SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 223274, June 19, 2019

RCBC BANKARD SERVICES CORPORATION, PETITIONER, v. MOISES ORACION,

JR. AND EMILY* L. ORACION, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court (Rules) filed by petitioner RCBC Bankard Services Corporation
(petitioner) assailing the Decision2 dated August 13, 2013 (RTC Decision) and the
Order3 dated March 1, 2016 (RTC Order) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig
City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 73756. The RTC Decision affirmed in toto the
Decision4 dated September 28, 2012 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig
City (MeTC) in Civil Case No. 18629, which dismissed the complaint of petitioner for
lack of preponderance of evidence.5 The RTC Order denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.6

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

The antecedent facts as gleaned from the MeTC Decision and narrated in the RTC
Decision are straightforward.

Respondents Moises Oracion, Jr. (Moises) and Emily L. Oracion (Emily) (collectively,
respondents) applied for and were granted by petitioner credit card accommodations
with the issuance of a Bankard PESO Mastercard Platinum 7 with Account No. 5243-
0205-8171-4007 (credit card) on December 2, 2010. 8 Respondents on various dates
used the credit card in purchasing different products but failed to pay petitioner the
total amount of P117,157.98, inclusive of charges and penalties or at least the
minimum amount due under the credit card.9 Petitioner attached to its complaint
against respondents "duplicate original" copies of the Statements of Account from April
17, 2011 to December 15, 201110 (SOAs, Annexes "A", "A-l" to "A-8") and the Credit
History Inquiry (Annex "B").11 The SOAs bear the name of Moises as the addressee and
the Credit History Inquiry bears the name: "MR ORACION JR M A" on the top
portion.12 Despite the receipt of the SOAs, respondents failed and refused to comply
with their obligation to petitioner under the credit card. 13 Consequently, petitioner sent
a written demand letter (dated January 26, 2012, Annex "C" to the complaint 14) to
respondents but despite receipt thereof, respondents refused to comply with their
obligation to petitioner.15 Hence, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money 16 dated
February 7, 2012 before the MeTC.17

Acting on the complaint, the MeTC issued summons on March 13, 2012. 18 Based on the
return of the summons dated April 12, 2012 of Sheriff III Inocentes P. Villasquez, the
summons was duly effected to respondents through substituted service on April 11,
2012.19 For failure of respondents to file their answer within the required period, the
MeTC motu proprio, pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure,
considered the case submitted for resolution. 20
Ruling of the MeTC

The MeTC, without delving into the merits of the case, dismissed it on the ground that
petitioner, as the plaintiff, failed to discharge the required burden of proof in a civil
case, which is to establish its case by preponderance of evidence. 21 The MeTC justified
the dismissal in this wise:
Perusal of the records shows that the signature in the attachments in support of the
[complaint] are mere photocopies, stamp mark22 in the instant case. The Best Evidence
Rule provides that the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely
substitutionary in its nature, such as stamp mark, as long as the original evidence can
be had. Absent a clear showing that the original writing has been lost, destroyed or
cannot be produced in court; the photocopies must be disregarded being unworthy of
any probative value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence (PHILIPPINE BANKING
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LEONILO MARCOS,
respondents, G.R. No 127469 2004 Jan 15, 1st Division). 23
The decretal portion of the MeTC Decision dated September 28, 2012 reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of [preponderance of evidence, herein [complaint] is hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.24
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal25 dated December 17, 2012 on the ground that the
MeTC Decision was contrary to the facts and law.26

In its Memorandum for Appellant27 dated February 19, 2012, petitioner argued that
what it attached to the complaint were the "duplicate original copies" and not mere
photocopies.28 Petitioner also argued that:
x x x [if for] unknown reasons or events the said Duplicate Original Copies were no
longer found in the record of the court or that the copy of the Complaint intended for
the court, where these Originals were attached, was not forwarded to the x x x MTC,
[petitioner] respectfully submits that justice and equity dictates that the x x x MTC
should have required [petitioner] to produce or reproduce the same instead of
immediately dismissing the case on that ground alone. In which case, a clarificatory
hearing for that purpose is proper. This is especially true in the present case
considering that there were allegations in the complaint that the Duplicate Original
Copies were attached as annexes therein; and that the x x x MTC motu proprio
submitted the case for decision. Not to mention the fact that these documents are
computer generated reports, in which case,  [petitioner] could simply present another
set of printed Duplicate Original Copies for the x x x MTC['s] perusal. 29
Ruling of the RTC

The RTC found petitioner's appeal to be without merit.30 It reasoned out that:
In the instant case, it is up to [petitioner] to prove that the attachments in support of
the complaint are originals and not merely substitutionary in nature. Only after
submission of such original documents can the court delve into the merit of the case.

[Petitioner's] insistence that it attached Duplicate Original Copies of the [SOAs] and the
Credit History Inquiry as Annexes x x x in its complaint is entirely for naught, as such
documents could not be considered as original.
A perusal of the said annexes would show that there is a stamp mark at the bottom
right portion of each page of the said annexes, with the words "DUPLICATE ORIGINAL
(signature) CHARITO O. HAM, Senior Manager, Collection Support Division Head,
Collection Group, Bankard Inc."

Further inspection of the said stamp marks would reveal that the signatures appearing
at the top of the name CHARITO O. HAM in the respective annexes are not original
signatures but are part of the subject stamp marks.

Indeed, Annexes "A", "A-1" to "A-8" and "B", attached to the complaint, cannot be
considered as original documents contemplated under Section 3, Rule 130 of the x x x
Rules of Court. In fact, even [petitioner] found the need to stamp mark them as
"DUPLICATE ORIGINAL" to differentiate them from the original documents.

The Court also noted the fact that [petitioner] filed a MANIFESTATION dated August 9,
2012, attaching therewith as Annexes "A", "A-1" to "A-8" the Duplicate Original
Itemized [SOAs], and as Annex "B" the Credit History Inquiry. Upon examination of
these latter annexes, the Court observed that they are merely photocopies of the
annexes attached to the complaint, but with a mere addition of stamp marks bearing
the same inscription as the first stamp marks. These only demonstrate that whenever
[petitioner] describes a document as "DUPLICATE ORIGINAL", it only refers to a copy of
the document and not necessarily the original thereof. Such substitutionary documents
could not be given probative value and are inadmissible pieces of evidence. 31
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision dated August 13, 2013 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding no cogent reason to disturb the
Decision of the [MeTC] dated September 28, 2012, said DECISION is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.32
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 33 dated August 29, 2013, which was denied
by the RTC in its Order34 dated March 1, 2016.

Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition. The Court in its Resolution 35 dated June 27, 2016
required respondents to comment on the Petition and directed the Branch Clerk of
Court of the RTC to elevate the complete records of Civil Case No. 73756, which were
subsequently received by the Court. In view of the returned and unserved copy of the
Resolution dated June 27, 2016, the Court in its Resolution 36 dated June 6, 2018
dispensed with respondents' comment.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. on pure question of law, whether the RTC erred in affirming the MeTC's dismissal of
petitioner's complaint in that pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC), an electronic document is to be regarded as an
original thereof under the Best Evidence Rule and thus, with the presented evidence in
"original duplicate copies," petitioner has preponderantly proven   respondents' unpaid
obligation; and
2.       in any event, invoking the rule that technicalities must yield to substantial
justice, whether petitioner must be afforded the opportunity to rectify its mistake, offer
additional evidence and/or present to the court another set of direct print-outs of the
electronic documents.

The Court's Ruling

On the first issue, petitioner invokes for the first time on appeal the Rules on
Electronic Evidence to justify its position that it has preponderantly proven its claim for
unpaid obligation against respondents because it had attached to its complaint
electronic documents. Petitioner argues that since electronic documents, which are
computer-generated, accurately representing information, data, figures and/or other
modes of written expression, creating or extinguishing a right or obligation, when
directly printed out are considered original reproductions of the same, they are
admissible under the Best Evidence Rule.37 Petitioner explains that since the
attachments to its complaint are wholly computer-generated print-outs which it caused
to be reproduced directly from the computer, they qualify as electronic documents
which should be regarded as the equivalent of the original documents pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence. 38

Procedurally, petitioner cannot adopt a new theory in its appeal before the Court and
abandon its theory in its appeal before the RTC. Pursuant to Section 15, Rule 44 of the
Rules, petitioner may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact
that has been raised in the court below and is within the issues framed by the parties.

In the Memorandum for Appellant which it filed before the RTC, petitioner did not raise
the Rules on Electronic Evidence to justify that the so-called "duplicate original copies"
of the SOAs and Credit History Inquiry are electronic documents. Rather, it insisted that
they were duplicate original copies, being computer-generated reports, and not mere
photocopies or substitutionary evidence, as found by the MeTC. As observed by the
RTC, petitioner even tried to rectify the attachments (annexes) to its complaint, by
filing a Manifestation dated August 9, 2012 wherein it attached copies of the said
annexes. Unfortunately, as observed by the RTC, the attachments to the said
Manifestation "are merely photocopies of the annexes attached to the complaint, but
with a mere addition of stamp marks bearing the same inscription as the first stamp
marks"39that were placed in the annexes to the complaint. Because petitioner has not
raised the electronic document argument before the RTC, it may no longer be raised
nor ruled upon on appeal.

Even in the complaint, petitioner never intimated that it intended the annexes to be
considered as electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence. If
such were petitioner's intention, then it would have laid down in the complaint the basis
for their introduction and admission as electronic documents.

Also, estoppel bars a party from raising issues, which have not been raised in the
proceedings before the lower courts, for the first time on appeal. 40 Clearly, petitioner,
by its acts and representations, is now estopped to claim that the annexes to its
complaint are not duplicate original copies but electronic documents. It is too late in the
day for petitioner to switch theories.
Thus, procedurally, the Court is precluded from resolving the first issue.

Even assuming that the Court brushes aside the above-noted procedural obstacles, the
Court cannot just concede that the pieces of documentary evidence in question are
indeed electronic documents, which according to the Rules on Electronic Evidence are
considered functional equivalent of paper-based documents 41 and regarded as the
equivalent of original documents under the Best Evidence Rule if they are print-outs or
outputs readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately. 42

For the Court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must pass the test of
admissibility. According to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "[a]n
electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on
admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in
the manner prescribed by these Rules."

Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence lays down the authentication process of
electronic documents. Section 1 of Rule 5 imposes upon the party seeking to introduce
an electronic document in any legal proceeding the burden of proving its authenticity in
the manner provided therein. Section 2 of Rule 5 sets forth the required proof of
authentication:
SEC. 2. Manner of authentication. - Before any private electronic document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the
following means:

(a)    by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have
signed the same;

(b)    by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be

authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents
were applied to the document; or

(c)    by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the
judge.
As to method of proof, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides:
SECTION 1. Affidavit of evidence. - All matters relating to the admissibility and
evidentiary weight of an electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating
facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiant or based on authentic records. The
affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to testify on the matters
contained therein.
Evidently, petitioner could not have complied with the Rules on Electronic Evidence
because it failed to authenticate the supposed electronic documents through the
required affidavit of evidence. As earlier pointed out, what petitioner had in mind at the
inception (when it filed the complaint) was to have the annexes admitted as duplicate
originals as the term is understood in relation to paper-based documents. Thus, the
annexes or attachments to the complaint of petitioner are inadmissible as electronic
documents, and they cannot be given any probative value.

Even the section on "Business Records as Exception to the Hearsay Rule" of Rule 8 of
the Rules on Electronic Evidence requires authentication by the custodian or other
qualified witness:
SECTION 1. Inapplicability of the hearsay rule. - A memorandum, report, record or data
compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by electronic,
optical or other similar means at or near the time of or from transmission or supply of
information by a person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the regular course or
conduct of a business activity, and such was the regular practice to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation by electronic, optical or similar
means, all of which are shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witnesses, is excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence.
In the absence of such authentication through the affidavit of the custodian or other
qualified person, the said annexes or attachments cannot be admitted and appreciated
as business records and excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence. Consequently, the
annexes to the complaint fall within the Rule on Hearsay Evidence and are to be
excluded pursuant to Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules.

In fine, both the MeTC and the RTC correctly applied the Best Evidence Rule. They
correctly regarded the annexes to the complaint as mere photocopies of the SOAs and
the Credit History Inquiry, and not necessarily the original thereof. Being
substitutionary documents, they could not be given probative value and are
inadmissible based on the Best Evidence Rule.

The Best Evidence Rule, which requires the presentation of the original document, is
unmistakable:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:

(a)    When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b)    When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c)    When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d)   When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office. (2a)43
With respect to paper-based documents, the original of a document, i.e., the original
writing, instrument, deed, paper, inscription, or memorandum, is one the contents of
which are the subject of the inquiry.44 Under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, an
electronic document is regarded as the functional equivalent of an original document
under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other
means, shown to reflect the data accurately.45 As defined, "electronic document" refers
to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and
affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically; and it includes digitally signed documents and any print-out or
output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document.46 The term "electronic document" may be used
interchangeably with "electronic data message"47 and the latter refers to information
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means. 48

Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules and Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence identify the following instances when copies of a document are equally
regarded as originals:
[1] When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time,
with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.

[2] When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from
another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally
regarded as originals.49

[3] When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time with
identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original,
or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical
reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the
original, such copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original. 50
Apparently, "duplicate original copies" or "multiple original copies" wherein two or more
copies are executed at or about the same time with identical contents are contemplated
in 1 and 3 above. If the copy is generated after the original is executed, it may be
called a "print-out or output" based on the definition of an electronic document, or a
"counterpart" based on Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.

It is only when the original document is unavailable that secondary evidence may be
allowed pursuant to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules, which provides:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. - When the original document has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
Going back to the documents in question, the fact that a stamp with the markings:
DUPLICATE ORIGINAL

(Sgd.)
CHARITO O. HAM
Senior Manager
Collection Support Division Head

Collection group
Bankard Inc.51
was placed at the right bottom of each page of the SOAs and the Credit History
Inquiry did not make them "duplicate original copies" as described above. The
necessary allegations to qualify them as "duplicate original copies" must be stated in
the complaint and duly supported by the pertinent affidavit of the qualified
person.
The Court observes that based on the records of the case, only the signature in the
stamp at the bottom of the Credit History Inquiry appears to be original. The signatures
of the "certifying" person in the SOAs are not original but part of the stamp. Thus, even
if all the signatures of Charito O. Ham, Senior Manager, Collection Support Division
Head of petitioner's Collection Group are original, the required authentication so that
the annexes to the complaint can be considered as "duplicate original copies" will still
be lacking.

If petitioner intended the annexes to the complaint as electronic documents, then the
proper allegations should have been made in the complaint and the required proof of
authentication as "print-outs", "outputs" or "counterparts" should have been complied
with.

The Court is aware that the instant case was considered to be governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, which does not expressly require that the affidavits of the witness
must accompany the complaint or the answer and it is only after the receipt of the
order in connection with the preliminary conference and within 10 days therefrom,
wherein the parties are required to submit the affidavits of the parties' witnesses and
other evidence on the factual issues defined in   the order, together with their position
papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them. 52

Given the nature of the documents that petitioner needed to adduce in order to prove
its cause of action, it would have been prudent on the part of its lawyer, to make the
necessary allegations in the complaint and attach thereto the required accompanying
affidavits to lay the foundation for their admission as evidence in conformity with the
Best Evidence Rule.

This prudent or cautionary action may avert a dismissal of the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence, as what happened in this case, when the court acts pursuant
to Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides:
SEC. 6. Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint
within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff,
shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and
limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided, however, That the court may in its
discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for being
excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the applicability of
Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants.
As provided in the said Section, the judgment that is to be rendered is that which is
"warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint" and such facts must be duly
established in accordance with the Rules on Evidence.

Upon a perusal of the items in the SOAs, the claim of petitioner against respondents is
less than P100,000.00,53  if the late charges and interest charges are deducted from the
total claim of P117,157.98. Given that the action filed by petitioner is for payment of
money where the value of the claim does not exceed P100,000.00 (the jurisdictional
amount when the complaint was filed in January 2013), exclusive of interest and costs,
petitioner could have opted to prosecute its cause under the Revised Rules of Procedure
for Small Claims Cases (Revised Rules for Small Claims).
Section 6 of the Revised Rules for Small Claims provides: "A small claims action is
commenced by filing with the court an accomplished and verified Statement of Claim
(Form 1-SCC) in duplicate, accompanied by a Certification Against Forum Shopping,
Splitting a Single Cause of Action, and Multiplicity of Suits (Form 1-A-SCC), and two (2)
duly certified photocopies of the actionable document/s subject of the claim, as well as
the affidavits of witnesses and other evidence to support the claim. No evidence shall
be allowed during the hearing which was not attached to or submitted together with the
Statement of Claim, unless good cause is shown for the admission of additional
evidence."

If petitioner took this option, then it would have been incumbent upon it to attach to its
Statement of Claim even the affidavits of its witnesses. If that was the option that
petitioner took, then maybe its complaint might not have been dismissed for lack of
preponderance of evidence. Unfortunately, petitioner included the late and interest
charges in its claim and prosecuted its cause under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Proceeding to the second issue, petitioner begs for the relaxation of the application of
the Rules on Evidence and seeks the Court's equity jurisdiction.

Firstly, petitioner cannot, on one hand, seek the review of its case by the Court on a
pure question of law and afterward, plead that the Court, on equitable grounds, grant
its Petition, nonetheless. For the Court to exercise its equity jurisdiction, certain facts
must be presented to justify the same. A review on a pure question of law necessarily
negates the review of facts.

Petitioner has not presented any compelling equitable arguments to persuade the Court
to relax the application of elementary evidentiary rules in its cause.

Secondly, petitioner has not been candid in admitting its error as pointed out by both
the MeTC and the RTC. After being apprised that the annexes to its complaint do not
conform to the Best Evidence Rule, petitioner did not make any effort to comply so that
the lower courts could have considered its claim. Rather, it persisted in insisting that
the annexes are compliant. Even before the Court, petitioner did not even attach
such documents which would convince the Court that petitioner could adduce
the original documents as required by the Best Evidence Rule to prove its
claim against respondents.

A Final Note

The present Petition is clearly a frivolous appeal. An appeal is frivolous if it presents no

justiciable question and is so readily recognizable as devoid of any merit on the face of
the record that there is little, if any, prospect that it can ever succeed. 54 The Petition
indubitably shows the counsel's frantic search for any ground to resuscitate petitioner's
lost cause, which due to the counsel's fault was doomed with the filing of a deficient
complaint.55 Thus, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 142 of the Rules the imposition of treble
costs on petitioner, to be paid by its counsel, is justified.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated August 13, 2013 and
the Order dated March 1, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City in Civil
Case No. 73756 are AFFIRMED. Treble costs are hereby charged against the counsel
for petitioner RCBC Bankard Services Corporation. Let a copy of this Decision be
attached to the personal records of Atty. Xerxes E. Cortel in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, J., Chairperson, Perlas-Bernabe, J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.