Allard Somalia
Allard Somalia
Allard Somalia
OPERATIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED
KENNETH ALLARD
Dedication
This book is respectfully dedicated to the memories of Master Sergeant
Gary I. Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall D. Shughart, United
States Army, who were killed in action on October 3, 1993 in Mogad-
ishu, Somalia. For "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life
above and beyond the call of duty" while defending their embattled Task
Force Ranger comrades, these soldiers were posthumously awarded the
Medal of Honor on May 23, 1994.
John 15:13
Table of Contents
Foreword ................................................................................ xi
Acknowledgments................................................................. xiii
Preface ................................................................................... xv
This book represents the first time a new toolthe Joint Uni-
versal Lessons Learned Systemis being used to evaluate an
operation in its totality. With it, Colonel Kenneth Allard
assesses the operation from its early stages of humanitarian
relief through the de facto combat of peace enforcement. He
has organized the lessons learned for ease of reading and
enlivened them with numerous concrete and anecdotal exam-
ples. Although focused on the operational level, the insights of
this study should be of interest to strategists and policymakers
as well.
xi
can take some time. The author has taken the essential first
step by identifying and articulating the hard lessons of Somalia
with candor and objectivity. But even as we resolve not to
repeat mistakes, we should not allow the tragic events in the
latter stages of our Somalia operations to obscure the many
things we did right. These too are lessons, ones to build upon
as we prepare to meet further challenges in the complex world
of peace operations.
ERVIN J. ROKKE
Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force
President, National Defense University
xii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
xiii
Special thanks are also due to the following people who
reviewed the draft and provided many helpful suggestions:
Ambassador Robert Oakley; Lieutenant General Robert B.
Johnston, USMC; Lieutenant General Thomas M.
Montgomery, USA; Lieutenant General Anthony C. Zinni,
USMC; Major General Frank Libutti, USMC; Colonel Carl
Farris, Lieutenant Colonel Sam Butler and Professor Kenneth
Menkhaus of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute; Colonel
F.M. Lorenz, USMC; Colonel Gary Anderson, USMC;
Colonel Thomas Leney, USA; Colonel Robert Killebrew,
USA; and Lieutenant Colonel(P) Eric T. Olson, USA.
Additionally, Mr. Bill Dawson of the U.S. Central Command
and Ms. Joani Schaefer of the U.S. Transportation Command
provided many useful insights into the key roles played by their
respective organizations during the Somalia operations.
While sincere thanks are due all these people, errors of fact
and interpretation are, of course, the sole responsibility of the
author.
xiv
PREFACE
xv
important advantages for the United States to keep in mind.
First, we clearly benefit when other nations help shoulder the
burden. Second, the voice of the international community is
importantjust look at the impact of world opinion in build-
ing the diverse coalition with which we stood during the Gulf
War. The bottom line is that our ability to build and support
multinational coalitions is now an important part of our
national security strategy in the post-Cold War world.
The significance of this strategic turning point has, for the last
2 years, prompted the National Defense University to study
peace operations as part of its mission of extensive research
and teaching on national security issues; this book is one of the
products of that program. With the cooperation of the Joint
Staff, a team at the National Defense Universitys Institute for
National Strategic Studies examined reports on U.S. opera-
tions in Somalia filed in the Joint Universal Lessons Learned
System (JULLS) in an effort to relate them to joint doctrinal
principles as well as other research on this subject.1 The
emphasis throughout this effort has been to focus on the most
important lessons at the operational level, primarily those that
might be encountered at the joint task force planning level or
at the headquarters of its major force components. Because
this level is the one that ties together the strategic and the tacti-
cal, some of those lessons are relevant here as well, but to help
bound the problem, those insights are usually presented as
either causes or effects.
xvi
What makes the Somalia experience important for U.S.
Armed Forces is that it was an operation that went through
three distinct phases:
xvii
now being readied for publication by the Army Peacekeeping
Institute at the U.S. Army War College.
xviii
I
1
2 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
direct military action. These categories have not always fit situ-
ations that seemed to go beyond peacekeeping but stopped
short of actual combat, so an informal term, Chapter Six-
and-a-Half, emerged to describe such activities as conflict
prevention, demobilization, cantonment of weapons, and
actions taken to guarantee freedom of movement within a
country. Mostly because of Cold War rivalries, only 13 U.N.
peacekeeping operations were approved between 1945 and
1987. With the winding down of the Cold War, however, 13
new ones (not including the peace enforcement operation in
Somalia) were approved between 1987 and 1992. There is
another important figure that will come as no surprise to any-
one who has ever stepped in to break up a barracks fight-
during this same time: more than 800 peacekeepers from 43
countries have been killed while serving under the U.N. flag.
JOINT DOCTRINE
Because they are often a central focus of international atten-
tion, peace operations have a unique ability to combine the
Joint Doctrine
4 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Joint Doctrine
CHAPTER I 5
Joint Doctrine
6 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Joint Doctrine
CHAPTER I 7
Joint Doctrine
8 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
THE FREIG HTER PVT FRA NKLIN J. PHILLIPS PULLS INT O KISMAY O , DELIVERIN G SUPPLIES
A N D F O O D STUFFS IN SUPP O RT O F O PERATI O N REST O RE H O PE.
clan armories. After the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991,
the political situation deteriorated, with the clans in the north-
ern part of the country trying to secede. With drought
conditions worsening everywhere, clan warfare and banditry
gradually spread throughout Somalia. By early l992, these con-
ditions brought about a famine of Biblical proportions: more
than one-half million Somalis had perished of starvation and at
least a million more were threatened. Somalia had become a
geographical expression rather than a countrybut whatever
it was called, the scale of the human suffering there had now
captured the attention of the international community.
U.N. Security
U.S.
Operation Dates Council
Commander
Resolution
urged delay until U.S. forces could effectively disarm the ban-
dits and rival clan factions that continued to operate
throughout Somalia. In addition, he proposed to rebuild the
countrys fragmented institutions from the top downan
exercise akin to nation-building.
MAJ O R GENERAL TH O MAS M O NTG O MERY RECEIVES BA CK BRIEFS WITH THE U.S.
Q UICK REA CTI O N F O RCE.
OPERATIONAL LESSONS
LEARNED
PLANNING
The job of the mission planner is always thankless: anticipating
requirements even before a mission statement has been for-
malized, orchestrating literally thousands of details that cause
an operation to be successful or to go at all, adjusting those
19
20 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Lessons
Examples
Planning
CHAPTER II 21
lia. No sooner had they arrived than the team found they had
been reconstituted as the nucleus for the operations JTF.
Despite the fact that both the mandate and the mission
seemed clear, the JTF soon found itself coordinating a 6-
month operation that eventually delivered 28,000 metric tons
of supplies. Their mission also came to include airlifting Paki-
stani peacekeepers into the country as well as conducting
delicate negotiations with clan warlords to assure the security
of relief supplies.
Planning
22 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Planning
CHAPTER II 23
Planning
24 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Planning
CHAPTER II 25
Term Definition
While there may have been some expectations that such staff
arrangements were all that was needed in a situation in which
the United States no longer had the lead, foot-dragging by
U.N. officials further complicated the transition between UNI-
TAF and UNOSOM II. The initial slowness in setting up the
UNOSOM II staff was aggravated by its composition; it was
formed incrementally from the voluntary contributions of the
multinational contingents who detailed personnel as they
Planning
26 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Lessons
Planning
CHAPTER II 27
Examples
Planning
28 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Planning
CHAPTER II 29
MULTINATIONAL CONTINGENTS
Lessons
Examples
Planning
30 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Planning
CHAPTER II 31
Planning
32 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Lessons
ROE are not only life and death decisions but also criti-
cal elements in determining the success or failure of a
peace operation: that means that the determination of
ROE is a command decision.
As important as they are, ROE are effective only to the
extent that they can be understood and applied by the
forces carrying out a peace operation: that means keep-
ing the ROE simple, direct, and unclassified.
Examples
Planning
CHAPTER II 33
Planning
34 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Planning
CHAPTER II 35
Lesson
Examples
Planning
36 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Planning
CHAPTER II 37
JOINT PLANNING
Lessons
Examples
Planning
38 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Planning
CHAPTER II 39
Planning
40 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
DEPLOYMENT
Possibly because they have a job almost as thankless as the
joint planner, those who actually conduct deployments of
operational forces like to remind us that amateurs talk about
strategy, while professionals talk about logistics. Both topics
come together in the execution of the basic elements of power
projection: airlift, sealift, and pre-positioned equipment. The
major share of the responsibility for deployment rests with
TRANSCOM, but, as they are also quick to point out, much
of their success depends upon other people. There should be
no doubt, however, about the success of the deployment to
Somalia. During Restore Hope, for example, 986 airlift mis-
sions (including both military and commercial aircraft) moved
over 33,000 passengers and more than 32,000 short tons of
cargo to Somalia. Eleven shipsincluding five fast-sealift ves-
selsmoved 365,000 measurement tons of cargo to the
theater as well as 1,192 containers of sustainment supplies.
Deployment
CHAPTER II 41
AIRLIFT
Lessons
Examples
Deployment
42 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Deployment
CHAPTER II 43
SEALIFT
Lessons
Examples
Deployment
44 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
PRE-POSITIONED SHIPPING
Lesson
Deployment
CHAPTER II 45
Examples
Deployment
46 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS
Lesson
Examples
Deployment
CHAPTER II 47
Two joint issues that arose during Restore Hope were finance
support and personnel rotation policies. Although pay opera-
tions were centralized in the Defense Finance & Accounting
Service, the Navy and Marine Corps communicated this infor-
mation through a single system used both on shore and during
operational deployments. The Army and Air Force lacked a
Deployment
48 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Deployment
CHAPTER II 49
Deployment
50 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
The operations conducted in Somalia during all three phases
of the operation showed once again the true professionalism of
the American soldier, sailor, airman, and marine. In all too
many instances, Somalia showed as well the heroism and dedi-
cation of a force that found itself in harms way while serving
in the cause of peace. The full story of those operations and
their significance at unit level is best left to the individual ser-
vice components. The joint world as it affected the operations
in Somalia dealt much more with the five areas presented
here: command and control, mission execution, civil-military
operations, negotiations, and intelligence.
Lessons
Examples
Conduct of Operations
CHAPTER II 51
Conduct of Operations
52 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Conduct of Operations
CHAPTER II 53
Conduct of Operations
54 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Conduct of Operations
CHAPTER II 55
MISSION EXECUTION
Lessons
Conduct of Operations
56 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Examples
Conduct of Operations
CHAPTER II 57
only to its superb personnel but also to the fact that the mission
was largely confined to force protection for the balance of its
in-country tour.
Conduct of Operations
58 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Conduct of Operations
CHAPTER II 59
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
Lessons
Conduct of Operations
60 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Examples
Conduct of Operations
CHAPTER II 61
Conduct of Operations
62 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
For these and similar reasons, one of the most important initia-
tives of the Somalia operation was the establishment of the
Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). Set up in Decem-
ber 1992 during the early stages of UNITAF, CMOC became
the key coordinating point between the task force and the
HROs. Liaison officers from the major multinational contin-
Conduct of Operations
CHAPTER II 63
U.S. TRU CKS FILLED WITH MEDIC AL PERS O N NEL A N D MEDICINE LINE THE STREETS O F
M O G ADISH U T O PERF O RM THE FIRST MEDIC AL CIVIC A CTI O N PR O GRAM IN S O MALIA.
Conduct of Operations
64 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
NEGOTIATIONS
Lesson
Examples
Conduct of Operations
CHAPTER II 65
Conduct of Operations
66 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Conduct of Operations
CHAPTER II 67
INTELLIGENCE
Lessons
Examples
Conduct of Operations
68 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Conduct of Operations
CHAPTER II 69
SUPPORT
The unprecedented nature of the operations in Somalia cre-
ated a new range of problems for the critical support services
that must work effectively if the mission is to be successful.
There was no telephone service of any kind, and such logistical
facilities as there were resembled those of a war zoneyet the
troops had to be supported, an infrastructure hastily con-
structed, and the American people kept informed of what their
sons and daughters were doing in this singularly inhospitable
climate. Here again, the key factor in adapting to these chal-
lenges was the quality of the joint force serving in Somalia.
Lessons
Support
70 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Examples
Support
CHAPTER II 71
Support
72 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Gulf War. During UNOSOM II, however, and with the U.S.
no longer in charge, those practices were discontinued.
Instead, each tactical area of responsibility was commanded by
one of the multinational contingents, whose commanders were
responsible for ensuring that all forces under their operational
control had compatible communications equipment. Because
area boundaries roughly corresponded to national forces, this
system worked reasonably wellas long as each national force
stuck to its own area. Crossing over the seams of national
control created severe interoperability problemsa situation
that occurred whenever one national contingent had to cross
over an area boundary to reinforce another.
Support
CHAPTER II 73
U.S. ARMY U H-60 BLA CKHAWK HELIC O PTER LA N DS AT THE BELET UEN AIRSTRIP,
DR O PPIN G O FF S O LDIERS FR O M 2 N D BRIG ADE, 10TH M O U NTAIN DIVISI O N , F O RT
DRUM, NY, T O SEIZE THE AIRSTRIP AS PART O F A C O MBINED U.S. A N D C A N ADIA N
ASSAULT D URIN G O PERATI O N REST O RE H O PE.
Support
74 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
IN-COUNTRY LOGISTICS
Lesson
Examples
Support
CHAPTER II 75
Support
76 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
MEDICAL
Lesson
Examples
Support
CHAPTER II 77
MEDIA
Lesson
Examples
Support
78 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Support
III
CONCLUSIONS
The difference between genius and stupidity is that genius has limits.
Anonymous
79
80 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
power may well set the stage for such action, the real responsi-
bility for nation-building must be carried out by the civilian
agencies of the government better able to specialize in such
long-term humanitarian efforts. Another bright line is any
action in a peace operation that effectively takes sides between
factions engaged in internal civil strifeclearly as much of a
problem for U.S. troops in Somalia as it was for an earlier gen-
eration of American soldiers in the Dominican Republic and
Lebanon. Such actions certainly include coercive disarma-
ment of a populace, an act that is qualitatively different from
simply controlling or confiscating the arms that may overtly
threaten the peacekeeping force. The reason: In societies
where peacekeeping may be needed, the distribution of arms
reflects internal power structures (political, cultural, ethnic, or
even tribal) that can be expected to fight to maintain their
position. If the disarmament of the population becomes an objective, then
there should be no mistaking the fact that the troops given this mission have
been committed to combat.
of May 1994 stated that U.N. command would not be the tool
of choice in future peace enforcement operations. The larger
point here, however, is not whether U.S. soldiers should serve
under U.N. control: No soldiers of any nationality should be expected to
serve under the U.N. command structure in any combat setting until the
reforms called for by President Clinton in PDD-25 have been put in place.
At a minimum, such reforms must achieve more effective
means than those demonstrated in Somalia for commanding,
controlling, coordinating, and communicating with multina-
tional forces committed to peace operations.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed
Forces. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
DC, 11 November 1991.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces
(UNAAF). U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
DC, 11 August 1994.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 9
September 1993.
87
88 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military
Operations Other Than War. (Draft)
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-17, Joint Tactics Techniques and
Procedures for Theater Airlift Operations. (Draft)
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning
Guidance and Procedures. U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC, 3 September 1993.
MULTI-SERVICE PUBLICATIONS
Air Land Sea Application Center. Multi-Service Procedures for
Humanitarian Assistance Operations. (Draft) This publication is
in development as of this writing. Each service will adopt it
into their publications system upon completion.
Multi-Service Publications
APPENDIX A 89
Graham, James R., ed. Non-Combat Roles for the U.S. Military in
the Post-Cold War Era. 1993.
Lewis, William H., and Marks, Edward. Triage for Failing States.
January 1994.
Quinn, Dennis J., ed. Peace Support Operations and the U.S.
Military. 1994.
93
94 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
MISSION
The CMOC was the key coordinating point for Humanitarian
Relief Organizations in their dealings with UNITAF.
FUNCTIONS
1. Validation of requests for military support. This
included requests within the Mogadishu area, long haul
convoy, security escorts to the interior, and requests for
support at specific sites within the UNITAF area of
operations. Military support to HROs within a Human-
itarian Relief Sector was usually the responsibility of the
local military commander and his CMOC.
2. Coordination of requests for military support within the
various military components of UNITAF.
97
98 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Functions
APPENDIX C 99
Rank Billet
Command
Colonel Director
Lt. Colonel Deputy Director
Operations
Major Operations/Civil Affairs Operations Officer
Captain (2) Asst Operations Officer
MSgt Operations Chief
SFC Admin Chief
Sgt Asst Admin Chief
Cpl and Below Driver/Security/Clerk
Transport
Major Convoy/Control/Transportation Officer
Captain Asst Transportation Officer
SFC Air NCO
Cpl Driver/Security/Clerk
HEAD Q UARTERS STRU CTURE
Functions
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
COL Allard holds a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law &
Diplomacy and an MPA from Harvard University.
101