards the claim that the accused Roderick Odiamar and companions allegedly forced the said
offended party to inhale smoke, out of a small cigarette, presumably a marijuana, it becomes doubtful because the
prosecution, however, failed to present any portion of that so-called small cigarette much less did it present an expert
witness to show that inhaling of smoke from the said cigarette would cause dizziness.

3) That, in that cottage where the accused, Roderick Odiamar allegedly brought the offended party, Cecille Buenafe, the
former was able to consummate the alleged offense of rape by removing the two (2) hands of the offended party, placed
them on her knee, separating them thereby freeing the said hand and consequently pushed the head of the accused but the
latter was able to insert his penis when the said offended party was no longer moving and the latter became tired.

4) That, after the alleged commission of rape at about 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of July 21, 1994, the offended party,
Cecille, Stephen Florece and the latter's companions all boarded the same jeepney going back to the Poblacion of Lagonoy,
without the said offended party, protesting, crying or in any way showing sign of grief regarding the alleged commission of
the offense of rape until the jeepney reached the house of Roderick Odiamar where the latter parked it.

5) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe had herself physically examined by Dr. Josephine Decena for medical certificate
dated July 27, 1994 and it states, among others, that there was a healed laceration on the hymen, her laceration might have
been sustained by the said offended party, a month, six (6) months, and even a year, prior to the said examination and that
the said laceration might have been caused by repeated penetration of a male sex organ probably showing that the
offended party might have experienced sexual intercourse.

6) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe accompanied by the Station Commander of Lagonoy, Camarines Sur, proceeded to
Naga City and upon the suggestion of Gov. Bulaong, the said offended party submitted for medical treatment before the
same physician per medical certificate dated August 1, 1994 but according to the said physician the lesions near the
umbilicus were due to skin diseases but the said offended party claim they were made by the accused after the sexual acts.
The office of the Solicitor General disagreed with the lower court. It opined that aside from failing to include some pieces of
evidence in the summary, the trial also misapplied some well-established doctrines of criminal law. The Office of the Solicitor
General pointed out the following circumstances duly presented in the hearing for bail:

1) There was no ill motive on the part of Cecille to impute the heinous crime of rape against respondent

2) Dr. Belmonte, the psychiatrist who attended to Cecille testified that based on her psychiatric examination of the
latter, Cecille manifested psychotic signs and symptoms such as unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts,
psychomotor retardation, poverty of thought content as well as depressive signs and symptoms.
3) The unrebutted offer of compromise by respondent is an implied admission of guilt

4) Cecille was threatened by a deadly weapon and rendered unconscious by intoxication and inhalation of marijuana
smoke.

5) The fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary investigations, "no bail was recommended in the information"
constitutes "clear and strong evidence of the guilt of (all) the accused".

6) Cecille categorically testified on re-cross examination (pages 5-7, Order) that respondent succeeded in forcibly
deflowering her because she was already weak and dizzy due to the effect of the smoke and the gin. Her declarations
remain unrebutted.

7) Cecille categorically testified that she performed acts manifesting her lament, torment and suffering due to the rape.
She went to Stephen Florece, cried and complained about the incident. Instead of helping her, Florece threatened to
harm her and her family.

8) The reliance by trial court on the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect that the lacerations suffered by Cecille
"might have been sustained by the latter a month, six (6) months or even a year prior to the examination" thus
implying that respondent could not have committed the crime is highly misplaced. Dr. Decena herself testified that
she cannot tell "how old is an old hymenal laceration" because she cannot indicate when an old laceration was
inflicted and that from the size of the vagina she "could not point the exact cause".

9) With respect to the cigarette wounds, Dr, Decena positively testified that the wounds could have been '"aused by
cigarette butts as alleged by the victimwhich confirms Cecile's testimony that respondent burned her "right side of the
stomach" thrice.