Political Behavior

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-022-09812-3

ORIGINAL PAPER

Are Republicans and Conservatives More Likely to Believe

Conspiracy Theories?

Adam Enders1 · Christina Farhart2 · Joanne Miller3 · Joseph Uscinski4   ·

Kyle Saunders5 · Hugo Drochon6

Accepted: 11 July 2022

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature
2022

Abstract
A sizable literature tracing back to Richard Hofstadter’s The Paranoid Style (1964)
argues that Republicans and conservatives are more likely to believe conspiracy
theories than Democrats and liberals. However, the evidence for this proposition is
mixed. Since conspiracy theory beliefs are associated with dangerous orientations
and behaviors, it is imperative that social scientists better understand the connection
between conspiracy theories and political orientations. Employing 20 surveys of
Americans from 2012 to 2021 (total n = 37,776), as well as surveys of 20 additional
countries spanning six continents (total n = 26,416), we undertake an expansive
investigation of the asymmetry thesis. First, we examine the relationship between
beliefs in 52 conspiracy theories and both partisanship and ideology in the U.S.; this
analysis is buttressed by an examination of beliefs in 11 conspiracy theories across
20 more countries. In our second test, we hold constant the content of the conspiracy
theories investigated—manipulating only the partisanship of the theorized villains—
to decipher whether those on the left or right are more likely to accuse political out-
groups of conspiring. Finally, we inspect correlations between political orientations
and the general predisposition to believe in conspiracy theories over the span of a
decade. In no instance do we observe systematic evidence of a political asymme-
try. Instead, the strength and direction of the relationship between political orienta-
tions and conspiricism is dependent on the characteristics of the specific conspiracy
beliefs employed by researchers and the socio-political context in which those ideas
are considered.

Keywords  Conspiracy theories · Conspiracy thinking · Partisanship · Ideology ·

Conservatism

Replication files can be found at https://​datav​erse.​harva​rd.​edu/​datas​et.​xhtml?​persi​stent​Id=​doi:​10.​

7910/​DVN/​MMMYGJ.

* Joseph Uscinski
uscinski@miami.edu
Extended author information available on the last page of the article

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Vol.:(0123456789)
 Political Behavior

Polls show that many Americans, occasionally majorities, believe in various con-
spiracy theories (Enders et  al., 2021). These beliefs are associated with numerous
counterproductive behavioral tendencies (Jolley, Mari, et al. 2020a), including poor
health practices (Romer & Jamieson, 2020), nonnormative political engagement
(Sternisko et al., 2020), and discrimination against racial and ethnic minority groups
(Jolley, Meleady, et  al. 2020b). Conspiracy theory beliefs are also associated with
political violence (Greenhill & Oppenheim, 2017), such as that which occurred on
January 6, 2021 at the U.S. Capitol Building.
While an emerging research agenda has identified many psychological factors
associated with beliefs in conspiracy theories (Douglas et  al., 2019), the literature
remains divided about the political characteristics associated with those beliefs. Are,
for example, partisanship or political ideology related to conspiracy theorizing? One
argument, dating back at least to Richard Hofstadter’s The Paranoid Style (1964),
holds that Republicans and conservatives are more likely to believe conspiracy theo-
ries than Democrats and liberals. On the one hand, several studies find supportive
evidence for this asymmetry thesis in the form of correlations between Republi-
can/conservative self-identification and various operationalizations of conspiricism
(e.g., van der Linden et al., 2021). On the other hand, some studies fail to identify
such asymmetries, instead concluding that conspiracy theorizing is a “widespread
tendency across the entire ideological spectrum” (Oliver & Wood, 2014; see also
Enders et al., 2021). As this impasse persists, much hangs in the balance, including
the development of strategies for combating the spread of conspiracy theories (Wit-
tenberg & Berinsky, 2020).
We argue that contradictory findings are the result of researchers’ choices and
assumptions. For example, most studies center their test of the asymmetry thesis on
only a small number of conspiracy beliefs (e.g., van der Linden et al., 2021). This is
potentially problematic because conspiracy theories are not created equally––they
exhibit qualities (e.g., villains, schemes, victims) that make them differentially
attractive depending on one’s psychological, political, and social characteristics
and motivations (Miller, 2020). Indeed, conspiracy theory beliefs are frequently the
product of motivated reasoning and elite influence (Miller et al., 2016). While both
forces influence people regardless of political orientations (Guay & Johnston, 2021),
they can also impact the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and political orien-
tations depending on the theories queried.
Previous work also shows that the political context (both temporal and geo-
graphic) in which conspiratorial views are polled can affect who is most likely to
believe specific conspiracy theories (Uscinski & Parent, 2014). Thus, findings of
left–right asymmetries (or lack thereof) may be an artifact of which conspiracy theo-
ries researchers investigate, as well as when, where, and how they are investigated
(Enders & Uscinski, 2021). One way to address these concerns is to conduct addi-
tional tests of the asymmetry thesis using multiple datasets, varying assumptions,
conditions, and operationalizations. This is our goal.
First, we examine correlations between partisanship/ideology and beliefs in 52
conspiracy theories in the U.S. We buttress this analysis with an examination of the
relationship between left–right ideology and belief in 11 conspiracy theories across
20 additional countries. In our second analysis, we provide an alternative test of

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Political Behavior

the asymmetry thesis by examining beliefs in five “content-controlled” conspiracy

theories in the U.S. for which we varied only the partisanship of the accused con-
spirators. In our final analysis, we examine the relationship between political ori-
entations and conspiracy thinking––the general predisposition to interpret events
and circumstances as the product of conspiracies (Uscinski & Parent, 2014)––in 18
datasets collected over the span of a decade (2012–2021). Across all studies, we
fail to observe consistent evidence that the right exhibits higher levels of conspiri-
cism––however operationalized––than the left. While some specific conspiracy the-
ories find more support among Republicans/conservatives, others find greater sup-
port among Democrats/liberals. Moreover, many conspiracy theories appeal equally
to the left and the right. Overall, we find that the strength and nature of the relation-
ships between various operationalizations of conspiricism and partisanship/ideology
depend on the conspiracy theories under examination and the political context in
which those theories are examined.

Conspiracy Theories and Asymmetry

Since the development of Hofstadter’s “paranoid style” (1964), many researchers

and journalists have argued that Republicans and conservatives are more prone to
believing in conspiracy theories than Democrats and liberals (e.g., Bump, 2021).
This perspective generally assumes, or surmises, that there are “bottom-up” psy-
chological processes differentially affecting individuals on the right (Carney et al.,
2008; Jost et al., 2009) that predispose them to believe conspiracy theories at higher
rates and with greater intensity (e.g., van der Linden et  al., 2021; for outside the
U.S., see Walter & Drochon, 2020).
A considerable body of evidence has been harnessed to support this conclusion.
First, researchers have identified numerous conspiracy theories that garner more
support among the right than left, including those calling into question the scientific
consensus on climate change (Miller et al., 2016), the authenticity of Barack Oba-
ma’s birth certificate (Pasek et al., 2014), COVID-19 (Miller, 2020), and the elec-
tion of Joe Biden (Pennycook & Rand, 2021). Second, some researchers show that
conservatives display higher levels of generalized conspiracy thinking than liberals
(van der Linden et  al., 2021); similarly, others show that “extreme” conservatives
are more likely to believe conspiracy theories than “extreme” liberals (Imhoff et al.,
2022; van Prooijen et  al., 2015). Third, conspiracy theory beliefs are sometimes
found to be associated with psychological tendencies more prevalent among con-
servatives, such as authoritarianism, need for cognitive closure, and threat percep-
tion (e.g., Dyrendal et al., 2021). Finally, several studies find evidence that those on
the right are more likely than the left to engage with fake news and misinformation
online (Garrett & Bond, 2021; Grinberg et al., 2019; Guess et al., 2019).
That said, not all investigations produce evidence for this form of partisan or
ideological asymmetry and some studies even suggest that the left is more prone
to conspiracy theorizing than the right. For example, Democrats/liberals are more
likely than Republicans/conservatives to believe in conspiracy theories that iden-
tify Republicans, conservatives, corporations, and the rich as conspirators (Enders

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 Political Behavior

et  al., 2021; Miller et  al., 2016; Oliver & Wood, 2014; Uscinski & Parent, 2014).
There are also many conspiracy theories finding equal support among the left and
right, including theories involving “chem-trails”, the moon landing, fluoridated
water, Freemasons, lizard people, and television mind control, to name a few (Jen-
son, 2013; Smallpage et  al., 2017). Moreover, the asymmetries identified in stud-
ies of online behavior are often due to small numbers of Republicans/conservatives
who are not representative of the right as a whole (Lawson & Kakkar, 2021) or idi-
osyncratic socio-political circumstances (Garrett & Bond, 2021). Finally, several
studies find that the general predisposition toward conspiracy theorizing is balanced
between the right and left (e.g., Enders et al., 2021; Uscinski et al., 2016, 2021). For
every investigation demonstrating asymmetry there is a counterweight showing the
opposite.
We posit that inconsistencies across findings are partially due to the concept of
conspiracy theory itself. A conspiracy theory is an explanation of an event or cir-
cumstance that accuses powerful actors of working in secret for their own benefit,
against the common good, and in a way that undermines bedrock societal norms,
rules, or laws (Uscinski, 2020). Conspiracy theories are not likely to be “true”––i.e.,
no even-handed burden of empirical proof has been satisfied––according to appro-
priate epistemological authorities (Levy, 2007). The concept of “conspiracy theory”
can refer to an infinite number of ideas that vary in myriad ways, including who
they accuse, what the supposed scheme entails, and what the theory seeks to explain
(Sternisko et al., 2020). In this light, scholars should not expect “a single ‘style’ of
conspiricism, a uniform embrace of all conspiracy theories, or for conspiricism to be
limited to one side of the ideological spectrum” (Oliver & Wood, 2014).
When researchers focus on conspiracy theories that are explicitly partisan (i.e.,
those accusing the out-party or its coalition, or otherwise bolstering the image of
the in-party) or are championed by elites in government or media, they are likely
to observe relationships between beliefs in such theories and political orientations.
But this is so for reasons unrelated to political orientations themselves. First, since
the mass public takes cues from co-partisan political and media elites (Zaller, 1992),
mass opinions—even those involving conspiracy theories—are often a reaction to
elite political discourse (Berinsky, 2015). Second, motivated reasoning, a ubiqui-
tous psychological process by which individuals accept (reject) information con-
gruent (incongruent) with their previously held beliefs and dispositions (Lodge &
Taber, 2013), oftentimes leads individuals to adopt accusatory perceptions (Zell
et al., 2021), including conspiracy theories about political out-groups (Miller et al.,
2016). Given that elite cues and motivated reasoning appear to similarly affect both
Republicans/conservatives and Democrats/liberals (Bolsen et al., 2014; Clark et al.,
2019; Ditto et al., 2019; Guay & Johnston, 2021), beliefs in conspiracy theories born
of these processes signal little about an innate connection between such beliefs and
partisanship/ideology.1
1
  These same mechanisms may also lead partisan subgroups (e.g., racial or religious groups comprising
a party’s coalition) to adopt specific conspiracy theories (e.g., Bird and Bogart 2003); in such cases, the
observed relationships are a spurious alignment of political orientations and the idiosyncratic character-
istics of a given conspiracy theory in a particular context. Reported asymmetries in conspiracy theory

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Political Behavior

Conspiracy theories, like other ideas, can also attract different adherents as politi-
cal and cultural circumstances shift over time. For instance, belief in conspiracy the-
ories about election fraud are tightly tethered to the electoral fortunes of one’s pre-
ferred party and that party’s messaging (Edelson et al., 2017; Pennycook & Rand,
2021). Whereas 9/11 “truther” theories found more support among Democrats/liber-
als in the years immediately following the attacks, likely due to both partisan moti-
vated reasoning and elite cueing, support for these theories has become symmetrical
as the 9/11 attack faded from partisan political discussion (Enders et al., 2020). In
cases such as these, researchers’ choices of when to poll the public leads to different
observed relationships between conspiracy theory beliefs and political orientations.
Similarly, the choice of where to poll can affect observed relationships. For exam-
ple, climate change conspiracy theories find more support in socio-political con-
texts (e.g., the United States, Australia) where elites have politicized climate change
(Dunlap et al., 2016) than other contexts where the subject is less politicized.
Simply put, making generalizable claims about the nature, scope, and correlates
of conspiracy theory beliefs is no easy task. We surmise that many of the observed
disagreements in the literature are due to a combination of limitations regarding the
operationalizations of conspiracy theorizing employed and the context––both tem-
poral and socio-political––in which beliefs are assessed. Our contribution is to pro-
vide a comprehensive set of tests of the asymmetry thesis using dozens of specific
conspiracy theories and different measurement strategies across time in the U.S. and
other countries. In the following three sections, we assemble an expansive body of
survey evidence to answer the question: Are those on the political right (e.g., Repub-
licans and conservatives) more likely than those on the left (e.g., Democrats and
liberals) to believe in conspiracy theories?

Finding 1: The Relationship between Conspiracy Theory Beliefs

and Political Orientations Depends on the Conspiracy Theory

Much of the evidence provided for the asymmetry thesis comes in the form of cor-
relations between partisanship/ideology and beliefs in one or a few conspiracy the-
ories. However, the relationships identified may be due to the specific conspiracy
theories under investigation rather than “bottom-up” psychological asymmetries
between left and right. To interrogate the asymmetry thesis, we examine the rela-
tionship between political orientations and a wides range of conspiracy theory
beliefs. Figure 1 displays Pearson correlations between beliefs in 52 conspiracy the-
ories and both partisanship and ideological self-identifications.

Footnote 1 (continued)
beliefs can also be affected by measurement strategies, such as question wording (Krosnick et al., 2014;
Sutton and Douglas 2020).

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 Political Behavior

Fig. 1  Pearson correlations between beliefs in conspiracy theories and partisan and ideological self-iden-
tification. Horizontal bands represent 95% confidence intervals, two-tailed tests

These data were collected across eight national surveys fielded between Octo-
ber 2016 and May 2021.2 All surveys were fielded by either YouGov, as part of the
annual Cooperative Congressional Election Study, or Qualtrics, and all samples,

2
 Data are from the following surveys: Qualtrics May 2021 (n = 2,021), Qualtrics October 2020
(n = 2,015), Qualtrics June 2020 (n = 1,040), Qualtrics March 2020 (n = 2,023), Qualtrics July 2019
(n = 2,000), CCES October 2018 (1, n = 1,000), CCES October 2018 (3, n = 1,000), CCES October 2016
(2, n = 1,000).

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which vary in size from 1,000 to 2,023 respondents, were designed to be representa-
tive of the U.S. population based on age, sex, race, and educational attainment; see
the online appendix for additional information about the sociodemographic compo-
sition of each sample, sampling procedures, and other details.
We compiled a set of conspiracy theories that vary in their topical domains (e.g.,
health, science, politics), accused conspirators (e.g., partisan and non-partisan
groups and figures, “the government”), alleged activities (e.g., causing direct harm,
undermining democracy, covering-up vital information), salience (e.g., the activi-
ties of the Rothschild family versus the current COVID-19 pandemic), and level of
specificity (e.g., explicitly identifying the conspirator versus positing a more ambig-
uous conspirator or group). All items meet the standard definition of “conspiracy
theory” described above. Both partisanship and ideological self-identification are
operationalized using the familiar seven-point measures coded such that greater val-
ues correspond to stronger Republican/conservative identification.3 If individuals on
the right are asymmetrically predisposed to adopting conspiracy theory beliefs, then
we should consistently observe positive, statistically significant correlations between
conspiracy theory beliefs and partisan and ideological identities across Fig. 1.
Figure 1 reveals that both the direction and magnitude of the correlations between
conspiracy theory beliefs and partisanship/ideology vary considerably across con-
spiracy theories. When the conspiracy theory implicates actors associated with the
political left in wrongdoing (e.g., Birther), or are endorsed by Republican and con-
servative elites (e.g., Global Warming Hoax), Republicans/conservatives exhibit
greater levels of belief than Democrats/liberals (see upper third of Fig. 1). Likewise,
when the conspiracy theory implicates actors associated with the political right (e.g.,
Koch Brothers World Control), or are endorsed by Democratic and liberal elites
(e.g., Trump is a Russian Asset), Democrats/liberals exhibit greater levels of belief
than Republicans/conservatives (lower third of Fig. 1). We also observe that many
conspiracy theories find equal support among the left and right. Online appendix
Figure A1, which shows the percentages of respondents on the right and left believ-
ing in each conspiracy theory shown in Fig. 1, also reveals parity in the proportion
of believers across the political spectrum.
Our results regarding two specific conspiracy theories deserve additional empha-
sis. First, those on the left and right equally express belief in the general theory
that “Regardless of who is officially in charge of governments and other organi-
zations, there is a single group of people who secretly control events and rule the
world together.” This question captures a sentiment that is presumably foundational
to many specific conspiracy theory beliefs; that we observe no difference between
left and right may suggest that the psychological bedrock for conspiricism traverses
mainstream political orientations. Second, we find political balance in the belief that
“The U.S. government is mandating the switch to compact fluorescent light bulbs

3
  In Figure A1 of the appendix, we also present the proportion of Democrats, Republicans, and Inde-
pendents who express belief in each conspiracy theory; this analysis demonstrates that it is proper to
treat Independents as falling between Democrats and Republicans on a single left-right continuum, as the
measure itself implies.

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because such lights make people more obedient and easier to control,” which was
fabricated by researchers (Oliver & Wood, 2014). That the right does not exhibit
greater levels of belief in this conspiracy theory prompts us to further question
whether there is an innate connection between right-wing identification and conspir-
acy theory beliefs.
While our intention is to test the asymmetry thesis, specifically, we note that
other research has found that extremists––those who identify with the most extreme
left/right categories of political identity measures––are more likely than moderates
to exhibit conspiracy beliefs (Imhoff et  al., 2022). Such a pattern would manifest
as a nonlinear, parabolic relationship between political orientations and conspiracy
beliefs. Of course, correlations (like the ones presented in Fig. 1) are only capable
of deciphering linear relationships. Whereas some nonlinear functional form may be
the “correct” model—although this, too, is in contention, (Enders & Uscinski, 2021;
van der Linden et  al., 2021)—our goal is not to provide the “best” model of each
conspiracy belief, but to detect asymmetries. Even if some nonlinearity was present,
correlation coefficients would still capture left–right asymmetries should they exist
(this applies to all analyses presented below). Regardless, an investigation of poten-
tial nonlinear relationships suggests that our empirical strategy is appropriate; in the
appendix, we provide evidence that the relationships we are interested in tend to be
linear.

Moving Beyond the US

Thus far, we found that the observed relationship between beliefs in various conspir-
acy theories and political orientations in the U.S. is dependent on the specific con-
spiracy theories in question. Still, an examination of the relationship between politi-
cal orientations and conspiracy theory beliefs across a wide range of socio-political
contexts can provide further clarity and demonstrate the role of political context. If
there is an innate connection between right-wing ideology and conspiracy theory
beliefs, we should observe greater support for conspiracy theories among those on
the right across countries, regardless of variation in political and economic systems,
social (in)equality, racial and ethnic composition of the populace, and many other
factors.
To extend our test of the asymmetry thesis in this way, we examine the corre-
lations between a seven-point measure of left–right ideology4 and 11 conspiracy
theory beliefs across 20 countries that span six continents (total n = 26,416), which
are presented in Fig.  2.5 All surveys were conducted by YouGov between July
30–August 24, 2020, who constructed the samples to be representative of each
country’s population based on available census records. Questions were approved

4
  Categories (coding) are as follows: “very left-wing” (1), “fairly left-wing” (2), “slightly left-of-centre”
(3), “centre” (4), “slightly right-of-centre” (5), “fairly right-wing” (6), “very right-wing” (7). “Left-wing”
and “right-wing” are understood to mean the same thing––i.e., social equality and egalitarianism versus
social hierarchies and order––across each of the countries we examine.
5
  The Holocaust Denial question was not asked in Germany.

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Fig. 2  Pearson’s correlations between beliefs in conspiracy theories and left–right ideological self-identification across 20 countries. Horizontal bands represent 95% con-

13
fidence intervals, two-tailed tests
 Political Behavior

of and translated by YouGov and their partners in each country. Additional details
about each survey, including sociodemographic information, appear in the appendix.
Asking about the same 11 conspiracy theories that address topics traversing socio-
political contexts (e.g., AIDS, COVID-19) allows us to examine the impact of con-
text on the relationship between ideology and conspiracy theory beliefs, providing
additional tests of the asymmetry thesis under different conditions.
Remarkably, not a single conspiracy theory investigated in Fig.  2 exhibits cor-
relations with consistently positive or negative signs (regardless of statistical sig-
nificance) across all 20 countries. For example, the 9/11 conspiracy theory finds
significantly more support among those on the left in 8 of the 20 countries and is
not significantly related to ideology in the remaining 12. Even the Global Warm-
ing Hoax belief, a feature of the political right in the U.S., finds significantly more
support among the left in 5 countries (Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and
Turkey) and exhibits no correlation with ideology in 2 others (Hungary and South
Africa). Despite some ideological “balance” across Fig.  2, most correlations are
quite weak, suggesting a lack of ideological discrepancy altogether. Indeed, the aver-
age correlation––across all conspiracy theory beliefs and countries––is a meager
0.03 (ranging from − 0.05 for 9/11 Truther to 0.10 for Global Warming Hoax).
To be sure, there are many possible explanations for the variability we observe
across conspiracy theories and countries. Our goal, however, is not to provide post-
hoc explanations for this variation, but rather to leverage it towards additional tests
of the asymmetry thesis. While some countries (e.g., France, Germany, Italy) and
some conspiracy theories (e.g., Global Warming Hoax, COVID is a Myth) provide
more support for the asymmetry thesis, others exhibit the opposite pattern. The
relationship between political ideology and conspiracy theory beliefs appears to be
dependent on both the details of the conspiracy theories and socio-political context.
Altogether, we find that symmetry comes in two forms. First, there are conspiracy
theories that prove to be systematically attractive to those on either the left or right.
Second, many conspiracy theories find similar levels of support (or lack thereof)
across the political aisle. We do not argue, nor do our data demonstrate, that beliefs
in any given conspiracy theory are or should be symmetric across political predis-
positions––this is entirely dependent on the details of the conspiracy theory, and
perhaps the context in which beliefs were assessed.
Of course, one might protest that the patterns depicted in Figs. 1 and 2 are arti-
facts of the conspiracy theories we chose to examine and, indeed, they would be
correct! However, as much would be the case for any study of specific conspiracy
theories. This critically important point explains the discrepancies among previous
studies: substantive inferences are heavily dependent on which conspiracy theories
are considered. Inferences about the fundamental nature of conspiracism should
not be made from patterns in a single or small number of conspiracy beliefs, even
though precisely such generalizations are commonplace in the conspiracy belief
literature.
Decisions about which conspiracy theories to poll and analyze are always fraught
with challenges. For example, one could criticize Finding 1 by claiming that some
of the conspiracy theories we employed are more plausible (e.g., believable, evi-
denced, or rational) than others, and that this variability in plausibility is correlated

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with ideology or partisanship. However, judgements of this nature (Douglas et al.,

2022), even among otherwise discerning researchers, are colored by motivated rea-
soning. It should not be a surprise that a Democrat, for example, would believe that
the conspiracy theories that other Democrats believe in are more plausible than the
conspiracy theories that Republicans believe in. Nevertheless, the conspiracy theo-
ries at the top and bottom of Fig. 1 are different from each other and not necessarily
comparable (though, this is again a matter of subjective judgment). We, therefore,
point readers to the conspiracy theories in the middle of Fig. 1. These are particu-
larly important because the correlations with partisanship and ideology––or the lack
thereof––are inconsistent with the asymmetry thesis (i.e., the right should be more
likely than the left to believe these conspiracy theories should the asymmetry thesis
be correct). For example, partisanship and ideology are not correlated with beliefs in
conspiracy theories about the JFK assassination, the MMR vaccine, the Holocaust,
GMO’s, Fluoride, cellphones, AIDS, pharmaceutical companies, government mind
control, and lightbulbs.
Furthermore, even though Finding 1 involves more conspiracy theory beliefs
than previous studies, our findings remain an artifact of which conspiracy theories
researchers investigate because there is no “correct” or “representative” set of con-
spiracy theories that researchers should employ. This problem motivates the analy-
ses that follow: an experiment which holds constant all but the partisanship of the
accused conspirators in a set of conspiracy theories, as well as an analysis of the
general predisposition toward conspiracy thinking. These analyses are attempts to
avoid the trappings of individual conspiracy theories.

Finding 2: The Political Left and Right Both Accuse the Out‑Party

of Conspiring

Even though we considered a larger group of conspiracy theories above than any
study we are aware of, one might still wonder how the idiosyncrasies of the conspir-
acy theories we examined may affect our inferences about partisan and ideological
(a)symmetry. To address this concern, we present an alternative strategy for explor-
ing the relationship between conspiracy theory beliefs and political orientations that
is not subject to alternative explanations owing to the idiosyncrasies of the conspir-
acy theories themselves. Specifically, we hold the details of the conspiracy theory
constant, varying only the political orientations of the presumed conspirators. This
approach enables a test of a more nuanced version of the asymmetry thesis—that
people on the right engage in partisan/ideologically motivated conspiracy theory
endorsement to a greater extent than people on the left. A finding of asymmetry in
this circumstance would show that Republicans/conservatives are more likely than
Democrats/liberals to endorse conspiracy theories that impugn political out-groups.
To this end, on two surveys––one fielded by MTurk in 2017 (n = 2,041) and the
other by Lucid in 2020 (n = 3,994)––we randomly assigned half of our respond-
ents to receive the “Republicans are conspirators” versions of five conspiracy the-
ory questions, and the other half to receive the “Democrats are conspirators” ver-
sions. To hold the content of the conspiracy theory constant, we created five general

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conspiracy theories on the topics of election fraud, political extremism, the econ-
omy, health policy, and crime. For example, the “economy” conspiracy theory ques-
tion asked:
Do you think that Democratic [Republican] political elites are…
definitely secretly plotting with large banks to lie about the health of the econ-
omy to gain support for their economic policy proposals (coded 4)
probably secretly plotting with large banks to lie about the health of the econ-
omy to gain support for their economic policy proposals (3)
probably not secretly plotting with large banks to lie about the health of the
economy to gain support for their economic policy proposals (2)
definitely not secretly plotting with large banks to lie about the health of the
economy to gain support for their economic policy proposals (1)
Full question wordings for the election fraud, political extremism, economy,
health policy, and crime questions appear in the online appendix. Partisanship was
measured via the standard seven-point branched question, and ranges from “strong
Democrat” to “strong Republican.” Symbolic ideology was measured via a seven-
point scale ranging from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative.”
Because of motivated reasoning (and consistent with the general pattern depicted
in Fig. 1), we expect that Republican/conservative respondents would be more likely
to endorse the “Democrats are conspirators” version of the questions (as indicated
by positive correlations with partisanship and symbolic ideology), and Democratic/
liberal respondents would be more likely to endorse the “Republicans are conspira-
tors” version (as indicated by negative correlations with partisanship and symbolic
ideology). For our purposes, the more pertinent question is whether partisan/ideo-
logically motivated conspiracy theory endorsement is asymmetrical. Does the rela-
tive size of the relationship between motivated conspiracy theory endorsement and
political orientations vary depending on whether the purported conspirators are
Democrats or Republicans?
Figure 3 displays the absolute value of the correlations between political orienta-
tions and both partisan versions of the conspiracy theory questions described above.
First, we should always observe correlations that are significantly distinguishable
from 0 (i.e., p < 0.05, two-tailed test); this would indicate that some level of partisan
motivated reasoning is behind the endorsement of conspiracy theories that involve
partisan groups/figures, consistent with findings presented above. Second, we should
observe significantly larger correlations between political orientations and beliefs in
conspiracy theories that malign Democrats (the red points) compared to those that
malign Republicans (blue points) if Republicans and conservatives are asymmetri-
cally motivated to believe in conspiracy theories about the left.
While we observe evidence of partisan motivated conspiracy theory endorsement
in all instances, we do not observe a tendency for Republicans or conservatives to
engage in such reasoning to a greater extent than Democrats and liberals. Regarding
partisanship, in five of the 10 tests, the correlations are not significantly different from
one another, indicating symmetry (i.e., p > 0.05). In the other five, Democrats evidence
a greater propensity for partisan motivated conspiracy endorsement than Republicans.
A similar pattern emerges for ideology. In four of the 10 tests, the correlations are

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Fig. 3  Pearson’s correlations between beliefs in specific content-controlled conspiracy theories and

partisan and ideological self-identification. Horizontal bands represent 95% confidence intervals,
two-tailed tests. Data from the following surveys: Lucid February 2020 ­(nRepublican Conspirator = 2,009;
­nDemocratic Conspirator = 1,985), MTurk October 2017 (­nRepublican Conspirator = 992; ­nDemocratic Conspirator = 1,023).
See online appendix for sample characteristics

not statistically significantly different from one another. In the remaining six, liberals
engage in greater motivated conspiracy theory endorsement than conservatives.
In sum, we find no support for the hypothesis that those on the right are more likely
to endorse conspiracy theories that impugn liberals than liberals are to endorse the
exact same conspiracy theories when they impugn conservatives. This finding has an
important implication for the asymmetry thesis: many individuals accept the oppor-
tunity to derogate the opposing political side, regardless of the specific factual details
of the charge and even if the charge alludes to a conspiracy. These results explain the
patterns in Fig. 1 and lead to our final analysis: an examination of potential partisan/
ideological asymmetries in conspiracy thinking, the general predisposition. Despite
our findings thus far, this predisposition may be asymmetric across partisan/ideological
lines.

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Finding 3: Conspiracy Thinking is Unsystematically Related

to Political Orientations

A final analytical strategy for assessing the relationship between political orien-
tations and conspiracy theory beliefs entails shifting focus from belief in specific
conspiracy theories to the general predisposition to engage in conspiracy theoriz-
ing (e.g., Bruder et al., 2013). This predisposition, conspiracy thinking (sometimes
referred to as conspiracy ideation, conspiratorial predispositions, or conspiracy men-
tality), can be thought of as a bias toward interpreting events and circumstances as
the products of conspiracies carried out by powerful, malign actors (Cassese et al.,
2020; Uscinski et  al., 2016). Empirical measures of conspiracy thinking are spe-
cifically designed to transcend the trappings of individual conspiracy theories; in
other words, an examination of the relationship between political orientations and
conspiracy thinking has the advantage of avoiding the complications of substantive
interpretation inherently posed by the idiosyncrasies of beliefs in particular conspir-
acy theories.
To measure this predisposition, we seek to measure general conspiratorial sen-
timents in which abstract nefarious groups are subverting norms, rules, and laws
by secretly engaging in harmful actions or by covering-up such actions. Here, we
employ the 4-item American Conspiracy Thinking Scale (ACTS), first developed by
Uscinski and Parent (2014) and based on items from McClosky and Chong (1985).
This scale is very similar in content and construction to other scales intended to
capture the disposition to believe conspiracy theories, such as the five-item Con-
spiracy Mentality Questionnaire (Bruder et al., 2013) and the 15-item Generic Con-
spiracist Beliefs Scale (Brotherton et al., 2013). Subjects responded, using five-point
response options ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5), to
each of the following items:

1. Even though we live in a democracy, a few people will always run things anyway.
2. The people who really “run” the country are not known to the voters.
3. Big events like wars, the recent recession, and the outcomes of elections are
controlled by small groups of people who are working in secret against the rest
of us.
4. Much of our lives are being controlled by plots hatched in secret places.

The resultant additive scale has been used in numerous studies, consistently
accounting for variation in beliefs in a wide range of conspiracy theories (Cassese
et  al., 2020; Miller, 2020; Uscinski et  al., 2016). Cronbach’s alpha reliability esti-
mates range from 0.76 to 0.86 across the 18 datasets employed in this analysis, sug-
gesting high reliability; the proportion of variance explained by the first factor of
an exploratory factor analysis ranges from 0.86 to 0.94, suggesting unidimensional-
ity. See the online appendix for detailed information about each individual dataset,
including the measurement properties of the ACTS (Figure A2).
To validate this measure in the context of the current investigation, Fig.  4
presents the correlations between the ACTS and beliefs in each of the specific

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Fig. 4  Pearson correlations between beliefs in specific conspiracy theories from Fig.  1 and conspiracy
thinking scale. Horizontal bands represent 95% confidence intervals, two-tailed tests. Qualtrics May
2021 (n = 2,021), Qualtrics October 2020 (n = 2,015), Qualtrics June 2020 (n = 1,040), Qualtrics March
2020 (n = 2,023), Qualtrics July 2019 (n = 2,000), CCES October 2018 (1, n = 1,000), CCES October
2018 (3, n = 1,000), CCES October 2016 (2, n = 1,000); see online appendix for sample characteristics

conspiracy theories examined in Fig.  1. Our intention here is to show that the
ACTS measure is a predictively valid indicator of the general tendency to believe
in conspiracy theories. We should expect all correlations to be positive and statis-
tically significant. Figure 4 shows universal support for this expectation. Moreo-
ver, we observe a pattern consistent with our earlier arguments about the impact
of partisan/ideological motivated reasoning and opinion leadership on beliefs
in some conspiracy theories: there is a weaker correlation between the ACTS
and beliefs in the specific conspiracy theories exhibiting the strongest political

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Fig. 5  Pearson’s correlations between conspiracy thinking scale and partisanship, symbolic ideology, and
operational ideology across studies and time. Horizontal bands represent 95% confidence intervals, two-
tailed tests. Data sources listed along vertical axis. Individual sample sizes and sample characteristics
appear in the appendix

asymmetries in Fig.  1 (i.e., those listed at the very top and very bottom of the
vertical axis).
Having established the criterion validity of the ACTS, we now turn to the empiri-
cal test of central concern: the relationship between political orientations and con-
spiracy thinking. Figure 5 depicts the correlations between conspiracy thinking and
ideological self-identification, partisanship, and operational ideology. This analysis
includes a total of 18 datasets (n = 31,741) spanning 10 years (2012–2021). Details
about all datasets appear in the appendix.
Beginning with symbolic ideology (measured via a seven-point scale rang-
ing from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative”), no consistent pattern
emerges (see the first panel of Fig.  5). In some surveys the correlation is positive
(indicating higher levels of conspiracy thinking on the right than left), in others it is
negative (indicating the opposite). In others still, correlations are statistically indis-
tinguishable from 0. Moreover, those correlations that are statistically significant
tend to be small, rarely exceeding an absolute value of 0.10 and never exceeding an
absolute value of 0.25. The average correlation between conspiratorial thinking and
ideological self-identification across all 18 national surveys is 0.04. The relationship
between conspiratorial thinking and partisanship (a seven-point scale ranging from
“strong Democrat” to “strong Republican) is similarly inconsistent and weak across
surveys/time (middle panel of Fig. 5); the average correlation is 0.03.
Eight of our surveys contained multiple questions measuring issue attitudes, such
as those regarding healthcare reform. For each survey we generated summary scales
of these attitudes, a common method for measuring operational ideology (Ansola-
behere et al., 2008; see online appendix for question wordings). Thus, we can inves-
tigate whether measures of ideology based on policy preferences rather than on
identity reveal relationships between ideology and conspiracy thinking. The third

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panel of Fig.  5 demonstrates that the relationship between conspiratorial thinking

and operational ideology is also inconsistent (ranging from 0.00 to 0.23), with an
average correlation of 0.09. Although these correlations are slightly stronger than
the averages we observe for symbolic ideology or partisanship, we note that we have
fewer data points; moreover, the positive relationship is substantially driven by the
same three 2016 data points for which we observed the largest correlations with
respect to symbolic ideology and partisanship in the first two panels of Fig. 5.
We suspect that this spike––observed across all three panels of Fig.  5 in
2016––owes to the political context in which the surveys were fielded: 2016 was a
presidential election year during which Donald Trump openly and frequently traf-
ficked in conspiracy theories, sharply deviating from past norms. While conspiracy
thinking is conceived of as a largely stable predisposition (Uscinski & Parent, 2014),
emerging scholarship suggests that conspiracy thinking can be temporarily height-
ened or diminished in some groups by situational political factors (Einstein & Glick,
2013; Farhart et al., 2020). This is not unlike how other predispositions like parti-
sanship, for example, operate: salient stimuli cause short-term fluctuations around
an otherwise stable mean (Smidt, 2018; West & Iyengar, 2020). The data offer sug-
gestive evidence for our proposition. In October 2012, the mean score on the ACTS
(range: 1–5) was 3.19 for Democrats and 3.13 for Republicans. In October 2016
(average of both CCES datapoints), this average increased to 3.51 for Republicans,
but remained stable for Democrats at 3.19. By October 2018 (average of all 3 CCES
datapoints), it had returned to 2012 levels––3.17––for both parties.
Regardless of the changing political circumstances and a potential Trump effect,
the totality of the evidence presented above is simply not indicative of a system-
atic left–right asymmetry in conspiracy thinking. As an additional check, we also
examined each bivariate relationship between ideology/partisanship and conspiracy
thinking separately, looking for evidence that political extremity, rather than valence
(i.e., left/right), is related to conspiracy thinking. We found only mixed evidence for
the proposition that strong partisans or extreme ideological identifiers exhibit higher
levels of conspiracy theorizing than weak identifiers or moderates/independents.
Details about these analyses appear in the appendix.

Discussion and Conclusion

Are those on the political right (Republicans/conservatives) more prone to conspir-

acy theorizing than those on the left (Democrats/liberals)? The smattering of evi-
dence across the literature provides conflicting answers to this question. We surmise
that disagreement in the literature is substantially the product of limitations regard-
ing both the operationalizations of conspiracy theorizing and the context––both tem-
poral and socio-political––in which beliefs are assessed in previous work. Given the
imperative of better understanding conspiracy theories and the people who believe
them, we compiled a robust body of evidence for testing the asymmetry thesis.
Across multiple surveys and measurement strategies, we found more evidence for
partisan and ideological symmetry in conspiricism, however operationalized, than
for asymmetry.

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First, we found that the relationship between political orientations and beliefs in
specific conspiracy theories varied considerably across 52 specific conspiracy theo-
ries. Conspiracy theories containing partisan/ideological content or that have been
endorsed by prominent partisan/ideological elites will find more support among
those in one political camp or the other, while theories without such content or
endorsements tend to be unrelated to partisanship and ideology in the U.S. We also
observed considerable variability in the relationship between left–right ideology and
11 conspiracy theory beliefs across 20 additional countries spanning six continents;
this variability suggests that the relationship between left–right ideology and con-
spiracy theory belief is also affected by the political context in which conspiracy
theories are polled. To account for the potential impact of idiosyncratic factors asso-
ciated with specific conspiracy theories, we next examined the relationship between
beliefs in “content-controlled” conspiracy theories and political orientations. We
found that both Democrats/liberals and Republicans/conservatives engage in moti-
vated conspiracy endorsement at similar rates, with Democrats/liberals occasion-
ally exhibiting stronger motivations than Republicans/conservatives. Finally, we
observed only inconsistent evidence for an asymmetric relationship between con-
spiracy thinking and either partisanship, symbolic ideology, or operational ideology
across 18 polls administered between 2012 and 2021. Even though the average cor-
relations across studies were positive, indicating a relationship with conservatism/
Republicanism (owing mostly to data collected in 2016), they were negligible in
magnitude and individual correlations varied in sign and statistical significance over
time.
Equally important as our substantive conclusions is an exploration of why we
reached them, which can shed light on existing inconsistencies in the literature.
While the core inferences we make from our investigation may deviate from the con-
clusions of others, empirical patterns are not irreconcilable. Take, for example, the
study conducted by van der Linden and colleagues (2021). They infer from a strong,
positive correlation between beliefs that “climate change is a hoax” and conserva-
tism that conservatives are inherently more conspiratorial than liberals. However,
we demonstrate that such conclusions cannot be made using beliefs in a single con-
spiracy theory. As can be seen in Fig. 1, climate change conspiracy theories show
one of the highest levels of asymmetry; therefore, exclusive examination of almost
any other conspiracy theory would lead to a result less supportive of the asymmetry
argument.
Van der Linden et al. (2021) also find a positive, albeit weak, correlation between
conservatism and generalized conspiracy thinking. While this relationship is sta-
tistically significant, liberals still exhibit high levels of conspiracism. Indeed, even
strong liberals score above the 50-point midpoint on their 101-point measure
(between 60 and 65, on average), whereas strong conservatives typically score about
10 points higher (see Figs. 1b and 3b). In other words, liberals, like conservatives,
are more conspiratorial than not. Moreover, van der Linden et  al.’s data hail from
2016 and 2018––years in which we also observed relatively elevated levels of con-
spiracy thinking among conservatives. However, this was not the case in other years
and samples we examined. This is exactly what we might expect of a disposition
that is not inherently connected to partisanship and ideology, but which may be

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sporadically activated by political circumstances. We do not question the veracity

of van der Linden et al.’s empirical findings or those of any other study with conclu-
sions that disagree with ours; rather, we argue that differences largely stem from
the inferences made from empirical relationships, which are frequently more general
than the data allows.
Despite the magnitude of data we employ, our study is not without limitations,
and we wish to emphasize that ours should not be the final word on this topic.
Although our data spans a decade, it was collected over the course of only three U.S.
presidential administrations. As political culture changes so, too, might the relation-
ship between political orientations and conspiracy theories. Unfortunately, measures
of general conspiracy thinking (to our knowledge) were not deployed on national
surveys until 2012 and specific conspiracy beliefs were only intermittently polled in
the past 70 years, severely limiting how much we can know about conspiracy theo-
rizing in the past. We encourage researchers to track multiple operationalizations of
conspiracy theorizing into the future so that we may better understand their political
dynamics and consequences.
We also recognize that, while an investigation of the asymmetry thesis across 21
countries constitutes a robust test, the more tests the asymmetry thesis undergoes
the more confident we can be about its (lack of) veracity. We encourage an exami-
nation of more conspiracy theory beliefs across socio-political contexts, especially
those that are closely tethered to each country’s political culture. We also recom-
mend more robust examinations of the asymmetry thesis in regions that have been
understudied, such as South America, Africa, and Asia. Even though we included
countries from each of these continents, very little is known about the basic nature
and scope of conspiracy theorizing outside of North America and Europe.
In a similar vein, conspiracy theories differ not only in who believes them, where,
and when, but in their consequences and dangers. As such, it may be useful for
researchers to consider categorizing conspiracy beliefs by various attributes, such as
their consequences, just as they do for political attitudes (e.g., issue attitudes, affec-
tive versus ideological attitudes, etc.)––perhaps the asymmetry thesis finds stronger
evidence among certain “classes” of conspiracy theories. Recent events in American
politics are suggestive of this possibility. Donald Trump and his allies in govern-
ment and media fostered election fraud conspiracy theory beliefs to the point of the
violent intimidation of elected representatives attempting to certify the 2020 elec-
tion. In this way, election fraud conspiracy theories––at least under the particular
circumstances that Trump and colleagues nurtured––are of more consequence than,
for example, conspiracy theories regarding the moon landing or lizard people. While
forecasting which conspiracy theories will result in tangible consequences and when
is surely difficult, we nevertheless note that symmetry of tendency to believe in con-
spiracy theories need not equal symmetry in consequence of conspiracy theories,
along political lines or otherwise.
Finally, we believe it is critical that work on beliefs, like that presented here,
be reconciled with related research examining political asymmetries in the ten-
dency to interact with or “spread” conspiracy theories on social media. Related
work by Guess, Nagler and Tucker (2019), Garrett and Bond (2021), and Grin-
berg et  al. (2019), for example, finds evidence for minor asymmetries in the

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extent to which Democrats/liberals and Republicans/conservatives share misin-

formation or distinguish between fake and true news stories online. By fusing
social media data with survey data researchers can gain greater leverage over
questions about the conditions under which online behaviors are reflective of, or
even impact, beliefs and offline behaviors. For now, we simply note that findings
of asymmetries online may not generalize to the broader population, as politically
active social media users are not representative of average Americans when it
comes to various political and psychological characteristics (Lawson & Kakkar,
2021). Just as social media data can be fused with survey data, so, too, can top-
down data on conspiratorial rhetorical strategies employed by political elites. Few
studies of this sort have been undertaken, particularly in the U.S. (see Oliver &
Rahn, 2016 for an example), but they are sorely needed––especially to test ear-
lier studies on the rhetoric of conspiratorial elites (Adorno, 2000; Lowenthal &
Guterman, 1948).
The last five years have witnessed Republican elites in government and media
(most notably Donald Trump) utilizing conspiracy theories in a way unprecedented
in the last half century of American politics, and with severe, deleterious conse-
quences for democratic institutions. This alone has encouraged renewed conjecture
about an asymmetry in conspiracy theory beliefs. However, elites are an imperfect
reflection of the public––they have different goals, incentives, and knowledge about
politics. Moreover, elite rhetoric rarely changes predispositions, such as conspir-
acy thinking, so much as it activates predispositions and connects them to salient
political choices (Leeper & Slothuus, 2014). In other words, while Republican elites
may have recently activated conspiratorial predispositions among supporters in the
mass public––where they exist––in a way that Democratic elites did not, they are
unlikely to be able to cause once non-conspiratorial supporters to become highly
conspiratorial.
That we find little difference in conspiracy theorizing between the right and left
among the mass public does not indicate that there are no differences between par-
tisan elites on this score, nor does it imply that there will not be asymmetries in
beliefs in specific conspiracy theories at any given point in time. Specific conspiracy
theories can find more support among one partisan/ideological side than the other
even though partisan/ideological motivated reasoning and conspiratorial predispo-
sitions operate, on balance, in a symmetric fashion. Likewise, the content of those
theories and the way they are deployed, particularly by elites, can result in asymmet-
rical consequences, such as political violence and the undermining of democratic
institutions. We encourage future work to integrate the conspiratorial rhetoric of
elites with studies of mass beliefs and investigate elite conspiratorial rhetoric from
actors including and beyond Donald Trump.

Supplementary Information  The online version contains supplementary material available at https://​doi.​
org/​10.​1007/​s11109-​022-​09812-3.

Data and Code Availability  ll data and code used in this study are available at: https://​datav​erse.​harva​rd.​
edu/​datas​et.​xhtml?​persi​stent​Id=​doi:​10.​7910/​DVN/​MMMYGJ

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Political Behavior

Declarations 

Conflict of interest  The authors declare no competing interests.

Ethical Approval  All surveys were approved by the appropriate institution’s IRB.

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and institutional affiliations.

Authors and Affiliations

Adam Enders1 · Christina Farhart2 · Joanne Miller3 · Joseph Uscinski4   ·

Kyle Saunders5 · Hugo Drochon6
Adam Enders
adam.enders@louisville.edu
Christina Farhart
cfarhart@carleton.edu
Joanne Miller
jomiller@udel.edu
Kyle Saunders
kyle.saunders@colostate.edu
Hugo Drochon
Hugo.Drochon@nottingham.ac.uk
1
Department of Political Science, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292, USA
2
Department of Political Science, Carleton College, Northfield, MN 55057, USA
3
Department of Political Science, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, USA
4
Department of Political Science, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33146, USA
5
Department of of Political Science, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80528, USA
6
School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham,
Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK

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