Recap of Module 8

 
In the U.S., conclusive presumptions of an evidentiary nature were held
UNCONSTITUTIONAL in a criminal case, Sandstrom v. Montana (442 US 510 [1979]).
Here, the US Supreme Court rejected an instruction that the law presumes a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his/her voluntary acts because it may have been
interpreted as conclusive or as shifting the burden of persuasion which would have
violated the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution mandating the prosecutor to prove
every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
 
The importance of this topic on burden of proof is often underestimated; yet, the right
to have the burden of proof properly placed is a valuable right; and to give force and
effect to such right some courts have gone even so far as to rule that failure to place it
over the request and proper exception of a party, constitutes reversible error. This rule
is founded upon the obvious purpose of facilitating justice by serving the convenience
of the court.
 
Read the following editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer on 9 March 2021.
Unless proven otherwise, any person found or is present within or inside the place of
sale, trading, marketing, dispensation, delivery, or distribution of dangerous drugs is
presumed to have been involved in the sale, trade, or distribution of such drugs. Any
person found in possession of dangerous drugs of a certain quantity or weight is
presumed to have been engaged in illegal drugs. A person is presumed a protector or
coddler of a drug suspect if he/she knows the seller, trader, distributor, or violator and
uses his/her influence, power, or position in shielding, harboring, or facilitating the
escape of the drug suspect.
These are among the many “presumptions’’ contained in the controversial House Bill
No. 7814, which seeks to amend the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Approved by the House with a vote of 188-11 with nine abstentions on March 2, the bill
has raised alarm from other legislators and human rights advocates for the threat it
poses to the cornerstone due process principle of “innocent until proven guilty’’—a right
enshrined not only in the Constitution but also in the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Some House members have withdrawn their support for the consolidated bill after
objecting to the dangers of the “presumptions’’ included in the final bill. Among them
are Quezon City Rep. Jose Christopher Belmonte, who warned that “many innocents
will be endangered by wrong assumptions”; Quezon City Rep. Jesus Bong Suntay, the
House human rights committee chair; and Muntinlupa Rep. Ruffy Biazon, one of the
authors of the bill.
Legal experts have also assailed the measure. In his column in this paper last Sunday,
retired chief justice Artemio Panganiban pointed out that “Though the presumption is
disputable in court, the bill still violates the basic constitutional right to be presumed
innocent unless proven guilty after observing due process before an impartial judge.
Worse, the presumptions could be used as prima facie bases for capital offenses that
would lead to the indefinite detention of suspects who would then bear the burden of
proving their innocence without any strong factual evidence of guilt other than the
presumptions provided in the bill.”
Law dean Mel Sta. Maria, commenting on the provision that anyone in the vicinity of a
drug transaction would be presumed involved, wrote in a Facebook post: “So if you just
happen to pass by and you didn’t know there was a transaction, you can be arrested.
Or if you just alighted from a jeepney where there is a transaction (that you don’t know
about), you can be arrested because you are ‘in the vicinity of an area’ where the
transaction is being made…’’
The criticisms have miffed Surigao del Norte Rep. Robert Ace Barbers, chair of the
House dangerous drugs committee, who denied that the bill disregards due process.
The “legal presumptions’’ of guilt in the measure are “not conclusive’’ and would still
need to be established during the trial, he insisted.
Why the need, then, for such presumptions? Barbers said the measure is meant to plug
loopholes and flaws in existing laws and “give more teeth’’ to the drug war. According
to him, data from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) showed that since
2013, no one has been charged as a protector, coddler, or financier of the illegal drug
trade.
But that is hardly the fault of existing laws. Who bears responsibility, for instance, for
the fact that big-time drug smugglers have not been identified, much less arrested,
even if they were able to smuggle in billions of pesos’ worth of shabu right under the
noses of Customs officials? Or the fact that despite the killings of thousands of drug
suspects, the illegal drug trade persists, not only on the streets but even inside the
national penitentiary which is under the administration’s control?
The drug war is now widely seen as a failure not because the law lacks teeth, but
because of yawning flaws and glaring corruption in its implementation. Justice
Secretary Menardo Guevarra’s own report to the United Nations Human Rights Council
last Feb. 24 admitted that in half of the police operations reviewed, the police failed to
follow standard protocols in inter-agency coordination and processing of crime scenes.
The sinister presumptions in the House bill indicate how far administration allies are
willing to thrash fundamental human rights to continue to enable a drug war that has
unleashed unprecedented violence on the country, but has failed to dent the illegal
drug supply or put drug lords behind bars. (How about the public presuming that
lawmakers who lobby and allocate pork barrel for their pet projects are guilty of
embezzlement, ill-gotten wealth, and plunder unless proven otherwise?) It is incumbent
upon the Senate to put a stop to this pernicious measure. (Read
more:  https://opinion.inquirer.net/138336/sinister-presumptions#ixzz6r8olDTzs   (Links
to an external site.))
 
Imagine if this bill becomes law.  Think for a moment how the presumptions the bill
seeks to perpetuate and perpetrate would affect truth-seeking.
 
Be that as it may, burdens of proof and presumptions figure strongly in fact-finding and
judicial decision-making. 
 
Below is a sampling of important cases you need to study. While reading these cases,
note how the Supreme Court applied the burdens of proof and presumptions to arrive
at its decision. Keep asking whether the allocation of the burdens and/or presumptions
justified the decision.

1. Burden of Proof vs. Burden of Evidence 

FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY (FEBTC) vs. ROBERT MAR CHANTE G.R.
No. 170598, 9 October 2013 
FACTS: Instant complaint was filed by petitioner against Chante to recover from Chan
the principal sum of P770,488.30 representing the unpaid balance of the amount
fraudulently withdrawn from Chan’s ATM. FEBTC alleged that between 8:52 p.m. of May
4, 1992 and 4:06 a.m. of May 5, 1992, Chan had withdrawn funds totaling P967,000.00
from the PNB-MEGALINK ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel in Manila; that the
withdrawals were done in a series of 242 transactions with the use of the same
machine, at P4,000.00/withdrawal; and that the transactions were processed and
recorded by the respective computer systems of PNB and MEGALINK despite the
following circumstances, namely: (a) the offline status of the branch of account (FEBTC
Ongpin Branch); (b) Chan’s account balance being only P198,511.70 at the time; (c)
the maximum withdrawal limit of the ATM facility being P50,000.00/day; and (d) his
withdrawal transactions not being reflected in his account, and no debits or deductions
from his current account with the FEBTC Ongpin Branch being recorded. FEBTC
asserted further that defendant took advantage of a system bug which allowed the
excessive withdrawals. Chan denied liability and instead insisted that he had been
actually home at the time of the withdrawals. He alluded to a possible “inside job” as
the cause of the supposed withdrawals, citing a newspaper report to the effect that an
employee of FEBTC’s had admitted having debited accounts of its depositors by using
his knowledge of computers as well as information available to him. Chan claimed that
it would be physically impossible for any human being like him to stand long hours in
front of the ATM facility just to withdraw funds. 
ISSUE: Whether a civil action may be decided in favor of the plaintiff where the
defendant relies on bare and uncorroborated denial of the former’s allegation. 
RULING: No. The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it
because mere allegation of the fact is not evidence of it. Verily, the party who asserts,
not he who denies, must prove. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who
would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. This is because our system
frees the trier of facts from the responsibility of investigating and presenting the facts
and arguments, placing that responsibility entirely upon the respective parties. The
burden of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the defendant, is on the plaintiff
if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner required
by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the
essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses, that, if proved,
would exculpate him from liability.
Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts,
namely: (a) the risk of nonpersuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply
persuasion burden; and (b) the duty of producing evidence, or the burden of going
forward with the evidence, or simply the production burden or the burden of evidence.
In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or issue by
such a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case at which the issue arises.
In its other concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at the beginning or at any
subsequent stage of trial in order to make or meet a prima facie case. Generally
speaking, burden of proof in its second concept passes from party to party as the case
progresses, while in its first concept it rests throughout upon the party asserting the
affirmative of the issue.
Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead of upon
the weakness of Chan’s evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to preponderantly
demonstrate that his ATM card had been used to make the withdrawals, and that he
had used the ATM card and PIN by himself or by another person to make the fraudulent
withdrawals. Otherwise, it could not recover from him any funds supposedly improperly
withdrawn from the ATM account. 

2. Presumptions 
a. Conclusive Presumptions
IBAAN RURAL BANK INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MR. and MRS.
RAMON TARNATE G.R. No. 123817, 17 December   1999 
FACTS: Respondent spouses entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage of the lots in question from its original owner Spouses Reyes. As, Private
respondents failed to pay the loan and the bank extrajudicially foreclosed on the
mortgaged lots. At the public auction, the bank was the sole bidder. Consequently, a
certificate of sale was issued. The said certificate stated that redemption period expires
two (2) years from the registration of the sale. Certificate of sale was registered on
October 16, 1979. Within the two (2) year period, private respondents offered to
redeem the foreclosed lots and tendered the redemption amount. However, petitioner
Bank refused and argued that the right to redeem had prescribed, as more than one
year had
elapsed from the registration of the Certificate of Sale. Private respondents filed a
complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of the foreclosed lots. They
argued that they were entitled to redeem the foreclosed lots because they offered to
redeem and tendered the redemption price before October 16, 1981, the deadline of
the 2-year. 
ISSUE: Whether failure to previously contest the redemption period stated on the
certificate of sale precludes the bank from asserting it as a defense to oppose the
exercise of right of redemption. 
RULING: Yes. By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to
believe that they had two years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse
of two years, petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was
only one year and that the period had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one,
by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to
speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe
certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he
will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. When
petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the
certificate and its contents. For two years, it did not object to the two-year redemption
period provided in the certificate (which should have been one year only). Thus, it could
be said that petitioner consented to the two-year redemption period specially since it
had time to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part
of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as
consent. 
 
SPOUSES REYNALDO ALCARAZ and ESMERALDA ALCARAZ PEDRO M.
TANGGA-AN et al. G.R. No. 128568, 9 April 2003 
FACTS: Petitioners leased a building from Respondent’s predecessor (Virginia). At the
time of the perfection of the contract, the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were aware
that the NHA, and not Virginia, the lessor, owned the land on which the rented house
stood yet they signed the same, obliged themselves to comply with the terms thereof
for five years and performed their obligations as lessees for two years. After two years
from the effectivity of the lease contract, Respondents filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer, with damages against petitioner for failure to pay rent. On the other hand, the
petitioner spouses alleged that they paid the rent to the new owners (Virgilio and
Angelita) of the lot where the building stood and not to respondents since the latter
supposedly no longer had the legal right to collect rentals. Petitioner claimed that the
lease contract ceased to be effective because Virgilio’s assumption of ownership of the
land stripped the respondents of ownership of the building. MTC rendered a decision in
favor of plaintiffs. MTC ruled that petitioner failed to show that the subject house
belonged to Virgilio. On the other hand, the respondents proved that the property in
question is registered in their name. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the
MTC based on the petitioner’s failure to present any documentary evidence modifying
or amending the contract of lease to justify the transfer of payment of the monthly
rental to Virgilio Tanga-an who claims only as the registered owner of the lot on which
the leased house is located. 
ISSUE: Whether a defendant in a suit, to which the cause of action arises from a
contract may assail the operation of such contract by disputing a previously affirmed
fact. 
RULING: No. Estoppel. Petitioners were aware that the lot in question was not owned
by the lessors at the time the lease contract was entered into. After recognizing the
validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are barred from
alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents
lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot. Section 2, Rule 131
of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption that: Sec. 2. Conclusive
presumptions. — The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: (a) Whenever
a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO, INC. v. BANGKO SENTRAL PILIPINAS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 194964-65, January 11, 2016
FACTS: Guillermo Torres (G) who chaired the board of Trustees of University of
Mindanao (UM) and previously operated a thrift bank First Iligan Savings & Loan
Associations (FISLAI) requested and was granted by BSP an emergency credit of 1.9M
for FISLAI. As mortgage for said loan UM through its vice president for finance
Saturnino petalcorin, executed a deed of real estate mortgage (REM) over UM’s
property in Cagayan de Oro in favor of Banko Sentral (BSP). BSP extended to FISLAI
another loan in the amount of Php600k over which a REM was executed over UMs
properties in Iligan City. Thereafter FISLAI became subject of a merger and became
Mindanao Savings and Loan Association(MSLAI). G died. Thereafter BSP sent a demand
letter for payment of the loan. UM denied receiving any loan and thereafter filed two
complaints for nullification and cancellation of mortgage, one with RTC Cagayan de Oro
and the other with RTC Iligan City.  The RTC of CDO decided in favor of UM declaring
the REM involving properties in CDO be cancelled reasoning that there was no board
resolution giving Saturnino authority to execute the mortgage on behalf of UM and
upon Aurora de Leon’s testimony that there was no board resolution and that she
signed the certificate only upon G’s orders. The RTC of iligan City also rendered a
similar decision to which BSP appealed. The CA reversed the decision of the two trial
courts and upheld the right to foreclose of BSP reasoning that there is a presumption of
regularity in the decisions of corporations absent any sign of fraud. That this
presumption is proved by the certificate executed by aurora de leon as secretary, which
had clothed saturnino with apparent authority to execute the mortgage and that BSP
relied in good faith on the said certificate. UM therefore is estopped from denying
saturnino’s authority. 
ISSUE: Was the execution of the mortgage contract ultra vires. 
RULING: Yes it was ultra vires because a corporation may exercise only powers given
by law and as provided in its charter. Securing loans from third persons is not among
the purposes for which petitioner UM was established. As an educational institution, it is
limited to developing human capital through formal instruction. It is not a corporation
engaged in the business of securing loans of others The Court ruled that The RTC
decision of November 23, 2001 and December 7, 2001 are reinstated.  
*Doctrine of apparent authority based on estoppel
*This court has recognized presumed or apparent authority or capacity to bind
corporate representatives in instances when the corporation, through its silence or
other acts of recognition, allowed others to believe that persons, through their usual
exercise of corporate powers, were conferred with authority to deal on the corporation’s
behalf.
* The doctrine of apparent authority does not go into the question of the corporation’s
competence or power to do a particular act. It involves the question of whether the
officer has the power or is clothed with the appearance of having the power to act for
the corporation. A finding that there is apparent authority is not the same as a finding
that the corporate act in question is within the corporation’s limited powers.
*There can be no apparent authority and the corporation cannot be estopped from
denying the binding effect of an act when there is no evidence pointing to similar acts
and other circumstances that can be interpreted as the corporation holding out a
representative as having authority to contract on its behalf.
*No apparent authority here because the Secretary’s Certificate and excerpt from
the minutes of the alleged board meeting were found to have been simulated.
These documents cannot be considered as the corporate acts that held out Saturnino
Petalcorin as petitioner’s authorized representative for mortgage transactions.
b. Disputable Presumptions 
HOSPICIO D. ROSAROSO et al. vs. LUCILA LABORTE SORIA et al. G.R. No.
194846, 28 June 2013 
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for nullity of the SPA authorizing Respondent to
sell the subject disputed lots to Meridian, as well as the deed of sale entered into
pursuant to the said SPA. Petitioner alleged that the said lot had already sold to them
by their predecessor Luis Rosaroso. During trial the second wife of Luis, Lourdes
testified deed of sale in favor of petitioners, was obtained through fraud, deceit and
trickery. She explained that they signed the prepared deed out of pity because
petitioners told them that it was necessary for a loan application. RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. The CA ruled
that the first deed of sale in favor of petitioners was void because they failed to prove
that they indeed tendered a consideration for the four (4) parcels of land. It relied on
the testimony of Lourdes that petitioners did not pay her husband. The price or
consideration for the sale was simulated to make it appear that payment had been
tendered when in fact no payment was made at all. 
ISSUE: Whether the validity of a contract may be assailed on a mere testimony that it
has no consideration. 
RULING: No. Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are
disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the
ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient
consideration for a contract. These presumptions operate against an adversary who has
not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence to
rebut the prima facie case they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is
presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the
presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being from
introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in
the place of evidence unless rebutted. In this case, the respondents failed to trounce
the said presumption. Aside from their bare allegation that the sale was made without a
consideration, they failed to supply clear and convincing evidence to back up this claim.
It is elementary in procedural law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence,
are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court. The CA decision ran counter to
this established rule regarding disputable presumption. It relied heavily on the account
of Lourdes who testified that the children of Luis approached him and convinced him to
sign the deed of sale, explaining that it was necessary for a loan application, but they
did not pay the purchase price for the subject properties. This testimony, however, is
self- serving and would not amount to a clear and convincing evidence required by law
to dispute the said presumption. As such, the presumption that there was sufficient
consideration will not be disturbed. 
HEIRS OF CIPRIANO TRAZONA vs. HEIRS OF DIONISIO CAÑADA G.R. No.
175874, 11 December 2013 
FACTS: Cipriano Trazona owned Lot No. 5053–H covered by Tax Declaration No.
07764. Sometime in 1997, when the heirs of Cipriano, herein petitioners, tried to secure
a copy of Tax Declaration No. 07764, they were informed that Tax Declaration No.
07764 had been cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Tax Declaration No. 23959 was issued
on 24 June 1996 in the name of Dionisio, the owner of the property adjacent to
Cipriano’s lot. Apparently, respondents had caused the issuance of Tax Declaration No.
23959 by submitting a Deed of Absolute Sale supposedly executed by Cipriano in favor
of Dionisio. The deed of sale covers a portion of Cipriano’s property which was
encroached upon by Dioniso during the former’s lifetime, but the new tax declaration
issued covers the whole property of Cipriano. Consequently, petitioners filed a
Complaint against respondents for quieting of title, annulment of deed of sale,
cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 23959. Petitioners alleged therein that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 27 June 1956 was a forgery. During the trial, petitioners presented
an expert witness testifying to the forgery of Cipriano’s signature on the assailed deed.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. Based on RTC Judge’s observation Cipriano’s signature
on the assailed deed bares a difference as compared to other documents bearing his
signature. On appeal, CA ruled that petitioners had failed to prove by requisite evidence
their allegation that the assailed deed was a forgery. The deed, being a notarized
document, enjoyed the presumption of authenticity and due execution. Also, the fact
that it was an ancient document that “remained unaltered after so many years, bodes
well for its authenticity. 
ISSUE: Whether the presumption of regularity of a notarized ancient document may be
assailed by the testimony of an expert witness and independent observation of the trial
court as to the forgery of signature therein. 
RULING: Yes. It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as
regards their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the
presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by
evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. In this case,
clear and convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of regularity
of the assailed deed was presented. First, the document examiner determined that the
signature of Cipriano in the assailed deed had been forged. No issue has been raised
about his expertise. Second, the RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that
the signature was forged. It likewise supported its finding that the signature was forged
through independent observation. Lastly, when the record management analyst from
the Bureau of Archives presented the assailed deed, the paper was noted to be white,
while its supposed contemporaries in the bunch from where it was taken had turned
yellow with age. Further, when the analyst was asked the question of when the assailed
deed was received by the Bureau of Archives, she answered that it was forwarded to
them only on 28 September 1987 by RTC Region 7, Notarial Division. 
LUIS UY vs. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA* MENDOZA G.R. No.
206220, 19 August 2015
FACTS: Luis Uy (Uy) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages against respondents Petra Rosca
(Rosca), and spouses Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana). Uy
alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as
husband and wife from the time they were married in until they separated and lived
apart. Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone in favor of Spouses
Lacsamana over a property he alleges to be a part of their marital property regime is
not valid for being simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration and consent. Rosca
denied the allegations of Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real
properties using her paraphernal funds. She added that she and Uy cohabited and
attempted to formalize their marital union with a marriage ceremony. However, the
celebration was not consummated because of the bombings which occurred on the day
of the ceremony. Likewise, they were unable to secure a marriage contract. Spouses
Lacsamana also filed their Answer with Counterclaim dated claiming that they were
buyers in good faith and for value and that they relied on the Torrens title which stated
that Rosca was the owner of the subject property.  
Uy died and his two daughters, Lydia Uy Velasquez (Lydia) and Shirley Uy Macaraig
(Shirley) substituted him in the case. Rosca and respondent Jose Lacsamana also died.
Meanwhile Spouses Lacsamana sold the property to Corazon Buena (Buena). Thus,
both Rosca and the Spouses Lacsamana were substituted by Buena as respondent in
this case. Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in
favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.
RULING: YES. Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the
property by Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage.
There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage."
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. However, this
presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence. Marriage
may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias, we held
that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has
been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. Uy was not able to present
any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced from his own personal
records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the marriage allegedly
took place. Even the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant
evidence that he was actually married to Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy
submitted showed that he and Rosca were not legally married to each other. While it is
true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and wife, defendant
Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their
marriage was not consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held that persons
living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter presumption
or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.  Consequently, with the
presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca
shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and
defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to
submit additional proof to show that they were legally married. He, however, dismally
failed to do so. Since Uy failed to discharge the burden (of evidence) that he was legally
married to Rosca, their property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the
Family Code which applies when a couple living together were not incapacitated from
getting married. The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are
presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial
and appellate courts that Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-
owned but is paraphernal. Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to
sufficiently overcome the presumption that any property acquired while living together
shall be owned by the couple in equal shares. The house and lot were clearly Rosca's
paraphernal properties and she had every right to sell the same even without Uy's
consent. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14
September 2011 and Resolution dated 1 March 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 93786.

DOLORES DIAZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 208113, 2

December 2015
FACTS: An Information for estafa was filed by Leticia S. Arcilla (Leticia) against Dolores
Diaz (Dolores) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for her alleged failure to return or
remit the proceeds from various merchandise valued at P32,000.00 received by her in
trust - i.e., on consignment basis from respondent. Leticia alleged that she is a
businesswoman engaged in the business of selling goods/merchandise through agents
(one of whom is petitioner) under the condition that the latter shall turn over the
proceeds or return the  unsold items to her a month after they were entrusted. She
averred that she entrusted merchandise worth P35,300.00 to Dolores as evidenced by
an acknowledgment receipt signed by the latter. However, petitioner was only able to
remit the amount of P3,300.00 and thereafter, failed to make further remittances and
ignored respondent's demands to remit the proceeds or return the goods. In her
defense, petitioner admitted having previous business dealings with respondent but not
as an agent. She clarified that she was a client who used to buy purchase order cards
(POCs) and gift checks (GCs) from respondent on installment basis and that, during
each deal, she was made to sign a blank sheet of paper prior to the issuance of POCs
and GCs. She further claimed that their last transaction was conducted in 1995, which
had long been settled. However, she denied having received P32,000.00 worth of
merchandise from respondent on February 20, 1996. RTC acquitted petitioner of the
charge of estafa but held her civilly liable to pay respondent the amount of P32,000.00.
CA upheld petitioner's civil liability. It ruled that respondent was able to establish by
preponderance of evidence her transaction with petitioner, as well as the latter's failure
to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the
same to respondent in case the items were not sold, the fact of which having been
substantiated by the acknowledgment receipt. To this, the CA rejected petitioner's
attempt to discredit the said receipt which she denied executing on the ground that she
was only made to sign blank documents, finding that even if petitioner was indeed
made to sign such blank documents, such was merely a safety precaution employed by
respondent in the event the former reneges on her obligation.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may be held civilly liable.
RULING: YES. At the outset, it is noteworthy to mention that the extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence, or "greater weight of
the credible evidence," is required. Thus, an accused acquitted of estafa may still be
held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant, as in this case.
Petitioner's claim that she was required to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and a
trust receipt in blank during her transactions with respondent, which she allegedly failed
to retrieve after paying her obligations, is a bare allegation that cannot be given
credence. It is well-settled that "[h]e who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
and a mere allegation is not evidence." On the contrary, respondent was able to prove
by preponderance of evidence the fact of the transaction, as well as petitioner's failure
to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the
same to respondent in case such merchandise were not sold. This was established
through the presentation of the acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996,
which, as the document's name connotes, shows that petitioner acknowledged receipt
from respondent of the listed items with their corresponding values, and assumed the
obligation to return the same on March 20, 1996 if not sold. In this relation, it should be
pointed out that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal
presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law
dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3 (p) of the
same Rule, it is equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular.
This behooves every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document
before he signs and delivers it. The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is
to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created,
thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail. In this case, petitioner failed
to present any evidence to controvert these presumptions. Also, respondent's
possession of the document pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses her claim
that the same has not been extinguished. Preponderance of evidence only requires that
evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence.  All things
considered, the evidence in this case clearly preponderates in respondent's favor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 30, 2013 and the
Resolution dated July 10, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97571 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, directing petitioner Dolores Diaz to pay
respondent Leticia S. Arcilla the amount of P32,000.00 with legal interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from July 28, 1998 until full payment. SO ORDERED.
 
3. Suppression of Testimony 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE G.R. No. 137664, 9
May 2002 
FACTS: Accused Roberto Padrigone, a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel, Jocel Ibanita, Michael
San Antonio and Abel Triumpante entered the dwelling of the Contridas sisters at 3:00
a.m. of January 3, 1995, and at knifepoint successively raped Rowena Contridas, a 16
year old lass. The victim became insane after the incident and was not able to testify in
Court. Nimfa Contridas, her fourteen year old sister, who was also present that time
narrated the incident when her elder sister’s innocence was forcibly violated. The trial
court, disregarding the Accused’s defense of denial and alibi, convicted the accused. On
appeal, herein Accused-appellant claims that the prosecution suppressed evidence by
not presenting Rowena, the victim, when the latter should have had her sane moments.
As a consequence, the trial court deprived appellant of the opportunity to cross-
examine her when she allegedly declared before the Chief of Police of Buhi that it was
only appellant who raped her which declaration became the basis for the latter’s
conviction. 
ISSUE: Whether failure to present as witness the victim of a crime who became insane
by reason of such offense amounts to suppression of evidence. 
RULING: No. The non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be
considered as suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of
Court, the rule (or presumption) that "evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced" does not apply if: DNCE
(a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties;
(b) the suppression was not willful;
(c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and
(d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the
opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a
witness. Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness stand. Second, Rowena
was certified to be suffering from "Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition" and thus
"cannot stand judicial proceedings yet." The non- presentation, therefore, of Rowena
was not willful. Third, in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also
present and in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister. 
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and G.T.P.
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 122899, 8 June 2000 
FACTS: Mr. Chia and Respondent GTP entered into a contract of sale with assumption
of mortgage wherein the latter assumes the former’s indebtedness with Metrobank.
Respondent, pursuant to the balance declared by Metrobank prior to the execution of
the sale, paid Chia’s loan balance with Metrobank in the amount of P116K+. This
notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate mortgage on
the subject property despite repeated requests, thus prompting respondent GTP to file
an action for specific performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia.
Metrobank refused to discharge of the real estate mortgage on the claim that the
subject property still secures "other unliquidated past due loans” as there exist a
stipulation in subject Deeds of Mortgage that mortgagors’ debts subsequently obtained
would be covered by the same security. Hence, the payment made by GPT does not
extinguish the mortgage. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent. On appeal, CA
reversed the decision. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 
With this unfavorable turn of events, respondent GTP, filed a motion for reconsideration
with alternative prayer to require METROBANK to furnish appellee (GTP) of the alleged
unpaid balance of Mr. Chia." At the re-scheduled date of oral arguments where
METROBANK was supposed to bring before the CA the current statement of the
mortgage debt of Mr. Chia secured by the deeds of mortgage sought to be released,
METROBANK’s counsel did not appear. Consequently, CA reversed its previous
decision. 
ISSUE: Whether failure of the mortgagee to present the proof of loan secured by the
mortgage estopped him from further asserting the existence of such liability 
RULING: Yes. It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material
fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence
which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not
founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that
the evidence, if produced, would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his
adversary. The scheduled oral arguments before the CA was supposed to be
Metrobank’s golden opportunity to prove the existence the "other unliquidated past due
loans" which is the basis of its refusal to release the mortgage property. But Metrobank
failed to appear thereon. No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in
his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to
prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist." 

4. Official Duty 
FILOMENA G. DELOS SANTOS vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 198457,
13 August 2013 
FACTS: Congressman Cuenco entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the
Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC) appropriating to the hospital the
amount of P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to
cover the medical assistance of indigent patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT)
Health Program. It was agreed that Cuenco shall identify and recommend the patients
who may availed of the program. Several years after the enforcement of the MOA,
allegations of forgery and falsification of prescriptions and referrals for the availment of
medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. Consequently, an audit thereof was
conducted and rampant violations of bidding and audit procedure were revealed.
Thereafter, Special Audit Team Supervisor, Boado disallowed the amount of
P3,386,697.10 for the payment of drugs and medicines for antirabies with falsified
prescription and documents, and holding petitioners, together with other VSMMC
officials, solidarily liable therefor. By way of defense, petitioners nonetheless argue that
VSMMC was merely a passive entity in the disbursement of funds under the TNT
Program and, thus, invoke good faith in the performance of their respective duties,
capitalizing on the failure of the assailed Decisions of the CoA to show that their lapses
in the implementation of the TNT Program were attended by malice or bad faith. 
ISSUE: Whether or not assertion of good faith in the performance of a public function
prevails over factual findings revealing violations of rules and regulations in the
performance of such function. 

RULING: No. Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice,
there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this
presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated .
Petitioners failed to make a case justifying their non-observance of existing auditing
rules and regulations, and of their duties under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners’ neglect
to properly monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and
eventual payment of 133 falsified prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-rabies
vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the patent
irregularities borne out by the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto. Had there
been an internal control system installed by petitioners, the irregularities would have
been exposed, and the hospital would have been prevented from processing falsified
claims and unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF. 
 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA G.R. No. 191263,
16 October 2013 
FACTS: Accused was charged with violation of RA 9165. The prosecution presented
Trayvilla, a Non-Uniformed Personnel of the PNP, who testified that on 31 July 2002 at
around 6:30 in the morning, while performing her duty as a female frisker assigned at
the NAIA Terminal I, she frisked the accused Cadidia upon her entry at the departure
area and she noticed something unusual and thick in the area of Cadidia’s buttocks.
Upon inquiry, Cadidia answered that it was only her sanitary napkin which caused the
unusual thickness. Not convinced with Cadidia’s explanation, Trayvilla and her female
co-employee Bagsican brought the accused to the comfort room inside the domestic
airport to check. When she and Bagsican asked Cadidia to remove her underwear, they
discovered that inside were two sachets of shabu. The two sachets of shabu were
turned over to their supervisor SPO3 Musalli I. Appang (SPO3 Appang). Trayvilla
recalled that Cadidia denied that the two sachets of shabu were hers and said that she
was only asked by an unidentified person to bring the same. During trial, accused
interposed the defense of frame-up. Both the trial court and the CA, on appeal,
conviced the accused. The accused also assails the application of presumption of
regularity in the performance of duties of the witnesses. She claimed that the self-
serving testimonies of Trayvilla and Bagsican failed to overcome her presumption of
innocence guaranteed by the Constitution. 
ISSUE: Whether the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of a public
officer may be assailed by bare allegations of frame-up. 

HELD: Yes. In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given
to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary
suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers.” In this case, the prosecution
witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the police to impute the crime against
Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled the
accused who entered the x-ray machine of the departure area. There was no pre-
determined notice to particularly search the accused especially in her private area. The
unusual thickness of the buttocks of the accused upon frisking prompted Trayvilla to
notify her supervisor SPO3 Appang of the incident. The subsequent search of the
accused would only show that the two female friskers were just doing their usual task
when they found the illegal drugs inside accused’s underwear. This is bolstered by the
fact that the accused on the one hand and the two friskers on the other were unfamiliar
to each other. Neither could they harbour any ill-will against each other. The allegation
of frame-up and denial of the accused cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of
three prosecution witnesses who corroborated on circumstances surrounding the
apprehension (Positive evidence prevails over negative evidence). 
 
5. Cohabitation 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS EDUALINO G.R. No. 119072, 11 April
1997 
FACTS: Accused Jesus Edualino was charged with consummated rape of a pregnant
woman.  Prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Rowena Nantiza –
victim/complainant; Aileen Yayen – eyewitness; and Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia – medico-
legal. On the other hand, accused-appellant relies on alternative defenses of alibi and
consent on the part of complainant. While accused- appellant's defense before the trial
court alleges that he had left the scene of the incident together with defense witness
Calixto Flora, he alternatively raises before this Court the contention that the elements
of the crime of rape have not been established. Accused-appellant raises the issue of
the character of complainant Rowena Nantiza. It is argued that a responsible and
decent married woman, who was then three (3) months pregnant, would not be out at
two (2) o'clock in the morning getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a
man to accompany her to drink beer. It is contended that complainant merely
concocted the charge of rape to save her marriage since her husband had found out
that she was using drugs and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle of herself
when she tried to seduce accused-appellant on 11 May 1994 while she was under the
influence of drug and alcohol. 
ISSUE: Whether the accused may question his conviction by assailing the character of
the victim. 
RULING: It should be pointed out that the moral character of a rape victim is immaterial
in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The Court has ruled that prostitutes
can be the victims of rape. In the present case, even if accused-appellant's allegations
that the victim was drunk and under the influence of drugs and that she (the victim)
cannot be considered a decent and responsible married woman, were true, said
circumstances will not per se preclude a finding that she was raped. The Court has
repeatedly held that a medical examination of the victim is not a prerequisite in
prosecutions for rape. A person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the
testimony of the victim provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing and
otherwise consistent with human nature and the course of things. 
 * The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses pertain to
minor matters and are even badges that the witnesses were unrehearsed and honest.
- Minor inconsistencies in testimonies of witnesses do not affect credibility of the
testimony or of the witness himself
_______________
 
Thus, in response to your Quiz No. 8, the following is the suggested answer:
 
Question: Read FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY (FEBTC) vs. ROBERT MAR
CHANTE G.R. No. 170598, 9 October 2013. 
Answer the following questions: 
1.    What are the facts of the case? 
The instant complaint was filed by petitioner against Chante to recover from Chan the
principal sum of P770,488.30 representing the unpaid balance of the amount
fraudulently withdrawn from Chan’s ATM. FEBTC alleged that between 8:52 p.m. of May
4, 1992 and 4:06 a.m. of May 5, 1992, Chan had withdrawn funds totaling P967,000.00
from the PNB-MEGALINK ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel in Manila; that the
withdrawals were done in a series of 242 transactions with the use of the same
machine, at P4,000.00/withdrawal; and that the transactions were processed and
recorded by the respective computer systems of PNB and MEGALINK despite the
following circumstances, namely: (a) the offline status of the branch of account (FEBTC
Ongpin Branch); (b) Chan’s account balance being only P198,511.70 at the time; (c)
the maximum withdrawal limit of the ATM facility being P50,000.00/day; and (d) his
withdrawal transactions not being reflected in his account, and no debits or deductions
from his current account with the FEBTC Ongpin Branch being recorded. FEBTC
asserted further that defendant took advantage of a system bug which allowed the
excessive withdrawals. Chan denied liability and instead insisted that he had been
actually home at the time of the withdrawals. He alluded to a possible “inside job” as
the cause of the supposed withdrawals, citing a newspaper report to the effect that an
employee of FEBTC’s had admitted having debited accounts of its depositors by using
his knowledge of computers as well as information available to him. Chan claimed that
it would be physically impossible for any human being like him to stand long hours in
front of the ATM facility just to withdraw funds. 
2.    May the civil action be decided in favor of the plaintiff where the
defendant relies on bare and uncorroborated denial of the former’s
allegation? 
Answer: The answer is in the negative. The party who alleges an affirmative fact has
the burden of proving it because mere allegation of the fact is not evidence of it. Verily,
the party who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. In civil cases, the burden of
proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. This
is because our system frees the trier of facts from the responsibility of investigating and
presenting the facts and arguments, placing that responsibility entirely upon the
respective parties. The burden of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the
defendant, is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the
complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he
admits expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense
or defenses, that, if proved, would exculpate him from liability. Burden of proof is a
term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts, namely: (a) the risk of
non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden; and (b) the
duty of producing evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence, or
simply the production burden or the burden of evidence. In its first concept, it is the
duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or issue by such a quantum of
evidence as the law demands in the case at which the issue arises. In its other concept,
it is the duty of producing evidence at the beginning or at any subsequent stage of trial
in order to make or meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking, burden of proof in its
second concept passes from party to party as the case progresses, while in its first
concept it rests throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue. Being
the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead of upon the
weakness of Chan’s evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to preponderantly
demonstrate that his ATM card had been used to make the withdrawals, and that he
had used the ATM card and PIN by himself or by another person to make the fraudulent
withdrawals. Otherwise, it could not recover from him any funds supposedly improperly
withdrawn from the ATM account. 

1.    What are the facts of the case? 

Robert Chante was a current account depositor of Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTC)
and was issued a Far East Card that he can use to deposit and withdraw funds from his
account.
A complaint was filed by FEBTC to recover from Chante the amount of P770,488.30
which Chante allegedly withdrawn from the PNB-MEGALINK ATM facility located at the
Manila Pavilion Hotel in Manila. FEBTC alleged that the withdrawals were made in 242
transactions at P4,000.00/withdrawal. Also, that the transactions were recorded by the
computer systems of PNB and MEGALINK. Further, FEBTC asserted that Chante took
advantage of a system bug which allowed the excessive withdrawals.
On the other hand, Chante denied liability and he instead insisted that he was actually
at home during the time of the alleged withdrawals. He suggested that the supposed
withdrawals may be due to a possible “inside job” mentioning that a newspaper
reported that an employee of FEBTC’s had admitted having debited accounts of its
depositors by using his knowledge of computers as well as information available.
Further, Chante claimed that it would be physically impossible for him to stand long
hours at the ATM facility just to withdraw the subject amount.

2.    May the civil action be decided in favor of the plaintiff where the
defendant relies on bare and uncorroborated denial of the former’s
allegation? 
No.
In the subject case, the Supreme Court discuThe party who alleges an affirmative fact
has the burden of proving it because mere allegation of the fact is not evidence of the
same. The party who asserts not he who denies, must prove. In civil cases, the burden
of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side.
This is because our system frees the trier of facts from the responsibility of
investigating and presenting the facts and arguments, placing that responsibility entirely
upon the respective parties. The burden of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff
or the defendant, is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the
complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he
admits expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense
or defenses, that, if proved, would exculpate him from liability.
Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts,
namely: (a) the risk of nonpersuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply
persuasion burden; and (b) the duty of producing evidence, or the burden of going
forward with the evidence, or simply the production burden or the burden of evidence.
In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or issue by
such a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case at which the issue arises.
In its other concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at the beginning or at any
subsequent stage of trial in order to make or meet a prima facie case. Generally
speaking, burden of proof in its second concept passes from party to party as the case
progresses, while in its first concept it rests throughout upon the party asserting the
affirmative of the issue.
Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead of upon
the weakness of Chan’s evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to preponderantly
demonstrate that his ATM card had been used to make the withdrawals, and that he
had used the ATM card and PIN by himself or by another person to make the fraudulent
withdrawals. Otherwise, it could not recover from him any funds supposedly improperly
withdrawn from the ATM account.