Charles Jelavich - Barbara Jelavich - The Establishment of The Balkan National States, 1804-1920-University of Washington Press (1986)

A History of East Central Europe
VOLUMES IN T H E SERIES
I. The Beginnings of History in East Central Europe

BY MARIJA GIMBUTAS
II. Byzantium and the Balkans in the Middle Ages, 400-1453

BY SPEROS VRYONIS, JR.
III. Northeast Central Europe in the High Middle Ages, 1000-1530

BY IMRE BOBA
IV. Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 1000-1795

BY ANDRZEJ KAMINSKI
V. Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804

BY PETER F. SUGAR
VI. The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands, 1526-1918

BY ROBERT A. KANN AND ZDENEK DAVID
VII. The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918

BY PIOTR S. WANDYCZ
VIII. The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920

BY CHARLES AND BARBARA JELAVICH
IX. East Central Europe between the Two World Wars

BY JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD
X. East Central Europe since 1939

BY WAYNE S. VUCINICH AND LUCIEN KARCHMAR
XI. Historical Atlas, General Index, and Bibliography

VOLUME VIII
The Establishment of the Balkan

National States, 1 8 0 4 -1 9 2 0
A HISTORY OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPE
VOLUME VIII
EDITORS
P eter F. S ugar
University o f Washington
D onald W. T readgold
University o f Washington
T he Establishment
o f the Balkan National
States, 1804-1920
CHARLES and BARBARA JELAVICH
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON PRESS

Seattle and London
Copyright © 1977 by the University of Washington Press
Printed in the United States of America
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Jelavich, Charles.
The establishment of the Balkan national states,
1804-1920.
(A history of East Central Europe ; v. 8)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Balkan Peninsula—Politics and government.
2. Eastern question (Balkan) I. Jelavich, Barbara
Brightfield, joint author. II. Title. III. Series:
Sugar, Peter F. A history of East Central Europe ; v. 8.
DJK4. S93 vol. 8 [DR43] 949s [949.6] 76-49162
ISBN 0-295-95444-2
Foreword
The systematic study of the history of East Central Europe outside the
region itself began only in the last generation or two. For the most part
historians in the region have preferred to write about the past of only
their own countries. Hitherto no comprehensive history of the area as a
whole has appeared in any language.
This series was conceived as a means of providing the scholar who
does not specialize in East Central European history and the student
who is considering such specialization with an introduction to the sub
ject and a survey of knowledge deriving from previous publications. In
some cases it has been necessary to carry out new research simply to be
able to survey certain topics and periods. Common objectives and the
procedures appropriate to attain them have been discussed by the au
thors of the individual volumes and by the coeditors. It is hoped that a
certain commensurability will be the result, so that the eleven volumes
will constitute a unit and not merely an assemblage of writings. How
ever, matters of interpretation and point of view have remained en
tirely the responsibility of the individual authors.
No volume deals with a single country. The aim has been to identify
geographical or political units that were significant during the period in
question, rather than to interpret the past in accordance with latter-day
sentiments or aspirations.
The limits of “East Central Europe,” for the purposes of this series,
are the eastern linguistic frontier of German- and Italian-speaking peo
ples on the west, and the political borders of Russia/the USSR on the
east. Those limits are not precise, even within the period covered by
any given volume of the series. The appropriateness of including the
Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians
was considered, and it was decided not to attempt to cover them sys
tematically, though they appear repeatedly in these books. Treated in
vii
viii Foreword
depth are the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Hungarians, Romanians, Yugo
slav peoples, Albanians, Bulgarians, and Greeks.
There has been an effort to apportion attention equitably among
regions and periods. Three volumes deal with the area north of the
Danube-Sava line, three with the area south of it, and four with both
areas. Four treat premodern history, six modern times. The eleventh
consists of an historical atlas and a bibliography of the entire subject.
Each volume is supplied with a bibliographical essay of its own, but we
all have attempted to keep the scholarly apparatus at a minimum in
order to make the text of the volumes more readable and accessible to
the broader audience sought.
The coeditors wish to express their thanks to the Ford Foundation
for the financial support it gave this venture, and to the Institute of
Comparative and Foreign Area Studies (formerly Far Eastern and Rus
sian Institute) and its three successive directors, George E. Taylor,
George M. Beckmann, and Herbert J. Ellison, under whose encourage
ment the project has moved close to being realized.
The whole undertaking has been longer in the making than origi
nally planned. Two of the original list of projected authors died before
they could finish their volumes and have been replaced. Volumes of
the series are being published as the manuscripts are received. We
hope that the usefulness of the series justifies the long agony of its con
ception and birth, that it will increase knowledge of and interest in the
rich past and the many-sided present of East Central Europe among
those everywhere who read English, and that it will serve to stimulate
further study and research on the numerous aspects of this area’s his
tory that still await scholarly investigators.
Peter F. Sugar
Donald W. T readgold
T his narrative deals primarily with the modern history of seven Balkan
peoples—the Albanians, Bulgarians, Croatians, Greeks, Romanians,
Serbians, and Slovenes—all of whom have a historical base of equal or
greater antiquity than that of the western European states. The oldest
are the Greeks, who claim an unbroken historical and cultural tradition
of over four thousand years. Next come the Illyrians, the ancestors of
the Albanians, who migrated into the peninsula at approximately the
same time, the second millennium b . c. Third are the Romanians, de
scribed by their historians as the descendants of the Dacians and of
Romans who controlled the province from a. d . 106 to 271. At the end
of the sixteenth century a medieval Romanian kingdom under Michael
the Brave embraced territories roughly equivalent to those of the mod
ern state. 9
The other four peoples, the Slavic population, settled in the penin
sula after the sixth century. The Bulgarians, whose name comes from a
group of Finno-Tartar invaders who first conquered and then were ab
sorbed by the Slavic inhabitants, experienced two periods of medieval
grandeur. The First Bulgarian Empire reached its peak in the reign of
Simeon from 893 to 927; the Second Empire, in that of John Äsen II
from 1218 to 1241. The Serbs can look back to a similar period of
greatness and power, which reached its height during the reign of
Stevan Dusan from 1331 to 1355. During the Middle Ages the Serbs,
Greeks, Romanians, Bulgarians, and some Albanians also shared the
experience of conversion to Christianity from the same Byzantine cen
ter. Thus, in modern times they all were, like Russia, members of the
Orthodox church.
In contrast, the Croats and Slovenes became Catholic and henceforth
were to remain culturally linked with the West. Like the other Balkan
peoples described, Croatia too had an independent kingdom which
IX
X Preface
came into existence in the tenth century. In 1102, however, after the
dynasty had died out and the state was defeated by the Magyars, the
Croatian nobility signed the Pacta Conventa with Hungary. In this doc
ument they recognized the king of Hungary as the ruler of the Triune
Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, but they retained the
right to administer their lands. For a brief period during the seventh
century the Slovenes, too, had an independent state, but it soon fell
under German rule. In the thirteenth ând fourteenth centuries Albania
enjoyed periods of independence or semi-independence as a prin
cipality.
Unlike the western European medieval states, the historical continuity
of Balkan national development was interrupted by a long period of
subjugation to outside rule. The Ottoman conquest was the great event
that shaped the future life of all of the Balkan people. Two dates have
particular symbolic significance in this regard. In 1389 at the Battle of
Kosovo an army of Serbs, aided by Bosnians, Croatians, Bulgarians,
and Albanians, was decisively defeated by the Ottoman forces. In 1453
Constantinople fell, thus bringing to an end the thousand-year Byzan
tine Empire. Thereafter, until the nineteenth century, the Balkan na
tionalities lived under a foreign rule. It should be emphasized that this
period of almost five centuries marked the submergence but never the
complete annihilation of national awareness. The Ottoman government
did not attempt to assimilate or destroy the Christian people. Although
the Balkan kingdoms disappeared, national identity was preserved
through the church, the languages, and popular culture. The memory
of the past was never completely erased. As shall be seen, the first step
in the national revival of each nationality was the resurrection of the
glories of the ancient or medieval history of their people by writers and
historians.
In the following pages, therefore, we will be dealing with the national
development of peoples with a long historical heritage, whose political
evolution was halted by a foreign conquest. In addition, the Ottoman
domination removed the region and its inhabitants from Western Eu
ropean influence, except in an indirect manner, as, for example,
through Venice, for over four centuries. The great strides made in the
West were consequently not reflected in the peninsula. The nineteenth
century was thus to witness not only the revival of national feeling
among the Balkan peoples, but also the growth of awareness of their
economic, social, and political backwardness and the first attempts to
remedy this situation.
In this book the authors have attempted to adhere to the statement
in the editors’ foreword and to present an introduction to the subject to
the “scholar who does not specialize in East Central European history
and the student who is considering such a specialization.” The foot
Preface XI
notes, in keeping with the policy of the series, have been held to a mini
mum. In addition, the books discussed in the bibliographical essay are
almost exclusively in English, although the text itself is based primarily
on works in other languages. The final volume in the series will contain
a historical atlas and complete bibliography.
The spelling of names and geographic points in this study has pre
sented certain problems because of the multiplicity of languages and
the variety of forms used both in the nineteenth century and at
present. Complete consistency has not been possible, but usually mod
ern spelling has been adopted unless a person or place is better known
under another form. Constantinople, not Istanbul, has been employed as
the name of the Ottoman capital because it was the word regularly used
throughout the nineteenth century. In general, the Library of
Congress system of transliteration, with modifications, has been used
for Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian. Albanian, Romanian, and Turkish
names follow their national forms unless they are better known in Eng
lish in another spelling. At times, alternative versions are given, e.g.,
Bitola (Monastir), Durrës (Durazzo). Thus, for example, whereas the
city is called Bitola, it is the vilayet of Monastir. First names are usually,
but not always, anglicized. The authors recognize that some may dis
agree with their individual decisions in this matter, but they have tried
to use the forms most readily understandable to English-speaking
readers and ones which are most commonly used.
The authors are greatly indebted to their friends and colleagues who
have kindly consented to read this manuscript. They are most grateful
for the comments and criticisms which they have received on what are
often controversial and complicated matters. All or a major part of the
manuscript was read by Professors Keith Hitchins, University of Illi
nois; John R. Lampe, University of Maryland; John A. Petropulos,
Amherst College; Marin V. Pundeff, California State University,
Northridge; Traian Stoianovich, Rutgers University; and Wayne S. Vu-
cinich, Stanford University. Professor Roderic H. Davison, George
Washington University, and Professor Stanford J. Shaw, University of
California, Los Angeles, read specific parts dealing with the Ottoman
Empire. Professor Stavro Skendi, Columbia University, commented on
the chapter on Albania. Professors Willis R. Barnstone and Ante Kadic,
Indiana University, assisted with the chapter on culture.
The authors would also like to express their gratitude to Professor
Michael B. Petrovich, University of Wisconsin, for having allowed them
to read the manuscript of his excellent study, which is now published in
two volumes entitled A History of Modem Serbia, 1804-1918 (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976). In addition, we appreciate the valu
able suggestions of Professors Peter F. Sugar and Donald W.
Treadgold, the editors of this series. We also wish to thank our two col
XU Preface
leagues Professor Norman J. G. Pounds, who drafted the maps, and
Mr. John M. Hollingsworth, who prepared them. Nancy Weil compiled
the index.
Finally, Mark and Peter Jelavich have both read the entire manu
script and have offered important contributions.
C harles and B arbara J elavich
Contents
1. The Ottoman Background. 3
2. The Serbian Revolution 26
3. The Greek Revolution 38
4. The Autonomous Serbian State 53
5. The Greek Kingdom 68
6. Wallachia and Moldavia before 1853 84
7. The Ottoman Empire to 1876: the Reforms 99
8. The United Principalities to 1876 114
9. The Bulgarian National Movement to 1876 128
10. The Crisis of the Seventies 141
11. Autonomous Bulgaria to 1896 158
12. The Balkan States: Internal Political Developments to 1914 170
13. The Expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from Europe 207
14. The Establishment of Albania 222
15. Balkan Nationalities in the Habsburg Empire 235

xiii
xiv Contents
16. Balkan Cultural Developments 266
17. The First World War 284
18. The Postwar Settlements 298
19. Conclusion 320
Bibliographic Essay 329
Index 345
Maps
1. The Ottoman Empire, 1815 21

2. The Straits 24
3. The Expansion of Serbia, 1804-1913 57
4. The Expansion of Greece, 1821-1919 79
5. The Expansion of Romania, 1861-1920 126
6. The Treaty of San Stefano; The Congress of Berlin 154
7. The Expansion of Bulgaria, 1878-1919 166
8. The Macedonian Contested Zone, 1913 218
9. Albania, 1913 231
10. The Habsburg Military Frontier 249
11. The Balkan States, 1914 262
12. The Formation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes,
1920 ' 303
13. The Balkans after World War I 317
XV
VOLUME VIII
The Establishment of the Balkan

,
National States 1 8 0 4 -1 9 2 0
CHAPTER 1
The Ottoman Background
G eneral Conditions of Life

A t the beginning of the nineteenth century the greater proportion of
the Balkan territories formed part of the Ottoman Empire. Stretching
over a wide expanse that embraced Asian, African, and European lands,
this state occupied a strategic position which made its fate a matter of
vital concern to all of the great powers. Within its European territories,
comprising about 238,000 square miles and containing approximately 9
million people, the Ottoman government controlled a predominandy
Christian population. Although these people were governed under a
system, unique in Europe, which divided them according to their re
ligious affiliation, an Ottoman administrative network nevertheless cov
ered the peninsula.
The area was divided into five provinces: Rumelia, Bosnia, Silistria,
Djezair (including the Peloponnesus and the Greek islands), and Crete.
These were in turn organized into nine subdivisions: Rumelia, Bosnia,
Belgrade, Shkodër (Scutari), Janina, Negropont, the Morea (Pelopon
nesus), Candia (Crete), and the Archipelago. Certain areas with wide
rights of self-government were also attached to the empire: for instance,
the two Romanian provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia and some Creek
islands. This pattern underwent many changes in the nineteenth cen
tury. Each of these divisions was staffed by Ottoman officials appointed
from Constantinople. The administrative head of each was usually sup
ported by a council (divan) of assistants and by a hierarchy of state of
ficials, including judges, tax collectors, police, and military officers. The
primary concern of these men was the defense of the empire, the collec
tion of taxes, the maintenance of public order, and the affairs of the
Muslim inhabitants. Cities, towns, and villages also had similar officials.
Although this Ottoman administration exerted a great deal of direct
influence on all of the Balkan people, the Christian communities in fact
3
4 T he Establishment of the B alkan N ational States
enjoyed a large measure of autonomy through the system of church and
local government adopted by the Ottoman conquerors. Considering
themselves primarily as Muslims, they preferred to organize their em
pire according to the religious affiliation of their subjects. They thus es
tablished four major administrative divisions, called “millets,” for their
Orthodox, Gregorian Armenian, Roman Catholic, and Jewish popula
tion. There was also a Muslim millet, and a Protestant organization was
recognized in the middle of the nineteenth century. Although other
religions were accepted or tolerated, particularly Christianity and Ju
daism, they were in no sense regarded as equal. An individual in the em
pire could not join the ruling strata or hold a high position in the politi
cal or military hierarchy unless he were Muslim. Although no really
determined efforts were made to convert the Balkan peoples, certain
areas, in particular Bosnia, Hercegovina, Crete, Albania, and sections in
the Rhodope Mountains, did become predominantly Muslim. Their in
habitants then enjoyed the privileges reserved for their faith.
The majority of the population of the Balkan Peninsula, however,
remained with their church and therefore belonged to the Orthodox
millet. As such they fell under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Con
stantinople, who was regarded as an agent of the Ottoman government.
He and his administration represented and spoke for the Orthodox
population in its dealings with the Muslim authorities. On the local level
they had jurisdiction over all legal and moral matters affecting their peo
ple. The main general effect of this system was the preservation both of
national divisions that had existed before the Ottoman conquest and of
local particularism. Through much of the Ottoman period the higher
church administration was divided along national lines. The Greeks be
came predominant at Constantinople, where the patriarch was the high
est ecclesiastical official of the Orthodox world, but the Serbs could look
to their patriarchate at Pec and the Bulgars to an archbishopric at Ohrid.
Despite this separation the Orthodox church as a whole did preserve a
spirit of Christian unity against Islam. The faithful were taught that they
had lost their freedom because of their sins, but that the day would come
when their church would emerge triumphant.
In addition to the millet the Balkan Christians had much control over
their own affairs on the local level. Although conditions varied widely
throughout the peninsula, usually the peasant communities enjoyed a
degree of autonomy under their own notables, who were called, among
other titles, kodza-bashi in Greece, staresina in Serbia, and chorbadzhiia in
Bulgaria. These men were either elected or appointed from among the
leading and generally more prosperous members of the community.
Their relative wealth rested on agriculture, trade, or tax farming. In
general they represented their villages to the provincial Muslim adminis
tration and were responsible to that authority for tax collection and the
The Ottoman Background 5
maintenance of law and order. Like the church officials, the notables
were part of Ottoman political life. Some areas, such as the Pelopon
nesus, enjoyed virtual autonomy; others, such as the Bulgarian lands,
felt Ottoman control more strongly.
Along with these separate political authorities the Christian was also
subject to three legal systems. At the top Muslim law applied to all
members of that faith and any matters involving Christians and Mus
lims. The ecclesiastical law of the millet regulated, in particular, ques
tions dealing with the family, such as marriage and morals. In time cus
tomary local law came to hold precedence in some communities. Here,
as in other facets of Balkan life, secular interests tended to gain strength
at the expense of the church.
In the local communides conditions were also favorable for the preser
vation, at least in a dormant form, of national divisions. The Ottoman
destruction of the former Balkan states and their ruling classes pro
duced a situation in which the Christian thereafter tended to identify
himself with and give his first allegiance to his own family, his village and
his church. After the establishment of Ottoman rule no effort was made
either to destroy or to unify the divergent elements of the peninsula.
Before the nineteenth century no attempts were made to provide a legal,
political, or cultural basis for a common Ottoman citizenship embracing
all of the diverse elements of the state. National and local particularism
was enforced and increased. In some localities Muslim, Serbian, Bulgar
ian, and Greek villages existed side by side for centuries with little or no
cultural or personal intermixing. In the towns the different peoples
lived in their own quarters. When in the nineteenth century the Ot
toman government tried to introduce the principles of the modern Eu
ropean state system, the attempt foundered because the empire had
been organized on quite a different basis during the previous four cen
turies.
Although the Balkan nationalities themselves tended to remain apart,
certainly the greatest division in the population was that between a privi
leged minority, the Muslims, and the majority, the Orthodox Christians.
In the decaying Ottoman Empire individual Muslims often suffered as
much as their Christian counterparts did from bad government, but
they still enjoyed important basic privileges, such as a far better chance
in court, fewer taxes, and a recognized superior status. The Christian
population was fully aware of the difference of its position. General
izations are difficult to make since conditions differed widely through
out the peninsula and changed with time. Christians, however, usually
were supposed to observe certain prohibitions that were as galling to
their personal pride as to their material interests. For instance, in theory
they could not bear firearms, wear conspicuous or rich clothes, or don
the color green, sacred to the Muslims. They were supposed to dismount
when passing a Muslim on horseback; their houses could not be richer
than or overlook those of their Muslim neighbors. Christian churches
could not have bells or belltowers; new churches were not to be built, but
old ones could be repaired. Despite the fact that by the nineteenth cen
tury many of these measures were no longer enforced, the Christian
remained in a distinct and recognized inferior position. It was perhaps
this aspect of Ottoman rule that was most resented by the subject popu
lation.
Next to the question of status, the tax burden that he was forced to
shoulder made the Balkan peasant most discontented with his lot. The
fact that by the nineteenth century the empire was not economically
prosperous and had few of the basic prerequisites for healthy develop
ment made this condition more difficult to bear. Although the Christian
was not required, indeed not usually allowed, to join the military forces,
he was expected to provide the tax support for them and the other func
tions of the state. The Christian peasant thus paid taxes on the produce
of his land and home industry and on his personal possessions, as well as
a special head tax levied on all male Christians in place of the military
service required of the Muslim. It should be noted that this payment was
the chief tax that was also not required of the Muslim population.
Together with the other inhabitants of the empire the Christian was sub
ject to additional services and contributions. He was particularly un
happy about the obligation to work on roads and public works and to
provide horses, oxen, and carts when called upon. In time of war these
burdens were, of course, increased. When it is considered that other
taxes in kind and in labor dues had to be paid for the use of the land he
tilled, the gravity of the tax problem for the peasant can be understood.
The methods used for collecting taxes were as bad as the heavy bur
den of payments. The Muslim peasant, of course, also faced this prob
lem. Government taxes were usually taken by tax farmers who won the
right by competitive yearly bidding. This official, who could be Christian
or Muslim, was concerned neither with the welfare of the peasant nor
with the government; he was primarily interested in gaining a high
profit. Great wealth could be acquired through this system, but the re
sults for the individual peasant could be disastrous. One of the principal
causes for peasant revolt in the empire was the almost impossible burden
of state taxes coupled with the payments required for land usage. Al
though both Muslim and Christian suffered from the corruption and in
justice of the empire’s fiscal system, the basic payments were higher for
the Christian, who also had much less chance of defending his rights
against the police and in the courts.
It is interesting to note that despite the personal and financial disad
vantages under which they labored, the Christian communities in the
Balkans were on the whole healthier than the Muslim. By the end of the
eighteenth century the Muslim population had entered a period of com
parative economic and moral decline. Several explanations have been of
fered for this development. Certainly the fact that the Muslim popula
tion provided the soldiers contributed to its ultimate weakening. Their
concentration in towns also made them more susceptible to the ravages
of plague and other diseases. Turkish customs, particularly the practice
of polygamy, played a part. This process of decay was clearly illustrated
in the eighteenth century in the changing demography of the Balkan
towns where Christian and national elements formed an increasingly
larger proportion of the population.
With regard to the life of the average Balkan Christian under Ot
toman rule, it is difficult to generalize because of the variety of condi
tions to be found in the peninsula. Nevertheless, it can be said that the
mass of the Christian population were peasants who produced the food
and provided the greater part of the tax base for the empire. Any indi
vidual’s actual conditions of existence depended greatly on where he
lived and how closely he was subject to direct Ottoman control. In re
mote sections, particularly in the less attractive mountain areas, he might
occupy a relatively independent position, either as a herdsman or as a
peasant farmer cultivating land that was in practice his private property.
In contrast, where the land was better, as in the Maritsa valley, Thessaly,
or Bosnia, he probably was a sharecropper on the estate of a landowner
who was usually Muslim, but who could also be Christian. In Moldavia
and Wallachia the land was held exclusively by Orthodox Christians. On
the estates, again depending on local conditions, the peasant might have
effective possession of his house and a garden area, but he was required
to surrender from 10 to perhaps over 50 percent of the produce of the
lands that he worked. He was also subject to numerous other dues in
kind or to labor obligations to his landlord. These were, of course, in ad
dition to the taxes owed to the Ottoman government.
Methods of cultivation were extremely primitive. While Western
Europe had long outgrown medieval conditions, the Balkan peasant
usually still relied on the three-field system and on the wooden plow
drawn by oxen or buffalo. His lands might consist of small plots scat
tered over a wide area and far from his village. Traditionally, he raised
wheat, maize, barley, millet, and rye, but during the eighteenth century
he began to pay more attention to corn and cotton as market crops. He
also raised horses, cattle, sheep, and pigs.
The peasant produced what was necessary for his own subsistence and
for payments to those who controlled his land and to the political au
thorities. He paid in kind; money played little part in his life. He made
his clothing and his household and farm equipment at home and con
served some food. The average peasant throughout the Balkans lived in
an extremely simple mud, stone, wood, or brick house consisting usually
of one or two rooms. His chief furniture was a small table and low stools;
he and his family slept on blankets or on a raised platform. He cooked
over a fireplace in his main room in clay pots using wooden utensils. In a
rich village or house the furniture might be more complete and the
floors covered with furs or richly decorated rugs. Here gaily embroi
dered pillows, towels, and curtains might brighten the home. The cloth
ing of the peasant family again depended on the prosperity of the region
and the family’s circumstances. It could range from the most simple and
basic covering to elaborate and beautiful folk costumes.
Most peasant homes were clustered together to form small villages
and hamlets lying in the middle of the fields cultivated by their inhabi
tants. Within this fold the individual was subject to a highly conservative
and traditional pattern of life, with the local church serving as the center
of the community. Quite naturally definite social differences existed
within this overwhelmingly agricultural society. Some peasants con
trolled good lands and were extremely prosperous; others were share
croppers or agricultural laborers. Priests, merchants, craftsmen,
teachers, and those connected with the local administration all had their
established place. Within this scheme the community leaders, both the
clergy and the notables, usually accepted the existing conditions; both
groups showed themselves resistant to revolutionary change. Over the
centuries they had learned to live within the Ottoman system; they had a
privileged position within their own section. The church, in particular,
was not likely to favor new movements that promised the westernization
and secularization of Balkan society.
Despite the extreme poverty and backwardness of the peninsula
under Ottoman rule, life was not necessarily drab or dull. The church
gave a basic view of life, thoroughly intermixed with superstition and
folk tradition, which explained each man’s place in the wider scheme of
life. This institution also offered a long series of religious holidays and
festivals that broke the monotony of rural life. Each locality had its own
songs, dances, and stories. The tight structure of the peasant family gave
the individual security in precarious times and a definite position in his
own society.
In contrast to the villages, which are here defined as primarily rural
and peasant communities, the cities of the Balkans served as military and
administrative headquarters and as commercial and handicraft centers.
As could be expected, the larger cities lay on the principal routes to
Europe where they served the needs of war or commerce. Particularly
significant was the line Constantinople-Adrianople-Plovdiv-Sofia-Nis-
Belgrade. The seaports Varna and Thessaloniki and the river ports of
Vidin and Ruse were similarly important. Some cities, such as Sarajevo
and Samokov, were major administrative centers.
In the period of Ottoman rule the silhouette and general appearance
of the cities was formed by Ottoman public buildings, usually of stone
construction. Typical of Ottoman architecture were mosques with min
arets, caravanseries (inns), fountains, baths, covered markets, and dis
tinctive bridges, tombs, and fortresses. In contrast, Christian building
was of necessity modest. There were Ottoman restrictions on both eccle
siastical and private Christian architecture. In some cities, such as Plov
div and Thessaloniki, wealthy merchants were able, in the course of the
nineteenth century, to construct impressive private homes, but these are
remarkable by their rarity.
Since the major cities were Ottoman administrative and military cen
ters, they contained large Muslim, Turkish populations. Like the coun
tryside, the cities were divided on a religious and national basis into
quarters (mahalle). The handicraft industry was organized on the guild
system. These organizations, which played a leading role in urban life,
were formed by both artisans and merchants. They could be Muslim,
Christian, or mixed in composition. They controlled the quality, quan
tity, and price of the items produced. Traditionally, certain crafts be
longed to particular national or religious groups. For instance,
metalworking and skillful leatherwork were usually the province of
Muslim craftsmen.
In addition to the split between the Muslim and Christian population
in town and country, basic divisions also developed among the Christian
nationalities. Within the Ottoman scheme certain groups came to enjoy a
privileged position and in fact to share in the benefits enjoyed by the
ruling strata. By the end of the eighteenth century it was clear that
among the Balkan people the Greeks occupied the most favorable place.
In Greece proper the local communities, despite the wars and disorders
of the time, ran their own affairs. More important, however, was the
power and wealth that the Greek merchant and administrator had ac
quired. As has been mentioned, under Ottoman rule the church was the
main governmental authority for the Christian people. Through the of
fice of the patriarch of Constantinople, which was consistently in Greek
hands, the Greek hierarchy was able to win and hold a position of pre
eminence in the cultural and religious life of the peninsula. Especially
important was the collaboration of the patriarchate and the Porte 1 in
securing the abolition of the Serbian patriarchate at Pec in 1766 and the
Bulgarian archbishopric at Ohrid in the following year. Thereafter, the
Serbian and Bulgarian ecclesiastical organizations were under the direct
control and supervision of the patriarch at Constantinople and Greek of
ficials. By the end of the eighteenth century the patriarch ruled about
eight million Christians, a quarter of the population of the empire.
The Slavic and Romanian people naturally resented the Greek domi-
1. The term “Porte” or “Sublime Porte” was used to designate the Ottoman government.
It refers to the building that housed the principal government offices.
10 T he Establishment of the Balkan N ational States
nation of the Orthodox church. They saw Greek control as a sign of
oppression and of the stifling of their own national rights. For many of
them the attainment of national liberation was to mean the overthrow
just as much of Greek ecclesiastic control as of Ottoman imperial domi
nation. Moreover, the patriarchate and the church hierarchy under its
control were exceedingly corrupt. Like the Ottoman government, its
high offices were for sale and it held great wealth. Although in theory
the representative of the oppressed Christians, it had a vested interest in
the maintenance of the status quo.
Greeks not only dominated the Orthodox church, but by the eigh
teenth century they also participated actively in the Ottoman administra
tive system. The Greeks were certainly the best educated of the Christian
people; their facility for languages, a talent particularly appreciated by
the Ottoman rulers, gave them definite advantages. Because of their
abilities and their ambition they were able to win important posts
throughout the empire. By the beginning of the nineteenth century they
had come to hold traditionally three high offices: grand dragoman, a
quasi-minister of foreign affairs; the governorships (hospodarships) of
the Danubian Principalities; and dragoman of the fleet. These posts
were administered with extreme corruption and some, like the
hospodarships, were used as vehicles of Greek political and cultural domi
nation. The Greeks who participated in the Ottoman administration
were generally known as “Phanariotes” after the district in Constan
tinople where many of the families lived.
In addition to these positions the Greeks, together with the Jews and
the Armenians, held the principal commercial positions in the empire.
The merchant group, with its opportunities to travel and its superior ed
ucation, was to take a leading role in the Greek national movement. It
should also be mentioned that the Greeks developed close ties with Rus
sia, thanks to their religious, political, and economic activities. Many
Greeks entered Russian state service, and in the Treaty of Kuchuk Kain-
ardji of 1774 Greek merchants gained the right to sail under the Russian
flag-
Second to the Greeks, the Romanians living in the principalities of
Wallachia and Moldavia enjoyed a special position in the state. Situated
relatively far from Constantinople, the provinces never came under
direct Ottoman rule; they were not Turkish pashaliks (provinces). In
theory Ottoman rights in the area were limited to the occupation of cer
tain strong points, the exaction of a tribute, and the right to name the
hospodars (princes or governors). After Peter the Great invaded Ro
manian lands in 1709 with the help of certain Romanian boyars, the
Romanian political position deteriorated. Thereafter, the Ottoman gov
ernment appointed not native Romanians, but Phanariote Greeks to the
posts of hospodar. During the eighteenth century these offices became a
source of power and wealth for Greek officials. The Romanian national
movement was thus to commence with action against Greek cultural and
political predominance.
In comparison with the Greeks and Romanians-the Serbs and Bulgar
ians occupied a much less advantageous position. Primarily a peasant
people living in impoverished circumstances, the Serbs suffered severely
from the warfare and turbulence of the late eighteenth century. Even
more difficult was the fate of the Bulgars. With their lands situated close
to Constantinople and lying on the route of the Ottoman armies, they
bore a higher burden of taxation and were more directly affected by the
hazards of war than were their neighbors. Like the Serbs, their church
fell under the control of the Greeks in the eighteenth century.
B ackground of R evolt
Most of the conditions to which the Christian population objected had

existed since the establishment of Ottoman control and particularly after
the state started to decline gradually. Although there had been sporadic
rebellions in the past, the nineteenth century was to usher in a period of
concentrated national revolution. Between 1804 and 1878 the major na
tional movements attained a large degree of success. Four independent
states, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and Romania, were established,
and an autonomous Bulgaria came into being. The Albanians were
forced to organize when their territories were threatened by other na
tional groups. The question thus arises of why, after enduring Ottoman
rule for so long, the Balkan people were able, in a relatively short time,
to regain control of their political destinies. Although this entire narra
tive will deal with this question, particular attention must be paid to the
historical circumstances in existence at the end of the eighteenth and
beginning of the nineteenth century. These conditions can best be dis
cussed under the headings of, first, the changing economic and social
conditions and, second, the growth of internal and external opposition
to the authority of the sultan and the central Ottoman government.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE: THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL EFFECTS
By the end of the eighteenth century the Balkans had been strongly
affected by European events. The previous century had marked a
period of economic upsurge in Western and Central Europe, a develop
ment occasioned by technological advances and the beginnings of the in
dustrial revolution. There was an increasing demand for Balkan raw
materials, in particular for the new colonial crops of cotton and corn,
and also for meats, hides, wax, silk, wool, tobacco, lumber, and other
products. This rise in European demand was both preceded and paral
leled by a change in the landholding system in the Balkans which al
lowed that area to produce the surplus necessary to supply the European
market.
After the Ottoman armies conquered a territory, they regarded it as
belonging to God; the sultan, as God’s representative, had the right to
redistribute it. This land became the economic base of the cavalry, the
spahis (sipahis) who won the first great Ottoman military victories. In re
turn for service in the military forces, or in the administration of the
state, an individual, almost always a Muslim, received a grant of land, a
timar, which he held on a nonhereditary basis. The peasant worked the
land for a fixed set of dues, usually a tenth of the crop and a few addi
tional labor and tax obligations. Except in rare cases he could not be re
moved from his land, so long as he performed his prescribed duties.
Moreover, he was not legally bound to the soil.
The timar system remained effective as both an economic and a mili
tary support for Ottoman power until gunpowder was introduced and
the infantry soldier with a musket became a more efficient instrument of
war than the horseman. Thereafter, the janissary corps became
the chief arm of the state. Recruited originally from the Christian pop
ulation under the deushirme 2 system, this body of dedicated, converted
Muslim soldiers ranked with the best troops in Europe. Despite the fact
that the infantry now became militarily more important, the state still
needed the estates as a source of food, military supplies, and taxes to sup
port warfare. Although the timar officially remained in existence until
its abolition in 1831, another type of estate, the chiftlik, (çiftlik) came to
predominate.
With the timar, it will be remembered, the uses that could be made of
the land and the dues and services that could be required of the peasant
were limited. In time, however, certain individuals were able to gain con
trol of large blocks of land on an extralegal basis and on terms which
were, in operation, close to those of owners of private property in other
societies, including hereditary possession. Timar lands were changed to
chiftlik estates through different processes. A chiftlik owner might assem
ble his lands by acquiring leases from various peasants; he might also be
a tax farmer and exploit this position to gain property. Pure force and
armed mercenaries could also be used to gain peasant holdings. This
land system had the great advantage that it could be adapted to capital
ist farming methods and thus supply the increasing European demands
for food and raw materials.
This development brought with it fundamental social and political
2. Approximately every five years the Ottoman authorities in the Balkans as a special tax
levy could take about one out of every four boys between the ages of ten and twenty from
the Christian population. This levy was called thedevshirme. The boys were then converted
to Islam. The most gifted received the best education possible at the time and were eventu
ally assigned to the highest offices in the empire. The others often ended in the janissary
corps. The system ended in the seventeenth century.
changes and a shift in the power balance between the central Ottoman
government and the provinces. Most significant at this time was the rise
to political prominence of local Muslim leaders known as ayans (âyan).
The exact equivalent of the Christian notable, .the ayan's power was
based on his economic prosperity as a landholder or trader and his rela
tionship to the central government. Like the Christian notable, he was
often the agent of the central administration in the local communities
and was responsible for duties such as tax collecting, the supervision of
the land system, and the maintenance of order. As the Ottoman central
authority weakened during the disastrous wars of the eighteenth cen
tury, the ayan was able to increase his own independence in the coun
tryside. The power of this group was considerably enhanced by the fact
that these notables assembled their own private armies numbering some
times thousands of retainers. These bands were used against rival
leaders and the government, and to keep the peasants under control on
the chiftlik estates.
The changing economic conditions benefited not only the ayan, but
also the Christian merchant. In the eighteenth century the carrying
trade of the empire was largely in the hands of Orthodox Christians.
The sea trade was dominated by the Greeks, but the land routes to
Europe were also important. Here Serbs, Bulgars, and Vlachs 3 shared
with the Greeks and Jews the profits which could be made. Because of
the conditions in the empire this wealth was generally put back into com
mercial ventures or into banking and moneylending. Trade with Europe
provided equal rewards for the Christian merchant and for the Muslim
ayan. The latter supplied the agricultural products and protected the
trader. Both groups wanted a free and open trade system within the em
pire and opposed .government regulation or control.
In contrast to the merchant and estate owner, the peasant found his
condidon steadily declining. On the chiftlik he was reduced to the posi
tion of a sharecropper. His obligations both in labor and in dues in kind
were sharply increased. Instead of being subject to fixed obligations, he
was now at the mercy of the chiftlik holder, who usually dominated the
political authority of the area and used armed guards to control those
who worked the land. Chiftlik villages predominated in some of the best
agricultural areas, such as the Maritsa valley and parts of Bosnia. In the
mountainous and remote areas individual peasant families had more
control over the land and herds, but taxes were high and tenure some
times uncertain. They were also at the mercy of those who held the polit
ical and police power in their region.
The dissatisfaction of the peasants inevitably had political repercus-
3. The Vlachs (Kutzovlachs, Arumanians, Tsintsars) were a nomadic or seminomadic peo
ple of Romanian ancestry who lived throughout the Balkans as shepherds, catdemen, and
traders.
sions as the power of the central government was eroded. The land
problem and peasant unrest will form a constant theme in this narrative.
The situation was bound to inflame religious hatred because the chiftlik
owners were usually, but not always, Muslim and the peasants Christian.
Poor conditions often forced the peasants to flee from the land or to join
behind a strong military leader. Like the ayan’s retainers, Christian
armed bands became more numerous. Already certain groups known as
haiduks or klephts, outlaws with a romantic reputation, were in existence.
The turbulence of the period thus led to an increase in the number of
men, either Muslim or Christian, who had the will and weapons to fight.
Not only the peasant, but also the city artisan was injured by the eco
nomic developments. Handworkers of all faiths and nationalities were
harmed by the increasing importation of cheaper European finished
goods of higher quality and by the failure of the Ottoman government to
adopt protective measures. In the eighteenth century a process was thus
begun which culminated a century later when the Ottoman Empire be
came primarily a source of raw materials and a market of the industrial
products of the West. This development was accompanied by the virtual
destruction of the empire’s own internal industrial capacity.
Although the Christian Orthodox merchant benefited from these con
ditions, his increasing contacts with Western and Central Europe were to
have a revolutionary effect on the Balkan world. Because of their mari
time interests and their geographical position, some elements of the
Greek population had always been in close touch with European intellec
tual developments. In the eighteenth century other Christian national
ities had similar opportunities. The principles of the Enlightenment and
then of the French Revolution were to affect the attitude of some of the
population not only toward the Ottoman government, but also toward
their own church organization. In spite of the fact that the Orthodox
church had been a major element in the preservation of Christian self-
awareness, it was also part of the Ottoman system. In the past it had
stood strongly against western influences and it had seen Catholicism as
its main enemy. The new doctrines were to strengthen the national con
victions of the Balkan leaders and give them a predominantly secular
outlook. The Orthodox church, particularly the lower clergy, was to play
an important role in the revolutionary movement, but the leadership lay
in other hands.
In the intellectual revival that now occurred the Greeks were again to
occupy a leading position. Greek merchants had previously been willing
to invest their profits in schools, and they saw the value of sending their
sons to Europe for an education. Among the Balkan peoples they were
the first to establish a system of secular education based on western mod
els. Although they were often attacked by other nationalities for their
early monopoly of education, both secular and ecclesiastical, their
schools did offer all Christians the opportunity to expand their knowl
edge of the world even though instruction was in Greek. At the end of
the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, the other
nationalities also shared in a period of national cultural awakening,
which was to be of great significance for future revolutionary move
ments. Even though their numbers were extremely limited and their
direct influence on the affairs of the day circumscribed, scholars, writers,
and national propagandists appeared to represent the interests of their
nation. They shared a deep interest in their national language and his
tory, and they generally had a close acquaintance with the Enlighten
ment. A brief description of the principal men in this group will be given
because of their importance both in the national movements and in later
national ideology.
Among the Greeks two names, Adamantios Koraes and Rhigas
Pheraios, stand out. Born in 1748, Koraes did most of his work in Paris,
but his books were imported into the Ottoman lands. Sympathetic with
the rational and anticlerical aspects of the Enlightenment, he sought to
revive in Greek minds the heritage of classical Greece and to establish
that civilization as the direct ancestor of the modern Greeks. He was ex
tremely critical of the Orthodox church. Especially significant for the fu
ture were his prefaces to editions of the Greek classics which he pub
lished. Since he did not approve of the vernacular Greek of the time, he
tried to create a literary language closer to ancient forms. He thus began
the unfortunate split in the Greek language between the written
hatharevousa and the spoken demotiki. In contrast to the scholar Koraes,
Rhigas was a revolutionary agitator and a publicist. Born in 1757, he
traveled extensively and also translated French works into vernacular
Greek. Constantly involved in conspiracies, he was finally arrested by the
Austrian government and turned over to the Ottoman authorities. Ex
ecuted for his activities in 1798, he subsequently became a Greek hero
and martyr. His revolutionary writings were widely circulated.
Activities similar to those of Koraes were undertaken by the Serbian
scholars Dositej Obradovic and Vuk Karadiic. Obradovic was born in
1743 in the Banat. At first a monk, he later traveled widely and became
acquainted with European thought. He was deeply interested in the lan
guage question, and he wished the Serbs, too, to have a literature in the
vernacular. This interest was carried forward by Karadiic, the ‘father’ of
the modern Serbian language. Like Obradovic, he was concerned with
the Serbian cultural heritage, and he collected popular Serbian poetry
and stories. Most important, he compiled a grammar and a dictionary
using the dialect of Hercegovina as his standard. This then became the
literary language of the Serbs and Croats. Unlike Greek, written Serbo-
Croatian was to remain close to the spoken language.
Similar developments in the Romanian principalities and in Bulgaria
were delayed because of Greek dominance in the cultural life there.
Because of the control of the Phanariote princes in Wallachia and Mol
davia in the eighteenth century, Greek was the main language of culture
and education. Later, French replaced it to an extent. Although the de
velopment of the national language was thus postponed, western ideas
and literature did enter the country through the French ties. The Bul
garian cultural revival was to occur even later, but Bulgarian historians
today emphasize the works of two early writers, Father Paisii and Bishop
Sofronii of Vratsa. In 1762 Paisii, a monk at Mt. Athos, wrote a highly
nationalistic history of Bulgaria which circulated thereafter in handwrit
ten copies. Sofronii first taught school in Kotel, but in 1802 he moved to
the freer atmosphere of Bucharest. While in Kotel, in 1765, he had
copied Paisii’s manuscript. Now he wrote his own works in the vernacu
lar, including a memoir The Life and Sufferings of Sinful Sofronii and Sun
day Book (Kiriakodromion), a collection of homilies.
Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century changes favorable to at
least some sections of the Christian population had occurred in the so
cial, economic, and intellectual atmosphere of the Balkans. Parallel with
these developments and intimately connected with them were a series of
events that threatened to bring about the disintegration of the Ottoman
government at the center. The Porte was now under attack from two
sides—on the one hand from the ayons with their strong hold in the
countryside and their private armies, and, on the other, from the great
powers, who continued their pressure on the Ottoman possessions.
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS: THE AYANS AND THE GREAT POWERS
The Ayans
Perhaps the most dangerous challenge to the Ottoman state came at
this time not from the European powers or discontented Christians, but
from the Muslim ayans. With the disruption caused by war and civil tur
moil the Balkan people needed some group to whom they could turn for
protection. Moreover, in some places local notables were popular be
cause they appeared to stand between the population and a rapacious
and unreliable central authority. Since the government could not
suppress these local leaders, it was usually forced to recognize them and
appoint them to official posts. Civil and military crises also compelled the
Porte to utilize these irregular armies and even bandit forces when the
regular army was insufficient. Local notables were thus given major mili
tary positions. Unable to control the ayans directly, the Ottoman govern
ment found its best weapon in playing them off against each other and
establishing a balance of power; this was at best a dangerous game. In
their turn the ayans could support antigovernment forces such as the
rebellious janissaries.
The problem of military weakness was recognized by the Ottoman
leaders who were well aware of the declining power of their state before
internal and external foes. The issue was not the necessity of reform,
which was clear, but the direction in which these efforts should be tur
ned. Some argued that the empire’s basic weakness lay in its deviation
from traditional practices and that former conditions should be re
stored. In opposition, a stronger current sought the abandonment of old
ways and traditions in favor of what appeared to be superior western in
stitutions.
The initial attempts at reform failed because of the opposition of local
notables and their ability to exploit the catastrophes of the time. The
first reforming sultan was Selim III, who came to power in 1789. In 1792
an interlude of peace allowed him to turn to the question of military
reorganization. Previously, French military instructors had been used
and the French government still wished to offer this assistance. The ob
vious weakness in the Ottoman forces was the janissary corps. This body
had become more influential in Ottoman life as an organized political
faction of a potentially dangerous character for internal policy than as
an effective fighting force against foreign threats. Selim’s major ac
complishment toward reform was the formation of a parallel and rival
infantry, the Nizam-i Cedid, or New Order, which received western style
training and uniforms. Selim also attempted to carry through changes in
tax policy and administration, but the military emphasis was stronger.
Unfortunately for the Ottoman state Selim proved too weak to carry
through his ideas. He failed, in particular, to make adequate prepara
tion for his refornjs or to build a strong enough group of supporters to
carry through the changes against those who had a vested interest in
maintaining the old order. The janissaries remained a major political
danger. They could not defeat foreign foes, but they could still threaten
the government in Constantinople.
In 1807 a crucial struggle commenced between those who favored
Selim and the opposition, which included conservatives, janissaries, and
ayans. The state was at war with Russia and, as will be shown, a rebellion
had broken out in Serbia. In May a military revolt resulted in the over
throw of Selim and his replacement in July by Mustafa IV. Although
Selim was allowed to live, a new regime dominated by Muslim conser
vatives and the janissaries was set up. Meanwhile, Selim’s supporters
and those who favored reform gathered in Ruse under the leadership of
Mustafa Pasha, called Bayrakdar (the standard bearer), who was himself
an ayan. In 1808 these forces moved on Constantinople. Faced with this
danger, Mustafa IV had Selim assassinated. The new insurgents were
nevertheless successful. Selim’s cousin, Mahmud II, now came to the
throne. Mustafa Pasha Bayrakdar died that same year, but Mahmud II
was to remain in power until 1838 and to become the first successful
reforming sultan.
The revolt of 1807 had involved the capture of the central govern
ment. Other actions by ayans, janissaries, and discontented elements of
the Muslim population threatened to dismember the state. Although this
book is devoted primarily to the formation of the Balkan Christian na
tions, an account of the activities of the three most important rebels, Pas-
vanoglu Osman Pasha, Ali Pasha of Janina, and Mohammed Ali is neces
sary because their actions are intertwined with the first Balkan Christian
revolutionary movements. Their careers are also important in that they
illustrate the atmosphere of Balkan life at the end of the eighteenth and
the beginning of the nineteenth century, which produced Muslim as well
as Christian revolt. Like the national leaders, these three men sought to
establish independent or autonomous principalities and to separate
from direct Ottoman rule.
The career of Pasvanoglu Osman Pasha had a major effect on the
beginnings of the Serbian revolution and on Bulgarian and Romanian
national history. When Pasvanoglu’s father was executed by the Ot
toman government, the son fled to join outlaw groups. Later he fought
with the Ottoman army in the war of 1787-92. Establishing a center at
the city of Vidin on the Danube, he collected a large force of bandits and
renegades. In 1795 he declared himself independent and thereafter
remained in almost constant revolt against Constantinople. The efforts
of the Ottoman government to control his activities will be discussed in
connection with the Serbian revolution.
The activities of Ali Pasha of Janina, although similar in many re
spects, were even more spectacular. Born in 1750 in Tepelenë in Epirus,
Ali was forced into a life of banditry when his father died. After an ad
venturous youth he succeeded in establishing a base at Janina. Through
intrigue and violence he was subsequently able to increase his power and
the number of his followers. At first he entered the service of the Porte
and used his official positions to add to his personal strength. In 1788 he
was appointed governor of the Janina district, whence he extended his
rule over surrounding territory in Thessaly, Epirus, and Albania. The
area under his control fluctuated in the following years, but it was always
sufficiently extensive to serve as a power base for semi-independent rule.
In 1799 the Porte, in dire need of his assistance, appointed him gover
nor of Rumelia, a position which he held and lost several times. The Ot
toman government particularly required his aid against Pasvanoglu and
other bandit and ayan leaders. Continually alert to his own interests, Ali
maintained close contacts with France. In 1809 he sent assistance to the
Porte in the war against Russia.
Although Ali ruled from Epirus in the manner of an independent sov
ereign, the Porte did not attempt to destroy his power until 1820. At that
time it prepared to move against him with naval and ground forces. In
retaliation Ali concluded agreements with local Greek notables and en
couraged other Balkan people to revolt. Unable to defeat the Ottoman
troops, Ali was finally forced back into Janina, which was then sur
rounded. During the seige he died, in January, 1822.
Mohammed Ali was the most successful of the leaders. He failed to
achieve his more ambitious goals, but his descendents ruled Egypt until
1952. Born in Macedonia in 1769 of a Turkish-Albanian family, he went
to Egypt in 1798 at the head of an Albanian force to fight Napoleon. Al
though his troops were defeated, Ali remained in Egypt and sub-
sequendy rose in the military and administrative service. A master of the
intrigue that plagued the empire, he was able to eliminate his rivals for
power and in 1806 was named governor of Egypt. During the first part
of his career he, like Ali Pasha, remained in the service of the Porte. At
the same time he used his official rank to secure and strengthen his per
sonal position. Active in the Sudan and in the suppression of local rebel
lions in Asia Minor, he was assisted by his extremely able son, Ibrahim
Pasha.
In 1825 the Porte, unable to suppress the rebellion that had broken
out in Greece, promised Mohammed Ali the island of Crete for himself
and the governorship of the Peloponnesus for his son Ibrahim in return
for military assistance. Although his forces were successful against the
Greek rebels, the Ottoman defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29
deprived Mohammed Ali of his expected reward. Because of this setback
and his desire to gain more territory, he launched an attack on Syria in
1832 and caused a major European crisis. His intention at this time ap
pears to have been to create a great Arabian kingdom centered on the
Red Sea and embracing Egypt, the Sudan, and Arabian lands in Asia
Minor. With the exception of Crete and the Peloponnesus he did not di
rectly threaten lands inhabited by Balkan Christians. Like Pasvanoglu
and Ali Pasha, Mohammed Ali represented the attempt to break up the
empire by the formation of separate states under Muslim military
leaders. Both his formidable armies and the character of his rule made
his movement far more of a threat to the existence of the Ottoman state
than the Serbian or Greek revolts.
The Challenge of the Great Powers
At the same time that the Porte was facing internal disintegration, it
had to meet renewed attacks from outside powers. When Selim III as
cended the throne in 1789, his government was still at war with both
Austria and Russia. The Habsburg forces had occupied Belgrade, and
Russian armies were operating along the Danube. In 1791 the Habsburg
Empire signed the Treaty of Sistova, returning Belgrade in exchange
for gains of Bosnian territory. Peace was made with Russia the following
year. In the Treaty of Jassy Russia extended her lands to the Dniester
River, but surrendered Moldavia and Wallachia, which her troops had
occupied. These two treaties marked the conclusion of what had been al
most a century of intermittent cooperation between the Habsburg Em
pire and Russia against the Ottoman Empire. Over eighty years were to
elapse before the two states were again to make a serious partition ar
rangement at the expense of the Porte. Both powers continued to show
interest in Ottoman territory, but the partnership that had prevailed
during the eighteenth century was interrupted.
The attention of all of the great powers was now drawn away from the
Near East and concentrated first on Poland and then on revolutionary
France. Poland was partitioned in three stages in 1772, 1793, and 1795.
In 1792 war broke out in Europe. Thereafter the main emphasis in Eu
ropean international relations remained on continental affairs, but these
events had wide ramifications in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterra
nean. In 1797, in the Treaty of Campo Formio, France annexed the
Ionian Islands, an event that was to influence the Greek revolt. In the
same agreement Austria took the remaining Venetian territories, thus
bringing to an end the independent existence of the seapower that had
formerly been a major Ottoman adversary.
In July, 1798, a period of direct French intervention in Ottoman lands
commenced when Napoleon launched an invasion of Egypt. The French
army quickly defeated the Mamluk soldiers. The Porte now entered into
the conflict against France in alliance with Britain. Russia also took the
Ionian Islands from France. In 1802 the Porte concluded a peace that
lasted until 1806. In the intervening period French influence so in
creased in Constantinople that the Ottoman government shifted its al
legiance and joined France against Russia and Britain. Although the
period of warfare from 1806 to 1812 was not marked by continual hostil
ities, the Russian government attempted to use the opportunity to in
crease its influence in Serbia and the Danubian Principalities. In 1812
this conflict was concluded by the Treaty of Bucharest. Despite the fact
that the Ottoman Empire was in a weak position, Russia asked only for
the surrender of Bessarabia and withdrew from the Principalities. The
Russian government was principally concerned with the impending
French invasion. This change in boundaries was the single territorial loss
suffered by the Porte after the Napoleonic Wars. In the Vienna settle
ment, in which the Ottoman Empire did not participate, the Ionian
Islands were given to Britain and Dalmatia to Austria. These lands, how
ever, had been part of the Venetian, not the Ottoman, Empire.
The Congress of Vienna was to mark the beginning of almost a cen
tury of relative peace for the great powers, but during that time the Ot-
Map 1. The Ottoman Empire, 1815
toman Empire was to lose most of its European possessions. In this
period it was repeatedly demonstrated that the Porte was not capable of
defending its territorial integrity or even of maintaining its political in
dependence without outside aid. The empire continued to endure
chiefly because of the strategic position of the Ottoman lands and their
vital significance for the expanding European imperial states. Particu
larly important was the attitude of Russia and Britain. Their conflict
over Constantinople and the Balkans became part of the great imperial
contest waged between these two nations and extending from the east
ern Mediterranean through Central Asia to China.
With the completion of the conquest of India in the eighteenth cen
tury, Britain regarded this land henceforth as the prime acquisition of
her great empire. Her position as the first commercial and industrial na
tion of the world and as mistress of the seas, which was maintained
throughout the nineteenth century, made her apprehensive and fearful
of any power who threatened to rob her of supremacy in these fields. At
the end of the eighteenth century and during the Napoleonic period she
saw France as her chief competitor throughout the world, including the
Near East. Thereafter, until the rise of a united Germany, Russia oc
cupied this role. From a world standpoint, based on British commercial
and naval preoccupations and the defense of India, the territories of the
Ottoman Empire were the key to the imperial system. Britain feared
constantly a Russian takeover of the Ottoman lands, either through a
direct conquest of territory, domination of the government in Constan
tinople, or the establishment of satellite Balkan states. Because of this
concern, Britain in the nineteenth century usually preferred to keep the
Ottoman Empire intact. Her representatives in Constantinople did,
however, consistently press the Ottoman government to reform its ad
ministrative system and to conciliate the Balkan nationalities.
The Russian position in regard to the Ottoman Empire was more
complex. After Bessarabia was absorbed in 1812 the Russian govern
ment contemplated no more direct annexations. Nevertheless, the op
portunities that subsequently arose for the extention of Russian influ
ence were most inviting. Unlike the other great powers, Russia could
expect to benefit from a triumph of the Balkan national movements.
The peoples looked to her as the greatest Orthodox power; this feeling
had been encouraged. In the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji of 1774 the
base was laid for some sort of a claim to a religious protectorate, al
though in a very ambiguous form. Not only did the Balkan Christians
expect aid from Russia, but important elements in Russian society were
strongly attracted along both Orthodox and Slavic lines to the idea of
giving assistance to the national movements. The Russian government
was thus under pressure both from the appeals from the Balkans and
from the reaction at home to do something for apparently oppressed
Christians and Slavs.
In addition the Russian government was continually tempted to inter
vene in Ottoman affairs for prestige and an extension of her own power.
Russia, like Britain, could not afford to see another power dominate the
territory. In its dealings with the Porte the Russian government had sev
eral strong weapons, including its influence with the national move
ments, its large army, and regular opportunities to dominate the Ot
toman government itself. In general the Russian leaders preferred to
follow the policy adopted in the Treaty of Unkiar Iskelesi of 1833,
namely, that of control from within.
Of the great powers directly concerned with Balkan events, the Habs-
burg Empire was perhaps in the weakest position. A multinational em
pire in an age of national revolution, she could win little by a change of
conditions in the Ottoman lands. The acquisition of more territory in the
area would only increase her minority problems; the establishment of in
dependent states would give encouragement to her own national groups
to follow a similar path. Although the monarchy usually cooperated with
Russia, the dangers of such a course of action were clearly recognized.
Habsburg policy was also limited by the fact that the military leaders
never believed that they alone could defeat the Russian armies should a
real crisis arise leading to a war in the Balkans. With her preference for
the maintenance of the status quo, the Habsburg Empire should logically
have cooperated with Britain since both countries feared Russian expan
sion. In such an alliance, however, the military burden and real risks
would have fallen on the monarchy; the British navy would have been of
little use in a land war against Russia.
Despite her enormous prestige in the previous centuries, France after
the Napoleonic Wars wielded less influence in the empire than did the
other three powers. Although French revolutionary ideology played a
great role in the Balkan national movements, France herself from 1815
to 1848 was not a center of agitation. Thereafter, particularly during the
reign of Napoleon III, French governments usually supported Balkan
national movements. Without an army on the scene and with a navy sec
ond to that of her rival, Britain, France hesitated to intervene in the
Near Eastern conflicts. This nation did, however, have designs on parts
of Ottoman territory. In 1830 she established herself in Algeria; her in
fluence at that time was paramount in Egypt. Later, in the 1840s and
1860s, she intervened in Syria and Lebanon. Because of her desire to ex
pand her empire into Africa and Asia, France usually supported the for
mation of the national states and the weakening of the central govern
ment. She opposed any situation that would allow the entire area to fall
under Russian or British control.
Map 2. The Straits
Unable to defend herself alone against the European states, the Ot
toman Empire was forced to adopt a policy of balancing the influence of
the great powers and playing one against another. In the nineteenth
century this was to prove a losing struggle. The empire was compelled to
grant concession after concession, both commercial and political, to
Europe. The national movements made steady progress, usually with
the support of one or of all of the European governments. It will be
noted that although the Balkan revolts were commenced by the Chris
tian people, the great powers made the final decisions over the establish
ment of the new states, their boundaries, and their forms of govern
ment. The European leaders were far from altruistic in their actions.
Their own interests and the maintenance of the balance of power came
first. Both the Ottoman Empire and the new Balkan states were to be
subjected to the same policies and treatment that the powers employed
in their other imperial adventures.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century it can thus be seen that
conditions prevailed in the Balkan Peninsula that would be favorable to
Christian rebellion. The weak Ottoman government could neither con
trol rebellious Muslim notables nor defeat foreign armies. During this
time of turmoil local centers of authority had appeared under strong
military leaders. A tradition and habit of rebellion had thus been es
tablished. The Balkan Christian rebellions stemmed from this atmo
sphere and these conditions. The first, the Serbian revolution, was di
rectly connected with the failure of the Ottoman government to
maintain control over its local officials and its weakness before its Muslim
opponents.
CHAPTER 2
The Serbian Revolution
T h e center of the first successful revolt of a Balkan people against Ot

toman authority was the pashalik of Belgrade whose administrative
problems at the end of the eighteenth century in many ways reflected
those of the entire empire under Selim III. Throughout the century this
area had been the scene of repeated battles between Austria and the Ot
toman Empire. Fighting occurred in 1716-18, 1737-39, and 1788-91.
In these years the fate of the Serbian inhabitants had been deeply in
volved with that of the Habsburg monarchy. The wars and the extreme
chaos associated with them had resulted in the emigration of large
groups of Serbs into Austrian territory, primarily into southern
Hungary. Particularly significant had been the mass migration of about
seventy thousand Serbs under Patriarch Arsenije III in 1690. This
group made Sremski Karlovci a religious and cultural center for the Ser
bian people. Thereafter, the Serbs in the monarchy, where conditions
were much more favorable, remained in close touch with the events in
Serbia proper. They were to have an important influence on the national
movement, on cultural development, and on the administration of the
Serbian national state in the nineteenth century.
During the wars the Habsburg government was often in administra
tive control of Serbian lands. Despite the opposition of the population to
Ottoman rule, Austrian dominance was not popular, largely because of
the activities of the Catholic church. Unlike the Ottoman Empire, which
did not actively attempt to gain converts for its faith, the Catholic
church, with Habsburg approval, did. Like the Greek experience with
Venetian rule, the substitution of a Christian for a Muslim overlord was
not attractive nor was it an aim that the Serbian population subsequently
sought as a political alternative.
The chief result of these years of frontier warfare for the Serbian pop
ulation was that it gave them experience in fighting. Serbs served as reg
26
The Serbian Revolution 27
ular soldiers in the Habsburg army or as irregular guerrillas. They
usually went into combat in their own units under their own officers.
During the Austrian occupations Serbs also were given higher offices in
the administration of the region than they held under the Ottoman. The
experience gained in the war of 1788-91 proved particularly valuable.
At this time many Serbs joined the Habsburg Free Corps, and they in
fact carried the main burden of the battles. Simultaneously, Ko£a And-
jelkovic organized an unsuccessful revolt, known as Kola’s rebellion. Al
though no immediate benefits were gained from these actions the Ser
bian leaders obtained training in military organization and confidence in
their own abilities.
The years of cooperation with Austria proved a great disappointment.
The Serbs felt that the monarchy had failed to deliver promised sup
plies, and certainly the peace terms brought Serbia no advantages. Nev
ertheless, despite the fact that in the future the Serbian leaders were to
turn more to Russia for aid, the Austrian frontier remained important
because of its proximity. Even when the Habsburg government did not
support Serbian actions, supplies and war material constantly crossed
the Danube; at the same time refugees from Ottoman persecution con
tinued to move freely into Habsburg territory.
As noted previously, the Peace of Sistova in 1791 and that of Jassy in
1792 gave Selim III a period in which to consider the reform of the em
pire. His desire for the establishment of peaceful and orderly conditions
corresponded exactly with that of his Serbian subjects. After the devas
tating period of war the Serbs would have continued to accept Ottoman
rule in return for the assurance of rights of local self-government and a
guarantee of tranquility in the countryside. These conditions, however,
could not be controlled by the central Ottoman administration. With the
cessation of the fighting the janissaries and the irregular military units
found themselves unemployed. They thus turned and preyed on the
population. Bands of these men seized villages and their lands and con
verted the property into their own estates. Others joined rebel ayans or
bandit organizations and plundered peaceful Muslims and Christians
alike. Under these circumstances the interests of the central government
and the Christian population coincided; neither could tolerate a contin
uation of this situation.
Selim III, well aware of these problems, tried to conciliate the Serbs
and alleviate the bad conditions. First, he appointed as local Ottoman ad
ministrators men who were directed to work with the people and to
suppress the unlawful elements. Second, he issued three firmans (de
crees), in 1793, 1794, and 1796, giving the Serbs essentially what they
sought. Together these documents defined the relations of the Serbs to
the Ottoman government. The Serbs now received much broader rights
of local autonomy. They could collect their own taxes, bear arms, and
form a militia. The abuses of the chiftlik system were to be corrected.
These firmans became the political program of the Serbian leaders in
the next years. Had these stipulations been carried out, the Serbian na
tional revolt could probably have been postponed.
Unfortunately, Selim III and his supporters could not execute their
own decisions. The problems of the empire in the following years
proved too great. Moreover, Constantinople remained a center of tradi
tional intrigue. Repeatedly, able and conciliatory commanders and ad
ministrators were removed from their positions by those whose basic in
terests were threatened by reform and, most important, by those whose
religious sensibilities were hurt by concessions to Christians.
The chief problem in the pashalik of Belgrade remained the janis
saries. One of Selim’s orders in 1791 had been to forbid their return to
Belgrade, a measure that these soldiers chose to resist. Their defiance of
the central government was made easier by the parallel action of other,
similar rebellious groups and of Pasvanoglu. The janissaries now made
common cause with those who would not accept the authority of the
Porte. To balance the military strength of this opposition, the Ottoman
authorities were forced to call for Serbian assistance. The policy of rely
ing on the Serbs and of granting them concessions was associated in par
ticular with the governor of Belgrade, Hadji Mustafa Pasha, known as
the “mother of the Serbs.”
Within the Balkans at this time the major problem was that of control
ling Pasvanoglu. Not content with the rule of extensive Bulgarian terri
tories, he also wished to establish his friends the janissaries in Belgrade.
Selim was now determined to act decisively. The Serbs were given new
privileges and allowed to raise their own army under their own leaders.
The population was thus fully armed. The alliance of official Ottoman
forces with the Christians was successful. Pasvanoglu suffered repeated
defeats until finally he retreated to his fortress at Vidin, which was
placed under siege. Once again, however, general world conditions hin
dered Ottoman efforts. In 1798 Napoleon entered Egypt. The Porte was
compelled to strip the Balkans of regular troops to meet the foreign in
vasion. Simultaneously pressures mounted in Constantinople. The pol
icy of arming Christians against Muslims continued to offend deeply
conservative opinion.
The new combination of circumstances proved disastrous for Serbian
interests. Unable to press his military action, Selim was forced to pardon
the janissaries and allow them to return to Belgrade on the condition
that they promised to obey Hadji Mustafa Pasha. At the same time the
sultan was also compelled to compromise with Pasvanoglu. Once back in
a strong position, the janissaries returned to their old ways. They re
volted against Hadji Mustafa and killed him. The balance of power thus
shifted to the janissaries and Pasvanoglu at the expense of the central au
thority and the Serbs.
After a period of conflict and instability, during which the janissaries
fought among themselves, four janissary officers> called dahi from their
rank in the corps, emerged on top in 1802. The result of this seizure of
power for the Serbs was immediately apparent; their autonomous rights
were ended. The janissaries again terrorized the countryside. The
events of the past repeated themselves. Large numbers of Serbs fled into
the hills where they joined existing irregular bands or formed new ones.
Throughout Serbia military units once more appeared. The most im
portant area for the resistance was to be the hilly forest region of the
Sumadija. Here a local notable, Karadjordje Petrovic, was able to assem
ble by the spring of 1804 as many as thirty thousand armed men. Other
centers under other local leaders were similarly organized throughout
the pashalik.
These military bands were soon to be needed. At the beginning of
1804 the Serbs were faced with the fact that they would have to defend
themselves or see their leadership literally destroyed. In January and
February the janissaries began what was planned to be a massacre of the
Serbian notables. In two months between 70 and 150 were killed. The
entire province reacted. Aware of the obvious need for coordinated ac
tion andv direction, about three hundred Serbian notables met at Orasac
in the Sumadija in February and named Karadjordje as their com
mander. The Serbian revolution had begun. It now had a leader and a
cause for which to fight.
The role of Karadjordje is so important in the revolution and in the
first political organization of the Serbian state that a short summary of
his career is in order. We know little about his early life. In fact, even the
date of his birth is uncertain although it was probably 1768. His parents
were poor, and the family was forced to move often in search of a liveli
hood. Karadjordje worked for a number of landlords before 1787 when
his family left the Sumadija, perhaps because of his activities against the
janissaries, and moved to the Vojvodina. There they became attached to
the monastery at KruSedol. When the Austro-Turkish war broke out,
Karadjordje joined the Free Corps and took part in the campaigns in
western Serbia, where he gained invaluable military experience and
learned Austrian military methods. After the Peace of Sistova he settled
in Topola in the Sumadija where he became a livestock merchant trad
ing with Austria. This business brought him in touch with many of his
compatriots; these connections were later to prove invaluable. In addi
tion he became a buljukbaia (the head of a military unit of about one
hundred men) in the Serbian national militia which had been authorized
by Selim III. In this capacity he cooperated with Hadji Mustafa against
the janissaries and thus gained experience in Ottoman military organiza
tion. When the janissaries returned in 1801, Karadjordje, like many
Serbs, foresaw that some measures of defense would have to be taken
against these violent and undisciplined forces. With his military expe
rience, Karadjordje’s background was typical of many of his coun
trymen.
Karadjordje now became and remained the leader of the first Serbian
insurrection, largely because of his personal abilities. As an outstanding
military leader, he was attractive to the Serbs; he was brave, firm, and
resolute. He was to show considerable good sense and judgm ent in han
dling the complex international situation during the Napoleonic period.
Under his guidance the Serbian question was raised from an internal Ot
toman problem to a matter of international concern. In domestic politics
he was a skillful enough politician to judge accurately the mood of most
of his countrymen and to hold the revolutionary movement together in
face of innumerable conflicting forces and interests.
In fact, his abilities in domestic affairs were probably decisive in main
taining his leadership. Almost from the beginning of the revolution
Karadjordje’s authority was challenged by others. As was typical in the
Ottoman system, political power lay in the individual villages and dis
tricts; there was no Serbian central authority for the pashalik. Even the
reforms of the 1790s had not altered this situation. Consequently, each
area had its own leaders and spokemen. In 1804 Karadjordje was well
known and respected only in his district in the Sumadija. In the western
part of the country Jakov Nenadovic was the principal figure; in the east
ern section Milenko Stojkovic and Peter Dobrnjac held a similar position.
Soon sharp conflict broke out between these men with their followers
and Karadjordje supported by his friends. Jealous of their position and
anxious to profit from the situation, the opposition leaders fought all at
tempts to create a strong centralized national government for the Serbs.
They did not wish to see their power in their individual localities weak
ened. They would agree to cooperate with a central authority only to the
end of defeating the Turkish forces. As will be shown, they also at
tempted to enlist the support of the Russian government against Kara
djordje.
In fighting his domestic opponents Karadjordje had to consider not
only his personal interests, but also the obvious fact that a centralized
regime with real power was necessary in a revolutionary period. More
over, certain internal problems, such as the distribution of former Ot
toman lands, taxation, and justice, had to be settled for the entire pasha
lik. Despite the undoubted need for a united leadership Karadjordje’s
rivals throughout the revolution kept up a constant pressure of criticism.
They asserted that no Russian aid would be forthcoming unless he were
replaced; they attacked his personal life and morals; they claimed he
used excessive brutality, that he enriched himself from Turkish prop
erty, and that he was involved in various intrigues and acts of violence
against other Serbs. Despite these unrelenting attacks Karadjordje, until
his final military defeat, was able to maintain his personal position at the
head of the first revolution. The centralization of leadership was an ad
vantage enjoyed by the Serbian revolutionaries which was not to be
shared by the Greeks later.
The divisive aspects of the Serbian internal scene were not apparent
during the first days of the revolt. The sudden action of the janissaries in
January of 1804 had produced a spontaneous national reaction for sur
vival. At the meeting at Orasac in February, Karadjordje was chosen the
supreme leader without opposition. At this time all of the Serbs recog
nized that a single strong executive authority was necessary. After May,
1804, Karadjordje was able to sign his orders and proclamations under
such titles as “Supreme Vojvoda” (duke), “Commander of Serbia,” and
“Leader.”
At first there was a unity not only in the leadership, but also in the goal
to be achieved. It is most important to note that at this stage the aim of
the revolt was not independence; rather it was directed against the janis
sary rule and toward the restoration of the autonomous rights already
agreed upon by the Ottoman government. At this time representatives
of the revolutionaries and the Porte were in regular communication on
what the Serbs wished. Throughout the negotiations the Serbian pur
pose was to secure terms that would give them a position of autonomy
within the Ottoman Empire. The immediate demand was the removal of
the dahis and a full pardon for the Serbian rebels. The Serbs further
wished the Porte to recognize their own head of state, a supreme knez
(elder or chieftain), who would have authority over the Serbian popula
tion of the pashalik and who would be responsible for tax payments. He
would also represent his people before the Ottoman government. The
desire was also expressed that the tribute and taxes be set and that no ar
bitrary increases be made. In addition janissaries were to be forbidden to
hold rural property, and the right of Muslims to reside in Serbian towns
was to be controlled. Freedom of religion, trade, and communication
were also to be guaranteed. While negotiating these points, the Serbian
leaders turned to both the Habsburg and Russian governments for sup
port.
The new situation found the Ottoman government faced with the now
familiar problem. The janissaries were again technically in rebellion, but
the forces against a reliance on the Christians were still strong. At first
Selim III had no desire to take a stand against the Serbs. He therefore
sent the popular vezir of Bosnia, Abu Bekir Pasha, who had previously
negotiated successfully with the Serbian leaders, to Belgrade to put
down the janissaries. By August, 1804, the dahis had been defeated;
again it appeared as though the janissary forces had been subdued. The
situation, however, was not stable. Rebellious Muslim factions were still
strong. Moreover, the Serbs now insisted upon some sort of foreign
guarantee for the terms of their autonomy, a concession that the Ot
toman government was loath to grant. In order to obtain outside sup
port the Serbian government despatched a delegation, which included
the prominent religious leader Matija Nenadovic, to Russia. The group
was received by the foreign minister Adam Czartoryski in November,
1804. Since Russia was now cooperating in foreign affairs with the Ot
toman Empire against Napoleon, the Russian minister advised the Serbs
to deal directly with the Porte.
The conditions in Serbia thus remained fluid. In preparation for pos
sible future action the Serbian leaders now sought links with Christian
groups in Bosnia and Hercegovina, with Greek klepht bands, and with
the governors of Moldavia and Wallachia. On the opposing side the
janissary and outlaw bands similarly organized to regain their position.
In the winter and spring of 1805 they again moved into the countryside;
once more chaos, terror, and anarchy prevailed. The Ottoman officials
were too weak to control their own lawless elements. Under considerable
pressure, Selim shifted his position. By the spring of 1805 he had come
to regard the Serbs as rebels. Abandoning a policy of conciliation, he ap
pointed the Pasha of Nis, Hafiz Pasha, as the new governor of Belgrade
and sent him with an army to deal with the Serbs. Hafiz’s forces were de
feated in the first major clash between Serbian and Ottoman troops at
Ivankovo in August, 1805. With this victory the Serbian forces pro
ceeded to take full military control of the pashalik. Smederovo was cap
tured in November and became the first capital of the new government.
Belgrade fell at the end of the following year.
Meanwhile an important change had occurred on the international
scene. Although the Ottoman Empire had at first been allied with Brit
ain and Russia against France, French prestige in Constandnople rose
sharply after the victories of Austerlitz and Jena in 1805 and 1806.
Napoleon also sent an astute diplomat, General François H. B. Sebas-
tiani, to gain an agreement with the Porte. As a result the Ottoman Em
pire now shifted its alliances and joined France. In the summer of 1806
fighting broke out between Russia and the Porte. This conflict was to
have a decisive effect on the fate of the first Serbian revolution.
The Ottoman government, faced with Serbian forces in control of the
pashalik and with renewed warfare, naturally wished to settle the Ser
bian question by negotiation and was willing to grant wide concessions.
The new situation, however, changed both the Serbian and the Russian
attitude. At war with the Ottoman Empire, the Russian government, of
course, had an interest in the continuation of the revolt. For its part the
Serbian regime, having achieved success on the battlefield, was attracted
to the idea that it could gain independence. The Porte had appeared
prepared to give the Serbs a large measure of autonomy. The question
was now whether more could be obtained and whether the Porte could
be trusted to abide by its agreements and to enforce them. Under the cir
cumstances the temptation to continue the rebellion with the objective of
real independence was strong. The final decision was certainly influ
enced by Russian actions. Henceforth the attitude taken by the Russian
government or its agents was to have a determining effect on the future
of the Serbian national state.
In the summer of 1807 Colonel F. O. Paulucci arrived in Serbia to
assess the political and military situation. He was to determine what assis
tance Serbia needed and what aid she could give Russia in the common
war against the Ottoman Empire, but he was not authorized to make a
binding agreement. From the evidence now available it appears that the
Serbian authorities were not aware of the limited extent of this emis
sary’s powers. On July 10 an understanding, commonly known as the
Paulucci-Karadjordje Convention, was concluded. This agreement
called for, among other stipulations, the appointment of Russian ad
ministrators in the Serbian lands, the establishment of Russian military
garrisons in the towns, and the sending of Russian military and eco
nomic aid. Believing that he had firm assurances of effective Russian
backing, Kardjordje now adopted a policy aimed at Serbian indepen
dence rather than autonomy under the Ottoman Empire. This decision
was a grievous error. Between July 7 and 9 Alexander I and Napoleon
met and signed the Treaty of Tilsit. One of the provisions of this pact
was that France would attempt to negotiate a peace between the Russian
and Ottoman empires.
The shift of the Russian attitude toward Napoleon was to have imme
diate disastrous consequences for Serbia. In line with the new Russian
policies, the government concluded the armistice of Slobozia with the
Porte in August. Although the Russian representatives to the negotia
tions had been instructed not to abandon the Serbs, the signature of the
agreement and the end of the hostilities left the Serbian forces in an ex
posed military position. Meanwhile the hostility of the Ottoman govern
ment toward the Serbian rebels, of course, increased.
Despite the extreme difficulty of the situation the Serbian forces were
nevertheless able to maintain control of the Serbian countryside. Their
final fate would obviously depend on the evolution of world affairs.
Meantime in Constantinople the crisis that resulted in the overthrow of
Selim III and the eventual succession of Mahmud II was taking place.
With the center of the Ottoman government paralyzed, the Serbian gov
ernment was in a better position. Not only was the Porte unable to
launch a major military campaign against the rebels, but it was more fa
vorable to a negotiated settlement. Although discussions were held, it
was still difficult to determine boundaries for the Serbian state.
Throughout this crucial period Karadjordje continued to face domes
tic opposition to his rule. In 1805 a council was established; in theory it
was to be a check on his power. In 1808, however, he declared himself
the hereditary supreme leader of the country, although he agreed to act
in cooperation with a governing council, which was also to be the su
preme court of the country. When the opposition intrigued with the
Russian representative, Constantine Rodofinikin, who had arrived in
August, 1807, Karadjordje sought assistance in France and Austria. The
struggle over the authority to be allowed the council was not settled satis
factorily during this revolutionary period. Karadjordje, in general,
was highly successful in maintaining his supreme control.
Despite his difficulties with the Russian representative Karadjordje
recognized the unity of interest that bound Serbia to Russia. When fight
ing broke out again in 1809 between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, he
was prepared to support the tsarist armies. Cooperation between and
coordination of the two forces was not, however, effective. Although
Karadjordje launched a successful offensive in Novi Pazar, he was sub
sequently severely defeated at Nis. The Ottoman troops then marched
on Belgrade. In August, 1809, there occurred another mass flight of
Serbs across the Danube, which included Rodofinikin. Although Serbia
had not been completely reconquered, a turning point had been reached
in the rebellion. Henceforth the Serbian forces were to remain on the
defensive; the goal was simply to hold on to the territories that they still
controlled.
In June, 1810, Russian troops arrived in Serbia for a second time.
Some military cooperation followed; weapons, ammunition, and medical
supplies were sent. Marshal M. I. Kutuzov, the great Russian military
commander, participated in some of the planning for the joint actions.
An air of optimism prevailed in the Serbian camp. With Russian assis
tance victory seemed at hand. But once again events in Europe inter
vened to destroy Serbian hopes.
Faced with the imminence of a French invasion, Alexander I now
wished to sign a definitive peace treaty with the Porte in order to free his
troops to meet the new attack. Again, as at the armistice of Slobozia, the
Russian government acted against the interest of its ally. The Serbs
were not even informed of the negotiations; they learned the final terms
from the Ottoman government. The second Russian withdrawal came
at a time when Serbian expectations were rising and Karadjordje had
reached the height of his personal power.
In the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Bucharest of May, 1812,
the Russian representatives once more attempted to do something for
their former allies. Article 8 dealt with Serbia. Here it was agreed that
the fortifications built by the Serbs during the revolt were to be de
stroyed unless they were of value to the Ottoman government. Ottoman
installations that had existed before 1804 were to.be reoccupied and gar
risoned by Ottoman forces. In return the Porte promised a general am
nesty in Serbia and certain autonomous rights. The Serbs were to con
trol “the administration of their own affairs” and the collection and
delivery of the tribute, which was to be fixed.
The reaction in Serbia was strong. Ottoman reoccupation of fortresses
and cities caused particular concern. Fearful reprisals were expected.
Moreover, the Serbian government had no guarantee that the Porte
would implement Article 8. The Russian government instructed the
Serbs to negotiate directly with Constantinople concerning the arrange
ments to be made, stating that Russian diplomatic support would be
given. This assurance gave small comfort, particularly when it became
apparent that Russian troops would not only be withdrawn from Serbia,
but also from Moldavia and Wallachia. Once these armies returned to
their own country, the Serbian apprehensions were fully confirmed. The
Ottoman Empire was now at peace so its forces could concentrate on
Serbia. The previous nine years of warfare had drained Serbian re
sources and manpower. Three Ottoman armies combined in the attack.
In July, 1813, Karadjordje and many of the Serbian leaders crossed the
Danube into Austrian territory. Ottoman armies re-entered Belgrade, a
city that they had been forced to abandon in 1806. Severe reprisals were
inflicted on the population. With these actions the first Serbian revolu
tion ended.
Despite the final failure Serbia had achieved a great deal under the
leadership of Karadjordje. A rebellion had been organized and the first
separate national government established. International attention, par
ticularly Russian, had been drawn to the Serbian question. Some attempt
had been made to answer what was to become the great political ques
tion: whether a centralized regime or a government where the real
power lay with the local communities was more advantageous. Great in
ternal changes had been accomplished. Much Ottoman property—
including land, houses, stores, and warehouses—fell into Serbian hands.
It had, however, been made abundantly clear that the future of the
country depended on the attitude of Russia and on the willingness of that
power to back Serbian autonomy.
After the French invasion of Russia in June, 1812, the eyes of the
Porte and of all of Europe remained focused on that area, next on the
batdes in Central Europe, and finally on the defeat of Napoleon and the
occupation of France. During this period the Ottoman authorities
wanted peace in their own lands and so again adopted a policy of concili
ation. At the end of October, 1813, they declared a general amnesty.
Many Serbian leaders, including the head of the next phase of the Ser
bian national movement, Milos Obrenovic, took advantage of the offer
and in return were confirmed in local positions of authority. As the
Serbs returned to their homes, the Ottoman soldiers and many Muslims
left the countryside. The Serbs were still armed, and the number of their
potential opponents had decreased.
Despite the conciliatory actions of the Ottoman administration bad
feeling continued to exist between the Christians and Muslims. As in
previous situations nothing had been really decided. In 1814 a local
revolt broke out. Milos Obrenovic, now the oborknez of Rudnik, offered
to put it down on the condition that the rebels received amnesty. Al
though the governor of Belgrade, Suleiman Pasha, had given this assur
ance, many of the participants were massacred following the suppres
sion of the rebellion. Again Serbian fears were aroused; some Serbs fled;
others prepared for revolt. In April, 1815, Milos abandoned his policy of
cooperation with the Porte and this time headed the rebellion. Both
domestic and world conditions now turned in favor of the Serbs. First,
the Serbs.had a decisive advantage numerically in comparison with the
Ottoman forces. Second, the great period of warfare was ending in
Europe; the Batde of Waterloo in June marked the final defeat of Napo
leon. The Porte did not want a major uprising.
With the Porte in a passive mood and with Milos also desiring negotia
tions, both sides could come to an agreement. Serbian delegates now
went to Constantinople where they declared that their rebellion had
been against Suleiman’s misrule and not against the Porte itself. The
Serbs were strengthened by Russian representations in their favor. The
Russian government in fact warned the Porte that it should come to an
agreement or Russia would bring up the question of the enforcement of
Article 8 of the Treaty of Bucharest. Suleiman was removed and re
placed by Mara§li Ali Pasha.
A final oral understanding was reached between Milos and Mara§li Ali
Pasha in November, 1815. Milos now asked for the terms that the Ot
toman government had accepted in 1807, but that Karadjordje had sub
sequently rejected when he decided to fight for independence. It was
agreed that Milos would be recognized as “supreme knez of Serbia,” that
in each province both Serbian and Ottoman officials would serve as
judges in cases involving Serbs, and that a national chancery would be set
up in Belgrade to act as the highest court in the land. Serbian officials
were to collect the taxes, and land payments were to be settled by an of
ficial firman. Three months later Mahmud II issued a firman confirming
the spirit of this arrangement. The Serbs were also given favorable tariff
and trading privileges, and janissary families were excluded from own
ing land. A Serbian and an Ottoman official were to serve together in
charge of towns and military installations. A full amnesty was also
granted.
These terms did not make Serbia a truly autonomous state within the
empire. Full autonomy was not achieved until 1830, but the period of ac
tive revolt and military conflict had been brought to a close. The next
steps were to be achieved by diplomatic negotiations and by Russian
pressure on the Porte. A Serbian administration, however, ran the
country and there was a recognized national leader. A strong basis had
been set for future national development.
The head of the new government was not, of course, the revolutionary
hero Karadjordje, but Milos who had excelled in negotiation rather than
in fighting. Like his predecessor, Milos soon faced opposition within the
state, much of it coming from supporters of Karadjordje. In 1817
Karadjordje returned to Serbia to seek support for a planned Greek in
surrection. Fearing his political strength, Milos had him murdered and
sent his head to Mara§li, who had it stuffed and presented to the sultan.
The subsequent feud between the Obrenovic and Karadjordjevic dynas
ties, which colored so much of later Serbian history, arose from this
event.
CHAPTER 3
The Greek Revolution
I n contrast to the Serbian revolution, which made little impression on

general European diplomacy, the Greek revolt became the main interna
tional problem of the 1820s. In fact, outside intervention was to be more
influential in determining the final outcome than were the actions of the
Greek leaders themselves. In the same manner the subsequent evolution
of Greek political life was to remain heavily dependent on the attitude of
the great powers.
In addition the extreme social complexity of Greek conditions influ
enced the course of the revolution there. As we have seen, the Serbian
revolt was carried on by a peasant people, fighting what was essentially a
guerrilla war under local military leaders. Serbian society was not sophis
ticated or highly differentiated. Although there was a merchant class
and large landowners, they were closely associated with the land and the
village. The Greek world, as previously described, introduced other ele
ments into the situation. The first direct steps toward revolution were
taken by Greeks living outside of Greece proper—merchants in the cities
and trading communities of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, the
Phanariotes of Constantinople, and Greeks living in the Principalities.
These groups were joined by some of the notables and upper clergy of
Greece proper. Once the revolution was underway in the Pelopon
nesus and Rumeli (mainland Greece) it involved military men and peas
ant followers. The essential split between the social and economic
groups was reflected in a civil war that was waged parallel with the fight
against Ottoman rule. In general, in the land held by the revolutionary
forces, the notables of the mainland, the Phanariotes, and the wealthy
shipowners found common cause against the military elements with
their peasant followers. The situation, however, was never clearcut.
Competition between individual military leaders and among the upper
group for predominant power in the movement cut across social lines.
The Greek Revolution 39
Regional differences were also significant. Men from Rumeli, the Pelo
ponnesus, and the islands could compete with each other or form alli
ances.
Constantly shifting allegiances and the struggle between individuals
prevented the rise of a strong leader. In contrast to the Serbian revolt
there is no one man who stands out in the Greek revolution. Similarly,
the Greeks were unable to form a single stable government to carry
through the revolution. Repeated outbreaks of civil war prevented the
formation of a united national government until 1827. The regime es
tablished at that time fell apart four years later when its president was as
sassinated. The final victory of the revolutionary movement found the
land in a condition of political chaos.
As there was to be no permanent governmental authority, there was
also no lasting military command. Individual military leaders, such as
Theodore Kolokotrones in the Peloponnesus and George Karaiskakes in
Rumeli, directed the operations of their own men. The Greeks fought
not as a national army but in guerrilla bands. The geography of the land
made this a practical and recommended method of warfare. The nega
tive feature was the damage that these troops often did to their own
countryside and their own people. The military commanders also used
their troops against each other or against the civilian government. The
same problems were to be found in the organization of the navy, which,
although it became very effective against Ottoman shipping, was also
plagued with problems of insubordination and revolt.
Reflecting well the divisions in the Greek world, the revolution had its
origins in two separate spheres: the outer world of the merchant, the
Phanariote, and the diaspora, and the inner world of the mainland of
Greece with its military elements and its peasant people. The first revolt
centered in the Danubian Principalities; the second arose from the con
ditions in Greece proper and from the attempt of Mahmud II to put
down the revolt of Ali Pasha. The first was highly organized with an
ideology gready influenced by western thought; the second, similar to
the Serbian revolt, arose on the old basis of the reaction of a Christian
Orthodox peasantry against Ottoman misgovernment and general con
ditions of chaos and lawlessness.
The activities of the Greeks overseas centered in what was perhaps
the most remarkable and successful of Balkan revolutionary organiza
tions, the Philike Hetairia, or Society of Friends. Founded by three im
poverished Greek merchants in Odessa in 1814, this group enlisted
widespread support, particularly among merchant and professional
groups on the lower level. Wealthy established merchants and peasants
were seldom found among its members. Organized on the model of the
Masons and other revolutionary bodies, it had an elaborate ritual and
different grades and placed a great emphasis on secrecy and conspiracy.
In 1818 the Hetairia moved its headquarters to Constantinople, which,
although it was the Ottoman capital, contained a large Greek popula
tion. Serious preparations were then made for revolt. The aim was to be
a general Balkan uprising supported by the Russian government.
Russian assistance was central in the plans of the society. In fact, its
leaders in arguing for their program gave every hint that Russian back
ing was assured. They spoke of a mysterious arche at the head of the soci
ety who might be Tsar Alexander I himself. In the past the Russian gov
ernment had indeed shown an interest in Balkan resistance to the
Ottoman Empire. In 1770 the Russian government had given encour
agement to the ill-fated revolt in the Peloponnesus. In subsequent trea
ties Russia had extended at least a claim to be the protector of Balkan
Orthodoxy and to have special rights to speak for the Serbs and Roma
nians. Moreover, many of the Russian consuls in the Balkans, who were
mosdy Greek, were members of the Hetairia; other Russian officials also
knew of the society and its goals.
In preparation for the revolution the society needed a leader with
prestige. The obvious first choice was John Capodistrias, a Greek from
the Ionian Islands who was then Russian foreign minister. Although he
declined, another Greek in Russian service accepted. Alexander Ypsilan-
tes, the son of a former hospodar of Wallachia, and at the time an aide-de-
camp of the tsar, now took charge of the organization of the revolt.
Other influential Greeks in Greece proper were also recruited. Particu
larly important were Theodore Kolokotrones, Petrobey Mavromichales,
an important notable in Mani in the Peloponnesus, and Germanos, the
Bishop of Patras. Agents of the society combed Greece to gain converts
and establish cells. Since the ideal of the society initially was a general
Balkan uprising, attempts were made to enlist other nationalities. Here,
too, much success was achieved; Bulgars, Romanians, and Serbs joined
as well as Greeks. In time the society had hundreds of branches and a
large membership.
Initially, the society planned that the first actions should be under
taken simultaneously in Serbia and in the Peloponnesus. Unfortunately,
conditions in Serbia were not favorable for such an event. The Hetairia
was successful in recruiting Karadjordje, who had been living in exile
but who in 1817 returned to Serbia to present the Greek plans. The
whole idea of an uprising, however, was in contradiction to the basic
ideas of Milos on how Serbia should act. Whereas Karadjordje favored
revolutionary tactics, Milos believed that Serbia could best gain her goals
through evolutionary means and by cooperating with the sultan. More
over, Milos was at this time engaged in negotiations with the Porte on
gaining the title of hereditary prince. He did not want these discussions
interrupted, and he did not think that his country was prepared for
another conflict. The entire issue also became involved in Serbian inter
nal politics. Karadjordje had become a political rival; some of Milos’s
other opponents, such as Stojkovic, had joined the society. The execu
tion of Karadjordje in 1817 ended any possibility that Serbia might join
in the plans for a general revolution.
The Danubian Principalities were finally chosen as an alternative. Al
though these lands were predominantly Romanian, there was a great
deal of logic in this decision. First, it must be remembered that the He-
tairia saw itself as leading a general Balkan uprising. The Principalities
had become a center for Serbian and Bulgarian refugees. In addition,
within Moldavia and Wallachia the chief political influence was Greek;
the Phanariote regimes controlled the administration of both provinces.
Michael Sutu (Soutsos), the hospodar of Moldavia, was a member of the
Hetairia. Support was also to be expected from the Romanian upper
clergy, which was Greek-dominated, and the large landowners, many of
whom were Greek or had close ties with the Phanariote regime. Most im
portant was to be the initial cooperation of Tudor Vladimirescu, who
now emerged as the leader of a Romanian national movement based on
the peasants and the small landowners. A member of the Hetairia, Vla
dimirescu at first joined in the Greek plans.
The choice of the Principalities was also determined by the weakness
of the Ottoman forces stationed there. The few Ottoman soldiers in the
land were concentrated in the Danubian forts. There were no Ottoman
officials in the countryside where the local militia was in the hands of
men whom the Hetairia considered dependable supporters.
Despite the favorable situation in the Romanian provinces Russian
support was recognized as essential for success. The Hetairia expected
that Russia would be forced to intervene should the revolt break out in
the Romanian lands because she had exerted such great political influ
ence there in the past. According to an agreement reached between Rus
sia and the Porte in 1802, Ottoman troops could not be sent into the
Principalities without Russian consent. The revolutionary leaders could
well expect that the tsarist government would either send in troops itself
or that it would prevent the entrance of Ottoman forces.
In the spring of 1821 the Hetairia commenced the revolt under the di
rection of Ypsilantes. The assured support of Vladimirescu and the fact
that Ottoman forces were tied up with the suppression of Ali Pasha in
Greece were factors in^the determination of the time for action. The He
tairia kept in close touch with events in Greece proper, where it was ex
pected that a similar revolt would soon break out.
From the beginning the revolution in the Principalities was a disaster.
No general Balkan uprising followed; during the entire period Serbia
did not move to hinder or embarrass the Porte. More important, not only
did Russia not give assistance, but the tsar denounced the entire action.
Alexander I was at the Congress of Laibach, which had been called to
discuss the revolutionary movements in Italy and Spain, when he re
ceived word of the revolt. Under the influence of the Austrian minister
Prince Metternich and the spirit of the Holy Alliance, the tsar saw this
uprising as another instance of a general European conspiracy. He dis
avowed the revolt and did not move to prevent the entrance of Ottoman
troops into the provinces.
The revolutionary movement also met severe reversals within the
Principalities. When Russian intervention did not occur, the relations be
tween the Greeks and Romanians began to deteriorate. The majority of
Romanians, regardless of social strata, disliked the rule of the Phanari-
otes. The Hetairia was essentially a Greek nationalistic organization;
there was no basic Romanian interest in a great Greek victory. Even
more serious, under Tudor Vladimirescu the movement soon acquired a
strong social character. Peasants throughout the country used the op
portunity to rise against their landowners. Vladimirescu himself was in a
very difficult position. Finally, realizing that the revolt would not suc
ceed, he tried to save himself by initiating negotiations with the Ottoman
authorities. The Hetairia, aware of this, kidnapped him. Ypsilantes then
had him executed on May 27. With his death any hope of a united
Romanian support behind the Hetairia died.
Meanwhile the Ottoman troops had entered the Principalities. At the
beginning of the movement Greek forces had massacred the Ottoman
populations of Jassy and Galap. Reprisals were to be expected. Ypsi
lantes and the “Sacred Battalion,” as the strongest Greek unit was called,
were decisively defeated at the Batde of Draga§ani. In June Ypsilantes
fled to Austria where he was imprisoned for the next nine years. The
revolution in the Principalities was at an end.
Although the Hetairia had failed in the Romanian lands, by the sum
mer of 1821 a similar revolt was well underway in Greece proper. Here
the entire situation was to prove much more favorable, and conditions
more closely resembled those in Serbia with the armed peasant popula
tion and the experienced military men. The Hetairia had, of course,
been extremely active here, and preparations for revolution had been
discussed. The involvement of Greek bands against Ottoman troops first
occurred when Mahmud II decided to settle the problem of Ali Pasha. A
situation soon arose that resembled Selim I l l ’s attempt to suppress the
janissaries in Serbia.
Faced with a determined Ottoman army in 1819 and 1820, Ali Pasha
found himself in a dangerous position. Although he relied on Muslim
support and despite the fact that he had previously denounced the He
tairia to the Porte, Ali was forced to seek Greek and Albanian aid. He
tried to make himself popular in the Christian villages through the re
duction of taxes and labor dues. He appealed in particular to the Kape-
tanioi (captains, military men) of Rumeli to join him against the Ottoman
forces.
At first Ali failed to gain Greek support. In August, 1820, Mahmud’s
troops began to move rapidly forward. Ali was finally forced to withdraw
into the fortress of Janina with about two thousand supporters. Al
though the Ottoman army held the surrounding land, Ali was able to
defend himself in the city. During these operations Greek military men
had first fought with the Ottoman soldiers. When these forces began to
ravage the land, however, the Greeks changed sides. By early 1821 some
five to seven thousand Greek mountain fighters had joined Ali. The Ot
toman army now found itself in the weaker position.
While Greeks were fighting Ottoman soldiers in northern Greece, the
Peloponnesus became the center of what was to be the main Greek re
volt. Although the Hetairia had a network in Greece, the movement
here was not coordinated closely with that in the Principalities. By the
time the news of Ypsilantes’ crossing of the Pruth reached Greece, the
events leading to the revolution were well underway.
Like the Danubian Principalities, the Peloponnesus was a logical place
for the organization of Greek resistance. The area enjoyed at this time a
type of political autonomy that was very similar to what the Serbs had
sought and finally won only after years of fighting and negotiations. In
each local community Greek officials were in control. Moreover, there
were executive and legislative organs for the entire region. Each com
munity elected representatives to a provincial body, which in turn chose
members for the Peloponnesian Senate. This chamber had virtual con
trol over administration and taxation of the area. In addition, the Greeks
chose two representatives to sit with two Muslims to form the permanent
council of the vezir. of the Peloponnesus. The territory also had the right
to send representatives directly to the Porte to discuss demands and
grievances.
Although Greek nationals thus controlled the local government, the
assemblies were in practice dominated by the large landowners. These
notables, together with the higher clergy, were not under all circum
stances interested in revolt against Ottoman authority. They were a part
of the existing order, and they had vested interests in protecting the Ot
toman regime. The clergy were also divided in their attitude. The revo
lutionary doctrines of groups like the Philike Hetairia could be in direct
opposition to the tenets of Orthodox Christianity. In the past the church
had not only cooperated in the Ottoman political system, but it had
firmly resisted influences from the West. The secular and rational lean
ings of the revolutionary ideology were more of a threat to the power of
the church than was the increasingly feeble Ottoman rule.
The hand of these groups was, however, forced by events. Because of
rumors of impending revolt, as a test of loyalty the Ottoman authorities
in March summoned the notables of the Peloponnesus to a meeting at
Tripolitsa. A large number complied and were held hostage once the
revolt broke out. Others, particularly those from the northern part of
the peninsula, resisted. The revolution was officially proclaimed almost
concurrently, around April 6, by Bishop Germanos in Patras and by Pe-
trobey of Mani in Kalamata. It will be noticed that the movement in
Greece proper thus contrasts with that in the Principalities. There was
not a centrally organized and planned rising in the Peloponnesus.
Agents of the Philike Hetairia had pressed circumstances to the point
that some notables were so compromised that they had to proclaim the
revolt. Others joined because of Ottoman measures. As in Serbia, the
Greeks reacted to events; the first fighting was done by military groups
and by peasant bands under local leaders. This pattern was to be main
tained throughout the revolt.
The Ottoman reaction to the Greek defiance was at first weak. The
authorities had already more than they could handle with the uprising in
the Principalities, the problem of Ali Pasha, and a war with Persia which
was also in progress. They were, however, forced to take some action. As
in the Principalities, wholesale massacres of Muslim civilians had been
among the initial acts of the Greek rebels. The destruction of the Muslim
population of Tripolitsa in October, 1821, was particularly bloody. Ot
toman reprisals followed a similar line. On Easter eve, before the first
sizeable Greek massacres of Muslims in insurgent Greece, a group of
janissaries hanged the patriarch of Constantinople and some of his bish
ops in front of their church. Greeks in the Ottoman capital and else
where were attacked and killed. Throughout the revolution both sides
repeatedly committed atrocities; mutual reprisal and massacres were
weapons in the type of guerrilla war waged. It was the Ottoman acts,
however, and not the Greek, that received publicity and attention in Eu
rope, including Russia. This fact was to influence strongly European
public opinion and to be a cause of European intervention. The Ot
toman massacre of an estimated three thousand inhabitants of the island
of Chios in April, 1822, was to make a particularly strong impression.
Although the Ottoman forces did suppress the revolt in the Principali
ties, they were at first able to make little headway against the movement
in Greece. Until Ali Pasha was finally defeated and died in February,
1822, the Porte did not have an army available. The war in the Greek
lands was also very difficult to conduct; the Greeks were fighting on their
own territory, and the terrain was ideal for guerrilla tactics. The Ot
toman troops simply could not stamp out bands operadng in inaccessible
mountains. Moreover, the rebels early established a firm base of opera
tions. By the summer of 1822 they held the Peloponnesus and many
islands. The most important of these, Hydra, Spetsai, and Psara, became
vital for the revolution as centers for the organization of a naval force
and for supplies. North of the Isthmus of Corinth the Greeks were also
able to hold Misolonghi, Athens, and Thebes with the surrounding area.
Misolonghi became particularly significant. The.revolt remained con
centrated in this restricted area. Outbreaks in other parts of the Greek-
inhabited lands were suppressed. The problem for the Ottoman govern
ment was to subdue this section. Its armies, setting out from Thessaly
and Epirus, normally operated from Rumeli and from there organized
campaigns into the Peloponnesus.
In the first period of the revolt, from 1821 to 1825, the rebels were
able to hold their main positions. Aided by their close knowledge of the
sea, they managed to organize very effective naval forces against Otto
man sea transport. These fleets operated more as pirates than as a for
mal fighting unit, but they did maintain contact with the outside world.
Although the Greeks were thus able to meet the external threat of the
Ottoman troops, they were to prove less successful in dealing with their
internal problems. In fact, whenever pressure from the Ottoman mili
tary lessened, the revolutionary leaders turned against each other. Paral
lel with the struggle against the Ottoman Empire, we find in the Pel
oponnesus the outbreak of a civil war between the forces who had
previously joined to support the uprising.
After the outbreak of the fighting the need to provide some sort of
central authority was recognized. Also at this time, chiefly because of the
reprisals taken against Greeks by the Ottoman authorities, prominent
Greeks from the outer Greek world began to arrive in the country. They
brought with them their more sophisticated political experiences, their
better formal education, and often a belief in many of the political prin
ciples of the French Revolution. In June, 1821, Demetrios Ypsilantes,
the brother of Alexander, arrived. The appearance of the Phanariote
Alexander Mavrokordatos was also to prove politically significant. Ypsi
lantes now favored the convening of an assembly and the formation of a
unitary state with a centralized leadership. Supported by the military
leaders, in particular by Theodore Kolokotrones, he sought to place
himself at the head of this government. In December, 1821, an assembly
meeting at Epidaurus established a government and in January, 1822,
issued a constitution. Here the civilian elements, the islanders and the
Peloponnesian notables, with Mavrokordatos particularly prominent,
were able to gain the regime that they wished. The model for the consti
tution of Epidaurus was the French Directory; the aim was specifically to
prevent the concentration of authority in the hands of one man. The ex
ecutive power was invested in a five-man committee headed by Mavro
kordatos. Realizing that the real strength of the state remained in the
regions of Greece, Mavrokordatos soon withdrew to Misolonghi to
create a firm local base for himself. This government, dominated by no
tables and islanders, was not respected by Kolokotrones and his military
and peasant followers.
In December, 1822, a second national assembly was held at Astros.
Here some attempts were made to centralize the government, but the
chief concern of the members was Kolokotrones. In an attempt to assure
civilian control of the military actions, Kolokotrones was deprived of his
military command. He reacted by kidnapping some members of the gov
ernment and forcing others to flee. Two centers of authority now ap
peared. Kolokotrones held the important city of Nauplion; the civilian
representatives setded at Kranidi where they were in close touch with
Hydra and Spetsai. Here a government was formed under George
Kountouriotes, who represented the islands and was the wealthiest man
in Greece. He was joined by Andrew Zaimes, a Peloponnesian notable,
and John Kolettes, who was to be important in future Greek politics. A
Vlach from Epirus, Kolettes had come to the Peloponnesus in 1821. He
had previously been connected with the court of Ali Pasha, and he had
great influence among the military men of Rumeli. In the future he was
to stand for the interests of that area.
In the struggle between the two centers the advantages lay with the ci
vilian group at Kranidi, which was closer to a legitimate political author
ity. Its victory was assured when it received a British loan in 1824. Kolo
kotrones himself surrendered Nauplion in return for a sum of money.
Despite this settlement the Greek political scene did not stabilize. At the
end of 1824 civil war broke out again. The islands and Rumeli now
fought against the Peloponnesus; soldiers from Rumeli made devastat
ing raids into the Peloponnesus.
By 1825 the Greek and Ottoman forces faced a stalemate. The Porte
could not crush the revolutionaries in the Peloponnesus and Rumeli; the
rebels had not enlarged their area of control and they had squandered
their resources in internal fighting. This balance was broken when Mah
mud II decided to call in his vassal Mohammed Ali, the pasha of Egypt.
This action was to change the entire situation in the eastern Mediterra
nean and to lead to foreign intervention.
Mohammed Ali placed a high price on his services. He was promised
the island of Crete, and his son Ibrahim Pasha was to become the gover
nor of the Peloponnesus. Crete was taken with little difficulty. In Febru
ary, 1825, an Egyptian army landed in the Peloponnesus. The undis
ciplined Greek soldiers could not match the trained and modern
Egyptian troops. The Greeks now paid the price for the years they had
wasted in internal strife; they were not prepared to meet a major assault.
Parallel with the Egyptian operations in the south, the Ottoman army
pressed the attack in the north. In April, 1826, the major stronghold of
Misolonghi fell; in June the Acropolis in Athens was in Ottoman hands.
The revolution appeared lost. Only a major foreign intervention could
save the Greek cause.
The decisive importance of foreign, that is Russian, intervention in
Serbian affairs and the disastrous effect of Alexander’s denunciation of
the revolt in the Principalities has already been shown. The Russian atti
tude toward the Greek national movement, however, was extremely
complex. Alexander I was indeed at this time strongly conservative, and
in Europe he joined with Metternich in demanding the repression of
revolutionary activity. He was nevertheless the tsar of a country that had
obligations toward Orthodox Christians and had already made claims to
be the protector of the Orthodox population of the empire. The hang
ing of the patriarch and the massacre of Greek populations were not ac
tions that could be so easily tolerated. The suppression of a political
rebellion could be allowed; a Holy War was another matter. Russian eco
nomic interests were also involved with the fate of Greek shipping in the
Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The civil war had disrupted com
merce and made the seas unsafe. In the summer of 1821 the worsening
of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte led first to an ul
timatum and then to the severing of relations. In these negotiations the
Russian government showed itself primarily interested in the protection
of Orthodoxy and in conditions in the Principalities rather than in a
movement for Greek liberation. This emphasis in the Russian attitude
was to continue. In the first years after the Greek revolt began neither
Russia nor the other European powers wanted a war in the Balkans over
the issue.
Although Russian attention lessened after 1821, interest in Greek af
fairs in the West began to rise. In August, 1822, George Canning fol
lowed Robert Castlereagh as prime minister in Britain. British policy still
called for the maintenance of the power and prestige of the Ottoman
Empire as a check against Russia, but Canning was more flexible in his
attitude. The revolt was also upsetting British commerce in the area and
having an unsettling effect on the Ionian Islands, which were under
British protection. When the Porte was unable to stamp out the rebel
lion, the British government felt itself drawn into the affair. What it
wished to avoid at all costs was the establishment of an autonomous or
independent Greece under Russian control. Canning now came to adopt
a policy that called for cooperation with Russia and then with France on
Greek problems. The aim was to bind the two powers in order to prevent
them from acting in a manner damaging to British interests.
The British as well as other governments also had to face a strong
wave of public opinion. The Greek cause was immensely aided by the
great movement of romantic Philhellenism. All of the leading statesmen
of Europe from London to St. Petersburg had received a classical educa
tion. They, like the other educated members of their society, tended to
see in the modern Greeks the direct descendants of their schoolbook
heroes. They imagined a noble, brave, and beautiful people, closely
resembling classical sculptures, batding frightful Muslim hordes. More
over, the first Greek constitutions were liberal in form and adopted from
western models. European liberals thus saw in the revolt a social and po
litical struggle sympathetic to their persuasions. Philhellenes came from
all segments of society. Many, particularly from the German states, came
to fight in Greece. Most influential for the Greek cause was to be the sup
port of the Bavarian king Ludwig I and the poets Byron and Shelley. In
Russia the religious note of embattled Orthodoxy was added.
On the basis of British self-interest and popular support Canning
began to take a series of measures. In 1823 the Greeks were recognized
as belligerents; this gave them certain advantages in naval warfare. In
1824 the City of London granted the Greek government a loan with a
face value of three million pounds. This transaction was characterized by
fraudulence and maladministration; nevertheless, it gave some British
financiers a stake in Greece’s future. Other loans were to follow. Even
more significant was Canning’s move toward cooperation with Russia.
Certainly, both London and St. Petersburg had many interests in com
mon in the Greek question despite their antagonism in other areas. Nei
ther liked the involvement of Mohammed Ali; both had been harmed by
the commercial interruptions and wanted peaceful conditions restored.
In 1825 Alexander I died and was succeeded by the more conservative
Nicholas I. Nicholas proved to be an even greater opponent of revolu
tionary movements than his brother had been; he was also more decisive
in his actions. Canning used the occasion of the coronation to send the
Duke of Wellington to Russia. There, in April, 1826, the Protocol of St.
Petersburg was signed. The two powers agreed to mediate between the
Greek rebels and the Ottoman government with the aim of establishing
an autonomous Greek state.
The signing of the agreement signified that Russia would cooperate
with Britain on the matter of Greece. This question was not, however, of
prime concern to the Russian government; the affairs of Serbia and the
Principalities always took precedence. Russia now turned to settle the
issues that had arisen in connection with these regions. In March, 1826,
the Russian government sent an ultimatum claiming that conditions in
Serbia and the Principalities were in violation of the treaties. The Porte
was directed to remove its troops from the Principalities and to restore
the situation that had existed prior to the Greek revolt. The stipulations
of Article 8 of the Treaty of Bucharest were to be carried out in Serbia.
Once again the Ottoman Empire was in a period of severe internal
crisis. In June Mahmud II, after careful internal preparation, finally
took the great step of abolishing the janissaries. Although this measure
was essential for the safety of the state, the Ottoman military forces were
temporarily in disarray. The Porte could thus not easily resist the new
demands that Russia now pressed. Therefore, in October, in the Con
vention of Akkerman, the Russian government received the terms that it
had demanded. This agreement was of profound significance for future
Serbian and Romanian affairs. Russia’s position as the protector of these
areas was acknowledged, and thus her right to interfere in their domes
tic affairs.
Meanwhile France had joined Britain and Russia in a common diplo
matic front. The French government could not stand aside and allow a
major Mediterranean crisis to be mediated without its participation. The
French king, Charles X, was also a Philhellene. In the Treaty of London
of July, 1827, the three signatory powers agreed to try to secure an au
tonomous Greece through mediation between the Porte and the rebels.
The allies, however, did more than sign documents. They now co
operated in establishing a naval blockade of Greece designed to prevent
communication between Egypt and its troops in the Peloponnesus. In
October, 1827, the combined allied squadron entered the Bay of Na-
varino where a Turco-Egyptian fleet lay anchored. Shots were ex
changed and general fighting broke out. As a result the entire Ottoman
fleet was sunk. This action, planned by neither participant, inaugurated
a chain of events that led to direct Russian military intervention in the
Balkans.
The Navarino engagement occurred at a low point in Greek fortunes.
Athens had fallen and the Egyptian troops were victorious. Moreover,
the official British reaction to Navarino was not heartening. Canning had
died two months before, and his successor, Wellington, condemned the
allied action and in effect reversed Canning’s policy. Wellington now
allowed Russia and the Ottoman Empire to go to war. Angered by the
Navarino episode and by other events the Porte denounced the Akker
man convention. War broke out between Russia and the Ottoman Em
pire in April, 1828. Although the Greek question was not really at issue
between the two powers, the war did decide the question of the Greek
national state.
After a difficult campaign in the Balkans, the Russian army finally
reached Adrianople. There in September, 1829, the belligérants signed
the Treaty of Adrianople. At this time the Russian government faced the
question of whether it should seek the partition of the empire and its de
struction as a truly independent power. It was decided that the state
should be maintained, but that Russia should attempt to dominate it.
The terms of the peace were thus not hard. Russia took her reward for
victory in territory in the Caucasus and a confirmation of her protector
50 T h e E s t a b l is h m e n t o f t h e B alkan N a t io n a l St a tes
ate over Serbia and the Danubian Principalities. The treaty also pro
vided for the setdement of the Greek question by international media
tion.
Meanwhile, political conditions had improved temporarily in Greece.
The Kountouriotes government had been replaced by one under Zaimes
after the fall of Misolonghi. JKolokotrones remained a problem. A third
national assembly was held in 1827 and drew up the Constitution of
Troezene. It also took the important step of inviting Capodistrias to
come to Greece as president. Two British Philhellenes, Sir Richard
Church and Alexander Cochrane, were chosen to head the Greek mili
tary and naval forces.
Capodistrias arrived in Greece in February, 1828. He had been dis
missed from Russian service in 1822 and had been living thereafter in
Switzerland. In Greek politics he had the support of Kolokotrones and
his followers and of the Peloponnesian notables. An experienced ad
ministrator, he recognized that the country needed a strong, stable gov
ernment and the support of the great powers. As a result of his past ca
reer and his acquaintance with European liberal political thought, he
attempted to organize Greece according to the theories of the time. He
wished to establish a centralized, bureaucratic administration which
would govern the land justly with due regard for the interests of all of
the social groups.
Immediately Capodistrias encountered a great deal of opposition; he
was never popular with the peasants. He was also unable to control the
distribution of the land. During the revolution Ottoman property that
passed into the hands of the rebels, including the estates, was divided
among those who held the political and military power: the notables and
the military leaders. It was not shared among the peasants. In foreign
relations Capodistria’s position was weakened by the fact that both Brit
ain and France unjustly considered him a Russian partisan.
Despite his difficulties Capodistrias did provide the necessary strong
direction in Greek affairs. Unfortunately, he was assassinated in Octo
ber, 1831. The next administration was headed by three men: Agostino
Capodistrias, the brother of the president, Kolokotrones, and Kolettes.
These divergent leaders soon quarreled, and the country was again
plunged into a state of political anarchy. The failure of the Greeks to
form a stable, lasting administration accounts for the form of govern
ment finally given the country by the great powers. It also helps explain
why Greeks were allowed so small a political role in the first administra
tions established in independent Greece.
As political conditions degenerated in the country, the diplomats con
ferred on the future of Greece. It will be noted that the fundamental
decisions, that is, those concerning the form of government and the per
son of the first ruler, were made by France, Britain, and Russia and not
by representatives of the Greeks. The great powers now determined that
Greece should be independent, not autonomous, but that the state
should receive very reduced boundaries. It was also to have a monarchi
cal form of government. The question of a constitution was left un
decided. The important agreement for Greece was signed in London in
February, 1830. The independent kingdom established in this treaty was
expressly placed under the guarantee of the three powers.
The next task was the selection of a ruler. The crown was first offered
to Leopold of Saxe-Coburg. Though he initially accepted, he later re
fused because he was not satisfied with the boundaries of the state or
with the financial arrangements. He was also not encouraged by Capo-
distrias. The choice of a ruler was to prove difficult since the powers had
agreed that no member of one of their ruling dynasties could hold this
office. Finally, in 1832 the governments agreed on the selection of Otto,
the seventeen-year-old son of King Ludwig of Bavaria. Otto arrived in
Greece in 1833 with a new European loan and with the boundaries of
the state finally set at the Arta-Volos line. He adopted the Greek form of
his name, Othon.
By 1833 a Greek state with a foreign prince had thus been established.
Despite the fact that the territories allotted included most of those held
by the insurgents during the revolution, only about 800,000 Greeks
inhabited the area. Three-quarters of the Greek people remained under
Ottoman rule. Moreover, notwithstanding the apparent success of the
revolutionary movement, it can be argued the Greek nation as a whole
lost more than it gained. The privileged position previously enjoyed by
the Greeks in the empire has already been emphasized. This situation
changed after the revolt in 1821. Greeks continued to serve in high posts
in the Ottoman service, but the prize offices were lost, in particular the
hospodarships of Moldavia and Wallachia, and with them the preemi
nent Greek position in the Principalities. In general, Greeks were now
looked upon with suspicion and hostility by the Ottoman authorities.
The effect was also felt in commercial and financial circles. In Constan
tinople Armenians replaced Greeks as the predominant element in
banking. In the supplying of state and military needs Bulgarian mer
chants gained a stronger role. The Greek merchant communities re
mained, but their special position was lost. In addition, Greek shipping,
on which so many fortunes had been based, had been severely damaged
and had to be rebuilt. Equally tragic for the countryside was the legacy of
ten years of civil war and revolt. Large areas, particularly in the Pelopon
nesus, were completely devastated and their population decimated.
A final negative aspect was the role that the three protecting powers
were henceforth to play in Greek internal and foreign affairs. Although
Greece, unlike Serbia, was now an independent state, she was to be sub
ject to a degree of foreign interference almost as vexatious as Ottoman
control had been. As already seen, Russia had by this time established
herself as the recognized protecting power in Serbia and the Principali
ties, but these states had the advantage that they were dealing with one
government. Greece, in contrast, had to deal with three powers who
usually carried on radically opposing policies in their relations with Ath
ens. O f the three Britain, with her paramount seapower in the Mediter
ranean, was in the strongest position. As will be shown, however, both
France and Russia also exercised great influence on the future of the
country.
CHAPTER 4
The Autonomous Serbian State
With the completion of the agreements of 1815 and 1816, which gave
Serbia a condition of semiautonomy, the Serbian leaders next faced the
task of setting up a national government and organizing the administra
tion of the country. In the next years they confronted the same great
problems that were to beset the statesmen of all of the successor states of
the Ottoman Empire. First, they had to establish the basic framework of
government and decide on the relationship between the central and
local authorities; second, they had to determine the course of the foreign
policy of their country; third, they had to concern themselves with their
internal social and economic conditions.
The main internal political problems remained the same as those that
had existed during the revolutionary period of both Serbia and Greece.
The relationship between Milo§ and opposition notables had yet to be
settled. The question of the establishment of a council or an assembly to
check the executive remained in dispute. In addition, the place of the
Orthodox church in the secular state had to be defined.
In the question of foreign relations two problems were most obvious.
Despite the agreements that had been made the exact status of Serbia
within the empire was not clear. The goal remained the securing of full
autonomy based on a treaty. In addition, the new state contained only a
minority of the Serbian people. A decision had to be made concerning
future expansion and the regions on which attention was to be concen
trated. In foreign affairs relations with the great powers as well as with
the suzerain Porte had to be regulated. Although Russia was by treaty
the protector power, Austria, France, and Britain were to play a role in
Serbian affairs. Russian influence, though strong, was limited by the fact
that the two lands were not contiguous. Adjacent Austria was in a more
advantageous position.
Finally, the Serbian leaders had to meet the enormous problem of
bringing their extremely backward country into the modern world.

Since the overwhelming majority'of the people were peasants, the land
question was of first importance. The government was also faced with
the necessity of establishing a network of communications, of creating
favorable conditions for trade and commerce, and of setting up a na
tional educational system. As will be shown, in the nineteenth century
these aspects of national life were relatively neglected. As in the other
Balkan states, Serbian attention remained fixed primarily on internal
political controversies and on issues related to foreign expansion.
The first political form of the Serbian government was the creation of
Milos Obrenovic and is unique among the Balkan nations. Unlike the sit
uation in Greece, where foreign influence was predominant, Milos was
in control in Belgrade. Like Karadjordje, his position rested on his role
in the revolution. He had been twenty-three when the revolt broke out.
His brother Milan had played a major part in the anti-Karadjordje
groups. When Milan was poisoned, his followers blamed Karadjordje,
whose responsibility was never proved. Milos continued to associate with
his brother’s friends. When Karadjordje fled in 1813 the fact that Milos
remained contributed to his prestige among his compatriots.
As has been seen, Milo§ preferred to win advantages for his country
by negotiation with the Porte rather than by insurrection. Although his
methods, combined with a favorable international situation, did win
gains for Serbia, the prince remained a controversial figure. He came to
power in difficult times. In 1816 Serbia had neither an established cen
tral government and administrative system nor written laws. Milos was
thus faced with the necessity of setting up a state structure and at the
same time dealing with the Ottoman government with the goal of gain
ing more rights and of preventing encroachment on those already at
tained. Milos met the major political problem by simply taking the con
trol of the state into his hands. It has been said that he ran the country
like a Turkish pasha. Opposition came chiefly from those of relatively
equal rank, namely, the notables prominent in the revolutionary period.
By and large he remained popular with the great majority of the peas
antry who had for centuries lived in a patriarchal society under an abso
lute authority. His methods of rule were not in contradiction to their un
derstanding of political power.
Nor did Milos hesitate to use his privileged position to make enormous
profits. Of course, other leaders of revolutionary movements had and
were to act similarly. What was unusual here was the degree of the
prince’s success. MiloS came from a poor family, but in 1837, two years
before his abdication, his personal gross income was 1,600,000 groschen
or 17 percent of the nation’s gross income of 9,500,000 groschen. In
order to acquire this wealth he had used many methods, such as seizing
the choice lands of former Turkish owners, establishing a monopoly on
The Autonomous Serbian State 55
livestock exports and the sale of salt, and maintaining the peasant labor
dues on the land he acquired. He even came to own estates and twelve
villages in neighboring Wallachia. In the 1840s, when he was in exile, he
was regarded as one of the richest men in Europe.
Despite his evident corruption, at least by western standards, Milos did
establish a national regime and he did gain the recognition of Serbian
autonomy. This second achievement was perhaps the most noteworthy
of his career. Obviously, the conditions granted in 1815 were not satis
factory. Milos had been recognized as supreme knez but not as a heredi
tary ruler. The boundaries of the state had not been set, and Ottoman
officials still held some positions. The prince’s first goals thus became the
acquisition of the right of hereditary succession, the settling of the
frontiers at their maximum possible extention, and the removal of all
Ottoman officials and soldiers from Serbian territory.
In his relations with the Porte the prince continued to follow his
former methods of negotiation, including the distribution of bribes. The
delivery of the head of Karadjordje to the sultan and the refusal to aid in
the Greek rebellion were part of his program of collaboration. For Milos
personally, of course, the recognition of his position as hereditary ruler
was of first importance. In 1817 he had a hand-picked assembly proclaim
him hereditary prince, but he needed the assent of the Porte to make
this effective.
Milos’s first successes came not so much because of his own cleverness,
but because he had Russian support. The Convention of Akkerman of
1826, as has been shown, called for the implementation of Article 8 of
the Treaty of Bucharest and placed Serbia under Russian protection.
This clause meant that the prince could expect Russian aid in interna
tional relations. The Treaty of Adrianople of 1829 confirmed these stip
ulations. In 1830 the sultan issued a hatti-sherif (imperial rescript) which
established Serbia as a truly autonomous state. Milo§ was now recognized
as prince of Serbia with the right of succession in his family. By 1830 the
Serbian leaders had thus gained control over their internal affairs. Ser
bian officials administered the country, collected the taxes, and regu
lated church affairs and other major aspects of national life. Ottoman
nationals were forbidden to live in the countryside. The Muslim popula
tion was concentrated in the major fortress cities. Ottoman landed prop
erty was confiscated with the agreement made that the Porte would com
pensate the owners from the Serbian tribute.
The problem of the delineation of the Serbian boundaries remained.
Both the treaties of Akkerman and Adrianople called for the inclusion
in Serbia of the six nahije (districts) that Karadjordje had taken but Milos
had never ruled. Because of his preoccupation with the revolt of Mo
hammed Ali of Egypt, the sultan could not resist these demands. In
November, 1833, he yielded the lands in dispute. Milos’s domain thus
extended to the Timok River in the east and the Danube in the north; in
the south the boundary ran east-west roughly north of the important city
of Nis and then from Raska in a northwesterly direction to the Drina
River, which formed the western frontier. Serbia developed within these
borders until 1878.
With the setding of the crucial issues of autonomy and national
boundaries, more attention could now be paid to the question of who
would control the political power in the state. As has already been
shown, this subject had caused constant difficulties for Karadjordje even
in times of national danger. Two practical choices existed: either the
government would be dominated by a strong leader and his followers, or
it would be controlled by a group of notables. The establishment of cen
tralized control in a sense contradicted Serbian traditions under Ot
toman rule. On the eve of the revolution Serbian authority was patriar
chal in nature and was based on the village and the nahija with the knez
and the notables as the titular leaders. Karadjordje wished to replace this
decentralized system with a strong personal rule. His opponents, basing
their claims on the old system, wished to create a kind of union of local
districts with a collective republican government. They tended to use
western European terminology, talking of constitutions, but they wished
in fact a return to the former order of rule. We have seen how they at
tempted to gain Russian support.
This pattern of political conflict continued throughout Milos’s reign.
It will be noticed that relatively few individuals were involved actively in
the political life of the country. Traditionally, there existed in Serbia the
democratic institution of the skupstina, which was an assembly of armed
males who met outdoors to decide questions of general importance.
During this period national assemblies of this type were indeed called,
but they were not responsible deliberative bodies. They were generally
summoned to ratify decisions or programs drawn up by the prince or
the notables.
Throughout his reign Milos, like Karadjordje, faced repeated chal
lenges from the notables, who now stood for the introduction of a consti
tution or charter which would establish a council or chamber with the
power to check the prince. They were joined in their stand by mer
chants, government officials, and others who did not like the prince’s ar
bitrary methods. The agreement of 1815 between Milos and Mara§li Ali
Pasha had provided for the establishment of a Serbian National Chan
cery. Milos appointed twelve of his supporters among the notables to the
body and then proceeded to ignore it. In the 1820s several rebellions
took place which Milos was able to suppress. The hatti-sherif of 1830
called for an assembly and a council, but the prince refused to put this
stipulation into effect. In 1835 the opposition was able to assemble about
four thousand supporters at a meeting which drew up the so-called
Map. 3. The Expansion of Serbia, 1804-1913
Presentation Constitution. The provisions called for the establishment of

an assembly and a council. Milos appointed a council and again allowed
it no power. The prince had the advantage in that at this time the Porte,
Russia, and the Habsburg Empire were all against the introduction of
constitutions providing for truly representative institutions.
Although Serbia had been hitherto fortunate in that it had been
spared the type of incessant foreign interference suffered by Greece and
the Danubian Principalities, intervention by the powers now determined
internal political events. Both the prince and the opposition sought sup
port in the foreign consulates which were established in the 1830s. An
Austrian mission opened in 1835, a British in 1837, and a French in
1838. Since Serbia was not an independent state, any changes in her po
litical structure were subject to the approval of the Porte, who was in
turn open to outside influence. At this time the French and British gov
ernments came to stand behind the prince and absolutism while Russia
supported the creation of a council of notables as called for in the 1830
hatti-sherif.
Negotiations on the subject were held in Constantinople. Here in 1838
the sultan issued the so-called Turkish Constitution, which was to be the
basis of Serbian government until 1869. This document, which resem
bled the Organic Statutes at that time in force in the Principalities, was
more an administrative statute than a constitution. It contained no gen
eral declarations of the rights and duties of citizens. The real power in
the government was placed in the hands of a council of seventeen
members who were appointed by the prince, but who held their offices
for life unless they were dismissed for crimes. The ruler and the council
shared the legislative functions. All laws and taxes had to be approved by
the council, but the prince had the right of absolute veto. The ministers
were made responsible to the council. In 1839 an amendment was in
troduced which provided that the ministers would have to be appointed
from the members of the council. The constitution also regulated the
civil service, the judicial system, and other aspects of state administra
tion.
Despite its obvious deficiencies this constitution did end the period of
absolute rule in Serbia. The prince was no longer supreme executive,
legislator, and judge. The government of the country now rested on a
written charter. For the next two decades, basing its control on this stat
ute, the council held the real power in Serbian political life.
In addition to the establishment of the central government on a firm
legal foundation, the reign of Milos also witnessed the imposition of a
centralized bureaucratic system on the local government of the country.
At the beginning of his reign it was in the prince’s interest to centralize
the administration of the country; the communities were the focus of the
opposition to his rule. It was thus important to the maintenance of his
position that the local officials should represent the central government
and not the areas to which they were assigned. He first assured this con
dition by seeing that the oborknez in the nahija was his appointee and paid
by him. He also rendered the local assemblies powerless. His measures
did effectively break the traditional system of local authority. From this
time on in the communities the most important offices, including the
police, were under the control of the central government.
To establish an effective national administrative system Miloä needed
literate officials, a requirement that presented a problem in the Serbia of
that day. He and his successors were forced to employ Serbs from the
Habsburg Empire, where a better education was available. Milo§ had a
feeling of contempt for those who worked under him. He kept a firm
hold on them and he tended to treat government officials as personal
servants. Their numbers rose quickly. By the end of Milos’s reign they
numbered 672 of which 201 were police. Naturally, these officials
formed an interest group in the state. Their prime political objective
came to be the protection of their own position and tenure in office.
Milos also had to deal with the problem of the church and its relation
to the state. Obviously, the church of the autonomous principality could
not remain under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople and
of an institution that was largely Greek in national composition. In the
hatti-sherif of 1830 the sultan agreed to restore the autonomy of the Serb
ian church which had been abolished in 1766. This settlement was con
firmed by the patriarch in 1832. Serbian Orthodoxy was thus freed of
Greek Phanariote control. MiloS was now able to regulate ecclesiastical
matters as he wished. Like other Orthodox princes, he regarded the
church as a state institution. The Metropolitan of Serbia was given the
tide of Metropolitan of Belgrade and of all Serbia. The most influendal
man to hold this post was Peter Jovanovic, who held office from 1833 to
1859. Educated in the Habsburg Empire, he introduced reforms mod
eled on the Serbian church in the Austrian lands, an action which Milos
approved.
In foreign policy, as we have seen, the prince’s efforts were directed
primarily toward widening Serbian autonomy. Throughout his reign he
consistently avoided foreign adventures and he refused to participate in
national uprisings. His goal remained the attainment of further advan
tages from the Porte through negotiation.
For Serbia the question of economic and social development involved
primarily the condition of the peasantry, who comprised 95 percent of
the population. Their great aim was the full control of the land they
tilled. The revolution did result in the end of Ottoman ownership of
property in the countryside; for the mass of the people this was the
major achievement of the revolt. Once the uprising had commenced life
was made impossible for Turkish landowners in the villages. In 1815 the
chiftliks were abolished; in 1830 the spahis lost the right to collect dues.
The removal of the Ottoman system did not, however, bring any finan
cial benefits to the peasant who now paid a 10 percent tax to the state,
and his labor dues went to public works such as roads and bridges.
Milo#, as we have seen, used the corvée to cultivate his private lands. In
fact, autonomy brought thç peasant higher psyments than he had car
ried previously.
The increase in the tax burden was due not only to the higher costs of
the government, but to the changing economic conditions as well. Under
Turkish rule the peasant had lived under a natural and not a money
economy. He produced almost all that he needed; his taxes were in kind.
With the foundation of the new state, which was endeavoring to set up a
modern political structure, taxes had to be paid in cash. Moreover, de
sirable manufactured goods and luxuries were now available in the mar
ket. The peasant needed items like salt, but he had a strong desire to buy
products such as coffee, sugar, tobacco, and candles. Imported or do
mestic machine-manufactured metal products such as nails, needles, and
plows were obviously more efficient than crude handmade items. The
necessity of earning a cash income led the peasant to become more inter
ested in raising a crop that could be marketed than in providing for all of
the needs of his family. This development also paved the way for the
dissolution of inefficient rural collective agricultural units, such as the
zadruga.
Milos was personally concerned about the welfare of the peasants, who
supported his position against the notables. Although the peasant had
gained control of his land, it was soon apparent that he might lose it
through unwise borrowing. The Homestead Act of 1836 was designed to
prevent the peasant families from having all of their possessions confis
cated by their creditors. The law set up a minimum—a house, a small
plot of land, and some livestock—that was believed necessary to support
a peasant household and that could not be taken away. In practice the
enforcement of this measure was lax. In 1860-61 and 1873 further legis
lation was necessary.
Among the most impressive of the changes during Milos’s reign was
the gradual alteration of the character of the cities. Previously, these had
been market and administrative centers with a predominant Ottoman,
Greek, and Jewish population. With autonomy the Ottoman officials and
artisans began to leave. Serbian merchants slowly replaced their Greek
and Jewish counterparts in the import trade, and they rapidly gained
control of the export trade, mainly in livestock.
The question of the establishment of a national educational system
also arose at this time. At first little was done. Moreover, the situation
was difficult. Serbia had few schools and inadequate supplies of books
and paper. There was a dearth of capable teachers. More attention was
paid to the question after 1830. In 1833 the first law on elementary
schools was passed. Although the state needed educated civil servants, a
secondary school system was not established. In 1831 the first printing
press was set up in Belgrade, but the problem of paper remained. Under
these conditions the center of Serbian cultural life remained in the
Habsburg Empire.
In 1839, almost immediately after the promulgation of the constitu
tion, Milos left the country, preferring not to rule under the restrictive
conditions. His son and successor, Milan, died within a month. Michael,
the second son, was only seventeen and thus governed through a
regency. After three years, this regime was overthrown; Michael fled the
country. An assembly, dominated by the opposition to the Obrenovic
family, then chose as the new prince Alexander Karadjordjevic, the son
of the revolutionary hero.
This radical change of leadership marked the complete victory of the
backers of the Constitution of 1838 and what was now known as the
Constitutionalist Party. That party was composed of notables, bureau
crats, merchants, and others who stood against absolute government
such as that of Milos. The group wanted to establish the rule of law and
an orderly administrative system that would in fact benefit their own in
terests and which they could control. They stressed legality, greater eco
nomic freedom, and the advance of education. In theory they wanted
written uniform laws which would be administered fairly by tribunals
free from the control of the prince. They were not democratic or equali-
tarian, and they were not for the regulation of national life by the state.
The leaders were Toma Vucic-Perisic, Avram Petronijevic and, most im
portant, Ilija Garasanin.
Despite the council’s apparent strength with this group in control, the
constitutionalist period was marked by a continual struggle of this body
with the prince. In this contest Alexander was in a weak position; he did
not have a strong character and he was not a hereditary prince. The
right of automatic succession had been granted only to the Obrenovic
dynasty. Moreover, Alexander did not have a powerful following in the
country. At issue, in particular, was the status of the cabinet of ministers,
whose members were appointed solely from the council. Clashes be
tween the supporters of the prince and those of the council became
stronger after 1855. At that time Alexander’s closest advisers, who re
sented the fact that they were powerless before the council and the Con
stitutionalists, urged the prince to dismiss the council members and
other officials without seeking the concurrence of the Porte, as was
required by the constitution. This recommendation, together with the
discovery of a plot on his life, impelled Alexander to attempt to rid him
self illegally of his opponents. When he did this, the Ottoman govern
ment forced him to return some of the officials to their posts.
Those in opposition to the prince wished to resolve this crisis by sum

moning an assembly, which would decide the limits of the prince’s au
thority. The Constitutionalists thought they could use this means to get
rid of Alexander. The proposal was also backed by those who desired to
bring back the Obrenovic dynasty and by the men who were to constitute
the future Liberal Party. Composed primarily of young intellectuals who
had been educated abroad, this group sought to go beyond the establish
ment of the rule of law and introduce guarantees of civil rights and dem
ocratic reform. Romantics at heart, they liked the idea of an assembly
which they saw as the embodiment of the will of the Serbian people.
They did not approve of the Constitutionalist’s bureaucratic regime.
With Alexander’s consent an assembly was summoned which met in
December, 1858, at Kragujevac. The St. Andrew Assembly, as it was
known, was out of the control of the Constitutionalists. It deposed Alex
ander, but it acclaimed the old Prince Milos prince. The constitutionalist
period thus came to an end; the former absolute ruler was returned by
popular choice.
Despite their defeat at this time the Constitutionalists had achieved
their aim of organizing a centralized, bureaucratic state system and of in
troducing a civil code which included criminal and administrative law as
well as regulations concerning crafts, government officials, local govern
ment, and education. The great achievement of the party, the civil code
of 1844, was taken over almost intact from Austrian prototypes. The sys
tem introduced protected the interests of the Constitutionalists in their
position as state officials. Almost all government posts were held by men
appointed by the government. The laws now assured that they would
hold their positions for life. These provisions created a separate class of
bureaucrats who felt apart from the peasant majority and superior to
others in the state. The division was intensified by the fact that of neces
sity so many offices at first had to be filled by those born and educated
outside of the former pashalik of Belgrade.
As previously explained, because of the lack of literate and educated
men in Serbia, the practice of employing Serbs from the Habsburg Em
pire in the administration had been inaugurated during the reign of
Milos. They were known as precani (men from across the river). Many of
them were able, gifted, and patriotic, but others came because they could
not gain a comparable position in Austria and they wished a comfortable
life. Their great disadvantage was their division in manners and attitude
from the peasant population they were to administer. A fine description
of these officials and the reaction to them in the country has been given
by one authority.
The transriparian Serbs regarded themselves as distinguished bearers of

Western culture, destined to administer the illiterate and “half-savage barbar-
ians” of the Principality. Dress, language and outlook divided them from the
native Serbs. The new “men o f the pen” looked down upon agricultural or
manual labor, demurred against teaching their sons a craft or marrying their
daughters to a craftsman, and for several years wore “German” clothing in
stead o f the Serbian national dress. Instead of saying-“thee” and “thou” in the
homespun manner of the Principality, they employed the German habit—
ridiculous sounding to Serbian ears—of addressing each other in the third
person. Finally they refused to call other Serbians “Brother” in the customary
fashion o f the patriarchal society of Serbia.1
Their domination was not, however, to last. Although higher educa

tion was not soon available within Serbia, native-born Serbs were in
creasingly sent abroad at state expense for their education. Between
1839 and 1855 about fifty students went to institutions outside of the
country. Although the substitution of natives did nothing to bridge the
gap between the bureaucrat and the peasant, the issue of the precani
died down. Since the new group was more impressed by French civiliza
tion and manners, Paris, not Vienna, became the central point from
which henceforth political and literary inspiration was to be drawn.
The Constitutionalist period, while witnessing a strengthening of the
state structure, brought no advances in foreign policy. Nevertheless, the
government was continually interested in the question of national ex
pansion. The best statement of the Serbian views at this time is to be
found in a plan, the Naüertanije, drawn up by GaraSanin in 1844 for the
guidance of Prince Alexander. What the author wished was in fact the
revival of the medieval empire of Tsar DuSan around the nucleus of au
tonomous Serbia. The lands that he wanted joined to Serbia were Bos
nia, Hercegovina, Montenegro, Srem, Banat, Ba£ka, and northern Al
bania with an outlet on the Adriatic, territories that he regarded as
basically Serbian in nationality. He planned first to inaugurate an elabo
rate educational and propaganda campaign among these people and the
Serbs of Hungary. He recognized that the Habsburg Empire would be a
permanent, unalterable foe of this program, and that Russia would also
not give support. He proposed, therefore, that Serbia seek assistance in
Paris and London. This program, as the subsequent plans of the Serbian
government, laid emphasis on the acquisition of lands that were Serbian
and Orthodox in population.
The fall of the constitutionalist regime and the return of Milo§ did not
solve the Serbian political problems. Three centers of power now ex
isted: the prince, the council, and the assembly. The last-named body
was not regularly organized, but it had just been the instrument for
the change of rulers. Two political parties now began to emerge from this
struggle for power within the state institutions. The Liberals remained
1. Traian Stoianovich, “The Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution, 1830-1880,“ Com
parative Studies in Society and History, 1 (March, 1959) 3:243.
the advocates of the supremacy of the assembly; the Conservatives fa

vored the ruler and the council. In January, 1859, a law was passed
calling for an assembly every three years, but one with only advisory
powers. As before, MiloS wanted to rule as an absolute prince. After his
death in 1860 he was succeeded by his son Michael who also became
prince for the second tinie.
The first reign of Michael Obrenovic, 1839-42, had been difficult
because of his youth. He now returned at the age of thirty-seven, a ma
ture and astute politician. Many regard him as the most effective ruler of
modern Serbia. In exile he had traveled widely. He was well educated,
experienced, and he had gained a realistic view of the international situ
ation. His reign coincided with the great age of the national revolutions
in Central Europe. In 1859 Wallachia and Moldavia united to form the
basis for the modern Romanian state. In the 1860s both Italy and Ger
many became unified nations. With these events dominating the Euro
pean scene it was natural that the prince should turn his greatest atten
tion to territorial expansion.
The obvious next step for the Serbian state in international relations
was to secure the complete removal of the Ottoman presence in the
country, that is, the Turkish occupation of several fortresses. Prepara
tion for the acquisition of neighboring Serbian lands could then be
planned. To prepare for these moves Michael first wished to concentrate
state power in his own hands so that he could act more effectively, and
he wanted to strengthen the Serbian army. He also desired to contract
alliances with the other Balkan Christian people in order to form a front
against the Ottoman Empire.
During the reign of MiloS, as we have seen, the Serbian government
was an absolute monarchy and under the Constitutionalist’s regime the
country was controlled by an oligarchy. Michael was now to give the gov
ernment the form, if not the content, of a constitutional monarchy. Al
though he wished to hold supreme power, he was too wise to attempt to
abolish the laws passed previously. He therefore moved to change mat
ters legally. He was able to secure his position through assemblies which
were held, as required, in 1861, 1864, and 1867, but which were in fact
tools in his hands. He did not hesitate to use the police to gain govern
mental majorities, and thus the assembly could be induced to curb its
own powers.
Michael also moved against the bureaucrats by introducing new mea
sures that made them subject to dismissal under certain conditions.
These measures were very popular since these officials had not en
deared themselves to the population. For most of his reign the prince
worked with the Conservative Party. His most prominent minister was
Ilija GaraSanin, who had also been important in the constitutionalist gov
ernment. The Liberal Party, the opposition, was deprived of influence
through the free use of repressive police measures. Its members were
forced to go abroad to publish their attacks on Michael and to organize
their resistance.
Since Michael’s main interest was foreign policy, he was greatly con
cerned with the organization of an effective army. He increased the
number of the militia and reintroduced the revolutionary concept of a
nation in arms. By a law of August, 1861, all males from twenty to fifty
years of age were made subject to military service. Thanks to these mea
sures Serbia, with a population of 1,138,000 in 1863, was able to put
90,000 soldiers in the field. Although it was badly equipped and inade
quately trained, the Serbian army was the most impressive in the Bal
kans. Michael also created a War Ministry and facilities for the training
of officers.
The last signs of Ottoman rule were the garrisons of six fortress cities,
especially Belgrade, which were the scene of constant incidents between
Ottoman and Serbian nationals. In 1862 one such clash resulted in the
shelling of Belgrade by Turkish soldiers. The Serbian government at
once turned to the guarantor powers and demanded the evacuation of
all Ottoman troops. Foreign pressure resulted in the withdrawal of two
garrisons at this time and the rest in 1867. By that date only the flag over
the Belgrade fortress and the annual tribute remained as signs of Ot
toman suzerainty.
Michael’s reign is best known for the system of alliances that he ar
ranged with the neighboring Balkan states. All were, of course, directed
against the Ottoman Empire. An agreement was signed with Mon
tenegro in 1866, with Greece in 1867, and with Romania in 1868. He
also had close relations with Bulgarian revolutionary groups. Enlarging
on GaraSanin’s original concept, the prince considered the inclusion of
Catholic Croatian lands in the nation that he wished to build around the
Serbian nucleus. The negotiations that led to the conclusion of the pacts
demonstrated the incompatability of the basic national ideas of the Bal
kan people.
Michael did not live to see the achievement of any of his major foreign
policy objectives. As his reign progressed, the opposition to his autocra
tic measures increased. In June, 1868, he was assassinated. Since he had
no children, he was succeeded by a cousin, Milan Obrenovic, the son of a
brother of Milo§. In no way was Milan prepared for the position. His
childhood had been troubled and difficult. His mother had been the
mistress of Alexander Cuza, the ruler of Romania. Since he was only
fourteen at the time of his accession, he ruled first under a regency.
The principal achievement of the first part of Prince Milan’s relatively
long reign was the issuance of a new constitution in 1869. This docu
ment was prepared by a constituent assémbly of five hundred delegates.
It is significant that, unlike its predecessor of 1838, this constitution was
formulated without outside interference even though Serbia was still a

part of the Ottoman Empire. In the discussions the regents succeeded in
gaining their desire for a strong executive, but many of the ideas of the
Liberal Party were included. The assembly was now given a stronger
role. In contrast, the council was reduced to the position of an adminis
trative committee. In the assembly three-quarters of the delegates were
to be elected and one-quarter appointed by the prince. The body was to
meet yearly. It had the right to initiate legislation, but only indirectly. In
theory no law could be issued, annulled, amended, or interpreted with
out the assembly’s consent, but these rights were limited in other provi
sions.
The prince retained a strong, if not predominant, position in the state.
The office was declared hereditary in the Obrenovic family. As has been
shown, the ruler appointed a quarter of the members of the assembly.
Moreover, if this body refused to pass the budget, the prince could
dismiss it and operate on the basis of the previous year.
The 1869 constitution, in contrast to that of 1838, contained general
declarations on civil rights—including statements on the equality of all
citizens, property rights, freedom of speech, religion, and the press, and
the right to petition. No mention was made of freedom of assembly or
association. Moreover, the civil rights granted were made subject to the
law of land.
In the years preceding the accession of Milan the country witnessed
some social and economic advances, despite the fact that the attention of
the government was usually focused on political and foreign problems
and not on questions of internal development. Beginning with the reign
of Michael military expenses absorbed an increasing percentage of the
national income. The growth of cities, mentioned before, continued.
The country, however, remained without industrial development. The
one heavy industry was an ironworks, which supplied the army. Handi
crafts still dominated the scene. There were some improvements in in
ternal communications. The number of roads and bridges increased
under Michael. In 1855 the telegraph was introduced, and in 1868 Bel
grade was connected with Vienna and Constantinople. Trade followed
the former pattern with the principal partner still being the Habsburg
Empire, followed by Romania and the Ottoman Empire. The chief ex
ports were livestock and animal products, while the main imports were
manufactured goods and luxury items.
In the countryside the main economic shift was the trend toward the
production of more grain, chiefly corn and wheat, and the decline of
animal husbandry, although the latter remained important for foreign
trade. The great oak forests which had covered the Serbian landscape
were fast disappearing. The peasant no longer had an ample supply of
acorns to feed his livestock, and so he raised fewer pigs. He continued to
face the problem of foreclosure. In 1873 a new homestead law set the
amount of land that the peasant could not be deprived of because of
debt at about eight and a half acres.
During this period further efforts were made to improve education.
The supply of teachers increased, but in 1866 still only 4.2 percent of the
population was literate. Michael, in particular, was interested in making
his country, not Austria, the center of Serbian culture. In the 1850s the
National Library and a museum were set up. A Serbian Royal Academy
of Sciences was founded in the next decade. Interest was also shown in
western European drama and music.
As has been shown above, the entire period of autonomous govern
ment from 1830 to the early 1870s was dominated by political concerns.
The chief issue was the question of who would control the state—the
prince, an oligarchy, or a democratically based assembly. Usually, the
prince was able to maintain the strongest position. When he was not able
to do so, an oligarchy ran the nation. During this period Serbia gained
some additional territory and her rights of self-government were
widened. By the 1870s, in fact, the Porte had lost all influence in deter
mining the pattern of Serbian domestic life. At that time also a radical
shift occurred in the main issues facing the Serbian leaders. Henceforth,
questions of foreign policy and national expansion were the predomi
nant Serbian interest.
CHAPTER 5
The Greek Kingdom
In 1830, as we have seen, three powers, France, Britain, and Russia, es
tablished Greece as an independent kingdom by international treaty.
Thus, this state started on its political development, at least on paper, a
step ahead of Serbia whose autonomy was only defined in that year.
Greek reality, however, lagged far behind Greek appearances. Unlike
Serbia, Greece was not a geographically isolated state of peripheral Eu
ropean concern. The Greek revolution had been a matter of major inter
national interest. The country’s position in the eastern Mediterranean
made the political allegiance of its government of prime importance to
the other European states. In addition, Greece was given not one, but
three protecting powers with opposing interests in the Balkan and Medi
terranean area. Contemporary international politics made it almost inev
itable than Athens would be a point of conflict in their foreign policies,
and that they would be drawn into internal Greek controversies. From
the beginning it was clear that of the three protectors Britain would pre
dominate, all other matters being equal. Her naval supremacy in the
Mediterranean and the vulnerability of the Greek state from the sea as
sured that in a time of crisis Greek policy would be dominated by the
strongest naval power in the region.
King Othon arrived in Greece in February, 1833. His first capital was
Nauplion; not until 1835 was Athens in any condition to house the gov
ernment. Since the new ruler was only eighteen, he was accompanied by
a regency chosen by King Ludwig of Bavaria. Vitally concerned with the
success of his son’s reign, the king chose able and proven administrators.
As president of the regency he appointed Count Joseph von Ar-
mansperg, who was known to be of liberal tendencies and who had
gained much experience in Bavarian service. The other members were
George Ludwig von Maurer, a well-known jurist and professor of law,
and Major General Karl von Heideck, who had been in Greece during
the revolution and was thus acquainted with the country. Karl von Abel
68
The Greek Kingdom 69
was the secretary; Johann Greiner also came as an adviser. These men,
with Greek assistants, immediately embarked on the task of giving the
state an administration. They divided the work among themselves. Hei-
deck concerned himself with miljitary and nava) affairs; Maurer, with
law, the church, and education; Abel, with internal administration and
foreign affairs; and Greiner, with economic problems. Each took ex
amples for Greece from what was regarded as the most progressive and
enlightened forms from western European experience. As in other
states the Napoleonic internal order was of the greatest importance.
Unfortunately for Greek domestic harmony, the members of the
regency soon came into sharp conflict. As a result of the struggle Ar-
mansperg secured the recall of Maurer in 1834 and reduced the influ
ence of Heideck. In 1835 Othon came of age, but Armansperg retained
his primary influence until 1837, when he was replaced by another Ba
varian, Ignaz von Rudhardt. In the same year Greece received its first
native prime minister; Constantine Zographos.
Greece, as we have seen, was established by the powers as an absolute
monarchy despite the preference shown during the revolutionary
period for constitutional governments with a limited executive. The pro
tector states were primarily interested in securing order and peace in
Greece and in ending the anarchy of the revolutionary period. Some
sort of assurance appears to have been given by the Bavarian govern
ment that a constitution might be considered in the future, but certainly
neither the powers nor the Bavarian king were initially enthusiastic
about the idea. Ludwig I, who always wielded great influence over his
son and thus over Greek affairs, was opposed to the concept. At the most
he would allow that the ruler could concede a charter with limited rights.
Until 1835 the absolute power of the monarch was exercised by the
regency. Ultimate control lay, of course, in the hands of Ludwig, who
could and did appoint and recall regents at will. The top administration
of the first government of independent Greece was thus entirely Bavar
ian. There was a ministerial council of the heads of ministries, who were
Greeks, but this body had no real power.
It must be emphasized that this nonnational government did attempt
to establish what its members considered the best possible government in
Greece. It may have made mistakes, particularly in financial matters, and
it may have wasted large sums in trying to graft on to a backward Balkan
state the framework proper for wealthier and more advanced states, but
its members, with the possible exception of Armansperg, were not cor
rupt and they did put a great deal of effort into their task. From the
Greek point of view they also had an advantage in that they were citizens
of a weak state, Bavaria, and not of one of the protecting powers. They
could thus not exert real pressure inside Greece except when they
gained the backing of one of the protectors.
In the first years of the new state the regents proceeded to set up a sys
tem of local administration, organize a national church, regulate military
and naval affairs, and establish educational, financial, and other institu
tions of a modern state. In the formation of a national administrative
system the regents were faced with many of the same problems as those
met by Milo§. Like the Serbian prince, Othon and his Bavarian advisers
had every interest in curbing institutions that might become a source of
opposition to the central power. On both practical and theoretical
grounds they also favored a centralized system which, as in Serbia, would
result in the destruction of the local self-government in effect in the Ot
toman period.
A start in this direction had been made during the Greek revolution
when the Greek leaders attempted to set up a government that would be
strong enough to carry through a successful struggle. At that time the
part of Greece under rebel control was divided into provinces, then into
cities and communes (villages). A prefect (eparch), a secretary-general,
and a chief of police were appointed for each province. The communes
in this system were able to maintain much control over their own affairs.
This administrative plan was never really put into effect because of the
disturbed conditions of the revolutionary period.
The first steps toward the organization of a national administradon
were taken under Capodistrias. His desire to form a strong central gov
ernment has already been discussed. An experienced administrator, he
too wished to apply in Greece the widely accepted standards of govern
ment of an efficient centralized state with uniform laws and regulations.
In April, 1828, a decree dividing the Peloponnesus into seven depart
ments and the islands into six was issued. Each of these was subdivided
into provinces, which were in turn divided into towns and villages. A
uniform system of municipal government was then introduced. Since
Capodistrias needed experienced, educated officials, and since he
wished to assure their loyalty, he appointed to local positions men from
outside of mainland Greece, for example, from Constantinople and the
Ionian Islands. These men, like the precani in Serbia, were separated
from the local populations by their manners and by their own personal
interests.
These tendencies continued during the reign of Othon. Like Capodis
trias, the regents wished to centralize the government and apply uni
form laws and standards. In 1833 Greece was divided into ten provinces
(nomarchies); these were then split into counties (eparchies) and further
into municipalities (demes). The chief official of the first two levels was
appointed by the central government. The municipalities were also so
organized that the real power lay in the hands of the central govern
ment. After the kingdom was established, the same separation between
governors and governed that had occurred in the revolutionary period
continued. The leadership of the Greek state in the first decade was
usually Bavarian or composed of Greeks from outside of Greece proper.
Later the local officials appointed by the central government to the rural
areas came from the ranks of thç educated youth, who, as in Serbia,
often had interests quite different from those of the natives of their
region.
The status of the Greek Orthodox church was also regulated by the
regency. As in Serbia the establishment of a national state led immedi
ately to the desire for ecclesiastical institutions independent of the patri
arch in Constantinople who was under the direct control of the Porte. A
move toward separation had already taken place during the revolution.
Under Ottoman pressure the patriarch had excommunicated the Greek
church. During the revolt ecclesiastical affairs, like other matters, degen
erated into chaos. With the return of peace a regulation of the church
was obviously needed. The settlement reached at this time was largely
the work of George Ludwig von Maurer and a synod of bishops. A lib
eral Protestant, Maurer used the examples of the Orthodox church in
Russia and the Catholic church in Bavaria. In both places the church was
a department of the state.
In 1833, when the new regulations were issued, the Greek church was
declared independent of the patriarchate. It was to be administered by
a synod whose members would be appointed by the crown. The head of
the Greek church became now in fact the Catholic king. A wholesale
reform of the monasteries, whose affairs were in a deplorable condition
after the events of the revolution, was also undertaken. Monasteries with
less than six members were closed. Their properties reverted to the gov
ernment and in theory were to be used for ecclesiastical and educational
expenses in the future.
This entire setdement was controversial. It was carried through by
Greek leaders who were in favor of secularizing and westernizing influ
ences. It was naturally not popular with the conservative elements of the
Greek church. The regulation, in particular the position of the Catholic
king in the hierarchy, became henceforth a major issue in Greek internal
and foreign affairs. Moreover, a serious split occurred with the patriarch
who, despite the fact that he had recognized a Serbian separation, re
fused to accept a similar arrangement in Greece. The change had been
made without negotiation with Constantinople, and it marked a break
with an organization that was also largely Greek in nationality. Russia,
deeply involved in religious affairs and intensely interested in preserv
ing Orthodox unity, also became concerned in this matter.
The breach was not healed, and a final settlement was not reached
until 1850. With Russian mediation the patriarch finally agreed to recog
nize the separate organization in return for some relatively minor con
cessions. A new law was passed in 1852. The church remained under a
synod whose president was the Archbishop of Athens. No decision was

valid, however, until it was signed by the government representative, the
procurator. The church thus remained dependent on the authority of
the civil government.
Unlike Serbia where the irregular contingents that fought in the revo
lution were reabsorbed into their villages, the status of the military and
particularly of the veterans became a major problem in the first years of
Greek independence and one that did not find a satisfactory solution.
Othon came to Greece with a force of thirty-five hundred soldiers, the
majority of whom were German or Swiss. The great powers wished to
make sure that the new monarch had troops on whom he could depend.
As far as Greek soldiers were concerned, at the end of the revolution
there were approximately five thousand irregulars and seven hundred
regulars. It was to the interest of both the great powers and the Greek
government that this force be disbanded because of its contribution to
the anarchy of the period. This was not, however, so easily done. These
soldiers received no regular payments; they lived off the localities where
they resided. Many could not return home because their lands were still
under Ottoman control. Plans were made to add Greeks to the regular
army, but this process was difficult. Othon needed a reliable army, which
would back his authority and which would maintain order in the state.
He also required soldiers who were amenable to European military dis
cipline and dress. The Greek military men did not like western uniforms
or drill. Some were indeed brought into the regular army or the gendar
merie. Many simply returned to their villages, but others became bandits
either within Greece or on the other side of the Ottoman border. Bands
of robbers continued to pose a problem throughout Othon’s reign.
Whether foreign or native in personnel, the military forces were an
enormous expense for the new state. Here, as in Serbia, they took far too
great a share of the very limited financial resources of the kingdom. Not
only were the foreign troops expensive, but the army was simply too
large. In 1835 the army, including the gendarmerie, had about seven
thousand men; that meant that for about every hundred Greeks there
was one soldier. O f these about half were Greek; the rest were foreign
mercenaries. This force absorbed more than half of the state budget. Al
though foreign influences were strong in the army, the navy established
at this time was dominated by Greeks.
The regency also organized other aspects of national life. A system of
primary and secondary schools was set up. In 1837 the University of
Athens was founded. This institution was to train the future administra
tors of the state and to wield great political influence. Later in Othon’s
reign the very controversial language question was regulated. In 1849
hatharevousa, the artificial literary language, replaced the spoken demotiki
as the official language for government, education, and the newspapers.
This change has been bitterly debated ever since. The existence of two
languages, one of which was not used by the majority of the people,
seriously complicated the political life and education in the kingdom.
At this time Maurer organized the legal system of Greece and directed
the codification of the civil laws. The regency and King Othon also de
voted a great deal of attention and expense to the city of Athens. At the
end of the revolutionary period Athens was little more than another
provincial Ottoman town graced by the Parthenon and other impressive
ruins. The Philhellene Bavarians and the Greeks themselves were pas
sionately interested in making their capital the worthy successor of the
ancient city. The modern city of Athens dates from this period.
In the first years of Othon’s reign much had thus been accomplished
toward the organization of the state. Great problems, however, re
mained to be settled. Although an absolute ruler, Othon was not a MiloS
or a Karadjordje, nor was he an intriguer. A weak and well-meaning
monarch, he did not have the strength of character to control firmly the
complicated political situation in Athens. In November, 1836, he mar
ried a Protestant, Duchess Amalia of Oldenburg. The queen and the alli
ance were popular, but the marriage remained childless. This was a po
litical disaster for Othon. Basically, the king faced truly difficult
problems. Of greatest significance were the economic weakness of the
state and the existence of treaties that allowed the protecting powers to
interfere continually in Greek internal affairs.
After the revolution the territory of independent Greece was in
ruins. Vineyards, olive groves, and orchards had been destroyed. The
entire tax-collecting system had been disrupted. Moreover, the land it
self was naturally poor; only 25 percent was arable, yet the peasantry
constituted about J75 percent of the populadon. The first government
was faced with the problem of setting up a modern administrative sys
tem with an empty treasury and few resources. What remained of the
Greek wealth in commerce and shipping was largely out of the control of
the government in Athens. Moreover, the debts incurred during the rev
olution had to be paid. Financial problems were to plague the nation
until the end of the century when bankruptcy was finally declared.
The economic situation was made worse by the bad system of revenue
collection which had changed litde since the Ottoman times. The Greek
like the Serbian peasant was soon to discover that independence was
more cosdy than Turkish rule and that the avoidance of payments was
more difficult. He continued to pay his tithe, but the methods of collec
tion often meant that he was forced to surrender far more. In fact, the
extortionate means used quite equaled the Ottoman period. Under
Othon taxes usually continued to be farmed. The right of collection was
aucdoned. Unlike the case in Serbia, payment was usually in kind. The
tax farmer and his agent had to assess the crop in the field. The peasant
could not harvest his grain until he had permission from the tax farmer.
He also had to collect it under conditions controlled by the collector.
Since crops are perishable, he often had to bribe the official to get his
taxes assessed. Not only was the entire system a disaster for the peasant,
but the prevalence of corruption meant that the central government
received only a proportion o f the amount paid. The regency and the
later ministries all recognized the problem. Efforts were made to make
the collection more efficient and to make certain that the tax farmers
paid the sums they owed.
In addition to the financial considerations, the Greek government had
to deal with a difficult internal situation, which allowed much outside in
terference. Greece was in theory an absolute monarchy, but it had in no
sense a repressive or absolutist regime. Throughout Othon’s reign vocal
opposition parties always existed. In the first two decades the political
scene was dominated by three parties who had their origins in the revo
lutionary period. Unlike Serbia, where the first political groups were the
Constitutionalists, the Liberals, and the Conservatives, that is, parties
formed primarily on the issue of the conflict between the ruler and the
notables, Greece developed a system based on the three protecting pow
ers.
The French, British, and Russian parties, as they were known, had
their centers in the individual legations on which they leaned for sup
port. Each represented a definite stand in Greek politics; each also re
flected the policy of the patron power. O f the three the French party was
probably the most popular in the years before the Crimean War, chiefly
because it could champion a program of national expansion. Its leader
was the extremely able politician, John Kolettes, who had close ties with
the July Monarchy in France and who represented his country for eight
years in Paris. The Russian, or Napist, party was probably next in influ
ence. Conservative and Orthodox in direction, it was first led by Koloko-
trones and Capodistrias during the revolutionary period and, after the
death of these two, by Andrew Metaxas. The British party was probably
the least influential, although it was able to exert great pressure at times
on the Greek government because of British naval strength in the area.
Hampered by the fact that the British government was usually a strong
upholder of Ottoman integrity, this party could not champion a great
national policy. During the first part of Othon’s reign it supported Ar-
mansperg. Mavrokordatos remained at its head throughout the period.
Its programs in general favored internal reform and constitutional gov
ernment. All three parties were primarily interested in political power.
When any individual party enjoyed a privileged position in the govern
ment, it supported the king. When it was out of power, it intrigued
against the central authority and whatever party was predominant.
The main problems of the first five years of Othon’s reign have al
ready been indicated. Othon had, as it can be seen, no organized faction
to support him; there was no Bavarian party. He also had to carry the
burden of the resentment of Bavarian rule, the ‘xenocracy’ as it was
called, even though Greeks gradually took over almost all the adminis
trative posts. By the end of the 1830s Greek soldiers were slowly replac
ing foreign troops; they were not enthusiastic royal partisans and were
not reliable. Moreover, throughout his entire reign the king suffered in
popularity from the fact that he was a devout Catholic. His failure to
have a son who could be raised in the Orthodox faith added to this
problem. His greatest fault in the eyes of his people, however, was his
failure to make any progress in the one field that engaged ardent Greek
sympathies, the question of joining other Greek lands to the indepen
dent state. In 1841, when the island of Crete rose against the Ottoman
government, Othon was unable to act.
By the 1840s Othon was faced with a condition of real internal crisis.
Discontent with his rule and with his internal and foreign policies was at
a height. The entire situation was made worse by the pressure now ex
erted by the powers on Greece in connection with the debt. In 1838
Greek finances had been put under a French supervisor, Artemonis de
Regny. By 1843 the entire financial situation of the country was disas
trous. With the exception of a single year the state had been run on defi
cit spending. Payments on the loan had been suspended for four years.
Interested primarily in protecting their investment, the powers now
pressed the Greek government to reduce sharply its internal expendi
tures. One of the obvious items that could be cut was the large military
budget. This action direcdy affected the interests of the army. The mili
tary disatisfaction with the situation was shared by other groups. At this
time the French party, in close cooperation with Othon, was in power;
the Russian and British were out. In 1842 Alexander Karadjordjevic had
become the Serbian prince through a military coup. The issue in this
revolt had been the question of the power of the executive. The idea of
controlling the monarch through a constitution was part of the British
party’s policy. The question of the personal power of Othon and its pos
sible limitation now became of immediate Greek political concern.
The combination of these issues resulted in the revolution of 1843. In
September of that year an army corps stationed in Athens marched on
the palace and seized the king and his government. The leaders of the
revolt demanded that Othon form a new government and summon a
constitutional assembly. The movement was a military coup d'état, sup
ported by the British, Russian, and a part of the French parties. It was
not a great popular uprising. The aim was to limit the power of the king
through a constitution. It will be noted that this was also the beginning of
the Constitutionalist period in Serbia.
Faced with the alternatives of accepting a constitution or abdicating,
Othon agreed to the demands of the revolutionaries. A constitutional as

sembly met from September, 1843, to March, 1844. It included repre
sentatives from Macedonia, Epirus, and Thessaly, lands that were, of
course, part of the Ottoman Empire. The leading roles in the delibera
tions were taken by Mavrokordatos, who returned from Constantinople
where he had represented Greece, and Kolettes, who came back from
Paris. The two western protecting powers, France and Britain, gave con
stant advice on the making of the constitution. The Russian government
stood aside, because of the convictions of Nicholas I on revolutionary ac
tivity.
The chief issue in drawing up the constitution became the question of
defining the relationship between the king and the projected represen
tative assemblies. Although both the British and French supported the
idea of constitutional government, neither wished too much power given
to the legislative bodies. After all, neither France of the July Monarchy
nor Britain, even after the Reform Bill of 1832, had regimes based on
real popular control. Both states were primarily concerned with assuring
a stable government in Athens. For that reason the constitution adopted
in 1844 was conservative and resembled the July Monarchy, which Ko
lettes knew so well. It established a two-house legislature. The chamber,
or vouli, was elected on the basis of universal manhood suffrage; a sen
ate, the gerousia, had members appointed for life from among distin
guished Greek citizens by the king with the approval of the prime minis
ter. The king had an absolute veto over legislation. He could appoint
and dismiss the ministers, who were responsible to him. The constitution
had a bill of rights containing the usual declarations on the equality of
citizens, freedom of the press, assembly, etc.
Thus in 1844 Greece became a constitutional monarchy. In actual
practice, however, the constitution had little direct effect on the actual
governing of the country. As in Serbia, the Greek leaders adopted west
ern political principles and constitutional forms, but modified them ac
cording to their own customs and traditions. The three parties returned
to their former practices and continued the struggle for political control.
During the year in which the constitution was debated the parties had
cooperated. The revolt resulted in the formation of a government
headed by Metaxas; it was replaced by a Mavrokordatos-Spyridon Tri-
koupes ministry, which was considered pro-British. It held power dur
ing the elections for the constituent assembly and during the assembly’s
meetings. The constitution itself was primarily the work of a committee
of twenty-one, of whom Mavrokordatos, Trikoupes, and Kolettes were
the most prominent members. The Russian party remained apart, it will
be remembered, because of the tsar’s attitude.
Once the constitution was accepted politics returned to normal. The
first election gave the victory to Kolettes. A Kolettes-Metaxas coalition
was then formed to the exclusion of the British party. In 1845 Kolettes
assumed full control and remained in power until his death in 1847.
During this period he established the system of government that was to
prevail until Othon’s expulsion in 1862. Although,the country remained
under a constitutional framework, Kolettes used the centralized system
of administration to assure that government candidates won the elec
tions. He put, of course, his partisans in all of the appointive positions.
Using force and patronage to assure victory, he and his successors were
not above recruiting bandits and organizing street riots to intimidate the
opposition. With government candidates regularly elected, the chamber
could not become an effective center of opposition to the regime in of
fice.
Despite its methods the government of Othon and Kolettes did enjoy
wide support. Kolettes was able to use the national program to gain pop
ular approval, and he became the spokesman for the plan of expansion
known as the Megale Idea, or Great Idea. The Greek state established in
1830 fell heir to a double tradition: that of ancient Greece and that of
Byzantium. Although in many ways the two legacies were in principle in
conflict, this great heritage played an active role in Greek politics. We
have already seen the importance of the classical Greek legacy in the lan
guage question and in the Philhellene movement, which so aided the
Greek revolution. In foreign policy and in national expansion, however,
it was to be the Byzantine past that was to predominate. The national
program, the Great Idea, was directed essentially to securing a revival of
the Byzantine Empire. The capital of the future state was to be Constan
tinople, not Athens. Although the lands to be joined in this empire were
not closely defined, they usually included Epirus, Thessaly, Macedonia,
Thrace, the Aegeap Islands, Crete, Cyprus, the west coast of Asia Minor,
and the territory between the Balkan and Rhodope Mountains, later
known as Eastern Rumelia. The emphasis was not on territory that was
ethnically strictly Greek, but on the lands in which Hellenic civilization
was believed predominant. The control of the Greek hierarchy over ec
clesiastical affairs and education in areas inhabited by Slavic peoples was
thus exploited to lay the foundations for political control.
The intensity of the conviction of Greek intellectuals in the justice of
their claims was to be shown throughout the next years until the entire
Great Idea went down in defeat in 1922. It was particularly apparent in
the violent negative reaction of these circles to the writings of Jacob P.
Fallmerayer, who, in a book published in 1836, claimed that Slavic mi
grations in the seventh and eighth centuries had decimated the Greek
population. Thus, modern Greeks were Hellenized Slavs. The Greek na
tional viewpoint was also expressed in the work of Constantine Papar-
regopoulos, whose History of the Greek Nation was published between 1860
and 1872.
The classic statement on the Great Idea was delivered by Kolettes

before the constitutional assembly. Here on January 15, 1844, he de
clared:
The kingdom of Greece is not Greece: it is only the smallest and poorest
part of Greece. Greece includes not only the kingdom, but also Janina and
Thessaloniki, and Serres, and Adrianople, and Constantinople, and Trebi-
zonde, and Crete, and Samos, and any other country where Greek history or
the Greek race was present. . . . There are two great centers of Hellenism,
Athens and Constantinople. Athens is only the capital o f the kingdom. Con
stantinople is the great capital, the City, i Polis, the attraction and the hope of
all the Hellenes.1
These national goals brought Greece into direct conflict with Britain.
Throughout Othon’s reign repeated episodes or European diplomatic
crises occurred which appeared to offer an opportunity for national
gains; in each the determination of Britain to maintain the status quo
blocked action. The uprising in Crete in 1841 has already been men
tioned. In 1848-49 there were minor revolts in the Ionian Islands. In
1850 the Greek government became engaged in a major quarrel with
Britain, now under the Liberal cabinet of Lord Palmerston. The British
prime minister at this time backed the claims of Don Pacifico, a Por
tugese Jew of British citizenship, whose house had been plundered by a
mob, and of the historian George Finlay some of whose property had
been confiscated by the Greek government. The ownership of two small
islands was also in dispute. In order to enforce its claims the British gov
ernment sent a fleet to Piraeus. Although the financial settlement was fi
nally arbitrated, the episode had the advantage of making Othon more
popular for his stand against the great power. British opposition to
Greek actions also brought about an improvement of relations with Rus
sia, as the settlement of the church question by agreement with the patri
arch indicated.
Should Greece expand, the natural next step would be the annexation
of adjacent Ottoman territory in Thessaly and Macedonia. Three times
during Othon’s reign the Porte was involved in crises that might have
created conditions that would allow the Greek government to move. In
1831-33 and 1839-40 Egypt challenged her suzerain; in 1853 the Cri
mean War commenced, bringing two of Greece’s protectors, Britain and
France, into war with the third, Russia. Although the Egyptian crises
could not be exploited, the Crimean War seemed to offer real opportu
nities. Greek sympathies were with Orthodox Russia, who was also at war
with the Porte. At the beginning of the conflict, which commenced with
the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in
1853, irregular bands supported by Greece began to act in Ottoman ter-
1. Edouard Driault and Michel Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Gr'ece de 1821 à nosjours,
(Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1925), vol. 2, pp. 252-53.
Map 4. The Expansion of Greece, 1821-1919
ritory. Although the Ottoman forces were capable of subduing these

movements, the hostile Greek attitude brought a strong reaction from
the western powers. From 1854 to 1857 a British-French fleet was an
chored in Piraeus. Under its pressure Othon was forced to appoint a
government headed by Mavrokordatos and the British party. The de
feat of Russia in 1856 dampened any Greek hopes that the status quo
would be changed. Until the end of Othon’s reign international condi
tions were to preclude any Greek territorial gains.
Despite the disappointments in foreign policy this period did witness
limited progress within the country. The nation, it must be remembered,
started with the liabilities of few resources and a large foreign debt,
which had been badly if not corruptly administered. In addition, the
country suffered from the fact that the revolutionary land setdement
had primarily benefited the notables. The majority of the peasant popu
lation either lived on extremely small plots or worked the lands of oth
ers. The peasant was further hampered by the ruinous methods of tax
collection and by the same problem of accumulating debts that we have
seen in Serbia.
Moreover, Greece had to contend with basic difficulties not shared by
the other neighboring Balkan nations. After her revolution Serbia en
joyed the benefit of sufficient agricultural land and large, unexploited
forests. In contrast, Greece could not produce the cereal crops needed to
feed her own population. The country was forced to concentrate on
growing export corps, particularly grapes, currants, olives, citrus fruits,
and tobacco, to pay for cereals and also for manufactured goods. In this
early period there was virtually no industrial development. The handi
craft industry in fact suffered from competition with imported machine-
made products. In contrast with this bleak picture, Greek shipping based
in free Greece did revive.
Although economic conditions in the independent kingdom remained
bad, the position of Greek nationals abroad improved. Despite the fact
that Greek preeminence was lost, Greeks remained in Ottoman service
and regained their importance in the economic life of the empire. Greek
merchants still prospered in the Balkan cities, in Egypt, and in the Danu-
bian and Black Sea trade. The real center of Greek economic power
remained in the Ottoman Empire—in Constantinople, Thessaloniki,
and Smyrna (Izmir). None of these financial resources, of course, were
of service to the Greek state. Greeks from outside the kingdom did in
vest in the state, but the government could not control or tax the wealth
of these people. It must be strongly emphasized that the major problem
of independent Greece was financial. With a basically poor country and
with such a large proportion of the state’s income devoted to the army
and the debt, there was not an adequate surplus for internal improve
ments even if the leaders of the state had wished to embark on such
policies.
Under these circumstances it was inevitable that discontent with the
rule of Othon should rise. After the death of Kolettes the system of royal
ministries was continued. In 1862 Admiral Constantine Kanares, then
prime minister, tried to influence Othon to reform .the government and
to limit royal interference, but with no success.
Meanwhile, in Greece, as in Serbia, a new generation had arisen which
had different ideas and wanted positions of power. The former domi
nant class of notables and rich merchants was now challenged by a politi
cally conscious commercial middle class and by those in government ser
vice. Apparent also was the rising influence of the young men who had
been educated either at the University of Athens or abroad and who
were impatient with the regime in power. They were joined and sup
ported by a group of reform-minded politicians, best exemplified by
Epaminondas Delegeorges, who attacked the institutions established by
the constitution of 1843. They wished the establishment of true parlia
mentary democracy, a curbing of royal authority, and an improvement
of the administration of the country. They were influenced by events in
France where in 1848 the July Monarchy had been overthrown. The
new concepts were reflected in a basic change in the political field in
Athens. After the Crimean War the parties based on foreign consulates
were replaced by loose factions headed by prominent political figures,
such as Delegeorges, Dimitrios Voulgares, and Thrasyvoulos Zaimes.
In addition to his other problems, Othon’s failure to produce an heir
continued to be a major impediment to his popularity. The constitution
of 1843 stipulated that the next king would have to be of Orthodox faith,
but there was no obvious successor who could fulfill this condition.
Othon’s brothers, also Catholics, showed no inclination to change their
religion for the Greek throne. The king’s personal position was further
weakened by European events. In 1859 war broke out between Austria
and France on the question of Italian unification. Greek sympathies
were with the Italian national cause; Othon, born a German prince, sup
ported Austria. These problems, together with the failure to achieve fur
ther national goals, gradually eroded the king’s political position.
The revolt in 1862, which led to Othon’s abdication, was, like its pre
decessor of 1843, primarily a military coup d'etat and not a national ris
ing. Led by junior and noncommissioned officers, it was backed by op
position politicians. In February, 1862, a revolt broke out in the garrison
at Nauplion. Although it failed, the conspiracy spread and in October
the Athens garrison rebelled. Othon and Amalia were at the time tour
ing the provinces. They were advised by the foreign consuls not to come
back to Athens. Othon took the opportunity to return quietly to Bavaria.
A new government was set up with a regency composed of Voulgares,
Kanares, and Venizelos Roufos and with a cabinet whose most promi
nent members were Delegeorges, Zaimes, and Alexander Koumoun-
douros. A second constituent assembly was then summoned. All three of
82 T h e E s t a b l is h m e n t o f t h e B alkan N a t io n a l S ta tes
the protecting powers had approved the departure of Othon. Thereaf

ter, they concerned themselves deeply in the choice of a new monarch
and the formulation of a new constitution. Again these states named the
king. The Greeks themselves would have preferred Prince Albert of
Britain, a son of Queen Victoria, under the mistaken assumption that
with this prince as ruler they would receive not only the Ionian Islands,
but also British backing for further expansion. The British government
refused to consider this nomination; all three powers were still in agree
ment that no member of one of their ruling dynasties should be king of
Greece. The final choice was in fact the British candidate, Prince Chris
tian William Ferdinand Adolphus George of Denmark, who now be
came George I of Greece. The second son of the heir to the Danish
throne, he was eighteen years old at the time of his selection. Reigning
until 1913, he was to be an extremely successful and popular ruler,
largely because he tended to stand aside in Greek politics. His nomina
tion was accepted by a constitutional assembly in March, 1863. His title
was “king of the Hellenes”; in other words his subjects in theory also
numbered Greeks outside of the kingdom. On his acceptance Britain
surrendered possession of the Ionian Islands. In 1866 George married
the Russian Grand Duchess Olga.
Although the assembly accepted the prince designated by the powers,
it did frame a constitution after its own desires. This time the liberal
Belgian constitution of 1831 became the model. With the aim of limiting
royal power Article 21 declared that: “All powers are derived from the
nation and are exercised in the manner prescribed by the constitution.”
The senate, which had been a mainstay of the king’s authority, was now
abolished. The legislature was to consist of one chamber elected by
direct secret manhood suffrage. It was to number not less than 150
members who were to be chosen for four years. The ministry was re
sponsible to this body. Nevertheless, the king did retain important
prerogatives, which could be used by a strong ruler. He appointed and
dismissed ministers, he could dissolve the chamber, and he could declare
war and make treaties.
The constitution was ratified in October, 1864. Kanares headed the
first government, to be replaced in 1865 by Koumoundouros. Thereaf
ter a period of rapid change followed. From 1864 to 1881 there were
nine elections and thirty-one governments. Despite the liberal frame
work, politics thus returned to their former state with the exception that
the monarch no longer controlled the process. The multiparty system,
where the parties were in fact factions clustered around a leader, added
to the instability of the situation. The membership in the parties and the
alliances between them shifted constantly. Electoral questions were now
predominantly those of personality and not of issues or ideology. More
over, the centralized administrative system, with the gift of appointment
to office in the hands of whoever won the elections, made the temptation
to cheat irresistible. Unlike Serbia, where tenure in office was at least at
times assured, a change in Greek government could mean a complete
shift of the personnel of all offices from top to bottom. Under these cir
cumstances fraud and violence were bound to continue to accompany
the electoral process. Former reformers like Voulgares and Delegeorges
showed themselves willing to adopt methods similar to those they had
previously attacked to maintain their own political power.
Although internal politics remained much the same, the reign of
George was to mark an active period in foreign policy and to witness the
achievement of some of the Greek objectives. By this time the Greek gov
ernment in foreign affairs not only had to consider the policies of the
great powers and the Porte, but also those of its Balkan neighbors. Au
tonomous Serbia was joined in the 1860s by a unified Romania, but most
important for Greece was to be the rising and in many respects competi
tive Bulgarian national movement.
CHAPTER 6
Wallachia and Moldavia before 1853
In the preceding chapters we have seen two national liberation move

ments, the Serbian and the Greek, attain partial success with the es
tablishment of autonomous or independent states. In both countries the
fighting in the revolution was carried on by peasant troops under local
military leaders. With the conclusion of the conflict with the Ottoman
Empire, the network of Ottoman administration was removed and sepa
rate governments were set up. Although certain similarities to Serbia
and Greece can be found, the national developments in the Danubian
Principalities differ, chiefly because these provinces at the end of the
eighteenth century had evolved along a divergent political and economic
path.
First, as described earlier, in the eighteenth century the Principalities
were under a Christian, although Phanariote Greek, regime. The Ot
toman government did not administer the area directly. The first step in
the national movement thus involved as much the removal of the alien
Greek control as a struggle against Ottoman suzerainty. Second, unlike
the other Balkan countries, the Principalities had a native artistocracy of
large landowners, the boyars; this group had survived the Ottoman con
quest. Large timar or chiftlik estates under Muslim control were not to
be found in the land. The boyars in the nineteenth century were to be in
a strong political position not only because they were the natural leaders
of the country, but also because they could profit so greatly from concur
rent European economic developments.
Like Polish, Hungarian, Prussian, and Russian lands, the Romanian
estates were to be a source of food supplies for the expanding western
industrial states. In contrast to other Balkan areas, the rich soil of the
Principalities was suited to grain cultivation for export on a large scale.
Under these circumstances it was in the boyar’s best interest to gain
direct control of as much land as possible and to assure himself of an ad-
84
Wallachia and Moldavia before 1853 85
equate labor supply. Since the peasant’s aims were to secure absolute
control over a single plot and to free himself from feudal obligations,
there was a natural antagonism between the two classes. Thus, we sel
dom find here the combination of local notable and fighting peasantry so
evident in Greece and Serbia. The main stages in the achievement of
Romanian independence were the result of diplomatic negotiation. Not
only were the two periods of revolution, that of Tudor Vladimirescu in
1821 and the uprising in 1848 in Wallachia, unsuccessful, but they also
demonstrated the political consequences of this division between the
peasantry and the boyars.
A third contrast between the Romanian events and those previously
discussed arose because of the geographic position of the provinces. Sit
uated on Russia’s land route to Constantinople, the region was the scene
of repeated Russian occupation: in 1711, 1736-39, 1769-74, 1787-92,
1806-12, 1828-34, 1849-51, and 1853-54. The presence of a foreign
army and one with definite political objectives was bound to be of vital
importance in national development. Although usually the Russian ac
tions were beneficial to the national movement, they did represent
foreign interference. To a lesser extent the Habsburg Empire exerted a
similar pressure. Her army was in occupation during the Crimean War,
1854-57. The presence of these two great and often conflicting powers
on their borders forced the Romanian leaders to put more emphasis on
diplomacy than on armed action to gain their aims. They could not hope
to withstand their more powerful neighbors, and they did not want to
turn their lands into a batdefield.
Because of the unique aspects of the Romanian conditions, the na
tional movement can best be divided into two periods. The first, dis
cussed in this chapter, extends to the outbreak of the Crimean War in
1853. In these years Phanariote Greek control was overthrown only to be
replaced by a Russian protectorate that involved interference in all
aspects of national life. The second, extending from 1853 to 1878, saw
the attainment of independence and with it the creation of a situation in
the Balkans that allowed the Romanian government to balance between
the great powers.
The process that finally resulted in the substitution of primary Russian
influence for Greek and Ottoman in the provinces commenced in the
eighteenth century with the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji. This agree
ment, which did limit the abuses of Ottoman rule, marks the first step in
the Russian acquisition of treaty rights in the Principalities. In Article 16
the Porte gave the assurance that amnesty would be granted to those
who had fought with Russia, a free exercise of the Christian religion was
promised, and it was agreed that the tribute would be fixed. In addition,
the hospodars of the Principalities were to have an agent in Constan
tinople. Most important, Russia could now speak in behalf of the prov
inces, and the Ottoman government promised “to listen with the consid
eration shown to friendly and respected powers.” In 1779 in the
Convention of Aynali Kavak, which dealt primarily with the Crimea, it
was stipulated that the tribute would be paid every two years, and Rus
sian rights of intervention were defined. In 1780 the first Russian repre
sentative was appointed in 'Bucharest.
The privileges of the Principalities were further delineated in other
ordinances issued by the Ottoman government. In 1783 and 1792 the
Porte agreed that Russia could make representations on financial
charges imposed on the Principalities. A hatti-sherif of 1784 recognized
the disastrous effect of the frequent changes of princes and directed that
they were only to be deposed for crimes. No extraordinary contributions
were to be levied in the future; only the tribute was to be paid. Supplies
needed by the Porte were to be purchased at market prices.
These stipulations, however, were never carried out. The internal ad
ministrations of the Principalities continued in the old pattern of re
peated changes of rulers; between 1792 and 1802 there were six such ac
tions in Wallachia and five in Moldavia. In addition, like Serbia and the
Bulgarian lands, Wallachia suffered from the attacks of Pasvanoglu and
from expeditions of pillage launched from the Ottoman Danubian for
tresses.
In 1802 the deprivations caused by Pasvanoglu brought another crisis
in the relations of the Porte and the Principalities. At this time the
boyars, backed by Russia, gained from the sultan a hatti-sherif that con
firmed their former privileges and significantly extended these rights.
Hospodars were now to be chosen for seven years. They were not to be
deposed except for crimes and with the consent of Russia. All taxes and
requisitions imposed after the decree of 1783 were to be abolished. The
amount of foodstuffs and other provisions to be sent to the Porte was to
be regulated by firmans and not determined arbitrarily; current prices
were to be paid. With the exception of certain merchants carrying fir
mans, Muslims were forbidden to enter or to live in the Principalities. In
addition, the hospodars were ordered to take into consideration the ad
vice of the Russian representatives. This act thus limited Ottoman inter
ference in the provinces and at the same time opened the door to in
creased Russian influence.
After 1802 the hospodars were the Phanariote Greeks, Constantine
Ypsilantes and Alexander Moruzi. In 1806, when war again broke out
between the Porte and Russia, the area once more became a battlefield.
The Principalities were also an object of barter between Napoleon and
Alexander I at their meetings at Tilsit in 1807 and at Erfurt in 1808. At
this second conference Russia was given definite control of the prov
inces. A consolidation of the Russian hold was, however, prevented by
the subsequent rupture in relations between Russia and France. In 1812,
in preparation for an expected French invasion, the Russian govern
ment was forced to make peace. Despite the fact that her armies were oc
cupying the Principalities, Russia, in the Treaty of Bucharest of 1812, re
turned these territories with the exception of the land between the
Dniester and the Pruth, known as Bessarabia. This area, which belonged
to Moldavia and was inhabited primarily by Romanians, was then an
nexed to Russia. This action was to prove a major block to good Ro-
manian-Russian relations in the future. Although Russia thus returned
Moldavia and Wallachia to the Ottoman Empire, her influence remained
paramount. The hospodars were now loan Caragea in Wallachia and
Scarlat Callimachi in Moldavia.
Despite the destruction caused by the wars, this period opened wider
possibilities for the sale of Romanian agricultural products. After the
loss of the Crimea to Russia in 1783, the Porte depended increasingly on
the Romanian provinces for supplies for Constantinople. With the assur
ance given that a market price would be paid by the Porte, Romanian
landowners had the opportunity to make real profits. They also began to
set up, on their own estates, small enterprises involving the processing of
their agricultural products, such as tanneries, alcohol distilleries, and fa
cilities for smoking of meats. With these possibilities for wealth the
boyars naturally desired to enlarge their estates and assure the con
tinued availability of peasant labor. They also wished to rid themselves
of the limitations that Ottoman rule still imposed on their activities.
The position of the peasant had been regulated in the middle of the
eighteenth century during the administrations of Constantine Mavro-
cordat in both Wallachia and Moldavia. The peasant was legally eman
cipated, but the questions about his rights to the land and about the
payments that he should make for its use were not settled. In 1774 it was
decided that the peasant communities in a locality would be guaranteed
the use of two-thirds of the boyar’s land in return for twelve days of
labor (theclacâ). These days, however, were defined in terms of tasks to
be accomplished so that the time actually required amounted to from
twenty-five to forty days. In practice it was difficult to enforce these rules
on a still sparse and mobile peasant population which depended chiefly
on animal husbandry for support. The labor obligations were often com
muted to a money payment or simply refused. The tithe that the peasant
paid was the chief source of revenue for the boyars until the middle of
the nineteenth century. The peasantry was also subject to a great many
other dues and taxes, from which the boyar was completely exempt. In
the future it was to be to the interest of the landowner to extend the
labor dues and to bring under his control land, such as forest and pas
tures, formerly under common use.
In addition to the estates of the boyars, large tracts of land belonged to
the Orthodox church. About a fifth of the Romanian territory was con
trolled by the so-called Dedicated Monasteries. These institutions, which

were under Greek direction, gained wealth and strength during the
Phanariote period. They did not pay taxes, and they were not under the
authority of the civil government. Their profits were in theory “dedi
cated” to the support of Holy Places such as Mt. Athos, Mt. Sinai, and the
Holy Sepulchre. They usually enjoyed Russian favor since Russian
armies used them during their frequent incursions into the Principali
ties. Conditions for the peasants were particularly harsh on those lands.
Although the interests of the peasant and boyar clashed, both opposed
Ottoman suzerainty and the Phanariote regime. The boyar resented the
controls that the Ottoman regime placed on his activities. He wanted a
completely free market for his products. The peasant suffered from the
fact that Ottoman rule had not guaranteed him conditions of law and
order in the countryside. Like the Serbian peasant, he had been the vic
tim not only of his own ruling class, but also of bandit groups and the ex
actions of occupying armies. In addition, the small native class of artisans
and traders were dissatisfied in particular with the capitulatory 1 regime
in effect in the empire. They saw foreigners occupying privileged posi
tions in their own trading communities and enjoying exemptions from
taxes and the controls that hampered the activities of the natives. All
groups—boyars, peasants, and merchants—desired a change in the po
litical life of the country.
These views made their influence felt during the insurrection of Alex
ander Ypsilantes and Tudor Vladimirescu. The reasons that the Prin
cipalities were selected for the opening of the Greek revolution have
been explained; Vladimirescu’s role is more complex. The son of a Wal-
lachian family of the free peasantry, the Romanian leader at the time
headed a movement that had strong social overtones and expressed the
desire of the peasant to be rid of the corvée and other oppressive dues. In
his speeches he attacked the privileged position of the boyar.
In March, 1821, as we have seen, Ypsilantes entered Moldavia with a
band of Greeks. From the beginning of the revolt cooperation between
Greeks and Romanians of any social class proved difficult. The Greeks
first massacred Turkish merchants at Jassy and Gala,ti, and in general
they behaved in Moldavia in a manner to arouse anti-Phanariote feeling.
The entire success of the Greek action hinged, of course, on Russian in
volvement. The Philike Hetairia had been quite free in its promises of
Russian aid. According to the treaties Ottoman troops could not enter
the Principalities without the consent of the protecting power. The revo
lutionaries hoped to create a situation in the provinces that the Porte
1. After the middle of the sixteenth century the Ottoman government concluded with the
European powers treaties called capitulations, which granted special privileges, exemp
tions, and rights of extraterritoriality.
could not handle and that would force Russian intervention, much in the
manner that Austria was acting at this time in Italy under the sanction of
the Holy Alliance.
When the Russian government refused to move and, even more im
portant, sanctioned the entrance of Ottoman troops into the land, not
only was the revolt doomed but Greek-Romanian cooperation became
even more strained. Although at first he cooperated with Ypsilantes, the
impending defeat of the movement led Vladimirescu to get in touch
with the Porte. At the same time the anti-Greek feeling of the Romanian
boyars rose. In their negotiations with representatives of the Porte, Vla
dimirescu and the boyars emphasized that their chief grievance was not
Ottoman suzerainty but the Phanariote regime. In other words, their
arguments resembled those of the Serbian leaders from 1790 to 1805
when they had attacked janissary rule instead of the sultan. Informed of
the Romanian actions, Ypsilantes had Vladimirescu kidnapped from
among his own troops and subsequendy executed for treason. Thereaf
ter some of his troops joined Ypsilantes, others went home.
After the defeat of the Greek rebellion, the elimination of Vladimires
cu, and the dissolution of his army, the Romanian boyars were able to
negotiate, with Russian backing, more favorable political conditions for
the Principalities. Although the uprising had caused serious economic
losses in the country and was to lead to a sixteen-months Ottoman oc
cupation, important political goals were achieved. Of obvious prime im
portance was the end of the long Phanariote rule. In 1822 two native
rulers were appointed: Gregory Ghica in Wallachia and Ionita Sturdza
in Moldavia. In the future the country was to be governed by Romanian
boyars assisted by boyar councils (divans). Although families of Greek de
scent were still to be prominent in the affairs of the country, the Greek
revolution here as elsewhere brought about the destruction of the para
mount influence which had existed previously.
The continuation of the Greek crisis with the uprising in the Pelopon
nesus was to cause further decisive political changes in the Principalities.
In the Convention of Akkerman of October, 1826, in addition to the sec
tions concerning Serbia, Romanian rights against the Ottoman suzerain
and Russian rights to intervene were both strengthened. The hospodars
were now to be elected by the boyar divans for seven years. Both their ap
pointment and their dismissal were subject to Russian and Ottoman ap
proval. The convention also provided that the boyars in each province
should draw up a new statute, or organic regulation, for the administra
tion of the provinces.
The Treaty of Adrianople of 1829, which followed the Russo-Turkish
War, confirmed and widened the Akkerman provisions. Hospodars were
now to be elected for life. The Ottoman fortresses on the left bank of the
Danube were to be evacuated. Ottoman subjects were to leave the prov

inces and to sell any land that' they had to natives within eighteen
months. The question of the tribute was finally regulated. There were to
be no more payments in kind, and in 1834 the amount was set at the
nominal sum of three million piastres. The Ottoman right of preemp
tion on the purchase of Romanian grain, catde, and sheep was surren
dered. A national militia was also to be organized. Finally, the stipulation
of Akkerman regarding the drawing up of an administrative regulation
was repeated.
The Treaty of Adrianople completed a process commenced with Ku-
chuk Kainardji. Ottoman control over the Principalities was now nom
inal. In contrast, the Russian position had become predominant. More
over, in the peace Russia annexed the Danube delta, which gave her a
controlling position on the river, and her armies of occupation were to
remain in the provinces until the Ottoman war indemnity had been paid.
Fully conscious of its position, the Russian government immediately pro
ceeded with the reorganization of Romanian political life.
Fortunately for the Romanians, the Russian administrator, Count
Paul Kiselev, was to prove a remarkable statesman. In charge of the area
from 1829 to 1834, he was direcdy responsible for the changes that now
took place. He first devoted his attention to the immediate crises arising
from the wartime conditions and to medical problems including dealing
with a cholera epidemic and re-establishing the Danube quarantine. His
greatest achievement, however, was his supervision of the completion of
the Organic Statutes. When he arrived, committees were at work in both
provinces in accordance with the provisions of both Akkerman and
Adrianople. In each Principality the committee consisted of four boyars,
two of whom were appointed by the divans and two by the Russian gov
ernment. Drafts of their proposals were sent to St. Petersburg where
they were examined by another committee under the chairmanship of
Prince I. A. Dashkov. The documents were then forwarded to the Porte
and back to the divans. The final statute for Wallachia was promulgated
in 1831, and that for Moldavia in 1832.
The Organic Statutes established similar and parallel regimes in both
Principalities. As such they were a step forward toward a possible even
tual unification. The documents resembled lengthy administrative stat
utes rather than political constitutions. They covered all phases of na
tional life from the organization of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of the government to small details concerning public health
and local administration. In general they set up the type of government
that would be of the greatest benefit to the boyar class. Like the Serbian
constitution of 1838, the power in the state fell into the hands of a group
of leading landowners at the expense of that of the executive. Again the
peasantry was excluded from a direct share in the government. In ac
cordance also with the direction in both Serbia and Greece the adminis
trative system was highly centralized with the control of local affairs held
by prefects appointed by the central government.
In theory at least the governmental structure provided for a division
of power. The executive branch consisted of a hospodar assisted by a
council. The hospodar was to be elected from among the high boyars for
life by a special assembly of 150 members. Here the boyars were to hold
the greater share of the representation although twenty-seven were to be
chosen from the merchants and the middle class. There were no peasant
representatives. The legislative branch was composed of an assembly of
forty-nine boyars, again chosen on a franchise which gave this group
control. The hospodar could veto the decisions of the assembly and could
prorogue but not dissolve it, but only with the consent of Russia and the
Porte. The assembly voted the budget; it could not dismiss the hospodar.
Both the assembly and the prince could appeal to Russia and the Porte
separately. This system, in which the executive and legislative branches
could effectively thwart each other’s actions, gave the Russian govern
ment unlimited opportunity for interference.
The boyars, having received a political system that accorded with their
interests, were also intent upon gaining further advantages for their eco
nomic position. Not only did they remain exempt from taxation, but
they also strengthened their control of the peasantry. For the first time,
in the Organic Statutes, the boyar was designated as the owner of the
land; the peasant’s rights were limited to a share in two-thirds of the land
of the estate. For this he continued to pay state taxes, and his labor dues
were increased as well. The number of days remained at twelve, but the
tasks he was required to complete meant that the time actually worked
would be about thirty-six days in Wallachia and perhaps twice that
number in Moldavia. These and other burdens signified that the peasant
would in all owe approximately fifty-two days in Wallachia, where the
obligation was largely paid in money rent, and eighty-four or the equiva
lent in Moldavia. Although in theory not attached to the soil, the peasant
had to give six months notice before leaving his plot, and he had to pay
his share of the taxes first. It should be emphasized, however, that in the
first part of the century the peasant obligations, in particular the labor
dues, remained difficult to enforce.
The Organic Statutes thus put the landowner in a position to benefit
from the end of the Ottoman right of preemption and the rise in the
demand for agricultural products in Europe. In the next years a great
expansion of Romanian agriculture occurred, particularly after the Cri
mean War. More land was put into use and rents rose sharply. Attempts
were made to improve methods and land use. As in Serbia, the increase
in grain production was paralleled by a relative decline in livestock. This

change was to the detriment of the peasant and his daily diet. In general,
Moldavian estates were directly administered by the boyar. In Wallachia,
in contrast, many landowners preferred to live in Bucharest and to con
tract out their estates or to work the land on a sharecrop basis.
The Organic Statutes, it will be noted, preceded both the Serbian Con
stitution of 1838 and the Greek constitutions of 1844 and 1864. Like
these documents, they reflected much of the constitutional thought of
Western Europe. Control of the government lay in the hands of the
‘men of substance,’ usually to the detriment of the power of the central
executive and to the exclusion of the majority of the people. This condi
tion was also to be seen in the British Reform Bill of 1832 and the system
of the July Monarchy in France. The Balkan nations thus reflected in
their institutions the political system of western Europe. Russia, the
sponsoring power, remained an absolute monarchy.
The Organic Statutes with their provisions for the establishment of a
regular national government in both Principalities should have repre
sented an advance toward national independence. In fact, the adoption
of these documents marked the beginning of a period of increasing Rus
sian interference. In 1834, in the Convention of St. Petersburg, Russia
and the Porte settled the questions of the Ottoman war indemnity and
the evacuation of the Russian forces. The two powers then chose new
hospodars. Although the Organic Statutes called for lifetime appoint
ments, the powers agreed that the first princes should only hold office
for seven years. Alexander Ghica now became hospodar of Wallachia and
Michael Sturdza of Moldavia. In the next years it soon became apparent
that three separate and conflicting centers of power had been es
tablished: the hospodars, the assemblies, and the Russian consulates. Both
the Organic Statutes and the treaties between the Porte and Russia al
lowed for unlimited intrigue by both the suzerain and the protecting
power and by the assemblies against the hospodars. In the period of the
Russian protectorate to 1856, many of the bad aspects of the Phanariote
period again came to the fore.
In general, the boyars were not basically discontented with the politi
cal situation. Some large boyars were to prove strong Russian partisans.
The Russian protectorship guaranteed them a conservative government
that would secure their economic and social advantages and their politi
cal privileges. It should also be remembered that at this time the govern
ments of the Principalities had no alternative but to cooperate with St.
Petersburg. In 1833 Russia and the Porte signed the Treaty of Unkiar
Iskelesi, which put the Ottoman Empire in a position of virtual subservi
ence. The subsequent signing of the Treaty of Münchengrätz in 1834
between the Habsburg Monarchy and Russia signified the renewed co
Wallachia and Moldaxna before 1853 93
operation of the two great conservative states. The Principalities could
thus not hope for outside assistance in resisting St. Petersburg. France
and Britain, although willing to intrigue in Bucharest and Jassy against
Russia, could offer no positive support.
During the period of the Russian protectorate affairs went relatively
more smoothly in Moldavia than in Wallachia. There Michael Sturdza
proved an enterprising and strong ruler, even though he was also cor
rupt and conniving. Although there was some friction, he was able to
work with the Russian consuls, first Besak and then K. E. Kotsebu. The
hospodar put his chief efforts into reforming the country along the lines
of the Organic Statute. Considerable improvements were made in the
roads, the postal system, and in particular in education. As could be ex
pected, he faced much opposition from the Moldavian boyars, but he
was able to control them through expert political maneuvering.
The situation in Wallachia was more difficult. Here Alexander Ghica,
like Sturdza, faced personal opposition from among the boyars. More
over, he soon clashed with the Russian representatives. In 1837 the Rus
sian consul, P. I. Rikman (Rückmann), demanded that the Wallachian
Assembly accept the so-called additional article for the Organic Statute
which stated that no change could be made in the document without the
consent of Russia and the Porte. The Russian consulate justified this ac
tion by claiming that the stipulation had inadvertently been “left out” of
the original draft. Since this clause would deal a real blow to the au
tonomy of the country, the assembly refused to accept it. A second as
sembly, held after the first was prorogued, not only objected to the ar
ticle, but was also strongly hostile to the hospodar. When its members
appealed to the Porte and Russia, both powers sent commissioners to in
vestigate. Ghica was.deposed in 1842. In December of that year a special
assembly, as directed by the Organic Statute, was held. George Bibescu
received the majority of the votes and became the first hospodar elected in
this manner.
The new prince faced the same problems as his predecessor: boyar in
trigues and Russian pressure. When the first assembly held during his
reign had a hostile majority, he prorogued it. When it met again, in
1844, another major crisis concerning Russia occurred. The incident in
volved the requests of a Russian engineer, Alexander Trandafilov. Rep
resenting a Russian mining company, he sought permission to survey
the country and to exploit for twelve years those mineral rights that he
discovered after compensation had been paid the state and the owners
of the property. The prince and his council agreed to the terms, but the
assembly would not. In 1844 it was prorogued. The grant was finally
refused. In 1847 an assembly was elected in which a majority supported
the prince, but intrigues against him continued, including constant
charges that he was too pro-Russian. At this time in Bucharest, as in

Belgrade and Athens, the Russian, French, and British consuls with
their opposing stands made the life of the. prince difficult.
Like Sturdza before him, Bibescu, despite a shortage of funds, did
succeed in bettering the general condition of the province. Means of
communication were further improved. More primary and secondary
schools were organized. A theater was opened in Bucharest, and the
great swampland in the center of the city was turned into a park. Of par
ticular importance were two legislative measures. In 1847 a law on natu
ralization was passed, which made it a simple process for a Moldavian to
gain Wallachian citizenship. In the same year a customs union was es
tablished between the two provinces. The economic union was the sec
ond major concrete step toward unification, the passing of the parallel
sets of statutes having been the first.
The period of the Russian protectorate coincided with the years of the
greatest rise in Romanian national feeling, particularly among the edu
cated and the privileged sections of society. Patriotic societies were
organized, and the educational system reflected the growing national
self-awareness. Since at this time Russian interference in Romanian af
fairs was more obvious than any actions resulting from Ottoman su
zerainty, the chief object of attack became the Russian protectorate. For
the future, the most important group from whom the leaders of the
movement would be drawn were the young men, sons of boyars, who
were sent to Western Europe, particularly to Paris, to complete their ed
ucation.
From the 1840s onward increasing numbers of young Romanians
began to gather in Paris. They were greatly attracted by the lectures of
such men as Alphonse de Lamartine, Jules Michelet, and Edgar Quinet,
all partisans of romantic nationalism. The majority preferred to study at
the Collège de France where there were no degrees and no examina
tions. They devoted most of their activities to national propaganda, to
the formation of various societies, and to frequent meetings. Although
they had no single political goal, they had certain ideas in common. Most
important they all advocated the unification of Romanian lands in an in
dependent state. They stood also for constitutional government and for
a program of civil rights. Unfortunately, many sections of the standard
liberal program, such as equality of taxation for all classes, equality be
fore the law, and a truly representative government, would have under
mined the political and economic foundations of the rule of their class in
the Principalities. Moreover, from their French education and their fam
ily background these young men had never had the opportunity to gain
knowledge or understanding of the peasant and his problems and out
look. The “people” remained for them an abstract concept gained from
books. Nevertheless, it was from these students that the national leader
ship for most of the rest of the century was to come. In the future Alex
ander Cuza, Nicholas and Radu Golescu, C. A. Rosetti, Ion and Dumitru
Brätianu, and Nicholas Bälcescu were to be particularly prominent. The
historian Michael Kogälniceanu, a Moldavian educated in Berlin, was to
have a similarly important political career.
In February, 1848, when the revolt against Louis Philippe broke out in
Paris, most of the Romanians went home to take a leading role in the
events that subsequently took place in the Principalities. Jassy was the
center of the first actions. Here on April 8 about one thousand men
gathered, the majority of whom were liberal landowners. Among them
were Alexander Cuza and Emanoil Epureanu. A committee of sixteen
was then chosen to draw up a petition, which called for moderate social
and political reform such as the guarantee of personal liberty, minister
ial responsibility, the establishment of a national bank, the organization
of a national militia, the end of censorship, and the election of a new as
sembly. About eight thousand people signed this petition of thirty-three
articles. Although this was no true revolution, Sturdza acted promptly to
put the entire movement down by force. Some of the leaders were ar
rested; others went into exile.
In contrast, in Wallachia the situation became far more serious. A rev
olutionary government actually held control in Bucharest for three
months. After their return from Paris the Brätianu brothers, Rosetti,
Bälcescu, and others immediately prepared plans for an insurrection.
They also got in touch with Romanian leaders in Transylvania. The
main thrust of their movement was to be against the Russian protector
ate, and they sought the cooperation of the hospodar, Bibescu. The first
step in the revolt occurred on June 21 at Islaz, a city on the Danube.
Here the revolutionaries issued a manifesto containing twenty-two basic
demands. These included a call for equal taxation, the convocation of an
assembly with representatives from all classes, and the election of a chief
executive, who could be from any class, for a five-year term. Article 13
supported the emancipation of the peasants with indemnification for the
landowners. From the beginning of the revolt the leaders emphasized
that they were acting against the regime of the Organic Statutes and
Russia, not against the Porte. They wished only a return of their for
mer rights.
Having issued their manifesto, the revolutionaries next set up their
first provisional government, which included Christian Tell, $tefan Go
lescu, Radu £apca, and Nicholas Pleçoianu. They then moved on to
Craiova on June 25. Meanwhile, events in Bucharest had proceeded
along the same road. Bibescu signed the Islaz proclamation and made no
overt attempt to put down the rebellion. On June 26 another provisional
government was formed, including some members of the Islaz group.
Metropolitan Neofit was named president. On June 25-26 Bibescu ab-
dicated and went to Bra§ov in Transylvania. In complete control this

regime adopted a new flag, blue-yellow-red in color, with the words
Dreptate-Frätie (Justice-Fraternity) on it. From the beginning the revolu
tionary government had the support of the city of Bucharest. A series of
meetings held on the Field of Liberty and attended by thousands showed
the degree of popular participation.
The provisional government was, nevertheless, in a most precarious
position. It was in constant danger of a conservative counter-revolution;
furthermore, its members were not in agreement on the social and polit
ical program they should introduce. On July 1 the government was
seized in a conspiracy led by Colonel loan Odobescu and loan Solomon
and only freed by the Bucharest crowd. Within the ranks of the leaders a
split had now become obvious between those who wished only political
changes and others, like Bälcescu, who wished thorough social and eco
nomic reform, in particular the execution of Article 13 of the Islaz proc
lamation concerning the status of the peasant. Meanwhile, however, the
provisional government did attempt to put into practice some of the
provisions of the manifesto, such as the abolition of corporal punish
ment, and the death penalty.
More serious, however, than the dangers from within were those from
without. The great question was the Russian reaction. In July Russian
armies occupied Jassy in preparation for an eventual march into T ran
sylvania against the Hungarian revolution. Rumors immediately swept
through Bucharest that Russia might also occupy Wallachia. The provi
sional government therefore left Bucharest, and Neofit set up a new ad
ministration based on the Organic Statute. A caimacamie (regency) com
posed of Theodore Vâcârescu and E. Bâleanu and supported by
Odobescu and Solomon was set up, but it was soon overthrown.
Having returned to Bucharest, the provisional government next
planned to call a national assembly to be elected on the basis of universal
manhood suffrage. At the same time attempts were made to come to an
arrangement with the Porte. On July 9 a message was sent to Constan
tinople emphasizing that the new regime did not wish to break away
from the empire. Equally apprehensive of possible Russian moves, the
Ottoman government now sent Suleiman Pasha and an army of twenty
thousand men to Ruse. Suleiman then went alone to Bucharest where he
was warmly received. Although he did not recognize the provisional gov
ernment, he did accept the formation of a new caimacamie containing
members of the revolutionary regime. This arrangement, however, was
subsequently rejected by the Porte. Another commissioner, Fuad
Efendi, accompanied by Ottoman troops, entered Bucharest on Sep
tember 25. There they encountered some resistance, but the revolu
tionary forces were too weak to organize a real military opposition. On
September 27 Russian troops also entered the Principality. The Ot
toman representatives now chose as sole caimacam (regent) Constantine
Cantacuzino, a conservative boyar. The revolutionary leaders went into
exile.
With Russian troops in Moldavia and Russian and Ottoman forces in
Wallachia, a new and more repressive political regime was instituted. In
May, 1849, Russia and the Porte signed the Convention of Balta Liman,
in which it was agreed that the hospodars would henceforth be named by
Russia and the Ottoman Empire rather than be elected. They would
serve for seven years. The assemblies were to be replaced by so-called
divans ad hoc, whose members would be nominated by the hospodar. Rus
sian troops remained in the Principalities until 1851.
The new hospodars were Barbu §tirbey, a brother of Bibescu, in Walla
chia and Gregory Ghica in Moldavia. Despite the difficult situation, both
princes tried to work for the improvement of the provinces. For the fu
ture the most significant legislation was the Land Law of 1851. Here the
days of corvée owed by the peasant were increased, but limits were placed
on what had to be done during the period. The law benefited the boyar,
whose aim remained the attainment of full control over the land with the
assurance of an adequate supply of peasant labor.
The major Romanian revolutionary movement in the nineteenth cen
tury thus ended in failure. The leadership was simply too weak to carry
through a program against the combined opposition of Russia and the
Ottoman Empire. Concurrent events in Transylvania had also not aided
the rebellion in the Principalities. The Romanian population of the
Habsburg Empire was primarily interested in winning an equal position
with the Hungarians. They thus sided with the Russian intervention and
the Habsburg dynasty against the Hungarian revolution. In addition the
revolt in the Principalities had demonstrated the division within the rev
olutionary command. A real national program had to include peasant
emancipation. However, only a few of the leaders, such as Bâlcescu,
were willing to embrace a genuine land-reform program, which would
inevitably undermine their economic and social privileges.
Although the revolutionary leaders in exile adopted no uniform polit
ical proposals, most of them moved to the right. The men of the revolu
tion of 1848, who were known subsequently as the ‘forty-eighters,’ in the
future came to stand for what was a comparatively conservative and lim
ited national program. Instead of a national state embracing all the Ro
manian lands and a real social program, they now confined their objec
tives to the unification of Wallachia and Moldavia and to the naming of a
foreign prince. Moreover, many recognized the futility of armed revolt.
So long as the three great empires stood opposed to Romanian national
demands, there was little hope that they could gain their goals by force.
Many, like Ion Ghika, now pressed for an emphasis on diplomatic
means.
Despite the fact that the refugees formed no single organization

abroad, they did all act along thè same lines. In no way discouraged by
their recent failure, they prepared for the future. A real propaganda of
fensive was launched; meetings were held and articles were written.
Romanian leaders made a great effort to speak with and to influence
prominent European statesmen. They achieved their greatest success
when they won the sympathy and support of Napoleon III. In contrast,
in Britain where the government continued to stand for the mainte
nance of the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against Russian expansion,
little progress could be made. Even with the assured support of influen
tial westerners, however, it was clear that even the limited Romanian na
tional program, that is, the unification of the provinces, could not be at
tained unless some event occurred that would remove the Russian
protectorate. The Crimean War was to be exactly this welcome oc
currence.
CHAPTER 7
The Ottoman Empire to 1876:

the Reforms
I n the preceding chapters the steps taken by three of the Balkan na
tional groups to secede from the empire and establish their own au
tonomous or independent regimes have been discussed. The parallel es
tablishment in these countries of constitutional forms of government
along European lines has also been covered. It is interesting to note that
during this same period the Ottoman government, whose authority still
extended over all of the peninsula with the exception of the small Greek
state, faced many of the same problems and adopted some of the same
solutions as the Christian peoples.
Throughout the century in both internal and foreign policy the Ot
toman Empire had fo deal with one single, overriding problem: that of
holding the empire together under highly adverse circumstances, many
of which have already been described. The Porte had to face the chal
lenge not only of the Christian nationalities and the Muslim ayans, but
also of the great powers who pressed to control, directly or indirectly,
the decisions of the Ottoman state. The same conditions that led to the
establishment of a French-British-Russian protectorate in Greece and a
Russian protectorate in Serbia and the Danubian Principalities resulted
in similar measures of domination in Constantinople at various times by
either Russia or Britain.
The leaders of the Ottoman state realized that unless their national
life were reformed they would not be able to stand against either foreign
pressure or internal subversion from both Christian and Muslim ele
ments. The military in particular needed a thorough reorganization.
Change was, however, quite difficult to accomplish. With relatively little
difficulty the Christian people were able to establish governments in
which the church became in effect a department of the state, and the
99
ruler of the country its nominal head. Despite their anti-Muslim tone,
the revolutions had not been pfedominantly religious struggles. More
over, the Serbs, Romanians, and later the Bulgarians viewed the Greek-
dominated heirarchy of the Orthodox church as a block to their own as
pirations. The patriarchate was a part of the Ottoman political structure.
In contrast, the religious influence remained predominant in Con
stantinople. The state was still a Muslim, not a Turkish, entity. For five
hundred years religion had provided the basis for a great and conquer
ing empire. The successes of the past made it difficult to change radically
ancient institutions and ideas. At the beginning reforms could only be
carried out when they were justified as a return to old ways. Moreover,
despite the often desperate position of the empire, too many of its citi
zens continued to have a vested interest in the maintenance of conditions
as they were.
As has already been seen, Balkan revolt was not always a clear case of
Christian against Muslim. It was also a class and social struggle between
those who were benefited by the system and those who were harmed or
felt stifled by it. Christian millet leaders often discouraged Ottoman
reform because they saw it as damaging to their position and as leading
to a further secularization of their society. Some Christian merchants
and notables also profited greatly from cooperation with the empire and
had no wish to change the political order. The situation was, of course,
much more difficult within Ottoman society. The ulema (learned men of
Islam), who controlled education and the law, saw no advantage in pro
gressive reform measures which would lead to a system of public educa
tion on the European model or to the adoption of a legal system separate
from Muslim law. Both Christian and Muslim conservative church
leaders opposed western ideas because they saw that they would lead
inevitably to a secular state in which religious institutions would be re
duced to a clearly subordinate position.
The path to reform in the Ottoman Empire was to proceed in the di
rection already taken by the Balkan states. First, an attempt was made to
establish a centralized, orderly administration whose members would be
loyal to the government, and to draw up uniform laws and regulations
applicable to the entire country. These initial reforms were determined
by the sultan and a small group of administrators close to him. Second,
the representative principle was introduced into some phases of the gov
ernment, and, third, an attempt was made to transfer the real control of
the government to a legislature chosen by a general election. The third
stage was achieved by a revolutionary action.
In addition to the problems already mentioned, it must be emphasized
that in the nineteenth century the Porte, unlike the Balkan states, was
faced with almost continual warfare—either at home or abroad. Often
reform had to be undertaken during severe crises and usually under
The Ottoman Empire to 1876: the Reforms 101
strong pressure from outside powers. Moreover, whereas the Christian

states could usually count on the friendship of one or more great powers
in their national struggles, the Porte could never be sure of support.
After the middle of the century it often felt more endangered by its sup
posed friends, particularly Britain, than by its usual enemy, Russia.
A real effort to reform the empire was begun, as we have seen, during
the reign of Selim III. At a time when it appeared that the state would
collapse from inner rebellion, from both Muslim ayans and Christian
rebels, the sultan recognized the primary need of military reform. Some
efforts along this line had commenced in earlier reigns. Since France was
recognized as the great military state of the age, and since she was the
oldest European ally of the empire, the Porte had naturally turned to
her for assistance and had received French military advisers. Selim’s at
tempt to establish a modern army organized on European lines failed di
sastrously. In 1807 his plans were abandoned, and in 1808 he was assas
sinated and replaced by Mahmud II.
Few rulers have faced the conditions that now confronted the new sul
tan. It was obvious that his empire could not long withstand the internal
and external threats. With rebellious ayans still in control of strong cen
ters, with the Serbs in revolt, and with a war with Russia on his hands, he
could do little before 1812 when the Treaty of Bucharest was signed.
Given the prospect of a period of freedom from foreign war, the sultan
first turned to crushing the rebellious ayons. Although he was successful
in subduing Ali Pasha of Janina and Pasvanoglu, he was unable to curb
Mohammed Ali. Ali remained in Egypt and assumed the attitude of an
independent ruler rather than a subject of the sultan. Moreover, the
problem of Christian rebellion remained. After the settlement of Ser
bian affairs in 1815, the Greek and Romanian movements in the Prin
cipalities and the revolt in the Peloponnesus again placed the empire in
grave danger. The great powers did not intervene until 1827, but the
threat of Russian action was imminent after 1821.
Like Selim III, Mahmud recognized that his chief military problem
was the weakness of the janissaries, which was again demonstrated dur
ing the Greek revolution. Unable to put down the rebellion with his
army, the sultan was forced to appeal to Mohammed Ali in 1825. The
Egyptians with their modern army performed well against the rebels.
The Porte could not, of course, continue to rely on a vassal state led by a
man of the caliber of Mohammed Ali. The sultan needed forces loyal to
his person. Unlike Selim, Mahmud prepared his moves well in advance.
Since the Muslim state was obviously threatened, he was able to win the
support of the mufti (interpreters of the law) and the ulema for the es
tablishment of what was in fact a form of the New Model Army of Selim.
Once again, the janissaries refused to accept any diminution of their
power and rebelled. This time the sultan was ready; in 1826 the revolt
was crushed and the janissaries abolished. At the same time Mahmud
dissolved the religious Bektaski Dervish order, which had been a main
support of the janissaries. The conservative forces in the empire thus
lost their one great source of military power.
The abolition of the janissaries, although a necessary move, left the
Ottoman state in a weak and exposed position. In that same year, it will
be remembered, Russia imposed the Convention of Akkerman on the
Porte; in 1827 the French, British, and Russian governments cooperated
in the joint blockade which ended in the disaster at Navarino and ulti
mately in the Russo-Turkish War. In 1829 in the Treaty of Adrianople
the empire surrendered the Danube delta to Russia and was compelled
to consent to the establishment of the Russian protectorship over Serbia
and the Danubian Principalities. The year 1830 saw the formal establish
ment of independent Greece and the recognition of Serbian autonomy.
At this same time France began its expansion in Algeria, a move that
heralded a century of European encroachment on the North African
lands associated with the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunate as these losses
were, an even graver threat was presented by the actions of Mohammed
Ali.
This clever, highly ambitious ruler with his reorganized state and his
excellent army now prepared to move. Although he had received Crete
as payment for his services in the Greek revolution, he naturally could
not obtain the promised Peloponnesus. He therefore wished Syria as
compensation. When Mahmud refused, the Egyptian forces attacked,
and at the Battle of Konya in December, 1832, they inflicted a grave
defeat on the Ottoman army. Once again the empire was in serious
danger; Constantinople lay open to attack. In this hour of peril the sul
tan was forced to accept Russian assistance; Russian troops and ships ar
rived in the Straits. In July, 1833, the Ottoman Empire and Russia
signed the Treaty of Unkiar Iskelesi. A treaty of alliance and mutual
defense, this agreement was important because it appeared to assure
Russian dominance in the affairs of the empire. The Porte was saved
from the Egyptian danger, but in the peace treaty Mohammed Ali did
receive terms which gave him the effective control of Syria. Conclusion
of peace allowed the empire another brief respite from foreign wars.
Although, as we have seen, the sultan had already commenced his ef
forts to reform the empire, the major changes occurred after the Russo-
Turkish War. Mahmud II has often been referred to as the Peter the
Great of the Ottoman Empire because of the nature of the measures that
he introduced during his reign. His efforts were directed to turning his
state toward the West, and he was interested in altering the appearance
as well as the content of state institutions. Like Selim, he continued to
place emphasis on strengthening the army, which had not performed
well against the Greeks or against the Egyptians. Again foreign instruc
tors were sought. In 1835 Helmut von Moltke and a group of Prussian
officers arrived to train the army; British advisers were secured for the
navy. Turkish students were also sent abroad for military training.
Mahmud then turned to the pressing problem of.political reorganiza
tion. By this time the sultan had absolute control in his own domains,
with the exception, of course, of the regions under the Mohammed Ali’s
rule. No other local ayans were able to challenge his authority. His chief
concern henceforth was to strengthen the central authority and to create
state institutions that would serve this purpose. He also wished to give
his regime the outward appearance of the European governments. He
thus changed the titles of officials so that he had, for instance, a minister
of foreign affairs, of the interior, and of the treasury. The grand vezir,
the chief Ottoman official under the sultan, now became the prime min
ister, although the original title was restored a few months later. A minis
terial council headed by the prime minister was established; it resembled
a European cabinet. In local government measures were taken to tighten
the hold of the central government on the provinces. An Ottoman
census and a survey were taken in 1831 for purposes of taxation and
conscription.
Like the leaders of the new Balkan states, Mahmud was faced with the
problem of finding officials who could fill the offices of state. The mod
ern bureaucratic system demanded a supply of literate, trained officials.
Some attention was therefore turned to the problem of secular educa
tion, but litde progress was made. In 1827 a medical school was es
tablished, but no further great advances were made at this time. As in
the Balkans teachers were simply not available.
With his reign dominated by problems of foreign affairs, Mahmud
recognized the need, to improve relations with the European courts. In
1834 permanent embassies in the major capitals were opened. These
posts became exceedingly important for the future development of the
country, because through them many of the chief reformers and states
men, such as Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha, received their basic training and
their experience with life in Europe. As direct relations with European
states increased the question of languages was posed. Very few Turks
had customarily learned foreign languages. The Porte had in the past
leaned heavily on Greek and Armenian interpreters. Since the Greeks
could no longer be completely trusted after the revolt, other provisions
had to be made. A Translation Bureau was established to handle the cor
respondence with other governments, which was in French. Here T ur
kish students could learn that language and also receive instruction in
subjects such as history and arithmetic.
Other important developments during Mahmud’s reign included the
appearance of the first Turkish language newspaper in the 1830s and
the establishment of a postal system in 1834. Like Peter the Great, Mah
mud was concerned with the dress of his officials. He introduced new
uniforms in the European style, and he replaced the traditional turban
with the fez. With these changes in dress, education, and manners the
process began that we have already seen in the Balkan countries. A bu
reaucratic elite began to emerge; it ran the government, but it became
increasingly separated from the mass of the people.
Although Mahmud’s reign ended in another foreign disaster, his ac
complishments must be acknowledged. The first steps were taken to
change the state organization so that it could better withstand assaults
from foreign powers and from dissident groups within the country.
The central power of the government was strengthened. Moreover, with
the abolition of the janissaries a more efficient fighting force could be es
tablished and the conservative and reactionary elements were less able to
topple the government. Mahmud’s desire to establish an efficient ad
ministration and to end corruption in public office was not ac
complished, but at least one of the major complaints of all of the Otto
man subjects had been recognized.
Throughout his reign Mahmud had been faced with the problem of
Mohammed Ali and his obvious ambition to erect a great state for him
self and his family. The sultan had also not forgotten the humiliation of
1832. By 1839 he decided that his reformed army was strong enough to
challenge his vassal, and in that year he unwisely declared war. The
results were tragic. Again Ibrahim Pasha, a truly great general, defeated
the Ottoman army. In this crisis Mahmud died, to be succeeded by the
sixteen-year-old Abdul Mejid. At this critical point most of the Turkish
fleet switched sides and joined Mohammed Ali. All three of these events,
the defeat of the army, the death of the sultan, and the loss of the navy,
occurred within two weeks.
Again the Ottoman Empire appeared at the point of collapse. The
issue now in European diplomacy was not a Russian threat, but rather
the close association of France with victorious Egypt. Fearing an upset in
the balance of power in the Mediterranean, Russia, Britain, Austria, and
Prussia joined to re-establish the status quo. Faced with this combination,
France dropped her support of Mohammed Ali. Despite his early suc
cesses, in the final settlement the pasha of Egypt received little more
than the right of hereditary rule in Egypt and the Sudan. He could
defeat the Ottoman army, but he could not withstand the combined
pressure of the great powers. At this time Russia let the Treaty of Unkiar
Iskelesi lapse and joined with the other powers in a new agreement. The
Convention of the Straits of 1841 put the area under international con
trol for the first time and in effect limited the authority of the sultan over
his own territory. The treaty provided that in time of peace the Straits
would be closed to foreign warships. These terms were a compromise
between Russian and British interests. With the closure British ships could
not menace the Russian shores of the Black Sea; in turn, Russian squad
rons could not endanger British shipping in the Mediterranean.
The reign of Abdul Mejid inaugurated the great period of Ottoman
reform known as the Tanzimat. Theaim of the measures passed at this
time was exactly the same as Mahmud’s: to save the empire. For the
Balkan peoples the significance of this endeavor lay in the question of
whether the empire could so change its structure that it would either be
more attractive to the non-Muslim inhabitant than the national alterna
tive, or so strong that revolt would be impossible. From the beginning
the task assumed by the reformers ranged on the impossible. The Chris
tian Balkan leaders did not seek equality in an Ottoman state; they
wanted a separate national existence. The concept of Ottoman citizenry
brought forth at this time offered limited appeal. In the same manner
no significant body of Muslims actively sought the reformation of the
state on the lines of religious and national equality. If change were inevi
table, the non-Turkish Muslims tended to prefer the Egyptian example
and a similar separation.
Unlike Mahmud II, Abdul Mejid did not provide firm direction for
change. The leadership lay more in the hands of active, energetic states
men like Mustafa Reshid Pasha. An excellent example of the new Ot
toman official, Reshid had been ambassador in France and Britain be
fore becoming the grand vezir. The sultan himself was a mild but
intelligent man who allowed his ministers much latitude. This period of
bureaucratic supremacy corresponded with an unusually long era of
tranquility in international affairs in the Near East. From the conclusion
of the Egyptian crisis until the outbreak of the Crimean War, Russia
and Britain were usually in agreement in their eastern policies. British
influence was usually stronger in Constantinople, but the Russian gov
ernment made no active effort to reverse the situation. The British gov
ernment was particularly interested in the maintenance and reform of
the empire after the signature of the very favorable commercial Treaty
of Balta Liman in 1838. This agreement opened the empire to British
imports on a virtually free-trade basis.
The two landmarks of the Tanzimat period are the Hatti-Sherif of
Giilhane and the Hatti-Hümayun of 1856. The first was issued in the
middle of the Egyptian crisis. Reshid wished to impress upon the powers
that the empire could reform and maintain itself as a viable state. The
document was a statement of the program that the government in
tended to introduce. Its goal was the further centralization and bureau
cratization of the state and the winning of popular support by the sultan
and his officials as against provincial loyalties and local notables. In this
document assurances were given that measures would be passed ensur
ing the security of life, honor and property, equal taxation, an improved
system of taxation, and a better system for recruiting soldiers. The guar
antees were offered to all Ottoman citizens regardless of religion. It is in

teresting to note that these declarations had to be justified by stating that
they were a return to the past basis of the empire:
In the last one h u n d re d an d fifty years a succession o f accidents an d divers
causes have arisen which have b ro u g h t ab o u t a d isreg ard fo r th e sacred code
o f laws an d th e regulations' flowing th erefro m , an d th e fo rm er strength and
prosperity have changed into weakness and p o v erty .1
Despite the strong British influence in Constantinople, the Ottoman

reformers usually preferred to follow French examples in their adminis
trative changes, in a manner similar to the Balkan states. In 1840 a new
law code was issued based on the premise of the equality of all the citi
zens. Improvements were also made in the system of secular education.
For the Balkans the most significant measure was probably the introduc
tion of a new system of local government in 1840. The power of the
provincial governor was now to be limited by the establishment of a
council of notables on which non-Muslims would be represented. In
practice these bodies, whose members were appointed by the governor,
were not only dominated by Muslims, but they also came to represent
those who had vested interests in the status quo and were not particularly
interested in reform. In addition, in the field of local administration at
tempts were made to improve the quality of the officials sent to the prov
inces and to end graft. More of these men were made responsible di
rectly to the central rather than to the local governments, and regular
salaries were paid.
Unfortunately for the Porte, the process of change was again inter
rupted by a foreign crisis and a revival of the contest among the great
powers for control of all or a part of the empire. Russian influence in Ot
toman lands, the importance of which has been amply demonstrated in
the preceding pages, was based on her military power, on her relations
with the Balkan national groups, and on a series of treaties giving her a
protectorate over Serbia and the Danubian Principalities and certain
rights in regard to the Orthodox Christians in general. The question of
exactly what the Russian position was in regard to the Orthodox church
became a matter of international concern as a result of a quarrel between
the Orthodox and Catholic churches over their respective rights in cer
tain Holy Places in Jerusalem. In this conflict Russia backed the Ortho
dox position, France the Catholic. When in 1852 the Ottoman govern
ment made a judgment favoring the French, the Russian reaction was
violent. Part of the army was mobilized and a special representative was
sent to Constantinople.
The Russian delegate, Prince Alexander Menshikov, arrived in Febru
1. J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record (Princeton:
D. Van Nostrand Co., 1956), vol. 1, p. 114.
ary, 1853, armed with considerable latitude to negotiate. Adopting a
tough and arrogant manner, he presented to the Porte demands that in
cluded a clear Ottoman recognition of Russia’s right to protect the Or
thodox Christians, and a treaty similar to Unkiar Iskelesi. These condi
tions, which changed the issue from a quarrel over the Holy Places to
one of the control of the Ottoman Empire, brought a strong British reac
tion. The energetic British ambassador, Stratford Canning, apparently
counseled the Porte to resist. When the Russian terms, which were pre
sented in the form of an ultimatum, were rejected, Menshikov left Con
stantinople and diplomatic relations were broken. Russian troops then
entered the Principalities. This was, of course, an act of war since the
provinces were under Ottoman suzerainty despite the Russian protec
torate.
The Russian actions now engaged all of the great powers. Britain,
France, and Austria could not allow the change in the balance of power
that would occur should the Ottoman Empire accept the Russian condi
tions and thus become a satellite of the great Slavic nation. No state,
including Russia, wished to go to war, but each government was drawn
into the conflict. Feeling in a strong position because of the apparent
support of the western powers, the Ottoman Empire declared war on
Russia in October, 1853. At the same time the French and British fleets
entered the Straits. In November the Ottoman navy suffered a disas
trous defeat in an engagement with Russian ships at Sinope. The entire
Ottoman fleet was sunk with the loss of four thousand men. After an
other four months of complicated negotiations Britain and France fi
nally declared war on Russia in March, 1854. Then in August, 1854,
Austria forced Russia to evacuate the Danubian Principalities, which
were placed under ajoint Austro-Turkish occupation.
The main event of the Crimean War was the British and French in
vasion of the Crimean Peninsula. For once an eastern war was not waged
chiefly on Ottoman territory, although fierce fighting did take place near
Kars. The ultimate defeat of Russia and the terms of the Treaty of Paris
of 1856 created a favorable international situation for the Porte. Russia,
as we have seen, had consistently been the chief foreign threat to the Ot
toman Empire. She had endangered the state by her claims to Ottoman
territory, by her attempts to control the government after the Treaty of
Adrianople, and by her patronage at times of Christian revolt. The
peace terms appeared to give the Ottoman government the assurance
that Russian pressure would be at least temporarily contained. Of ut
most importance was the stipulation that the Black Sea was to be neutral
ized and that no fortifications were to be built on its shores. This condi
tion applied equally to the Ottoman Empire, but that state could
maintain a fleet in the Straits. In contrast, southern Russia would be
completely without maritime defenses. Other terms of the pact also fa
vored the Ottomans. Russia was now pushed back from the Danube
River. The delta was returned to the Ottoman Empire; Moldavia was
given three districts of Bessarabia bordering the mouth of the river. The
Danube was then internationalized. In addition, the Russian protec
torship over Serbia and the Principalities was abolished, and the states
were placed under the guarantee of the great powers. In the treaty the
Ottoman Empire was expressly admitted to the “concert of Europe,” or
the European community of nations. The Porte promised to reform its
internal administration, while the other powers agreed that they would
not interfere in Ottoman internal affairs.
The Crimean War and the peace treaty led to another period of re
form. The war itself had brought many Europeans to the Ottoman capi
tal. These people associated with the Ottoman upper classes, and the lat
ter’s partial adoption of western clothes and habits aided the Tanzimat
supporters. By this time Constantinople had also become the home of
many political refugees, in particular Poles and Hungarians, many of
whom entered into the service of the Ottoman state. They, too, provided
a channel to acquaint Ottoman society with European developments.
These years thus brought to the fore another generation of reformers.
These men often had been educated in Europe, and they carried on the
work of their predecessors in reforming the state along European lines.
Of these men the most important were to be Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha.
The new era of reform marked a continuation of the emphasis on the
equality of all citizens regardless of religion. In 1855 the poll tax for non-
Muslims was abolished, and they were allowed to bear arms. Together
with rights came, of course, the obligation to serve in the military. These
measures were greeted with little enthusiasm in the Balkans. There was
certainly no eagerness to fight in the Ottoman armies. The Christians
preferred to pay a tax exempting them from service. For their part, the
Muslims were reluctant to serve with Christian soldiers or obey Christian
officers.
The major document to appear now was the Hatti-Hiimayun of 1856,
issued in connection with the Treaty of Paris. It had been formulated
under foreign pressure, and it was a declaration of intentions. Again the
equality of all of the citizens in matters such as justice, education, re
ligion, and tax payments was proclaimed. And again either these stipula
tions were to remain largely unfulfilled or their implementation failed to
appease Christian dissatisfaction.
The 1850s and 1860s also saw continuing efforts to improve com
munications. In 1855 the telegraph reached Constantinople, placing
that capital in close touch with Europe. The network was subsequently
extended throughout the empire. In the 1860s the building of railroads
commenced and hereafter their construction was to play a major role in
the relations of the Porte and the Balkan governments with foreign pow
ers. The railroads were to serve as yet another means of European politi
cal and economic penetration into the area.
Despite growing criticism the reforms were continued during the first
part of the reign of the new sultan, Abdul Aziz, who came to the throne
in 1861. Fuad and Ali continued to alternate in office as his chief minis
ters. Attention was turned to the problem of local government. I n 1864
the Law of Vilayets (provinces) reorganized the empire; again French
examples were followed. The governors of the provinces were still to be
appointed by the central government, but administrative councils and
provincial assemblies representing both Muslim and non-Muslim ele
ments of the population were now associated with them. A standard
body of regulations was issued for all of the divisions. The efforts to cen
tralize and standardize local administration were thus continued.
Changes were also made in the central government. The ministerial
council was enlarged and charged with the drawing up of new laws; a
High Court of Justice was established. The continuation of legal reform
resulted in the issuance of a new civil code, the Mecelle, between 1868
and 1876, which was based on traditional Muslim law. Education was
further improved. In 1868 the Lycée of Galatasaray was opened with
French as the language of instruction. Its goal was to provide a modern
education on the secondary level.
Once these measures were passed the impetus toward reform began to
die. Among the reasons for the waning enthusiasm were the defeat in
1870 of France, whose example had been so important for the re
formers, and the deaths of both Fuad and Ali by 1871; no minister of
equal ability replaced them. In the next years the sultan took more
power into his own hands. His chief minister, Mahmud Nedim, relied
more on Russia than on Britain. By this time criticism of the Tanzimat
was strong. The aim of reform had been the preservation of the state,
yet the process of dissolution was obviously continuing unchecked.
After the Crimean War repeated incidents occurred that resulted in a
further weakening of the Ottoman position. Between 1859 and 1861 the
Danubian Principalities, in violation of the treaties, united. In 1860-61
the great powers intervened in a revolt in Syria and Lebanon, compel
ling the Porte to grant autonomy to that area. In 1866-68 Crete again
was the scene of a rebellion involving European interference. The ef
forts of Prince Michael of Serbia to stir up Christian resistance have al
ready been discussed. Most significant, in October, 1870, the Russian
government denounced those clauses of the Treaty of Paris that pro
vided for the neutralization of the Black Sea. That state was now free to
embark on an active eastern policy. In July, 1875, a massive insurrection
broke out in Hercegovina and Bosnia. It was thus obvious that reform
measures were not bringing Balkan peoples under Ottoman administra

tion closer to their government. Throughout the area signs of resistance
and extreme discontent were evident.
Not only was reform not producing the desired results among the
Christian population, but the financial basis of the empire was fast weak
ening. Like the Balkan states, the Porte found that modern internal im
provements were costly. Since the Ottoman government could not fi
nance them from its own resources, it too resorted to foreign loans.
Expensive foreign technicians were often employed since the Ottoman
educational system did not provide men with the necessary skills. The
officials themselves had scant experience with financial matters. At first
little attempt was made to coordinate the expenditures of the various
departments of state. The government resorted to indiscriminate print
ing of money at times and to borrowing on unwise terms. Although ef
forts were made to remedy the situation after Abdul Aziz came to the
throne, the conditions continued to worsen. The first loan was taken out
in 1854. By 1860 the government was paying 20 percent of its income on
the service of the debt, and by 1875 it was paying 50 percent. In 1876
payments on the debt were suspended; the state was thus technically
bankrupt.
The Tanzimat period witnessed an increase in the volume of Ottoman
trade, but again the results were unfavorable for the state. The empire
was not only hampered by the capitulations, but also by the terms of its
commercial treaties, particularly with Britain. Operating under a free
trade policy, which benefited mainly the industrial countries, the Porte
found its markets filled with imported manufactured goods. The Ot
toman craftsman and home industry, whether Muslim or Christian,
were severely harmed. These economic difficulties caused much criti
cism of Tanzimat policy.
The measures discussed above were formulated to improve the ad
ministration of the state and to remove the obvious abuses. They were
not designed to improve general social and economic conditions in the
countryside. In the empire, as in the autonomous areas, the major social
problem was the condition of the peasant and the question of the dis
tribution of the land. No specific laws were enacted by the Porte regulat
ing landholding, with the exception of the land law of 1858. This act
placed the control of the state lands involved into the hands of lease
holders or tax farmers to the detriment of the peasant who actually
worked the land and who now became a sharecropper or a tenant. T urk
ish agricultural policy thus continued to give the advantage to the holder
of the large estate. It should be strongly emphasized in this connection
that the position of the peasant throughout the empire was in general
declining. He suffered from high taxes and extortionate methods of
collection. In this regard the Muslim was no better off than his Christian
counterpart. The Tanzimat reforms did not alter this situation, nor were
they intended to do so.
Probably the greatest criticism that can be made of the reform period
was that it did not accomplish its basic aims. It did not prevent the loss of
further Ottoman territories, nor did it reconcile the Christian people to
membership in the empire. It did not create a common citizenship. In
addition, the reforms were imposed from the top by a small minority in
fluenced by European thought, and they were simply grafted on to a civ
ilization based on other principles. A major underlying difficulty also lay
in the failure of the majority of both Christians and Muslims to accept
the spirit and intentions of the reforms. Most Muslims were content with
the conditions that existed, in particular with the maintenance of the
secondary status of the Christians. These people in turn wanted national
independence rather than a reformed empire.
Moreover, as in the Balkan nations, the creation of a bureaucratic state
apparatus brought forth a class of officials quite divided in manner, sym
pathies, and education from those below them. The aim under the re
forming sultans was to establish an efficient administration free of brib
ery and corruption. The goal was not accomplished. Commenting on
this question, one authority has written concerning the reign of Mah
mud:
Some o f th e officials were com petent and industrious, whatever their degree
o f westernization. But the majority were not, and many looked only for sine
cures, o f which th ere were never enough to go around. It was estim ated that
half the people o f Istanbul lived o ff the state in some way. Many, both in Istan
bul and in the provincial capitals, became unsalaried hangers-on of pashas,
hoping that position o r graft would com e their way. T h e crowd of relatives
and parasites in the anteroom s o f every high official was one of the great
curses o f O ttom an adm inistration, leading to favoritism, inefficiency, and
bribery.2
To this criticism should be added the fact that despite numerous dec
larations and decrees the Ottoman administration in the Balkans did
continue to be dominated by Muslim officials who did not regard Chris
tians as equals. The repeated complaints by the nationalities that the
promises made in the reform edicts were not carried out were justified.
The attitude of the great powers was also harmful to reform efforts.
Although all of the powers were critical of Ottoman rule, they did noth
ing to make the task of the Porte easier. They insisted on the mainte
nance of their capitulatory rights, and they pressed for special privileges
for their client nationalities. In their mutual struggle for influence each
2. Roderic H. Davidson, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1963), p. 34.
was willing at different times to support strongly national programs for

their own ends. Thus, France encouraged Greek plans and Russia at
times backed resistance movements among the Slavic peoples. Given the
possibility of foreign aid, the Balkan peoples saw less need to find a satis
factory political accommodation with the Porte.
By the 1860s the reform program was under attack not only by those
who claimed that it failed to work because it violated Ottoman traditions,
but also by those who believed that the chief problem was that it had not
gone far enough. The latter group wished the reform to proceed from
administrative reorganization to the establishment of organs of repre
sentative government. As in the Balkan states, the reforms and the edu
cational improvements had produced an intellectual class composed of
civil servants, army officers, writers, and some businessmen who were in
touch with European developments and who were not satisfied with the
rate of progress in the Ottoman Empire. In 1865 some of these joined
together in the Young Ottoman Society. Among their numbers were
many talented writers, the best known being Namik Kemal. Combining
progressive ideas with an emphasis on Islamic traditions, they criticized
the Tanzimat because they believed that it had given too much to the
Christians at the expense of the Muslims. They disliked Ali Pasha per
sonally and considered him too dictatorial in his methods. This group
admired certain parts of European civilization. They wished to adopt
what it had to offer in science, technology, education, and economic ad
vances, but they emphasized their Muslim and Ottoman identity. Their
slogan was Liberty (hiirriyet) and Fatherland (vatan). They sought to join
Christian and Muslim in a common Ottoman citizenship. Regarding spe
cific changes in the government, they desired a limitation of the absolute
power of the sultan and the introduction of representative institutions.
In 1876 the Young Ottomans had the opportunity for a brief time to
put their program into practice. At that time, in another period of grave
international crisis, Midhat Pasha led a coup which succeeded in
dethroning first Abdul Aziz in May and then his mentally unstable suc
cessor Murad V in August. Abdul Hamid II came to the throne after
having promised a constitution. This document was drawn up and sub
sequently issued in December, 1876. Essentially conservative in spirit,
the constitution allowed the sultan broad powers. He appointed the min
isters, approved legislative acts, and summoned and dissolved the legis
lature. He was also proclaimed caliph, and his person was sacred. The
legislative branch consisted of a senate responsible to the ruler and a
chamber elected indirectly. A bill of rights and provision for an indepen
dent judiciary were also included. All citizens were declared equal, but
Islam remained the state religion. National unity was strongly empha
sized.
The first chamber chosen under this constitution met in March, 1877.
In April Russia declared war to open the fourth Russo-Turkish war of
the century. The Tanzimat reforms were now to be put to a practical
test. It remained to be seen whether the empire cöuld resist alone the
power that had been its main threat for over a century.
CHAPTER 8
The United Principalities to 1876
T he early 1850s had been a difficult time for the Romanian nationalist.
The failure of the revolutions of 1848 had resulted in renewed Russian
and Ottoman intervention in the internal life of Wallachia and Moldavia.
Unless some international event were to occur to deter these two powers,
it seemed most unlikely that the program of the nationalists for the unity
of the Principalities and a foreign prince could be achieved. The Cri
mean War provided such an opportunity. The terms of the Treaty of
Paris guaranteed both that Russia alone would not be able to determine
the aff airs of the provinces and that Ottoman control would not be re-es
tablished. It will be remembered that the agreement replaced the Rus
sian protectorate with a guarantee by the great powers. The mutual dis
trust and competition among these states assured that they were not
likely to exert real influence over the Principalities. Similarly, the neu
tralization of the Black Sea and the Russian surrender of three districts
of southern Bessarabia to Moldavia were favorable developments.
Most advantageous for the Romanians was the fact that the peace con
ference gave Napoleon III the opportunity to support the nationalist
position. At the end of the war Austrian and Ottoman troops occupied
the country. The powers were faced with the problem of what regime
was to replace the Russian protectorate and the Organic Statutes. In
their discussion on this question the powers naturally followed their
traditional interests in the area. Napoleon III, who now emerged as the
patron of European national movements, argued for the full unionist
program of the joining of the Principalities under a foreign prince. His
position was backed by Prussia and Piedmont, themselves in a period of
national upsurge, and by Russia who had joined with France in what was
to be the beginning of a brief period of cooperation in international af
fairs. Against them stood the Porte, who saw union as an infringement
of its treaty rights and a step that would inevitably lead to independence.
114
The United Principalities to 1876 115
Now and later the Habsburg government supported the Ottoman posi
tion, principally because of its fears over Transylvania, a territory
claimed by the Romanian nationalists. At first Britain also disapproved
of union because of her desire to maintain a strong Ottoman Empire.
Since the powers could not come to an understanding at the congress
in Paris, it was agreed that an attempt would be made to consult the
wishes of the Romanians. In order to do this the powers decided to hold
elections for so-called divans ad hoc in each Principality, which in turn
would express an opinion on the organization to be given the country.
The first election, held in July, 1857, was clearly fraudulent. As a re
sult of Ottoman and other pressures, conservatives who wished to
maintain the separation of the provinces won a clear majority in Molda
via. This event caused a crisis between France, who wished the elections
annulled, and Britain, who was still primarily interested in upholding
Ottoman rights. In a compromise the French finally agreed not to press
for unification and the British accepted new elections. These, held in
September, 1857, resulted in the choice of unionist candidates, who in
October voted for union and a foreign prince. Since the powers would
not accept this solution, the Porte dissolved the two bodies and the mat
ter again was referred to international consideration.
In May, 1858, the representatives of the great powers met in Paris to
discuss the Romanian question. As before France stood for union; the
Habsburg Empire and the Porte were the chief opponents. A compro
mise was again achieved and resulted in the conclusion of the conven
tion of August 19, 1858. This document, which now replaced the
Organic Statutes, provided a new political organization for the Princi
palities. The provinces were to be known as the United Principalities of
Moldavia and Wallachia and were to remain under the suzerainty of the
sultan and be guaranteed by the powers. Like the Organic Statutes, the
convention provided that the provinces were to have parallel but sepa
rate institutions with two hospodars, two ministries, and two assemblies.
As a sop, however, to nationalist feeling, a Central Commission at
Focçani and a single court of appeals were to be established. The hospo
dars were still to be elected by special assemblies and approved by the sul
tan. The legislative power was divided between the assemblies and Cen
tral Commission. The assemblies were to be elected every seven years
with the ministries responsible to them. They controlled the budget and
taxation. Elected on a highly restrictive franchise, their membership
guaranteed that the boyars would continue to control the state.
Like the Organic Statutes, the new convention introduced changes in
the land system. Article 46 stated:
All the privileges, exem ptions o r m onopolies which certain classes still enjoy
will be abolished, and th e revision of the law which regulates the relations of
the landlords with the farm ers will be u n d ertak en w ithout u n d u e delay with a
view to im proving th e conditions o f th e p easan t.1
The same article provided that all citizens were to be “equally liable to
taxation and equally admissible to public service in both Principalities.
Their individual liberties will be guaranteed.”
Although the Convention of August 19 did mark certain advances
toward union, it obviously did not meet the desires of the nationalists,
politically the most active group in the Principalities. To them the most
favorable feature of the document was the introduction of a Central
Commission to enact measures of interest to both Principalities. It could,
however, act only with the approval of the two chambers and the hospo-
dars under a complicated procedure. Given the division of the great
powers on the question of Romanian unity, the terms of the convention
were the best that could be expected.
With the signature of the agreement the two Principalities proceeded
with preparations for the elections to choose the new hospodars. As in the
preceding years, these took place amid confusion and recrimination.
Each Principality was under the charge of a caimacamie of three. The
functions of these bodies were not clear, and their membership was split
between those who wished union and the conservatives who did not. The
first elections were held in the last week of December in Moldavia. Al
though they did not dominate the assembly selected at that time, the
unionists nevertheless succeeded in securing the election of Alexander
Cuza on January 17, 1859. In Wallachia the voting took place at the
beginning of February. Again the unionists did not win, but the conser
vatives were split between rival candidates. During the meetings of the
assembly in Bucharest, there was considerable agitation in the streets in
favor of the unionists. Divided among themselves, the members of the
assembly finally also chose Cuza. The election was the victory of the lib
eral leaders and certainly a great step toward achieving the program of
the forty-eighters. The two Principalities were now linked in a personal
union.
Since this action broke the spirit if not the letter of the August conven
tion, the powers again consulted on what should be done. As could be
expected, France was the main supporter of the Romanian union and
was again backed by Russia who wished to maintain the entente with
Paris established after the Crimean War. The Ottoman Empire and Aus
tria remained opposed; Britain wished a compromise. The chief prob
lem for those who desired a strict observance of the convention was how
1. The text of the convention is given in D. A. Sturdza, A rtf' si documente relative la istoria
renascerei României (Acts and documents relating to the history of the Romanian renais
sance) (Bucharest: Carol Gobi, 1900-1909), vol. 7, pp. 306-16.
the Principalities could be compelled to hold new elections. No power
was willing to allow the Porte to send troops to enforce the decisions
previously reached.
The Romanian cause was, however, to be strongly aided by the out
break of war in Italy between France and Austria in April. The Italian
crisis now effectively removed Austria from the diplomatic negotiations
on the Principalities. Faced with military defeat in Italy, the monarchy
was in no position to enforce her views on the Romanian question. In
September, 1859, the powers finally agreed to recognize as an exception
the double election of Alexander Cuza. The principle of the separation
of the Principalities was reconfirmed; only the personal union for the
lifetime of Cuza was accepted.
At first glance Alexander Cuza, a prince whose period of rule was to
witness real reform in the Principalities, did not seem particularly well
qualified for the role he was called on to play. His past associations had
been with the Liberals, and he had joined in the revolutionary move
ment in Moldavia in 1848. After a short period in exile he had returned
in 1849 and had served in the administration under Ghica and Nicholas
Vogorides. His election in Jassy came as a complete surprise; he had not
sought the office. He was not a personally impressive man, nor did he
have a party or a clique behind him. He suffered from an additional dis
ability in that he was obviously considered only a poor substitute for a
foreign prince by his Liberal supporters. With these handicaps he had to
deal with a difficult internal situation, the constant rivalry of ambitious
politicians, and pressure from abroad.
The double election had done little to simplify the complicated politi
cal organization set up by the August convention. The provinces had
one hospodar, but there were still two separate assemblies, two adminis
trative systems, and the Central Commission. During his first period in
office Cuza could not accomplish much. The two political parties, the
Liberals and the Conservatives, dominated the political life of the coun
try. Representing, for the most part, the great landowners, the Conser
vatives had no real program or competent organization. Because of the
restrictive franchise they controlled the assemblies, but partisan politics
within the party made the presentation of a united front difficult. In
contrast, the Liberals were better politicians. Their numbers were made
up of the smaller landowners, state officials, and some men from the
professions and business. They had formed the leadership of the revolu
tionary movement in 1848, and they were to provide the Principalities’
most effective statesmen in the years to come. In contrast to the Conser
vatives, who wished to preserve the political, social, and economic status
quo, some Liberals were, at least in theory, for land reform. These par
ties, which represented but a small minority of the Romanian popula
tion, provided the same sort of opposition to Cuza as did similar groups
to other Balkan princes.
The combination of the cumbersome state machinery and the political
rivalries made the Principalities most difficult to govern. Moreover, like
other Balkan leaders, Cuza was aware that a further move toward na
tional unity was the one issue on which all competing factions would
unite. Even the Conservatives, who were in opposition to Cuza, would in
the majority approve the next step, that is, the administrative union of
the two provinces. The prince wisely decided to work toward this goal,
not through another fait accompli, but through negotiation with the su
zerain power. In the spring of 1861 he was able to gain the consent of
the Porte to the establishment of a single ministry and assembly and to
the abolition of the Central Commission. Like his appointment, this
union was to last only for Cuza’s lifetime. Since these changes involved
an alteration of the August convention, the consent of the powers was
necessary. Here Russian opposition marked a change in the position of
that power toward the Principalities. The Russian government now
argued that this would be just another move toward the accession of a
foreign prince and the further breaking of treaties. Since the Ottoman
government did not oppose the move, however, in December, 1861, the
powers accepted the full unification of the administration of the prov
inces, although only for the duration of Cuza’s reign. This measure was
a major accomplishment for the Romanian nationalists. For the first time
in modern history a true Romanian state existed. In December Cuza
could proclaim: “Romanians, union is accomplished. The Romanian na
tionality is founded! . . . Long live Romania.” 2 On February 3, 1862, the
first single government was formed under the Conservative Barbu Ca-
targiu; on February 5 the united assembly convened. Bucharest now be
came the capital of the country.
The change did not diminish Cuza’s problems. He still faced the ne
cessity of dealing with domestic opposition and two great interrelated in
ternal problems: agrarian reform and a widening of the franchise. As
long as the electoral law was so restrictive, it was inevitable that the as
semblies would be dominated by Conservatives who would try to main
tain the vto//« quo. At this time Catargiu led the Conservatives, and Ion
Brâtianu and Michael Kogälniceanu, the Liberals. In June, 1862, Ca
targiu was assassinated; in July Nicholas Crefulescu became premier.
The pressing national question was land reform, but as long as the Con
servatives dominated the assembly, nothing could be accomplished.
In October, 1863, Cuza finally took a decisive step and appointed the
Moldavian Liberal Kogälniceanu as prime minister. Under his leader
ship the country embarked upon its greatest period of social and eco-
2. Quoted in T. W. Riker, The Making of Roumania (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1931), p. 340.
nomic change. The two landmarks were the secularization of the lands
of the Dedicated Monasteries, and the Agrarian Law. Kogâlniceanu han
dled the first of these problems at once since this question caused little
disagreement. With the end of the Phanariote rule of 1821, each suc
ceeding government in both Principalities had attempted to deal with
the matter and to free what was approximately a quarter of the Roman
ian acreage from foreign control. The provinces naturally wished to get
hold of these rich lands and their revenues, but this action was not so
easily taken. The heads of the monasteries argued that they were not
subject to the jurisdiction of the state. Their stand was supported by Rus
sia who wished to do nothing to weaken the ecumenical patriarchate at
Constantinople. All classes in the Principalities opposed the special privi
leges of the monasteries and their holding of such vast territories. The
Romanian clergy resented this remnant of Greek domination. The
boyars hoped to secure the property for their own exploitation. The
peasants knew that those who worked on the ecclesiastic lands were
worse off than those on the private estates.
After 1821 real efforts were made to negotiate a satisfactory agree
ment. In 1843 the monasteries agreed to pay a fixed amount to the state,
but the offer was not satisfactory from the Romanian viewpoint. The
matter was still unsolved at the time of the union of the Principalities. In
the subsequent discussions both sides adopted an unyielding attitude.
The monasteries would not concede on any major point; the Romanian
government wanted complete control over the lands. Russia, the logical
mediator as the only Orthodox great power, remained biased on the side
of the Patriarchate. As negotiations dragged on, Cuza decided to act, in
December, 1863. He ended the negotiations and declared the lands
secularized. When the Porte and the powers protested, he insisted that
this was a purely Romanian internal affair. The assemblies approved the
expropriations, but they also offered compensation. The Patriarchate
remained adamant and in the end received nothing.
The sequestration of these lands was a very popular measure. In con
trast, the next question, that of land reform, aroused much domestic op
position and led to a political crisis. In April, 1864, the Conservative as
sembly voted a motion of censure against Kogâlniceanu. Cuza
nevertheless refused to dismiss this ministry and instead dissolved the as
sembly on May 14. He then announced that he would hold a national
plebiscite on a new statute, which would both increase his own powers
and also widen the franchise. This action, a veritable coup d’état, was suc
cessful. Using the powers of the central government to influence the vot
ing, Cuza won by 682,621 to 1,307; 70,220 abstained. Since stipulations
of the August convention were involved, the powers had to approve
these actions. Despite the protests of the Porte, not only were the
changes accepted, but it was now agreed that the guarantor states would
henceforth only intervene in questions relating to the vassal-suzerain

relationship of Romania with the Ottoman Empire.
With the election of a compliant assembly assured, Cuza and Kogâlni-
ceanu could proceed with their greatest reform measure, the Agrarian
Law. It will be remembered that Article 46 of the August Convention of
1858 called for legislation in this field. The Conservative boyars had al
ready formulated their conception of land reform; they wished to enact
measures that would leave the peasant without land. They would thus
not only control all the land, but they would be assured of a more than
adequate labor supply. The Agrarian Law introduced in July, 1863,
avoided this extreme, but its provisions were not unfavorable to the
boyar, who was required to surrender no more than two-thirds of his
land. The peasant was to be the full owner of his share. Allotments, as
was customary in Romania, were based on the number of catde that a
peasant family owned. If a landowner did not have sufficient property to
fulfill the law, state lands were to be provided. All payments and ser
vices owed by the peasant to the landowner were abolished. The boyar,
however, received compensation for these losses from the state. The
peasant paid a fixed amount over a fifteen-year period. The intention of
the law was to create a class of prosperous, free peasants. The newly
acquired land was declared inalienable for thirty years to prevent the
peasant from selling it back to the boyars. In addition to these peasants
there were approximately 107,000 others who already controlled their
own lands.
The law, which was hastily drawn up, was full of loopholes. The great
difficulty was the lack of proper supervision to assure that the provisions
would be fairly carried out. The boyar obviously was in a stronger posi
tion than the peasant, and he dominated his locality. There were no ade
quate surveys or statistics on which to base the division of the estates.
The boyar thus was able to take the best sections and to control the own
ership of the forests and pastures. Peasant holdings were not only often
from the poorest soil, but the individual could receive scattered plots far
from his home village. One of the greatest problems was, however, to
come in the future. From 1859 to 1899 the Romanian population grew
54 percent. The grave social consequences of the repeated subdivision of
plots thus soon arose here as elsewhere in the peninsula. The unfortu
nate position of peasant was shown in the continual unrest in the coun
tryside culminating in the great uprising in 1907. Although grain ex
ports increased sharply for the rest of the century, few of the benefits of
this trade were passed on to the peasant. More and more peasants were
forced to go into debt, rent land, or become agricultural laborers on a
large estate. In 1866 and 1872 laws on agricultural contracts were passed
that placed the peasantry almost in a position of bondage to the great
landowner. The reform thus did not result in the formation of a class
of stable and contented peasant proprietors. Romania remained a

land of great estates where production was directed toward fulfilling
the demands of a large grain export trade.
In addition to these measures, other reforms were passed under
Kogälniceanu’s ministry. A national system of education was established
providing for primary and secondary schools throughout the country
and for universities in Bucharest and Jassy. A civil code was issued based
on the Code Napoleon. Local government was reorganized, again along
French lines. In the future the strong centralization of the administra
tion allowed the authorities in the capital to control the localities through
the prefects and the police. As in Greece and Serbia, this system gave the
ministry in power control over elections. The reign of Cuza also saw the
inauguration of a period of foreign investment in Romania, which was to
have important repercussions later.
Despite, and even because of, the magnitude of these reforms, Cuza
faced increasing opposition. The Conservatives, who represented the
great landowners, hated the prince because of the land and electoral
laws. The Liberals, who had never wholeheartedly backed Cuza and who
were also divided on the agrarian question, became increasingly discon
tented. Moreover, Cuza was anything but a model prince. He was not
ambitious and he does not seem to have concerned himself with adopt
ing regal ways. He also had a private life which, although not in outright
contradiction to Romanian customs, was not well regarded in the head
of a state. Living apart from his wife, he had as his mistress Marie
Obrenovic, whose son Milan was to become the first king of Serbia. The
prince also had no legitimate heir so the problem of succession existed.
In February, 1865, Cuza finally broke with Kogälniceanu. Since he
had now estranged both the Conservatives and Liberals, it was inevitable
that members of both parties should conspire together to remove him.
The leaders of this movement were Lascar Catargiu, Ion Ghica, Ion
Brâtianu, the Golescu brothers, and Rosetti. Once again the leaders of
the Wallachian revolution of 1848 headed an insurrection. Rosetti took
the principal role in Romania; Ion Brâtianu went to Paris to try to assure
French support for a change of rulers and, most important, to find
another candidate for the throne.
One night in February, 1866, a group of army officers who had been
won over to the conspiracy entered the prince’s rooms and forced him to
sign an abdication. He later left the country. A regency was immediately
formed composed of General N. Golescu, Ion Ghica, and Colonel N.
Haralambie. The revolutionary government now proclaimed as its goals
a program calling for unity, autonomy, a foreign prince, and the es
tablishment of constitutional government. The assembly then proceeded
to chose Philip Count of Flanders, a brother of King Leopold II of
Belgium, as prince. This candidate, who did not have French support,
declined at once, but in the meantime Brätianu had found a suitable sub
stitute.
Although the exact role taken by Napoleon III in the selection of the
next ruler of Romania is not clear, he certainly approved the candidate
now designated by Brätianu, Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmar-
ingen. The second son of Prince Karl Anton, the head of the Catholic
southern branch of the Prussian ruling dynasty, Charles was by birth as
much French as German. On his mother’s side he was related to Napo
leon III; on his father’s to the Prussian king. In March Brätianu met
with the prince and his father. Shortly after this visit he was able to
telegraph Bucharest that Charles would accept the position. In April,
1866, the provisional government held a plebiscite to confirm this
choice. Given the political conditions in the country, it is not surprising
that Charles was approved by 685,969 votes to 224. Once again the
Romanian leaders were to be aided by the course of internadonal events.
The danger existed that a war might soon break out between Prussia and
Austria. Charles, as a Prussian officer, was forced to slip through the
Habsburg Empire in disguise. He arrived in Bucharest in May, 1866,
where he was welcomed as the long-desired foreign prince. As the inter
national situation worsened, the powers were thus forced to deal with
another Romanian fait accompli.
According to the treaties, after the abdiction of Cuza the Romanian
provinces should have returned to the separate status that they had held
in August, 1858. No power expected this to happen since all had recog
nized, even when limiting the unification to the lifetime of Cuza, that the
union could not be undone. More serious was the question of the foreign
prince. Luckily for Romania the powers were as divided in 1866 as they
had been in 1859 and 1861. As usual, France remained the chief support
of the national program; the Porte, Austria, and Russia were against it.
As before, the prime question was how to force Charles off the throne
and again enforce the treaties. No power would allow a Turkish inter
vention. Moreover, in June the Austro-Prussian War broke out. The im
pressive Prussian victories nullified Austrian opposition to the events in
Bucharest. The acceptance by Charles of the Romanian throne had been
approved by the Prussian king and by his chancellor, Otto von Bismarck.
Meanwhile, the provisional government proceeded in haste to pre
pare the constitution that it had promised. The resultant document was
based on the Belgian constitution of 1831. As in similar documents dis
cussed above, freedom of speech, press, assembly, and the equality of all
citizens were guaranteed. The prince was given a relatively strong posi
tion in the state. He could name and dismiss ministers, and dissolve the
assembly; most important, he had an absolute veto over legislation. The
legislative branch of the government consisted of two houses: a senate
and a chamber. Indirect elections assured that the landowners and those
who held political power in 1866 would retain control of the govern
ment. The chamber was to be elected for four years and was to have reg
ular annual sessions. It had control over the budget. In what was to
become a controversial article in the future, the constitution stated that
“only foreigners who are Christians can become citizens.” Despite its lib
eral phraseology, the document, like those of Serbia and Greece, did not
guarantee a truly representative government. The centralized adminis
trative system still allowed a strong ministry or a determined prince to
dominate the electoral procedure. Nevertheless, the year 1866 did mark
the achievement of goals set by the Romanian national leaders in 1848.
The country was united, and it was ruled by a foreign prince.
Despite the revolutionary basis of his authority, Charles was able to
gain the recognition of the powers. In October, 1866, he was invested by
the sultan. In addition, the Porte now conceded him the right to issue his
own coinage and to have an armed force of thirty thousand men. The
prince, a highly ambitious and able man, came to Romania with the
expressed determination to establish orderly government and economic
prosperity. Highly conscious of his personal position, he disliked the fact
that a Hohenzollern prince should be the vassal of the sultan. Neverthe
less, in foreign affairs he followed an extremely cautious policy until
1877, when events allowed him to act otherwise. As a Prussian officer he
placed great emphasis on building up an efficient Romanian militia,
which could be used if further gains in foreign policy were possible. In
1867 he joined, as we have seen, in a secret alliance with Prince Michael
of Serbia, but it is safe to assume that he would only reluctantly have
gone to war against the Porte. In 1869 he made a very popular marriage
with Princess Elizabeth of Wied, a Lutheran. Since he was a Catholic,
Charles, like Othon» had agreed to bring up his children in the Ortho
dox faith. Elizabeth, writing under the name of Carmen Sylva, did much
to introduce Romania to Europe.
Although Charles was to become a strong and popular ruler, his first
years found him involved in continual political controversies. During the
period of nadonal crisis that followed Cuza’s fall, the Conservatives and
the Liberals had joined hands to preserve the interests of their country.
Once the external dangers were removed, the parties returned to their
factional disputes. Charles was not an experienced political leader, nor
had he come to his throne with an adequate knowledge of the country.
He was soon quarreling with those very persons who had been chiefly
responsible for his selection, Brätianu and the Liberals. The fall and
winter of 1870-71 were to prove particularly difficult for the prince. In
July, 1870, France declared war on Prussia; in the next months it was
soon clear that the Romanian patron would be militarily crushed. Feel
ing ran high. As a Prussian officer and a patriotic German, the prince
made no attempt to hide his sympathies or his opinion that Prussia
would win. In August, 1870, an uprising backed by republican elements

occurred in Ploeçti. Although it was repressed, the prince was most dis
turbed when a jury freed the participants. This action seemed a direct
challenge to his authority.
To add to the political troubles, a scandal connected with the building
of railroads also damaged the prince’s position. At the beginning of his
reign Charles, interested in the modernization of Romania, had favored
the swift construction of railroads. As was to be the case in all of the
Balkan countries, the Romanian lack of capital and skilled technicians
meant that the lines had to be constructed by foreign firms and with
loans. Although most of the companies involved in enterprises in the
country fulfilled their tasks, one railroad contractor, a Prussian Jew by
the name of Strousberg, fell into financial difficulty and could not pay
dividends to his stockholders. He then attempted to compel the Roma
nian government to shoulder his financial liabilities. The affair also re
vealed the involvement of some Romanian politicians in fraudulent
transactions. In addition, Bismarck strongly backed the stand of the
Prussian citizen. The incident was used to damage the prince, and it
coincided with a period of rapidly increasing anti-Semitism.
Charles was now becoming increasingly depressed. He was convinced
that he could not continue to reign with a constitution that allowed the
political parties, which, of course, represented only a fraction of the
Romanian people, to thwart constantly his actions. The same struggle
between the prince and the rival parties that we have seen in Greece and
Serbia and during the time of Cuza was thus being repeated. Fully pre
pared to abdicate if necessary, the prince, in the fall of 1870, wrote a per
sonal letter to the protecting powers concerning his difficulties in ruling,
given the political situation in the country. Unfortunately for the prince,
he chose the wrong moment to act. Not only were France and Prussia at
war, but in October Russia had denounced the Black Sea clauses of the
Treaty of Paris. No European power wanted another complication.
Moreover, most of the governments misunderstood the aim of the letter.
They thought that Charles was preparing the ground to declare Roma
nian independence.
Charles’ personal position became even more precarious after an in
cident on the night of March 22-23, 1871. That evening the German col
ony of Bucharest was holding a dinner to celebrate the Prussian victory
and the founding of the German empire. They were attacked by a mob
while the police stood by. This event, together with the problems pre
viously discussed, led Charles to inform Lascar Catargiu and Nicholas
Golescu that he would resign. Faced with what would obviously be a dan
gerous situation, the two statesmen assured the prince of Conservative
support. Lascar Catargiu then succeeded in forming a cabinet which
lasted for five years. George Costaforu became foreign minister. Since
the central government could control the elections, the assemblies in this
period were dominated by the ministry.
The formation of the Catargiu government heralded a brief period of
calm in Romanian internal affairs. The Conservative regime wished the
country to be a Belgium at the mouth of the Danube and not to engage
in foreign adventures. Conditions in Europe were also favorable for
such a policy. After the Prussian victory and the unification of Germany,
this power, Russia, and the Habsburg monarchy came together to form
the informal coalition called the Three Emperors’ Alliance. Romania’s
two neighbors were thus now allies. The Romanian link with the trium
phant Hohenzollern dynasty gave additional prestige to the nation.
With the strengthening of his own position, Charles was free to con
centrate more on forwarding the Romanian interests in international
relations. Like previous Romanian statesmen, he preferred to rely on
diplomacy to advance the national cause. His government thus pro
ceeded to attempt to conclude various treaties and conventions with
other powers to test how far the autonomous state could go in conduct
ing an independent foreign policy. First, postal and telegraphic conven
tions were arranged. Then, diplomatic agencies were opened in the
major capitals—Vienna, Berlin, Rome, and St. Petersburg—in the
1870s. From now on Romania’s closest ties were to be with Germany and
the Habsburg monarchy. Defeated France was not to play such a large
role in the Romanian alliances until after the outbreak of the First World
War.
In the diplomatic offensive the most important move was the Roman
ian attempt to conclude separate commercial conventions and to set its
own customs rates. Both Britain and the Porte refused to recognize this
right. They argued that Romania was legally bound by the commercial
treaties concluded by the Ottoman Empire, which, incidentally, were
usually favorable to British interests. For Romania the issue involved was
political not economic. The successful negotiation of such an agreement
would signify a further step toward independence.
The state that had the greatest interest in the question was the Habs-
burg Empire, with its primary economic interests in Romania and its
leading position on the Danube. In order to put pressure on Vienna, in
June, 1874, the Romanian government introduced a new set of customs
dues, which would mean that nations not having agreements would pay
higher rates. The Habsburg government agreed to start negotiations,
which led to the conclusion of the first Romanian commercial conven
tion in June, 1875. Although the economic terms were favorable to the
monarchy, the Romanian government, concerned primarily with the po
litical aspects, regarded the treaty as a victory. In March, 1876, a similar
agreement was signed with Russia and later with the other powers.
As can be seen, great progress had thus been made in the years from
1856 to 1876. The program of the forty-eighters, the union of the Prin
cipalities and a foreign prince, had been accomplished. An agrarian
reform act had been passed and a constitution adopted. A truly national
government was in existence, although the country was still under the
suzerainty of the Porte. The most important advances in the national
program had been made by diplomacy and by presenting the powers
with afait accompli. Romania had taken advantage of other nation’s wars;
she had not fought herself. Each change had been in violation of inter
national treaties, but the great powers, divided among themselves, were
unable to agree on how the Romanian acts could be reversed.
Despite the great gains of these two decades, much was left to be ac
complished. The final Romanian goal, like that of the Greeks and Serbs,
was the acquisition of all the lands inhabited by their nationals. Transyl
vania, Bukovina, and most of Bessarabia lay outside the Romanian state.
It was obvious at this time that it was impossible to annex these lands
since they were held by Russia and the Habsburg Empire who were in al
liance. The Romanian nationalist did, however, have one objective that
did not seem so remote, the achievement of independence, an aim that
was also particularly appealing to the prince. In the summer of 1875 the
Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Hercegovina were the scene of a peas
ant rebellion which could not be suppressed. In May, 1876, a Bulgarian
uprising occurred; in the summer of that year Serbia and Montenegro
went to war against the Porte. The entire eastern question was thus again
reopened. The problem for the Romanian government was to deter
mine where in an extremely complicated situation its best interests lay. It
also had to deal with a new national movement arising in the neighbor
ing Bulgarian lands.
CHAPTER 9
The Bulgarian National Movement

to 1876
The national development of Bulgaria, the last of the Balkan states to

obtain an autonomous or independent regime in the nineteenth cen
tury, lagged considerably behind the areas already studied. Perhaps the
best explanation of this condition lies in the simple geographic fact that
the Bulgarian lands lay closer to Constantinople and were therefore
more easily controlled. In addition, of the Balkan peoples the Bulgarians
probably suffered the most from the lawless conditions of the late eigh
teenth and early nineteenth centuries. During this period bands of janis
saries, demobilized soldiers, and bandit groups, called kirdzhali, whose
activities resembled those of the dahi in Serbia, roamed the area between
the Balkan Mountains and the Danube. Pasvanoglu, as we have seen, as
sembled many of these outlaws around himself in his center at Vidin.
They reduced sections of northern Bulgaria to a wasteland and forced
the population to flee into the foothills and mountains.
The Bulgarian lands, like the Danubian Principalities, were also the
scene of constant warfare. In the nineteenth century Russian troops
fought here during the war with the Ottoman Empire that lasted from
1806 to 1812 and again in 1828-29. In these conflicts some Bulgarians
joined the Russian army and had hopes that the tsarist victories would
bring them political gains. As mentioned previously, however, the Rus
sian government was primarily interested in Serbia and the Danubian
Principalities. The peace treaties contained no clauses concerning the
Bulgarians. Nevertheless, throughout the century the Bulgarian na
tional leaders did consistently look to Russia as their best hope among
the foreign powers.
After the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars and with the establish
ment of generally stable conditions in the empire, life in Bulgaria began
128
The Bulgarian National Movement to 1876 129
to improve. Like the Greeks and the Serbs, the great majority of'the pop
ulation were peasants, and, like other Balkan peoples, they lived in vil
lages under the direction of their notables, known here as chorbadzhiis.
Like the Orthodox church hierarchy and the Phanariote Greek, these
men were a part of the Ottoman state system and had a general interest
in its maintenance. As their counterparts elsewhere on the peninsula,
they often showed a great interest in national revival and national cul
ture, but they were hesitant to adopt radical measures to attain political
liberation. It should also be emphasized that early in the century the
higher church offices and what education was available was exclusively
Greek controlled. This influence had to be removed before any political
moves could be undertaken.
The Bulgarian position was greatly improved by the Greek revolution
and by the changes in the status of the Principalities. The first event re
moved the predominant Greek influence in Constantinople; in fact,
Greeks generally became objects of suspicion. Like the Armenians, the
Bulgarian merchants used the opportunity to strengthen their position
in Constantinople. The end of preemption rights over the products of
the Principalities in 1829 led the Porte to turn more toward the Bulgar
ian lands for supplies for both the army and Constantinople. It will be
remembered that in 1826 Mahmud II began the formation of a modern
regular Ottoman army. Thereafter, Bulgaria became the chief supplier
of food and of textiles for uniforms, blankets, and other military needs.
From 1830 until 1878 the country enjoyed the market of the entire em
pire. It traded its agricultural products, including grains, honey, wax,
silk, catde, wine, and also manufactured goods such as pig iron, leather
items, iron and metal work, and shoes and clothing. An active cottage in
dustry specializing.in woolen cloth developed in the Balkan Mountains.
Although after 1856 signs of decline were apparent because of the in
creasing penetration into the empire of foreign manufactured goods,
this period of relative prosperity provided a material basis for the na
tional movement.
Moreover, despite the continued complaints about the tax system and
land payments, the Bulgarian peasant did enjoy improving conditions.
As in other Balkan countries, the free peasants living generally in the hill
and mountain regions had a better life than did those on the chiftlik es
tates situated on the more fertile lands. The chiftlik system itself, how
ever, was in the process of change. Faced with rising competition from
neighboring countries, the chiftlik holder was finding that the estates
were no longer so profitable; he was willing to sell land to the peasant.
Thus in Bulgaria, in strong contrast to Romania, more land was passing
to the Bulgarian small holder. This period of economic upsurge coin
cided with the Tanzimat reforms. Although the decrees were not carried
out satisfactorily, the general atmosphere did improve. In fact, as will be
seen, there was some peasant participation in revolutionary activities,

but never the mass involvement that has been shown in Greece and Ser
bia.
Rising prosperity and the parallel increase in political awareness
created the same conflicts in interest and attitudes between social classes
and national groups that we have seen elsewhere. The Bulgarians, like
the Romanians, faced the necessity of freeing their national life from the
double burden of Greek cultural and ecclesiastical control and Ottoman
political domination. Within the country certain circles were particularly
active in working for national goals. In the cities the commercial and ar
tisan groups took the lead. Bulgarian merchants in competition with
Greeks became more deeply aware of their separate identity. O f particu
lar importance were the activities of the guilds. Organized in a manner
similar to their western European counterparts in an earlier period, the
guild members were willing to support educational and cultural projects.
The first major step in the Bulgarian national movement was the es
tablishment of secular educational institutions free from Greek control.
As elsewhere in the Balkans, education at the beginning of the century
was closely connected with the church. Although higher education was
exclusively Greek, Bulgarian cell schools existed in certain churches and
monasteries. Here the pupils learned to read religious works in Church
Slavonic and to write. These schools were obviously unsatisfactory for a
population that was expanding its economic activities and becoming
more conscious of a wider world. Of the Greek insdtutions the most im
portant were the so-called Helleno-Bulgarian schools, which had been
set up by Greek merchants in major trading centers. They specialized in
the subjects necessary for commerce. Here students had access to
courses in mathematics, history, French, and geography. Many Bulgar
ians were attracted to these institutions. Since Greek was the general lan
guage of commerce, they also had an interest in learning this tongue.
Moreover, not only were these schools secular, but through them the
Bulgarian student came into contact with European political thought, in
particular with that associated with the French Revolution. Liberal and
national convictions were thus acquired in these establishments.
The foundation of the first modern Bulgarian schools was the result
of the activities of Vasil Aprilov. Orphaned, Aprilov was taken to Mos
cow by his brothers, who were merchants. There he was enrolled in a
Greek school because of the importance of this language for trade. Al
though he appears to have been at first favorable to Greece, in 1831 he
read a history book that was to play a significant role in the Bulgarian na
tional movement, the Ancient and Modern Bulgarians, written by a Ukrai
nian, Iuri Venelin. Aprilov thereafter became intensely patriotic and
turned his attention to the education of his countrymen. He saw the es
tablishment of a system of national education as a sure step toward even
tual political independence. As a result of his efforts the first modern
school was established in Gabrovo in 1835. It became subsequently the
model for similar institutions which were opened thereafter in Kazanlik,
Kalofer, Triavna, Sofia, Panaguirishte, Koprivshtitsa, and elsewhere.
These cities, it will be noted, were trade and craft centers.
As in Serbia and other Balkan countries, the Bulgarian schools lacked
good teachers. Most schools at first adopted the Bell-Lancaster system,
where the best pupils were used to teach the others. In addition, as in the
other states, Bulgarian young men began to go abroad for their higher
education. Some went to Central Europe or to France, but a significant
group received Russian scholarships. It will be noted that the over
whelming number of the subsequent revolutionary leaders were trained
either in Greek schools or in foreign institutions.
In addition to the problem of teachers, the Bulgarian students lacked
books and materials in the national language. Because of combined
Greek and Ottoman pressure, the first Bulgarian books were produced
in Belgrade, Bucharest, Constantinople, and other cities rather than in
the Bulgarian lands. Only after the Crimean War did a significant
number of books appear that were printed in Bulgaria. As had been true
elsewhere, a standard literary language had to be established. Wisely
avoiding the Greek example, Bulgarian writers did not choose Church
Slavonic despite its close association with the great period of their na
tional history. Since a majority of the better authors came from eastern
Bulgaria, this dialect subsequently became the literary language.
Significant as were these economic and cultural advancements, na
tional life was still stifled by the control of the ecumenical patriarchate
over the church. The establishment of a national church was a logical
move. In Serbia, Greece, and the Principalities action had already been,
or was to be, taken in the direction of freeing the national religious insti
tutions from control from Constantinople. In these lands, however, the
attempt to separate from the patriarchate was made after the achieve
ment of an independent or autonomous government. By contrast, in
Bulgaria it was to precede the acquisidon of a better polidcal posidon. In
fact, from the second quarter of the nineteenth century inidatives were
taken to try to re-establish the independent religious authority abolished
in 1767 in Ohrid.
Most significant for the religious question was the issuance of the
Hatti-Sherif of 1839. Although the intent of this declaration was to
equate Muslims and Christians, the Bulgarians saw in it an assurance of
the equality of Bulgarian and Greek Orthodoxy. The leadership in
forming a separate church was now taken by Neofit Bozveli and Ilarion
Makariopolski, first in Turnovo, and after 1845 in Constantinople. A
thriving Bulgarian commercial community lived in that city. Many were
wealthy and willing to contribute to the cause. The demand was first
made that the Bulgarians should have bishops of their own nationality,
chosen by them, and that they should have a representative at the Porte.
In addition, they wished to build a church in Constantinople and to
publish a newspaper.
Any conflict involving the authority of the ecumenical patriarchate
was bound to involve Russia, the greatest Orthodox nation. At this time
in regard to the Bulgarian desires, as previously in the question of the
Dedicated Monasteries and the establishment of the autocephalous
Greek church in 1833, the Russian government stood opposed to any
move that would weaken the power of the patriarch. It therefore agreed
that strong action should be taken against Neofit and Ilarion for their ac
tivities. Neofit subsequently died in jail; Ilarion was released only in
1850. Despite these setbacks and the Russian attitude, the Bulgarian
leaders did make one gain. In 1849 the sultan issued a firman allowing
the “Bulgarian millet” to open a church in Constantinople. This act
recognized for the first time the existence of a separate Bulgarian na
tion.
The issuance of the Hatti-Hümayun of 1856 gave added impetus to the
Bulgarian insistence on an equal position with the Greeks. Although
opinion diverged concerning how far they should go, the Bulgarian
leaders were in full agreement concerning the direction in which they
should proceed. Faced with this continued challenge, the patriarch acted
to preserve the unity of the institutions still under his control. In 1858 he
called into session the first of seven church councils, to be held between
1858 and 1872. As a token gesture, three Bulgarians were included
among the more than thirty members of the first council. The Bulgarian
demand for their own bishops in Bulgarian dioceses was, however, rejec
ted. Instead, the patriarch would only agree to confirm one Bulgarian,
Ilarion Makariopolski, as a bishop. Not satisfied with this arrangement,
Ilarion on Easter Sunday, 1860, took the dramatic step of conducting
services without the patriarch’s approval. Moreover, during the cere
mony he deliberately substituted the name of the sultan for that of the
patriarch, thus signifying the separation of his church from the jurisdic
tion of the patriarchate.
The patriarch answered by convening a second church council. Here
the patriarchs of Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria joined in the con
demnation of Ilarion and the anathematizing of his supporters. The
strength of the Bulgarian opposition, nevertheless, gained them further
concessions. Bulgarian bishops were now to be allowed to write in their
own language and to print religious material in Bulgarian on the condi
tion that the contents were first approved by the patriarchate. Despite
his condemnation Ilarion, supported by his congregation, continued to
conduct services. Subsequently, he and two other church leaders were
forced into exile.
At this point the Bulgarian cause was greatly aided by a change in the
Russian attitude. The Uniate movement, which sought to have the Or
thodox accept the primacy of the pope at Rome, was receiving consider
able attention in Bulgaria. Neither the Uniates nor the American Protes
tant missionaries, who were also active there, were a real threat to
Orthodoxy. Their activities, nevertheless, seriously upset the metropoli
tan of Moscow, Filaret. He now came to favor the establishment of a Bul
garian national church that would remain in union with the patri
archate.
In 1864 the Russian government appointed Count N. P. Ignatiev as
ambassador to Constantinople. A Panslav, Ignatiev also sought to main
tain the unity of the Orthodox people. He thus wished to find a compro
mise between the Greek and Bulgarian positions. He won Bulgarian
favor by securing the return of Ilarion and his two supporters who had
been in exile since 1861. The ambassador could not, however, obtain the
real cooperation of the patriarch, who felt his interests threatened
throughout the Balkans. In 1864, it will be remembered, the Romanian
government had seized the lands of the Dedicated Monasteries. Three
church councils were held concerning the Bulgarian problem, in 1863,
1864 and 1866, but little progress was made. In 1866, in exasperation,
the Bulgarian church leaders themselves acted and expelled the Greek
bishops from their lands. This act meant that patriarchal authority had
de facto ceased to exist in Bulgaria. The problem was now to obtain legal
recognition of this situation.
Meanwhile, the Ottoman government had become deeply concerned.
Signs of Christian revolt were again apparent throughout the Balkans.
As a result of the bombardment of Belgrade in 1862, Ottoman officials
had been compelled to evacuate Serbia completely by 1867. In 1866
Crete was once more the scene of a major revolt. The Porte naturally
wished to prevent Bulgaria from becoming an area of disorder and
rebellion. The government therefore urged the contestants to mediate
their differences and itself took definite action. The issue now shifted
from the establishment of a Bulgarian church to the territories over
which that organization would have jurisdiction. The entire problem
was, of course, fraught with strong political implications. Correctly es
timating that the extension of Bulgarian ecclesiastical authority would
foreshadow eventual political domination, both the patriarchate and the
Greek government, now involved in the dispute, sought to limit Bulgar
ian control as narrowly as possible.
With religious and political rivalry thus correlating, the two religious
bodies could not settle their disputes alone. The Bulgarian lands were
the last remaining major source of revenue for the patriarchate. In addi
tion both the Greek government and the patriarchate were most reluc
tant to abandon the large Greek colonies in Bulgaria, particularly in
Plovdiv and Varna, despite the fact that the surrounding countryside
was completely Bulgarian. Nor did the Greek church wish to yield the
diocese of Veles in Macedonia. The situation was immensely compli
cated when the Serbian government entered the conflict with the claim
to Pec, their former patriarchal seat, and also Ohrid, the historical Bul
garian ecclesiastical center. Given these bitter disagreements, it can be
understood why the mixed Bulgarian-Greek commissions created by the
Porte could not come to a setdement. Finally, arguing that the issue was
no longer primarily religious but political, the Ottoman government, in
1870, issued a firman settling the main problems and establishing a Bul
garian exarchate. The territorial boundaries of its jurisdiction were also
defined and encompassed Plovdiv and Varna. Moreover, Article 10 pro
vided that if two-thirds of the inhabitants of a district desired to join the
exarchate, their wishes would be fulfilled. This provision opened the
door to the intense, bitter, and bloody conflict that was to break out in
Macedonia between the Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgars.
The firman did not, of course, end the ecclesiastical conflict. Orthodox
tradition required that the new church receive the endorsement of the
patriarch. Although the matter was under discussion for two years, the
participants remained unable to settle the religious or political issues in
volved in the drawing of the boundaries of their jurisdictions. When a
settlement by negotiation failed, the Bulgarians again acted alone. On
Epiphany, January 6, 1872, the sultan’s firman was formally accepted.
Both the patriarch and Ignatiev attempted unsuccessfully to block the
action. A sixth patriarchal council was subsequently convened where the
Bulgarian bishop Uarion and several others were excommunicated. In
March, 1872, Antim I was designated as exarch. His first official action
was to read a proclamation declaring the independence of the Bulgarian
church. This open defiance caused the patriarchate to declare the ex
archate schismatic. It is interesting to note that neither the Russian,
Romanian, or Serbian churches, nor the patriarch of Jerusalem, ac
cepted this judgment. The other patriarchs, and of course the Greek
church, endorsed the action of the patriarchate at Constantinople.
On the question of the establishment of an independent Bulgarian
church with a wide jurisdiction, there had been little division among the
Bulgarian leaders. They had won their objectives with assistance from
the Ottoman government, which wished to retain the loyalty and grati
tude of this important part of its domains, and with reluctant Russian
support for the final creation of the exarchate. On the next question,
that of achieving a separate political status, a comparable unity of opin
ion was not to be found. Parallel with the efforts to form the exarchate,
other groups had worked to secure an autonomous relationship with the
Porte or even independence. The majority of these came to favor revo
lutionary methods rather than the slow process of negotiation that had
brought victory in the church question.
Although the major revolutionary activities occurred in the second
half of the century, a few minor actions took place before that time. For
the future the most significant event was the organization of a small
armed detachment, a cheta, by Vasil Hadzivulkov and a Serbian, Captain
Vladislav Tatic. In 1841 this band, organized in Braila in Wallachia,
crossed the Danube and landed on Bulgarian soil, hoping to precipitate
a general rebellion. Like its successors, this group failed, but cheta orga
nizations remained characteristic of Bulgarian revolutionary activity
until 1868 when the emphasis was placed on actions within Bulgaria
rather than on the formation of bands on foreign soil.
During this period there were also signs of peasant unrest, and local
disturbances took place. Their cause was, however, economic and not
political, and they reflected peasant discontent with the tax system and
the conditions of the chiftliks. Uprisings of this type occurred in 1835 in
northwest Bulgaria; in 1841 especially in the Vidin region; in 1841 and
1842 in Braila; and in 1850 again in the Vidin area. These movements
were poorly organized and easily crushed by the Ottoman authorities.
After the Crimean War signs of renewed revolutionary activity were
soon apparent. The events of the war and in particular the Russian
defeat indicated that the Bulgarian leaders would have to act on their
own and not expect foreign assistance to gain political advances. More
over, both Serbia and the Principalities now had autonomous regimes;
the temptation to strive for a similar goal was attractive. The difficulty
lay in obtaining agreement as to the path to be followed. The country
was enjoying a period of relative economic prosperity. Those that bene
fited from this situation, the merchants, artisans, and chorbadzhiis, natu
rally did not want to endanger their own interests. They were nationally
minded, but they preferred to seek political gains through diplomacy
and negotiation within the framework of the empire. In other words,
they wished to use the methods which were to be successful in the Prin
cipalities; they did not want a revolution on the Greek or Serbian model.
Others disagreed with this position. Like the forty-eighters in Mol
davia and Wallachia, the core of this group was made up of young men,
sons of well-to-do merchants or professional men, who had enjoyed the
opportunity to travel and who had been educated in foreign schools.
Like their Romanian counterparts, they were deeply affected by current
European political ideology. They were not “men of the people” like
Karadjordje, Vladimirescu, Kolokotrones, and similar peasant leaders;
essentially they were intellectuals whose ideas were formed by their stud
ies and not by experience.
Whereas the Romanian youth had their views shaped by their French
education, the Bulgarians were influenced by their studies in Greek

schools, in Russian institutions and to some extent in the colleges of the
American Protestant missionaries in Bulgaria and Constantinople. In all
of these places they were exposed to the liberal-national political ide
ology. Most interesting, however, was the effect on some of their Russian
education. In 1858 the Moscow Benevolent Society was formed. A Pan-
slav organization devoted to furthering the welfare of the Orthodox
Slavic peoples, it provided scholarships for young Bulgarians to study in
Russia. Once there, these students came into contact with the radical
Russian youth of the sixties. The writings of Alexander Herzen, N. G.
Chernyshevsky, N. A. Dobroliubov, and D. I. Pisarev appealed more to
the Bulgarians than the example of autocratic tsarist Russia. The Bul
garian youth thus came home not with admiration for the tsarist empire,
but with a firm belief in social revolutionary programs.
Because of the strong Ottoman surveillance and the opposition of
many Bulgarians to revolutionary activity, the first plans for action were
formulated in Serbia and the Danubian Principalities. The governments
of these states either closed their eyes to the Bulgarian conspirators or
actively aided them, hoping to obtain benefits for their own cause. The
leaders of the Bulgarian movement were never united on their goals.
Ideologically oriented, they devoted much energy to debating princi
ples. The chief problems facing them were four: first, should they strive
for autonomy within the Ottoman Empire or for total independence;
second, should they join a Balkan federation and if so, what kind; third,
should they rely on outside aid or only on their own efforts; and fourth,
what kind of internal organization should the Bulgarian state have.
The most important revolutionary leaders were to be George Ra-
kovski, Liuben Karavelov, Vasil Levski, and Khristo Botev. Each repre
sented a stage in the development of the national movement; their ideas
can thus best be understood against the background of the events. Since
in the early sixties Serbia was the center of the Bulgarian activities, Ra-
kovski had his headquarters in Belgrade and Novi Sad. The Serbian gov
ernment aided him both in his organization of a Bulgarian Legion and in
the printing of books and pamphlets. In 1861 he founded the journal
Dunavski Lebed (Danube Swan). Like Vasil Levski later, he believed that
chela tactics were not enough, and that a revolt would have to be organ
ized within the Bulgarian lands. As far as the future of the state was con
cerned, he was willing to enter into a federation with the Serbs and
Romanians, but not the Greeks. Although he had been educated at
Greek schools, Rakovski wished to exclude Greek influence. In his politi
cal philosophy he followed the standard program of Balkan liberalism.
The Bulgarian activities were not carried on without friction with
Serbian nationalist groups. Very soon Rakovski and his followers clashed
with their Serbian supporters over the entire question of Balkan Slavic
unity. At this time Serbia too had adopted an expansionist program
aimed at achieving predominance in South Slav areas also claimed by the
Bulgarians. In 1862, after the conclusion of the crisis over the Ottoman
shelling of Belgrade, the center for the Bulgarian movement shifted to
Bucharest. Close cooperation was nevertheless maintained with Serbia,
particularly during the reign of Michael. Despite disagreements among
the participants underground preparations for a general Balkan revolt
went forward parallel with Prince Michael’s endeavors to unite the Bal
kan governments.
Romania offered even better opportunities for Bulgarian conspira
cies. The Liberal Party in that state looked with sympathy on the move
ment. Bulgarian territorial objectives were not yet openly contradictory
to those of Romania. A large colony of Bulgarian merchants lived in
Bucharest and in the Danube port cities. In this favorable atmosphere
Rakovski continued his activities. In April and May, 1866, two compa
nies of Bulgars were sent across the Danube to continue the cheta tactics.
When these bands failed, the Bulgarian merchants became opposed to
such actions. A year later Rakovski died of tuberculosis.
Despite these unsuccessful actions the cheta continued to play a major
role in revolutionary planning. A major attempt was made in 1868. At
that time the Bulgarian revolutionary societies organized the Hadzhi
Dimitur and Stefan Karadzha cheta. It was directed to cross the Danube
and proceed to the Stara Planina where it was to establish a revolu
tionary government which would then direct a general Bulgarian upris
ing. In July, 1868, 120 men crossed the Danube. The group was discov
ered by a Turkish patrol, and within two weeks its members were wiped
out.
After Rakovski’^ death Karavelov, Levski, and Botev dominated the
revolutionary movement. Of these Karavelov was the most moderate. At
one time he had considered a relationship with the Ottoman Empire
similar to the Ausgleich (Compromise) which had just been arranged in
the Habsburg monarchy. Under this system the sultan would be the king
of Bulgaria. The advantage of a continued association with the Porte was
that it might block Serbian and Greek acquisition of lands claimed by the
Bulgars. Later Karavelov abandoned this plan and came to favor the es
tablishment of a Balkan federation. So far as revolutionary tactics were
concerned, he believed that a general Balkan uprising would be neces
sary to obtain Bulgarian freedom. Politically liberal, he was apprehen
sive about Russian domination in the future.
Of the three men Vasil Levski best fitted into the romantic revolu
tionary tradition. He wished to achieve Bulgarian separation from the
Ottoman Empire through a mass peasant revolt. He did not want to rely
on other states in the initiation of the action. Like Rakovski, he believed
that it was essential that a revolutionary network be established through
out the Bulgarian lands. In 1869 he went to Bulgaria to set up commit

tees to prepare for the future revolt.
The third figure, Hristo Botev, was Bulgaria's greatest modern poet.
In contrast to the others he was a socialist and he hoped that a mass revo
lution would occur that would lead not only to political freedom, but also
to social change. He saw the future Bulgaria as a republic joined in a
Balkan confederation of states with similar governments. Although he
had acquired his beliefs as a student in Russia, he felt little attachment to
that country.
In 1870 the conflicting groups and leaders finally joined together in a
new organization, the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee. In
1872 a meeting was held which included representatives from Bulgaria
as well as from other emigrant organizations. Here a compromise be
tween the different programs was at least partially achieved. It was
agreed that revolutionary means, not negotiation, should be used to gain
the goal of liberation from Ottoman control. The chief objective was to
be the formation of a federation, including Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia,
Montenegro, and Greece, in which each nation would be autonomous.
The extreme divergence of views prevented the group from agreeing on
the internal organization of the future Bulgaria.
Although Karavelov was president of the Central Committee, Vasil
Levski and his chief assistant, Dimitur Obshti, were given the task of re
turning to Bulgaria to organize the revolution. This endeavor soon re
sulted in disaster. In order to secure money Obshti, without the approval
of the committee, robbed the Turkish mail and was apprehended. In
order to demonstrate to his captors and to Europe that he was not a com
mon criminal but a respectable political conspirator, he confessed the
general plans for the insurrection to the Ottoman authorities. With this
information they were able to capture Levski and others. Levski and
Obshti were hanged. Deeply affected by this failure, Karavelov and
others left the committee in 1874. They were now convinced that
foreign assistance, particularly from Serbia and Montenegro, was abso
lutely necessary if they were to achieve their aims. They also realized that
they had to work to indoctrinate their conationals in Bulgaria with a
more militant spirit.
Despite these disappointments and defections plans for insurrections
continued to be made. In 1875, when the revolt broke out in Bosnia-
Hercegovina, which was to precipitate another great eastern crisis, the
new leadership of the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee, in
particular Hristo Botev and Stefan Stambolov, went ahead with the
preparations for an uprising to be centered in Lovech, Stara Zagora,
Sliven, Shumen, Turnovo, and Ruse. Hastily conceived, poorly planned,
and ill-timed, the so-called Stara Zagora revolt met the same fate as its
predecessors had. Again, the lack of support within the country was
clearly evident. For example, at Chirpan the committee had expected to
find three hundred volunteers, but only twenty-four appeared; a mere
twenty-five joined at Ruse and sixteen at Shumen. .Needless to say, the
Ottoman authorities had little difficulty dealing with this action.
These disasters still did not discourage the Bulgarian leadership
abroad. With the continuation of the revolts in Bosnia-Hercegovina and
the obvious preparations for war being made in Serbia, Montenegro,
and Greece, the opportunity for a successful revolt seemed highly favor
able. The Ottoman government now had its hands full in other regions
of the Balkans; troops were no longer available for action in Bulgaria.
Under these circumstances another great uprising was planned, this
time under the direction of George Benkovski. Once again, arms and
supplies were collected in Romania and plans were drawn up for a revolt
to take place in May, 1876. For purposes of organization Bulgaria was
divided into four sections with headquarters at Turnovo, Sliven, Vratsa,
and Plovdiv. In January, 1876, the organizers of the revolt crossed into
Bulgaria; Plovdiv was to be their center.
At the end of April representatives of the revolutionary groups held a
meeting at which the date of May 13 was set for the uprising. The plans,
however, were discovered by the Ottoman authorities. Because of this
disclosure revolts broke out prematurely first on May 2 at Koprivshtitsa,
then in Panagiurishte and Klisura. The fighting remained largely con
fined to this Balkan Mountain area, although there was some action also
in the Rhodope Mountain region. Once again there was no mass Bulgar
ian uprising.
Occupied elsewhere, the Ottoman government had only a limited
number of regular »soldiers to send against the rebels. Consequently, it
was compelled to use irregular detachments. Ottoman feeling was very
strong since the Bulgarian insurgents, like other Balkan people in simi
lar circumstances, had massacred resident Turkish civilians. Moreover,
the revolt was put down only after heavy fighting and after atrocities had
been committed on both sides. The Ottoman reprisals, the so-called Bul
garian horrors, received great publicity in Europe where only the Bul
garian side of the story was known. Estimates of the actual number of
Bulgarians killed in the suppression of this revolt vary: the Ottoman fig
ure is 3,100; 1 the British, 12,000; the American, 15,000; and the Bul
garian, from 30,000 to 100,000.
In that same month Botev led the last Bulgarian attempt to organize
an insurrection. At the end of May he and about two hundred of his fol
lowers boarded the Austrian steamer Radetzky. Once on the river the
1. David Harris, Britain and the Bulgarian Horrors of 1876 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1939), p. 22.
conspirators seized control of the ship and forced it to land them on the
Bulgarian shore. Again the Ottoman authorities learned of the action
immediately. Botev was killed and his men dispersed.
The Bulgarian revolutionary movement thus ended in total failure.
The tactics adopted could only have worked if indeed a mass peasant up
rising had occurred when the small bands crossed the Danube or if the
majority of Bulgarians had followed the directives of the revolutionary
committees. Even then foreign intervention would probably have been
necessary to achieve the desired political goals. Thus, in the end the Bul
garian nationalists too were forced to await the moment when general
European events would be favorable to their cause.
Despite the failure to achieve any political objectives, by the summer
of 1876 a separate ecclesiastical organization, the exarchate, had been set
up. The victory in the religious field had been achieved through negotia
tion and with the eventual support of both Russia and the Ottoman Em
pire. In the negotiations with the patriarchate and in the organization of
revolutionary societies on foreign soil, the dangers blocking the attain
ment of the Bulgarian national aims had become clearly apparent. Until
this time, in the events leading to Greek independence and to Serbian
and Romanian autonomy, there had been some significant mutual assis
tance between the Balkan peoples, and, equally important, little outright
enmity. Territories with a varied ethnic composition had not been in
question. The Bulgarian movement, as shown in the quarrels over the
jurisdiction of the exarchate and in the question of the Serbian position
in a South Slav organization, involved the political future of lands with a
mixed population and a complicated history. The quarrels arising from
this condition were to lead the peninsula into a different historical age.
CHAPTER 10
The Crisis of the Seventies
In the preceding chapters the internal development of' the Ottoman

Empire, Serbia, Greece, and Romania has been traced. During the
nineteenth century these three Christian states were able to achieve vary
ing degrees of freedom from the Porte and to establish national regimes.
In each nation similar political organizations were adopted, in which the
Christian groups who had been in power before the revolutions, or who
had risen to power during the period of national revival and the es
tablishment of the new state apparatus, maintained their superior posi
tions. The national movements thus brought about political but not so
cial change. Although all of the new states adopted more or less liberal
constitutional systems, practical political control rested in the hands of a
relatively small percentage of the population. Organized into competing
factions and political parties, these men fought for control of the gov
ernment and associated patronage. Against the combined power of this
group, the prince in each state was usually at a disadvantage. Except for
Milos at the beginning of his reign, no Balkan prince exercised auto
cratic powers. The rulers of Greece and Romania after 1866 were for
eigners with no party of their own in the country; the prince of Serbia
was always threatened by a rival dynasty.
Faced with almost constant domestic opposition, the Balkan rulers
usually found that the best way to protect their own authority and unify
their countries was to adopt active national programs for either gaining
more political rights from the Porte or for territorial expansion. By this
time all of the nations had formulated national goals, which included not
only the acquisition of regions in which they were clearly the predomi
nant nationality, but also of ethnically mixed lands where they could put
forward historical, cultural, geographic, or strategic claims. As we know,
three programs typifying this trend were the Greek Megale Idea, the
greater Serbian plans as expressed in the Nadertanije, and the Roma-
141
nian desire for the union of Transylvania, Bukovina, Bessarabia, and later
Dobrudja and the Banat with Wallachia and Moldavia. Prior to the 1870s
the states had not come into outright conflict over the division of the
Balkan territories since an Ottoman buffer zone covering the Bulgarian
lands, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia, and Hercegovina still existed. Dur
ing this decade, however, the possibility arose that Ottoman rule would
be removed from at least some of these regions, most of whom were dif
ficult to divide on strictly national lines. The rival claims to these areas
introduced a new element into Balkan relationships. Moreover, it must
be remembered that in each state questions of foreign policy had be
come deeply embedded in the domestic political balance. Princes or par
ties who failed to advance national interests gravely endangered their
own positions.
As the Ottoman rule in the peninsula weakened, the great powers
gained more direct control over the governments. At the beginning of
the century no European state had a predominant influence on the life
of any one of the Christian peoples. By the time of the Crimean War
three-power supervision had been established in Greece, and a Russian
protectorate over Serbia and the Principalities had been set up. In the
Treaty of Paris the signatories jointly assumed the duty of guardians. In
tervention of the powers in quarrels between the Porte and its subjects
eventually meant that all Balkan boundaries were determined by inter
national treaties. They therefore could not be altered without the ap
proval of the signatories. This situation meant that the Balkan peoples,
even if they had been able to agree among themselves, could not have ar
ranged their affairs alone. The great powers had to consent to all
changes. Since in international affairs the principal nations concerned,
Russia, Britain, and the Habsburg Empire, were intensely jealous of
each other, most controversies were settled on the basis of the balance of
power, that is, on the principle that no one of these states should acquire
a predominant influence in the entire area. These solutions often did vi
olence to the legitimate interests of the Balkan nations and added one
more complicating factor to a difficult situation.
The crisis of the 1870s, which was to bring these problems into the
open, was precipitated by a revolt of Christian peasants in Hercegovina
and Bosnia and by the deep involvement in the event of neighboring
Serbia and Montenegro. Before proceeding to this affair, however, brief
mention should be made of the development in the nineteenth century
of both Montenegro and Bosnia.
Intermittently, Montenegro, under the rule of a prince-bishop, played
an important role in the Balkans despite its size and poverty. From 1781
to 1830 the ruler, Peter I Petrovic, was able to strengthen the state inter
nally and to double its territory. He fought against the Porte both at the
time of the Ottoman campaign against Ali Pasha of Janina from 1819 to
The Crisis of the Seventies 143
1821 and again during the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29. His succes
sor, Peter II, better known as Njegos, was a poet and the author of the
Mountain Wreath, one of the chief South Slav literary accomplishments.
He continued the task of attempting to extend the authority of the state
over the rebellious and independent tribes of the area, and in 1832 he
too fought the Ottoman troops. A major change took place when the
next ruler, Danilo I (1852-60), wished to marry and thus secularize the
state. The princely office was now made hereditary in the Petrovic fam
ily. In 1852 and 1858 there was renewed fighting with the Porte. In 1860
Nicholas I, sometimes called Nikita, ascended the throne where he was
to remain until 1918. During the first part of his reign the constant
conflicts with the Ottoman Empire continued. The chief issues con
cerned the territories in dispute, involving usually Bosnian, Her-
cegovinian, or Albanian lands, and the exact status of the Montenegrin
state, which the Porte claimed was a part of the empire. Because of their
mutual interests, their common Serbian nationality, and their Ortho
doxy, Serbian and Montenegrin relations were usually close. There was,
nevertheless, always an undercurrent of rivalry between the rulers for
leadership in Serbian and South Slav affairs. The Montenegrin princes
were also tempted to use the dynastic disputes between the Karadjord-
jevic and the Obrenovic families for their own advantage. By the 1870s
Montenegro was chiefly interested in securing a port on the Adriatic and
the possession of Hercegovina.
Like Montenegro, Bosnia and Hercegovina remained a constant prob
lem for the Porte, but for very different reasons. Montenegro was a con
tinual center of Christian rebellion; Bosnia, at least during the first part
of the century, stood stubbornly for maintaining old ways and against
reform. During the reign of Selim III it was a stronghold of ayan power.
It will be remembered that Bosnia was one of the few areas in which
there were mass conversions to Islam after the Ottoman conquest. The
notables of the area, known as begs, were thus both Muslim and Slavic.
They fought stubbornly at this time to maintain their authority both
against Constantinople and over their Christian peasants who were, of
course, of the same nationality and who spoke the same language. The
begs revolted against the Porte in 1821,1828, 1831, and 1837. They were
able to maintain a condition of almost complete local autonomy until
1850 when Ottoman troops under Omer Pasha managed to defeat them
and to reassert the authority of the central government.
Despite the fact that both beg and peasant were of the same nationality,
the condition of the peasant in Bosnia and Hercegovina was one of the
worst in the Balkans. Both the tax levels and the con'ée dues were exorbi
tant. It has been estimated that they absorbed over 40 percent of the
peasant’s income. Ottoman reforms were also not enforced here. Peas
ant revolts aimed at bettering economic conditions and not at political
change occurred in 1857-58 and 1861-62. The worst crisis came in the
mid-seventies. The bad harvest of 1874 caused much distress. In July,
1875, an insurrection broke out in Hercegovina and then in Bosnia
which the Ottoman authorities could not suppress. Like the Greek and
Serbian rebellions earlier in the century, Ottoman soldiers could not
defeat determined peasants fighting under local leaders and using guer
rilla tactics. The main grievances of the rebels remained the miserable
agrarian conditions.
With Bosnia and Hercegovina in rebellion, it was inevitable that Serbia
and Montenegro would be drawn in. The people of both states were, of
course, sympathetic with the rebels, and some Serbs had been involved
in the organization of the uprising. The most important question, how
ever, was the reaction of the Serbian government. During most of the
first part of the reign of Milan, Jovan Ristic was in charge of Serbian
foreign policy. The diplomatic situation in the Balkans was now very dif
ferent from what it had been during the reign of Michael. Belgrade was
no longer the center for the organization of Balkan rebellion against the
Porte. Although the government tolerated the presence of groups such
as those of the Bulgarian revolutionaries, it did not actively encourage
them.
In this period of relative calm the news of the Bosnian revolt jarred
Serbian opinion. Again national and religious sympathies were deeply
stirred. Elections held in August, 1875, returned an assembly in which
the Liberals, who were in favor of action to aid the insurgents, had the
majority. In August the former Conservative ministry gave way to a Lib
eral government under Stevca Mihajlovic, with Ristic as foreign minister
and Jevrem Grujic as minister of interior. Since these men openly fa
vored intervention, Milan was in disagreement with the assembly and his
own ministry. Pressure on the prince continued to increase. By August,
1875, Nicholas of Montenegro had shown himself willing to act, but
Milan held firm. He realized that his country was not prepared, and he
was receiving warnings from the great powers not to move. In October
he set up a coalition government under Ljubomir Kaljevic to replace that
of Ristic and Grujic; it stayed in office seven months. Meanwhile, the
Bosnian revolt had become an international crisis. As could be expected,
the Serbian government looked to St. Petersburg for direction, but it was
not clear what that country wished. Official Russia, along with the other
powers, warned Serbia not to become involved in the rebellion, but at
the same time unofficial Panslav circles made their great enthusiasm for
the insurgents clearly apparent.
Although the Conservatives, who were in the minority, continued to
stand for peace, Milan was soon forced to change his policy. Interna
tional events also seemed to compel him to act. In May, 1876, the Bul
garian uprising occurred. It was followed by the great internal crisis in
Constantinople in May, which in turn resulted in the deposing of Abdul
Aziz and the succession of Murad V. In the same month General M. G.
Cherniaev, a hero of the Russian Central Asian campaigns, arrived in
Belgrade and offered his services. A large number of Russian volunteers
sent by the Panslav committees also streamed into the country. It seemed
indeed as if Russian opinion, despite the official declarations, strongly
supported Serbian intervention.
In May the coalition cabinet was replaced by a government again
headed by Ristic and Grujic. This ministry and public opinion were
strongly for war. At the end of June the decision to fight was finally
made. The Serbian military plans called for campaigns in Bosnia, in the
Sanjak of Novi Pazar, and in the Nis and Timok areas. It was hoped that
another Bulgarian uprising would occur and, of course, Serbia had the
assistance of the Bosnian revolt which was still in progress. In July, 1876,
Serbian and Montenegrin forces invaded Ottoman territory. As their ob
jectives, the governments hoped that the war would result in the annexa
tion of Hercegovina by Montenegro and Bosnia by Serbia. Although the
Montenegrin operations were to be successful, the Serbian action soon
became a military disaster.
As Milan had feared, Serbia was not prepared to fight. Her peasant
soldiers, under badly trained officers, could not defeat the well-
equipped, well-led Ottoman forces. Cherniaev proved an inept com
mander, and the Russian volunteers were soon a national scandal. Great
friction developed between the Serbian and Russian elements in this ill-
coordinated campaign. Serbian efforts were also weakened by the fact
that no great Balkan revolt took place. The Bulgarians did not rise
again; the Romanian and Greek governments waited for indications of
the possible outcome. Most disastrous, however, was the failure of the
Russian government to offer any practical aid.
The powers attempted to stop the fighting as soon as possible; they
had every interest in bringing the affair to a conclusion. Although an ar
mistice was arranged in August, it was broken by the Serbs in the next
month. In October the Serbian army suffered a devastating defeat,
which opened the path into the Morava valley to Belgrade for the Ot
toman forces. This time Russia did intervene. After receiving a Russian
ultimatum the Ottoman government agreed to an armistice on No
vember 3. Although peace was now re-established, the war had a disas
trous effect on Serbia, both materially and morally. Her casualties
amounted to fifteen thousand men, and it had been made clear that her
armies were no match for the Ottoman opponent.
With the war now over, the problem of the Bosnian revolt remained.
The great powers found themselves drawn again into the settlement of
the questions that had caused the peasant rebellion. Certainly, none of
these governments had welcomed a resurgence of the eastern question.
After the Crimean War the Balkan area had been relatively quiet. The
great events had taken place ill Central Europe and Italy, not in the
Near East. For future Balkan affairs Prussia’s defeat of the Habsburg
monarchy in 1866 and jthe reorganization of the state in the Ausgleich of
1867 were particularly important. Thereafter the monarchy, now
usually referred to as Austria-Hungary, was divided into two administra
tive sections united in the person of the emperor and with a common
minister of war, foreign affairs and finance as it related to these two of
fices of government. The next event, the Franco-Prussian War and the
unification of Germany under Prussian leadership, resulted in the for
mation of a powerful state whose policies were henceforth to have great
influence on Balkan affairs. Prussia, as we have seen, had previously
played only a minor role in the peninsula.
It should be noted that German unification was accomplished with the
approval and assistance of Russia. That state used the opportunity to de
nounce the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris and to gain interna
tional approval of the act. Although the Russian government did not
thereafter embark on a real program of naval construction, the path was
now open for Russia again to pursue an active Balkan policy.
After these events the governments of Russia, Germany, and Austria-
Hungary joined together in the early 1870s in the Three Emperors’ Alli
ance. This informal association was based on the exchange of visits and
communications between the heads of the three nations; it was not a for
mal alliance. It did, however, make it probable that the states would co
operate if another eastern crisis arose. In 1875 they did act together
because none was prepared for a major upset in the area. They wished
the Bosnian revolt to be settled peacefully, if necessary by outside medi
ation; they did not want it to lead to a great Christian rebellion in the
Balkans.
Of the three courts the Russian government was under the greatest
pressure. In the past it had often claimed a special relationship with the
Balkan Christians. The feeling always existed that if Russia had the right
to intervene in their behalf, she also had the duty to act if Christian
rights were indeed endangered. Unfortunately, the Bosnian crisis also
coincided with a period when great enthusiasm was felt in Russian soci
ety for things Slavic. The racial tie of Panslav feeling was thus added to
the religious issue of Orthodoxy. Although Panslav programs differed,
all looked to the freeing of Orthodox Slavic people from foreign control,
either Ottoman or Habsburg, and their unification in some sort of a fed
eration in which Russia would play the predominant role. Prominent
Russians including the heir to the throne, the future Alexander III,
N. P. Ignatiev, and many generals adhered to these ideas. The Panslavs
naturally wished to aid the Balkan peoples against the Ottoman Empire.
It was their committees who had despatched volunteers and supplies to
Serbia.
In contrast, most of the responsible members of the Russian govern
ment disliked the implications of the program for the current crisis in
the Balkans. They feared that Russia would be drawn into a war with the
Ottoman Empire which in turn would involve the other great powers.
The events of the Crimean War could thus be repeated; Russia might
face a coalition of European states who did not wish the balance of
power overturned. The official Russian policy was thus that a solution
should be reached through negotiation among the powers and in close
association with Vienna and Berlin. The Panslavs continued to insist on
Russian aid to the Balkan rebels and that the final setdement of the
problem should be on a bilateral Russian-Ottoman basis.
Since the official Russian position coincided with the interests of
Vienna and Berlin, these three governments did cooperate during this
crisis. Among the powers the major disturbing element was Britain. This
government under the leadership of Benjamin Disraeli, did not wish to
see Ottoman interests threatened and disliked the close association of
the three conservative courts, which gave these powers a predominant
influence in European affairs. When it became obvious that the Porte
would not be able to quell the disturbance in Bosnia and Hercegovina,
the three powers cooperated to secure reform measures. In December,
1875, such a program was proposed by the Habsburg foreign minister,
Julius Andrassy. It was accepted by the Porte, but not by the insurgents.
In May, 1876, a second plan suggested by the three states was rejected by
Britain and therefore by the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, the Bulgar
ian uprising had taken place and the Balkan states were preparing for
war. Constantinople was in the midst of the crisis that brought Murad V
to power in May and Abdul Hamid II in August.
The outbreak of the war between the Porte and her vassals, Serbia and
Montenegro, did not disturb the Three Emperors’ Alliance. In July,
1876, the Russian foreign minister, A. M. Gorchakov, and Andrassy
agreed upon the Reichstadt Convention. Although there was later dis
agreement on exactly what had been decided, the pact did preserve the
balance of great power interests. The statesmen decided that if the Bal
kan states were defeated in the war, Austria and Russia would cooperate
to maintain the status quo. If, on the contrary, the Balkan armies should
be victorious, the two great powers would proceed to partition the Ot
toman Balkan territories, but with the provision that no great Balkan
state should be established. Autonomous regimes were to be set up in
Bulgaria and Rumelia; Constantinople was to be a free city; Greece
would receive Thessaly and Crete. Russia, for her part, would take
southern Bessarabia and territory in Asia Minor. Austria’s share was to
be Bosnia and Hercegovina. It will be noted that the chief Serbian terri
torial objective in the war was thus to go to the Habsburg Empire, an ac
tion that, incidentally, was also in complete contradiction to the Panslav
idea.
After the conclusion of the war of the Balkan states against the Ot
toman Empire in 1876, the powers continued to try to negotiate a settle
ment which would appease the Balkan people and satisfy great power in
terests. They made a final attempt to save the situation in December,
1876. At that time in the Constantinople Conference new reform pro
posals were formulated. On December 23, however, the Porte an
nounced the introduction of the constitution for the empire and pro
claimed the reforms unnecessary. A declaration of war by Russia became
now almost inevitable. In January and March, 1877, two more arrange
ments were made by Russia with Austria-Hungary to assure the latter’s
neutrality. Bosnia-Hercegovina was still to go to Vienna, but the status of
the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, a strip of territory separating Serbia and Mon
tenegro, was to be decided later. Russia also agreed that her troops
would not fight inside the territory of these two states.
After signing an agreement with Romania Russia declared war on
April 24, 1877. The campaign was to prove surprisingly difficult. The
chief Russian obstacle was the inability to capture the Ottoman strong
hold of Pleven (Plevna). From July until December the Russian advance
was stalled at this point. The delay placed the Balkan states in a terrible
position. Expecting at first a short war, the Russian government had not
wished their active cooperation. After the check at Pleven Romanian,
Serbian, Montenegrin, and Greek assistance was desired. Except for
Romania none of the other governments responded with eagerness. All
sought money for military preparations and territorial guarantees for
the future. Uncertain of the general situation, Serbia and Greece de
layed their entrance into the war. The Romanian government, in con
trast, believed that the time had come to achieve certain national goals.
The revolt in Bosnia-Hercegovina, like previous Balkan crises, pre
sented the Romanian government with both opportunities for advance
ment and threats to its interests. The Romanians, like the Greeks, did
not welcome the possibility of the creation of strong, independent Ser
bian or Bulgarian states linked with St. Petersburg. Nevertheless, it was
seen that the situation did offer the chance to press for more privileges
from the Ottoman government. During the next three years, keeping
these conditions in mind, the Romanian leaders remained concerned
primarily with three aspects of the international scene. First, as already
mentioned, they wished to exploit the difficult position of the Ottoman
government; second, they hoped, to make territorial gains and achieve
full independence should a general war occur; and, third, they did not
want Russia to acquire again a predominant position in their state. In the
The Crisis of the Sex>enties 149
conduct of foreign policy Prince Charles played the leading role. Until
April, 1876, the Conservative ministry of Lascar Catargiu remained in
power. It was replaced in May by a Liberal government. After this time
the two Liberal party leaders Ion Brâtianu and Michael Kogâlniceanu,
cooperating closely with the prince, shared with him the chief responsi
bility for the decisions reached. The Liberal Party, in contrast to its
previous stand, now stood strongly behind the throne.
During the first two years of the crisis, with the revolts in Bosnia-Her-
cegovina and Bulgaria and the war between the Ottoman Empire and
Serbia joined by Montenegro, the Romanian government maintained an
official policy of neutrality. At the same time it put pressure on the Ot
toman government to obtain more rights and privileges within the em
pire, and gave limited assistance to the neighboring Christian belliger
ents. Some arms and volunteers passed through the country to Serbian
batdefields; Bulgarian bands continued to organize on Romanian soil.
During this period, however, the general situation did not evolve to the
Romanian advantage. Victorious over the Balkan armies, the Ottoman
government rejected the Romanian demands. The same conditions, the
defeat of the Slavic Christian people and Ottoman intransigence, were
also likely to bring Russian intervention, an action feared by the Roman
ian government. Obviously, should Russia go to war with the Ottoman
Empire, Romania would either have to allow the Russian armies passage
or risk the danger of becoming a major battlefield. In view of their coun
try’s past history Romanian statesmen of all political parties were most
hesitant to accept the presence of a Russian army.
Russia’s immediate intentions were made clear in October, 1876, when
Brâtianu and a delegation of Romanians visited Alexander II at Livadia.
At this time and latér the Russian government pressed for an agreement
with Romania, but one which would only cover questions arising from
the passage of the Russian army to the Danube. The Romanian leaders,
in contrast, wished a full political understanding, and one that would
expressly protect their territorial integrity. In particular they feared the
loss of the three southern Bessarabian districts gained in 1856.
During the negotiations with Russia, which lasted until April, 1877, al
ternate paths of action were thoroughly explored. Discussions were con
tinued with the Ottoman Empire. Representatives were also sent abroad
to seek the support of the other guarantor powers should Romania
decide to resist Russian pressure. The results of these moves were dis
couraging. In the Ottoman constitution of December, 1876, Romania
was declared an “integral part” of the empire and numbered among the
“privileged provinces.” This was exactly the issue at stake between the
two governments. Regarding the possibility of outside assistance against
Russia, the picture was even bleaker. The Habsburg monarchy, bound
by secret understandings with Russia, advised Romania not to sign an
agreement, but simply to allow the Russian army to march through the
country. The Romanian army should withdraw to western Wallachia.
Germany, in contrast, favored full acquiescence to Russian wishes.
France was, of course, of no assistance because of her military weakness
at the time. The British government both could not and would not offer
aid.
The agreement with Russia, signed finally on April 16, 1877, was thus
almost forced upon Romania, particularly once the Russian government
had agreed to a formal political treaty with a clause guaranteeing Ro
manian territorial integrity. It should be noted that there was little en
thusiasm in Romania at this time for war against the Ottoman Empire in
alliance with Russia. At a crown council held on April 13 and attended
by the Romanian ministers and other prominent men, the majority fa
vored maintaining neutrality and withdrawing the army to western Wal
lachia away from the Russian line of march to the Danube. The sub
sequent decisions, from cooperation with Russia to the eventual
entrance into combat, were largely those of the prince supported by
Brätianu and Kogälniceanu.
The question of active participation in the Russo-Turkish conflict did
not, however, arise at once, largely because of Russian reluctance to ac
cept Romanian military assistance. The Russo-Romanian pact provided
for Russian passage only; technically Romania thus remained neutral
after the war broke out on April 24. Prince Charles, with a well-trained
army of thirty thousand, found this position most uncomfortable, partic
ularly after Ottoman forces made attacks on Danubian ports. On May 21
the Romanian chambers voted a declaration of independence; a state of
war with the Porte now existed. Nevertheless, the Russian government
continued to show little interest in Romanian military support. It would
accept Romanian troops only to guard prisoners or to garrison towns.
Prince Charles sought a more glorious role; he wanted to conduct an in
dependent action and to maintain the Romanian troops as a separate
unit in battle.
The Russian attitude toward Romanian participation in the war
changed abruptly in August, 1877, after the disaster at Pleven. In sore
need of Romanian manpower the Russian leaders now offered the com
mand of the entire operation to Charles. Intensely flattered, the prince
abandoned his previous insistence that the Romanian forces should
operate separately. He also neglected to use the opportunity to specify
what Romania should receive in the future peace negotiations. During
the assault on Pleven relations between Russian and Romanian leaders
remained relatively good.
A sudden change in both the Romanian attitude toward the war and
the Russian treatment of their ally came with the fall of the Ottoman
stronghold in December, 1877. Throughout the war the Romanian gov-
eminent had considered as its goals recognition of independence, an in
demnity, and the acquisition of the Danube delta and as much land as
possible on the right bank of the river, including Dobrudja. The mainte
nance of Romanian territorial integrity, however, was soon to become
more important than these issues. Although Russia did not openly and
officially notify the Romanian government of its intention to retake
southern Bessarabia until January, 1878, rumors reached Bucharest
from many sources. It was this issue that was henceforth to form the cen
tral theme of Romanian diplomacy. The government was in fact divided
on how to deal with the matter. Brätianu, whose policy triumphed, felt
that public pressure would force the government to remain steadfast on
the question. The prince and Kogâlniceanu, believing the cause hope
less, preferred to use the question as a bargaining point, perhaps to gain
the Ruse-Varna line for Dobrudja.
In contrast to the Romanian attitude, Serbia was not so eager to enter
the war. The final peace treaty had only been signed with the Ottoman
Empire in March, 1877; the Serbian forces were exhausted. Moreover,
no assurances could be obtained concerning territorial gains. Serbia
wanted lands primarily in Bosnia and Old Serbia, but Russia, bound by
the secret agreements with the Habsburg Empire, could not give Bel
grade any promises concerning future peace arrangements. Moreover,
other dangers had arisen. It was quite clear to Serbia that Russia was now
solidly behind the Bulgarian interests. At the Constantinople Confer
ence Ignatiev had wanted to award Nis, Skopje, and Prizren to Bulgar
ian control despite the Serbian claims. Thus, when the Russian govern
ment pressed Serbia for assistance after the defeat at Pleven, the Serbs
took a long time in replying. First, they wished financial assistance and a
clear indication of the lands they would receive. Finally, three days after
Pleven was finally captured, on December 10, Serbia entered the war.
Russia provided some money, but she would still give no territorial
promises.
Like Serbia, Greece too acted only at the last moment. During the Bos
nian rebellion and the Serbo-Turkish War the Greek government,
under strong pressure from Britain, had taken no action to aid her
neighbors. This entire crisis, following as it did the exarchate dispute,
had made clear what difficulties were to face Greece. It was not the Ot
toman government, but the rival Slavic Balkan states who now threat
ened to block the accomplishment of Greek national aims. The Greek
government wished in the future to incorporate Crete, Thessaly, Epirus,
Thrace, and as much of Macedonia as possible. Although the Greek
position in the first three areas was strong, Bulgarian claims now rivaled
those of Athens in Thrace and Macedonia. A successful campaign of the
Balkan peoples against the Ottoman Empire would thus not assure
Greece advantages and might indeed create a worse situation. Despite
these hard realities the same division of opinion existed in Greece as has
been seen in Serbia and Romania. Many Greeks feared that if they did
not fight they would be left out of any future peace arrangement. More
over, as in Serbia a great fund of public enthusiasm existed for any ac
tion against the Porte even when conditions were not favorable. Great
pressure was exerted by these circles on the king and the government.
In 1876 Alexander Koumoundouros headed a ministry that stood for
the maintenance of peace and the achievement of territorial objectives
through diplomacy. His regime was naturally under attack from those
who wished to declare war on the Porte and to foment rebellion in
Macedonia. The Greeks became even more apprehensive when at the
Constantinople Conference, which they had not been invited to attend,
plans were developed for a great Bulgarian state holding lands claimed
by Athens. In June, 1877, at this time of national danger, a coalition cab
inet under Admiral Kanares replaced that of Koumoundouros. It con
tained four former premiers; Charilaos Trikoupes was the foreign min
ister. Attempts were now made to strengthen the Greek military
position, and troops were concentrated on the Ottoman frontier. When
after the Pleven debacle the Russian government asked for the Greek
participation, the government found itself in an impossible situation. On
the one hand, the British put strong pressure on the country not only
not to enter the war, but also to aid in holding down rebellions in Ot
toman territory. Should Greece go to war, the danger existed that Brit
ain might in fact aid the Porte. The Greek military forces were also not
ready. On the other hand, should Greece not act, it was probable that the
Slavic states would reap the full benefit of a Russian victory. Serbian as
well as Bulgarian conflicting interests in Macedonia were feared.
In these negotiadons neither Britain nor Russia would give the Greek
government any definite assurances on the territorial question. During
the Pleven crisis the Russian government did make some vague promises
concerning Thessaly and Epirus, but it remained silent on the controver
sial Macedonia and Thrace. Despite the fact that its diplomatic efforts
failed, the Greek government was faced with the reality that public opin
ion was becoming increasingly belligerent. The possibilities for action
remained twofold: Greece could enter the war, or she could incite re
volts in Greek-inhabited Ottoman territories.
The fall of Pleven in December jolted the Greek as well as the Serbian
government. Fears were now strong that the war would come to an end
and the Greek claims be forgotten. The fall of Adrianople on January
20, 1878, made this possibility all the more probable. By this time the
expressions of dissatisfaction from the Greek public had become so
strong that King George feared that he would lose his throne. He thus
mobilized the army and sent it to the border. Since this act was unconsti
tutional, it caused an immediate internal crisis. A new government
The Crisis of the Se\>enties 153
under Koumoundouros was formed with the belligerent statesman
Theodore Deliyannes as foreign minister. Riots were now taking place in
Athens. The government, clearly for war, gave directions for the com
mencement of rebellions in Thessaly, Epirus, and Macedonia. On Feb
ruary 2 it announced that Greek troops would enter Ottoman territory
to “protect Christians” from the effects of these same revolts. Like Ser
bia, the Greek government acted too late. On February 3 it learned that
on January 31 an armistice agreement had been signed between Russia
and the Ottoman Empire. Its terms made no mention of Greece. The sit
uation that Athens had feared had thus arisen. The Ottoman army
could now concentrate against the Greeks. The Greek forces withdrew
behind their own boundaries; the powers intervened to prevent further
Ottoman actions. With the conclusion of the hostilities the Greek gov
ernment found itself in a weak position with regard to the future peace
terms. It could be expected that Russia would support the Slavic states;
Britain had not wished Greece to go to war.
The end of the conflict and the Russian victory thus caused little joy
and much apprehension in Romania, Serbia, and Greece. The terms of
the armistice agreement of January foreshadowed Russian intentions in
the Balkans and were a profound shock to these three states. Most impor
tant was the provision for the creation of a great Bulgarian state. The
full Russian program was more precisely expressed in the Treaty of San
Stefano of March 3, 1878. This agreement, negotiated bilaterally by Rus
sia with the Porte broke a series of international treaties, including the
pacts that had been made with Austria-Hungary prior to the war. The
outstanding features of this treaty, like the armistice agreement, were
the sections concerning the establishment of a Bulgaria embracing terri
tory north and south of the Balkan Mountains, Thrace, and most of
Macedonia. This state, potentially the strongest in the Balkans, was ob
viously designed to be under Russian control, with the Russian army in
occupation for two years. In addition, Montenegro, who still enjoyed
Russian favor, made huge gains and tripled in size.
The other Balkan states received comparatively little or, in the case of
Greece, nothing at all. Serbia, who had wanted the pashaliks of Nis,
Prizren, Skopje, and Novi Pazar in addition to Vidin and some sur
rounding territory, received only Ni? and some other pieces of land,
amounting in all to an increase of about 150 square miles. Russia’s ally
Romania received perhaps the worse treatment of all. Despite the fact
that the Russian government had signed a pact with Romania guaran
teeing her territorial integrity, it now reannexed the three districts of
southern Bessarabia lost after the Crimean War. In return, the Porte was
to cede the Danube delta and Dobrudja to Romania. As in the armistice
agreement, Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro were declared to be in
dependent states.
Map 6. The Treaty of San Stefano; The Congress of Berlin
Not only were the Balkan nations dismayed by this settlement, but
Austria-Hungary and Britain found it impossible to accept the terms.
Neither power could contemplate the establishment of a Bulgarian state
that would command strategically the peninsula and put Russian armies
within close marching distance of Constantinople. In addition, the
agreements that gave Bosnia and Hercegovina to the Habsburg Empire
had been ignored and in the treaty Russia had taken Asiatic territory of
the Ottoman Empire to the detriment of Britain. An international crisis
followed immediately. After a period of constant negotiation Russia
agreed to submit the treaty to revision by the powers at a congress to be
held in Berlin in June. Before this conference convened Russia and Brit
ain came to terms over many of the basic changes to be made, the most
significant of which was that the Russian government accepted the divi
sion of the large Bulgarian state.
Before the opening of the congress the Balkan states found them
selves in a helpless position. The great decisions were being made in
Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg. The fate of the small na
tions would depend on the bargains made in their behalf by their patron
great powers. Perhaps the strongest reaction to the terms of the peace
came from Romania. The state had been deprived of national territory.
Moreover, the Russian army was still in the country. A clause in the
Treaty of San Stefano had provided for the passage of Russian troops
through Romania during the proposed two-year occupation of Bulgaria.
The Russian government now pressed Bucharest for a new convention
to cover this question. Fearing that a prolongation of the presence of
Russian troops would lead to the re-establishment of a Russian protec
torate, the Romanian government resisted the action and appealed
abroad for aid. Although Romania had no real friends or sponsors
among the powers, the Habsburg government wished to keep Romanian
friendship so long as the possibility existed that war might break out
over the terms of the peace. Bucharest and Vienna thus remained in
close touch.
Serbia was in a similarly unfortunate plight. The terms of San Stefano
had clearly indicated the Russian abandonment of Belgrade. In fact,
Serbian representatives were told plainly by Russian diplomats that they
should seek assistance in Vienna. The Serbs were extremely bitter that
San Stefano had created a Bulgarian state far more powerful than their
own. With no other alternative available, the Serbian government thus
turned to Vienna to obtain the backing of at least one great power. In re
turn, the Habsburg government insisted on the immediate negotiation
of a favorable economic agreement. On July 8, 1878, Ristic and An-
drassy signed a pact which was indeed advantageous for the monarchy,
but not really harmful to the economically backward Balkan land. The
agreement covered commereial and railroad problems as well as the
right of the Habsburg Empire to improve the navigation of the Danube

at the Iron Gates. A provision was included for a future trade treaty or a
customs union.
Although none of the Balkan states was allowed to participate fully in
the congress, each was able to send representatives to state its views in
the sessions devoted to questions directly related to its area. In no case
were these arguments able to alter a major decision. Brätianu and
Kogälniceanu both spoke at length protesting the loss of southern Bes
sarabia, but to no avail. The Greek government, with Deliyannes as the
chief spokesman, made strong claims to Thrace, Thessaly, and Crete.
Although for a time it appeared that Britain would sponsor Greek claims
as a check to Slavic gains, France in fact was of chief assistance to Athens.
The final outcome of the congress, the Treaty of Berlin, was the single
most important agreement for the Balkan nations during the nineteenth
century. The main difference between its terms and those of San Ste
fano concerned the status of the Bulgarian lands. The great Bulgarian
state was now divided into three parts. Bulgaria proper, an area north of
the Balkan Mountains but including Sofia, was established as an au
tonomous, tributary principality. Eastern Rumelia, the territory south of
the mountains, was to be a semiautonomous province with a Christian
governor, who would be chosen by the Porte and approved by the pow
ers. Macedonia and Thrace were returned to Ottoman control. Al
though clearly within the tsarist sphere of influence, Bulgaria was to be
occupied by Russian troops only for nine months. The gains of Mon
tenegro were also considerably reduced, but that state still received a re
spectable extension of territory. Serbia, with the acquisition of Nis,
Pirot, and Vranje, obtained an addition of 200, not 150, square miles.
The Romanian settlement remained much the same as provided for in
the treaty of San Stefano. Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania were now
all recognized as independent states. The recognition of Romanian in
dependence, however, was tied to conditions regarding the Jewish ques
tion, which will be discussed subsequently.
Greece received no territory directly. The congress directed Greece
and the Ottoman Empire to negotiate an adjustment of their frontiers in
Thessaly and Epirus, and indicated in Article 24 of the treaty that should
these efforts fail the great powers would mediate. As could be expected,
the Greek government attempted immediately to implement this deci
sion while the Porte delayed as long as possible. Finally, in February,
1879, delegations from the two powers met at Preveza. When they could
not come to an agreement, the powers were forced to intervene. A con
ference was held at Constantinople from August to November, 1879,
when it broke down. The Greek cause was aided immensely by the es
tablishment of a Liberal ministry in Britain in 1880 under the Philhel-
lene William Gladstone. At a conference held in Berlin in June of that
same year, the powers awarded Greece a favorable frontier settlement.
The problem of enforcement remained. Not only did the Ottoman gov
ernment object, but here, as well as in the question of the Montenegrin
frontier, the Albanian populations affected by the border decisions re
sisted any changes. The powers finally settled the question in July, 1881.
The Greeks received less than they wished, but Thessaly and a part of
Epirus joined the independent kingdom. The final boundaries were set
in 1882.
Not only the small states, but also the great powers received extensions
of territory. Russia took southern Bessarabia, while Austria-Hungary
received the right to occupy and administer Bosnia and Hercegovina
and to administer the Sanjak of Novi Pazar. Moreover, in addition to the
losses in Europe the Porte was forced to yield Asiatic territory to the Eu
ropean states. Russia received Batum, Kars, and Ardahan. In the sepa
rate Cyprus Convention, Britain took that island. The chief victim of the
treaty was, of course, the Ottoman Empire. Serbia, Montenegro, and
Romania were now independent; Bulgaria was autonomous. The Porte,
however, had been able to maintain control over Thrace, Macedonia,
and the Albanian lands. The fate of these territories was not to be deter
mined for another thirty-five years.
After the Congress of Berlin the major continental powers reformed
their alliance groupings. Although France remained isolated until the
1890s, in 1879 Germany and Austria-Hungary concluded the strong
Dual Alliance. In 1882 Italy joined the alignment, which was now re
ferred to as the Triple Alliance, a combination that was to last until the
First World War. Previously, in 1881, Russia and Austria-Hungary had
at least temporarily healed their differences and together with Germany
signed an agreement which revived the Three Emperors’ Alliance. Ar
ticle II of this pact concerned the Balkans. Here the signators agreed to
act together should further changes occur in the area. As regards spe
cific questions, Germany and Austria-Hungary were to support the Rus
sian interpretation of the international agreements on the closure of the
Turkish Straits; all three nations were ready to accept the Russian desire
for a future union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia and the annexation
of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Austria-Hungary should an opportune mo
ment for these actions arise. With this pattern of alliances in effect, a new
equilibrium between the great powers had been established.
CHAPTER 11
Autonomous Bulgaria to 1896
D espite the establishment of a separate Bulgarian church and the cre

ation of the autonomous state of 1878, the Bulgarian nationalist viewed
the events of the 1870s with bitter disappointment. From this time on he
regarded the boundaries of the Treaty of San Stefano as the true border
of his state. Nevertheless, much had in fact been attained. Although still
under Ottoman suzerainty, the autonomous state, with its capital at
Sofia, was to have its own prince and a constitutional regime, which would
be guaranteed by the powers. Even Eastern Rumelia was given a special
organization. The territory was to have an organic statute and to be ad
ministered by a Christian governor-general appointed by the sultan with
the approval of the great powers. Moreover, at Berlin the diplomats had
realized that the separation of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia was of a
temporary nature, and that the two provinces would eventually unite.
Only the third part of the Greater Bulgaria of San Stefano, Macedonia,
was returned outright to the Ottoman Empire.
These political advances, however, had their drawbacks. Like the Prin
cipalities after the Russo-Turkish War of 1828, Bulgaria was to find that
the weakening of Ottoman control was to be accompanied by a sharp
increase in Russian influence. The Bulgarian lands were of the utmost
strategic importance to Russia because of their proximity to the Turkish
Straits and Constantinople. The tsarist government was determined to
make Sofia a reliable outpost of Russian interests. Since the great powers
had in fact recognized Russia’s predominant position in the new state,
Russian officials were relatively free to act as they wished here. As pre
viously in the Principalities during the administration of Kiselev, these
men were sincerely interested in establishing as fine an administrative
system as possible and in creating the basis for a real Russian-Bulgarian
f riendship in the future.
Two problems demanded immediate Russian attention: first, a consti-
i .->k
Autonomous Bulgaria to 1896 159
tution had to be drafted; second, a prince elected. The question of the
constitution was of primary importance. At the Congress of Berlin, it will
be remembered, it had been decided that the Russian army of occupa
tion would leave Bulgaria nine months after the treaty was ratified. In
order to prevent political and administrative chaos, which could serve as
a pretext for the intervention of the Porte, Britain, or Austria-Hungary
in Bulgaria’s internal affairs, the Russian government was determined to
secure the adoption of a constitution before its troops withdrew. Thus,
in November, 1878, the imperial commissioner in Bulgaria, Prince A. M.
Dondukov-Korsakov, and his aides drafted a constitution modeled on
those of neighboring Serbia and Romania.
This document was then sent to St. Petersburg where it was examined
by both the foreign and war ministries and by a special committee. In his
comments the acting foreign minister, N. K. Giers, argued that the prin
cipal power in the state should be entrusted to the executive branch, that
is, to the prince. His colleague, D. A. Miliutin, the minister of war, con
tended that Russia’s influence in Bulgaria depended upon popular sup
port and not upon that of a foreign prince, as yet not chosen. Therefore,
the ultimate authority should rest in the legislature, not in the ruler.
Miliutin also raised two other considerations. First, he believed that the
Bulgarian constitution should not be more conservative than that of ei
ther Romania or Serbia; Bulgaria should be an example to them and not
vice versa. Second, the document should be more progressive than the
Organic Statute which was being drafted for Eastern Rumelia. If this
were achieved, the people of that province would agitate for a prompt
union with Bulgaria. In other words, he wished Bulgaria to become a
model progressive state in the Balkans. Since his point of view prevailed,
Giers instructed Dondukov-Korsakov to inform the Bulgarian constitu
tional assembly, which was in the process of being elected, that the con
stitution submitted by Russia was only a proposal, and that the delegates
were to have “complete freedom” to express their own views and reach
their own decisions. Consequently, during the debates the Russian gov
ernment did not exercise any overt pressure on the members of the as
sembly.
In February, 1879, the constitutional assembly was convened in Tur-
novo. It was composed of 231 representatives, 89 of whom were elected
on the basis of one delegate for every 10,000 males. The others were
chosen from the church hierarchy and from city and town officials. It
quickly became apparent that the assembly was divided into two oppos
ing groups, which became the Conservative and Liberal parties. The
Conservatives tended to be more prosperous and better educated.
Among their members were Dimitur P. Grekov, Todor Ikonomov,
Gregory D. Nachevich, and Constantine Stoilov. Prior to 1878 they had
supported an evolutionary policy toward the Porte and had resisted rev
olutionary programs. So far as the constitution was concerned they be

lieved that the executive branch should be dominant in the new state.
Since they did not think that the electorate had sufficient political matu
rity, they wanted a strong, paternal ruler who would guide and educate
his subjects. Further, they favored a bicameral legislature and they did
not support a free press. In foreign policy they were pro-Russian. Their
views generally coincided with those of the Russian foreign ministry.
The standpoint of the Liberals, in contrast, was nearer that of the Rus
sian minister of war. Most of the members of this party, some of whom
were Petko Karavelov, Petko R. Slaveikov, Stefan Stambolov, and
Dragan Tsankov, came from the urban areas and had previously been
more involved in revolutionary movements. Because many of them had
been educated abroad or exposed to western ideas, they were more dem
ocratic and thus were uncompromising champions of a strong parlia
ment and civil liberties. Among them were many eloquent orators. In
the assembly their views finally prevailed. The Turnovo constitution of
1879 was thus an extremely liberal document. In it the principal power
in the government lay in the legislative branch.
The constitution provided in fact for two assemblies—the National As
sembly, the traditional legislative body, and the Grand National As
sembly, whose purpose was to handle extraordinary matters such as the
cession of territory, amendments to the constitution, and the election of
a new ruler. The National Assembly had one representative for each ten
thousand inhabitants based upon universal manhood suffrage. This
body was given the right to introduce legislation and to control the
budget. Although the prince was authorized to issue ordinances when
the assembly was not meeting, he was obliged to submit them for ratifica
tion at the next session. He could not, in addition, impose new taxes; that
task was the sole prerogative of the assembly. Its members could freely
express their views in the sessions, and they were to be immune from
prosecution. The assembly could not convene itself, but the prince was
obligated to call it into session at least once every year for two months
beginning on October 15.
Despite these strong legislative powers, the prince had much author
ity. He convened and closed the National Assembly, which he could also
prorogue but only for two months. He appointed the cabinet ministers
and all state officials. The ministers were responsible jointly to him and
to the assembly, although the constitution was not precise on what would
happen should a conflict arise on this question. All laws required the sig
nature of the prince and the countersignature of the responsible minis
ter. The prince also had, of course, the traditional authority of a head of
state. He was commander-in-chief of the army, and he conducted the
foreign relations of the country.
For administrative purposes the country was divided into departments
(iokruzi), districts (okolii), and communes (obshtini). The departments were
directed by a prefect appointed by the prince. The prefect was assisted
by a departmental council elected for three years by universal suffrage.
Its duties were to assess taxes, prepare budgets, and administer depart
mental property. The districts were subdivisions of the departments and
were administered by subprefects, who were in charge of the police and
responsible for public order. The smallest administrative unit was the
commune. Since this division had played such a significant role in Bul
garian life under Ottoman rule, its existence and functions were pro
tected by the constitution. It had an elected council, from which the
mayor and two assistants were chosen. The mayor administered the
town or village and served as the link with the higher offices of govern
ment. In other words, in contrast to the neighboring states Bulgaria re
tained a large degree of local self-government.
The constitution also provided for a judicial system, and civil liberties
were guaranteed. As in the other Balkan countries, freedom of speech,
press, assembly, and association were assured. Private property was pro
tected, unlawful search prohibited, mail and telegrams were regarded as
secret and inviolable, and the right of petition was guaranteed to all. As
elsewhere, the application of these assurances was to leave much to be
desired.
Once a liberal constitution had been adopted, the next problem was
the selection of a prince. Here, as previously in Greece, the great powers
named the candidate. At Berlin they had agreed that the prince could
not be a member of any of the major ruling dynasties. After much con
sideration they chose Alexander of Battenberg, a prince of Hesse, a
twenty-two-year-old German army lieutenant. Thus Bulgaria, like
Greece and Romania, received a German prince. Alexander seemed at
first an excellent choice from an international viewpoint. His aunt was
the empress of Russia; hence he was a nephew of the tsar. Since it was as
sumed that Russia would have predominant influence in the new state,
this relationship was important. It is interesting to note that neither the
tsar nor his wife envied the young man. When his name first came up for
consideration, Alexander II said that he would “never” wish such a dif
ficult position for his nephew. Although the tsar eventually changed his
mind, the tsarina remained firmly opposed to exposing her relative to
the problems that he would face in Bulgaria.
Alexander accepted the position as prince because he had no pros
pects within the German army. Despite his excellent dynastic connec
tions his military training and his aristocratic background gave him little
preparation to govern a peasant state with a highly liberal constitution.
Like Prince Charles of Romania, Alexander intended to rule his coun
try. He had little sympathy with constitutional restrictions or the ideas of
the predominant Liberal Party. The inevitable clash came when the
prince made his first major decision. Instead of selecting a member of

the majority Liberal Party to form his first government, or of creating a
coalition ministry as some had urged, Alexander entrusted this task to
T. S. Burmov, a Conservative. The prince wished to establish the fact
immediately that he intended to rule the nation notwithstanding the con
stitution and the Liberal strength.
In order to defend itself and to prepare for future unification with
Eastern Rumelia, the principality needed a disciplined and well-
equipped army. For this Russian support was indispensable. Although
Alexander was at liberty to choose his own minister of war, it was under
stood by all that he would act in consultation with his uncle, the tsar. A
Russian general, P. D. Parensov, was thus appointed to this office. It was
his task to train the Bulgarian army. Reflecting the views of his superior,
Miliutin, Parensov soon quarreled with the prince and came to support
the Liberals. Despite the general’s political activities he could not be re
moved since he was a Russian officer appointed by the tsar.
To complicate the problem further, the Russian consul general in
Sofia, A. P. Davydov, who received his instructions from the foreign
ministry, threw his support behind the prince and the Conservatives. In
other words, the two responsible Russian officials in Bulgaria were pur
suing diametrically opposed policies. Understandably, the prince, the
two political parties, and the Bulgarian citizenry, who followed develop
ments closely through the partisan press, were confused.
The conflict between the prince and the Conservatives, on the one
side, and the Liberals, on the other, intensified over the next two years.
The prince’s opponents were suspicious of his German advisers, and
they were particularly alarmed when he sought to introduce German
officers into the army. It appeared as if Alexander were trying to gain
control of the army to prepare for a coup d'état. For his part, the prince
became increasingly convinced that he would have to suspend the consti
tution or find ways of circumventing it. In order to prepare for a possi
ble change in the document, Alexander and members of his family ap
pealed to the tsar, but to no avail. Then, unexpectedly, Alexander II was
assassinated in 1881 and succeeded by his reactionary son, Alexander III.
Because of his cousin’s conservative attitude Prince Alexander was now
able to suspend the constitution with official Russian sanction.
Although the prince believed that he could govern the country effec
tively, he was soon faced with a serious problem. Alexander III was an
autocrat who demanded respect and deference from all, including
Prince Alexander. Moreover, he considered Bulgaria as little more than
a Russian satellite or as a province of his own empire. In contrast, Prince
Alexander believed that he could treat the tsar as a relative and his
equal. A conflict between these two strong-willed rulers was inevitable.
Moreover, paralleling this strain in personal relations at the top, it was
increasingly apparent that Russians and Bulgarians were not cooperat
ing smoothly on the lower levels. The most serious conflict developed in
the army between the junior officers and noncommissioned personnel of
Bulgarian origin and their Russian superiors. All of the ranks in the Bul
garian army from captain up were reserved for Russians, and so capable,
proud, and ambitious young Bulgarians soon realized that their careers
were restricted. Similar clashes also developed in the administration of
the country because of the increasingly overbearing attitude of some
Russian officials.
As a result of this situation Russian-Bulgarian relations declined
precipitously. By 1883 even the Liberals, who had strenuously fought
the prince, had become convinced that they had merely exchanged Ot
toman for Russian domination. Eager to prove that they were capable of
governing themselves, the rival political parties rallied behind the prince
to present a united front before the Russian officials. For his part, Alex
ander agreed to restore the Turnovo constitution. He was now the
true head of the Bulgarian state; for the first time since 1879 there was a
semblance of unity in the country. This victory, however, permanently
estranged the tsar, who was determined to oust the prince. Moreover, it
was clear that so long as he remained the Bulgarian ruler, Russia would
oppose the unification of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. By this time
events had evolved in that province in such a way that the question of
union might soon arise.
Whereas Russia had been entrusted with the organization of Bulgaria
in 1878, Eastern Rumelia had been placed in the hands of an interna
tional commission of the great powers. This body completed its work on
the Rumelian Organic Statute in April, 1879, the same month that
Bulgaria adopted the Turnovo constitution. In contrast to the Bulgar
ian document, which was carefully drawn, the Organic Statute with its
495 articles was completely unworkable. The commission entrusted with
its formulation had not functioned as a unit. Instead, each of the powers
was given the task of preparing a certain section. Thus, the British drew
up the electoral laws; the Italians drafted the financial sections; the Aus
trians were responsible for the legal system; the French introduced their
own administrative system; and the Russians and French collaborated on
the organization of the militia. Local customs and needs were largely ig
nored. In order to administer this province the powers approved the sul
tan’s appointment of Aleko Pasha, a Christian, as governor-general. As
sociated with him were a German as director of finance, a Britain as chief
of the gendarmes, and a French citizen in charge of the militia, whose
officers were Russians or Russian-trained Bulgarians. The province also
was given an assembly of fifty-six members, twenty of whom were nom-
inated and thirty-six elected. Eastern Rumelia was hardly a model state.
Its citizens could easily be. attracted to Bulgaria with her constitutional
regime, as Miliutin had hoped.
The two principal problems that now confronted Aleko Pasha con
cerned the fate of the lands formerly owned by Muslims, but which had
been abandoned and then appropriated by the local population, and the
continual agitation for union with Bulgaria. The first question was re
solved essentially by frightening the former owners with threats of repri
sals for actions during the war, so that they would not return to claim
their lands. Those who did come back found that a tax of 10 percent had
been assessed upon the estimated value of their property. They usually
had to sell their possessions to pay this. These former Ottoman homes,
lands, and estates were purchased principally by Rumelian peasants.
The former land tenure system thus ended, and this province, like
Bulgaria to the north, became basically a land of small proprietors.
The issue of unification was much more dangerous. The population
overwhelmingly favored the measure and was ready to take steps to real
ize it. Moreover, at first Russian representatives in the country showed
the same enthusiasm and encouraged the citizenry to work for this goal.
Russian officials, with or without the approval of their government, fos
tered intrigues and secredy armed the population. Although the Treaty
of Berlin limited the size of the militia, they organized and trained so-
called gymnastic societies, which could easily be transformed into mili
tary units if necessary.
This initial cooperation between the Russians and the Rumelian popu
lation on the question of union was brought to an end over many of the
same basic issues that we have seen in Bulgaria proper. Some Russians in
Rumelia sought special favors and economic concessions; the young na
tive officers in the militia resented their Russian superiors. In addition,
many of the members of the Bulgarian Liberal Party, who were forced to
leave Sofia after Alexander set aside the constitution with the tsar’s en
dorsement, fanned this anti-Russian sentiment. By 1884, when the
prince and the tsar had become lasting antagonists, Aleko Pasha, too,
found himself the object of Alexander I l l ’s dislike. Whereas the tsar
could not easily force Prince Alexander’s abdication, he could have the
governor-general removed. Aleko Pasha’s appointment had been for
five years. In 1884 Russia refused to agree to a second term. The powers
then chose Gavril Efendi Krustevich, who was acceptable to Russia
largely because the man appeared weak and thus could be easily con
trolled. His ardent national sympathies were unknown at the time.
By 1885 the unionist movement in Rumelia was active and strong.
Local committees existed throughout the province. Finally, on the night
of September 17-18, 1885, the Rumelian leaders, supported by the mili
tia, proclaimed the overthrow of their government and union with
Bulgaria. Krustevich made no effort to resist his removal from office.
The Rumelian revolutionary regime now called on Prince Alexander to
assume the leadership of a united nation.
This appeal presented the prince, with a difficult decision. He knew
that union was strongly desired by his subjects, and that if it were
achieved under his leadership his personal position in the country would
be virtually unassailable. If he chose not to assume command, he would
have to prepare to abdicate. At the same time the risks were high if he
did accept. First, he had assured the Russian government in August that
he would not be a party to any unification movement. To reverse him
self a month later would make his relations with St. Petersburg even
worse. Second, the unification could reopen the entire eastern question
without any guarantee that the ultimate outcome would be beneficial to
Bulgaria. Nevertheless, when told bluntly by one of his advisers that his
choice was either to lead the country or to leave it, he chose the former
course.
Although the union was not completely unexpected, it caused a major
diplomatic crisis, since it violated the Treaty of Berlin and thus involved
the great powers. The question of territorial compensation for Greece
and Serbia came up at once. The strongest reaction, as could be ex
pected, came from Russia. To express his total disapproval, the tsar
withdrew all of the Russian officers from Bulgaria. The purpose was to
convince the Bulgarians that without Russian support the union would
be in jeopardy and that they should take steps to overthrow the prince.
Whereas the tsar acted from personal anger, the foreign ministry
looked at the problem from the aspects of national interest. It was con
cerned about the strain that this event might put on the Three Em
perors’ League. The Russian government also feared that Austria-
Hungary might seize the opportunity to annex Bosnia-Hercegovina, and
that Greece and Serbia might move into Macedonia. In order to prevent
a major Balkan upheaval, Russia called for an ambassadorial conference
where she proposed the restoration of the status quo ante. In this she was
supported by her allies, Austria-Hungary and Germany. In contrast,
Britain changed her policy of 1878 and now supported the union. Since
the united Bulgaria was anti-Russian, the state was a bulwark against and
not an outpost for Russian influence in the Balkans. The major problem
for the powers was precisely the one that had arisen during various
stages of the Romanian national movement, namely how to reverse the
action. Only the Ottoman government wished to use force to dissolve the
union; not even Russia would endorse this step.
The Bulgarian position was considerably eased by an ill-considered ac
tion of King Milan of Serbia. This ruler recognized that the union would
upset the political balance among the Balkan states and give Bulgaria a
decided advantage in the ensuing struggle for Macedonia. In order to
YUG
Map 7. The Expansion of Bulgaria, 1878-1919

protect the Serbian interests, he declared war on his neighbor. He did
not, however, make his aims clear to his subjects, who showed little en
thusiasm for the conflict. Although most observers expected Serbia to
triumph, Prince Alexander and his army, led by young officers who ad
mirably filled the posts vacated by the Russians,' soundly defeated the
Serbian forces. After this decisive victory, even the Russian government
was forced to agree to the union. In 1886 the great powers accepted the
prince of Bulgaria as governor-general of Eastern Rumelia for five
years. Alexander was not named specifically. Despite this form, the pow
ers understood that the union would be permanent.
Prince Alexander had thus emerged triumphant. Seven years after
the Treaty of Berlin was signed, two of the three lands claimed by
Bulgaria were united. The prince was praised for his skillful diplomacy
and honored for his military victory over Serbia. This good fortune was
not without its price. Alexander III had been deeply humiliated. Con
vinced that the prince was the sole obstacle to amicable Russo-Bulgarian
relations, the tsar approved the overthrow of his rival. The Russian rep
resentatives in Sofia now actively plotted to oust the prince. These ac
tions were done with the knowledge of the tsar, his foreign minister, and
his minister of war. Support was found among some disgruntled army
officers, who believed that they had not been properly rewarded for
their role in the Serbo-Bulgarian War, and among some strongly pro-
Russian politicians. These Russian partisans were also convinced that
Macedonia could only be gained with Russian assistance. They were
ready to sacrifice the prince for the achievement of the San Stefano
Bulgaria. After careful planning the conspirators carried out a coup d'état
in August, 1886. Prince Alexander was forced to abdicate and was es
corted out of the country.
Metropolitan Kliment, a loyal supporter of Russia, then formed a new
government, but the prince’s popularity and political strength were soon
proved. Led by Stefan Stambolov, a prominent participant in the upris
ing of 1876 and a former minister, a popularly supported counter
revolution forced the resignation of the Kliment government after a few
days. Within ten days of the coup the prince was back on Bulgarian soil.
In the crowd that came to greet him was a Russian vice-consul. Alex
ander took this as a sign that the tsar had forgiven him. Seeking the tsar’s
blessing, he sent a telegram to his cousin, without consulting Stambolov.
In it he expressed his devotion and promised: “As Russia gave me my
crown, I am prepared to give it back into the hands of its Sovereign.” 1
The tsar’s reply was brutal and frank. He did not approve the prince’s
1. Egon Caesar Conte Cord, Alexander von Battenberg, tr. by E. M. Hodgson (London: Cas
sell, 1954), p. 239.
return and stated: “Your Highness will appreciate what you have to
do.” 2 With no choice left, Prince Alexander abdicated for the second
time.
Although Bulgaria was now left without a prince, she did have a
strong political leader in Stefan Stambolov. Two problems confronted
the government: the intense pressure from St. Petersburg had to be
resisted, and a new ruler had to be chosen. The Bulgarian constitution
called for the election of a Grand National Assembly to approve the
choice of a prince. Claiming that the country was in turmoil and that an
orderly election was not possible, Russia insisted that the action be post
poned. In order to secure his desires the tsar sent a special emissary,
General N. V. Kaulbars, to argue the Russian case. When Stambolov,
supported by the overwhelming majority of the leading Bulgarians, re
fused to heed his advice, Kaulbars toured the country, openly threaten
ing, cajoling, and haranguing the Bulgars in a flagrant display of inter
ference in Bulgarian affairs. Two Russian warships were also dispatched
to the Black Sea port of Varna. Still Stambolov would not yield. The elec
tion was held, and the assembly prepared to decide on a new ruler. The
Russian government seized upon an insignificant incident to sever diplo
matic relations. Only eight years had passed since Russia had gone to
war for the Balkan Slavs and had supported the formation of the Great
Bulgaria of San Stefano.
The selection of a new prince was not easy because the great powers
still had to approve the choice. The Russian government was deter
mined to veto any nomination. Thus, the first candidates named by the
assembly refused the position. However, in August, 1887, another Ger
man prince, Ferdinand of Coburg, accepted even though he did not
have the approval of the powers. As a result, his first years as prince were
precarious. In internal politics he was dependent on Stambolov who had
backed his candidacy. Nevertheless, his government did have the sup
port of the country. The Bulgarians resented plots and intrigues which
the Russian partisans continued to organize. A climax was reached in
1891 when assassins killed the minister of finance; Stambolov had been
their real target. In order to counter these acts and maintain his popu
larity with the electorate, Stambolov gained the Porte’s approval for new
Bulgarian bishoprics in Macedonia. In 1893 he also had the constitution
amended to permit Ferdinand to marry a Catholic princess, whose chil
dren would not have to be christened in the Orthodox faith. This action
was a direct challenge to the defender of Orthodoxy, Russia, and it
marked the zenith of Stambolov’s career. Only a year later, in 1894, he
was to be dismissed from office.
Prince Ferdinand was a proud, ambitious, and shrewd ruler. He
2. Ibid., p. 240.
dreamed of leading Bulgaria to the position of the predominant power
in the Balkans. Because of his difficult situation in the first period of his
rule, he let Stambolov carry the burden of responsibility for the actions
of the government. In time, nevertheless, he came to realize the dangers
of his own position and the necessity of a reconciliation with Russia.
After seven years in Sofia he still had not been recognized officially by
any great power as the legitimate prince of Bulgaria. Moreover, without
Russian support expansion into Macedonia would be impossible. Stam
bolov now seemed the major obstruction to a reconciliation. Thus, in
1894, when Stambolov threatened to resign over a minor issue, a tactic
he frequently used to intimidate the prince, Ferdinand accepted the res
ignation. In October, 1894, Alexander III died and was succeeded by
Nicholas II. The path was now open for a renewal of Russo-Bulgarian
relations.
First, however, Ferdinand had to lay the groundwork. Of primary im
portance was the conversion of Boris, the prince’s infant son, from Ca
tholicism to Orthodoxy. This action reversed one of Stambolov’s greatest
successes. In addition, a delegation led by the pro-Russian Metropolitan
Kliment went to St. Petersburg where it placed a wreath on the grave of
Alexander III. Nicholas II then received the group. Some pro-Russian
politicians who had been imprisoned were also released. Finally, in 1896
relations were formally re-established. This action paved the way for the
recognition of the prince by the other powers, who approved his nomin
ation as ruler not only of Bulgaria, but also of Eastern Rumelia. The
union of 1885 was thus formally accepted.
Once recognized by Russia and the powers, the prince was free to con
centrate on the internal development of the state and, even more impor
tant, on the question of national expansion. After 1878 the overriding
issue in Bulgarian political life was the fate of Macedonia. This was the
one issue that could rally the nation and unite the political parties. The
realization of the boundaries set at San Stefano had now become the na
tional program of Bulgaria. The struggle to attain this goal was to shape
much of the future history of the country.
CHAPTER 12
The Balkan States: Internal Political

Developments to 1914
With the recognition of the independence of Serbia, Romania, and

Montenegro and the establishment of an autonomous Bulgaria, the basis
for the modern Balkan state system had been laid. Independent Greece,
of course, had come into existence in 1830. With the exception of Al
bania, which did not make its appearance until 1913, the major national
ities had established political centers outside of the direct control of Con
stantinople. Despite the fact that these states often found themselves in
conflict, they shared many attributes in their national development.
Four—Romania, Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria—were constitutional
monarchies with centralized administrative systems. In each state the
real power lay in the police and the army. Political struggles took the
form not only of a conflict among political factions, but also between
these groups and the monarch. Where the ruler could rely on the armed
forces, he kept his throne. Where he lost this support, as Cuza did in
1866 and Othon in 1843 and 1862, his position was either in grave
danger or he was forced to abdicate. This pattern was to continue in the
future.
In regard to social and economic development each state looked to the
West, despite the strong reliance placed at times on Russia as the best
source of military assistance against the Ottoman Empire. Western polit
ical forms were adopted, and the aim of each state was to attain the gen
eral standards of the western European countries. Backward peasant
societies sought to accomplish quickly what it had taken their models
centuries to achieve.
Despite the obvious desire for political and economic improvement,
the prime energies of the new governments were to be channeled in
another direction. Having secured national independence or autonomy,
170
Balkan States: Internal Political Developments to 1914 171
each state turned toward national expansion, to gain either ethnic or his
toric boundaries. No government was content with the status quo. After
1878 the Ottoman government still held Thrace, Macedonia, and Al
bania; Balkan nationals predominated in important areas under Habs-
burg control such as Transylvania, Dalmatia, and Croatia. The emphasis
on the irredenta explains also the importance of the military in Balkan
societies. It was recognized that strong armies would be necessary to ac
complish national goals and that they would be used not only against the
Ottoman and Habsburg empires, but also probably against neighboring
Balkan states. Each nation kept a close watch on the military growth of
the others.
In this chapter the internal development of each of the Balkan states
during the period before the First World War, together with those
foreign policy issues that involved only limited areas, will be discusssed.
The great international issues of the expulsion of the Ottoman Empire
from Europe and the fate of the Romanian and South Slav inhabitants
of the Habsburg Empire will be described in subsequent sections.
Greece
In 1864, it will be remembered, Greece had acquired a new constitu
tion and a Danish dynasty. Thereafter the emphasis remained on na
tional expansion, the one great issue that could rally the nation. Despite
constant crises litde had been achieved in the subsequent decade. Atten
tion was directed northward toward Macedonia and southward to the
island of Crete. In 1881, as a result of the decision reached at the
Congress of Berlin, Thessaly and a part of Epirus had been acquired,
but in a sense the situation had worsened. The Greek government
regarded the Treaty of San Stefano as the worst possible solution of the
Macedonian problem. The very establishment of an autonomous
Bulgaria, as a future rallying point for Macedonian Slavs, had not been
to the Greek interest. The Serbian expansion to the south at this time
was also dangerous. In addition, Crete remained under Ottoman con
trol. Since no other power rivaled Greek claims here, however, major at
tention was still focused on Macedonia. In no case did the Greek gov
ernment wish to be faced with a situation in which it would be forced
to surrender Macedonian lands in return for the possession of the island.
One of the major obstacles to Greek advancement was the nation’s
poverty, which precluded the acquisition of the military power necessary
for an ambitious program of national expansion. In this sense the state
was probably in a worse position than her Balkan rivals. A peasant
country with less than half of her lands suitable for farming, Greece sim
ply did not have the basis for the strong foreign policy desired by most of
her inhabitants. As in the rest of the Balkans agricultural methods re
mained extremely primitive. The soil could not even supply the grains
needed to satisfy national demand. The original kingdom was a land of

small units and subsistence farming. With the acquisition of Thessaly the
state gained a potentially rich agricultural region, which had previously
been predominantly an area of great estates with Muslim landowners.
These lands were not divided among the peasants, but fell into the
hands of Greek large landowners. As in Romania, the estates were badly
managed and run mainly on a sharecropping basis where the peasant
tilled the soil and surrendered a third to a half of the produce. There
was no incentive for making improvements. Large sections remained in
pasture.
In order to pay for imports of wheat and other products, Greece
relied at first principally on the export of a single crop, currants. The
dangers of dependency on one item in the world market were shown by
the fate of this export. Between 1861, with a crop of 42,000 tons, and
1878, when the figure was 100,700 tons, currant exports increased rap
idly. In 1878 when French vineyards were hit by phylloxera, French
winemakers turned to Greece until their own vines recovered. The
French government then moved to protect its agricultural products. In
1892 the tariff adopted by France caused a disastrous collapse of the
Greek exports. Thereafter, attempts were made to find a substitute crop.
Tobacco gradually assumed an increasingly important position and be
came the chief item after the First World War.
Economic conditions remained backward throughout this period. In
1870 the only railroad was the nine kilometers of track from Athens to
Piraeus. No significant moves toward industrialization were made; in
1875 there were only eighty-nine factories. In addition, the unique prob
lem of the Greek debt remained. As we have seen, the Greek revolution
and the first independent governments had been financed by large
foreign loans. Succeeding Greek regimes also resorted to borrowing
abroad. The bad financial conditions were somewhat eased by the mas
sive emigration which took place at this time. Approximately a half mil
lion Greeks left for the United States. From 1905 to the First World War
the emigrants sent enough money to Greece to cancel out the large im
port surpluses that would otherwise have strained the balance of pay
ments.
Greek internal politics reflected accurately the major problems. Ex
pansion remained the national passion, but the real need of the state was
internal reform and economic development. The tug between these two
directions was shown in the political struggles of the last two decades of
the century and in the rivalry between two men, Charilaos Trikoupes
and Theodore Deliyannes. As in other Balkan countries, political parties
remained groups organized around individuals rather than formal orga
nizations in the Western sense. In 1875 King George agreed that gov-
ernments would be formed by the party or the individual who had the
backing of the majority in parliament. With this measure a kind of two-
party system arose. In 1875 Trikoupes organized the first of his seven
governments. He was initially opposed by Koumoundouros and his fol
lowers, and then, after 1885, by Deliyannes’ party.
The Trikoupes party based its reform program on the obvious need to
improve the Greek internal conditions. Its main strength came from the
professional and commercial classes. During its two long periods of con
trol, from March 1882, to April, 1885, and from May, 1886, to Novem
ber, 1890, the party did introduce a great deal of legislation. Although
Trikoupes did not hesitate to appoint his own adherents to public of
fices, he did try to improve the civil service and the administrative system
of the country. Judges were given tenure, the police reformed. A pro
gram of public works was also inaugurated to expand road, railroad, and
harbor facilities. In addition, attempts were made to strengthen the
armed forces. A French military mission came to advise the army from
1884 to 1887.
Trikoupes encountered considerable opposition. His ambitious plans
were costly and involved heavy borrowing. Between 1879 and 1890
Greece received loans totaling 630 million gold francs. Taxes doubled in
the two decades after 1875. The Trikoupes government was also vulner
able on questions of foreign policy. This ministry tended to work with
Britain and to follow the British recommendations that internal im
provements should precede foreign expansion.
Making use of the opposition to the tax measures and foreign policy
issues, Deliyannes formed governments in 1885, 1890, and 1895. Dur
ing his administration many of the reforms were repealed. The
Deliyannes program put the chief emphasis on the pursuit of a glorious
national policy. Tfie alternation of the two opposing groups in power
and the declining economic position of the country was disastrous for
state policy. The financial problem became increasingly serious. By 1892
the service on the debt took a third of the budget. In the next year
Greece was bankrupt. Trikoupes retired from politics in 1895 after the
loss of an election; he died the following year. George Theotokes took
over the leadership of his party.
During this period, despite Deliyannes’ emphasis on foreign policy is
sues, this field brought only disappointment. In November, 1885, when
Serbia went to war with Bulgaria, Deliyannes was in power. Like the
Serbs, the Greeks felt entitled to compensation for the Bulgarian absorp
tion of Eastern Rumelia; they desired the rest of Epirus. In September
the army was mobilized. The great powers reacted immediately with an
ultimatum, supported by all but France, demanding that Greece demo
bilize. When the Greek government refused, a blockade was established
in May. With the failure of his rival’s policies, Trikoupes then returned
to power and his regime gave in. The cost of mobilization added to the
overburdened state finance.
The chief national goals remained, however, not Epirus, but Mace
donia, and to a lesser extent Crete. The Cretan problem played a large
part in domestic politics until 1913, when the island became a part of the
Greek kingdom. After the revolution of the 1820s Crete remained
under Egyptian control until 1840 when the island was returned to the
Ottoman Empire. Thereafter, the area became the scene of repeated in
surrections. Here the problem was social as well as national and resem
bled in many respects the situation in Bosnia. About a half of the inhabi
tants were Greeks who had become Muslims after the Ottoman
conquest. They held the best lands and the large estates. The uprisings
were against the political and economic dominance of these people. Re
volts in 1841 and in 1858 resulted in the introduction of some measures
of self-government. From 1866 to 1868 another insurrection took place.
These events put great pressure on George I; his subjects expected
him to react forcefully on national issues. In 1867 he had married the
Grand Duchess Olga; he could thus hope for some Russian support. In
1868 he named his new born son Constantine, thus referring to the By
zantine emphasis of the Great Idea. Like his predecessor Othon, the
king could not, however, act against the combined wishes of the majority
of the great powers. Unilateral intervention in Cretan affairs was out of
the question regardless of domestic pressures. Although the revolt of the
1860s resulted in the application of the Organic Statute of 1868, the
reform measures did not calm the situation. Another insurrection in
the period 1875-78 was overshadowed by the more dramatic events
on the peninsula. In October, 1878, the Porte accepted the Halepa
Pact, an agreement calling for the election of an assembly under rules
that guaranteed it would be controlled by the Christians. The sultan
also named a Christian as governor and agreed to introduce other re
forms. Continued tension resulted in the breaking of this accord. In
the 1890s Muslim governors were appointed, and the assemblies did
not meet.
The Cretan issue remained, of course, deeply embedded in Greek
domestic politics. In November, 1894, the Ethnike Hetairia, or National
Society, was formed. Its purpose was to further the Greek cause; three-
quarters of the army officers belonged to it. Although primarily inter
ested in Macedonia, this group was to play a major part in Cretan affairs.
Its offices became a center for despatching volunteers and arms to the
island, and it operated beyond the control of the government.
In 1896, after more disturbances, the Porte agreed to restore the
Halepa Pact and to grant measures leading to autonomy. At the same
time the Greek government found itself under pressure, on the one
hand, from the great powers who wished to stop the flow of men and
weapons to the island, and, on the other, from the Greek nationalists
who wanted open intervention. In February, 1897, the revolutionary
forces in Crete declared their union with Greece. At once a force of fif
teen hundred Greeks arrived on the island. In March the Greek govern
ment, with Deliyannes at the head, ordered mobilization. In April Greek
forces crossed into Turkish territory. The Greek army was now under
the command of Prince Constantine, while the navy was under Prince
George.
The month-long war showed the Greeks’ lack of preparation. The
Ottoman forces quickly proved themselves to be immensely superior.
Moreover, Greece received no help from her neighbors. Under pressure
from the powers, Russia and Austria-Hungary in particular, Serbia and
Bulgaria remained neutral. With the Ottoman army driving deep into
Thessaly, the powers intervened to secure peace. An armistice was
signed in May and a peace treaty, in December. Despite the fact that
Greece had lost the war, the country suffered relatively little. Some
minor points on the border were surrendered, and an indemnity of a
hundred million francs was levied. In the Cretan question, however, the
Greeks made notable advances. Pressed by the great powers, the Porte
now agreed to an autonomous regime and, most significant, to the ap
pointment of Prince George, the second son of the king, to the post of
High Commissioner for Crete.
Despite the advances thus made the war had been a great humiliation
for the nation. The dynasty again became the scapegoat. Both the king
and Prince Constantine were strongly attacked; the prince was blamed
for the poor showing of the army. Moreover, the financial burden of the
war and the necessity of paying an indemnity led to the imposition of
foreign financial control on the state. An International Commission of
Control was now established in Athens with the right to collect certain
taxes. Although this supervision stung Greek pride and severely limited
the fiscal sovereignty of the nation, the Greek financial situation im
proved markedly in the next years and the debt was reduced.
Greece, however, entered the new century in an atmosphere of gen
eral disappointment and discontent. The need to reform the administra
tion and to improve the armed forces was recognized, but the major
problem remained that the country simply did not have the financial
basis for either action. Nor was the existing political system favorable to a
national resurgence. Between April, 1897, and December, 1905, there
were ten changes in the government. Thereafter a ministry was formed
by Theotokes, who remained at the head of the former Trikoupes party,
which lasted until July, 1909. In March, 1905, Deliyannes was assassi
nated. His party then divided into two sections, which were under Kyria-
koules Mavromichales and Demetrios Ralles. A fourth party was led by
Alexander Zaimes. Greek politics remained much as before. With each

change in regime the victorious .party put its own followers in the state
posts. Strong personal rivalries, bribery, patronage, and a lack of dis
cipline continued to characterize political life. The assembly was para
lyzed by obstructionist tactics and filibustering.
Nor were events proceeding smoothly in Crete. Here Prince George
soon clashed with Cretan politicians, including Eleutherios Venizelos,
soon to become the predominant political figure in Greece. The Cretans
continued to seek enosis, that is, union with Greece. As before, the Greek
government did not oppose this action, but it feared great power inter
ference and it did not wish to be in a position where it would be forced to
trade full control of Crete for gains by the Slavic states in Macedonia. In
the spring of 1905 the Cretan assembly once more declared the union of
the island with Greece; again the great powers intervened. In 1906
Prince George returned to Athens, and his position was taken by Alex
ander Zaimes.
The defeat by the Ottomans made a complete reform of the Greek
army essential. In 1900 the army had over twenty-five thousand men,
but neither it nor the navy was in a satisfactory condition. In April, 1900,
Constantine was named commander in chief with the authority to
reorganize the armed forces. In 1904 a reform program was instituted
which set the number of men at twenty-five thousand, but provided for
expansion to sixty thousand in time of war. Improvements were also
made in the navy. The grave financial conditions blocked further mea
sures; the state could not afford to re-equip these forces. The Greek
army was thus weaker than that of either Serbia or Bulgaria. The prob
lem of the prince in command was also to continue to be a political issue.
None of the actions taken in the first years of the new century arrested
the increase of discontent with the progress of the state and the slow de
velopment of national life. The general desire for change was reflected
in the program of the “Japan” party, led by Ion Dragoumes, which took
as a model the swift changes occurring within the Oriental nation. This
group achieved litde and soon disbanded. It is against this background
of criticism and uneasiness that the events of 1909 can best be under
stood.
In 1908 another major Balkan crisis was precipitated by the Young
Turk revolt in the Ottoman Empire, an action which was followed by a
Bulgarian declaration of independence and the annexation of Bosnia-
Hercegovina by the Habsburg Empire. These events, which will be dis
cussed in detail in the next chapter, had repercussions throughout the
Ottoman lands. In October, 1908, the Cretans again proclaimed union
with Greece, but the Greek government feared to move. A similar Cre
tan declaration of unity in July, 1909, brought the same response from
Athens and produced another intervention by the great powers.
This combination of domestic inaction and continual failures in
foreign policy led to another military coup. An organization called the
Military League was now formed by patriotic and nationalistic younger
officers. On August 28, 1909, Col. N. K. Zorbas led three thousand
officers and men of the Athens garrison in a demonstration against the
government. As in 1843 and 1862, a military revolt now caused major
changes in Greek political life. The ministry of Ralles, which was then
in power, resigned and was replaced by a government headed by Kyria-
koules Mavromichales, who led a faction with relations with the Military
League.
Once in power the league wished to enact a reform program. Its
members also opposed the presence of the princes in the army leader
ship. Although in control of the state, the army officers were without po
litical experience and no real political leaders emerged from their ranks.
Fully aware of their problem, they now turned to Venizelos. The Cretan
statesman came to Athens in January, 1910, as a political adviser to the
league. He supported the summoning of a national assembly to change
the constitution. Although he worked for the league, he opposed a mili
tary dictatorship. When the king accepted the proposal for the assembly,
it was also agreed that the league would dissolve.
In October, 1910, Venizelos formed his first government. From this
date until the summer of 1912, he dominated Greek politics. Since he in
sisted that the assembly not be constituent, Venezelos’s reforms did not
fundamentally alter the constitution of 1864. The king remained in a
strong position. The fifty-three amendments aimed at improving the ex
isting structure of government. For instance, civil servants were now to
have more secure tenure, a ministry of agriculture was established, ele
mentary education was made compulsory, and the number necessary for
a quorum in the assembly was reduced from a half to a third to prevent
obstructionist tactics. In regular legislation some social measures were
introduced, such as factory laws, a minimum wage for women and chil
dren, and the provision for the distribution of lands from some of the
large estates in Thessaly. Venizelos was also deeply interested in military
and naval reform; he kept these ministries for himself. The general fi
nancial situation now improved. The popularity of the program was
reflected in the elections of March, 1912, when the Venizelos supporters
received 150 of the 181 seats in the regular assembly.
The Venizelos measures were in no sense revolutionary. The system
was maintained with relatively few changes, and the dynasty was pre
served at a time when increasing numbers of Greeks were coming to at
tack it. Moreover, Venizelos’ activities introduced certain new features
into Greek political life. His party was organized on mass lines; it had a
central leadership and it maintained party discipline. Many of the old
abuses remained. The state administrative apparatus was extended in
these years, and the posts were given to Venizelos’ adherents. Neverthe
less, this government did provide direction and did help prepare the
country for the long war; it marked a definite step forward.
Romania
As in the case of Greece, the settlement of 1878 left much dissatis
faction in Romania. Even though part of Dobrudja and the Danube
delta were acquired and the state became independent, the three dis
tricts of southern Bessarabia were lost and the settlement of the new
boundaries caused further discontent. In Dobrudja the Romanian gov
ernment had wished to acquire Silistria. In this, as in other matters, the
Russians gave strong support to the Bulgarian claims. In June, 1880,
the disputed lands were awarded to Bulgaria.
Moreover, Romanian independence was not granted without qualifi
cation. Article 44 of the Treaty of Berlin imposed the condition that the
state not allow “difference in creed and confessions” to exclude anyone
from the “enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public
employments, functions, and honors, or the exercise of the various pro
fessions and industries in any locality whatsoever.” Although this clause
referred also to Muslims, its chief effect was on the status of the Jews.
This question had become a major national issue by the late 1870s.
After the middle of the nineteenth century, as conditions for Jews
worsened in the Russian lands, an increasing number entered the Danu-
bian Principalities. In 1859 approximately 118,000 lived in Moldavia
and 9,200 in Wallachia. This number rose sharply thereafter, until by
1899 there were 210,000 in Moldavia and 68,000 in Wallachia. The Jews
thus formed a group of approximately a quarter of a million out of a
total population of 6 million. In 1899 the total urban population was
about 1,131,000, of which 215,000, or 19 percent, were Jewish.
The urban concentration of the Jews resulted not so much from
choice as from economic necessity. Article 7 of the Constitution of 1866
stated that naturalization would only be given to “foreigners belonging
to the Christian faith.” Thus, Jews were unable to become Romanian citi
zens. Not only were they deprived of civil rights, but, equally important,
they could not purchase or own land. Limited in their choice of occupa
tions, the Jewish population worked where they could; often their em
ployment increased the opportunities for friction with the Romanians.
In the cities they were usually small traders and merchants, occupations
that native Romanians had traditionally regarded as inferior and had
left to foreigners. In the countryside they tended to run inns or act as
moneylenders or stewards on the estates of absentee landlords, positions
that inevitably led to trouble with the Romanian peasants. Although
many Jews were indeed wealthy, the great majority lived in wretched
conditions in the larger cities.
The Jewish situation had caused problems in international relations
for Romania before the Treaty of Berlin. It had been a major issue in
commercial negotiations with countries such as Britain, and it had com
plicated relations with Germany in the affair of the railroads. The Ro
manian government had also been the target of attack by European Jew
ish organizations such as the influential Alliance Israélite. Although
accustomed to foreign protests, the Romanian leaders resented Article
44, which they regarded as interference in their internal affairs, in par
ticular since Russia, one of the states requiring acceptance of the clause,
did not observe similar rules in relation to its own Jewish population.
Since there was no question, however, that Romanian independence
would not be recognized without a change in the regulations, the Ro
manian assembly did pass some laws in October, 1879. Jews could now
become naturalized citizens, but a special act would be required for each
case. The provision that only Romanian citizens could own land re
mained in effect. The measures, which were introduced with reluctance
and only after strong German pressure, did not really fulfill the spirit of
the Berlin treaty. Nevertheless, the European powers did, after 1880,
recognize Romanian independence. The Jewish issue was to remain a
sore question in Romanian internal politics. Neither the Romanians nor
the Jews desired assimilation, and the religious and cultural split caused
repeated conflicts.
The achievement of independence was a personal triumph for Prince
Charles. He had long disliked being a Turkish vassal. In March, 1881,
with the assent of the assembly he was crowned king of Romania and his
country became a kingdom. He then took steps to consolidate the Ho-
henzollern dynasty. Since it was now apparent that there would be no
direct heir, in November, 1880, he named his nephew, Prince Ferdinand
of Hohenzollern, as his successor. The prince then came to Romania to
become acquainted with the state. In 1893 he married Princess Marie of
Edinburgh, a granddaughter of both Queen Victoria and Tsar Alex
ander II, thus contracting a highly advantageous dynastic alliance.
During most of the 1880s the Liberal Party remained in power. Ion
Brätianu held office to April, 1881, when he was temporarily replaced
by Dumitru Brätianu. In complete control of the political organization,
Brätianu ran the administration along French lines and kept his hold on
the country through the prefects and the police. In general, the Liberals
continued to represent the city population, the professions, and the bu
reaucrats as well as the small landowners. The Conservatives remained
more the party of the large landowners, although some were in the op
position ranks. During this period the party divided. Catargiu was still
the titular head, but a group known as the Junimists, after the literary
society Junimea (Youth), split away. Its most prominent members were
Peter Carp, Titu Maiorescu, Theodore Rosetti, and Alexander Marghi-
loman. Educated in Germany rather than France, this group tended to

look toward the Central European powers. They also supported a pro
gram of moderate peasant reform.
In complete control of the legislature, the Liberal leadership now in
troduced a change in the electoral law to strengthen further their posi
tion. Elections were held for a new constituent assembly. As the govern
ment party the Liberals were able to win 134 seats as against 12 for their
Conservative opponents, who then boycotted the meetings. The fran
chise was changed in 1884. The country now had an elaborate electoral
system, based on colleges, for the selection of both houses. Two colleges
were established for the senate and three for the assembly. The fran
chise was given to all male citizens paying taxes. The first college was
composed of those with landed property bringing an income of 1200
francs; these numbered 15,973 in 1905. The second consisted of those
who had completed a primary course of education and those who lived
in cities and paid direct taxes of at least 20 francs. This group numbered
37,742. The third college included the rest of the population. The first
two voted directly. In contrast, the third voted indirectly, with fifty elec
tors choosing one delegate who would then vote directly. The first college
represented 1.5 percent of the voters and chose 41 percent of the 183
delegates; the second college represented 3.5 percent and selected 38
percent; the third, comprising the vast majority of the voting popula
tion, elected a mere 21 percent. The franchise for the Senate was even
more restrictive. Here the members were chosen by two colleges, one
consisting of 10,659 electors and one of 13,912. In June, 1887, a new law
on the election of communal councils provided also for a two-college sys
tem.
In practice this political organization put the real power in the hands
of Charles, who proved to be a capable and clever politician. Since the
ministry in office could control the elections through patronage and the
police, the king could nominate the government he wished and then dis
solve the assembly and be assured of gaining a majority in the ensuing
elections. This system also allowed the monarch to play one party off
against the other and to balance their influence. Although there were
two parties, they represented, at least in their leadership, but a small mi
nority of the population. Both the peasants and the city-workers were
effectively excluded from this part of national life. Continual splits
within the parties themselves occurred over either issues or personal
rivalries. For all the governments until 1914 the major questions debated
remained foreign policy, military affairs, and economic advancement.
Although foreign policy predominated in Romanian politics as it did
elsewhere in the Balkans, the Romanian position was in some respects
unique. The chief irredenta of Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria were lands
under the control of the weak, declining Ottoman Empire. In contrast
the major Romanian goals, Bessarabia and Transylvania, were posses
sions of the great powers, Russia and the Habsburg Empire respectively.
At the end of the nineteenth century there was no sign that either of
these states was near dissolution; only a major European catastrophe,
which few could envision, could create a situation that would allow the
annexation of these provinces. Thus, of necessity Romanian policy had
to be directed to less important issues, such as the claims against Bulgaria
in Dobrudja and the position of the Vlachs in Macedonia.
The chief impression left with the Romanian leadership from the
crisis of the 1870s had been a feeling of being endangered by Russia.
Participation in the Russo-Turkish War had not only resulted in the loss
of the three districts of southern Bessarabia, but also in fears that the
former protectorate would be re-established. Russian patronage of
Bulgaria was also intensely disliked. This attitude should have led to
close relations with Vienna, but there were obstacles here too. After the
Ausgleich the situation of the Romanians in Transylvania deteriorated
and the whole issue of the position of the nationalities in the Habsburg
Empire began to draw increasing attention. The Romanian government,
in addition, had an interest in limiting the extension of Habsburg con
trol over Danubian river traffic and in avoiding the establishment of an
unfavorable economic relationship. Litde could be done on the Danube
question. In 1883 the Dual Monarchy was able to gain its objectives here
and to assure its own predominance over the main course of the river.
Despite the many points of friction with Austria-Hungary, the Ro
manian government was nevertheless forced by circumstances to enter
into a close political alliance with that state. After the unnerving experi
ences of the previous years it was felt that Romania needed a foreign alli
ance to protect herself against Russia. She would have preferred a close
alignment with Germany, but Bismarck insisted that any German-
Romanian relationship be established through Vienna. Therefore, in
October, 1883, Romania and the Habsburg Empire signed a secret de
fensive treaty directed primarily against Russia. Germany adhered to it
immediately, and Italy did so in 1888. Romania thus became associated
with the Triple Alliance, although indirectly. The terms of the agree
ment obligated the monarchy to aid Romania against any state; Romania
would have to give assistance only in case of a Russian or Serbian attack
on Austria-Hungary. The alliance, which was renewed periodically and
was in effect in 1914, was kept absolutely secret. It was not submitted to
the assembly, and Charles did not inform all of his ministers of its exis
tence.
Even with this improvement in the political relationship between the
countries, economic ties became strained. The commercial agreement of
1875, described previously, had been disadvantageous to Romania. The
government had originally pressed for its conclusion primarily for politi
cal rather than for economic reasons. Habsburg products were granted
an almost free entrance into Romania, while Romanian agricultural im
ports into the empire were burdened with a tariff designed to protect
Hungarian interests. In practice, Romania had been deluged with Habs-
burg goods, which hindered the development of or ruined native small
industry. As a result, in June, 1885, the Romanian government de
nounced the commercial convention. This act meant that the protective
tariffs of the law of 1874 would apply to Habsburg imports. In May,
1886, a new, protectionist tariff law was adopted. In reply, Austria-
Hungary forbade the import of Romanian livestock and placed prohibi
tive tariffs on goods from Romania. The result was a customs war, which
lasted from May, 1886, to December, 1893. In some respects this conflict
resembled the later “Pig War” between Serbia and the monarchy. In
both cases the Habsburg government used the quarantine, presumably
for disease, as a weapon to limit imports of livestock.
The adoption of the protective tariff paralleled a simultaneous at
tempt by the Romanian government to encourage industry. The Lib
erals now favored both this type of legislation and subsidies to industry.
Laws to this effect were passed in the 1880s, the most significant of
which was that of May, 1887, designed to aid in the development of large
industry. Advantages were given to those enterprises having at least
twenty-five workers. At this time Romania led the Balkan nations in state
encouragement of industry. The Romanian endeavors, however, were
not truly successful from a national point of view. The new enterprises
could not be based on native capital. Some landowners and merchants
did invest, but the main support for Romanian industrial development
came from abroad, chiefly from Germany and Austria-Hungary. Before
the First World War the degree of industrialization remained low, al
though per capita production was more than double that of Bulgaria,
Serbia, or Greece.
In addition, the condition of agriculture declined toward the end of
the century as it did in other agrarian states. The competition of wheat
from the American prairies, which began to flood the European markets
in the 1880s, directly affected the Romanian estates. The tariff war with
Austria-Hungary had a disastrous impact on livestock production. An
adequate alternate market to the Dual Monarchy could not be readily
found, despite the fact that more agricultural exports now went to
Belgium and Britain. Although in the next years Romanian economic
ties to Germany tightened, that country was not a satisfactory substitute
either.
The long period of Liberal predominance came to an end in 1888. In
March a Junimist government, headed by Theodore Rosetti with Peter
Carp as foreign minister, was chosen. Conservative political control was
preserved until 1895, although there were changes of officials reflecting
the conflict of the factions within the party. During this period the gov
ernment passed some reform measures, adopted the gold standard, and
nationalized the railroads. A bridge over the Danube at Cernavoda was
completed in 1895. Trade conventions were signed with the major Euro
pean nations, including an agreement with Austria-Hungary in 1893
which ended the trade war. The exploitation of Romanian oil resources
also commenced.
The 1890s witnessed the death of the old Liberal leadership, which
had been so largely responsible for the establishment of the independent
Romanian state. Ion Brâtianu and Kogâlniceanu both died in 1891. The
head of the Liberal Party was now Dimitrie A. Sturdza, who formed a
government in 1895. From this time until the outbreak of the First
World War the two parties continued to alternate in office. A shift of
regimes marked no major change in government policies. Political
power was the preserve of but a small minority, and Charles remained in
a pivotal controlling position between the rival parties. In the decade
prior to 1914 the major problem in internal politics concerned the con
dition of the peasantry, whose relative position in Romanian society had
continued to decline.
The wretched conditions on the land after the reforms of the 1860s
have been described. Thereafter Romania remained a country of large
estates and an impoverished peasantry. The chief problem from a social
and political standpoint continued to lie in the unequal division of the
land. The concentration of ownership in the hands of a few, on the one
hand, and the continual subdivision of peasant holdings through equal
inheritance, on the other, resulted in a situation where the country had
no significant number of well-established, prosperous medium-sized
peasant holdings. At the beginning of the twentieth century five thou
sand large estates held half the arable land, while 85 percent of the peas
antry had no land or so little that outside employment had to be found.
Concentration of land ownership in large estates had certainly proved
of benefit in some nations, notably in Britain and Prussia. There large-
scale farming allowed the introduction of modern methods and scien
tific management, leading to a notable increase in production. This did
not happen in Romania. After 1829, as has been shown, a great expan
sion did indeed take place, but it was due to the fact that more land was
brought under cultivation and the raising of livestock curtailed. By 1914
Romania ranked as fourth in the world among cereal exporters and fifth
as a wheat exporter. This position, however, had not been won through
intelligent exploitation of the land.
The great landowners did not usually run their estates. They pre
ferred instead to lease their property and to live in Bucharest or Paris.
Their leaseholders in turn subdivided the land among peasant tenants
on a sharecropping or rental basis. By 1900, 72 percent of the estates
were handled in this manner. Quite understandably, the leaseholders

were primarily interested in a quick profit rather than in the long-term
improvement of the estates or the welfare of the peasants. As a group
they soon acquired a bad reputation, a situation that contributed to the
rise of anti-Semitism, although in fact only 27 percent of the large ten
ants were Jewish. The lands were thus actually worked by Romanian
peasants who provided both labor and draft animals; large landholding
did not result in an improvement of methods or the widespread in
troduction of machinery.
As the population increased during the century, the conditions of
peasant life became increasingly difficult. Plots subdivided through in
heritance were too small to support families; there was an urgent need
of more land. Rent on property naturally rose sharply during this
period. Because of the worsening situation peasant unrest became more
apparent toward the end of the century. The political parties tried to al
leviate the problem by passing measures concerning agricultural con
tracts and by selling some government lands. The principle of state in
tervention to protect the peasant was recognized, but little was done in
practice.
These conditions finally led to a great peasant revolt in 1907, which
began in Moldavia in March and spread throughout the country. It had
strong anti-Semitic overtones, but it was also directed against the large
tenants and the absentee landlords. The government, which contained
few if any real representatives of the peasants, reacted strongly. The
army, under the direction of General Alexander Averescu, put down the
revolt with extreme violence; about eleven thousand were killed.
Only when the rebellion had been repressed was the need for reform
recognized. New laws were passed on agricultural contracts and regulat
ing the relations of the peasants and the landowners. The problem re
mained that of enforcement in a country where the administration was
controlled by persons whose economic and social interests did not coin
cide with those of the peasantry. Nevertheless, by 1914 the peasant
desire for land and the probable necessity of the breakup of the large
estates had been recognized. In April, 1908, a law was passed establish
ing a rural bank to aid the peasants in buying land. Some attempt was
also made to control the size of leased estates, but a real reform had to
wait until after the war.
Although Romania was potentially the richest Balkan state, she suf
fered, as we have seen, from many of the same problems as the others.
Moreover, the Romanian government, like its neighbors, had to support
ever-increasing expenses connected with internal improvements, an ex
panding civil service, and, most important, the maintenance of a strong
army. Like Greece, Romania resorted to foreign loans as the best solu
tion to the financial stresses.
Serbia
The disillusionment over the results of the events of 1875-78 was
perhaps greater in Serbia than in any other Balkan country. Not only
had territorial objectives—Bosnia in particular—been handed over to
the Habsburg Empire, but Russia, Serbia’s former champion, had put
the entire weight of its diplomatic influence behind the Bulgarian claims.
At the end of the war Jovan Ristic remained in power at the head of a
Liberal government. The immediate problems he had to face were the
bad financial situation resulting from the years of crisis, and the shape of
foreign relations for the future. The latter, of course, were bound to in
volve primarily Vienna, since Russia had rejected previous Serbian over
tures.
In Serbia, as in Romania, the prince occupied a strong position. He
named the ministers who in turn could influence the outcome of elec
tions. Milan, however, was not a Charles, who could control the political
situation. Nor was he an Alexander of Battenberg, who could unite the
country behind him against foreign intervention. Essentially a weak man
who was also lazy, corrupt, and petty, Milan made enemies easily. He
provided neither a firm rallying point for the national forces nor the
strong leadership necessary for a weak and backward country.
This period witnessed the rise of two other groups, the Progressives
and the Radicals, who were subsequently to challenge the Liberal Party’s
predominance. Resembling the Junimists in Romania, the Progressives
emerged from the left wing of the Conservative Party. Western-orien
ted, they wanted to follow the example of the advanced European states
and regarded Russia as a backward and primitive state. Their members
were usually well educated and had traveled. The Progressives’ political
program followed the classic pattern of nineteenth-century liberal
thought and called for strong civil rights legislation, with provisions for a
free press and free assembly, an independent judiciary, and wide local
autonomy. In essence the Progressives wanted to duplicate in Serbia the
middle-class civilizations of Western Europe.
In contrast, the Radicals had their roots in the populist, Marxist, and
anarchist currents of the 1870s. Although they were to modify their pro
gram when they attained power, they were at first far to the left of the
Progressives. They stood for universal manhood suffrage, the predomi
nance of the legislature in the government, direct and graduated taxes, a
strong civil rights program, and virtual autonomy for local government.
They were particularly interested in curbing the influence of the police
in the elections, a prerequisite for their own victory. Perhaps their most
important contribution was their attempt to involve the peasantry for
the first time in the political life of the country. Initially, the party did
not emphasize this direction, but subsequently the leaders Nikola Pasic
and Pera Todorovic did work out a program that could attract this mass
base.
Meanwhile, Milan and his Liberal ministers attempted to come to an
understanding with Austria-Hungary concerning the building of
railroads, commercial relations, and, finally, a political treaty. On the
first point the Habsburg government wanted to be sure that the Serbian
railroad schemes were to its benefit; an extension of the Serbian network
southward was sought. In April, 1880, Serbia agreed to continue her
line from Belgrade to Vranje through Nis. Unfortunately for Milan, he
soon faced a major scandal with effects quite similar to the earlier
Strousberg affair in Romania. In March, 1881, Milan signed a contract
with a company approved by Vienna, that of E. Bontoux of Paris. Only a
short time later, in January, 1882, this firm collapsed, causing not only a
financial crisis in Paris, but even severer repercussions in Belgrade. On
paper the Serbian state appeared to have lost more than its national in
come for one year. Moreover, during this incident evidence of wide
spread bribery and the corruption of Serbian officials, including Milan,
was exposed. In the end, thanks to Austrian assistance, Serbia lost only
12 million dinars, but the damage to Milan and his government was ex
treme.
The negotiation of a commercial convention proved even more dif
ficult than the railroad question. The Serbian government needed a new
treaty. At the Congress of Berlin it had been decided that the indepen
dent Balkan states should continue to abide by the terms of the agree
ments negotiated by the Ottoman Empire. The tariffs allowed under
these agreements were kept to 3 percent for Serbia, while the monarchy
was allowed to increase hers at will. The Habsburg government was
willing to make a new arrangement. As in the negotiations with Ro
mania, pressure was applied to Serbia and the excuse of disease was used
to limit livestock imports. Again Vienna sought to gain what were in fact
quite unequal terms, in particular advantages for their manufactured
goods. The conditions offered were not unfavorable to the Serbian peas
ant, who needed the Habsburg market. Serbia also did not have an in
dustry that needed protection. Nevertheless, Jovan Ristic insisted on
equality. He refused to accept the Habsburg proposals and resigned in
October, 1880. After twelve years in office the Liberal Party surrendered
its position to the Progressives, who were to dominate Serbian political
life for the next seven years. The new government, with Milan Piro-
canac as premier and Cedomil Mijatovic as foreign minister and minis
ter of finance, signed the commercial agreement in April, 1881. The
terms were advantageous to Serbian agriculture, but they also allowed
Habsburg-manufactured goods to enter Serbia on a privileged basis.
Serbian trade was now almost exclusively with the Dual Monarchy, with
77 percent of Serbian imports and 82 percent of the exports tied to this
market.
The dependence of Serbia on Austria-Hungary, reflected in the com
mercial treaty, was even more pronounced in the political agreements
concluded at this time. With the Habsburg Empire in control of Bosnia-
Hercegovina and with the new Bulgaria backed by Russia, Serbia needed
some protection for her interests in the only area in which she could
hope to expand, Macedonia. Milan, like Charles, also wished to take the
tide of king. The treaty signed by Austria-Hungary and Serbia on June
28, 1881, contained an assurance of Habsburg support for Serbian ex
pansion southward should future developments allow this action. The
elevation of the state to a kingdom was similarly approved. The terms of
the agreement contained the assurance that if either state were at war,
the other would remain neutral. For its part, the Serbian government
made two important promises. First, it agreed that it would not tolerate
“political, religious, or other intrigues” against the Dual Monarchy on its
territory or in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Novi Pazar. Second, and much
more significant, Article 4 stated that “without a previous understand
ing with Austria-Hungary, Serbia will neither negotiate nor conclude
any political treaty with another government, and will not admit to her
territory a foreign armed force, regular or irregular, even as volun
teers.” 1
These declarations caused an immediate crisis when they became
known in Belgrade. Pirocanac preferred to resign rather than to accept
a statement that reduced Serbia to a position of political subordination to
the monarchy. He finally went to Vienna and obtained from the Habs-
burg government the declaration that the article would not “impair the
right of Serbia to negotiate and conclude treaties, even of a political na
ture, with another’government.” 12 With this assurance Pirocanac stayed
in office. Unknown to the premier, however, Milan, in an exchange of
letters with Vienna, promised not to “enter into any negotiations whatso
ever relative to any kind of political treaty between Serbia and a third
state without communication with and previous consent of Austria-
Hungary.” 3 In this backhanded manner Milan was able to assure for
himself the support of the monarchy. In March, 1882, Serbia became a
kingdom. Despite the unequal relationship thus established, it must be
emphasized that the country really had no alternative. Like Romania,
Serbia needed support from a great power in international relations.
1. Alfred Franzis Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914, tr. by Denys
P. Meyers and J. G. D’Arcy Paul (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), vol. 1, pp.
51-53.
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 61.
3. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 59.
With the Russian backing of Bulgaria, no other alliance partner was

available.
At the same time the Progressive government had begun to imple
ment its political program. Liberal, not democratic, it proceeded to pass
a series of laws resembling those passed by similar parties in the neigh
boring countries. Measures,concerning the freedom of the press, the in
dependence of the judiciary, and compulsory elementary education
were put into effect. In 1883 military service was made obligatory. In the
same year a national bank was established. The Progressive program
reflected middle-class interests, not those of the peasant majority. As in
the case of all the neighboring Balkan countries and of previous Serbian
administrations, the Progressive Party replaced Liberal Party appointees
in the bureaucracy with their own men.
The entire period in which the Progressive government held power
was marked by frequent internal scandals and foreign disasters. In addi
tion to the collapse of the Bontoux firm, Milan’s dismissal of the popular
metropolitan of Serbia, Michael, caused further domestic agitation. A
supporter of the Liberal Party and pro-Russian, Michael objected to
measures calling for the taxation of church property and to the whole
sale dismissal of Liberals from office. To replace him Milan appointed
his own candidate, Theodosius. When the Serbian synod would not con
firm him, Milan had to turn to the Serbian patriarch in Sremski Karlovci
in the Habsburg monarchy. The nomination was finally accepted by the
patriarch in Constantinople and by the Greek and Romanian churches,
but not by Russia.
Milan and the Progressive Party’s declining influence was reflected in
the elections of 1883. Despite the Progressive control of the government
the Radicals won a two-to-one majority. Refusing to accept this result,
Milan called Hristic and the Conservatives back to power. A Progressive
government was restored in 1884 following a revolt in the Timok area in
November, 1883. The cause of this rebellion was ostensibly the govern
ment’s demand that the peasant militia store their military weapons in
regular arsenals rather than in their homes. Members of the Radical
Party were, however, deeply implicated in the action. After the revolt
was suppressed by the army, Radical leaders were forced into exile.
Nikola PaSic, who had left the country before the event, was condemned
to death. A large number of refugees crossed into Bulgaria. Although
ninety-four received a death sentence for participation in the rebellion,
only twenty were executed.
The presence of the refugees in Bulgaria led to an immediate worsen
ing of relations with that state despite the fact that Milan and Alexander
were personal friends. The situation was made worse by an almost comi
cal incident. In the preceding years the Timok River marking the
boundary between the two states had changed its course. The shifts in
the river bed had resulted in roughly equal losses by both countries, but
Serbia now tried to keep the newly won land and to hold on to her
former strips. As a result a clash occurred on the border and the Bulgar
ians ousted a Serbian garrison. The dispute was not settled until 1888.
This growing hostility reached a climax in 1885. This time, as we have
seen, the issue was neither minor nor farcical. When it became apparent
that Eastern Rumelia would indeed join Bulgaria, Milan at once de
manded compensation. In November, 1885, on the mistaken assump
tion that a Bulgarian army devoid of Russian officers would be weak,
Milan launched an attack on the neighboring state. The war was a disas
ter for Serbia. At the Battle of Slivnitsa the army was defeated, and only
the intervention of his Habsburg ally saved Milan from further losses.
Peace was restored on a status quo ante basis.
From the 1880s to the revolution of 1903 a disproportionate role in
the politics of the Serbian state was played by the domestic affairs of the
Obrenovic dynasty. During this period the Serbian public was presented
with a series of scandals which not only disrupted political life but also
gave the world an impression of Serbia that damaged the state’s prestige.
The scandals were a constant danger to the dynasty because of the exis
tence of a possible alternative candidate for the throne in the person of
Peter Karadjordjevic, who lived in exile but who followed Serbian events
closely. In 1883 he strengthened his position by marrying Zorka, the
daughter of Prince Nicholas of Montenegro. Despite the dangers of irre
sponsible public behavior Milan and his wife Natalia proceeded to con
duct in public a series of personal and political quarrels. The daughter
of a Russian colonel of Romanian extraction, Natalia favored a pro-Rus
sian course in Serbian foreign policy. She also opposed her husband’s
desire that their sop Alexander be educated in Austria. In open and ir
reconcilable conflict with his wife, Milan sought a divorce; the issue split
the government. In 1887 Natalia and Alexander left the country.
By 1888 Milan had sickened of his position. He could not win a clear
victory in the elections despite his control of the police. Determined to
abdicate, his last act was to summon a constitutional assembly. This body
met in December, 1888; five-sixths of its members were from the Radical
Party and one-sixth from the Liberals. The Progressives had failed to
win a representative. Nevertheless, the draft for the new constitution
was drawn up by a committee representing all three parties. The docu
ment, which was more democratic than the one it replaced, defined
more closely the civil liberties granted, gave more relative power to the
parliament, and strengthened local government. It also provided for
secret elections and gave the suffrage to all taxpayers. With this task
completed, Milan abdicated in March, 1889, in favor of his thirteen-
year-old son, Alexander.
The reign of Alexander Obrenovic was in many respects a sad in
terlude in Serbian history. Although not without abilities, he was to see

his private life together with that'of his mother, his father, and later his
mistress become the laughing stock of Europe. He had experienced an
extremely lonely childhood coupled with a strict military education. His
parents had felt no scruples about using him in their quarrels. Before
leaving the country Milan had personally appointed a regency of three,
headed by Jovan Ristic. Since the abdication was a victory for the Radi
cals, this party now took control. General Sava Grujic became premier,
and Pasic returned from exile. The Radicals thus had the opportunity
to put their program into practice.
Whereas the electoral strength of the party rested on peasant votes,
the Radical leadership came from the middle classes and the intellec
tuals. Once in office the Radicals showed that they shared their prede
cessors’ desire for administrative positions and filled the civil service with
Radical candidates. The party did, however, have a program, which it
tried to implement at least in part between the years 1889 and 1892.
Many Radicals shared a theoretical dislike of the capitalist West. They
wished Serbia to be a democratic state based on a union of self-govern
ing communes. The army was to be popularly controlled. In practical
legislation, however, they did little more than introduce measures wid
ening the suffrage, strengthening civil rights, and increasing the author
ity of local government.
These actions could not, obviously, solve the personal problems of
young Alexander. His parents, living both within and without the coun
try, continued to quarrel publicly and vie for their son’s affection. Milan
was perpetually in need of money, and the question of his divorce re
mained a national issue. At the same time political conditions within the
country deteriorated. In June, 1892, the Radical government was re
placed by a Liberal regime, which assured itself of a sufficiently strong
position in the assembly by using the police and army in the elections. In
April, 1893, Alexander, at his father’s urging, and with the aid of the
army, simply took control of the country. At first the seventeen-year-old
king appointed his ministers from the Radical Party; new elections as
sured a Radical assembly. In 1894 Alexander abolished the constitution
of 1888 and restored that of 1869. These actions provoked no real reac
tion. In fact, in the next years the king was able to control the political
system by playing off the parties and controlling the elections. His rela
tively strong political position was, however, undermined by the popular
reaction to his irregular personal life.
Not only did Milan and Natalia continue to struggle openly over the
control of Alexander, but the unfortunate king contracted a relationship
which deeply offended Serbian sensitivities. At his mother’s house Alex
ander had met a widow, Draga Masina, who was more than ten years his
senior. Her father had died insane and her mother was an alcoholic. It
was believed that she could not have children, and she had acquired an
extremely bad reputation because of her relationship with other men.
Alexander made her his mistress in 1897 and soon announced his inten
tion to marry her. Both the king’s parents disapproved. The Russian
government, however, used this opportunity to attempt to regain influ
ence at the Serbian court. The tsar acted as best man at the wedding by
proxy.
The rest of Alexander’s reign was dominated by scandals associated
with the new queen and her family. Reports of false pregnancies only
served to underline the fact that the Obrenovic dynasty was dying out.
In April, 1901, Alexander issued another constitution on his own au
thority. Serbia was now to have a bicameral legislature with an elected
chamber and a senate, three-fifths of whose members were to be ap
pointed by the king. Although the government continued to win elec
tions through intimidation, it could not stifle the mounting national dis
content.
Alexander’s rule came to an end on the night of June 10-11, 1903,
with a coup organized by a group of young officers who were humiliated
by their ruler and who felt that the country could not advance under his
leadership. About 120 were involved in the plot. The conspirators in
vaded the palace and killed the king, the queen, the premier, the war
minister, and both of the queen’s brothers. The action horrified Europe.
Not only was Alexander shot, but he also received multiple saber
wounds.
There was no question who would be the next king; Peter Karadjordj-
evic was the only candidate. The conspirators first organized a provi
sional government with Jovan Avakumovic at the head. The two-house
legislature of the^ constitution of 1901 was then summoned, and it
elected Peter, who accepted at once. In 1903 the constitution of 1889
was restored with certain amendments. The new king was almost sixty
when he became the ruler of a country about which he knew little. The
third son of Alexander Karadjordjevic, he had been educated in France
and Switzerland. A nationalistic Serb, he had fought in the Bosnian War.
His ties were with Russia. His marriage to Princess Zorka had ended with
her death in 1890.
The first task facing the new regime was to counter the shocked reac
tion of the powers to the coup. Although Austria-Hungary and Russia
soon recognized the change, Britain and the Netherlands withdrew their
ambassadors. None of these countries liked the fact that conspirators oc
cupied high posts in the government after the coup. The removal of
these men aided in the resumption of normal foreign relations, but Brit
ain did not recognize the new government until 1906.
Peter was crowned in 1904. With his accession political life became in a
sense simplified. The two strongest parties were the Radicals and the In
dependent Radicals, both offshoots of the original party. After five

changes of government between 1904 and 1906, the Radicals held con
trol of the government until 1918.
The Obrenovic dynasty had been tied to Austria-Hungary; that link
had now been broken. Despite the Russian connections of both Peter
and the Radicals, this country was deeply involved in the disastrous war
with Japan and could offer little support. Almost immediately conflicts
developed with Vienna, chiefly over questions concerning railroads, mil
itary purchases, and loans. The Habsburg government wished the Serbs
to purchase Skoda guns with money loaned by the monarchy. For their
part the Serbs wanted to acquire French weapons similar to those used
by Bulgaria, and not restrict themselves to Austrian financing. During
the negotiations the Habsburg government learned that Serbia and
Bulgaria had signed a customs agreement in June, 1905, which was to go
into effect in 1906 and which would result in a virtual economic union by
1917. Regarding this as damaging to the Habsburg position in the Bal
kans, the monarchy suspended negotiations with Belgrade, including
those being carried on over a trade treaty. Pressure was put on Serbia to
renounce the Bulgarian agreement, and the Habsburg border was
closed to Serbian livestock. Disease was again used as a pretext.
This conflict, known as the “Pig War,” in many ways paralleled earlier
controversies between the monarchy and Romania. Agreement was only
reached in 1911. Although the boycott on Serbian livestock was disas
trous for some areas, the action forced the Serbian government to end
its close economic dependency on the Dual Monarchy and to look for al
ternate markets. Commercial treaties were concluded with other states,
and the Serbs began to process their own meats. The state also now
turned to France for military equipment. The change of dynasties and
the consequences of the Pig War effectively broke the former tight polit
ical, military, and economic ties between Serbia and the Habsburg mon
archy. From this time on the Serbian government looked to St. Peters
burg for direction.
Peter’s reign was marked by continual crises in foreign policy. Since
these events involved deeply the other Balkan states as well as the great
powers, they will be discussed elsewhere. It should, however, be men
tioned that in the next years the Serbian government entered a period
where strong emphasis was placed on national expansion. The Serbian
goals continued to involve the annexation of lands still under Ottoman
rule, but an increased concern was shown over the fate of the South Slav
peoples under Habsburg rule.
B ulgaria
After the resignation of Stambolov Prince Ferdinand appointed the
Conservative Constantine Stoilov as his successor. His first task, it will be
remembered, had been to effect a reconciliation with Russia. Ferdinand
was now determined to be a strong ruler and to control the political pro
cess of the state. His goals remained the expansion and strengthening of
the nation and, like Charles and Milan, he looked forward to the day
when he would win a royal tide and rule over an independent state. The
prince’s desire for power was aided by the evolution of the Bulgarian po
litical system. The former Liberal and Conservative parties soon split
into new organizations with competing programs. Ferdinand was thus
always able to find a political party or a coalition that would work with
him and carry out his policies. Between 1894 and 1913 the government
shifted between these groups approximately a dozen times.
Before the First World War nine political parties competed for power.
Three were splinter groups from the Liberal Party: the National Lib
erals led by Dimitur Petkov, Stambolov’s successor; the Liberals under
Dr. Vasil Radoslavov; and the Young Liberals of Dimitur Tonchev.
Their differences centered largely around the personalities of their
leaders. All were basically anti-Russian and pro-western in foreign pol
icy, and they found their support in the urban intellectuals and the peas
ants. Their chief opposition came from the former Conservatives, who
were called the National Party after 1894 and were led by Constantine
Stoilov. In the political struggles the National Party cooperated with the
Progressive Liberal Party led by Dragan Tsankov. This group leaned
toward Russia in foreign affairs, and its members came from the middle
class and the more prosperous landowners. Between these blocs was the
Democratic Party of Petko Karavelov. It preferred a policy of free hands
in foreign affairs, but it was rather more pro-western than pro-Russian.
The other three parties were the Agrarians and two Social Democratic
associations, who were relative newcomers to Bulgarian politics.
The five years of Stoilov’s premiership set the direction of Ferdinand’s
reign. Like Charles, the prince was concerned with internal develop
ment and he wished to encourage industrialization. In 1894 a law was
passed to protect native industry, and loans were granted to firms that
had a capital of over 25,000 leva and at least 20 workers. In 1897 all of
ficials were required to wear domestically produced clothing and shoes.
These measures, which encouraged machine production, were harmful
to the handicraft industries of the country, but were believed necessary
for economic progress.
The prince was also deeply interested in the development of internal
communications, particularly in the building of railroads. Like all the
Balkan countries, Bulgaria had great difficulties with the foreign conces
sions granted for this purpose. Prior to 1878 the Ottoman government
had contracted with western firms, mainly British and Austrian, for
railroad construction. In the Treaty of Berlin the Bulgarian principality
was obligated to assume these commitments. During the 1880s the Bui-
garian government found itself under constant pressure from conces

sion hunters, some of whom were now Russian. The foreign entrepre
neur was, of course, primarily concerned with making a profit for
himself and his stockholders. Some of the lines proposed would have
been of little benefit to Bulgaria. By 1888 the main line through
Bulgaria, which linked Constantinople with Vienna and the other great
European cities, was completed. The country now had 693 kilometers of
track. In order to proceed with the next step, the development of branch
lines, the government obtained loans from Viennese banks, often at high
interest rates. Other problems also arose. Under questionable circum
stances the state paid a high price to purchase the railroad of the Orien
tal Company in Rumelia, which was owned by the Berlin Deutsche Bank.
Stoilov was forced to resign in January, 1899, on this issue. Although
railroads continued to be built—Bulgaria had an impressive 1,931 kilo
meters of track by 1911—the cost placed a heavy burden on the econ
omy.
Bulgarian agriculture also suffered from many of the same problems
as those found in the neighboring countries. After 1878, with the
breakup of the great estates formerly held by Ottoman proprietors, Bul
garia became a nation of small peasant farmers. The acquisition of land
did not improve the level of peasant life. As elsewhere, the plots were
repeatedly subdivided through inheritance, and farming methods were
not improved. Peasant discontent mounted steadily. This group had cer
tain definite demands; it wanted, for example, loans to be available at
reasonable rates, guaranteed markets for crops, and the assurance of
low prices for staples, such as matches, soap, and sugar. The peasants
particularly disliked the rising costs of consumer goods when their own
incomes were declining. Peasant discontent reached its height when,
after several bad harvests, in 1899 the government imposed a 10 percent
tax in kind. A storm of protest arose. The measure had been introduced
by D. Grekov, the leader of the National Liberal Party, which now domi
nated the government in coalition with the Liberals. The army was used
to enforce the law, and some peasants were killed. The use of force had
been decided on by Radoslavov, who had replaced Grekov as premier.
This action caused the formation of the Agrarian Union, a new party
devoted to furthering the interests of the peasants, who previously had
largely voted for the Liberals.
Not only did Radoslavov use strong measures against the peasants, but
he also illegally dissolved the communal councils and other local govern
mental bodies. Ferdinand was aware of his minister’s increasing un
popularity and in 1901 appointed a new coalition government composed
of Democrats and Progressives under the leadership of Karavelov. The
10 percent tax was immediately rescinded. Much of the good-will gained
by this step, however, was dissipated when the government sought to use
a tobacco monopoly to secure a loan from Germany, an action that the
assembly would not approve.
Throughout Ferdinand’s reign foreign policy was dominated by the
Macedonian question. The state not only sponsored the organization of
revolutionary societies, but also sought to make advances through ne
gotiations with the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Some success was
gained through discussions with the Porte. In 1897 the sultan issued two
decrees for new bishoprics to be placed under the jurisdiction of the ex
arch. Little assistance, however, could be gained from St. Petersburg. Al
though the Bulgarian crisis of 1885-87 had caused the dissolution of the
Three Emperors’ Alliance and a period of estrangement between Russia
and Austria-Hungary, by the late 1890s the two countries had again de
veloped common interests in Balkan affairs. Russia was more concerned
with events in the Far East; the Habsburg Empire had to deal with great
internal problems. Therefore, in 1897 the two states agreed to cooperate
to prevent any crisis from arising in the Balkans. In the next years they
also worked closely together on the Macedonian question. Under these
circumstances Bulgaria could not expect Russia to back her aims.
Despite the fact that new territory could not be gained at this time,
Ferdinand was soon to achieve another of his goals. In 1908 the Young
Turk revolution in the Ottoman Empire brought to power a new leader
ship, which was determined to maintain the integrity and strength of
that nation. Cooperating closely with Austria-Hungary, who was con
cerned about Bosnia-Hercegovina, Ferdinand prepared to exploit the
opportunity presented. He first recalled his representative in Constan
tinople and then seized the Ottoman railroad in Eastern Rumelia. Fi
nally, in October, 1908, he proclaimed Bulgaria’s independence and as
sumed the tide çf tsar. The next day the Habsburg monarchy
announced the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Although an inter
national crisis followed, the Bulgarian action was eventually accepted by
the Porte in return for an indemnity. This achievement naturally im
mensely strengthened Ferdinand’s personal position, which had been
under attack during the period from left-wing groups.
With the achievement of independence the government gave its full
attention to Macedonia. By this time it had abandoned hope of acquiring
ail of this territory. The best solution now seemed a partition with the
other Balkan states in agreement with Russia. The obstacle to negotia
tions with other states was Article 18 of the consdtution, which required
the approval of the assembly for such agreements. Thus, there could be
no secret discussions. The necessity of amending the constitution was
clear. In March, 1911, a coalition government of the National Party and
the Progressives was formed under the premiership of E. Geshov. The
mood of the nation and the importance attached to the solution of the
Macedonian question was expressed when the newly convened Grand
National Assembly unanimously approved the constitutional change.

Ferdinand could now enter into secret treaties with the neighboring
states.
Despite the numerous domestic problems Bulgaria did progress in
many areas in the years before 1913. As noted previously, the railroad
network almost tripled from 693 kilometers in 1887 to 1,931 in 1911.
During the same period roads increased from 3,727 kilometers to 8,945.
Telegraph lines extended from 3,548 kilometers to 6,517, and tele
phone lines from 195 kilometers to 2,231. In addition, the Turnovo con
stitution had guaranteed free, compulsory education for all. At first this
program could not be implemented because of the shortage of trained
teachers and schools. Yet by 1910a system of education had been devel
oped; administered by local school boards, it provided for four years of
primary education, three years of pregymnasium, and five years of gym
nasium. In 1888 the so-called Higher School was established in Sofia,
which in 1904 became the University of Sofia.
Economic and Social P roblems: the Intervention of the Great
Powers
In previous chapters economic and social problems have been dis
cussed as part of either the domestic political life or the foreign relations
of a state. Before continuing to the complicated international situation,
which led ultimately to the great war of 1914, it might be well to summa
rize these developments, particularly for the period after 1878, and to
consider briefly the standard of life achieved by the Balkan people in the
century of national liberation. Emphasis will also be placed on the role of
the great powers in this sphere of Balkan activity.
The Congress of Berlin marked an historical break in Balkan and to
an extent general European development. The achievement of separate
national existences by the majority of the Balkan people at this time coin
cided with a new epoch of imperial expansion on the part of the Euro
pean great powers. The western industrial states now turned with in
creasing interest to the rest of the world in search of new markets,
sources of raw materials, and opportunities for investment. The old im
perial countries of Britain and France were now joined by Germany,
Italy, and the United States as the leaders in the movement. Although
Russia was to be an imperial power in the Far East and Central Asia, she
could not offer direct economic competition with these western states. In
fact, in her relations with the West Russia was to share with the colonial
lands the attribute of being an exporter of raw materials and an im
porter of industrial goods and capital.
As we have seen, once the Balkan states had achieved some measure of
independence they desired the characteristics of a modern state—in par
ticular a large bureaucratic establishment and an efficient army. They
also needed internal improvements, especially better means of com
munication. All of these items were expensive and none of the states had
an adequate tax base or sufficient accumulation of wealth to meet the im
mediate new expenses. Greece, for example, had been forced to go
deeply into debt simply to pay for the national revolution. As a result the
Balkan states sought capital and industrial goods from the great imperial
powers, who were willing to make loans to win political allies and who
regarded the Ottoman Empire and the successor states as areas of impe
rial exploitation. The relationship could not be equal. The Balkan na
tions and the Ottoman Empire did not have the power to resist the
encroachment of the strong empires. Moreover, the large states were
themselves in a period of intense economic and national rivalry. By en
tering the Balkan conflicts they not only became involved in the Balkan
disputes, but in turn drew the small states into the major powers’ quar
rels.
Perhaps the question of the railroads provides the best example of the
differences between the great powers’ interests and the problems as
sociated with European investment. In the middle of the nineteenth cen
tury all nations had a passion for railroad building. The Balkan gov
ernments, on achieving a measure of political independence, were no
exception, but for them the question of payment was not easy. The
desires of the Balkan states were seconded strongly by the powers be
cause the lines would facilitate their trade. The West wanted a direct link
with the Ottoman Empire for both economic and strategic reasons. Be
cause of these considerations, the Balkan railroads were generally built
more to meet the needs of the powers than those of the Balkan states.
The first lines built, the Constanta-Cernavoda and the Varna-Ruse
routes, served Austrian and British interests by connecting the Black Sea
and the Danube River. In 1868 the most ambitious plan for a Balkan
railroad network was drawn up. At this time the Ottoman government
gave the Austrian concern of Baron Hirsch a concession for a line to run
from Constantinople through Adrianople, Plovdiv, Sofia, Nis, and Bel
grade to the Habsburg border. Construction began in 1872, but was in
terrupted by the wars of the second half of that decade. Constantinople
and Vienna were joined only in 1888.
The issues connected with railroad building were a constant source of
conflict between the states, as has been shown in the case of Romania and
Germany in the 1870s and Austria-Hungary and Serbia in 1882. Similar
friction developed between the Habsburg monarchy and Russia in 1908
over the desire of Russia and Serbia to construct a line running east to
west from the Danube to the Adriatic, a plan in conflict with Vienna’s
desire for a north-south route through Ottoman territory from the Aus
trian border to Thessaloniki.
The completed Balkan railroad network did run counter to some of
the economic interests of the states through whose territory the lines ran
and who in fact paid for the construction. Certainly, the first effects were
not favorable. The increased penetration of European manufactured
goods served to drive out local products, and native handicraft indus
tries were often wiped out. The financing of the railroads also brought
the Balkan governments a vgreat deal of trouble, including the above-
mentioned association of members of both the Romanian and Serbian
governments with obviously corrupt financial practices.
Nevertheless, despite these disadvantages the Balkan countries did
acquire a railroad system.4 The first Greek line was the nine-kilometer
stretch from Athens to Piraeus constructed in 1867-69; by 1914 the
state had 2,196 kilometers of track. The initial Romanian railroad ran
from Bucharest to the Danube port of Giurgiu; by 1914 the network
had increased to 3,754 kilometers. By this date Serbia had 1,567 kilome
ters of railroad and Bulgaria 2,227. The chief Bulgarian line was the
stretch of the Constantinople-Vienna route that ran through the state.
This railroad was a national luxury; it did not support itself and it was of
limited aid in the economic development of the country. It should also
be noted that all of these railroads, although built by foreign private en
terprise, became state owned—in Romania in 1888, in Serbia between
1889 and 1892, in Bulgaria in 1885, and in Greece from the beginning.
Construction of a better system of roads and improvements on rivers
and ports in all of the Balkan countries closely paralleled the building of
railroads. Particularly notable were the completion of the Cernavoda
bridge across the Danube and the cutting of the Corinth Canal between
the Peloponnesus and Greece proper, both of which occurred during
the 1890s. By the outbreak of the First World War, the transportation
facilities in the peninsula were much superior to those in the days of Ot
toman rule.
These internal improvements were made largely with borrowed
money. Loans also paid for military equipment and for regular state ex
penses. By the end of the century all of the Balkan governments faced
real difficulties because of this policy. Not only had much of the money
gone into noneconomic expenditures, but the service of the debts had
come to absorb an entirely disproportionate percentage of the state
budget. Greece was forced to accept an international commission with
control over most of her state finances; Serbia and Bulgaria had to allow
similar arrangements for the state monopolies only at the beginning of
the new century. In each case foreign advisers gained control of the rev-
4. The statistics on the following pages come principally from Nicolas Spulber, The State
and Economic Dei'elopment in Eastern Europe (New York: Random House, 1966) and Ivan T.
Berend and Gyorgy Ranki, Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). See also appropriate sta
tistical handbooks.
enues from certain taxes. Romania, because of her grain exports and her
developing oil industry, was in the best economic position, but she, too,
borrowed heavily for military and railroad expenditures, with 52 per
cent of the debt owed to German investors. By 19,14 the new states had
acquired a large public debt burden: Bulgaria owed 850 million francs;
Serbia, 903 million; Greece, 1.25 billion; and Romania, 1.7 billion.
Closely allied with the desire of the Balkan governments to acquire
modern armies, bureaucracies, and public works was their natural wish
to follow in the path of the western states towards an industrial economy.
With a poor basis for such a development, little advancement was
achieved in this direction in any Balkan state during the nineteenth cen
tury. In the beginning of the twentieth century changes did commence,
but the outbreak of the First World War found the area still overwhelm
ingly agrarian in character. Of the states the most notable achievements
were in Romania, chiefly because of the development of the oil re
sources, but even here the place of industry in the total economy re
mained very small. In 1863 Romania had 565 plants employing 5 or
more workers for a total of 5,500 workers. The main enterprises were
food processing, construction materials, and textiles. In 1902 the
country had 625 large works with 40,000 workers. By 1912 the Ploeçti oil
fields and the related chemical industry became important. Here foreign
capital dominated, the Romanian share in the oil exploitation being only
8 percent.
In Greece a similar pattern can be found. In 1877 the state had 136 in
dustries with 7,350 workers; by 1917 the number had increased to over
2,000 plants with 36,000 workers, with food processing and textiles pre
dominating. In addition, Greece had strong handicraft industries.
Foreign capital wa§ also important here. The Greeks themselves tradi
tionally preferred to invest in small enterprises and in trade. In one area,
the historic occupation of shipbuilding, Greece was unique in the Bal
kans. The introduction of steamships resulted in a momentary setback for
Greek builders, but this was later recovered. Unfortunately for the state,
the later rise of large shipping concerns under the direction of Greek na
tionals did not profit the nation. For tax and other reasons these ships
were often not registered in the Greek kingdom.
Both Serbia and Bulgaria were slow in industrial development; both
were markets for Habsburg and British products. Nevertheless, after the
turn of the century some progress was made. In 1910 Serbia had 16,000
workers employed in 470 industrial plants, of which half were mills. The
mining of coal and some copper was also developed. Small enterprises
characterized Serbian economic development.
In Bulgaria national liberation resulted in an economic decline be
cause of the loss of the Ottoman market. The emigration of Turkish
craftsmen after 1878 and the building of railroads, which brought in
competing foreign goods, similarly was a blow to local production. In the

1870s some industry did exist, particularly in textiles and food pro
cessing. In 1910 there were 110 mills with 1,400 workers and 76 textile
enterprises with 4,400 workers. There were also breweries, ceramics en
terprises, alcohol distilleries, and a match factory. By 1911 the country
had 345 industries with 16,000 workers.
Despite these slow beginnings the Balkan governments did encourage
industrial development, although not to the extent of offering direct
subsidies as in the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy. Assistance was
given instead through protective tariffs on manufactured imports and
measures that exempted industrial firms from taxes, and through im
port tariffs on raw material and machinery. Although there were discus
sions in the various assemblies about a concerted effort to foster indus
trial and general economic development, the level and indeed the type
of aid was not sufficient to achieve the desired results. In addition to the
very obvious problem of poverty, the governments were restricted be
cause of the determination of the great powers to maintain essentially
unequal economic relationships with the Balkan states and the Ottoman
Empire.
As we have seen, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania shared the problem
that at first their tariff limits were determined by the Treaty of Berlin
which provided that the former Ottoman commercial treaties should
remain in effect. It was not until the new century that the results of this
provision could be fully set aside. International considerations thus hin
dered the introduction of a truly protective tariff. Moreover, each state
had to consider the interests of its people; there were in fact few infant
industries to protect. If the governments raised tariffs to stimulate such
development, other states might retaliate to the detriment of the
agrarian interests. Serbian and Romanian peasants did, for instance,
need an export market for grain and livestock. The commercial treaties
between the states and the Dual Monarchy, which allowed an almost free
import of Habsburg manufactured goods, did no direct harm to the ma
jority of the population. Only later, when tariffs were raised and customs
wars resulted, did the peasants and merchants suffer. Nevertheless, all
the Balkan states raised their tariffs when they could. Bulgarian rates
were increased in 1905; the Serbian during the Pig War; and the Greek
in 1910.
In addition to these commercial policies the Balkan governments also
gave their industrial enterprises certain direct aid through legislative
measures. Such assistance took, in general, the form of tax exemptions,
duty-free imports of machinery and raw materials, preferential rates on
railroads, free land for factories, and the assurance of government con
tracts. The Romanian law of 1887, as we have seen, gave special favors to
industries with more than twenty-five workers; Serbia passed similar
laws in 1898. Here factories with more than fifty workers received privi
leges. Bulgaria introduced comparable measures in 1894 and 1897.
Along with this assistance, the governments sought to encourage in
dustrial development by creating an atmosphere favorable to foreign in
vestment. Since this source of capital was believed essential, official ap
proval helped attract outside money. And indeed foreign investment did
play a major role in the initial exploitation of the natural resources of the
area. This condition was particularly apparent in Romania, the most ad
vanced of the nations under consideration. In that country the major
part of the industry rested on foreign investment. In the oil industry by
1914 only 8 percent of the capital was from Romanian sources, while
27.5 percent was German, 23.7 percent British, and 20 percent Dutch. A
similar domination of outside investment could be found in the gas, elec
tric, sugar, and timber industries. Foreign capital was also heavily in
volved in the exploitation of Serbian mineral resources, in particular of
coal, iron, copper, lead, chromium, and zinc. European investors natu
rally developed the fields that would yield the highest profits; their activ
ities usually did not contribute to the real economic development of the
countries in which they operated because there were few links between
these extractive operations and the native economy. The fact that
members of the Balkan governments benefited from participation in
certain of these activities did, of course, introduce the issue of political
corruption into the entire relationship.
Despite the efforts to industrialize the Balkan nations were hampered
by the two-fold problem of an agrarian economy and an extremely back
ward agriculture. Important regional differences did exist, but the states
shared certain parallel disabilities. In every area, regardless of whether
small peasant farming or estates dominated the picture, agricultural
methods were too primitive to produce a crop that could compete in the
world of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In Serbia,
Bulgaria, and Romania agriculture had developed along a roughly simi
lar line: the peasant producer had shifted by the second half of the nine
teenth century from livestock to grains. During this period the amount
of land under cultivation had risen resulting in a great increase in pro
duction. The primary goal of farming itself also shifted from self-suf
ficiency to the cultivation of cash crops. In the 1880s American and
Australian wheat began to enter and then flood the European markets to
the detriment of the Balkan products. At the same time both Serbian
and Romanian agricultural interests were harmed by the Hungarian
desire to protect the Habsburg market for its own grains and livestock.
As the competitive value of Balkan agriculture declined, the popula
tion rose. In 1878 Serbia had a population of 1.7 million; by 1910 she
had 2.9 million. Together Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia had 1.5 mil
lion people in 1881, but 4.3 million in 1910. In 1815 the Romanian Prin
cipalities had 1.5 million inhabitants, but 6.9 million in 1910. The Greek
figures rose from 750,000 in 1829 to 2.7 million in 1911. The Greek
increases, of course, reflect the annexation of Thessaly, the Ionian Is
lands, and part of Epirus in 1882.
This rise in population was not accompanied by an improvement in
land use. During the first part of the century the increase could be ab
sorbed by the development of unexploited lands. For instance, the great
Serbian forests gradually disappeared. Once the unused land had been
claimed, the difficulties began. Balkan agriculture did not benefit from
the experience of other countries, which had shown that the cheapest
and most efficient manner by which export crops could be produced was
on large estates managed along capitalist lines and worked by hired
labor. On such estates modern techniques, advanced farm machinery,
and the new chemical fertilizers brought vastly increased yields. Instead,
Balkan agriculture went in precisely the opposite direction. Even the
large estates, such as those in the Principalities and Thessaly, were cul
tivated chiefly by sharecropping peasants using their own primitive im
plements. Although some machinery was introduced, the majority of the
peasants continued to use wooden plows and oxen for transport. In
Bulgaria, for example, only 10 percent of the peasants had iron plows in
1900; in 1910 the figure had risen to 20 percent. Backward methods
resulting in low yields meant that the Balkan peasant could not compete
with the American farmer, let alone assure himself of anything but the
most primitive standard of living.
By 1914 the situation had become critical: there was simply not
enough land to support adequately the population, given the level of ag
ricultural activity. The problem of underemployment was acute; so
many people were not needed for the tasks they fulfilled. Unfortunately,
what changes were made went in the wrong direction largely because the
individual peasant saw the solution to his problem mainly in the acquisi
tion of more land; he wanted the division of the large estates. He also
continued to support inheritance laws, such as one passed in Bulgaria in
1890, that maintained the equal division of property among all the chil
dren of a family. This system, together with the increase in populadon,
led to a proliferation of dwarf plots on which the majority of Balkan
peasants attempted to support themselves. The peasants sought to rem
edy their situation by acquiring more land, not by improving farming
methods.
In addition to the basic economic problems connected with Balkan
landholding, the peasant majority carried the chief weight of supporting
the national bureaucracies and the armies. Taxes, which had often been
negligible under Ottoman rule, became extremely burdensome and
their collection was more efficient. Thus between 1879 and 1911 it has
been estimated that the Bulgarian peasant paid between 15 and 20 per
cent of his earnings to the state in taxes. Moreover, the peasant had to
make high payments on the land he was able to acquire. For example, al
though Turkish landowners in Bulgaria were forced to leave after 1878,
the Bulgarian peasant had to compensate them for their losses. When
state lands were sold or when private lands came on the market, the
prices were high. Rents on agricultural property also rose steeply. This
had been one of the main causes of the Romanian peasant revolt of
1907.
As a result of these circumstances the peasant was constantly in need
of money. He often had to borrow just to survive. The problem of peas
ant loans remained constant in the century before 1914. Usurious
charges were commonplace in the countryside throughout the Balkans.
The governments did little to protect the peasant from the money
lender, although some laws were passed such as the Serbian Homestead
Act of 1836. It should also be mentioned that the Balkan peasant had
learned to enjoy many products, such as tea, coffee, sugar, manufac
tured cloth and thread, and other industrial products, which usually
came from outside of the country, were cosdy, and required cash. More
products that he wanted were available to him, while his ability to pur
chase them declined.
The impoverished condition of the masses affected the entire struc
ture of each of the Balkan states. Obviously, a poor people could not pay
enough taxes to keep the Balkan governments out of financial difficul
ties. Nor could it form a satisfactory market for an increase of local in
dustry; nor could it provide capital for industrial or commercial devel
opment. The failure of the states to develop an industrial base, of
course, deprived the rural population of alternative employment.
In this account little attention has been given to the condition of the
workers, largely because of the overwhelmingly agrarian character of
the Balkan states and the fact that industrialization commenced late and
remained weak. Nevertheless, because of their enormous future impor
tance mention must be made of the Social Democratic parties, in particu
lar in Romania and Bulgaria.
The beginnings of industrialization in the Balkans were accompanied
by all the abuses so familiar in other parts of the wprld. The workers
were employed for long hours, sometimes twelve to sixteen hours a day,
at low wages and in bad conditions. The housing and food available in
the cities was deplorable. Like their western equivalents, Balkan workers
also formed unions, conducted strikes, and established political organi
zations to protect their interests. They sought state intervention to con
trol the activities of their employers and to improve their working condi
tions. The Social Democratic parties, usually with a workers’ base but
with an intellectual, middle-class leadership, represented their political
goals.
In Romania workers’ organizations of importance first appeared in

the 1880s. The most influential'Marxist writer and organizer in this
period was Constantine Dobrogeanu-Gherea, a major figure in world so
cialism. In 1893 fifty-four delegates from various Romanian cities met in
Bucharest and formed the Social Democratic Party. In 1899 it dissolved
with many of its members joining the Liberal Party. Meanwhile, the
trade union movement made headway. In 1906 the first conference was
held and a general commission was set up. In the following year the So
cialist Union was organized, and it became the basis for the revival of the
Social Democratic Party in 1910. This organization, under the direction
of Christian Racovski, was militant and revolutionary in its attitude. Its
political program called for universal suffrage and social reforms. It
should be noted that Romanian socialist programs also advocated
agrarian reform, and support was given to the peasants in the revolution
of 1907.
Similar developments occurred in Bulgaria. It is interesting to note
that this country, with the weakest industrial development, produced
perhaps the most vigorous and controversial Socialist movement. Like
Romania, Bulgaria had a socialist leader of international stature in Dimi-
tur Blagoev. In 1891 he and twenty others founded the Social Demo
cratic Party of Bulgaria. Almost at once a conflict developed between
Blagoev and Ianko Sakazov, who believed that the party should concen
trate on bettering the condition of the workers by shortening the work
ing day and obtaining higher wages rather than on revolutionary activ
ity. He also welcomed the support of the peasantry with whose help he
was elected to the assembly in 1894. Blagoev, in contrast, did not trust
the peasants. He concentrated on the industrial workers, despite their
infinitesmal numbers, and his program was radical. He insisted that all
private property be confiscated, “from the biggest machine to the tailor’s
needle, from the large tracts of land to the last inch of land.” 5 Because
of his interpretation of Marxism his followers were called the Narrows,
while Sakazov’s, with their less dogmatic views, were referred to as the
Broads.
The fortunes of the party and the two factions fluctuated from elec
tion to election. For example, there were six Socialists in the assembly in
1899 and eight in 1902. They were elected mainly with peasant votes.
After the formation of the Agrarian Union this support was lost so the
Socialists had no representatives between 1903 and 1912. In 1913, how
ever, twenty-one Broads and sixteen Narrows were elected, reflecting
the dissatisfaction of the voters with the defeat in the Balkan Wars rather
than the appeal of the socialist program.
5. Joseph Rothschild, The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Dmelopment, 1883-1936
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 25.
Despite their poor political showing the Socialists did lead in the labor
movement and the organization of strikes. In the 1890s there were
strikes among textile workers, printers, tobacco processors, and wood
workers, and there was a large railr.oad strike in 1907. In 1904 the Nar
rows organized the General Workers Trade Union Federation and the
Broads countered with their own Free Trade Union Federation. By
1914 these organizations together had less than ten thousand members,
the majority of whom were teachers, civil servants, and others in that cat
egory, and not industrial workers. Despite these limitations the basis for
a future strong Socialist movement had been laid.
The Social Democratic Party in Serbia was organized in 1903. In 1905
it had 300 members, and by 1911 it had grown to 2,889. As in Romania
and Bulgaria, unions were formed and strikes were organized. One of
the longest occurred in the Cukarica sugar factory in Belgrade in 1907.
In Greece socialist parties were not organized until after the First World
War, but worker’s organizations were formed in the 1880s and strikes
held. Prior to 1910 many of these unions had representatives of the em
ployers; in that year a law forbade this, and the workers’ position was
improved.
The strikes and political agitation in the Balkan cities for an improve
ment in the miserable working and living conditions served to emphasize
the fact that national liberation, that is, the establishment of indepen
dent and autonomous governments, had not in fact been accompanied
by a rise in the condition of the majority of the population. This situa
tion, of course, was the result of general economic as well as political cir
cumstances. Improvements in life had come to the minority of the popu
lation—to the landowners, the merchants, the industrialists, the
bureaucrats, the army officers, and the professional classes, who usually
lived in the cities and adopted Western European manners and customs.
In the period before 1914 the governments attempted to pass social
legislation aiding the peasants and workers. They accepted the principle
that the state should intervene to protect the mass of the population.
The main focus in national life, however, was not in this direction. In the
twentieth century, as before, the leaders continued to emphasize foreign
affairs, each state concentrating on the acquisition of lands still under
foreign control. The real financial support went to the army. These ef
forts were not in vain; the opportunity to act was soon to arise. Although
the great powers during the nineteenth century had been usually able to
restrain the national controversies and maintain something like a bal
ance on the peninsula, these controls broke down for the decade from
1912 to 1922. In these years the Balkan nations were involved in a con
tinuous period of war or in postwar conditions that were equally peril
ous. The prizes at stake were primarily lands still under Ottoman con-
trol, but also the territories in the Habsburg Empire inhabited by South
Slavs and Romanians. The first decade of the twentieth century was to
see the beginning of the expulsion of Ottoman rule from the peninsula,
with the exception of the city of Constantinople and its hinterland; the
second was to witness the completion of that process and the dissolution
of the Dual Monarchy.
CHAPTER 13
The Expulsion of the Ottoman Empire

from Europe
A fter 1878, despite severe losses, the Ottoman Empire still held exten
sive lands. Direct control was exercised over Macedonian and Albanian
territories. Although the Habsburg Empire controlled Bosnia-Her-
cegovina and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, that state was in theory only
“administering” the areas, which were under Ottoman suzerainty. In the
next years the situation remained much as before. The Porte was deter
mined not to surrender its possessions; the Balkan states were equally set
on their partition. Moreover, the Habsburg desire eventually to annex
Bosnia-Hercegovina was shown in subsequent negotiations which were
carried on between the partners of the Three Emperors’ Alliance. Until
1914 the peninsula remained a major center of conflict between both the
Balkan states and tne powers. The great prize to be won was Macedonia.
T he Macedonian Q uestion
Macedonia is generally defined as the area that is bounded on the
north by the Sar Mountains, on the east by the Rhodope Mountains, on
the south by the Aegean Sea, Mt. Olympus, and the Pindus Range, and
on the west by Lake Ohrid. The region includes the Vardar and Struma
rivers and the cities of Thessaloniki (Salonika, Solun), Kastoria, Fiorina,
Serres, Petrich, Skopje (Üsküb), Ohrid, and Bitola (Monastir). In the
nineteenth century this region was not prosperous. Its main crops were
cereal, tobacco, and opium poppies; livestock, mainly sheep, were also
raised. The population of less than two million within a 25,000 square-
mile area was divided into nine distinct groups: Turks, Bulgars, Greeks,
Serbs, Macedonians, Albanians, Vlachs or Kutzo-Vlachs, Jews, and Gyp
sies. Since the population was intermixed, a clear line could not be
drawn separating the nationalities. The cities usually had strong Turk-
207
ish, Greek and Jewish elements. In the villages and rural areas different
nationalities existed side by side. N or was it possible to determine accu
rately the precise numerical strength of any of the groups. Census re
ports were almost meaningless because the results usually reflected the
interest of the census-taker. There were school, language, and religious
censuses, but any of these could be misleading. For example, it is known
that the Slavic peoples of Orthodox faith attended Greek churches when
a Slavic service was not available. Serbs and Bulgars also went to each
other’s churches if the only other alternative was a Greek service. In
other words, expediency and politics as well as nationality could deter
mine church membership.
When the struggle over Macedonia became more heated after the
Congress of Berlin, anthropologists, linguists, and physiologists from
the Balkan countries all used their specialty to claim the area for their
own particular nationality. The Bulgarians used linguistic arguments to
demonstrate that the Macedonian Slavs were indeed their brothers. Ser
bian linguists countered with claims of the closeness of their grammar to
the language spoken in the area. Serbian anthropologists argued that
their slava festival, found also among the Macedonians, made them
Serbs. The Greeks sought to demonstrate that anyone in Macedonia
under the authority of the ecumenical patriarch was Greek. Thus, each
nation used every conceivable argument to back its claims, and each
could be effectively challenged.
The real significance of the region, the geographic-strategic, involved
both the Balkan states and the great powers. Bulgaria, Greece, and Ser
bia all wished to acquire Macedonia or a major portion of it for three
main reasons. First, it would enlarge the state and incorporate more na
tionals within it. Second, the acquisition of the Vardar and Struma river
valleys and the railroads through them would have great economic ad
vantages. Third, and perhaps most significant, whoever controlled Mac
edonia would be the strongest power on the peninsula. For the great
powers this last concern was certainly the most important. They also
recognized that possession of Macedonia gave the owner a strong stra
tegic outpost in relation to Constantinople and the Turkish Straits. Brit
ain had violently opposed the creation of San Stefano Bulgaria, a state
that would have been under Russian control, because of these military
considerations. Austria-Hungary shared Britain’s concern, but the
monarchy had an additional reason. She was interested in developing
economic links with Thessaloniki and in extending her influence south
ward toward the Aegean.
Until the creation of the Bulgarian exarchate in 1870 the influence of
Greece was paramount. She had assets that at first seemed unassailable.
Certainly Philhellene sentiment in the first part of the century assured
her important European support. Many Europeans sincerely believed in
The Expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from Europe 209
the Greek nationality of the area. Travelers stayed in towns and cities
where there was indeed a large Greek population; the inns were almost
always run by Greeks. Moreover, the ecumenical partriarchate, as we
have seen, did serve to strengthen Greek national interests throughout
the Balkans. In Macedonia it strongly resisted any challenge by the Bul
garians and the Serbs. Before 1870 even Russia was not ready to under
mine the patriarch’s authority in the interest of the other Balkan peo
ples. The Greek church also controlled the education available in the
area. Many non-Greeks who attended Greek schools learned the lan
guage and simply passed over into the Greek cultural sphere. They were
then willing to accept Greek political control.
Against these advantages Greece had liabilities. For most of the nine
teenth century attention had to be directed first to the acquisition of
Thessaly and Epirus, lands that separated the kingdom from Mace
donia. Thereafter, the Cretan problem absorbed much Greek energy.
Any Greek attempt to expand was also bound to meet with British disap
proval since that empire usually favored the maintenance of Ottoman
rule. With the British fleet predominant in the Mediterranean, Greece
could not move northward without danger. In addition, as the century
progressed, the Greek position weakened. The creation of the Bulgarian
exarchate was a real blow. Because of this erosion of its strength, toward
the end of the century the Greek government came to stand more for
the preservation of the status quo until a situation arose that would allow
it to advance. Ottoman sovereignty was certainly preferred to either Bul
garian or Serbian possession of Macedonia.
Unlike Greece, the position of Bulgaria improved with the years. In
the Treaty of San Stefano that state had received what it considered its
ideal boundaries. Even though these were lost, hope of their eventual at
tainment remained high. In this period, therefore, the Bulgarian gov
ernment wished to precipitate an immediate solution to the problem. As
we have seen, at first Russia supported the Bulgarian position. When
that aid was lost, Britain and Austria-Hungary became more sympa
thetic toward Bulgarian aspirations. Along with this strong outside assis
tance, the exarchate also proved a useful means of extending Bulgarian
influence. If two-thirds of the inhabitants of any district expressed a
desire to join the exarchate, they could do so. It was relatively easy to
convince the Slavic people of the region that they should choose the
“Slavic” exarchate rather than the “Greek” patriarchate. The Ottoman
government usually aided in these endeavors.
Notwithstanding these favorable aspects, Bulgaria had numerous
problems to face. Most serious was the fact that after San Stefano both
the Greeks and the Serbs saw Bulgaria, backed by Russia, as their chief
adversary. With their vital interests threatened, both states mobilized
their educational, religious, and political resources. Romania also joined
with tftfem at the turn of the century. In addition, although Bulgaria was
at times aided by the great powers, this assistance was never certain. The
Balkan policy of all of the great states was determined by their world in
terests which could and did shift frequently.
O f the three powers Serbia was in the weakest position. In fact her ini
tial task was simply to convince the great powers that she did indeed
have a rightful claim in the area. The Greek and Bulgarian interests
were recognized, but not those of Belgrade. In the 1880s the Serbian
disadvantages seemed many. First, since 1804 Serbia had sought to ex
pand principally in the west, toward Bosnia, Hercegovina, and the
Adriatic. In addition, she was concerned about the Serbs to the north, in
Srem, Backa, and the Banat of the Vojvodina. The shift to an emphasis
on the south, which occurred principally after the Habsburg monarchy
occupied Bosnia-Hercegovina and thus made the provinces for the time
unattainable, was not easy to make. Second, the Serbian government did
not have religious institutions comparable to the exarchate and the patri
archate. Nor did it, of course, enjoy the support of Russia until the acces
sion of Peter Karadjordjevic, a patronage that might have offset some of
the advantages of its rivals. Third, the Obrenovic dynasty and the Habs-
burg alliance of 1881 were an impossible basis for a strong and aggres
sive national policy. Milan and Alexander were not rulers who could
rally their people behind them. Although the monarchy did give some
assistance at the Congress of Berlin, it was unlikely that this state would
allow a real strengthening of Serbia in view of the South Slav problem
within its own state.
In addition to Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia, Romania also put for
ward claims to Macedonia. In this heterogeneous population there were
a large number of Vlachs who were mainly traders and shepherds. Re
lated to the Romanians, their exact numbers are not known. Despite the
weakness of the relationship, by 1900 the Romanian government was
subsidizing Vlach schools and by 1912 it is estimated that one million
francs had been spent for this purpose. In 1905 the sultan was per
suaded to recognize a Vlach millet separate from the ecumenical patri
arch. The Romanian intentions were clear; the state could make no real
istic claims to Macedonia or hope to annex any land there. The chief
purpose was to block Bulgaria and to make impossible the re-creation of
the San Stefano boundaries. It was also hoped that Romanian claims in
Macedonia could be used as a bargaining point to gain additional terri
tory in Dobrudja.
At this time also there was the beginning of a Slavic Macedonian na
tional movement. Its premise was that the Slavs in Macedonia were nei
ther Bulgars nor Serbs, but another distinct and separate branch of the
Slavic race with a unique national language. Initially overshadowed and
overwhelmed by the Bulgarian and Serbian forces, this idea was to ac
quire major importance only in the future and outside of the framework
of this narrative.
Although the struggle for Macedonia primarily involved the Christian
people, it must not be forgotten that the region had large numbers of
Muslims. Most of these were Turkish or Albanian, but some were Slavs
who had converted earlier. This population naturally strongly favored
the maintenance of Ottoman rule and looked to Abdul Hamid II for
protection. The Porte, in turn, made every effort to defend its position.
Despite the existence of other nationalities, the chief contestants re
mained the three neighboring states: Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia. In
the last two decades of the nineteenth century they entered into a regu
lar batde for predominance. Their weapons were the competing
churches, educational establishments and national societies. The ecclesi
astical warfare continued on previous lines. The Bulgars sought to gain
the approval of the sultan for more bishoprics; the Greeks worked
through the patriarchate to try to block the requests. The Serbs, too,
now sought a separate organization, but it was not until 1902 that they
were allowed a bishopric in Skopje. By the end of the century each na
tion had also established a large number of schools, which became in
struments of state policy. Primers, grammars, history books, and pro
paganda tracts were disseminated, each of which argued for one or
another national cause.
The organization of competing national societies, however, was to
cause the greatest difficulties. Although some were primarily cultural in
intent, others were dedicated to achieving a solution through violence.
The first, the Cyril and Methodius Society, was founded in 1884. Its pur
pose was to educate, indoctrinate, and convert the Slavs in Macedonia to
the Bulgarian cause. Two years later the Serbs responded with the cre
ation of the Society of St. Sava, named after their patron saint, with the
same goals to be achieved in behalf of Serbia. In 1894 the Greeks formed
the Ethnike Hetairia, which was also effective in Crete.
Although most of the societies were for cultural and propaganda pur
poses and did not participate in outrages, some did. The best known of
the extremist organizations were both Bulgarian. The Internal Mace
donian Revolutionary Organization, or IMRO, appeared in 1893. Its
purpose was to overthrow Ottoman rule and establish an autonomous
Macedonian state; hence its motto was Macedonia for the Macedonians.
Its sympathies were nevertheless Bulgarian. Its rival was the Macedo
nian Supreme Committee, known both as the Supremists and the Exter
nal Organization. It was located in Sofia and its membership came
chiefly from refugees from Macedonia. It enjoyed the support, although
not openly, of the Bulgarian government. Its goal was the annexation of
the area to Bulgaria. Whereas IMRO initially devoted its energies to the
preparation of a carefully planned uprising to be carried out in the fu
ture, the Supremists did not hesitate to send raiding parties into Mace
donia to terrorize villages or even to assassinate Turks with the hope that
reprisals would force the population to revolt.
The Greeks and Serbs responded with their own acts of violence and
terror. The diplomatic reports of European consular officials and corre
spondents attest to the atrocities committed by all sides. Not only did the
local population suffer from the action of their more fanatical members,
but the Ottoman authorities also were caught in a dilemma. They were
responsible for maintaining order, yet if they acted to apprehend and
punish the guilty, they could find themselves pillored in the European
press as barbaric and oppressive even when the charges were not de
served.
Both the governments of the Balkan States and the great powers rec
ognized that the danger in these disturbances was that they might force
another major crisis in international affairs such as that of 1875-78. All
conducted negotiations on the question. In 1892-93 Serbia and Greece
attempted to reconcile their differences at the expense of the Bulgar
ians, but they could not agree on spheres of influence. In 1897 the
Macedonian problem was an important part of the Cretan crisis and the
Greek-Turkish War. The most significant discussions, however, were
those conducted between Franz Joseph and Nicholas II in April, 1897.
Since neither wished a Balkan upheaval at this time, the two powers
reached an understanding of far-reaching significance. Once again the
rulers of Russia and the Habsburg monarchy agreed upon the partition
of Turkish lands. In these negotiations the annexation of Bosnia, Her
cegovina, and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar by the Habsburg Empire was
foreseen, as was the eventual creation of an independent Albania. The
remainder of the Ottoman territory in Europe was to be divided equita
bly between the Balkan states. This decision signified that Serbian claims
would also be taken into account. These plans were not, however, to be
implemented until the distant future. Both governments were deter
mined that for the present the Balkan governments should be kept from
bringing about a European crisis or upsetting the status quo.
Notwithstanding the intentions of the great powers, the Bulgars,
Greeks, and Serbs intensified rather than curtailed their activities. The
height of these endeavors was reached in August, 1903, when IMRO
precipitated the Ilinden Uprising. Its goal was to seize the vilayet of
Monastir as the prelude to the complete liberation of Macedonia from
Ottoman control. It was another of the scores of ill-conceived and poorly
prepared revolts that had plagued the Balkans in the nineteenth cen
tury. The Ottoman forces responded with unusual vigor. It is estimated
that about nine thousand homes were destroyed.
While this event was unsuccessful in its wider aims, it did force Russian
and Habsburg intervention. In 1903 Franz Joseph and Nicholas met at
Mürzsteg and sponsored a new program of reform. The Ottoman gen
darmerie in Macedonia was now to be placed under the control of
foreign officers, and the victims of the Ilinden Uprising were to receive
financial compensation for their losses. The impossible task of defining
ethnic boundaries in the region .was also attempted. In 1905 the Porte
accepted the international supervision of the collection of taxes. In the
next years further reform proposals were offered by the powers. In
1908, however, the Macedonian question was temporarily over
shadowed by more dramatic events in Constantinople. In that year a rev
olution occurred, which was again to bring into question the status of all
of the sultan’s domains.
T he Young T urk Revolution
Not only was the Ottoman government faced with Christian rebellion,
but dissatisfaction was again growing within the Muslim society. Al
though Abdul Hamid II ruled autocratically, he did believe in reform.
During his reign elementary and secondary education was expanded,
medical schools were founded, and the University of Istanbul es
tablished. The army was gready improved. Means of communication,
such as railroads and telegraphs, were expanded. Keenly aware of the
losses that his empire had suffered previously, the sultan was convinced
that the cause had been primarily the political and economic exploitation
by the European powers. Adopting an antiwestern attitude, he sought to
strengthen his position by emphasizing his role as caliph, that is as the
temporal and spiritual head of the Islamic faith, and by attempting to
unite the 300 million Muslims of the world against these alien influences.
His actions were popular with his religious leaders and with many of his
Turkish Muslim subjects, but among the intellectuals and many in the
military there was a rising sense of frustration and dissatisfaction. These
men shared the sultan’s alarm about the condition of the empire, but
they did not believe that autocratic rule was the answer.
Three basic concepts were advanced as means by which the empire
could be revived and saved. The first was Pan-Islamism, which Abdul
Hamid favored. A state based on the unity of the Muslims would, how
ever, presuppose the abandonment of the Christian Balkan lands. The
second program, Ottomanism, has been discussed before. This plan
favored the attempt to create a common citizenship, which would em
brace Muslims and Christians alike. It ran directly counter to the nation
alist movements not only among the Christians, but also among the
Arabs. The third idea, Pan-Turanianism, or the unity of the Turkic peo
ple including those in Russia, more closely resembled contemporary na
tional concepts elsewhere. Its obvious weakness lay in the disproportion
between the Ottoman and Russian military power.
These proposals together with the practical problems of the Ottoman
state had been analyzed, debated, and discussed in the empire for three
decades before 1908. Those who were most outspoken in their demand
for a change in the political structure of the state were exiled to remote
provinces of the empire. The more fortunate fled to Europe, principally
to Switzerland and France. There they published newspapers and held
meetings. Most of these men supported the restoration of the constitu
tion of 1876. They emphasized the need to assure the equality of all Ot
toman subjects, and they stressed the preservation of the empire. Links
were also established with the Ottoman army, in particular with the
Third Army Corps, whose headquarters were in Thessaloniki in Mace
donia.
The army officers were practical and realistic in their outlook.
Alarmed by the continuing decline of the empire, they were determined
to restore its strength and prestige. At the same time they were disturbed
by conditions in Macedonia. They were bitter that the government could
not control the Bulgarian insurgents, and they resented the fact that Eu
ropean officers were in charge of the gendarmerie after the Mürzsteg
reforms. Many were angry because they were not being paid regularly.
By 1908 some had joined secret cells where plans for the future were dis
cussed. Their leaders were also in touch with their compatriots living
abroad. These people formed the most important part of the mem
bership of the Committee of Union and Progress (C. U. P.) which had
been formed in the 1890s. By 1908 it is estimated that this organization
had over fifteen thousand members. The goal became the restoration of
the constitution of 1876 and the removal of Abdul Hamid, but not of the
royal dynasty.
Through his secret service the sultan learned of the conspiracies, but
he did not appreciate the strength of the movement. When he began to
investigate, spontaneous revolts erupted throughout the Third Army
Corps area in June and July, 1908. The loyal troops could not suppress
an uprising led by army officers. On July 23 the Committee of Union
and Progress demanded that Abdul Hamid restore the constitution. The
next day he capitulated to the demands of his best military unit, the
Third Army Corps.
The Committee of Union and Progress had as its motto Liberty, Jus
tice, Equality, and Fraternity. Jubilant in their victory and fervent in
their belief that they could save the empire, the rebel leaders placed
their faith in the constitution and in the appeal of their promise of equal
ity to all citizens. They could not proceed with the removal of the sultan
because the soldiers who supported them revered the ruler as the
“sultan-caliph” despite the desire for constitutional government. The
country then prepared for elections for an assembly.
On October 5 and 6 the revolutionary movement suffered a severe
blow. In a coordinated move first Bulgaria proclaimed her indepen
dence and then the Habsburg Empire announced the annexation of
Bosnia-Hercegovina. The actions did immense harm to the Young Turk
movement. Its leaders had come to power determined to save the em
pire, but within less than three months they had lost important Euro
pean territories. The crisis also gave courage to the conservative ele
ments. In April, 1909, they were able to stage a brief counterrevolution.
Although the army quickly crushed the revolt and proceeded with the
deposition of Abdul Hamid, with the concurrence of the Sheik-ul-Islam,
the highest religious authority of the empire, it was obvious that the new
government would continue to face serious opposition. Moreover, the
Austrian and Bulgarian actions had caused an international crisis and
reopened the eastern question. The consequences could further endan
ger Ottoman interests.
T he B osnian Crisis
Under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, it will be remembered, Bos
nia and Hercegovina, despite the Habsburg occupation, remained an in
tegral part of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore the assembly that was
called to convene in Constantinople by the Young Turk regime was to
include representatives from this region as well as from autonomous
Bulgaria. Naturally neither the Habsburg nor the Bulgarian govern
ments could allow this development. Prince Ferdinand had long deter
mined that he would proclaim Bulgarian independence when possible.
The Habsburg monarchy saw the control of Bosnia-Hercegovina as ab
solutely essential, particularly after the accession of King Peter Karad-
jordjevic, which placed a pro-Russian regime in power in Belgrade. Not
only did the control of the provinces provide a military-strategic hin
terland to Dalmatia, but the spread of Serbian influence could be better
curbed. The monarchy had also devoted considerable attention to the
area and had contributed to its material prosperity.
Preparations for the Habsburg annexation were made not only in co
operation with Bulgaria, but also with Russia. In September the Austrian
foreign minister, Alois von Aehrenthal, met with the Russian minister,
A. P. Isvolsky, in Buchlau in Moravia. No official record was kept of the
meeting, about which there was considerable controversy later, but it can
be assumed that the Habsburg desire to annex the provinces was ac
cepted. In return, Aehrenthal agreed to support the Russian plan for a
change in the Straits setdement, which would open the waterway exclu
sively to the warships of the Black Sea states. Later disagreement arose
on the question of timing. Isvolsky evidently expected that the monarchy
would not act at once. Instead, he read in the newspapers on his way to
Paris of both the annexation and the Bulgarian declaration of indepen
dence.
An immediate diplomatic crisis followed. The most violent reaction
came from Belgrade. Despite the Habsburg occupation, nationalist

Serbs had still numbered Bosnia and Hercegovina among their ir
redenta. So long as the provinces were technically still under the
sovereignty of the weak Ottoman Empire, there was hope that sometime
they would join with Serbia. As an integral part of the strong Dual Mon
archy, they now seemed lost. The Serbian press and some of the political
leaders urged that a defiant attitude be maintained and that the Habs-
burg action not be accepted. There was also hope of Russian assistance.
For five months Serbia remained adamant. The government was forced
to yield only when the Russians accepted the annexation after receiving
a virtual ultimatum from Berlin.
The immediate questions, that is, the annexation and the establish
ment of Bulgarian independence, were settled finally on the basis of ne
gotiations between Constantinople, Sofia, and Vienna. In return for its
acceptance of the changes, the Porte received an indemnity and the re
turn of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar to its full control. For the Balkan states
and the European powers the main significance of the crisis was that it
ended the period of cooperation between the monarchy and Russia
which had commenced in 1897. The results of this incident were deeply
humilitating for both Serbia and Russia. With strong German support
the Habsburg Empire had forced the Russian government to retreat.
Russia’s goal became to reverse this situation and to organize the Balkan
states in a front against the monarchy. The nations were to prove willing,
but they wished to set their own diplomatic objectives.
T he B alkan Wars: 1912, 1913
The Balkan League, which was to initiate the conflict aimed at ex
pelling the Ottoman Empire from Europe, was formed under the initial
prodding of Russia. After the Bosnian debacle the Russian government
again gave its Balkan policy priority. In October, 1909, an agreement
was made at Racconigi with Italy, signifying that these two powers would
cooperate on Balkan affairs. In 1911 Italy launched a war against the Ot
toman Empire to seize Tripoli. The Ottoman defeat in this conflict and
the continuation of internal unrest in the empire, as well as the general
international situation, encouraged the Balkan states to hope that Mace
donia would soon be partitioned.
Bulgaria and Serbia were the first states to start negotiations. Between
1904-7 the two nations had developed closer cultural, economic, and
even political ties. In the discussions after the Bosnian crisis each had en
tirely different objectives. The Bulgarian government wished any agree
ment to be directed primarily against the Porte and to have as its chief
aim the establishment of an autonomous Macedonia, which would later,
it was assumed, either voluntarily join or be annexed to Bulgaria. Serbia,
in contrast, rejected the idea of autonomy and asked for a partition
agreement. Considering itself primarily endangered by the Habsburg
government, the Serbian government wanted any pact to cover also an
attack on its territories from the north. Finally, on March 13, 1912, an al
liance of mutual defense was signed. It was agreed, in addition, that both
powers would take common action against any state that threatened to
seize Ottoman lands. The core of the pact, however, was the secret
annex in which concrete arrangements were made for the partition of
Macedonia.
The secret clauses stated that in the division of the region the lands
north of the Sar Mountains would fall to Serbia, whereas those east of
the Struma River and the Rhodope Mountains would become Bulgarian.
This understanding left the overwhelming bulk of the Macedonian terri
tory unallocated. In this unassigned area, nevertheless, the Serbian gov
ernment agreed that its maximum claims would only extend to a line
running roughly from Kriva Palanka near the Bulgarian frontier in
northeastern Macedonia, then southwest, north of the city of Veles, and
ending just north of Ohrid. Should the two allies not be able to agree,
the disposition of this contested territory, that is, the area between the
Sar Mountains to the north and Kriva Palanka-Veles-Ohrid line to the
south, would be made by the tsar, whose decision both parties promised
to accept. In other words, the maximum Serbian demands at this time
represented at most about a third of Macedonian lands inhabited by
Slavs. The remainder would thus be divided between Bulgaria and
Greece. It should be noted that it was the question of the control of pre
cisely this area that was to become the center of the Serbo-Bulgarian
dispute which led to the Second Balkan War. This agreement was fol
lowed by a military accord in which Bulgaria agreed to provide 200,000
troops and Serbia 150,000. Of these each was to send 100,000 to the
Vardar, i.e., Mâcedonian, front.
The next understanding was between Bulgaria and Greece. In the
previous years relations had gradually improved. In 1911-12 there was
more cooperation between the exarchate and the patriarchate, the mu
tual acts of terror in Macedonia abated, and some students were
exchanged. The common enemy was now the Ottoman Empire. Unlike
the previous treaty, the Greek-Bulgarian agreement was a simple defen
sive alliance. The Bulgarian government was not able to obtain Greek
approval of an autonomous Macedonia, and both states wanted Thessa
loniki. With rival claims that could not be compromised, the states signed
a document that did not contain the word Macedonia.
The final agreements were made by Serbia and Bulgaria with Mon
tenegro. Their aim was simply to prepare the stage so that small country
could start a conflict with the Porte. The other Balkan states would then
be able to join in on an assault on Ottoman territories.
These negotiations extended well over a year. It soon became appar-
ent to the Russian government that its interest in the Balkan League,
that is, that it block Austria-Hungary, had now become a secondary issue
for the Balkan states. In addition, the territorial provisions, which in
cluded a Bulgarian claim to Adrianople, a city close to Constantinople
and the Straits, caused real concern in St. Petersburg. Russia was at the
time in no position to face a crisis in which the fate of that area would
come before the great powers. Therefore, in cooperation with other Eu
ropean states, the Russian government now tried to pacify the Balkan
nations by proposing a new reform program for the Ottoman Empire.
On October 8, 1912, Russia and Austria-Hungary, the two adversaries,
cooperated to warn the Balkan states in behalf of the powers that modifi
cations in the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire would not be
recognized. It was, however, too late. On that same day Montenegro had
commenced hostilities, to be enthusiastically joined by her allies.
The military operations progressed relatively smoothly. While the
Greek navy prevented the Ottoman army from receiving reinforce
ments, the combined allied armies of over 700,000 men attacked the
320,000 Ottoman defenders. The main Bulgarian thrust was toward
Constantinople, whose outskirts were quickly reached. With the aid of
some Serbian forces the Bulgarian army laid siege to Adrianople. Al
though the Bulgars raced to Thessaloniki, they found that the Greeks
had occupied this prize the previous day, November 8. Meanwhile, Ser
bian troops advanced far beyond their assigned sphere of influence and
took Prilep, Bitola, and Ohrid, cities south of the Kriva Palanka-Veles-
Ohrid line.
The hostilities involved more than the Macedonian lands. After its ex
periences in the Pig War the Serbian government was determined to
acquire an outlet to the sea. The best port available was Dürres
(Durazzo) in northern Albania. Although the territory was Albanian, the
Serbs justified their claim on strategic and economic grounds. Other Al
banian lands were also the objective of the Balkan allies. Serbian and
Montenegrin forces besieged the city of Shkodër (Scutari); the Greeks
attacked Janina. These actions again brought the fate of the Albanian
population of the peninsula to the attention of the great powers.
The military successes of the Balkan states meant that at the beginning
of 1913 the Ottoman Empire in Europe had been reduced essentially to
the four besieged cities of Constantinople and Adrianople in the east
and Shkodër and Janina in the west. At this point the great powers inter
vened to halt the hostilides. In May, 1913, they imposed the Treaty of
London, which set the Enos-Media line as the boundary of the Ottoman
Empire, thus excluding Adrianople and leaving Constantinople with
only a small hinterland. Crete was finally assigned to Greece. The great
problem of the disposition of Macedonia, Albania, and the Aegean Is
lands remained, but it was now clear that the great powers rather than
the Balkan allies would determine the final fate of these territories.
The Macedonian issue was tied direcdy with the Albanian. Both Aus
tria-Hungary and Italy were determined to exclude Serbia from the
Adriatic. The establishment of an independent Albania would ac
complish this purpose. In addition, Italy was interested in such a state as
her sphere of influence in the Balkans. After Italy was unified she, too,
began to vie with the Habsburg Empire and Russia for a share in the po
litical domination of the peninsula. The strong support of Italy and the
Dual Monarchy assured that an Albania would come into existence. This
decision, of course, affected the setdement drawn up between the Bal
kan states. Thus, Serbia in the north and Greece, with her claims to
southern Albania,1were thwarted in their plans to annex Albanian terri
tories. Both demanded compensation elsewhere.
For the Serbian government the only alternate lands were those origi
1. It should be mentioned that in Greek terminology Epirus indudes a large part of
present-day southern Albania, an area referred to in much Greek writing as northern
Epirus.
nally assigned to Bulgaria. Arguing that the outlet to the Adriatic had
been denied and that Serbian troops had carried the main weight of the
fighting in Macedonia, Serbia now demanded that her share of Mace
donia extend beyond the Kriva Palanka-Veles-Ohrid line. The question
was not whether the inhabitants were Serbian or Bulgarian; some Ser
bian scholars referred to them as Macedo-Slavs. The question was rather
of the balance of power among the Balkan states. Bulgaria had now ex
tended her control to the shores of the Aegean; this, along with the
Macedonian territory assigned to her, would make her the predominant
power in the peninsula. The Greek government, which did not like the
presence of Bulgarian forces just a few miles north of Thessaloniki,
shared the Serbian apprehensions about this situation. The Serbian gov
ernment refused to yield the lands in Macedonia that they had occupied
even though those lands extended beyond the previous maximum
claims. The Bulgarian position, in contrast, was that the terms of the
original treaty of alliance should be enforced.
As explained earlier, it was less difficult for the Serbian and Greek
governments to reach an agreement than for either to come to an under
standing with Bulgaria. Athens and Belgrade could simply divide Mace
donia, with Greece taking the southern and Serbia the northern part.
The Bulgarian interests stretched across the area to Albania, thus cut
ting across the lands claimed by the two other states. As relations between
the nations over the peace terms became strained, it was thus natural
that Greece and Serbia should cooperate. They now made a secret
agreement that they would seek a common frontier in Macedonia west
of the Vardar River. This division still left an eastern section for
Bulgaria. The two signatories further promised to aid each other if war
broke out. They were also able to gain the support of Montenegro and
even Romania, who had designs on the Dobrudjan territory in Bulgarian
hands. Discussions were further initiated with the Ottoman Empire.
Meanwhile, the Bulgarian civilian and military leaders were becoming
convinced that a solution by force might be necessary. The diplomatic
scene was also more complicated. Russia proposed that the tsar mediate
the differences between the Balkan states and invited the premiers of
Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece to St. Petersburg. The Bulgarian govern
ment agreed to take part only on the condition that arbitration be con
cluded within seven days, a step necessary to placate the army, which was
urging military action. This condition was interpreted in St. Petersburg
as an ultimatum and was categorically rejected. Thereafter Russian sup
port was given to Serbia. The Habsburg monarchy also attempted at this
time to disrupt the Balkan League through negotiations with Greece and
Romania. As a result of these discussions Bulgaria was left without allies
among the Balkan states and real supporters among the great powers.
Her adversaries, in contrast, had concluded firm mutual defense pacts
among themselves. Evidently, Sofia failed to understand the seriousness
of this predicament.
Convinced of its military superiority, the Bulgarian government, on
the night of June 29-30, 1913, mounted a surprise attack on Serbia and
Greece, thereby starting the Second Balkan War. Montenegro, Ro
mania, and the Ottoman Empire subsequently entered the conflict
against Sofia. Bulgaria did not have a chance against this combination;
on July 31 she signed an armistice.
The Treaty of Bucharest, concluded on August 10, settled the contest
over the division of the Albanian and Macedonian territories. The terms
were, as could be expected, extremely damaging to Bulgaria. Adriano-
ple and most of Eastern Thrace reverted to Ottoman control; Romania
took southern Dobrudja; Greece extended her border to about fifty
miles north of Thessaloniki and eastward beyond the port of Kavalla. In
the west Greece annexed Epirus including Janina. Serbia almost dou
bled her size with the acquisition of the major portion of Slavic Mace
donia, including areas that she had earlier agreed were not within her
maximum claims. The Sanjak of Novi Pazar was divided between Serbia
and Montenegro, giving the two states a common frontier. Bulgaria was
awarded only a small part of eastern Macedonia in the Struma valley, but
she did obtain an eighty-mile stretch along the Aegean coastline, includ
ing the port of Dedeagatch. The treaty also provided for an indepen
dent Albania.
The Treaty of Bucharest is of great significance for the Balkan states
because, with minor adjutments, the boundaries set at this time re
mained fixed. In addition, the agreement marked the expulsion of the
Ottoman Empire from Europe with, of course, the exception of the city
of Constantinople and a small section of Thrace. The Balkan Wars thus
brought about the final realization of the goal set by most of the Balkan
leaders throughout the nineteenth century. Until the last part of the cen
tury the chief objective of each government had been the acquisition of
lands occupied principally by members of their own nationality. In 1912
and 1913 these considerations proved secondary to concerns about
maintaining the balance of power on the peninsula, or to desires to ob
tain more territory for strategic or economic reasons. No state had been
in the least hesitant about claiming lands with Albanian inhabitants.
Each state hàd shown itself primarily interested in advancing its own in
terests rather than in protecting the national principle as such. Finally,
this period resulted in the appearance on the map of the last of Balkan
national states, Albania.
CHAPTER 14
The Establishment of Albania
T he Albanian national movement was unique in comparison with those

previously discussed in that the leaders, at least before 1912, did not
wish the Ottoman Empire dismembered, nor did they seek an indepen
dent state. Instead, they feared that should the empire fall their lands
would be divided among their neighbors. Autonomy within the Ot
toman state appeared to be the best guarantee of their national safety.
The Albanian attitude can perhaps be best understood when the com
plexity of the Albanians’ situation is considered. The Albanians were one
nationality and spoke dialects of the same language. They were, how
ever, divided into two main groups, the Gegs and the Tosks, and had
three religions: Muslim, Orthodox, and Catholic. The Gegs, comprising
the majority of the population, lived in the northern half of the country,
where those who lived in the mountains had a strong tribal organization,
were very conservative, and had little contact with the outside world.
The Tosks, in contrast, were concentrated in the south and had more
opportunities to associate with other peoples or to migrate. Most Tosks
were peasants, many of whom worked on estates for large landowners
who were generally Albanian.
After the Turkish conquest a majority of the population had accepted
the Muslim faith. In 1914, 70 percent of the population was of that
religion while 20 percent were Orthodox and 10 percent Catholic. The
Catholics, who lived predominantly in the northern coastal areas, had
contact with neighboring Italy and Austria-Hungary. The Orthodox,
concentrated in the south, naturally were more closely associated with
the patriarchate and were more under Greek cultural influence. The
Muslim majority held the strongest position in the country. Conversions
here had followed to some extent the pattern of those in Bosnia-Her-
cegovina. The landed aristocracy had accepted Islam to preserve their
political and economic position, but in Albania the peasantry also be
The Establishment of Albania 223
came Muslim. Most of the Muslim Gegs belonged to the conservative
Sunni sect, whereas the Tosks were both Sunni and Bektashi. The Sunni
stood strongly for the maintenance of Ottoman traditions, for loyalty to
the sultan, and they were less susceptible to ideas of political reform.
They preferred the established tribal rule and adherence to local cus
toms and laws. In the empire at least thirty of the grand vezirs had come
from these Muslim Albanians. Some of the finest and bravest Ottoman
soldiers were born in this region. Throughout the previous centuries the
Albanian population as a whole had been an element of strength in the
empire.
Despite the loyalty of the people, Albania had remained one of the
most backward areas of the empire. An improverished country whose
population supported itself by livestock raising and subsistence agricul
ture, its political system mirrored its state of development. The people
lived in remote communities under local leaders. Until late in the nine
teenth century the country lacked most of the bases for the development
of national self-consciousness which existed in the other states. Physical
communication within the country was extremely difficult; by 1912
there were only about 200 kilometers of paved roads. What schools ex
isted, except for the Catholic institutions in Shkodër, were taught in ei
ther Turkish or Greek. Here religion, which had been a strong unifying
force in the other Balkan countries, was a divisive element. The great
common bond was language, but it was not taught in the schools nor had
a standard alphabet been devised. Books in Albanian were almost non
existent.
Largely because of these negative considerations an Albanian national
movement did not make an appearance until 1878, and even then it
came about largely as a reaction to external threats. Before that time nei
ther the historical background of the area nor the fact that prominent
rebels of Albanian background had challenged Ottoman rule had pro
duced a national ideology or leadership. The ancestors of the people,
the ancient Illyrians, had settled in the Balkan peninsula before
the Slavs. Although Mohammed Ali of Egypt and Ali Pasha of Janina
were Albanians, both worked for their own power and not the interests
of their countrymen. After 1830 there had indeed been numerous in
stances of local revolts against Ottoman rule, but most of these were in
protest against high taxation, reforms in the army, or changes in the cen
tral administration. By and large the Albanians were satisfied with the
status quo and local autonomy. Their privileged position in the empire
outweighed the liabilities of membership in a rapidly weakening political
entity.
The Albanian leaders first sensed the growing danger to their position
when the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano were announced in March,
1878. Under the provisions of this agreement Greater Bulgaria included
parts of present-day eastern Albania, while Montenegro was awarded

lands in the north primarily inhabited by Albanians. National territories
were thus assigned to two Slavic Orthodox states, neither of whom could
be expected to deal leniently with Muslims. It was to save themselves
from their neighbors, not from the Ottoman government, that the Al
banians were forced to act. .
Protests were immediately organized against the treaty and commit
tees were formed throughout the land. The center of resistance became
Prizren, a city in the Kosovo region of present-day Yugoslavia. Here
northern Muslim conservative landlords and local notables, joined by
some representatives from the south, particularly Abdul Frashëri, the
driving nationalistic force of the time, met in June, 1878, and established
the League of Prizren, or the Albanian League. The goal was simply to
defend the integrity of the Albanian lands. It was decided that commit
tees would be set up in other cities, most notably in Shkodër, to counter
Montenegrin encroachments. In addition, the Albanian leaders agreed
on two practical steps: first, that they would support the maintenance of
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire at the Congress of Berlin, and, sec
ond, that they would petition the sultan to unite the four vilayets of
Janina, Monastir, Üskub, and Shkodër and to grant this area autonomy.
In other words, they wished to unite the Albanian population in one po
litical and administrative unit.
At the Congress of Berlin the Albanian lands were left largely intact,
principally because of the conflict of the great powers and not because of
the Albanian protests. Greater Bulgaria was divided, and the Albanian
sections returned to Ottoman control. In response to their demands for
Epirus, including Janina, the Greeks received only a small section. Some
territory claimed by the Albanians was given to Montenegro, but not all
that this small nation desired. The Albanian actions at this time, which
were not limited to words but in some places involved fierce fighting,
also made the European states aware of the existence of these people
and their wish not to be partitioned by their neighbors.
Although the Albanians had cooperated with the Ottoman govern
ment in resisting the Bulgar, Greek, Montenegrin, and Serbian de
mands, the sultan refused to unite the four vilayets. The attainment of
this objective was, however, crucial for Albania’s national interests.
Moreover, Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin sanctioned administrative
changes in the region, although it indicated no specific direction. In
November, 1878, the southern Albanian leaders met in Frashër under
the direction of Abdul Frashëri and formally adopted the program of
the union of the vilayets. Subsequently, the northern Albanian organiza
tion accepted the principle of territorial unity and autonomy, but the
two groups could not agree on details of timing and implementation.
The radical faction believed that immediate steps should be taken to
achieve autonomy. The conservative group, led by the feudal begs, pre
ferred a moderate, cautious approach and were ready to cooperate with
the Ottoman authorities.
There followed much political maneuvering, but by 1880 the au
tonomist element in Prizren and Frashër was able to gain control of the
Albanian League. They were strongly opposed by the large landowners
who remained staunchly loyal to the sultan-caliph. In April, 1881, the
sultan ordered his army, under Dervish Pasha, to move against Prizren
and crush the autonomist movement. Despite this setback the previous
three years had produced significant achievements for the national
movement. First, many Albanian leaders had come to recognize that the
Ottoman Empire was near collapse and that they had to plan for the fu
ture. Second, the initial steps had been taken to affect a common policy
in both the north and the south, areas that hitherto had not been in com
munication. Third, and most important, the spirit and basic program of
the Albanian League had been accepted by the various factions who now
differed chiefly on how the common aims should be achieved. The first
concrete moves towards the creation of an Albanian state had thus been
taken.
As elsewhere, the Albanian national movement was accompanied by a
period of cultural awakening. With the lack of a common religion or
geographic center, language remained the main bond between the peo
ple. There was not, however, any standard literary language, nor was
there common agreement on the alphabet. In the mid-nineteenth cen
tury the area had attracted the interest of foreign scholars, most notably
F. Bopp, who first affirmed that Albanian was an Indo-European lan
guage, and the Austrian J. G. von Hahn, generally regarded as the fa
ther of Albanology, who produced a grammar, a vocabulary, and a col
lection of folklofe. By the end of the century it was established that “the
Albanians were descendants of a great and ancient Indo-European peo
ple in the Balkans.” 1 This heritage played the same role in boosting na
tional pride among Albanian intellectuals as did the similar links to the
classical past among the Greeks and Romanians. Subsequently, the study
of Albanian history, language, and folklore became popular, particularly
among the Albanians in Italy.
A major aid to the literary movement occurred in 1879 with the
founding of the Society for the Printing of Albanian Writings in Con
stantinople. The goal of the organization was to establish a standard lan
guage which would lead to the publication of books, journals, and news
papers to be used and understood by all. The translation of important
foreign works into Albanian was also an objective. The spirit of the orga
nization was well expressed in the preamble to its constitution: “All en-
1. Stavro Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912 (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 115.
lightened nations have been . . . civilized by writings in their own lan

guage. Every nation that does not write its own language and has no
works in it is in darkness and is barbarian. And the Albanians, not writ
ing their own language and having no [present] works in their own lan
guage, are in the same state.” 2
The question of a standard literary language involved not only the
question of the choice of a basic dialect, but also of a common alphabet.
At this time foreign and native scholars vied with one another to pro
duce a standard form. Usually, each preferred the alphabet employed in
the region of Albania with which he was most familiar. After much dis
cussion and controversy a congress was held in Bitola in November,
1908, where the Latin alphabet was adopted. There was much opposi
tion to this decision, particularly among the Muslims of the north who
still preferred the “script of the Koran.” Even the Young Turk regime
reacted strongly against the preference shown for the Latin alphabet. In
March, 1910, the Grand Vezir stated that: “The government considers
the desire to adopt the Latin characters [on the part of the Albanians] as
the first step to be detached from Turkey. . . . The government must do
everything, and will do everything, to prevent the adoption of the Latin
alphabet.” 3 Nevertheless, this form was accepted as standard. A com
mon literary language, however, was not adopted in this period.
Education also was a major problem. There were only a few Albanian
schools or institutions that taught Albanian. As in other Balkan countries
at the beginning of the century, the instruction available was ecclesias
tical—here Muslim, Orthodox, or Catholic. The schools that the Ot
toman government supported for the Muslim population were not only
religious in direction, but Turkish in language. The basic purpose was to
unite the Muslim people against their Christian neighbors and to make
them loyal subjects of the Ottoman state. The Orthodox schools had
other objectives. They were Greek in language and thus vehicles of Hel-
lenization. Both the Ottoman government and the patriarchate opposed
the establishment of secular Albanian schools. The Ottoman officials saw
them as the basis for future claims for autonomy or independence. The
patriarchate, after the recent bitter experience with the Bulgarian ex
archate, feared that they would be the prelude for the demand for a sep
arate Albanian Orthodox church.
In contrast to the Muslim and Orthodox establishments the Catholic
schools were conducted in the native language. The Habsburg govern
ment had certain privileges in the empire, one of which was to maintain
Catholic schools and churches. The Franciscans and Jesuits played a
prominent role in their development. Italian Catholics also had their in
2. Ibid., p. 120.
3. Ibid., pp. 387-88.
stitutions. Both the Habsburg and Italian schools naturally had political
as well as religious aims. Like the Ottoman government and the Greek
patriarchate, the two Catholic nations used their educational weapons to
advance their causes and to counteract Slavic influences.
Under these conditions there was an obvious need for secular schools
under Albanian control. Some were, in fact, run secretly in defiance of
Ottoman and Orthodox disapproval. Others were opened when influen
tial Albanians gained the assent of sympathetic local Ottoman adminis
trators. Thus, the first Albanian boys’ school was opened in Korçë
(Koritsa) in 1885, followed by an institution for girls in 1891. These and
similar schools functioned only a short time before Constantinople or
dered them closed. The situation remained difficult in view of the con
tinued opposition from the chief civil and ecclesiastical authorities. The
Greek Orthodox church excommunicated students who attended the
new schools. The Ottoman government became if anything more severe
in its restrictions on Albanian education. In 1902, for instance, it was for
bidden to possess books in Albanian and to use the language in corre
spondence. A change for the better did not occur until after the Young
Turk Revolution. This new regime did approve at first the teaching of
the language in primary and secondary schools and the opening of new
institutions.
The educational activity described above was enthusiastically sup
ported by the Albanians living in Italy, Egypt, Constantinople, Romania,
Bulgaria, and the United States. Although these groups differed on
plans and strategy, they were united in their desire to encourage the de
velopment of Albanian national feeling. These Albanian colonies pub
lished books, journals, and newspapers, and they championed the na
tional cause abroad. Ultimately, they were able to rally influential
segments of European public opinion behind Albanian interests.
For the Albanian nationalist these cultural activities were, of course,
not enough. Although quiet generally prevailed after the dissolution of
the Albanian League in 1881, there were sporadic outbreaks with na
tionalist overtones in the next years. The most serious situation occurred
in 1897 during the Cretan revolt when the Ottoman government used
Albanian troops against the Greeks. Once armed, the Albanian forces
naturally considered making political demands for themselves, and they
were reluctant to surrender their weapons at the end of the fighting.
More disturbances thus took place.
The Macedonian problem, however, caused the most difficulty. As
mentioned earlier, the Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian governments had
largely ignored the existence of the Albanians and Turks who in many
regions of Macedonia comprised an absolute ethnic majority. These two
people thus had a common interest in resisting the Christian Balkan
states, and the Porte sought to exploit this situation. Although usually
supporting Constantinople, the Albanian leaders were constantly aware

of their own interests. Thus, in the anarchical conditions prevailing in
the area in the decade before the Young Turk rebellion, Albanians
sometimes fought for the empire, but when conditions were favorable
they also came into conflict with the government over their objectives of
further autonomy. They did not, however, form a common front with
the Christian nationalities against Constantinople.
The success of the Young Turk Revolution aroused great hopes
among the Albanian nationalists. Many Albanians, including Ismail
Kemal, took an active part in the organization of the revolt, and Bitola
was one of its main centers. The Young Turk program, with its emphasis
on the re-establishment of the constitution of 1876, decentralization, the
rights of non-Turkish people and the opening of Albanian schools, was
naturally welcomed. National associations were quickly formed, and
twenty-six Albanians were elected to the Turkish parliament. The only
serious opposition to the new regime came from the northern Kosovo
area where the conservative beys remained loyal to the sultan and de
fended their historic rights and privileges. This favorable attitude
changed sharply when after the loss of Bulgaria and Bosnia-
Hercegovina the Young Turk regime reversed its former policy and in
stead attempted to impose a centralized, Turkish-national administra
tion. Albanian schools were closed, and national associations and news
papers were prohibited. The government also attempted to convey the
impression abroad that the Albanian people did not really want au
tonomy.
Both the nationalists and the conservative northerners strongly op
posed the new policies. The main center of resistance was the Kosovo
region where the inhabitants organized to protect their traditional rights
and privileges and to oppose the tax and military recruitment measures.
In March, 1910, the Porte dispatched a military force to the region. The
best indication of the bitterness that now developed between the Al
banians and the government is the fact that about ten thousand refugees
fled into Christian Slavic Montenegro, a state that had been heartily de
tested in the past. The fighting was strongest in the north, but there was
also resistance in the south. The aim of the Albanians remained the
achievement of autonomy within the empire. When it became evident
that the movement could not be suppressed by force, the Young Turk
government once again changed direction. In March, 1911, it was de
cided that Albanian schools could reopen and the Latin alphabet was ac
cepted. The government, however, insisted that the Koran be studied in
Arabic script as decreed in 1869. Thus, after three decades of effort the
Albanians finally had their own schools and the right to use their lan
guage. Although the north and south had acted together against Con
stantinople to achieve certain limited goals, they had not agreed on a
common national policy nor had they chosen a mutually acceptable
leader.
The final resolution of the Albanian question came as a result of the
long period of warfare which began for the Ottoman Empire in 1911. In
September of that year the war with Italy comrrienced and the Balkan
states opened negotiations toward the formation of the Balkan League.
To consolidate their internal position and to meet the threat from
abroad better, the Young Turk regime held new elections for the Ot
toman parliament and won 215 of the 222 seats. This vote, clearly the
product of fraud and intimidation, precipitated the conclusive break be
tween the Young Turks and their Albanian supporters. By August,
1912, the entire country was in open revolt. Despite the fact that they
soon gained military control, the Albanian leaders remained divided on
their ultimate objectives. Some preferred to seek the restoration of
Abdul Hamid II and the prerevolutionary regime; others wished to have
the stipulations of the constitution of 1876 enforced. The majority, how
ever, continued to pursue the elusive goal of autonomy, including the
specific conditions of a union of the four vilayets, the creation of a sepa
rate national administration, control of local taxes and expenditures, the
official use of the Albanian language, and the right of the populace to
remain armed. In September, 1912, Constantinople accepted the basic
demands, but before all of the issues could be resolved, the First Balkan
War broke out in October. With this event all of the rival factions in Al
bania realized that the very survival of the nation was at stake. The
danger now existed that the lands would be partitioned by their Slavic
and Greek neighbors.
At first the Albanian leaders stood by their previous goal: autonomy
within the empire. When the initial success of the Balkan states in the
fighting opened the possibility that the Porte might well lose all its Euro
pean lands, the objective shifted to the gaining of absolute indepen
dence. Instead of defending the empire, the Albanians now joined those
who stood for dismemberment. On November 28, 1912, a national as
sembly of eighty-three Muslim and Christian delegates met at Vlorë
(Valona) and proclaimed Albanian independence. Ismail Kemal was
elected president, and a cabinet of Muslims and Christians appointed.
This action would have been little more than a futile gesture in face of
the threatening Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian, and Montenegrin armies
had not the state been able to gain the support of at least some of the
great powers.
Of the outside nations Italy and Austria-Hungary had the most direct
interest in the survival of Albania. Each wished to add the area to its own
sphere of interest and to check the expansion of the neighboring Slavic
states. If Italy could dominate the land and thus control both sides of the
Straits of Otranto, which are only fifty miles wide, the Adriatic would
indeed become an Italian sea. If, conversely, Austrian influence pre

vailed, the safe passage of the Habsburg navy through the straits could
be assured. Recognizing the importance of the region, the two powers
started a struggle for predominance after the Congress of Berlin. The
Italian government attempted to use the large Albanian colonies on its
territory for this purpose. Because the latter were predominantly Catho
lic or Uniate, however, they were not completely trusted by the Muslim
and Orthodox Albanians. The Habsburg government appealed more to
the native intellectuals and was even able to gain the sympathy of some
Muslims despite the connection with the Catholic church. In fact, for a
brief period after the First Balkan War began a few prominent Al
banians called for an Austro-Hungarian protectorate over their country
should the Ottoman Empire collapse. Pursuing their individual aims, the
Italian and Habsburg governments were most active in opening schools,
hospitals, and orphanages. Their scholars were diligent in the study of
Albanian subjects, and their public was instructed in the strategic impor
tance of the area.
The chief issues in the territorial settlement after the Balkan wars
have been discussed previously. As we have seen, Serbia sought a port on
the Adriatic Sea in order to escape the Austrian hold over her economy.
Durrës, in northern Albania, was the chief objective. If this city with its
hinterland were lost, a future Albanian state would be badly crippled.
The Habsburg monarchy, however, was determined to keep Serbia a
landlocked state; Montenegro’s attempt to acquire Shkodër and other
Albanian lands was also opposed. The Italian position was similar; this
government too wished to check the expansion of the Slavic states. In ad
dition, it was concerned about the Greek designs on Southern Albania
and the threat to the port of Vlorë and the Island of Saseno, that is, to
the eastern shore of the Straits of Otranto. Vienna and Rome thus joined
in a solid front against the claims of the Balkan states in favor of the cre
ation of an independent Albania with ethnic frontiers.
O f the other great powers, only Russia expressed a serious interest in
the question. The Russian government was sympathetic to the claims of
the Slavic states, especially to the Serbian desire for an Adriatic port.
France in general backed the Russian position; Britain and Germany
pursued essentially a neutral course. During the ambassadorial confer
ences in London, which decided the question, the Italian and Habsburg
point of view eventually prevailed. In December, 1912, the great powers
agreed to recognize an independent Albania. Thus, the last Balkan state
was established in 1913.
As a final act the great powers assumed the task that they had pre
viously undertaken in the other Balkan states, namely, to draw the
boundaries of the new nation, to determine its form of government, and
to choose its ruler. The frontier issue was particularly complex. The Al-
banian leaders naturally sought ethnic boundaries, a goal supported by

Austria-Hungary and Italy. Russia, in contrast, wished to allow Serbia
and Montenegro at least some of their territorial objectives, even though
they included lands that were ethnically Albanian. The Serbian govern
ment remained determined to gain its Adriatic outlet; the Montenegrins
were similarly desirous of obtaining Shkodër. The negotiations were
protracted and delicate. There was also a problem in that Serbian and
Montenegrin troops were in possession of the regions in dispute; they
retreated only before an Austrian threat of war. In return, however,
Austria reluctantly agreed that districts including the cities of Pec (Ipek),
Prizren, Djakovica (Gjakovë), and Debar (Dibër) should be ceded to the
Slavic states. Thus, many Albanians were excluded from the national
state.
Whereas the northern and eastern borders were drawn at the expense
of Albanian interests, the frontier with Greece was more equitable. The
Greek government sought to annex Southern Albania (which was called
Northern Epirus in Greek terminology) with the districts of Gjirokastër
(Argyrokastro) and Korçë. This territory comprised about 2,800 square
miles and had a mixed population of Muslims and Orthodox Christians.
Since the great powers decided that the line should be drawn on the
basis of nationality, the responsible commission assigned most of the
contested area to Albania, an act that left about thirty-five thousand
Greeks under foreign rule and an equal number of Albanians under
Greek control. Despite the fact that Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Al
bania were not satisfied with the final setdement, the boundaries es
tablished in 1913 were to remain essentially unchanged.
The next problem, the form of the government to be introduced, did
not cause as much international controversy despite its enormous impor
tance to the Albanian people. Ismail Kemal headed the provisional gov
ernment, which was formed in November, 1912, for over a year, but not
without encountering strong opposition from rival polidcal leaders. One
of the most important of these, Esad Pasha Toptani, was a member of a
distinguished family of Tirana. He and his followers defied the central
government from their headquarters in Durrës. In the southern Korçë
area Greek-supported Albanian dissidents also resisted the provisional
regime. In addidon, throughout the land many of the feudal landlords
would not surrender the rights and privileges that they had enjoyed for
centuries to any regime, be it Ottoman or Albanian. These divisions
made the conduct of orderly administration almost impossible. The situ
ation led the great powers in October, 1913, to create an Internadonal
Control Commission to direct the national administration; Ismail Kemal
resigned in January, 1914.
In April, 1914, the commission, to which one Albanian member had
been added, completed the draft of a constitution. The state was to be a
sovereign principality whose neutrality would be guaranteed by the
great powers. The national assembly was to be composed of three repre
sentatives from each of the seven administrative divisions, to be elected
by direct suffrage, and ten delegates nominated by the prince. Certain
notables, the heads of the Muslim, Orthodox, and Catholic faiths, and
the commissioner for the national bank were to be ex-officio members.
The legislature was to have a four-year term. The prince had the power
to appoint the Council of Ministers, which was responsible to him. Thus,
once more the great powers determined the form of government for a
new Balkan state.
In the selection of the prince the choice again fell on a German, as had
been the case in Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria. William of Wied, a
thirty-five-year-old captain in the German army, who was also a nephew
of Queen Elizabeth of Romania, arrived in Albania in March, 1914. Six
months later, shortly after the outbreak of the First World War, he left
the principality, never to return. The difficulties in governing the new
state had proved insurmountable. The prince lacked administrative ex
perience and he proved a weak leader, but even the most gifted ruler
could not have accomplished much in the six months before Albania
was engulfed by war. William also suffered from the grave disadvantage
that he was regarded as an Austrian protégé, particularly in Italy. The
Italian government openly intrigued against him and found ready col
laborators among the Albanians who aspired themselves to the throne.
The prince’s cabinet proved another source of weakness. It was headed
by the ambitious Esad Toptani, a potential rival, who held the position of
both Minister of Interior and Minister of Defense, two key posts. Instead
of appeasing him, his offices gave him a better opportunity to intrigue
and foster dissension throughout the country. The prince also included
in his government representatives of the feudal landowning class. This
action alienated many of the young intellectuals who had championed
first the autonomist movement and then independence. In the north the
traditional conflicts between the Muslim and Catholic factions were re
newed. Had William been granted a number of years of peace, many of
these problems might have been resolved. As it was, the establishment of
a stable government and the final recognition of the borders had to await
the end of the great conflict in Europe.
Despite the collapse of the first government, the thirty-six years since
the Congress of Berlin had produced great changes in the Albanian
lands. Previously, Albanian history had been characterized by regional
loyalty and rivalry between different religions and political groups.
These antagonisms had been at least for the moment buried in face of
the grave danger of partition. In the process local interests, which had
been paramount for centuries, began to yield to larger considerations
encompassing the entire Albanian population. Because of the necessity
of cooperating for national defense, Albanians from different geo

graphic areas came to know each other. The leadership of the national
movement came from every region, from different social and economic
groups, and from all three religious communities. Although much was
left to be done, the Albanian efforts had resulted in the establishment of
an independent state and had laid the basis for the postwar develop
ments.
CHAPTER 15
Balkan Nationalities in the

Habsburg Empire
With the weakening of the Ottoman Empire and the growing strength
of the national idea in Eastern Europe, it was natural that the fate of the
other great multinational state should come into question. At the
beginning of the nineteenth century the Habsburg Empire was an as
semblage of territories differing widely in size, tradition, culture, econ
omy, and language. These lands had been gathered together under the
Habsburg dynasty over many years through inheritance, marriage, di
plomacy, or war. The boundaries had fluctuated strongly from century
to century and had at one time even embraced the great Spanish empire
of the new world. The symbol of unity was the imperial family. Its posi
tion had been immeasurably strengthened by the great wars of the six
teenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries against the Ottoman Em
pire, when the monarchy stood as the outpost of Christendom against
the Turk. Before the eighteenth century the weight of the central gov
ernment, the court, was, with a few exceptions, little felt in the outlying
provinces. The monarchy concerned itself with the army and foreign
policy; the local nobility had free sway in the countryside. In the eigh
teenth century, during the reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, an at
tempt was made to introduce a uniform administrative system and Ger
man as the language of government. These efforts met the same
resistance encountered in the Ottoman Empire when the Porte at
tempted similar reforms.
In the nineteenth century eleven distinct national groups lived in the
monarchy. Among these there were great differences in power and his
toric tradition. In the first position were the Germans, whose language
had been that of politics and literature and who had consistently pro
vided governmental and military leadership throughout most of the
235
previous history of the state. Next in influence were the Magyars, who
possessed a strong sense of national pride and self-consciousness and
were usually able to maintain control over their historic territories,
known as the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. These territories con
tained large Romanian, Slovak, and South Slav populations. Below the
two dominant nationalities .were the Czechs, Poles, Croats, and Italians,
each with an important place in the structure of the empire. On the bot
tom of the scale were to be found the Slovaks, Serbs, Slovenes, Roma
nians, and Ruthenians. The national ranking of each people was also
reflected in its social composition. Thus among the nationalities with
Balkan connections, the Croats, occupying a middle position, had a mid
dle class and an aristocracy, while the Serbs, Romanians, and Slovenes
were primarily peasants.
Within the empire the peoples most influenced by the events in the
Ottoman Empire were naturally those with close ethnic ties—the Ro
manians and the South Slav Slovenes, Serbs, and Croats. The Roma
nians lived principally in Transylvania, but also in Bukovina and the
Banat. In language and nationality they were identical with the inhabi
tants of Wallachia and Moldavia. The South Slav situation was more
complex. The Slovenes lived chiefly in Carniola and Styria. They were
a Catholic, peasant people with a western Slavic language not readily
intelligible to most Serbs and Croats. The Croats of the empire were
to be found principally in Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia and in Bosnia-
Hercegovina which was occupied in 1878. They were Catholic in religion
and spoke a language almost identical to that of the Serbs except that the
Latin alphabet was used. In Dalmatia, a land acquired from Venice only
in 1797, the peasant population was primarily Croatian, but the cities
had a large Italian middle class. In Croatia and Slavonia there was a
Croatian nobility, middle class, and peasantry. The Serbs of the mon
archy were concentrated primarily in the Vojvodina, in the Croatian Mili
tary Frontier region and in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Like their conationals
of Serbia, they were Orthodox in religion and they used the Cyrillic
alphabet in their writing.
In their political ties Slovenia, Dalmatia, and Bukovina remained close
to Vienna and the imperial government. Although some political con
troversy existed here in the nineteenth century, the true centers of the
local national movements were in Transylvania and Croatia-Slavonia.
During modern times these provinces were closely tied with Hungary
and were included in the lands of the crown of St. Stephen. The politi
cal struggles here were not so much over the relationship with Vienna
and the court as with Budapest and the Hungarian administration. As in
the Balkans, where the Slavic and Romanian people had first to over
throw Greek cultural and political dominance, in the Habsburg Empire
Balkan Nationalities in the Habsburg Empire 237
the major conflict through most of the period under consideration was
with Hungary and the force of Hungarian nationalism. Given the fact
that in the nineteenth century the Hungarian leaders were principally
interested in gaining almost complete rights of self-government from
Vienna, a three-cornered conflict was actually in progress among the
Habsburg central government, the Hungarians, and the other national
ities that were part of the historic Hungarian realm. In the next pages
the emphasis will be placed on the national movements in the three
provinces of Transylvania, Croatia, and Slavonia. No attempt will be
made to discuss the evolution of the empire as a whole or subjects out
side of the framework of the national question as it relates to the forma
tion of the Balkan states.
T ransylvania
The political history of Transylvania, in many ways as complex as that
of Macedonia, has in recent times involved primarily a contest for su
premacy between the Romanian and the Hungarian inhabitants. Most of
the basic problems of this relationship find their origins in the Middle
Ages. At the end of the ninth century the Hungarians appeared in
Europe and conquered their present homeland; in the following century
they also took Transylvania. Thereafter, they invited the so-called Sax
ons, Germans from the Rhineland, to setde there as frontier guards,
merchants, and prosperous peasants. Another group, the Szeklers, who
were related to the Hungarians and spoke the same language, also
inhabited the territory. The Saxons and the Szeklers received charters
from the king of Hungary which made each a medieval “natio” or na
tion, with the right of self-government in their districts. They elected
their own count, who was responsible to the Hungarian king, and the
land was administered through the Transylvanian diet. By the fifteenth
century the province under the domination of these three people had
become a state semi-independent of Hungary proper. After 1526 Tran
sylvania and Hungary fell under Ottoman rule, but the region was still
able to maintain its separate status. The religious conflicts of the Refor
mation also left their imprint here. During this period the Saxons be
came Lutheran, the Magyars were Catholic and Calvinist, the Szeklers,
Catholic, Lutheran, and Unitarian. At the end of the sixteenth century
there were thus three recognized nations and four religions: Catholic,
Calvinist, Lutheran, and Unitarian. Each nation had its own nobility and
clergy and, from a political point of view, constituted the only people
with a recognized status.
In these arrangements no place was allotted to the Orthodox church
or to the Romanian people, although this population was obviously
large. By the eighteenth century it has been estimated that it constituted
the absolute majority in the province. Hungarian and Romanian histo

rians have hotly debated the question of the origin of the Romanian set
tlements here for two centuries. Without entering into the merits of the
arguments, it can be said that the Romanians claim to be descended
from the Dacians and Roman colonists, that they have lived continuously
in Transylvania since ancient times, and that their settlements thus pre
cede those of the Hungarians by centuries. The Magyars, in opposition,
argue that the Romanians only arrived during the thirteenth and four
teenth centuries from south of the Danube, and that since they came as
shepherds and poor peasants they could not be regarded as equal to the
three privileged nations. No matter which version is accepted, the fact
remains that in the eighteenth century the majority of the Transylvanian
people, the Romanians, had no political rights and their church was not
recognized.
In the Treaty of Karlowitz (Sremski Karlovci) of 1699 the Habsburg
Empire received back Transylvania from the Porte. Already in 1691 Em
peror Leopold had issued a diploma defining the status of the province,
a regulation that was to remain in force until 1848. In this document he
confirmed the rights of the three nations and the four religions, and he
acknowledged the autonomy of the area. In 1722 Transylvania was rec
ognized as part of the Hungarian crownlands, but the province kept its
own diet and administrative system. The emperor and the court re
tained ultimate political control. A governor was regularly appointed,
and the diet was chosen from the upper classes of the recognized nations
and religions.
In this political framework the Romanians had little opportunity for
advancement. It should be emphasized that socially and economically
they formed the lowest strata of society. Most of the peasants lived on the
estates of large landowners where they worked under the same burdens
of taxation and labor dues that have been seen elsewhere. They were il
literate and politically passive. In no section and among no national
group in the empire did this level of society enjoy political rights. In
other words, the subservient Romanian position in Transylvania was due
to the social composition of the population as well as to its national and
religious attributes.
As among other Balkan peoples, the Orthodox church in Transylvania
played a major role in the first steps of the national movement. The
clergy here was the single educated group among the Romanian popula
tion. Its members suffered from the fact that their church was not recog
nized and that the empire was predominantly Catholic. At the beginning
of the eighteenth century, hoping to better their position, the Orthodox
officials signed the Act of Union with the Catholics, creating the Uniate
church. Although the Romanian expectations that this action would im
prove their position were disappointed, this institution henceforth
played a leading role in Romanian national development. The first
major spokesman for Romanian rights in Transylvania was Ion Ino-
chentie Clain, a bishop of the Uniate church from 1729 to 1751. Since he
could gain nothing from the Transylvanian diet, he repeatedly appealed
to Vienna. He requested in particular that the Romanians should join
the Hungarians, Saxons, and Szeklers as a fourth nation, and he pro
tested against the exploitation of the peasantry. He was finally forced
into exile. In 1761, however, discontent in Transylvania led the mon
archy to allow an organization for the Orthodox church to be formed, al
though on a stage lower than that for the four privileged religions.
Under Joseph II some attempt was also made to improve the status of
the peasants.
Both the Uniate and the Orthodox churches remained the center of
Romanian intellectual life. The three major names in the early national
movement, George §incai, Peter Maior and Samuel Clain (Micu), were
all educated in Uniate establishments. They became the founders of the
so-called Transylvanian School, which sought to establish the fact that
the Romanians were indeed the descendents of the ancient Dacians and
Romans, and that they were the original inhabitants of the province,
while the Hungarians were recent arrivals of the Middle Ages. The work
of George §incai and Samuel Clain for the Romanian language was also
extremely important. In 1780 they published the first Romanian gram
mar, Elements of the Daco-Roman or Wallach Language. They also secured
the replacement of the former Slavonic alphabet with the Latin, and
they worked to remove non-Latin words from the language. Their ef
forts thus paralleled those of Obradovic and Karadzic in Serbia. In 1812
Maior completed the highly significant History of the Origins of the Roma
nians in Dacia. The influence of these men extended into Wallachia and
Moldavia, where their works greatly stimulated the national movement
there.
The major political document for the Romanian movement in the
eighteenth century was the Supplex libellus Valachorum of 1791, a petition
that was sent to the Transylvanian diet. It was drawn up by Samuel Clain
and other leading Romanians. The Supplex stated the Romanian ver
sion of their history and made definite demands. These included the
recognition of the Romanians as a fourth nation and proportional na
tional representation at all levels of administration in Transylvania. The
signators also desired that a national congress be convened and that
Romanian place names be used where the majority of the population
was of that nationality. The diet summarily rejected these proposals.
The time was not favorable for such actions; the entire empire was in a
period of reaction against the reform measures of Joseph II and to the
events of the French Revolution. Nevertheless, the Supplex represented

a national program, which was supported by Romanian intellectual and
religious leaders.
In the next years the Romanian movement not only failed to make
progress, but it faced increasing dangers. At the beginning of the nine
teenth century Hungary went through a period of intense national re
vival. The goals were two in number. First, the attempt was to be made to
create a unitary, centralized state out of the lands of the Hungarian
crown, and, second, complete independence from Vienna was to be
sought. The first policy signified that the effort would be made to assimi
late, or magyarize, the Slav, Romanian, and Saxon inhabitants under the
jurisdiction of an Hungarian administration. The initial step in this di
rection would be the substitution of Hungarian as the sole official lan
guage of the country for Latin.
This policy, which was to be the base of all the subsequent nationality
conflicts, was not without logic from the Magyar point of view. It repre
sented essentially the policy of Louis Kossuth, the great Magyar national
leader of the mid-century. If the Hungarian nationalists limited their
program to the establishment of an ethnic state, the great crown lands
with a primarily non-Hungarian population, such as Transylvania,
Croatia-Slavonia, Vojvodina, and Slovakia, would have to be surren
dered. Without these territories Hungary would be a poor and weak na
tion. If, however, all of the territories of the crown of St. Stephen were to
be held, some political arrangement would have to be made for the other
nationalities, who represented more than 50 percent of the population.
They could not be given autonomy, since this concept was in contra
diction to the basic idea of a Hungarian national state. The only alterna
tive appeared to be a policy of magyarization. The chief means would be
the imposition of the language and its exclusive use in the administra
tive, judicial, and educational systems as well as in commerce and busi
ness. In essence this remained the Hungarian policy until 1914, notwith
standing certain periods when compromise and moderation appeared to
prevail as, for example, in 1860-66. For the Romanians and the Slavs the
defeat of this policy was essential for their national survival.
The crucial year for the Hungarian movement came in 1848. As the
Habsburg central authority collapsed before the revolutionary move
ments which swept the empire, the Hungarians too established their own
separate government. In accordance with the liberal ideas then prevail
ing they set up a constitutional regime, which promised civil liberties to
the entire population. The occasion was also used to integrate Transyl
vania into Hungary. The Romanian leaders welcomed the liberal re
forms, but not the union of Transylvania with Hungary. At a meeting at
tended by forty thousand people in Blaj in May, 1848, on the so-called
“Field of Liberty,” resolutions were adopted which again called for the
recognition of the Romanians as a nation and of the Orthodox church as
an equal religious institution. Proportional representation in the diet
and the administration was also sought. Most important, the meeting
rejected the idea of a union of Transylvania with Hungary without the
assent of population of the province.
The Hungarian revolutionary government under the leadership of
Kossuth not only rejected these demands, but similar declarations from
the Saxons, Serbs, and Croats. Faced with this refusal and the adamant
Hungarian attitude, the Romanian leaders next turned to Vienna. Al
though the court was at this time faced with great difficulties, it never
theless listened to the Romanian representations. Since their demands
had at least not been rejected, the Romanians, like the South Slavs, gave
their support to the government in Vienna against the Hungarian revo
lution. When in 1849 the Austrian army entered the Hungarian lands,
non-Magyar nationalities cooperated with it. The Russian troops, who
joined in the conflict in June, 1849, to assist the imperial forces, received
similar assistance.
Much to the disappointment of both the Romanian and the South Slav
leaders, their political position did not improve with the restoration of
Habsburg power and the suppression of the Hungarian revolutionary
government. Instead, the Habsburg government attempted to impose a
centralized administration, known as the Bach system, upon the entire
country. Transylvania lost her autonomous rights and came under
direct imperial administration. The delegations and petitions that were
repeatedly sent to Vienna to protest this condition were disregarded.
The Romanian goals remained the same: acceptance as one of the recog
nized nations, and an autonomous government for Transylvania in
which Romanians would enjoy a position proportionate to their numeri
cal strength.
During this period the outstanding Romanian leader was undoubtedly
the Orthodox Bishop Andreiu §aguna. He devoted his efforts both to
improving the position of the Orthodox church and to the education of
the Romanian population. The main obstacle for the church remained
the Catholic fear that a strong Orthodox establishment would damage
their proselytizing efforts through the Uniate church. In addition, op
position came from the Serbian patriarchate of Sremski Karlovci, under
whose jurisdiction the Romanian Orthodox fell. In the educational field
§aguna attempted to improve the training of the clergy so that they
would be more effective teachers in the schools. These institutions were
considerably expanded at this time. Approximately a decade later about
five hundred new elementary schools had been added to the previous
hundred. §aguna was also responsible for the establishment of a new
printing press and a newspaper. At this time he supported imperial rule

from Vienna, recognizing that it was preferable to a system that placed
Transylvania under Magyar control.
The greatest Romanian success came in 1863. After its defeat in Italy
in 1859 the Habsburg government abandoned the Bach system and at
tempted to return the state to some form of constitutional rule. For
Transylvania the changes meant that the diet would be restored. More
over, each national group, including the Romanians, was now to be con
sulted concerning future reforms. The new measures met strong H un
garian opposition. The Magyar argument was that the union of
Hungary and Transylvania proclaimed in 1848 should be regarded as
still valid, and that there should be no separate diet for the province.
The Romanians, supported by many Saxon leaders, replied that the
union had been invalidated by the Hungarian defeat in 1849 and by the
Bach system. They further demanded and succeeded in introducing a
new electoral law to replace that of 1848, which had resulted in the
choice of only three Romanians in a diet of three hundred delegates.
The Hungarian reaction was simply to refuse to participate when the
next diet was chosen.
With the Hungarian abstention, the Romanian and Saxon delegates
were free to enact far-reaching changes in the administration of the
province. The Romanians were declared a nation equal to the Magyars,
Szeklers, and Saxons; the Uniate and Orthodox churches were placed
on the same level with the other four. Largely through §aguna’s efforts,
the emperor also agreed to the separation of the Romanian Orthodox
church from the Serbian patriarchate. A metropolitanate was created at
Sibiu and bishoprics at Arad and Caransebe§. The Romanian language
was also recognized to be on the same level with German and Hungar
ian. For the first time in modern history the Romanians were legally
equal to the other inhabitants of Transylvania.
These reforms did not last long. Within the empire the Hungarian
position was too strong and that of the central government too weak.
The abstention of the Magyars from cooperation with the imperial au
thorities forced Franz Joseph finally to surrender to many of their de
mands. In 1865 the former franchise for election to the Transylvanian
diet was reintroduced. As a result the Hungarians, who were only 29
percent of the population, elected eighty-nine delegates while the Ro
manians, the majority of the people, had only thirteen. This diet then
proceeded to vote the union of Transylvania and Hungary, a decision
that was accepted by the emperor. Thus, the province which, although a
part of Hungary, had previously had its own administration and diet,
was directly incorporated into the kingdom of Hungary. Whereas in
1863 the Romanians were a majority in Transylvania and had achieved a
status of equality with the other nationalities, they were now to be trans
formed into a minority of 15 percent within the Hungarian kingdom.
Moreover, the future was to be bleak in other respects. A new generation
of Hungarian statesmen was now to carry on the tradition of Kossuth
and to inaugurate a determined policy of magyarization.
After the defeat by Prussia the Habsburg government, as has already
been described, was completely reorganized in the Ausgleich (Compro
mise) of 1867. This event was to have unfortunate repercussions for
both the Romanians and the South Slavs. Henceforth, Austria-Hungary
or the Dual Monarchy, as the state was now designated, was divided into
two distinct entities, united chiefly in the person of the common ruler,
who was emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. There was, in addi
tion, to be a common foreign policy and one army. Delegations from the
two halves were to meet periodically to resolve common problems. With
respect to their internal administrations, the governments of Austria
and Hungary were free to pursue their own policies. The Romanians
and South Slavs under the Hungarian crown could thus no longer ap
peal to Vienna for redress against measures decided upon in Budapest.
Initially, the Ausgleich did not appear to be an unfavorable develop
ment. In 1868 the Hungarian parliament proclaimed the equality of all
Hungarian citizens and the abolition of special privileges to any national
ity. At the same time the Law of Nationalities was passed. One of the
most progressive pieces of legislation ever enacted in a multinational
state, it basically guaranteed the right of each nationality to use its own
language in all phases of its cultural and political life. For example,
primary and secondary schools were to be taught in the mother tongues
of the students; the local language was to be used in district courts of jus
tice; each member of a county assembly could use his native language;
district administrators were to know the language of the area; and non-
Hungarians wotild be employed in administrative and judicial positions.
As similar reforms in the Ottoman Empire, however, its provisions were
never put into practice.
Unfortunately, the generation of Hungarians who brought their na
tion from the defeat of 1849 to the political triumph of 1867, men such
as Francis Deâk and Joseph Eötvös, were not able to carry through their
programs. Their policy had been based on the conviction that accommo
dations would have to be made with the nationalities. Their adversaries,
whose chief spokesman was Koloman Tisza, were determined to make
Hungary a unitary, Magyar state. In 1875 Tisza became Minister Presi
dent of Hungary, and for the next thirty years the Liberal Party con
trolled the Hungarian government. During this time every means was
used to assure Magyar predominance. Elections were arranged to pro
duce Magyar majorities. With a safe parliament the Liberals were able to
pass laws affecting the educational system, which was regarded as the
key to the success of magyarization. As Bela Grunwald, Tisza’s collabo-
rator, so vividly described it: “The secondary school is like a huge ma
chine, at one end of which Slovak youths are thrown in by the hundreds
and at the other end of which they come out as Magyars.” 1 In 1879 all
elementary school teachers were required to know Hungarian, even
those in Romanian or Slovak villages. Later measures for the establish
ment of secondary schools provided chiefly for Hungarian institutions.
Soon all public notices, street, postal, and railroad signs were in Hungar
ian. Families were pressed to magyarize their names. The courts and ad
ministration were put in safe Magyar hands. In addition, Hungarian
peasants were encouraged to colonize Transylvania, and Hungarian en
trepreneurs received inducements to develop industries there.
The policy of magyarization produced the expected reaction. The
measures brought the entire population together and made all classes
more aware of their national identity. The first Romanian political party,
the National Party, was founded in Sibiu in 1881. Its program called for
the restoration of Transylvanian authority, the use of Romanian in the
administration and the courts, and the appointment of officials who
knew the language. The Romanian leaders further adopted the policy of
“passivism” to meet the Magyar threat. They boycotted the parliament
and refused to take part in any governmental activities. At the same time
a new generation of students, resembling those of Moldavia and Walla-
chia in 1848, came to stand for a program calling for the union of all
Romanians in a single kingdom, a goal that would, of course, mean the
dismemberment of the Hungarian crown lands. The National Party in
1890 also used similar references in speaking of a great Romanian na
tion of eleven million people.
Throughout the nineteenth century events in Transylvania had been
followed closely in the Principalities. The issue of the treatment of the
Romanians in Transylvania had long been a sensitive point in Ro-
manian-Habsburg relations. As the pressure on the Romanians in the
empire increased, a reaction in the Romanian kingdom was bound to
come. In 1891 the Romanian Cultural League was founded in Bucharest
by university teachers and students. This group drafted a “memoran
dum” in five languages to call the Romanian grievances in Transylvania
to the attention of European opinion. This declaration drew a reply
from the Hungarian students in Budapest, which in turn solicited a
rebuttal from Romanian students in Transylvania. The author of the
Transylvanian answer, Aurel Popovici, who in 1906 was to produce a
famous plan for the reorganization of the monarchy, was sentenced to
prison, but he succeeded in escaping to Romania. The cause of the
students was taken up by the National Party, which drafted its own mem
orandum and sent a delegation to Vienna to appeal to Franz Joseph.
1. R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Roumanians from Roman Times to the Completion of
Unity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934), p. 400.
The document, which called again for the restoration of Transylvanian
autonomy, was not accepted by the emperor. The leaders of the Na
tional Party were subsequently arrested and brought to court by the
Hungarian government. The Memorandum Trial, as it was called,
proved to be an excellent opportunity for the Romanians to bring their
cause to the attention of a wider public. Although the trial damaged the
position of the National Party and the defendents were jailed, the epi
sode had the same propaganda value for the Romanians as similar court
proceedings were later to have for the South Slavs. In addition to these
actions, the Romanians began to cooperate more with the Slavic nation
alities. In 1895 a Congress of Nationalities was held with the Serbs and
Slovaks in Budapest; there it was stressed that Hungary was a multina
tional and not a national state.
The protests of the other nationalities did not affect Hungarian pol
icy. In fact, the Hungarian government now extended its national aims
in another direction and came again into direct conflict with Vienna. In
1905 the attempt was made to create a separate army at the expense of
the common force established by the Ausgleich. Here, however, a point
was raised on which Franz Joseph was extremely sensitive and on which
he would not yield. Because the Hungarians were forced to retreat, the
Romanians were encouraged to abandon their policy of passivism, which
had not, in any case, been a success, and to participate again in the gov
ernment.
When the Romanian delegates returned to the parliament, they were
faced with further severe measures. Count Albert Apponyi, the minister
of education, introduced new school laws in 1907. Teachers were hence
forth to be required to have a fluent command of Hungarian; Magyar
patriotism was to be taught in all schools. If at the end of four years the
students did not'know Magyar, the teachers were to be dismissed. In ad
dition, the state now took over the Romanian church school system. In
order to weaken it the salaries of the teachers were set so high that some
church institutions could not afford to pay them. In 1909 further regu
lations required that religious instruction in Romanian middle schools
should be in Hungarian. Additional moves against the church occurred
in 1912 when the Vatican approved the Hungarian request that eighty-
three parishes be removed from the control of the Romanian Uniate
church. These districts were placed under the newly created Hungarian
Greek-Catholic bishopric of Hajdudorog. The liturgical language was to
be Byzantine Greek, but until the clergy learned it, Magyar was to be
used. This action was thus a further attempt at magyarization. Although
some efforts were made before 1914 to calm national discontent, the
Romanian demand that Transylvanian autonomy be restored was an
issue that Budapest would not even consider.
By 1914 it can thus be seen that the Romanians of Transylvania had
developed strong feelings of national self-consciousness, made particu

larly intense by increasing Magyar pressure. The goals of the Romanian
opposition remained the restoration of Transylvanian autonomy and
the assurance that the nationalities would enjoy a political position pro
portionate with their numbers. In 1910 the Romanians were 55 percent
of the population; the Hungarians, 34 percent. Although on many issues
the Saxons sided with the Romanians against Budapest, it was unlikely
that they would support the dissolution of the empire at this time. Since
the Romanians held only a small majority in the province and were faced
with what appeared to be a stable European situation, the aim of the
Romanian nationalists had of necessity to be the reform of the monar
chy, not its dissolution. Moreover, although there was considerable Ro
manian political activity in Transylvania, it did not compare with that in
the South Slav lands where throughout the nineteenth century we find a
profusion of political programs and parties and where the lands in dis
pute were usually overwhelmingly historically and ethnically dominated
by the non-Magyar nationalities.
Although the Transylvanian question did receive a great deal of atten
tion from the Romanian government, acquisition of the province was
not at this time a part of the official policy of the nation. On the eve of
the First World War, however, it is undoubtedly true that the question
had come to play a greater role in relations between Bucharest and
Vienna than previously, and that those Romanians with political influ
ence had become even more sensitive to the national issue. Throughout
the previous century the Habsburg government had consistently been
aware of the possible attraction that the Romanian state could offer to its
minorities in Transylvania. Liberal Party oratory had repeatedly spoken
of historical Romanian lands, which included Transylvania along with
Bukovina and Bessarabia, as irredenta to be acquired in the future.
Before 1914, however, severe limitations restricted the actions of Ro
manian leaders in Bucharest. First, Romania was part of the Triple Alli
ance system. The Habsburg Empire was in fact an ally. Second, King
Charles, although a conscientious and devoted ruler, remained basically
a German prince in sympathy and background. Unlike King Peter in
Serbia, he could not be expected to lead a national movement against
countries to which he had a sincere personal attachment. Third, it must
be emphasized that the primary Romanian problems at this time were
economic, not political. Of first importance was the fact that the king
dom had experienced in 1907 what was one of the greatest peasant
revolts of the entire period with which this narrative deals. The status of
the Romanian peasant and that of land distribution was the first national
priority. Equally important, Romania, more than the other Balkan coun
tries, was proceeding toward an economic transformation and a devel
opment of her natural resources and industrial capacity. Members of the
government were involved in this process. The possibility of acquiring
Transylvania became a matter of immediate national concern only after
the outbreak of the war when an entirely unforeseen situation arose.
Before 1914 the immediate problem in Romanian foreign policy was
not the Transylvanian irredenta, but relations with Bulgaria. The Ro
manian leaders, like those in Greece and Serbia, strongly opposed the
Bulgarian determination to restore the San Stefano boundaries and thus
gain a position of preponderance in the Balkans. In addition, Southern
Dobrudja remained a Romanian territorial objective. In 1913 this policy
brought Romania into conflict with the monarchy, which sought to pro
tect Bulgarian interests, but it did not break the alliance. The Romanian
actions in the Balkan Wars had, as we have seen, resulted in close coop
eration with Serbia. By 1914 Serbia, in turn, was also deeply involved in
the national controversies in the Habsburg Empire and had, particularly
in Bosnia-Hercegovina, an irredenta that she would claim should a fa
vorable occasion arise.
T he South Slav Q uestion
In Transylvania the national question had centered on the relatively
straightforward issue of the conflict of the Romanian majority with the
Hungarian authorities. In the South Slav lands of Dalmatia, Croatia, and
Slavonia the problem was far more complex since it involved not only
the relations of the Croatian majority with the Magyar-dominated ad
ministration, but also with the Serbian minority in these areas. Like Ser
bia, Croatia had been a medieval kingdom whose territory included
roughly the present-day regions of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, and
much of Bosnia. In 1102, with the death of their own king and after a
defeat by the Hungarians, the Croatians elected the ruler of Hungary as
their monarch. T he two countries, nevertheless, remained as separate
kingdoms united through the crown. This relationship existed until
1527 when, after the defeat of Hungary by the Turks, Croatia elected
the Habsburg emperor as her king.
Unlike Serbia, where the native aristocracy was wiped out after the Ot
toman invasion, Croatia did have a nobility which in the past had pre
served the identity and protected the interests of the nation. In Croatia
proper the aristocracy was largely Croatian, but most of its members
belonged to the lesser nobility and some were so poor that they were
scarcely to be distinguished from the peasantry. In Slavonia, although a
Croatian aristocracy existed, the large estates of the region were pri
marily in the hands of landowners of German or Hungarian origin who
spoke Latin, not Croatian, as their common language. In Dalmatia, the
predominant class was more closely associated with commercial and
maritime pursuits, and it spoke Italian. The peasantry was Croatian. In
these lands the church shared the privilege of land ownership with the
nobility, and the upper clergy had the same social, economic, and politi
cal interests as the aristocracy. A small urban middle class was to prove
extremely active politically. In all three areas the overwhelming majority
of the population were peasants. Until shortly before the outbreak of the
First World War this group sought economic reforms and was not a
serious political force.
In the Croatian lands there was also a strong minority of Serbs, partic
ularly in Croatia-Slavonia where, according to the 1910 census, there
were 62.5 percent Croats and 24.6 percent Serbs—or 1 Serb for every
2.5 Croats. The two people had an essentially identical language, written
in different alphabets, and they were both South Slavs, but the Serbs
were Orthodox and the Croats, Catholic. Most of the Serbs in Croatia-
Slavonia lived in an area called the Military Frontier, a buffer zone es
tablished by the Habsburg Empire during the sixteenth century as a
barrier against the Ottoman Empire. In order to attract setders who
would garrison and defend the area, the monarchy had offered favor
able economic, social, and political conditions. Large numbers of Serbs,
refugees from Ottoman-occupied Serbian lands, took advantage of the
opportunity. The Military Frontier began on the Adriatic Sea, south of
the city of Rijeka (Fiume), and extended well beyond Belgrade in the
east. It was a stretch of land, varying in width, but averaging over
twenty kilometers, with the Sava River as its southern border. It was
completely contained within the historic Croatian lands. It should be
noted that Serbs also lived in Backa and Banat, part of the Vojvodina,
but this area never became a point of conflict with the Croats.
The distribution of population set the pattern for the basic conflicts of
the nineteenth century. With the development of the national move
ments at that time, both the Serbs and the Croats had two choices. They
could follow a separate road and look to the re-establishment of their
medieval kingdoms on an independent basis, or they could emphasize
their South Slav, or Yugoslav, bonds and work for the formation of a
common state. A similar dilemma faced the Serbian kingdom. This state
could seek to form a greater Serbia on a strictly national basis or it could
assume the leadership in a movement to unite all of the South Slav lands.
The chief obstacle to the creation of an autonomous or independent
Croatia was to be the existence of the large Serbian minority; the great
hindrance to a Yugoslavia was the inability of the Serbian leaders in
Belgrade to submerge their individual nationality into the larger frame
work. Thus, until 1914, throughout the South Slav lands of the mon
archy there was the double national conflict of the Hungarians against
the Slavic inhabitants, and the struggle among these people for their po
litical future. The question of the relationship with Vienna was also
present.
During the late eighteenth century the Croatian and Hungarian nobil-
Map 10. The Habsburg Military Frontier
ity shared a common dislike for the reform plans of Joseph II. They
both stood for tradition, custom, and the established order against a
“revolutionary” emperor. In particular, they defended the use of Latin,
which had been their means of communication for centuries, against the
threatened introduction of German as the language of administration.
When the Hungarians soon thereafter attempted to impose Hungarian,
the Croatian nobility remained the strong supporters of Latin. Although
there was opposition to Magyar control on this question, by 1828 the
social and economic interest of the Croatian aristocracy prevailed over
any national sentiments. In that year they agreed that Hungarian could
be taught in Croatian schools; the first step in magyarization.
As in other central European nations the true nationalists, whether
Croatian or Yugoslav, were to be found among students, intellectuals,
and the small but active middle class. The first national idea of real sig
nificance to emerge from this group was the Illyrian movement, which
has been closely associated with the name of Ljudevit Gaj. A close ad
herent of the romantic national currents so strong in Europe at this time,
Gaj was influenced by the Slavic scholars and writers P. J. Safarik, Jan
Kollâr, and J. Dobrovsky. The turning point in Gaj’s career came in 1835
when he obtained permission from the Habsburg authorities to publish
a Croatian newspaper, Danica (Morning Star). The Austrian govern
ment was now well aware of the dangers of the growing Magyar nation
alism to the empire so they approved the expression of Croatian oppo
sition to Hungarian control. During this period the Croats, like the
Transylvanians, could thus appeal to Vienna against the Hungarians.
Gaj’s principal contribution was, however, his advocacy of the linguis
tic, cultural, and political unity of the empire’s South Slavs. The Illyrian
movement aimed at bridging the historical differences which had sepa
rated these people through the centuries and in bringing them together
to resist Magyar influence. For a period of eight years, from 1835 to
1843, there was a veritable explosion of literary activity and of publica
tion in this direction. As part of this program Gaj was also able to per
suade the Croatian writers to use not the kajkavian dialect of Zagreb,
but the stokavian of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Dalmatia, and Serbia. He saw
the importance of a common literary language and realized that this
unity could lead to political cooperation.
Although the Illyrian movement enjoyed great popularity among
Croatian intellectuals, it did not receive similar acclaim among the Slo
venes and Serbs. The Slovenes, closely associated with Vienna, did not
feel threatened by the Magyars. Moreover, the Slovenian language was
distinct, and their history set them apart from both the Serbs and the
Croats. For their part the Serbs did not like the implications of the
Illyrian idea. Most Serbian leaders at this time adhered to the views
expressed in the Nacertanije of Ilija Garasanin and preferred to work
for a united ethnic Serbian state. Vuk Karadzic, the greatest Serbian
scholar of the period, was unsympathetic to the idea. He felt that anyone
who used the standard stokavian dialect was a Serb. In the same manner
most of the Serbian intellectuals in the Vojvodina reacted negatively to
the movement.
Despite the lack of success among the Serbs and Slovenes, the pro
gram upset the Magyar leaders. In 1841 they succeeded in forming the
first Croatian political party, the Croatian-Hungarian Party, whose
members, called Magyarones, strongly rejected the Illyrian idea and
favored the maintenance of close ties with the Hungarians. Efforts were
also made to persuade the imperial authorities that the movement was
dangerous. The argument was advanced that Illyrianism was an ally of
Panslavism and a threat to the empire. In 1843 Vienna took measures to
suppress it and to control Gaj’s newspaper. Nevertheless, the impact of
Illyrianism was profound. It became the basis for the later Yugoslav
movement, which also had its center in Croatia.
The first practical test of possible South Slav unity occurred during
the revolutions of 1848-49. At the time of the Hungarian revolution the
supporters of Illyrianism were in control in Zagreb. Josip Jelacic, a colo
nel in the Habsburg army and the ban (governor) of Croatia, became
their leader and spokesman. When Kossuth and his government de
manded that the Hungarians have the right of self-government in the
empire, the Croadans asked for the same condidons from the Magyars.
They wanted freedom from Hungarian administrative control, a sepa
rate parliament, the abolition of serfdom, and the restoration of the
Triune Kingdom, that is, the union of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia.
Of these historical lands, Austria ruled Dalmatia, while Hungary con
trolled Croatia and Slavonia. When Kossuth rejected these demands out
right, the Croatiàns, like the Transylvanians, turned to Vienna.
At this time the Croatian leaders found an ally in the Serbs of the Voj
vodina, who also sought local self-government and were willing to unite
with the Croats in a common state. This cooperation was solemnly pro
claimed when Josip Rajacic, the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch of Sremski
Karlovci in the Vojvodina, bestowed his blessings in Zagreb on Jelacic,
the Catholic governor. Both Serbs and Croats, joined by Serbian volun
teers from the principality, now fought together against the Hungarians.
In addition, the government of Prince Alexander Karadjordjevic in Bel
grade clandestinely encouraged its Serbian conationals with arms, sup
plies, and men.
Although both the Serbs and Croatians were strongly anti-Magyar,
neither at this time opposed the Habsburg government. In 1848 their
ideas were best expressed in the Austro-Slav program, whose purpose
was to gain political equality for the Slavs within a federalized empire. In
1849 Serbian and Croatian military units joined Austrian, Russian, and
Romanian soldiers in crushing the Hungarian revolution. Jelacic led his

troops loyally even though by this time he knew that the Habsburg gov
ernment would not grant the type of local autonomy that both the Slavic
peoples and the Romanians sought.
The revolutions of 1848-49 meant the end of the Illyrian movement.
Within a decade two opposing political currents emerged. The first em
phasized Croatian nationalism, while the second was an expansion of the
Illyrian idea. In 1861 Ante Starcevic and Eugen Kvaternik founded the
Party of Rights (i.e., state’s rights). Its program, which was in the tradi
tion of nineteenth-century nationalism, called for the formation of an in
dependent Croatia. As for Illyrianism, Starcevic not only scorned it, but
he even denied the existence of the Serbs and the Slovenes as a separate
people. The former he regarded as Croats who had become Orthodox;
the latter, as “mountain Croats.” He could thus plan to incorporate these
people in the future greater Croatia. This program, which was the
strongest expression of Croatian separatism to date, repudiated the be
liefs of both the Magyarones and those who wished to cooperate with
Vienna. Hungarians and Germans alike were seen as enemies. More im
portant, the party rejected any accommodation with the Serbs or Slo
venes. Ultimately, Prava&tvo, as the program was called, played a major
role in dividing the South Slavs of the empire. The Serbs of Serbia could
understand its implications because it was the Croatian counterpart of
their own greater Serbian national ideas.
The Illyrian tradition was carried on by the Catholic clerics Josip Juraj
Strossmayer and Franjo Racki. The two were to be an inseparable part
nership. Strossmayer, the bishop of Djakovo and Croatia’s leading eccle
siastical spokesman, was an astute politician with great influence and au
thority among his own people and abroad. Canon Racki, more the
intellectual, developed the basic ideas of Yugoslavism as their program
came to be called. Whereas Starcevic had rejected the Illyrian move
ment, Strossmayer and Radki developed it further. The immediate goal of
Illyrianism had been the unification of the South Slavs of the empire; the
aim of Yugoslavism was to join together all South Slavs both within and
without the monarchy. Illyrianism had been oriented more toward Cen
tral Europe. It had stressed linguistic and cultural unity and it had at
tempted to overlook religious issues. Yugoslavism was directed towards
the Balkans, and its leaders sought to bridge the religious differences be
tween the Serbs and the Croats. In contrast to Starcevic, who wished an
independent Croatia, Strossmayer and Racki saw the country as part of
a South Slav federation. To further their goals they established in Za
greb a “Yugoslav” rather than a “Croatian” Academy of Arts and
Sciences to provide, among other things, an outlet for all South Slavic
scholarly publications.
In line with his beliefs Strossmayer attempted to establish contacts
Balkan Nationalities in the Habshurg Empire 253
with the Serbian government. At this time, it will be recalled, Prince
Michael and his foreign minister Garasanin were pursuing an active
foreign policy aimed at uniting Montenegro, Greece, and Romania
against the Ottoman Empire. They entered into correspondence with
Strossmayer with the aim of using him for their goals rather than work
ing toward a union with the Habsburg South Slavs. The Ottoman lands
were their target, not the Habsburg Empire. In fact, in 1866 when
Strossmayer believed that he had reached an understanding with Bel
grade, the Serbian government was negotiating an accord with the
Magyars at the expense of the Croats.
In addition to these two groups two other Croatian parties were in ex
istence, one pro-Magyar and the other pro-Habsburg. The Magyarones
still supported the idea that the Croats should join with the Hungarians
in a common front against Vienna. They wished the restoral of rights
and privileges enjoyed before 1848, and they sought the abolition of the
Bach system. At this time also Ivan Mazuranic, a well-known Croatian
author, formed the Independent National Party. Its goal was to restore
the Triune Kingdom through cooperation with the Habsburg govern
ment. Since Dalmatia was under Vienna, Mazuranic thought that his ob
jectives could only be obtained by a pro-Habsburg policy. The existence
of these parties demonstrated the divisions among politically conscious
Croatians. It will be noted, however, that of the four parties, three were
based on cooperation with other national groups.
The Ausgleich was a blow to all of the parties except the Magyarones,
who, of course, approved it. In 1868 the Hungarians and the Croatians
signed another agreement, the Nagodba (Compromise), which allowed
Croatia-Slavonia a large degree of self-government. Croatia was to have
its own Sabor (assembly); the official language was to be Croatian, and
the Croatian flag' was to fly beside the Hungarian. In addition, a delega
tion of Croatian representatives was to take part in the common parlia
ment in Budapest. The ban, however, was still appointed by the Hungar
ian government, which also maintained considerable control over
Croatian finances.
For different reasons Strossmayer, Racki, Starcevic, Kvaternik, and
Mazuranic all rejected the agreement. The new ban, Levin Rauch, was
able to manipulate the elections to the Croatian assembly to bring about
an overwhelming victory for the Magyarones. With the failure of his
program Kvaternik organized a revolt at Rakovica to liberate Croatia by
force. It was immediately crushed by the army and its leader was killed.
Strossmayer became disillusioned with the new developments and with
drew from active politics. He continued nevertheless to support the
Yugoslav idea in his writings and speeches until his death in 1905.
The real test of Serbo-Croatian relations and the Yugoslav idea was to
come during the crisis of the 1870s and particularly after the Habsburg
occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1878. Here issues arose in which

the Croatian and Serbian national ideas were in direct conflict. The
Habsburg administration of these lands, which Serbia regarded as eth
nically hers, was a tremendous blow to the Serbian nationalist. In Croa
tia, however, the reaction was different. It was felt that since the prov
inces were now under Habsburg control it would be easier for the
Croatians to assert their claims to the lands than if they had remained a
part of the Ottoman Empire, or, worse, if they were to fall to Serbia. The
issue concerned both those who favored a Yugoslavia and those who
were for an independent Croatia. Because of their central locadon, who
ever held this territory would dominate a South Slav state; without this
area a separate Croatia was impossible.
The geopolitical importance of Bosnia-Hercegovina to Croatia is best
understood in the context of the Triune Kingdom. These three lands—
Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia—are shaped like a crude boomerang. In
this form they are militarily indefensible. With Bosnia-Hercegovina the
Triune Kingdom would be transformed into a quadrilateral, and thus it
would become a viable state. While the area was indispensable to a Croa
tian state, its annexation by Serbia would be disastrous for the Croatian
position in their historic lands. Because of the Military Frontier, with its
high concentration of Serbs, the danger existed that should Serbia ever
succeed in carrying through the greater Serbian program of uniting all
her people, Croatia would lose her claims to Bosnia-Hercegovina and
much of her southern lands in the Military Frontier. In fact by seizing
the Lika region in southwestern Croatia, which had a large Serbian pop
ulation, Serbia could drive a wedge between Croatia and Dalmatia.
Should this happen it would be inevitable that the rest of the Croatian
territories would eventually be absorbed by the neighboring states. In
this contest the Croatians had the disability that only 20 percent of the
population of Bosnia-Hercegovina could be classified as Croatian, while
43 percent were Orthodox Serbs. The third of the population that was
Muslim was to be courted by both sides.
The disputes over Bosnia-Hercegovina were a prelude to a quarter
century, 1878-1903, of strong antagonism between the Serbs and the
Croats. At the same time, in Serbia, as has been shown, Milan and his son
Alexander worked closely with Vienna. In Croatia Ban Charles Khuen-
Hédervâry, who was in office from 1883 to 1903, successfully increased
hostility between the Serbs and the Croats by using a divide and rule pol
icy. Favoring the Serbian minority in educational, economic, and politi
cal matters, he thus won the support of the Serbian middle class, some
intellectuals, and the clergy. Understandably, the Croats responded by
giving strong support to Starcevic’s Party of Rights. In the 1880s this
group, with its strident Croatian nationalism and its anti-Serbian tone,
clearly dominated the Croatian political scene. In the 1890s relations
were so bad that bloody clashes took place between Croats and Serbs in
Zagreb and other cities. These incidents in turn elicited an angry re
sponse from Belgrade, where some went so far as to demand a war of ex
termination between the two South Slav peoples.
In these years Yugoslavism as a political program practically disap
peared. In 1903, however, an abrupt change took place. In that year, it
will be remembered, Peter Karadjordjevic became king of Serbia. At the
same time Khuen-Hédervâry was replaced as ban of Croatia, and Ben
jamin Kallay, who had been governor of Bosnia-Hercegovina in the pre
ceding two decades, was removed. Although the provinces had bene
fited materially during Kallay’s tenure, the political situation had
worsened. Attempts had even been made by the Habsburg authorities to
foster a separate Bosnian nationalism. The principal changes were, how
ever, those in Belgrade and Zagreb. Relations between the Croatians and
the Magyars now improved, but those between the Serbian kingdom and
the Habsburg monarchy declined precipitously. With a new regime in
power in Belgrade, the Serbian government could better contemplate
the possibility of exploiting the Habsburg national problems to its own
benefit.
During King Peter’s reign, as we have seen, Serbia was almost con
stantly in conflict with her northern neighbor. It was thus natural that
Belgrade should become a cultural and intellectual center for South Slav
activities. There were congresses of students, teachers, and physicians as
well as art exhibits and concerts. In 1904 some students and intellectuals
formed a society called Slovenski Jug (the Slavic South), whose purpose
was to bring about the unity of not only the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes,
but also the Bulgars. The events in Belgrade and the obvious improve
ment in economic and political relations between Serbia and Bulgaria
were observed by the South Slavs of the monarchy. Serbia under the
Karadjordjevic dynasty was now a point of attraction.
Changes were also taking place in Croatia. Hitherto the Hungarian
pressure against the Croatians had led them to emphasize their own na
tional idea and not Yugoslavism. After 1895, following serious student
disorders in Zagreb, many South Slav students left to study in Prague.
There they came under the influence of Professor Thomas G. Masaryk,
who, along with Strossmayer, became a foremost advocate of the Yugo
slav idea. A keen observer of Habsburg politics and an outstanding
scholar and persuasive teacher, Masaryk emphasized to his students how
Austrian and Magyar policy aimed at dividing the Serbs and Croats in
the interest of maintaining the dual system. By 1903 a new generation of
young Serbs and Croats existed who were determined to work together.
They held meetings and attended congresses in Belgrade.
Equally significant was the reconciliation that now took place between
the majority of the Croatian and Serbian political parties in the empire.
Impetus for cooperation came from Dalmatia where for the preceding
forty years Croatian and Serbian parties had usually collaborated, except
when they had direcdy opposing interests, such as in Bosnia-Her-
cegovina. In 1905 the Hungarians were again in conflict with Vienna
over the question of the army. The Croatian leaders in Dalmatia decided
to exploit the differences between these two centers of state power. Since
they now felt that Austria was the major danger, they backed coopera
tion with not only the Serbs, but also the Magyars and even the Italians.
They hoped in return for their stand to win Magyar support for the res
toration of the Triune Kingdom. These considerations were the basis of
the Rijeka (Fiume) Resolution of October, 1905, passed by a meeting of
the Croatian parties of Dalmatia. Two weeks later at Zadar (Zara) the
Serbian parties of the entire empire endorsed this plan in return for
Croatian recognition of the Serbian nationality in the Triune Lands.
These events in turn led to the formation of the Croatian-Serbian Coali
tion of 1905, whose program was based on the Rijeka and Zadar resolu
tions and whose membership was drawn from Croatian and Serbian par
ties from both parts of the monarchy. The goal of the coalition was to
achieve South Slav unity within the empire to be followed in the future
by a union of all the Yugoslavs. The coalition, reflecting the complex po
litical situation in the Croatian lands, was composed of the Croatian
Party of Rights, the Croatian Progressive Party, the Serbian Indepen
dent Party, the Serbian Radical Party, the Social Democrats, and promi
nent figures not associated with specific factions. The leadership lay in
the hands of Frano Supilo, Ante Trumbic, Josip Smodlaka, and Svetozar
Pribicevic, all of whom were to play major roles in future South Slav pol
itics.
Efforts to reach a reconciliation with the Magyars soon collapsed. The
Hungarian leaders again abandoned their demand for a separate army
and temporarily settled their differences with Vienna. Although at
tempts to magyarize Croatia continued and an effort was made to break
the coalition, the core remained intact until 1918. The chief result of
Hungarian policy was to drive the coalition closer to Belgrade. Many of
the ties with Serbia remained secret, but the coalition did not conceal its
desire for South Slav unity. Moreover, it was able to win a position of
leadership in the Croatian Sabor after the elections of 1906 and 1908. In
three years, therefore, major Serbian and Croatian political parties had
been able to reconcile many of their differences and to form a common
front which became the single most influential political organization
among the South Slavs of the empire, even though it did not represent a
majority of the electorate.
Meanwhile, the problem of Bosnia-Hercegovina had again arisen.
After the occupation of 1878 the monarchy had invested a great deal of
money in the provinces and had attempted to appease the population,
Balkan Nationalities in the Habshurg Empire 257
particularly during the governorship of Kallay in the two decades be
tween 1883 and 1903. Roads, schools and public buildings were con
structed, and attempts were made to modernize the backward area. The
Bosnian population had also taken steps to improve its own position.
The annexation of the provinces irt 19Ô8 had, as we have seen, produced
a great national reaction in Serbia. Many were ready to go to war on the
issue. In December, 1908, the Narodna Odbrana (National Defense) soci
ety, a civilian organization, was formed to rally the nation behind the
Bosnian cause and to send volunteers to fight the Habsburg occupation
troops. Within the monarchy adherents of South Slav unity held public
meetings, issued proclamations, and appealed for support through the
European press. Their cause was aided by the inept conduct by Habs-
burg officials in two political court proceedings—the Zagreb (Agram)
and Friedjung trials—which were connected with the annexation and
the Croatian-Serbian Coalition.
The Zagreb trial resulted from charges of treason brought against
some members of the Croatian-Serbian Coalition. The accused were
primarily Serbs, and the purpose of the trial was to destroy the organiza
tion by turning its members against each other. The trial began in
March, 1909, and lasted six months. The contention was that the coali
tion was a tool of the Serbian state. The evidence produced, much of it
forged, was of such a weak nature that even after the defendents were all
found guilty, the Budapest newspaper, Pester Lloyd, declared that “all
and everything [in the trial] was politics.” 2 In 1910 Franz Joseph par
doned the imprisoned men.
The Friedjung trial was more serious because its objective was to pro
vide a justification for war with Serbia at a time when it appeared that
Belgrade would not accept the annexation. Again, the target was the co
alition and some*of its members, all of whom were accused of being in
the pay of the Serbian government. Again, forgeries were used by the
Habsburg authorities, some of which appeared to have been constructed
with the knowledge of the foreign minister, Count Aehrenthal. When
the nature of the proceedings became clear, the charges were dropped
and the accused exonerated. Both trials provided fine material for South
Slav propaganda, and they received a great deal of attention in the Euro
pean press.
The primary target during the Friedjung trial was Frano Supilo, the
head of the coalition. Although not convicted, he resigned to protect the
coalition. The members then elected Svetozar Pribicevic, the leader of
the Serbian Independent Party. Whereas Supilo, a Croat from Dalmatia,
had believed that Croatia should lead Yugoslav unification, Pribicevic, a
Serb from Croatia, saw Serbia in this role. The fact that a Serb led the co-
2. Henry Wickham Steed, Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922: A Personal Narrative (New
York: Doubleday 8c Page, 1924), vol. 1, p. 307.
alition was another example of the success of the attempts to reconcile

the two Slavic peoples since 1903. Equally important, as a Serb, Pri-
biüevic could serve as an effective link to Belgrade.
Despite the achievements of the coalition, the popularity of the Yugo
slav idea among a greater circle of people, and the continued mistakes
made by chauvinistic Hungarian and Habsburg officials, the majority of
Croatians on the eve of the World War wished reform within the em
pire, not its dissolution and the formation of a South Slav state with Ser
bia. The former fears and hesitations remained. Thus the Pure Party of
Rights, which broke off from the Party of Rights in the 1890s, strongly
championed an autonomous Greater Croatia, which would include
Bosnia-Hercegovina and remain part of the empire. It was actively hos
tile to Serbia. The Peasant Party of Stjepan Radie, which was to be the
strongest Croatian party after the war, supported only the union of the
South Slavs of the monarchy. This viewpoint was now shared by the
Social Democrats, who wished a “national-cultural” union, but without
leaving the state. In addition, the program of Trialism associated with
the name of the heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, who in fact did not
espouse the idea, had wide appeal. In this plan the South Slavs of the
empire were to be united in a political unit equal to the two already in ex
istence. Throughout the programs of most of the Croatian parties the
awareness of the religious difference with Belgrade was apparent, but,
even more important, their members did not want to be drawn into the
Balkans, an area which they felt was culturally inferior, by a union with
Serbia.
After the turn of the century another element entered Croatian poli
tics. Hitherto the Croatians had used legal and peaceful means to
achieve their goals. Now, however, a group of young students appeared
who, impatient with both the supporters of the coalition and those who
opposed it, resorted to violence. Thus, in 1912 two efforts were made to
assassinate the ban of Croatia, Slavko Cuvaj, and in 1913 and 1914 at
tempts were made on the life of his successor, Ivo Skerlecz.
Although the emphasis in this account has been on the events in
Croatia-Slavonia, a brief comment should be made on developments in
Slovenia. O f the South Slavs the Slovenes remained most loyal to the
monarchy, and their strongest party, the Clerical Party, supported Trial
ism, not Yugoslavism. Both factions of the Slovene Liberal Party were in
terested in gaining more autonomy for Slovenia, but within the empire
and not at its expense. In the same manner the Social Democrats
stressed national autonomy in cultural affairs, not the breakup of the
monarchy. Only some students of the Preporod (Renaissance) group,
founded during the Balkan Wars, believed that the Slovene national
question could be solved within the framework of a larger South Slav
state. Yugoslavism was thus not a vital force among the Slovenes before
1914.
The reaction to the Yugoslav idea in the kingdom of Serbia was, every
thing considered, even less sympathetic than among the Slavs of the
Dual Monarchy. It is true that to some King Peter had become a symbol
of South Slav unity; his statements appealed to many Serbian students
and intellectuals, within both his kingdom and the Habsburg Empire,
and caused much apprehension among officials of the monarchy. Yet
the dominant political forces in Serbia, the army officers and the politi
cians, were not so concerned about the fate of the Slovenes and the
Croats. Their attention had for over a century been directed toward the
formation of a great Serbian state embracing lands that were historically
and ethnically Serbian. Serbs under Habsburg rule, particularly in
Bosnia-Hercegovina, were naturally objects of their interest. Although
their aims were similar, the civilian officials and the military officers
disagreed on the means to be used. The politicians were realistic and
cautious; they saw the dangers of a reckless expansionist foreign policy.
The army, in contrast, with considerable support from the Orthodox
clergy, was willing to risk war with either the Ottoman Empire or the
Dual Monarchy for national goals. Understandably, the government
wished to determine state policy, but King Peter equivocated. The army,
which had brought him to power in 1903, retained considerable au
tonomy. Hence, in the decade before 1914 he was faced with pressures
from the Serbian statesmen and the military, each of which had their
own plans for their state’s future.
The loss of Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1909 was a bitter blow to all. The
government recognized that it had to back down on the issue; it even
curbed the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which was a civilian and
not a military ofganization. This attitude was not understood in the
army, which came to feel that at best the state was led by weaklings and
at worst by traitors. In face of what seemed to be a situation of national
peril, some of the army officers now determined to organize to prepare
to meet any further international crises and to exploit them in order to
bring the Serbs of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires into Serbia.
In 1911 the secret society Ujedinjenje ili Smrt (Union or Death), also
know as the Crna Ruka or Black Hand, was formed under the leader
ship of Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic, pseudonym Apis. One of the
conspirators in the 1903 assassination, Dimitrijevic was a strong patriot
and in many ways an outstanding man, but he was reluctant to entrust
Serbia’s fate to her civilian rulers. Army officers were the nucleus of his
group, but there were also other members who were intrigued by the
conspiratorial aspects or who strongly championed pan-Serbian pro
grams. The objective of the Black Hand was affirmed in the first article
of its constitution: “to achieve the ideal of the unification of Serbdom.”

The second article stated that this aim was to be attained through “revo
lutionary action, rather than cultural, and is, therefore [to be] kept secret
from the general public.” 3 By 1913 Dimitrijevic had become Chief of
Intelligence of the Serbian General Staff, a position of obvious major
importance. The army had its own network of agents among the Serbs
of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. Through them Colonel Dimi
trijevic worked for the unification of the Serbs, not the South Slavs.
The task of the control of the military was, of course, the duty of the
Serbian government, headed by Nikola Pasic, who was also the leader of
the Serbian Radical Party. A brilliant and astute politician, he was well
aware of the limitations of his country’s power. His handling of relations
with Austria and his diplomatic success during the Balkan Wars attest to
his skill. He was now faced with two alternative roads—whether Serbia
should concentrate on the establishment of a greater Serbia or seek a
united South Slav state. There was no doubt that the Serbian idea had
the overwhelming support of the Serbian people—the politicians, pro
fessional men, soldiers, clergy, peasants, and even most of the students
and intellectuals. Pasic himself adhered to this view. Furthermore, Ser
bian nationalism was in the tradition of the past, while Yugoslavism was at
best a nebulous concept. Moreover, Pasic could not ignore the army. Its
political role in 1903 and the military victories in 1912 and 1913 had
enhanced its power and prestige. It could, on certain issues, effectively
defy the government.
At the same time PaSic recognized that he could not rebuff the sup
porters of the Yugoslav idea. He expected the state of enmity with the
Dual Monarchy to continue in the future. Unredeemed Serbian lands
lay within that state. Consequently, any individual or group that could aid
in the Serbian objectives should obviously be encouraged. The Serbian
government thus surreptitiously maintained relations not only with the
Serbs, but also with the Yugoslav sympathizers in Bosnia-Hercegovina,
Vojvodina, and Croatia, lands with large Serbian populations. Perhaps
the best evidence of Pasic’s restricted interest in Yugoslavism was his
lack of concern for the Slovenes, who were regarded as essential
members of the Yugoslav movement by its sponsors. The minister was
also well aware that the advocates of Yugoslavism needed Serbia more
than Serbia needed them.
By 1914 the Yugoslav idea had won adherents in all the South
Slav lands. Although it promised a better future for all of the South
Slavs, it was primarily a Croatian concept and lacked mass Serbian and
Slovenian support. Even in Croatia the Croatian-Serbian Coalition did
not represent the majority of the country. The inhabitants of the empire
3. Vladimir Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966),
p. 374.
preferred programs advocating the unity of the South Slavs within the
existing political boundaries. In Serbia too, as we have seen, there was
strong agreement that the future goal of the state should be a strong Ser
bia containing all of the Serbian lands.4
S arajevo
The immediate causes of the First World War stem directly from the
complex situation arising from the force of Serbian nationalism, the
Habsburg annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the implications of
the Yugoslav movement for the monarchy. The incident that led to the
war is well known. On June 28, 1914, Franz Ferdinand was in Sarajevo
after attending army maneuvers in Bosnia. The day for the visit was
badly chosen; it was the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, the Serbian
national holiday. Security was inexcusably lax. Six young Bosnians
armed with pistols and bombs were stationed along the streets where the
archduke was expected to drive. The first attempt to assassinate him
failed when the bomb rolled off the automobile, exploded, and injured
some officials. This episode caused the plans for the procession to be al
tered. When it was resumed, the archduke’s chauffeur, who was not in
formed of the changes, was forced at one point to stop, back up, and
then proceed at an intersection. By chance another conspirator, Gavrilo
Princip, was on the street corner. He stepped to the car, fired at the arch
duke and General Potiorek, the military commander of Bosnia. He
missed the general, but killed both the archduke and his wife.
The conspirators, all but one of whom were under twenty-one, were
Bosnian revolutionaries in the romantic tradition. Gavrilo Princip had
been fourteen years old when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia. In the
six years that followed he and his companions were caught up in the un
derground activities of the province. The young men, who came from
one of the poorest districts of the Balkans, read extensively in the revolu
tionary literature of the day—Chernyshevsky, Bakunin, Dostoevsky and
Gorki as well as Western writers such as Ibsen, Wilde, Poe, Dumas, and
4. Since this subject is controversial, it might be well to quote the views of three well-known
scholars concerning the acceptance of the Yugoslav idea in the South Slav lands. Professor
Michael B. Petrovich, University of Wisconsin, writes that “in Serbia itself, while the Yugos
lav ideology was nurtured with sincere enthusiasm, especially by the intelligentsia, the idea
of the unification of all Serbs offered a more immediate attraction” to Serbia than did the
Yugoslav concept. Michael B. Petrovich,.4 History of Modem Serbia, 1804-1918 (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976), vol. 2, p. 607. Professor Bogdan Krizman, University of
Zagreb, states that “on the eve of the First World War there were . . . not many movements
in Croatia that were openly anti-Austrian or threatened the existence of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy.” Bogdan Krizman, “The Croatians in the Habsburg Monarchy in the
Nineteenth Century,” Austrian History Yearbook, 3, pt. 2 (1967), p. 144. Professor Fran
Zwitter, University of Ljubljana, comments that “on the eve of the First World War the
anti-Austrian movement was only in its incipient stage in the Slovenian areas of the
monarchy." Fran Zwitter, “The Slovenes and the Habsburg Monarchy," Ibid., pp. 182-83.
Map 11. The Balkan States, 1914
Scott. They particularly admired the activities of another young Bos
nian, Bogdan Zerajic, who in 1910 had committed suicide after trying to
assassinate a government official. The aim of the conspirators was to
eliminate Franz Ferdinand whom they saw as a major obstacle to their
principal political objective, which was the union of Bosnia-Hercegovina
to Serbia. They feared that the program of Trialism, which they incor
rectly associated with the archduke, would be introduced and that the
provinces would become an integral part of a reorganized Habsburg
Empire.
Two main aspects of the assassination need concern us here: first, the
responsibility of the Serbian government, and second, the degree to
which fears concerning Yugoslav activities led the Habsburg govern
ment to declare war on Serbia. The answer to the first question is com
plex. The archives of the Serbian government on this problem have not
been opened to historians, but there are certain generally accepted con
clusions. On the question of complicity the activities of two men, Pasic
and Dimitrijevic, are crucial. In late May or early June Pasic learned that
some young Bosnians who were students in Belgrade were planning an
unspecified action against the archduke during his visit to Sarajevo. The
Serbian premier also ascertained that Serbian officials had assisted them
in crossing the frontier into Bosnia illegally. With this knowledge the
Serbian government through its representative in Vienna attempted to
warn the Habsburg authorities on June 5. Since this advice was not given
in a direct or forthright manner, its seriousness was not appreciated in
Vienna. Neither Pasic nor members of his government knew of the
exact plans, nor did they assist directly in illegal activities.
Although the civilian authorities can be exonerated of the charge of
direct involvement, the Chief of Intelligence of the army, Colonel Dimi
trijevic, cannot be cleared. At the head of the Serbian secret service, he
did have agents in Bosnia. Since he was also the leader of the Black
Hand, he could have recruited the disaffected youth for action against
the monarchy. It is, however, almost certain that the plot was initiated by
the young men themselves and that the Black Hand merely assisted at
their request. Whatever interpretation is accepted, the fact is that
members of the conspiracy did meet with Dimitrijevic in Belgrade in
May. Through his offices they were provided with pistols and bombs
from an official army arsenal. Arrangements were also made to smuggle
them back into Bosnia. When the Central Committee of the Black Hand
learned what had taken place, it ordered Dimitrijevic to halt the plans,
but it was too late.
The question of Serbian complicity thus becomes the issue of whether
the Serbian government was responsible for the actions of its army of
ficers. The Black Hand was at this time a state within the state; it could
not be controlled. In June it was even able to defy the government on a
Macedonian issue and to force King Peter to yield his authority to his
son, Prince Alexander. The chief of army intelligence did provide the
assassins with the weapons used to kill the archduke, and his associates
did send the conspirators back to Bosnia illegally. The Habsburg gov
ernment, in these circumstances, clearly had ample reason to take strong
action.
The second question, that concerning the Habsburg opinion of the
Yugoslav danger, can be clearly answered. It had certainly been a major
subject of discussion among the Habsburg authorities in the past. The
implications of the program of South Slav unity for the integrity of the
state and the role of Serbia in such an action were apparent to everyone.
Two alternate solutions were suggested, one associated with the name of
the Chief of Staff of the army, Conrad von Hötzendorf, and the other
with Franz Ferdinand. Hötzendorf favored force. Since he regarded
Serbia as the greatest threat to the monarchy, he consistently advocated,
after 1906, a preventative war. Without Serbian support a Yugoslav
movement could not succeed. Ideally he would have liked to partition
Serbia between the monarchy and Bulgaria. In contrast, Franz Fer
dinand, who also had army support, preferred to reach an under
standing with the Slavic peoples and the Romanians. Regarding the
Hungarians as the major menace, he wished to grant more autonomy to
the other ethnic groups.
The assassination presented the imperial leaders with the apparent
necessity of making a clear choice, since they were convinced that Serbia
was implicated in the plot. They could either destroy the Serbian state,
which had been the center of continual anti-Habsburg activities since
1903, or they could await the slow dissolution of the monarchy. The
decision was reached over the long period between June 28 and July 28.
Foreign Minister Count Leopold von Berchtold and Hötzendorf were
the first to be convinced of the advisability of war; they then set out to
convince the emperor and Count Stephen Tisza, the Hungarian pre
mier. They also had to consult their German ally. It must be stressed that
none of these men expected the dispute to end in a general European
war, although the possibility was considered. Franz Joseph was per
suaded to accept a strong solution without too much difficulty, but Tisza
proved obdurate. He only agreed to action on the condition that Serbian
territory not be annexed to the empire. The Hungarians wanted no
more Slavs. With internal agreement and with the support of Germany
the Habsburg government then delivered a forty-eight hour ultimatum
to Belgrade. It will be noted that no attempt was made to reach an un
derstanding with Russia, despite the close association of that power with
Serbia. This action violated a two-century-old tradition of close consulta
tion between the courts.
The ultimatum to Serbia was designed to be rejected. It called for the
suppression of anti-Habsburg publications in Serbia, the dismissial of
anti-Habsburg teachers and officers, the participation of Austrian of
ficials in the investigation in Serbia of the assassination, the arrest and
dismissal of men implicated in the event, and similar provisions. The
Serbian government agreed to everything except Habsburg partici
pation in inquiries concerning the assassination in Serbia proper. The
apparent capitulation brought relief to the diplomats of Europe. The
German emperor, William II, called the answer “a brilliant performance
for a time-limit of only 48 hours. This is more than one could have ex
pected! A great moral success for Vienna; but with it every reason for
war drops away . . .” 5 The Habsburg government, unfortunately, did
not agree with this last opinion. Since the ultimatum had not been com
pletely accepted, the reply was rejected and the war commenced.
By early August Austria-Hungary and Germany were at war with
France, Russia, Serbia, and Britain. Italy and Romania, both a part of
the Triple Alliance system, remained neutral. Once again as in the Cri
mean War, the great powers found themselves pulled into war over
problems associated with the Eastern Question and the rise of the na
tional movements in the Balkans. In contrast to the earlier conflict, how
ever, the First World War was to be a catastrophe for all of the partici
pants. Not only did the Balkan states suffer devastating losses, but the
political repercussions were to bring down the Habsburg and Ottoman
empires as well as the government of tsarist Russia and imperial Ger
many.
Before proceeding to an account of this disastrous period, Balkan cul
tural developments in the preceding century will be discussed. The ac
complishments of the peoples in the Habsburg monarchy, the Ottoman
Empire, and its successor states will be included.
5. Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of the World War (New York: Macmillan, 1928), vol. 2,
p. 348.
CHAPTER 16
Balkan Cultural Developments
D uring the period under discussion Balkan culture evolved in close as
sociation with the political events. Books, educational systems, and art
works reflected, with few exceptions, the great central issues of the es
tablishment of the national state and the social tensions arising from the
political and economic changes. For this reason the preceding pages
have often dealt with literary figures and have mentioned the opening of
universities, libraries, and similar institutions. It is impossible to avoid
some repetition in this section. In fact, a discussion of cultural trends will
serve admirably to sum up the more than one century of Balkan history.
Chief attention here will be given to literature because of its primary
position in Balkan life, but some comment on art, architecture and music
will be included.
In general, Balkan cultural developments can best be followed on two
levels: first, that of the peasant and the village, which included the ma
jority of the people, and second, that of the educated and politically
aware minority, a group ranging in composition from the village priest
and the schoolmaster to the Romanian boyar and Phanariote merchant
prince. Toward the end of the nineteenth century a small urban indus
trial working class joined the first category. Although the main stress will
be placed on the activities of the second literate group, it will be seen that
both sections of the population were joined by common participation in
the national movements, by the intense interest which many Balkan in
tellectuals often devoted to peasant problems, and by the fact that folk
poetry and art underlay many of the products of Balkan high culture.
The primary characteristic of the cultural life of the Balkan peoples
was the strong national direction, including the aim of the establishment
of the independent, nationally based state. Once this goal had been
achieved writers and artists continued to give active support to their na
tion and any measures leading to its expansion and strengthening. Al-
266
Balkan Cultural Developments 267
though they often criticized its political and social organization, they
remained basically nationalistic in outlook. Controversies did arise, how
ever, concerning the direction which national life should take and
whether foreign, that is, West European, examples should be followed
rather than purely native forms. In this atmosphere it was inevitable that
writers and artists would be deeply involved in political activities, either
as participants in rebellions, or as teachers and holders of state offices.
The emotional attraction of the national idea and the dramatic events of
the century inspired fine artistic accomplishments, but also the produc
tion of what can best be termed blatant political or social propaganda.
In discussing literature, the central theme here, three divisions will be
made, each reflecting the major events previously recounted. The first
section will cover the role of Balkan literary developments during the
revolutions and the establishment of the first autonomous or indepen
dent governments. The second will include the early history of these ad
ministrations. The third will discuss the movements characterizing the
final years of the century to the outbreak of the First World War. The
shift from romanticism to realism to the modern currents of impres
sionism, symbolism, and decadence of the pre-war era paralleled, with
some unique local variations, comparable movements in general Euro
pean cultural life. The relationship was to become a major point of
dispute.
The evolution toward a modern national culture began in the eigh
teenth century before the chronological limits of this study. All Balkan
peoples entered the new era with two major foundations for further de
velopment. Of first importance was the basic peasant culture, which
showed both common characteristics over the whole geographic area
and unique local qualities. The majority also shared in the Orthodox
religion with its'formal literature and music, its popular accounts of
saints and martyrs, and the world of art and architecture associated with
the Byzantine tradition. Catholic peoples maintained a similar rela
tionship with their church. In addition, some nationalities had a secular
literature of long standing. For instance, Greek writers, chiefly in Crete
and the Ionian Islands, and their Croatian counterparts, in Dalmatia in
particular, produced major works during the Ottoman period.
Because of the almost universal illiteracy and the paucity of printing
presses in the Ottoman Empire, cultural life for the majority of the peo
ple centered in deeply rooted folk art and oral literature. This heritage
can be divided into three general categories. First, poetry dealing with
nature, the emotions, and problems that the peasants encountered in
their daily lives, in particular, love, marriage, and death; second, stories
and folk tales, including those about local heroes, klephts, and haiduks;
and, third, epic poetry based on historical events. The latter were usually
sung or chanted, often by professional singers, to the accompaniment of
simple instruments like the one-stringed gusla. Such songs and poems
continued to be composed to record major events throughout the nine
teenth century, but with rapidly diminishing frequency.
For the national movements the epic poetry assumed a prime signifi
cance. The earliest in this group were the Greek Acridc songs, which de
scribed the exploits of Byzantine border fighters against the Arabs in the
tenth century. The most famous was Diogenes Akritas. For the Greeks the
fall of Constantinople was also the subject of narrative poetry. By far the
most significant cycle of songs for the South Slavs concerned the Battle
of Kosovo, the event symbolizing the crushing of the Christian medieval
states by the Muslim empire. Bulgarians and Serbs alike had a hero in
Prince Marko (Marko Kraljevic in Serbian, Krali Marko in Bulgarian).
The Catholic Slavs had similar poems concerning the struggle with the
Ottoman forces which date from the fifteenth century. Albanian Muslim
songs concerned the struggle with the Christian Slavs. In these epics the
emphasis was on the activities of the individual hero and the attraction of
the fighter’s free life. In the nineteenth century the national aspects
came to the fore. Thus the Batde of Kosovo came to stand not for the
acts of the individual heroes or Christianity, but for the fate of the Ser
bian nation.
This body of peasant oral literature was to play an active role in the na
tional revivals and in the subsequent development of modern literatures.
The first enthusiasm for the study and collection of this material came
from Europe, particularly from Germany. The romantic school found
such writings the best source for the expression of the “folk spirit.”
Writers from many countries, including Goethe, Pushkin, Mickiewicz,
and Scott, were interested in and translated folk epics. Balkan scholars
soon showed a similar concern over the collection and publication of
these works and made them a part of the national revival movements.
All of the nations exhibited certain common characteristics during the
first period in the development of secular literatures. Many aspects of
European romanticism, such as the emphasis on history, on the basic val
ues of peasant societies, and on the emotions and the imagination, fit
well with the spirit of early Balkan liberation efforts. The interest in his
tory held a particular attraction since all of the Balkan people could look
back to a more heroic era when they were free of foreign control. For
the Balkan scholars the revival of the past was to have more than an aca
demic appeal. It was regarded as an educational tool to inform and
enlighten a nation on its historic importance and to instill pride in its
previous achievements as a spur to political action. The attention paid to
language and its “pure” and “national” character had similar objectives.
In most instances this direction of intellectual activity was in opposition
to the church and to religious education, which was usually conducted in
a language not generally spoken by the community in its everyday life.
The rise of secular education thus involved a sharp break with an ecclesi
astical past.
The preeminent position of the Greeks among the Orthodox Balkan
peoples in the eighteenth century has been discussed previously. Not
only did they have political power through the church and the position
of the Phanariotes in the Ottoman administration, but they came into
close touch with general European developments through their rich
commercial enterprises. With centers of influence in Constantinople,
Bucharest, and Jassy and with large colonies in Vienna, Paris, and other
western cities, they were best qualified to inaugurate first a period of na
tional cultural revival. Because of the conditions in the Ottoman Empire,
Vienna became the center of the first significant activities. Books and pe
riodicals appeared here when after 1783 Joseph II allowed publications
in Greek to be printed. Paris and the Ionian Islands were also important
for the new movement.
The two great Greek names of this era were Rhigas Pheraios and
Adamantios Koraes. Of the two the works of Koraes held the greater sig
nificance for future writing. Koraes emphasized political education and
believed that the Greek people should be instructed through a knowl
edge of the classics. His major effort was thus directed towards the pro
duction of new editions with long introductions. His main undertaking
was the Library of Greek Literature, which appeared between 1805 and
1826 and included seventeen volumes of classical texts. Koraes’ activities
had an enormous influence on future Greek literary development. I n a
nationalist effort to “purify” spoken and written Greek of words of Ve
netian, Slavic, and Turkish origin and to reintroduce into current usage
many forgotten classical words, he devised a new form, katharevousa, the
purist language, to replace demotic Greek, the natural heir of Byzantine
Greek. As we have seen, katharevousa became the official language of the
independent state despite the fact that most subsequent writers did not
use it.
In the Romanian lands the impetus toward cultural change came from
two directions. Never under direct Ottoman rule, the Principalities
had always been more open to outside ideas than had their immediate
neighbors within the empire. Through the Orthodox church these lands
had been under a strong Slavic influence and the language was first writ
ten in Cyrillic. The Phanariote rule of the eighteenth century repre
sented another foreign element, one that had both positive and negative
effects. The Greek princes brought into the country not only Greek cul
ture, but that of the West. The Phanariote educational institutions of
Bucharest and Jassy taught mathematics and science. Through Greek
circles the ideas of the Enlightenment were also disseminated among
the Romanian boyars. European classical literature, including the works

of writers such as Molière, Corneille, Schiller, and Shakespeare, was
similarly introduced, often through Greek versions.
The second, and for the national movement more significant, impulse
came from Transylvania. The activities of George ßincai, Peter Maior,
and Samuel Clain (Micu) of the Transylvanian School have already been
discussed. Of prime importance were their efforts to trace the history of
the Romanian people in an unbroken line back to the Romans. Their
publication of grammars and historical works was to have a major impact
on the Principalities. The views of the Transylvanian School were
brought across the Carpathians chiefly through the endeavors of two
men, George Lazar in Bucharest and George Asachi in Jassy, in the sec
ond decade of the nineteenth century. The ideology of the adherents of
this school also involved the form of the written language. Like their
Greek counterparts, they wished to emphasize the ancient nature of
their speech and thus endeavored to eliminate where possible non-Latin
based words from the literary language.
This direction naturally tended to strengthen Romanian associations
with the other Latin countries, France and Italy. Particularly influential
in this regard was the work of Ion Eliade Rädulescu. The central orga
nizer of two cultural groups, the Literary Society of 1826 and the Phil
harmonic Society of 1833, Eliade not only wrote prolifically himself, but
he was also responsible for the translation and publication of many
French works. French political concepts naturally penetrated through
these channels. After 1821, when Greek power waned with the begin
ning of the revolt, French cultural influence became predominant.
As we have seen, the generation that led the revolution of 1848 was
largely French educated. Although the French imprint was strongest,
some of these men had also traveled widely, in particular in the German
states, the Habsburg Empire, and Italy, and they were aware of interna
tional cultural developments. Living in an era of romantic nationalism,
which involved a union of intense patriotism with an urge to take direct
action, these young men also placed a high value on literary endeavors.
Nicholas Bälcescu and Michael Kogälniceanu both influenced future
Romanian prose writing. Bälcescu is best known for his work on the
national hero Michael the Brave; Kogälniceanu, for his publication of
medieval manuscripts. The major poet of this period was Vasile Alecsan-
dri, whose career was to span the century. The historical fiction of
Constantine Negruzzi, the poetry of Iancu Väcärescu and his brothers, as
well as the writings of Dimitrie Bolintineanu and Gregory Alexandrescu
belong also to this epoch.
Similar developments occurred in the South Slav lands. Here, too, the
question of past historical glory and the form of the literary language be
came major issues. Because of conditions in the Belgrade pashalik, the
Serbian revival came from the communities in the Vojvodina established
principally in the late seventeenth century. As with the Greeks, the first
Serbian newspaper and journal were published in the Habsburg mon
archy in 1790s. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Serbs of
the Habsburg Empire had available to them institutions of higher educa
tion, libraries, and printing presses. Serbian students received the type
of education common to the other citizens of the monarchy. A language
problem, however, existed here too. The Serbian Orthodox church, with
its center in Sremski Karlovci, was closely tied to Russia. Theological
students went to Kiev for their training. As a result the literary language
became not Serbian or Church Slavic, but the so-called Russo-Slavic with
its high proportion of Russian words. This form was used by the church
and the educated Serbs of the Habsburg Empire.
A counterinfluence to this artificial usage came from the two most in
fluential Serbian writers of this period, Dositej Obradovic and Vuk
Karadzic, both of whom wrote in the form of the spoken language. For
the development of the Serbo-Croatian literary language Karadzic was
to be the most influential scholar of the century. Working both in Vienna
and Belgrade, he involved himself in a wide range of activities in the na
tional interest, including the publication of a grammar and a dictionary,
and the collection of folk songs and poetry. Through his efforts the
Kosovo cycle and the haiduk songs became part of the literature of the
national movement.
Like the Serbs, the Croatian writers were faced with a choice of lan
guages. At the beginning of the century Latin was still used to com
municate with the Magyars. There was also a national literature, which
had developed first in Dubrovnik and in the nineteenth century in Za
greb, but which was written in the two separate dialects of these areas. As
has been previously shown, the chief influence in the final choice came
from the Illyrian movement, associated closely with the name of Ljudevit
Gaj. Following the ideas of the Czech scholar Jan Kollar, that the Slavs
were one people speaking four dialects (Russian, Czech, Polish, and
Illyrian), he gave his preference to the stokavian dialect, which was also
that chosen by Karadzic.
The Slovenian intellectuals faced more difficult problems. German
held a strong attraction for the educated classes. Equally complicated
were the issues raised by the Illyrian movement. The political implica
tions and the advantages of sharing a common literary language with the
Serbs and Croats were obvious. Nevertheless, awareness of the distinct
Slovenian national existence remained alive. Two writers initiated mod
ern Slovene literature: Anton Linhart, who published a history of
Carinthia in German, and the poet Valentin Vodnik. A journal, the
Corinthian Bee (Kranjska Cbelica), was founded in 1830. Although issued
only until 1834, it published the work of the greatest Slovenian poet,
France Preseren. Unhappy in his own life, Preseren’s outlook was pes
simistic; his main work, A Wreath of Sonnets (Sonetni venec), concerns a
disappointed love affair, a theme which received a nationalistic interpre
tation. After Preseren the principal literary figure was Fran Levstik.
Both a poet and a prose writer, he was active in the Slovenian national
movement.
Because of the double restraint of Ottoman rule and Greek political
and ecclesiastical domination, Bulgarian literary development lagged
behind that of the neighboring lands. In the early part of the nineteenth
century, however, particularly after the revolution removed Greek influ
ence, the Bulgarian lands went through a period of economic and cul
tural revival known as the Bulgarian renaissance. Again as in other na
tions the first interest was in history and the language. The initial
endeavors of Father Paisii and Bishop Sofronii of Vratsa and the educa
tional activities of Vasil Aprilov were important. Mention should be
made also of the publication of Dr. Peter Beron’s schoolbook, called the
Fish Primer because of its illustrations, in 1824 and Neofit Rilski’s gram
mar in 1835. Although the first Bulgarian newspaper, the Bulgarian
Eagle (Bulgarski orel), appeared in Leipzig in 1846, the most successful
was the Constantinople Herald (Tsarigradski vestnik) published in the Ot
toman capital between 1848 and 1862.
Because of the political conditions within the Bulgarian lands, the ini
tial cultural centers were outside of the country. The question of the lit
erary language was setded with the adoption of the eastern Bulgarian
dialect. This was the language of the first major poet, Naiden Gerov. His
principal work, the poem Staian and Rada, was published in Odessa in
1842. Modern Bulgarian literature dates from the middle of the cen
tury. Among the first important writers was Petko R. Slaveikov, a poet
and journalist. A strong nationalist, he favored the gaining of Bulgarian
independence by evolutionary and not revolutionary means.
In contrast, three literary figures appeared, George Rakovski, Liuben
Karavelov, and Khristo Botev, whose revolutionary exploits have al
ready been described. These men were deeply involved in political activ
ity and revolutionary exploits. Their literary talents were at the service
of the national idea and they were closely associated with the conspira
cies of the time. The first, George Rakovski, it will be remembered,
moved to Belgrade in 1860 where his periodical Danube Swan (Dunavski
lebed) was published; he later lived in Bucharest. His major work was
the narrative poem, The Forest Traveler (Gorski putnik), published in
1857 in Novi Sad. The second, Liuben Karavelov, was a leading poet,
journalist, and prose writer. Both he and Rakovski were interested in the
collection and publication of folk poems. O f the three, the major talent
belonged to Botev. His reputation as the greatest Bulgarian poet rests on
some twenty lyric poems written between 1867 and 1873. A radical na-
tional and social revolutionary, Botev became a national martyr and
hero after his death in the ill-fated action in 1876.
The common cultural characteristics, such as emphasis on education,
national history, language, and participation in political activities, which
linked the Balkan nations in the first revolutionary period, continued
after the establishment of independent or autonomous regimes. At first
the new governments followed in the tradition of romantic nationalism
and patronized national educational systems, the foundation of libraries
and academies, and the publication of works that would be supportive of
the political order in existence and the national aims. A reaction soon set
in, however, to overstated chauvinistic literature and to reliance on
foreign models for national development. Most important, as economic
change took place interest began to shift to social problems, first to the
life of the peasant and then to the city-dweller. Awareness of and con
cern over the problems of peasant life in an age of declining prosperity
and the breaking of traditional patterns of life increased. Realism and
naturalism gradually replaced romanticism as the primary characteristic
of the national literatures.
After 1835 Athens became the center of Greek cultural life. The
Phanariotes, expelled from positions of power in the Ottoman capital,
now transferred their activities to the new kingdom. The deeply Philhel-
lene Bavarian administration favored the classical over the Byzantine
and Orthodox past. Athens was rebuilt in the neoclassical style on the
model of Munich. This emphasis naturally gave support to continued
use of the archaic form of the language. Greek writing was also strongly
influenced by French romanticism, which, with its attention to the past
and its emotional content, coincided ideally with Greek feelings in the
post revolutionary epoch. The foremost writer of the period was the
poet Achilles Paraschos, who composed highly patriotic verse in
katharevousa. Also of importance was the poetry of Alexander Soutsos,
the prose and poetry of Alexander Rizos Rangaves, and the prose of
Emmanuel Roides.
In the years immediately after the revolution many participants pub
lished their memoirs. The best of these was written by the military
leader, S. Makriyannes, in the vernacular. Constantine Paparregopoulos
wrote the first major historical work, entitled History of the Greek Nation
(Historia tou hellenikou ethnous) and published between 1860 and
1872. His objective was to show the links of the modern state with an
cient Greece.
Parallel with Athens, the Ionian Islands, under Britain until 1864, be
came a center of Greek cultural development. The greatest modern
Greek poet, Dionysios Solomos, was born in Zante. Influenced by his
Italian education, he wrote first in that language and then in demotic.
He did not finish his major undertakings, and only fragments of his
work remain. Among his most popular poems are the Greek national an
them, Hymn to Liberty (Hymnos es ten Eleutherian), The Free Besieged (Oi
Eleutheroi Poliorkemene), The Poisoned Girl (He Farmakomene) and The
Woman of Zakynthos (He Gynaika les Zakynthos). A second Ionian poet,
Andreas Kalvos, wrote in the archaic language.
The poetry of Solomos was to achieve great importance later in the
century when a group of poets joined together to challenge the romantic
writers of the older generation and to write in demotic. Expressing the
extreme frustration felt at the time with the development of the Greek
state, they attacked both the style and the language of their predeces
sors. The battle for linguistic reform was launched in 1888 with the
publication of John Psychares’ book, My Journey (To taxidi mou), a travel
account in demotic. The foremost writer and main figure of the New
School of Athens was, however, the poet Kostes Palamas. Dominating
Greek cultural life for sixty years, he is best known for his two poetic
works, Dodecalogue of the Gypsy (Didecalogos tou Gyftou) and The Flute of
the King (I flogera tou Vasilia). Nicholas Polites’ folklore studies were also
an inspiration to this group. The bitter conflict between the supporters
of the vernacular and those who preferred katharevousa was never finally
setded. In practice, demotic now came to be used in poetry and in most
fiction.
In Romania a similar reaction against the older ideas occurred. As we
have seen, the first writers had drawn their ideas largely from French
sources. Extremely active politically, this group, the men of 1848, had
led the movement that resulted in the unification of the Principalities in
1859 and 1861. They then formed the basis of the Liberal Party. In the
1860s a rival circle was formed around Titu Maiorescu. The German-
educated Maiorescu was influenced by idealist philosophers such as
Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. He and his followers formed in 1864
the group.known as Junimea (Youth). In 1867 they founded ajournai,
Literary Discussions (Convorbiri Literare) which continued publication,
with minor interruptions, until 1944. Almost all of the important writers
of this period were associated at one time or another with this circle. Its
program stressed reliance on native rather than foreign sources for po
litical and cultural inspiration. The political activism of the earlier gener
ation was also condemned. Conservative in its political stance, its
members reproached the Liberal Party for having a program based on
foreign principles.
The most famous writer of this group, Michael Eminescu, was also the
greatest Romanian poet. Born in 1850 in Moldavia, he led an extremely
unsettled youth. In 1870 he attended the University of Vienna, and in
1872 the Junimea group gave him the funds to spend two years in Ber
lin. He was later employed in lower educational offices in Jassy, and in
1877 he became a journalist in Bucharest. He became mentally dis-
turbed in 1883 and died in 1889. Despite his short life, he wrote a great
deal. His lyric poetry remains the base of his reputation; Evening Star
(Luceafârul) is perhaps the best example of his work. Often pessimistic
in outlook, he was attracted to the magical, dreamlike, and changing.
Concerned also with political and national issues, he believed that each
nation should follow its own spirit, and that it was the task of those in po
litical life to find the institutions which would best express this unique at
tribute.
Two other outstanding writers were associated with the Junimea cir
cle. Ion Creangä, who published almost all of his work in Literary Discus
sions between 1875 and 1881, is known for his descriptions of peasant
life, particularly for his memoirs of his youth, Recollections of Childhood
(Amintiri din copilärie). His literary versions of folk tales have remained
extremely popular. The leading dramatist, Ion Luca Caragiale, had a sa
tirical style and was interested in portraying urban life. Other authors
closely associated with Junimea were Alexander Odobescu, Ion Slavici
and Duiliu Zamfirescu.
The stand of Junimea on the subject of outside influence and, more
important, its members’ belief that art should stand apart from political
controversy were bound to arouse opposition. Criticism came from two
divergent directions: socialist and populist writers who expected social
engagement in literature, and nationalists who did not like the group’s
cosmopolitan attitude on certain questions of literary standards. Among
the latter were the most prominent Romanian historians. Historical writ
ing on a modern basis, as we have seen, had commenced with Bâlcescu
and Kogälniceanu and the generation of 1848. Now three authors,
Bogdan Haçdeu, Alexander Xenopol, and Nicholas lorga, opposed the
Junimea stand and continued the nationalist emphasis. Xenopol, the
first major Romanian historian, taught at the University of Jassy. Like
Paparregopoulos in Greece, he traced the history of his people back to
their ancient origins. His major work was the six volume History of the
Romanians of Trajan Dacia (Istoria Romînilor din Dacia Traianä) pub
lished in Jassy from 1888 to 1893. The greatest Romanian, in fact the
foremost Balkan historian, was his pupil Nicholas lorga. A man of
formidable energy, lorga wrote some 1,200 books and pamphlets and
23,000 articles and reviews, while at the same time conducting an active
and controversial political life. He is best known for his two syntheses
of Romanian history, Geschichte des rumänischen Volkes im Rahmen seiner
Staatsbildungen (1905) and the ten volume History of the Romanians (Is
toria romînilor) (1936-44) which also appeared in a French edition.
In the South Slav lands the romantic current, which included the work
of Karadzic, remained predominant in Serbia. The greatest Serbian
poet was not, however, from the principality, but from Montenegro.
There the poet prince Peter Petrovic Njegos wrote three major works
which rank among the masterpieces of Balkan culture. The best known,
the dramatic poem The Mountain Wreath (Gorski vijenac), was published
in 1847 and concerned Montenegro’s struggle with the Ottoman
Empire. The two others were Light of the Microcosm (Luca mikrokosma),
1815, and The False Tsar Stephen the Small (Laini car Scepan Mali), 1851.
The latter dealt with the life of an adventurer who became ruler of Mon
tenegro in the eighteenth century.
Other noteworthy Serbian writers of the romantic school were the
poet Branko Radicevic, the novelist and dramatist Jovan Sterija Popo-
vic, and three outstanding poets of the latter part of the century, Jovan
Jovanovic-Zmaj, Djura Jaksic, and Laza Kostic. By this time the cultural
center of Serbian life had shifted from the Habsburg Empire to the prin
cipality. The question of language had been decisively settled in favor of
the popular form with the emphasis in writing on poetry and themes
connected with patriotism, human emotions, and the natural world.
In Serbia, as in the other Balkan countries, the years after the
Congress of Berlin were marked by a growing concern over the prob
lems of the changing economy and the difficulties associated with the or
ganization of a modern state. Interest shifted from national to social
problems and to the life of the common man, in particular the peasant.
Instead of the romantic attention to poetry, the new realism was best
expressed in the short story. As previously, contemporary European
writing remained influential. The works of such authors as Turgenev,
Hugo, Zola, and Daudet were translated. Great interest was shown in the
Russian Populist movement and in the writings of Dobroliubov, Herzen,
and Gogol. A major literary critic of this time was Svetozar Markovic,
who was also the founder of Serbian socialism. In contrast to previous
trends, he believed that literature should actively serve the needs of the
majority of the people and deal with the basic problems of everyday life.
Among the authors of the realistic short story and novel were Jakov Ign-
jatovic, Milovan Glisic, Lazar Lazarevic, and Simo Matavulj.
Croatian romanticism, as we have seen, had found expression in the
Illyrian movement. After Gaj, the next eminent writer was Ivan Ma-
£uranic, who was best known for his epic poem, The Death of Smail Aga
Cengic (Smrt Smail-age Cengica). As in Serbia, the last decades of the
century brought a turn for the worse for the South Slav people of the
Habsburg monarchy, a change which was also reflected in Croatian liter
ature. The economic developments, as previously noted, led to the ruin
of the small nobility. After the Ausgleich the major positions in the state
went to other nationalities, particularly to Hungarians. Emigration in
creased rapidly. Reflecting the new concerns, the novel became the prin
cipal literary form, and urban predominated over rural themes. Almost
without exception the writers belonged to the Party of Rights and were
politically active.
The foremost Croatian writer in this period was undoubtedly August
Senoa. He believed that literature should have a social and national pur
pose, and that it should be written for the people. As a poet, editor,
dramatist, critic, and novelist, he exerted a major influence on his era.
Other Croatian realist writers were Evgenij Kumific, Ksaver Sandor
Djalski, Ante Kovacic, and Vjenceslav Novak. A similar development oc
curred among the Slovenes, whose authors included the poets Ivan Tav-
car and Anton Askerc and the novelist Janko Kersnik.
Historical writing progressed in both Zagreb and Belgrade. In Croatia
the central figure in the development of modern historiography was
Franjo Racki, the close associate of Strossmayer, who was responsible
for the publication of medieval source collections. Important also was
the work of Tadija Smiciklas and Ferdo Sisic. Sisic, the outstanding
Croatian historian, published a three volume History of Croatia (Hrvatska
povijest) between 1906 and 1913. The major Serbian historians were
Stojan Novakovic, Stanoje Stanojevic, Jovan Radonic and Slobodan
Jovanovic.
In Bulgaria the establishment of the autonomous regime created a dif
ferent atmosphere. Botev and Liuben Karavelov had died. Many who
had previously been engaged in literary activities found themselves
drawn into state service as officials or teachers. Most writers, including
Slaveikov and also the now prominent Ivan Vazov and Constantine Ve-
lichkov, worked for the government. Of the latter two, Vazov was un
doubtedly the best known and dominates the period to the 1920s. His
most famous novel, Under the Yoke (Pod igoto), was started in Odessa
where the author was in political exile during the Stambolov regime.
This book, highly emotional and patriotic in tone, dealt with the last
period of Ottoman rule including the April uprising of 1876. In 1896
Vazov published* a second novel, New Land (Nova zemia), which was
more critical in tone. Like others, he had become disillusioned by his ex
periences under the autonomous regime. Velichkov and Aleko Kon
stantinov, both novelists, shared this outlook. Konstantinov’s best work is
his account of his visit to the United States in 1893, entitled To Chicago
and Back (Do Chikago i nazad), and his satirical Bai Ganuo in which he
presented a major character who was the “embodiment of all that was
crude, unintelligent, blundering and bourgeois in the Bulgarian
spirit.” 1 While these writers described urban as well as rural conditions,
another group, chiefly influenced by the Russian narodnik movement,
dealt primarily with the crisis in peasant and country life. Returning
often as teachers to the villages, they met at first hand the disintegration
and destitution on the land. In this number were Todor Vlaikov, Tsanko
Tserkovski, and Mihalaki Georgiev.
1. Charles A. Moser, A History of Bulgarian Literature, 865-1944 (Hague: Mouton, 1972), p.
111.
In the third period of this survey, covering the turn of the century to
the outbreak of the First World .War, many of the earlier currents con
tinued. There was still concern with social and economic problems and
with the life of the peasant and the urban middle class. The idea was
held that literature and art should teach and serve with the emphasis on
the social rather than the national aspects of state life. At the same time
some authors believed that the cultural life of their country should join
with the main stream of European thought, which had become increas
ingly dominated by impressionism, neoromanticism, and symbolism.
They argued that national and peasant themes had either been ex
hausted or represented a backward cultural emphasis.
In Greece the continuance of the poetic tradition brought to the fore
two major writers. Angelos Sikelianos carried on the tradition of the
New School of Athens. In contrast, Constantine Cavafy, who lived and
worked in Alexandria, wrote in the demotic, but used some kathare-
vousa words. His poetry was, on the one hand, intensely personal and
sensual, and, on the other hand, historical. His historical poems are
largely set in the Hellenistic period of Greco-Roman culture. Since his
experiences were with those of the Greek community in Egypt, his work
was more nationalistic in content. In prose writing both the demotic em
phasis and the interest in the life of the common people continued.
Greece’s foremost short story writer, Alexander Papadiamantes, dealt
with themes concerning peasants and fishermen. Andreas Karkavitsas
continued in the same realistic line. City problems now received atten
tion in the novels of such authors as Gregory Xenopoulos, Kosmas Polî
tes, and Constantine Theotakes.
Romanian literature continued to reflect a reaction to the Junimea
standpoint. Both the new socialist left and those who continued to em
phasize traditional nationalism urged the return to an attitude of politi
cal engagement. In addition, a smaller group adopted the modernist
stand of contemporary western and central Europe. In general, how
ever, attention remained focused on the great problems of national life
and the peasant dilemma, which reached a climax in the revolt of 1907.
Like his Serbian counterpart Svetozar Markovic, the first major Ro
manian socialist writer, Constantine Dobrogeanu-Gherea, favored a po
litically involved literature. He directed his attention primarily to the
problems of the victims of the social and economic developments of the
new age. His most important work, Neoserfdom (Neoiobägia), was pub
lished in 1910 after the peasant rebellion. Of greater influence at the
time, however, were the works of writers who gave their full attention to
rural problems. In 1901 a new journal, The Sower (Sämänätorul) began
publication under the initial direction of George Coçbuc and Alexander
Vlahuja. The review and the circle around it stressed national and tradi
tional views. From 1903 to 1906 Iorga took over the editorship. A con
servative, he opposed both socialist and populist as well as modern cur
rents. Early in his career the great novelist of the interwar period,
Michael Sadoveanu, was associated with this group.
In addition to this circle another was formed to represent the populist
view, or Poporanism. Its journal, Romanian Life (Viaja Româneascâ), ap
peared in 1906 and was edited by G. Ibräileanu in close association with
Constantine Stere. Like the Russian narodniks, these writers believed
that intellectuals should involve themselves in political questions and
work for peasant reform.
Although the modernist school was first represented in Romania by
the poet Alexander Macedonski, its major exponent was Ovid Den-
susianu. Influenced by his studies in Paris, he became convinced that
symbolism was the true expression of the Latin spirit. In contrast to the
populist authors, he contended that literature should entertain and in
spire rather than teach.
A similar dual development was discernable in the South Slav lands.
Here, however, the modernist trends were more important than in Ro
mania or Greece. Although realism had been the prevailing mode, by
the end of the century a new direction was apparent. Since most Serbian
intellectuals had either had a French education or felt ties with Paris,
their models became French writers, in particular the symbolists. Social
themes were replaced by a highly individualistic and subjective litera
ture, which emphasized artistic value and style. The leading figures were
the poets Jovan Du£ic and Milan Rakic.
In the Croatian lands a parallel change took place. Although realist
prose emphasizing patriotism and the life of the people continued to be
written, Croatian moderna drew its primary influence from the new cur
rent. The principal writers of this group were the dramatist, poet, and
novelist Ivo Vojnovic, the essayist and critic Antun Gustav Matos, and
the poet Vladimir Nazor. Slovenian literature followed in the same di
rection.
In Bulgaria the modernist writers, known as “Europeans,” had their
center in the journal Thought (Misai) founded by Krastiu Krastev. Like
their counterparts elsewhere, they wanted to remove their writing from
social and political involvement and from what they regarded as paro
chial influences. They wished to introduce instead permanent and uni
versal standards. The poet Pencho Slaveikov and the novelist Petko To-
dorov were among this group. The realist novel continued, however, to
appear. The early writing of the two outstanding postwar writers, Elin
Pelin and Iordan Iovkov, belongs to this period. In 1904 and 1911 Pelin
published collections of short stories based on conditions in the coun
tryside and on peasant life.
Art, architecture, and music showed the same basic lines of develop
ment. Again, the foundation for the nineteenth century lay in the two
sources: the peasant world and the church. Under Ottoman rule a great
wealth of artistic activity existed on the village level with the emphasis on
textiles, pottery, and the ornamentation of homes, clothes, and persons.
Church exteriors had to remain unobtrusive because of Ottoman restric
tions on Christian buildings, but the interiors could be richly decorated
with ikons, frescoes, and wood carving. With the founding and the de
velopment of the modern state this aspect of national cultural creativity
gradually died. With industrialization, machine-made textiles rapidly
replaced homemade fabrics. Other village handicrafts followed a like
path to extinction. Ecclesiastical art was similarly affected. The new age
was secular; the leadership of the revolutionary movement was unlikely
to favor the investment of large sums in church building or decoration.
As in literature and politics, Balkan art and architecture were to be
closely tied to European models. Paris, Vienna, and Munich held at dif
ferent times an attraction for the artists of the different nations. As
could be expected, France was the main source of inspiration for the
Romanian artist. The first great modern painter, Theodore Aman, stud
ied in Paris and became known for his historical scenes, portraits, and
portrayals of village life. Nicholas Grigorescu and Ion Andrescu fol
lowed in the same pattern. At the end of the century the new trends
were reflected in the work of Stefan Luchain. Known for his use of color,
he took themes from village and urban life. Jean Al. Steriadi, Stefan
Dimitrescu, and Camil Ressu also belong to this period. The foremost
painter of the interwar period, George Petra§cu, commenced his work at
this time.
Serbian and Croatian artists were influenced by both French and Ger
man examples. In Serbia the classical school, which emphasized the
painting of portraits, historical scenes, and mythological subjects, domi
nated until the middle of the century. The outstanding painter of the
succeeding romantic school was Djura Jaksic; Novak Rakonic, and Ste-
van Todorovic were known for their landscapes. Among the realists of
the last decades of the century, the most popular was Uros Predic.
Milos Tenkovic, George Krstic, and Paja Jovanovic were also of impor
tance. The leading Croatian painter of the middle of the century, Vje-
koslav Karas, was connected with the Illyrian movement. As in Serbia,
realism then dominated until the end of the century. The new impres
sionist trend was introduced by Joseph Racic and Miroslav Kraljevic;
both studied in Paris and together with Vladimir Becic rank as the
greatest Croatian painters.
Bulgarian art developed more slowly. Although some artists studied
abroad before the establishment of the autonomous administration, it
was not until the 1890s that the country had an organized and active
group of painters. The first artists of importance were both of Czech ori
gin: Ivan Mrkvichka and Iaroslav Vesin. The landscape painting of
Nicholas Petkov and the work of Vladimir Dimitrov the Master marked
the height of Bulgarian prewar accomplishments.
As could be expected, modern Greek artists first studied in Munich
where they were primarily influenced by German examples. The main
painters of the romantic school -were Nicephoros Lystras, Nicholas
Gyzes, and Constantine Volonakes. At the end of the century French im
pressionism became of chief importance. Constantine Parthenes, one of
the greatest Greek artists, belongs to this period.
Although Balkan painters in general did not enjoy general European
popularity, two sculptors received world recognition; Constantine Bran-
cu§i and Ivan Mestrovic. Brancu§i was born in Oltenia in 1876 and
subsequendy studied in Paris where he was gready influenced by Rodin.
Abstract in form, his work also took themes from Romanian folklore.
Mestrovic, born in Dalmatia in 1883, received his early training in
Vienna and with Rodin in Paris. Although modern in style, his sculpture
before 1914 had a predominantly nadonalistic imprint. Later he became
interested in religious and other subjects.
In architecture the new Balkan nations were similarly under central
and west European influences. Only in Romania and Greece was any
real attempt made to build on national foundadons. After the establish
ment of the modern states the chief large-scale building naturally in
volved the construction of offices for the new bureaucracy, schools, and
libraries. Architects were imported, and the Paris of Napoleon III and
the Vienna of Franz Joseph were gready admired. Existing Balkan styles
were often rejected as “Turkish.” Only much later were attempts made
to preserve historical buildings and appreciation shown for native con
struction.
Perhaps the greatest adjustment from Ottoman life had to be made in
the field of musit. There had been no equivalent of the opera or the
symphony orchestra in the empire. Although the new states early ac
quired opera houses, in imitation of the other European capitals, and
showed a great interest in contemporary composition, no outstanding
national composers arose. The one composer of European stature, the
Romanian George Enescu, belongs properly to the next era.
In the preceding pages the cultural evolution of the Turkish and Al
banian-speaking people has been omitted. In general in this account Ot
toman developments have been limited to those directly affecting Bal
kan life. Although in the preceding centuries certain facets of Ottoman
culture such as architecture, language, and attitudes toward life had
deeply influenced all of the inhabitants of the empire, this condition
changed sharply in the period under discussion. Like the Balkan na
tions, the modern Turkish writers were strongly attracted by western, in
particular by French, literature. After the middle of the century, at the
time of the reform movement, standard French authors such as Racine,
Fénélon, Voltaire, and Lamartine were translated. The drama and the
novel were introduced as new literary forms. The Young Turk Revolu
tion accelerated this trend. Turkish writers used themes from their own
historical past and dealt with their own people, but in the spirit of west
ern European writing. The question of language, which was unusually
complicated, was not setded until after the First World War.
The general cultural background to the Albanian national movement
has been covered in a previous chapter. Mention should be made, how
ever, of several outstanding writers of this period. The national litera
ture originated in the middle of the nineteenth century among the Al
banians in Italy. The first prominent writers were Demetrio Camarda
and Girolamo de Rada. Camarda, a linguist, studied the language for
the purpose of demonstrating its ancient origin. De Rada, a poet, took
themes from pre-Ottoman Albanian life; his The Hapless Skenderbeg
(Skanderbeku i pafanë) described the struggle of the Albanians under
their great leader against the Ottoman invaders in the fifteenth century.
Other poets with this background were Giuseppe Serembe and Giu
seppe Schirö.
Increased agitation for autonomy within the empire marked the
period after the Congress of Berlin. Two authors, one Muslim and one
Catholic, were particularly important for the national cause. Naim Fra-
shëri, a member of the Bektashi sect, was a romantic nationalist poet of a
strongly religious temperament. His best known works are Cattle and
Land (Bagëti e Bujqësi ), Spring Flowers (Lulet i Verës), and History of Sken
derbeg (Istori e Skënderbeut). O f greater importance, however, was Fa
ther Gjergj Fishta, a Catholic priest from northern Albania. His great
epic The Lute of the Mountains (Lahuta e Malsisë) was published in three
parts between 1905 and 1931. Its main theme was the struggle of the Al
banians against the Slavs.
By the eve of the First World War the political evolution of the states
had thus been paralleled by developing Balkan cultures that mirrored
the change from the previous ecclesiatic, Ottoman-dominated societies
to the modern secular national states. With few exceptions, as we have
seen, writers and artists supported national objectives and provided an
ideology to back expansionist programs. These same men participated
in the life of the state and often held official positions. The audience for
their work was drawn almost solely from the same social groups that
dominated the new regimes. Toward the end of the period more interest
was shown in peasant life and in urban problems, but few writers were
revolutionaries in a social or political sense. A different situation, of
course, existed in the Habsburg Empire, particularly in those lands
under Hungarian control.
Extreme patriotism did not prevent the wholesale importation of
foreign ideas. Paris remained the primary point of attraction. The as-
sumption was made that western European culture represented prog
ress and provided a pattern that civilized nations must follow. Both
tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire were regarded as backward.
Abandonment of Muslim and Byzantine examples was usually consid
ered a step forward. Where there was a reaction against imitation, it
proved difficult to formulate concrete alternative styles. Of course, the
greatest creative artists, such as Eminescu and Solomos, did not follow
the pattern. By August, 1914, however, when the great powers became
involved in a war over what was initially a Balkan issue, the leadership of
the new national states was fully determined to emulate in their political,
economic, and cultural life the prosperous and apparently successful
great powers.
CHAPTER 17
The First World War
T he First World War began in the Balkans, and the first indication of its
conclusion appeared here when Bulgaria surrendered on September 29,
1918. During the four-year interval the peninsula was a secondary the
ater of operations. For the great powers the main battlefields were in
northern France and in the vast and fluid eastern front. The fate of the
small states was also linked to the outcome of the conflicts in these areas
rather than to local campaigns. After the beginning of the war both the
Allies and the Central Powers sought the support of the Balkan states to
strengthen the military position of their own alignment. The Balkan na
tions, in contrast, desired to complete the process of national unity.
There was no one great adversary blocking this objective. Instead, de
pending on the state, the enemy could be Austria-Hungary, the Ot
toman Empire, Russia, Italy, or even a Balkan neighbor. Thus, the gov
ernments committed themselves militarily and politically only when they
received assurances that they would attain concrete objectives. They also
did not want to be on the losing side.
The first Balkan state to feel the full effects of the war was, of course,
Serbia. A nation of 4.5 million now found itself in conflict with a great
power of 50 million. When it received the ultimatum the government
tried to avoid a war and accepted all but one of the conditions, including
those that, like the censorship of publications, would have required an
amendment to the constitution. The Serbian leaders had also wished to
continue negotiations and had asked that Vienna “not hurry in deciding
this matter.” 1 Nevertheless, on July 28 Belgrade was bombarded from
across the Sava and Danube rivers.
Despite the fact that Serbia could mobilize about 350,000 men, most
military experts expected that the monarchy would win a quick victory.
1. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents m the Origins of the War,
1898-1914 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1926), vol. 11, p. 371.
284
The First World War 285
As expected, the Habsburg forces crossed the Sava and Drina rivers and
entered Serbian territory. In mid-August the two armies met in a bloody
four-day batde, which ended in a major victory for Serbia, most of whose
troops were veterans of the Balkan Wars. The Habsburg army was
forced to retreat to its own territory.. By this time Russia had entered the
war and some Habsburg units had to be transferred to other fronts.
With their morale high, the Serbs then went on the offensive and carried
the war into the Habsburg lands. The situation changed early in De
cember when a new Austrian offensive resulted in the capture of Bel
grade. It was soon obvious that a major obstacle for the Serbs would be a
lack of supplies and replacements; only a limited amount of material was
sent by the Allies through Thessaloniki.
In mid-December the Serbian army scored another major military vic
tory by defeating the Habsburg forces at the Kolubara River. The invad
ing army again withdrew from Serbia and Belgrade was retaken. The
batde cost the Serbs about 100,000 men, and it became obvious that Ser
bia could not win a war of attrition or hold out in a prolonged struggle.
This victory was the last great Serbian military achievement. The
country was further weakened by a disastrous typhus epidemic, which
hit both the army and the civilian population. Notwithstanding the
fact that the Allies sent medical supplies, it is estimated that by the
summer of 1915 Serbia had lost another 150,000 people.
During the course of these and other deadly campaigns both sides
were engaged in intense negotiations to involve other Balkan nations.
The next state to enter the war was the Ottoman Empire. This govern
ment signed a secret alliance with Germany, directed against Russia, on
August 2, a day before Berlin declared war on France and two days
before Britain entered the conflict. The treaty was the work of Enver
Pasha, the pro-German minister of war. Thereafter, although the em
pire was not at war, it did aid the German effort. Eight days after the
agreement was signed, two German warships, the Goeben and the Bres
lau, sailed into the Straits to avoid capture by the Allied fleets. This ac
tion violated the international conventions that closed the Straits to war
ships when the Ottoman Empire was at peace. The Ottoman
government argued that it had purchased the warships, which neverthe
less continued to be manned by German officers and sailors wearing
Turkish fezzes. After two months of intense pressure from Germany,
the Ottoman fleet, including the two warships, attacked the Russian navy
in the Black Sea. The Ottoman Empire was now committed to the Cen
tral Powers; in November the state was formally at war with the Allies.
The Ottoman entrance had the profound effect of breaking the only
adequate lines of communication between the western Allies and Russia,
which were through the Straits. Because of the significance of this action,
the British government adopted a controversial plan of Winston Chur
chill, designed to open the Straits and defeat the Ottoman Empire. The
Dardanelles and Gallipoli campaigns were organized with these goals in
mind. The first began in February, 1915. The major action occurred in
the middle of March when eighteen British warships attempted to force
their way through the Dardanelles. After four ships had been lost, the
commander ordered a withdrawal. Had the attack been pressed, it
would have succeeded. It is now known that the Ottoman troops, be
cause of the shortage of munitions, could not have withstood another
day of bombardment.
Despite the failure at the Dardanelles, the Allies continued with their
plans to take the Gallipoli Peninsula, whence they hoped to base a major
campaign against the Porte. Although the Allied troops, who came
chiefly from New Zealand and Australia, fought stubbornly, the Turkish
soldiers were well entrenched on the heights above the landing sites. Un
able to break out of the tight area, the Allied forces remained there from
April, 1915, to January, 1916. Finally casualties, disease, combat fatigue,
and low morale led to their evacuation.
The entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the war, the weakening of
Serbia, and the failure of the Dardanelles campaign gave the apparent
advantage in the Balkans to the Central Powers. These gains were to a
degree offset when Italy joined the Allies in April, 1915. Italian unifica
tion had occurred late and was, at least in the eyes of the intense patriots,
still incomplete. Like the Balkan states, this government had claims on
ethnically Italian territory, but more important, it also laid claim to
other lands whose acquisition could be justified only on strategic and
military lines or for reasons of glory and prestige. The territories chiefly
coveted by Italy were the South Tyrol, Trentino, Istria, and Dalmatia—
all of which belonged to the Habsburg monarchy, and Albania—which
was in theory an independent state. Although a member of the Triple
Alliance, Italy had not gone to war with Germany and Austria-Hungary,
because the alliance was defensive and the action of the monarchy
against Serbia had been clearly offensive. Instead, the government re
mained neutral and immediately commenced sharp bargaining with
both sides. In these negotiations the Central Powers had less to offer.
The Habsburg monarchy was willing to surrender only Trentino in re
turn for continued Italian neutrality. The Allies were in a theoretically
better position because they could use Habsburg territory as an induce
ment, but even they were caught in a difficult position. Ostensibly, the
war had started over Serbia, but if Dalmatia and Istria were surrendered
to Rome, 700,000 South Slavs would be placed under Italian rule. Not
only would the creation of a Yugoslav state be made impossible, but Ser
bia would be deprived of the outlet to the Adriatic that she had sought
over the past decades.
The Serbian war aims, which were involved in these negotiations with
Italy, had in fact not yet been clearly defined. At the beginning of the
war the Serbian government was chiefly concerned with the fate of the
Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina and in securing an outlet on the Adriatic.
As we have seen, the Serbian government under Nikola Pasic was not an
ardent champion of South Slav unity, but it did wish to acquire the lands
that it regarded as ethnically Serbian. Moreover, tsarist Russia, on whom
Serbia depended for diplomatic support, was not for a Yugoslav policy.
In 1915 Serge Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, stated that: “if it
would be necessary for the Russian people to fight under arms only half
a day in order that the Slovenes be liberated, I would not consent to it.” 2
Despite this attitude, Pasic was soon forced to deal with the question in
his relations with the Allied powers.
As soon as the war began a number of South Slav leaders from the
monarchy, including Ante Trumbic and Frano Supilo, left for Italy
where they formed the Yugoslav Committee. From the beginning the
organization was committed to the union of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes
in a single state. Learning that negotiations detrimental to their cause
were taking place, the committee left Rome and went to Paris and Lon
don where it vigorously lobbied. At first no power would commit itself to
a plan that involved the dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire. Nev
ertheless, the committee’s intensive and vigorous propaganda campaign
did have its effects on opinion in the United States, France, and Britain.
Its major weakness was the failure to come to an early understanding
with Serbia. Quite understandably, so long as the Serbian state was intact
Pasic and his government did not treat the committee as an equal body.
They regarded themselves as spokesmen for all of the South Slavs. It was
not until the kingdom fell and its leaders moved to Corfu that an agree
ment could be made.
Regardless of whether the Belgrade government chose to follow the
path to a greater Serbia or to a Yugoslavia, the Italian demands were in
direct contradiction to Serbian national interests. The Allies themselves
were divided on the issue. Russia was, of course, more closely involved
with Serbia than was Britain or France. Yet in August, 1914, she was
prepared to grant Italy a dominant position in the Adriatic as well as
control of Trentino, Trieste, and Vlorë in Albania in return for prompt
military aid. At this time Britain and France did not share this view.
However, by spring, 1915, the military situation on all fronts made Ital
ian assistance even more necessary. Russia now proved reluctant to make
an agreement at the expense of Serbia, but her hesitation was overcome
by the British assurance that Constantinople and the Straits would be
Russian after the war.
The Allies and Italy signed the Treaty of London on April 26, 1915.
2. Milada Paulova, Jugoslavemki Odbor (The Yugoslav Committee) (Zagreb: Prosvjetna
Nakladna Zadruga, 1925), p. 54.
In return for its entrance into the war within thirty days, the Italian gov
ernment was awarded the South Tyrol, Trentino, Trieste, Istria, much
of Dalmatia, the strategic island of Saseno, and the port of Vlorë in Al
bania. The Greek-inhabited islands of the Dodecanese archipelago in
the Aegean together with a promise in a share of any Ottoman territory
that might be partitioned completed the bargain. The Allies thus gave
Croatian, Serbian, Slovenian, Albanian, and Greek national territory to
Italy in return for her services as an ally. On May 23, 1915, Italy de
clared war on Austria-Hungary and then waited fifteen months, until
August, 1916, to enter into conflict with Germany. This agreement ^vas
to have immense consequences in the future for the South Slavs and the
Albanians.
The next state to enter the war was Bulgaria. Throughout all of the
negotiations that government had only one aim: to gain what it regarded
as its legitimate share of Macedonia, including important areas under
Serbian control, and territories recently acquired by Greece, in particu
lar the port of Kavalla. It also wanted to regain the part of southern
Dobrudja that the Romanians had taken in 1913. In return for her sup
port Bulgaria had much to offer both sides because of her central stra
tegic position in regard both to the Straits and to Serbia. Should the state
join the Central Powers, they would then have a solid front from Ger
many to the Ottoman Empire, unless, of course, the Gallipoli campaign
succeeded. At the same time the position of Serbia would be made im
possible because that state could not withstand the opening of another
front in the south. These developments in turn would affect the attitude
of the yet uncommitted Romania and Greece. If the Allies, on the other
hand, could gain the support of Sofia, the situation would be reversed.
Bulgaria could be an effective military asset in the Gallipoli campaign to
seize the Straits and to open the supply route to Russia. The Central
Powers would then face a dangerous situadon.
In this bargaining the Allies were in the weaker posidon. Once again,
as in the case of Italy, they had to bargain with Serbian interests. This
dme, however, Serbia would be expected to yield territory, not like Dal
matia on which she only had claims, but lands in Macedonia which her
armies had conquered in the Balkan Wars and which were under her ad
ministration. So long as her forces were holding the Habsburg invader
back, the Serbian government would not make real concessions. Later it
would only agree to relinquishing territory east of the Vardar River; in
no case was the common border with Greece to be surrendered. The
Central Powers, of course, did not have to worry about Serbian sensibil
ities; they could agree to partition the country. However, both the Cen
tral Powers and the Allies were in the same difficult position in regard to
the Bulgarian claims against Greece and Romania.
Under the leadership of King Ferdinand and Premier Vasil Radosla-
vov the Bulgarian government was still suffering from the shock of the
Second Balkan War when all of its neighbors had been allied against it,
and of the Treaty of Bucharest, which deprived the country of Mace
donian lands considered Bulgarian. Both the king and the premier were
sympathetic to the Central Powers* Moreover, relations were now cool
with St. Petersburg. In early 1914 the new Russian minister in Sofia,
A. A. Savinskii, had told Ferdinand that Bulgaria would have to demon
strate that she deserved Russian support. At a subsequent meeting Sa
vinskii advised: “You must not forget that Russia has her own political
tasks, which exceed all others in importance; that is what the Bulgarians
have so often overlooked.” 3 It was clear that the situation of 1878 was
now reversed. Russian assistance would go to Belgrade and not to Sofia.
San Stefano Bulgaria was not a Russian goal. Despite this fact, once the
war broke out the Russian diplomats did endeavor to win Bulgaria, and
they were ready to offer more Macedonian territory than Serbia was
willing to concede.
Whereas Ferdinand and Radoslavov tended to lean toward the Cen
tral Powers, the country was in fact divided. There was almost universal
support for the acquisition of Macedonia, but the nation was not anxious
to enter another war. The two Balkan wars had cost 58,000 dead and
over 100,000 wounded. Both the Socialists and the Peasant Union op
posed further fighting. Yet the appeal of Macedonia finally overcame
most opposition. It was soon apparent that Bulgaria would join the
alignment that would best assure the acquisition of what were consid
ered just territorial concessions.
In the negotiations with the Allies Sofia soon found that the terms of
fered were closely tied to successes or failures on the battlefield. In May,
1915, when the Allied position appeared favorable and Italy had joined
the war, they were willing to concede to Bulgaria the Macedonian lands
south of the 1912 Kriva Palanka-Veles-Ohrid line, but on the condition
that Serbia gained Bosnia-Hercegovina and an oudet on the Adriatic.
The Allies also agreed that Bulgaria’s southern boundary could stretch
to the Enos-Midia line, within easy striking distance of Constantinople,
and that Bulgarian claims to Kavalla and Dobrudja would be considered.
The Serbian government, however, refused to agree to the surrender of
Macedonian lands until September, 1915, when its military situation had
worsened, but even then it would give up only half of the territory under
consideration.
None of these concessions could compete with those that came from
the Central Powers. Germany and the Habsburg Empire now offered
the boundaries of San Stefano together with all of the lands east of the
Morava River to the Danube. This solution meant the dismemberment
3. James M. Potts, ‘T h e Loss of Bulgaria,” in Alexander Dallin, et al., Russian Diplomacy
and Eastern Europe, 1914-1917 (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1963), p. 200.
of Serbia. In addition, Bulgaria was to receive Dobrudja and Thrace

should Romania and Greece join the Allies. An alliance to this effect was
concluded in September, 1915. In October a major Austro-German of
fensive was commenced against Serbia. On October 14, as stipulated in
the treaty, Bulgaria entered the war and attacked Serbia from the east.
At the same time the Allies landed four divisions in Thessaloniki in the
hope of aiding the Serbs. Unsuccessful efforts were also made to bring
Greece into the conflict.
Caught between two invading forces, the Serbian army, which had
fought stubbornly for a year, proved unable to withstand the combined
assault. Within six weeks the country was overrun. As the army retreated
in the dead of winter across the rugged mountains of northern Albania,
many died from enemy action, cold, or disease. Eventually thirty thou
sand soldiers reached the Adriatic and were evacuated in January, 1916,
in Allied ships to the island of Corfu. There a Serbian government-in-
exile was established under the leadership of Pasic and the prince
regent Alexander, who, it will be remembered, took control from King
Peter in 1914.
In early 1916 the Central Powers were thus in control in the Balkans.
In January the Allied troops withdrew from Gallipoli, and in the same
month the last remnants of the Serbian army arrived in Corfu. The Cen
tral Powers now held a bloc of territory running from Germany through
central Europe to the Persian Gulf. For this reason the alignment of the
two uncommitted Balkan states, Romania and Greece, became of partic
ular importance to the antagonists. Both of these nations had respect
able armies and occupied strategic positions.
Unlike Bulgaria, which had one principal irredenta, Romania had two
major areas of concern, Transylvania and Bessarabia, and two minor
regions, Bukovina and the Banat. Three of these were under the control
of Austria-Hungary and one of Russia. For both the Allies and the Cen
tral Powers Romanian allegiance was important for economic and mili
tary reasons. Romanian oil and wheat were needed by all the belliger
ents, and the Romanian army, although not as effective as the Serbian,
was an asset to any ally. In the preceding decades the chief Romanian
diplomatic ties had been with the Habsburg monarchy and Germany.
The defensive alliance of 1883 had been renewed five times, most re
cently in 1913, and was in effect when the war began. The agreement
had been made, it will be remembered, because of the Romanian fears of
Russia and, to an extent, of her Slavic neighbors, Bulgaria and Serbia. In
the years immediately preceding the war relations with Vienna had be
come strained over the Transylvanian question and also Romania’s ac
tions in the Second Balkan War. When the fighting commenced in 1914,
the Hohenzollern king Charles believed that his honor and the treaty of
1883 obligated the country to stand with the German nations. However,
he did not have the authority to carry through his desires. The real
power lay in the hands of his prime minister, Ion I. C. Brätianu, the son
of the great Liberal Party leader.
Whereas King Charles was pro-German, Brätianu was pro-Entente.
Brätianu’s goal was to unite all of the Romanians in one state, almost half
of whom lived outside of the kingdom in 1914. In addition, he sought to
preserve the balance of power that had emerged among the Balkan
states after 1913. Because of his amazing success in finally achieving
these aims he has been variously described as shrewd, Byzantine, decep
tive, and untrustworthy. Although these descriptions may not be wholly
justified, Brätianu must be credited with a remarkable ability to exploit
diplomatic situations to make gains for his country.
Before the war Romanian relations with the Habsburg Empire had
cooled while those with Russia had definitely improved. The Bes
sarabian issue still rankled, but the problem of Transylvania now re
ceived more emphasis. In June, 1914, on the eve of the assassination,
Nicholas II paid a highly successful official state visit to Romania.
Brätianu and S. D. Sazanov, the Russian foreign minister, established a
close relationship. Thus, by the opening of the war Russian-Romanian
relations were basically amicable. At this dme Brätianu seized upon a
diplomatic blunder committed by Sazonov which was to cause the Allies
great difficulties in the future.
Apprehensive over the prospects of war and desirous of influencing
the Romanian position, the Russian government on July 30-31, without
consulting Britain or France, offered Transylvania to Romania in return
for neutrality. At the same time Germany assured Bucharest that it
could have Bessarabia on the same terms. In other words, by remaining
neutral Romania would receive either Transylvania or Bessarabia, de
pending on who won the war. When these alternatives were presented to
the crown council meeting on August 3, only the king and the pro-Ger
man minister Peter Carp urged that the nation commit itself to the cause
of the Central Powers. The others agreed with Brätianu, who urged a
policy of neutrality.
In the next months Brätianu exploited Sazonov’s blunder. When the
Russian government sought to persuade the Romanians to join the Al
lies, it had no real leverage. Romania would receive Transylvania for
simply being neutral. When the Allies suggested that Russia make con
cessions in Bessarabia, that state turned down the idea, just as the Dual
Monarchy had rejected similar suggestions by Germany in regard to
Transylvania. The Allies did receive, however, the assurance of Roma
nian neutrality in a secret treaty signed between Bucharest and St. Peters
burg on October 1, 1914. In this Romania received the guarantee that
she would acquire all of Transylvania and those portions of Bukovina
that had a predominandy Romanian population. In return, the Roma
nian government agreed that it would permit Russian supplies to cross

its territory to Serbia, but that German matériel destined for the Ot
toman empire would not be allowed transit rights. Thus, technically the
state was not neutral; it was obvious which side was now favored.
Between the signature of this treaty and Romania’s entrance into the
war in August, 1916, negotiations were carried on concerning the exact
terms and conditions under which Romania would join the Allies.
Brätianu concentrated on gaining a written statement on the territories
to be received. The Allies in turn pressed Romania for concessions such
as yielding southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria in order to entice that power
into the Allied camp. The discussions and terms closely reflected the for
tunes of the battlefield. When Serbia was fighting desperately in the fall
of 1915, Sazonov appealed to Brätianu to aid the country, to whom
Romania was still bound by the treaty that joined the two states against
Bulgaria in 1913. The Romanian minister, however, observed that Ger
many had captured Warsaw, that the Austrians had retaken Galicia and
Bukovina, and that the Gallipoli campaign was stalled. Therefore, be
fore he would consider such an action he demanded a British and
French invasion of Bulgaria, a more vigorous Gallipoli operation, a new
Russian offensive, and the delivery of more war matériel to Romania.
These conditions were clearly designed to preclude Romanian partici
pation. Moreover, at the same time Romania continued to sell oil and
grain to the Central Powers, thus keeping that option open. For these ac
tions Brätianu was denounced in the Romanian chamber for “trafficking
with one side and with the other, deceiving both, lying in wait watching
for the best opportunity.” 4 Yet he continued to enjoy the support of the
majority of the chamber and King Ferdinand, who had succeeded to the
throne after the death of Charles in October, 1914.
The year 1916 found the Allies in a bad situation on all fronts. A stale
mate existed in the west; Russia was losing ground in the east. In the
Balkans Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers, Serbia was defeated,
and Gallipoli abandoned. Nevertheless, when in June, 1916, the Brusi
lov offensive was launched by the Russians, Brätianu concluded that the
moment had come to fight. In the campaign, which lasted three months,
the Russian army advanced about a hundred miles; it seized such impor
tant cities as Czernowitz and it captured about half a million prisoners.
This action coincided with the Somme offensive in the west. Brätianu
was now obsessed with the fear that Russia would take Transylvania
without Romanian assistance and that the province might be lost. He was
also afraid that a general or separate peace might be made in which
Transylvania would remain under Habsburg rule. The Russian govern
ment did not disabuse him of this suspicion.
4. Sherman David Spector, Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the Diplomacy
of ïoan I. C. Bratianu (New York: Bookman Associates, 1962), p. 30.
Romania now negotiated with Britain, France, and Italy and not with
Russia alone. Brätianu was determined to extract the maximum benefit
from the discussions, which lasted almost two months. He was successful
largely because the Russian military offensive was meeting stiffer resis
tance with each day, and so the Allies needed Romania’s active partici
pation. He finally obtained everything he wished. Romania was prom
ised Transylvania and the Banat up to the Tisza (Theiss) River as far as
Szeged. The boundary would then follow a slightly northeasterly direc
tion passing Debrecen to the Some§ River, giving a good portion of what
is present-day eastern Hungary to Bucharest. In addition, Romania was
to extend her boundary in the Bukovina to the Pruth River and to enjoy
an equal status with the other powers at the postwar peace conference.
There was no provision for a coordinated Russo-Romanian military ef
fort; Romanian forces alone were to operate in Transylvania. When
these terms were presented to the crown council, they were enthusi
astically received. On August 26, 1916, the nation went to war against
the Dual Monarchy.
Romania had waited too long. By the time the country entered the
war, the Brusilov offensive had lost its momentum. Germany now trans
ferred fifteen divisions from the western front, and the tide turned.
Within a month the Romanian armies in Transylvania were halted by
General Erich von Falkenhayn; next a concerted German-Bulgarian at
tack under Field Marshal August von Mackensen was launched in Do-
brudja. Bucharest fell in December, and the Romanian army and gov
ernment retreated into Moldavia where a capital was established at Jassy.
The Central Powers now controlled two-thirds of the kingdom, includ
ing crucial oil wells and grain supplies. In the next eighteen months the
situation became even worse. The Allies, including the United States
after her entrance into the war in 1917, made it clear that the dismem
berment of the Dual Monarchy was not one of the war objectives. At the
time these governments were negotiating with Vienna for a separate
peace. For Romania this decision meant the repudiation of the agree
ment that had brought her into the war. The revolutions in Russia in
March and November, 1917, also weakened the Romanian position.
The military defeats and the general diplomatic situation led the Ro
manian government to sign an armistice with the Central Powers in
December, 1917. This act was done against the advice of the Allies who
had wished the Romanian government and army to withdraw into
southern Russia. In February, 1918, Brätianu was replaced as premier
first by General Alexander Averescu and then by Alexander Marghilo-
man, a known Germanophile. This action was taken on Brätianu’s ad
vice. Should the Allies win, the onus for the German orientation would
be on another’s back. In May, 1918, the new Romanian ministry signed
the Treaty of Bucharest with the Central Powers. This agreement
awarded Romania Bessarabia, but it assigned all of Dobrudja to the Cen

tral Powers collectively, and a number of strategic areas in the Car
pathians to the Dual Monarchy. Germany also acquired control over the
Romanian oil fields for ninety years.
The last Balkan state to enter the war was Greece, who joined in 1917.
Her entrance was delayed by internal developments in Greece, which
differed sharply from those in other Balkan states. Although there had
been substantial disagreement on foreign policy in all of the countries,
finally one course of action had been accepted by both the monarch and
his ministers. Moreover, the policy adopted did not arouse enough inter
nal opposition to impede its implementation. In contrast, in Greece the
nation simply split into two opposing camps with King Constantine at
the head of one faction and Prime Minister Venizelos leading the other.
For the three years that this stalemate prevailed, the state could not join
either the Allies or the Central Powers.
As we have seen, the national program in Greece was expressed by the
Great Idea, which called for the unification of all Greeks; for some it also
meant a revival of the Byzantine Empire and the acquisition of Constan
tinople. By 1914 Greece had most of the Greek-inhabited territories,
including Crete and lands in Macedonia and Epirus. Nevertheless, a
Greek population remained under Bulgarian rule in Thrace, under Ot
toman control in western Anatolia, under British administration in Cy
prus, and in the Italian-ruled Dodecanese Islands. The first two areas,
Thrace and western Anatolia, now became the immediate national ob
jectives with the acquisition of Constantinople only a remote dream. Ne
gotiations toward gaining these areas were precluded, however, by the
conflict that developed between the king and his minister.
King Constantine was the brother-in-law of the German emperor. He
concealed neither his sympathy for the Central Powers nor his hope that
they would triumph. Many Greeks, some of whom had studied at Ger
man universities, shared his feelings. Realizing that Greece was exposed
to Allied naval reprisals, and that he could not gain direct assistance
from the Central Powers, the king favored a policy of neutrality. In con
trast, from the beginning of the war Venizelos supported the Allies and
was convinced that they would win. He wished to commit the Greek
army to their cause because he believed that this was the best means of
completing Greek unification. Although Constantine disagreed, he
could not dismiss this popular and powerful minister. Venizelos, on his
side, was unwilling to work for the deposition of the king. The govern
ment was thus deadlocked on the basic issue of participation in the con
flict.
Although Greece did not take a decided stand, negotiations were car
ried on throughout the entire three-year period. When the war began,
the country was technically obligated by the alliance of 1913 to aid Serbia
against an unprovoked attack by any power, including the Dual Monar
chy. The Greek government justified its inaction by arguing that Serbia
had provoked the attack. Instead, neutrality was proclaimed, a policy
that not only the king but also Venizelos approved under the existing
circumstances. Thereafter, the two men went their separate ways. Once
the Ottoman Empire entered the war and with the intensification of
pressure on Serbia, the Allies naturally became increasingly interested in
gaining Greek support. Later, during the Allied attempts to win
Bulgaria, Greece was asked to yield lands on the Aegean in return for
unspecified territories in Asia Minor. Venizelos was willing to give up the
Drama-Kavalla area and 30,000 Greek inhabitants, but only in return
for the Smyrna region of Anatolia with its 800,000 Greeks. This acquisi
tion would turn the Aegean into a “Greek lake.” Venizelos further con
ditioned the Greek entrance into the war on the simultaneous action by
both Bulgaria and Romania, an impossible achievement.
The Dardanelles and Gallipoli campaigns produced a major govern
mental crisis. When the action was being planned, Venizelos was ready
to join it. Both the king and the chief of staff disagreed, arguing that
participation would expose the country to a Bulgarian attack. They
would also not surrender any territory to appease Bulgaria. When his
plan was refused, Venizelos resigned in March, 1915. New elections
were then held, which returned the popular minister to power. Another
clash between the two sides soon came. In September, 1915, when
Bulgaria mobilized in preparation for an attack on Serbia, the Allies
urged Greece to honor the 1913 commitment. Venizelos again ap
proved, and Constantine consented to mobilize the army. The General
Staff, however, construed this as a defensive measure only. It contended
that the treaty obligated Serbia to put 150,000 troops on the Bulgarian
front, an impossible condition to fulfill under the circumstances. The
Allies then agreed to meet this commitment with some of their own
forces. Venizelos and the assembly accepted this solution. Between
October 3 and 5, 1915, one British and one French division landed at
Thessaloniki to be supplemented later by more French troops. On
October 5, however, Constantine repudiated his minister’s policy;
Venizelos again resigned.
The two camps in Greek politics were now irreconcilably set. New
elections were held in which Venizelos’s Liberal Party refused to partici
pate. Instead, his supporters formed a “semigovernment” in opposition
to the king and his adherents. The royal government in turn blamed the
nation’s problems on the Allies, whose actions it regarded as a violation
of the sovereignty of the state. The Allied troops in Thessaloniki were
harassed, and permission was refused to Serbian forces on Corfu to
cross Greece to join this encampment. Finally, in May, 1916, no resis

tance was placed in the way of a German and Bulgarian occupation of
Fort Rupel, which commanded the Struma Valley.
The Allies now moved against the king in what was indeed a flagrant
intervention in the affairs of the state. In June, 1916, they demanded
that Constantine dissolve, parliament, demobilize the army, and form a
new government. The king consented only to nominate another prime
minister. The final crisis came in October, 1916, when Venizelos trans
ferred his separatist government from Crete, where it had been formed
in August, to Thessaloniki. In December Britain recognized this regime
as the government of Greece. In the same month Allied fleets again ap
peared at Piraeus, where they stayed for more than three months. Fi
nally, in June, 1917, Constantine, without a formal abdication, surren
dered his throne to his second son, Alexander. Venizelos then returned
to Athens, and in June, 1917, Greece joined the Allies.
Whereas Italy and Romania on their entrance into the war had re
ceived concrete commitments on what they would receive in the future,
Greece had asked for no similar assurances. The country would thus
have to depend on the good will of the Allies for the acquisition of terri
tory. Not only was Greece assured of no concrete rewards, but the nation
remained bitterly divided even after the departure of Constantine. Nev
ertheless, the Greek army joined its allies in Thessaloniki and took part
in the last batdes in the Balkans.
The offensive from Thessaloniki was not launched until September,
1918. By this time it was clear that the Allies would win the war. The
withdrawal of Russia had been more than balanced by the entrance of
the United States. The final German offensives in northern France had
failed; the initiative was on the opposing side. Of the twenty-eight Allied
divisions under French command in Thessaloniki, nine were Greek and
six Serbian. They were faced with German and Bulgarian forces of
about equal strength. Whereas the Allied army had a high morale, the
Bulgarian troops showed little spirit for the battle. The war had become
a terrible burden on the nation. In addition to the losses in the Balkan
Wars, it had suffered an additional 101,000 killed and over 300,000
wounded. In other words, between 1912 and 1918 about 160,000 had
been killed and 400,000 wounded from a total population of about 5
million. The country had also experienced several bad harvests. Much of
the available grain had been bought up by the German and Austrian
authorities, an act that antagonized the urban population although the
peasants temporarily seemed to profit. Popular disaffection soon in
fected the army, which had to contend with extensive desertions. In
other words, Bulgaria was not prepared to face further warfare.
Under these conditions, on September 29, two weeks after the Allied
offensive began, the Bulgarians surrendered in the hope that their
country might be spared an invasion. The German and Habsburg forces
continued fighting, but were rapidly forced northward. By November 1
Belgrade had been taken and Serbia was freed from foreign occupation.
The Serbian army then crossed into former Habsburg territory and took
the South Slav lands of Bosnia-rHercegovina and the Vojvodina.
Serbia was thus in effective occupation of much of the lands which the
proponents of a Yugoslavia wished included in such a state.
Meanwhile, Romania re-entered the war on November 10 and imme
diately set out to take the lands that she had been promised by the Allies
in 1916. This advance was aided by simultaneous Serbian moves and by
Czech actions in the north. The Dual Monarchy now simply dissolved
into its national components. An Austrian republic was proclaimed on
November 13, and an independent Hungary on November 16. On De
cember 1, 1918, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was of
ficially proclaimed. On the same day a national assembly of Romanians
from Transylvania and the Banat met in Alba Iulia and announced their
union with Romania. Notwithstanding these developments, the crucial
question of the setdement of the boundaries of these states and their in
ternational recognition had still to be met. The dangerous issue of the
conflicting claims of the nationalities, even among the victors, had now
arisen.
Simultaneously, the other great multinational empire was meeting a
fate similar to that of the Dual Monarchy. On October 31 the Ottoman
Empire, largely as a result of a successful British campaign in the Ara
bian lands, was also forced to surrender. The disposition of the Ottoman
possessions in Asia Minor was to cause conflicts among the nations as bit
ter as those in Europe. In fact, the settlements in the two areas were soon
to become intertwined.
Before continuing to the peace negotiations, brief mention should be
made of Albania’s involvement in the war. After the departure of Wil
liam of Wied in 1914, the central government of the new state collapsed,
and the Albanian lands again became the victim of their neighbor’s poli
cies. First Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro occupied parts of the land;
then France and Italy seized territories. When Serbia fell in 1915, Aus
tria-Hungary took over most of central and northern Albania, while the
southern sections remained in Italian and French hands. After the Bul
garian and Habsburg troops withdrew, the Greek, Serbian, and Italian
armies took possession of the lands they claimed. Of all the Balkan states
Albania was obviously in the most vulnerable position at the conclusion
of the hostilities. The fate of this nation, as well as the distribution of
other Balkan territories in dispute, thus would be determined at the
peace table.
CHAPTER 18
The Postwar Settlements
T he conclusion of the armistice agreements in mid-November, 1918,

did not mark the introduction of a period of either peace or stability in
the Balkans. Greece and Turkey were not to setde their differences until
1922. Romania invaded Hungary in 1919, and Yugoslav troops on a
number of occasions entered Austrian territory until 1921. Moreover, in
the immediate postwar years drastic changes, which forced the peoples
to adjust to entirely new political relationships, occurred in most of the
areas under study. The major events were the formation of a South Slav
state, the establishment of a greater Romania, the expulsion of the
Greeks from Asia Minor, the revolution in the Ottoman Empire, and the
final formation of a stable Albanian government. This section will con
centrate on these questions rather than on a discussion of the peace trea
ties themselves. Some mention, however, must first be made of the basis
on which the treaties were concluded.
As throughout the entire century of Balkan history covered in this vol
ume, the final agreements were chiefly the work of the great powers,
with relatively less influence being exerted by the small states at the con
ferences. Nevertheless, there were severe limitations on the actions of
the strong nations. These states, too, were divided among themselves
and they had to face realistically the conditions in Europe at the time,
many of which had been created by the policies of the small countries.
Three former great powers were not at the peace tables. Germany was
excluded as a defeated state, a situation unique in European diplomacy.
Austria-Hungary had dissolved into its national components during the
last weeks of the war. Russia under Bolshevik control was considered a
dangerous revolutionary element; Allied forces were operating on her
territories. The settlements were thus to be the primary responsibility of
Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, the latter a new major parti
cipant in European affairs.
298
The Postwar Settlements 299
In the making of the treaties the statesmen were bound by certain
prior agreements, most importantly the secret treaties, many of which
were to prove most embarrassing to their signatories. There was also the
necessity of restoring the European balance of power, which was in fluc
tuation after the elimination of the Central Powers and the Russian revo
lution. In addition, further considerations had arisen towards the end of
the war, which had to be taken into account. Post-war Europe was in a
state of revolution; Russia already had a communist regime and that
state had become a center of revolutionary propaganda. Upon gaining
power the Bolshevik regime had promptly renounced and then pub
lished the secret treaties. It came to stand for a “people’s peace” and one
without “annexations or indemnities,” as did the strong Social Demo
cratic parties of Europe. In January, 1918, Woodrow Wilson repeated
some of these principles in his Fourteen Points and declared American
support for self-determination. These idealistic declarations were, of
course, in sharp contrast to the terms of the secret treaties, which bar
tered territories and peoples quite freely. The makers of the peace
agreements repeatedly had to decide whether they would abide by their
wartime pacts or stand by their publicly declared principles.
In the peace negotiations, therefore, two contradictory bases for nego
tiation existed: the secret treaties and the principle of the self-deter
mination of peoples. Each state tended to support the stand that was in
its best interest. The victor small nations thus tended to favor the secret
treaties and a policy of maximum territorial aggrandizement. The de
feated powers and sometimes Woodrow Wilson defended self-deter
mination and the concept of justice. Serbia, although a victor, naturally
denounced the secret Treaty of London. The western great powers,
France and Britain, were equally concerned about the restoration of the
balance of power, but they wished to go about it by different means. In
the treaties France endeavored to build up a front of victorious powers
in Eastern Europe to replace the former Russian alliance and to check
Germany. Romania and the South Slav state were to have important
positions in the new French alignment. Britain, in contrast, wished to re
store the balance through a more equitable settlement and a return to
normal conditions, although many compromises were made in her pol
icy. The British statesmen, well aware of past history, had also no desire
to see France emerge as the clearly predominant power on the conti
nent.
In the final agreements two Balkan states, the future Yugoslavia and
Romania, emerged as enormous winners; Bulgaria and the new Turkish
Republic were losers, as was Greece ultimately. Albania was restored to
her prewar condition. The fate of these states will be discussed in that
order.
T h e F o r m a t io n o f t h e K in g d o m o f t h e S e r b s , C r o a t s a n d S l o v e n e s
The proclamation of the establishment of the Kingdom of the Serbs,

Croats, and Slovenes in December, 1918, marked the culmination of
protracted negotiations that had been carried on during the war, and of
the evolution of Serbian policy. The initial lack of enthusiasm felt by
Pa£ic, backed by the Prince Regent, for a Yugoslav state has been re
corded previously. However, the government-in-exile on Corfu was
open to outside influence. After the fall of tsarist Russia, which had been
the major Serbian supporter, Pasic found that the domestic and foreign
pressure for an understanding with the Yugoslav Committee was too
strong to resist. In July, 1917, in the Declaration of Corfu the Serbian
government was, for the first time, formally committed to work for the
unification of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in one state. The political
form was to be that of a constitutional monarchy with the Karadjordjevic
dynasty at the head. A constitution for the new state was to be drafted by
an assembly elected by direct, secret suffrage. All religions were to be
recognized, and both the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets were to have equal
status. Local autonomy was to be granted. This document was also en
dorsed by the Montenegrin Committee in Paris, a group of refugee poli
ticians similar to that formed by the Habsburg South Slavs. It will be
noted that the great question for the future, whether the state was to be
unitary or federal, was not settled at this time.
At first little progress was made toward the implementation of this
common program. It will be recalled that in early 1918 Britain, France,
and the United States, who were trying to negotiate a separate peace
with the Dual Monarchy, made it clear that they were not seeking the de
struction of that nation. Determined to save what he could, Pasic in
structed his minister in Washington to find out if Serbia could at least re
ceive Bosnia-Hercegovina. When the Yugoslav Committee heard of this
move, there was a crisis within the South Slav ranks. By April, 1918,
however, when it became clear that a separate peace would not be made,
the Allies again shifted their policy. Very significant also was an appar
ent change in the Italian attitude.
In April, 1918, the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities was held in
Rome which ended by calling for the breakup of the monarchy. At this
time Dr. Andrea Torre, the chairman of the Italian parliamentary dele
gation to the meeting, signed the Pact of Rome with Ante Trumbic, the
president of the Yugoslav Committee. This agreement, which recog
nized the legitimacy of the Yugoslav goals, was concluded with the
knowledge of the Italian prime minister, V. E. Orlando, but against the
wishes of the foreign minister, Baron Sidney Sonnino. In the next
months Sonnino continued his opposition to the Yugoslav concept and
he attempted to block Allied recognition. Finally, by September he, too,
had to admit that South Slav unification could not be stopped, but he was
nevertheless determined to secure for Italy the terms of the Treaty of
London.
Meanwhile, as the hostilities were coming to an end, parallel develop
ments were occurring in the lands of the monarchy. At the end of Octo
ber, 1918, the political leaders of the Croats and Slovenes who had re
mained in the country during the war created a revolutionary
government, the Narodno Vijece (National Council) of Zagreb and pro
claimed the union of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of the Dual Monar
chy. This body was a third organization, distinct from the Serbian gov
ernment and the Yugoslav Committee abroad. It quickly won popular
support, and for one month it became the government of the South Slav
lands of the empire. It then voted to join Serbia and Montenegro to
form a new South Slav kingdom. In a solemn ceremony on December 1,
1918, in Belgrade the representatives of this group invited Prince
Regent Alexander to proclaim the union. The action also involved the
participation of Montenegro. A similar committee had been formed in
Cetinje and, against the strong opposition of Nicholas who had taken the
tide of king in 1910, had likewise voted to join a South Slav state.
In the excitement of the moment and under the pressure of outside
events, the Yugoslav statesmen of all nationalities had concentrated on
the basic issue of union and of gaining the recognition of the powers.
The question of the exact form of the association was thus not setded
before the unification was actually accomplished. In fact, the issue of the
frontiers was to take precedence over that of the future internal polidcal
order. The new Yugoslav state of December, 1918, had no setded fron
tiers. Once the unification was proclaimed this matter held the highest
priority in Belgrade. Here the most acute controversies were to arise
with Italy which now wished to implement the Treaty of London and to
win a predominant position on the Adriatic.
The Yugoslav conflict with Italy centered on three areas: Dalmatia; Is-
tria, with its port city of Trieste; and the port of Fiume (Rijeka). The first
two regions had been promised to Italy in the Treaty of London, but
Fiume had not. Both Dalmatia and Istria were predominantly Slavic;
Dalmada and its islands had a population that was 95 percent South Slav.
The Italians had a majority in only one city, Zara. In Istria the Slavic in
habitants numbered 58 percent, but the vital port of Trieste was over
whelmingly Italian. In fact, the bulk of the Italian population in Istria
was concentrated in the two cities of Trieste and Pola (Pula) while the
countryside was Slavic. Fiume, the only other natural port in the area,
was historically Croatian, but it also had an Italian and Hungarian ma
jority.
In the debates on the fate of these lands, Italy based her arguments on
the Treaty of London. Although the United States stood for ethnic
boundaries here, neither France nor Britain was prepared to repudiate

the secret treaties, from which .they too benefited, and they sought in
stead a compromise. The Yugoslav case rested completely on the na
tional principle and the clear preponderance of the Slavic population in
the areas claimed. The principal support for Belgrade came from
President Woodrow Wilson. In the peace conference he had already
gone against his convictions in allowing Italy to take all of Trentino and
the South Tyrol with their strong German minority of 250,000. In re
turn for this concession Wilson expected Italy to yield on the Yugoslav
frontier. Most observers felt that the so-called Wilson Line was a fair
solution. This boundary would have granted Italy approximately three-
fourths of Istria with about 370,000 Yugoslavs. Belgrade accepted this
settlement, but Italy would not. When Wilson went back to the United
States, the Yugoslav position was considerably weakened. The fate of
Fiume took up a great part of the discussions. In a dramatic move the
Italian poet, Gabriel D’Annunzio, seized the city and proclaimed himself
dictator on September 12, 1919.
The final setdement reflected more the Italian than the Yugoslav de
mands. In September, 1920, Italy agreed to renounce her claims to Dal
matia and to support an independent Albania within the 1913 bounda
ries in return for all of Istria, an independent Fiume, the city of Zara,
and some Dalmatian islands. Although the Istrian settlement meant
abandoning a large number of Yugoslavs to Italian rule, the terms were
reluctantly accepted by Belgrade. By this time also the Kingdom of the
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as the Yugoslav state was officially called
until 1929, had been recognized by the major powers, including Italy.
The second controversy over frontiers involved the new state of Aus
tria and centered on the Klagenfurt region, north of the Karawanken
Mountains. Finally a plebiscite was held which was won by Austria, but
the Maribor and Medjumurje districts of Styria were awarded to Bel
grade. Similar conflicts developed with Hungary over parts of Baranja,
Backa and the Banat, areas where the Serbs had a plurality of the popu
lation. The fact that the Serbian army was occupying these territories as
sisted the Yugoslavs in gaining the majority of their demands. In the
Banat, however, they met not only Hungarian opposition, but also Ro
manian. The Romanian government wished to annex the entire Banat
up to the Tisza River, which had been promised in the Treaty of Bu
charest of 1916. The Romanians also argued that the province was an in
divisible economic and political entity. The Yugoslav position, which
was finally accepted, involved the partition of the region along ethnic
lines. A frontier was thus drawn leaving Romania with a minority of only
65,000 Yugoslavs, and Belgrade with a similar group of 75,000 Roma
nians.
The Yugoslav government wished to make similar gains on their Bul
garian frontier. Here the basis for the claims was military and strategic,
Map 12. The Formation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 1920
not ethnic. The attempt was made to acquire the Struma River as the
boundary, to secure control of the Dragoman Pass and to take the city of
Vidin. In other words, Belgrade sought territories east of and well
beyond the natural watershed that had been the previous frontier and
where the population was indisputably Bulgarian. None of the other
powers would allow these extravagant demands, but the Yugoslavs did
receive four strategic salients—Negotin, Tsaribrod, Vranje and the Stru-
mica Valley. The Greek and Albanian frontiers remained the same as
those of 1913.
The battle at the peace table was paralleled by the conflict that devel
oped on the form of government to be established in the.new state. Two
major national groups, the Croats and the Serbs, were now brought
together; each had undergone an entirely different historical experience
in its political development. Serbia, as we have seen, in the accomplish
ment of its national program had fought first against the Ottoman Em
pire and then against the Habsburg monarchy. A unitary state on the
French model had been established early in the century. To the Serbian
leaders the new South Slav state was simply the culmination of the long
line of events leading to national unity. They saw no need to adapt their
institutions and their political convictions to their new partners. The
Croatians, in contrast, throughout their history had lived usually in a
federal relationship with other peoples or within a larger political frame
work. The union with Hungary in the Middle Ages and the subsequent
Habsburg rule had safeguarded the maintenance of a separate and au
tonomous Croatia right up to 1914. The Croatian leaders insisted on the
continuance of this tradition. They stood for the establishment of a fed
eral system in which they would be equal partners not only with the
Serbs but also with the Slovenes, who had a similar opinion on the
question.
In the Declaration of Corfu it had been agreed that a constituent as
sembly would be summoned. Because of the crisis with Italy this body
could not be called at once. In December, 1918, a cabinet was formed
representing all the political groups and the regions. A transitional gov
ernment was thus in power while the preparations were made for the
elections. Fifteen political groups participated in the voting, which was
held in November, 1920, to choose 419 delegates. The two winning par
ties were the Radicals, who elected ninety-one delegates, and the Demo
crats with ninety-two. The Radical Party was the continuation of the
prewar ruling party in Serbia, which was now supported by some of the
former Habsburg Serbs. The Democratic Party had been founded in
1919 and was composed of members of the Croatian-Serbian Coalition,
some former Serbian Radicals, Slovenian Liberals, and others. It was the
only Yugoslav party and it supported a centralist regime. Two parties
that emerged with surprising strength were the Croatian Peasant Party,
with fifty seats, and the Communist Party, with fifty-eight. The Peasant
Party under Stjepan Radie won the overwhelming support of the Croa
tian peasants, and it stood strongly for Croatian autonomy. Some of its
leaders even favored total independence. The Communists, represent
ing all sections of the country, received a strong protest vote in the des-
parately poor areas of Montenegro and Macedonia.
Before the assembly met the Peasant Party withdrew in protest against
the regulations drawn up for voting in the body. The government took
measures against the Communists after a conflict over a number of polit
ical and economic issues. Thus, only 342 of the 419 members of the as
sembly took part in the deliberations. Many drafts for a constitution
were presented. The government’s version was based on that of Serbia,
the only changes being in matters such as religion. The state was to be a
centralized, constitutional monarchy, with universal male suffrage and a
secret ballot, and the country was to be divided into departments. The
drafts presented by the other parties differed widely. The chief influ
ence in the assembly was that exerted by Svetozar Pribicevic, a Serb and
a former leader of the Croatian-Serbian Coalition, now in the Demo
cratic Party. A strong believer in the Yugoslav idea, he wished to end the
historic divisions. He was backed by Pasic, who not only preferred this
form but wanted to form a stable government as soon as possible. The
Radical and Democratic parties, the strongest in the assembly, also stood
for this goal. In June, 1921, only 258 delegates participated in the final
voting. Not only the Peasant Party, but other Croatian groups, Slovene
clericals, and the Communists had withdrawn. The constitution was ac
cepted by 223 of the delegates, who represented mainly the Democrats,
the Radicals, and representatives of the Bosnian Muslims. The new state
thus received a highly centralized government, which was in fact a con
tinuation of the Serbian system. The troubled history of the nation dur
ing the next years in great part stemmed from the nature of this docu
ment.
Greater Romania
Although the debates over the Yugoslav border had been protracted
and difficult, the question of the Romanian boundaries caused perhaps
even greater controversy. It will be remembered that Romania had
joined the Allies in 1916 with the promise of Transylvania and the
Banat. After its defeat the country had signed a separate peace with the
Central Powers. Romania then re-entered the war on November 10,
1918, a week after Austria-Hungary had surrendered and one day be
fore the German capitulation. At this time King Ferdinand dismissed the
pro-German premier Marghiloman and on December 12 recalled
Brätianu, who was determined to secure the terms of the 1916 agree
ment despite the fact that Romania had violated its provisions in making
the separate peace. Brâtianu not only intended to get Transylvania,
Bukovina, and the Banat, but he had hopes for Bessarabia and most of
Dobrudja. He also expected the Allies to treat his country as an equal at

the peace negotiations.
Brätianu had certain definite advantages. His armies were in occupa
tion of many of the territories claimed. The Allies were divided on their
attitude toward the Romanian demands. Most important, the Russian
Revolution had introduced a new element into the East European pic
ture. Not only had a Bolshevik regime come to power in Russia, but in
March, 1919, a similar government was set up in Budapest under Bela
Kun. Allied fears of the new revolutionary menace werejto aid the Ro
manian cause in both Hungary and Bessarabia. In addition, as in the
case of the Yugoslav lands national committees in some regions had
voted for unification with the original kingdom. Most impressive was the
meeting at Alba Iulia on December 1, 1918, where a hundred thousand
Transylvanian Romanians declared their desire to join with Bucharest.
Similar votes took place in Bukovina on November 28 and in Bessarabia
on December 10. In January, 1919, the Saxon-Germans made the same
decision. The Romanian army was in occupation in all of these areas.
For Brätianu the major prizes were the Banat and Transylvania. The
Romanian position in the first region has already been discussed; the
Banat had about 1,500,000 inhabitants of whom, according to Romanian
statistics, 600,000 were Romanian, 385,000 were German, 358,000 Ser
bian, and 240,000 Hungarian. The Romanian government wished to
preserve the unity of the province and argued that the German popula
tion would prefer Romanian to Yugoslav rule. Brätianu thus proposed a
plebiscite. The Allies, however, did not want to expose the capital city of
Belgrade, which would happen should Romania gain the entire Banat.
Serbian troops also occupied theTorontal district, which was Serbian in
population, and it would be difficult to dislodge them. The partition
plan was thus finally adopted.
Such an equitable solution was not to be found for the Transylvanian
problem. The final terms of the Treaty of Trianon left almost two mil
lion Hungarians in Romania. This result was to a large measure due to
the fact that the Hungarian population was concentrated in east central
Transylvania, surrounded by the eastern and southern Carpathian
Mountains and the Bihor range. To the west the inhabitants were pre
dominantly Romanian. The main group of Hungarians was thus cut off
from Hungary proper. Although the Hungarian government did not
wish to surrender even these nationals, the most heated controversy de
veloped over the lands in the west where Romanians and Hungarians
lived together along the line of cities Arad, Oradea (Nagyvârad), Carei
(Nagykâroly) and Satu Mare (Szatmârnémeti). An important railroad
connected these cities; whoever controlled it had a decided economic ad
vantage. In general, the cities were primarily Hungarian and the coun
tryside Romanian. A true ethnic boundary would bisect the rail line in
several places.
Brâtianu’s plans, however, went far beyond the achievement of an eth
nic boundary. He sought, instead, the border of the Tisza River, which
would have awarded Romania the eastern portion of Hungary. These
demands, together with his other proposals, were too much for the Allied
statesmen.1Brâtianu for his part felt that he was not appreciated and that
Romania should be rewarded for “having saved Salonika, decongested
Verdun, and stopped Bolshevism.” 12
Despite such criticisms, the Romanian government had an immense
advantage at the peace negotiations because of the Allied attitude to
ward the apparent communist threat. In March, 1919, when Bela Run’s
revolutionary government was established in Budapest, Brâtianu sent
the Romanian army into Hungary and occupied Budapest on August 4.
The Romanian minister then announced that his army had “protected
European civilization against the destructive wave of Bolshevism.” 3 The
Allies approved the suppression of the Run regime, but not subsequent
Romanian actions. As reparations the Romanians demanded that
Hungary surrender half of her river boats and railroad cars, about a
third of her catde and industrial machinery, and 35,000 wagon loads of
grain. The Allies protested sharply; the American representative at the
peace negotiations went so far as to suggest that an Allied fleet be sent to
restrain the Romanians.
For Brâtianu personally the issue of the Hungarian boundary became
intertwined with a second question, that of the minorities treaties. Since
it was obvious that the new boundaries would include many minorities in
each state, the Allies wanted the East European nations to sign treaties
pledging that they would respect the political and personal rights of
these people. Both the Yugoslav and the Romanian governments re
sented these agreements as being infringements of their sovereignty, in
particular because the great powers would not accept similar provisions.
Brâtianu led the opposition in Romania and used this as a campaign
issue. In September, rather than agreeing to a treaty, he resigned to be
replaced by General Arthur Vâitoianu, who was one of his close sup
porters. In November elections were held in which the Liberal Party was
defeated by the Transylvanian Nationalists, a new party, and by the
peasant parties of the original kingdom. In the same month the Allies
sent an ultimatum to Bucharest to evacuate Hungary to a prescribed
frontier, to sign the minorities treaty, and to submit the issue of repara
tions to an Allied commission. If these terms were not accepted, relations
would be severed. Despite the harsh tone, the Allies did not immediately
act. In December, 1919, Ring Ferdinand appointed Alexander Vaida-
1. Spector, Rumania at the Parts Peace Conference, pp. 144, 145.

2. Ibid., p. 137.
3. Ibid., p. 167.
Voievod, a Transylvanian, as premier. The Allies then tried to smooth

the path for the new and apparently more conciliatory minister.
Although he reluctantly agreed on the minorities treaty, Vaida-
Voievod, for internal political reasons, hesitated to withdraw from
Hungary. Finally, Lloyd George broke the deadlock by proposing that
the Allies recognize the Romanian acquisition of Bessarabia after her
troops had withdrawn from Hungary. This action was taken in March,
1920, under the new government of Alexander Averescu. The Roma
nian government thus abandoned the claim to the lands to the Tisza
River, but it did obtain the Arad-Oradea-Satu Mare boundary and the
railroad. At the same time Romania divided the Maramureç region with
Czechoslovakia and received roughly the southern third, which had a
Romanian population, and the city of Satu Mare.
Romania gained a favorable setdement in two other areas, Bukovina
and Bessarabia. In the Treaty of Bucharest of 1916 the state had been
promised about two-thirds of Bukovina, which was predominantly Ro
manian; the other third, with a Ruthenian population, was expected to
go to Russia. After the Bolshevik Revolution, Romania claimed the
whole province and her armies occupied it. Despite strong American ob
jections, most of the province was allotted to Bucharest, although Poland
received a portion in the north.
Bessarabia, as we have seen, had been a hotly disputed region between
Russia and Romania. Like Transylvania, this province was a major Ro
manian irredenta. In the negotiations with the Central Powers, this was
the one prize that those states could offer. The area had been thrown
into a condition of chaos by the Bolshevik Revolution of November,
1917. Subsequently the Romanian nationalists in Bessarabia, through
their governing body, the Sfat Tarn (Council of the Land) appealed to
the Romanian government for protection against both Bolshevik and
Ukrainian intervention. Romanian troops then occupied the province.
At the same time the Romanian government had made an armistice with
the Central Powers. In the negotiations for a peace, the question of Bes
sarabia was most important. The Treaty of Bucharest, signed in March,
1918, however, only gave the Romanians permission to occupy the area.
In December, 1918, the Sfat voted for union with Romania. Despite this
action the Allies, in particular the United States, were not eager to hand
over the territory. Suspicions were expressed about the truly represen
tative nature of the Sfat and about the role of the Romanian army in the
decision. There was also some reluctance to hand over former Russian
territory until the fate of the Bolshevik regime was finally decided, de
spite the fact that the population was at least 60 percent Romanian. Fi
nally, as has been shown, the question was linked with that of Hungary,
and in January, 1920, the Allies agreed to award this disputed land to
Bucharest.
Thus, by clever diplomacy and by exploiting the fears of Bolshevism,
the Romanian diplomats were able to achieve their maximum program.

Both Translyvania and Bessarabia were acquired, an event that would
have been considered highly improbably in 1912 and almost impossible
in the preceding century. Minorities now constituted 30 percent of the
state’s population, but that was to be a problem for the future. Like Ser
bia after the war, the officials of the kingdom had to determine what
their relationship would be to the new provinces, all of which had their
own distinct histories and traditions. Similar to their counterparts in
Belgrade, they could think of no alternative but to extend their political
system over the entire country. The worst reaction was to come from
Transylvania. In voting for union in December, 1918, at Alba Iulia the
Transylvanian leaders had not considered this an unconditional action.
They hoped to gain from Bucharest what they had not obtained from
Budapest. At this time they demanded strong guarantees for all nation
alities and religions in Transylvania and civil rights such as freedom of
the press and of association, and the use of native languages in adminis
tration, education, and justice. They also requested that local autonomy
be allowed until a constituent assembly could be called. The assembly
chose a Directing Council and a cabinet of fifteen under Julius Maniu,
who was now to emerge as the strongest Transylvanian politician. A tele
gram announcing the union was sent to Bucharest. In the same month
some Transylvanians, like Vaida-Voievod, were taken into the Roma
nian government.
In November, 1919, what were perhaps the first really free elections in
Romania were held. The result was a shock to Brätianu’s Liberal Party,
which won only 93 out of 244 seats for the assembly. The victors were
the National Party of Maniu and Vaida-Voievod, which was to ally with
the peasant parties of the original kingdom. Despite Ferdinand’s dislike
of parting with^Bratianu, as we have seen, he did appoint Vaida as
premier. However, he was replaced in March, 1920, by General Avere-
scu. New elections were held in May in which it was soon apparent that
Romanian politics had gone back to their former condition. The Liberal
Party, returning to the tradition that the group in power wins the elec
tions, gained 209 of the 369 seats in the chamber. At this time the Tran
sylvanian Directing Council was abolished. In December, 1921, Avere-
scu left office and was followed in January, 1922, by Brätianu. The
Liberal Party was to dominate Romanian politics until 1928.
In the elections, which were held in March, 1922, the Liberals in
creased their Hold to 260 seats. This assembly than proceeded to draft a
new constitution. Completely under Liberal control, this body produced
a document that was little more than a continuation of that of 1866. The
centralist direction was shown in the statement that Romania was “a uni
tary and indivisible state.” The organization of the government re
mained much the same, with the monarch retaining extensive powers.
By this time the strong reaction of the provinces, in particular Tran
sylvania, had been expressed. The government at Bucharest had over

run the new territories with officials from the old kingdom. The army,
the high administrative positions, and the foreign service remained the
stronghold of the Wallachians and Moldavians. The strength of feeling
was shown when Ferdinand was crowned in October, 1922, at Alba Iulia.
Not only was the National Party, the strongest in Transylvania, not
present, but the ceremony Avas attended by none of the leaders from the
new territories, who had been chiefly responsible for the union. As in
Yugoslavia, the future pattern of Romanian politics was largely to be de
termined by the insensitive treatment by the central government of their
new, and often more highly developed, provinces.
B ulgaria
Of the states that have been previously discussed, two, Bulgaria and
the Ottoman Empire, found themselves on the losing side. Of these
Bulgaria had to submit to the harshest terms. As mentioned before, the
Bulgarian leaders had been divided on the question of entrance into the
war. In June, 1918, popular pressure forced King Ferdinand to dismiss
Radoslavov. In September the agrarian leader, Alexander Stambolisky,
was freed from prison. Within a week of his release, he was at the head
of a revolutionary movement which declared Bulgaria a republic. The
army easily crushed this revolt, but, nevertheless, Ferdinand on October
4, 1918, felt compelled to abdicate in favor of his son, Boris III. Fer
dinand and Radoslavov then went into exile in Germany. For about
eight months a coalition government of Democrats, Agrarians, Socialists,
Liberals, and Conservatives ruled, and in August, 1919, elections were
held, which produced a plurality for the Agrarians. The king then en
trusted the government to Stambolisky who signed the extremely puni
tive peace terms.
The Bulgarian loss of four strategic points to Yugoslavia, areas that
were ethnically Bulgarian, has already been discussed. The Allied deci
sion to give Western Thrace to Greece and to deny Bulgaria an outlet on
the Aegean was based on similar strategic considerations, chiefly the
desire to keep a former enemy nation away from the Turkish Straits.
The area had a mixed population of Turks, Bulgars, and Greeks, none
of which had an absolute majority. However, the outlet at Dedeagatch
was much more important for the Bulgarian economy than for the
Greeks, who already had Kavalla and Thessaloniki. To soften the judge
ment, the Greek government agreed to let Bulgaria use a duty-free port
on the Aegean, but the offer was refused. The Bulgarian government
preferred to keep the issue open, and they did not accept the loss of the
area.
Equally drastic were other provisions of the final treaty. Bulgaria was
required to pay an indemnity of $450 million over 38 years. The poorest
nation in the Balkans, aside from Albania, the state was placed under an
impossible burden. Her army, gendarmes and border guards were lim
ited to 33,000, but this provision could be easily circumvented. It should
be noted that all aspects of this harsh peace did not receive general ap
proval. For instance, in the preliminary deliberations the American rep
resentatives suggested that Romania might cede to Bulgaria the areas in
southern Dobrudja where the Bulgarians had a plurality. Brâtianu,
needless to say, was not a statesman to yield land. For the next years the
Bulgarians in general remained bitter about the results of both the Sec
ond Balkan War and the First World War. They would accept any op
portunity in international affairs for revision.
Greece and the O ttoman Empire: the T urkish Republic
Despite the differences in their positions, the post-war fate of Greece
and the Ottoman Empire was to be closely intertwined. At first the Ot
toman government appeared to face a hopeless future. Not only were
the Ottoman armies defeated in the Arab lands, but in November, 1918,
an Allied fleet passed through the Dardanelles and anchored before
Constantinople. The final humiliation occurred in February, 1919, when
the commanding French general rode into Constantinople on a white
horse provided by the Greek community. In May, 1919, Greek troops
began disembarking in Anatolia.
In drafting the terms for a peace with the Ottoman government, the
Allies had to consider four secret treaties in which Britain, France, Italy
and Russia had previously partitioned the empire among themselves. In
1915 Britain and France agreed that Russia should gain Constantinople
and the northern shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles at the
end of the war. At the same time the Treaty of London promised Italy
Adalia, the southwestern portion of the Anatolian peninsula. In 1916, in
the Sykes-Picot agreements, Britain and France divided the Arab lands
between themselves. Russia was now to take Armenia. Finally, the St.
Jean de Maurienne accord of 1917 reaffirmed Italy’s right to Adalia and
also further assigned her the district of Smyrna which was predomi
nantly Greek in population. If these agreements had been carried out,
the Ottoman government would have been left with only the northwes
tern and north central section of the peninsula. Lands inhabited exclu
sively by Muslim Turks were assigned to European states.
The agreements, like similar ones concerning other areas, were to
prove difficult to implement. With the collapse of the tsarist government
and the Bolshevik publication and denunciation of the pacts, the Allies
could disregard their commitments to Russia. There remained, how
ever, the problem of the contradictory arrangements. Italy was deter
mined to take both Adalia and Smyrna, despite the fact that the latter
and its surrounding area contained a Greek population of over a million
and that Greece was an ally. Venizelos was equally convinced that the
time had come to realize the maximum program of the Great Idea and
to gain control of the eastern shores of the Mediterranean in Anatolia.
Capitalizing on his obvious loyalty to the Allied cause in the war, Veni
zelos obtained the approval of Britain, France, and the United States to
land Greek troops in Smyrna in May, 1919. The western powers not only
wished to back the Greek position, but they also needed the Greek forces
to use against the rising Turkish opposition in Anatolia. In other words,
since they did not have troops of their own because their electorates
demanded demobilization, they expected the Greeks to enforce the
stringent peace terms on the Ottoman government. At this time there
were also French and Italian troops in occupation of other parts of
Anatolia and an independent Armenian state had been proclaimed.
In August, 1920, Sultan Mohammed VI was forced to sign the Treaty
of Sèvres. The stipulations were severe. All of the Arab lands were taken
by France and Britain; Armenia was to become independent. Greece was
awarded Eastern Thrace, that is, lands north of the Dardanelles, the Sea
of Marmora, and Constantinople. In addition, Greece was to administer
Smyrna and its hinterland for five years. A plebiscite, whose result any
one could foretell, would then be held. Greece was also awarded the
strategic islands of Tenedos and Imbros. The Italian control of the
Dodecanese Islands was reaffirmed and the Straits were to be inter
nationalized. The Ottoman Empire kept Constantinople and the re
mainder of Anatolia. This settlement involved not only the dismem
berment of the empire, but the partition of ethnically Turkish lands.
The surrender of the Arabic territories was accepted reluctantly, but the
other losses, in particular those to Greece, aroused a violent national re
action. If the treaty were put into effect the Turkish state would be cut
off from the Aegean and Greek-held lands would surround Constan
tinople. The Treaty of Sèvres and the Greek occupation thus led to a
new revolutionary current, which was to result in the final overthrow of
the Ottoman government and the establishment of the Turkish republic.
The Turkish national movement was fortunate to have as its leader
one of the most gifted statesmen of the period, Mustafa Kemal. In the
war he had displayed great military ability, and he emerged as the only
victorious Ottoman general with successful campaigns at the Dar
danelles and against the Russians to his credit. After the war, realizing
the impotence of the Imperial government, he began secretly to orga
nize a resistance to both the sultan and the occupying powers. At first, he
did not find much support because the average Turk was still loyal to the
sultan-caliph. This attitude shifted as a result of sporadic Greek resis
tance activities, especially in Thrace, but mainly because of the Greek
landing in Smyrna in May, 1919. The Greek troops not only occupied
the areas assigned to them, but they began to advance inland into T u r
kish territory. Although the Turkish soldiers were fatigued, the country
had been at war almost continuously since 1911, large numbers now
rallied to the side of Mustafa Kemal. He established a center of opera
tions not at Constantinople but at Ankara in Central Anatolia. His move
ment was political as well as military, and his followers won control of the
Ottoman parliament in the elections of 1919. Since the sultan still com
manded much support, Kemal did not immediately challenge his posi
tion. When the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres were announced, there
was an immediate outcry from the entire country. In order to compel
the sultan to accept the terms and to silence Rental's followers, the Brit
ish government encouraged the Greeks to advance. In July they took the
city of Brusa in Anatolia and reached the Sea of Marmora; they also oc
cupied Adrianople, north of Constantinople. On August 10 the sultan
surrendered and accepted the peace terms. By then, however, the real
leader of the country was Mustafa Kemal.
The Greek decision to undertake these operations in Antolia had
come about due to a complicated political situation in Athens and a con
tinuation of many of the same conflicts that had existed throughout the
war. When the hostilities were concluded, Greece seemed at first in a
good position. The country had been on the winning side; the two prin
cipal enemies of the past, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, had been
defeated. It was expected that the country would receive rewards, in
cluding perhaps southern Albania. To guarantee the success of his poli
cies Venizelos went to the peace conference at Paris and remained there
for two years. Although he succeeded in influencing the Allies, his elec
toral strength at home virtually vanished. At the same time he allowed
his country to be drawn into the dangerous Anatolian campaigns. At
first both he and the Greek staff officers opposed any action in the area,
particularly an operation without the participation of other Allied
troops. Finally, hpwever, Venizelos went against his own judgement and
the best military advice. The possibilities of gaining large territories in
Asia Minor appealed too strongly to this nationalistic leader, and he
responded to the British call for military assistance.
In Greece Venizelos’s military ventures were not fully understood.
The Greek population supported the occupation of the Smyrna area,
but not the further campaigns. Weary of war, the people wanted the
three hundred thousand troops demobilized. The royalists also kept up
a constant criticism of Venizelos and his policies. From Paris the Greek
statesman could do little to influence the electorate or explain his objec
tives. Then, suddenly, in October, 1920, the nation was thrown into a
constitutional crisis when King Alexander died of a bite from a pet
monkey. The crown was offered to his younger brother, Prince Paul,
who refused saying that his father, ex-King Constantine, had not for
mally abdicated. Consequently, the parliamentary elections held in De
cember, 1920, became in effect a plebiscite on the return of Constantine,
Venizelos’s adversary.
The supporters of the former king conducted a clever campaign. A

stunning defeat was inflicted on Venizelos. He lost his seat in the as
sembly, and his Liberal Party held only 120 seats in the parliament of
370, although his adherents did win 52 percent of the total vote. A
proud man, Venizelos was deeply humiliated by this result and left
Greece three days after the election. A month later Constantine re
turned in triumph to Athèns. The change in government, however, did
not mean an abandonment of Venizelos’s Turkish policy. Although the
royalists had strongly criticized it, they, too, were caught up in a wave of
enthusiasm and hoped to Fulfill the Great Idea by a final, crushing defeat
of the Ottoman adversary.
In 1921 the Greek forces in Anatolia launched another campaign.
The Turkish troops gradually retreated inland, thereby drawing the
Greek army deep into Anatolia, into hostile territory, with a single-line
railroad and extended lines of communication. On August 24 Mustafa
Kemal, in charge of the Turkish operations, decided to make a stand
along the east bank of the Sakaria River in Central Anatolia. For two
weeks the Greeks assaulted the Turkish fortifications. The battle was
fierce; it is estimated that both sides lost half of their men. By September
16 the Greek troops were forced to withdraw.
The victory of the Turkish army over the invader made Mustafa
Kemal a great military hero and unquestionably the most important po
litical figure in the country. The real power rested not with the sultan in
Constantinople, but with Kemal and his followers in Ankara, which was
now the nationalist capital. Not only had Kemal won military honors, but
in the preceding months he had conducted a skillful diplomatic cam
paign that had split the great powers and had left Britain and Greece
alone in their attempts to enforce the Treaty of Sèvres. He also had
come to terms with the Bolshevik regime, and in April, 1920, he made a
military agreement with that government. In October he was able to
suppress the independent Armenian state that had been set up. He then
proceeded to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet government in
which he returned Batum, but kept Kars and Ardahan, which had been
taken by Russia in 1878. With this agreement Kemal’s eastern flank was
secured. Next, in March, 1921, he persuaded Italy to evacuate south
western Anatolia in return for economic concessions.
The diplomatic successes continued after the victory at Sakaria. In Oc
tober, 1921, the French evacuated the Cilician region also in return for
economic advantages. Thus by October, 1921, Italy, France, and the So
viet Union had made agreements with Mustafa Kemal and not with the
sultan. The latter’s sole supporters were Britain and Greece. Since Brit
ish troops were only in the Constantinople area, the Greek army in
Anatolia was Kemal’s last major obstacle.
In August, 1922, the Turkish leader launched a well-organized and
coordinated campaign against the Greek troops. Exhausted and dispir
ited, these forces collapsed and on September 9 the Turkish army en
tered Smyrna. By September 14 fire had destroyed this once rich city.
Attention was next turned to Eastern Thrace. Although Britain called
upon Italy and France to help defend this territory, both refused. With
the failure of the Allies to enforce their settlement, in October Eastern
Thrace, Constantinople, and the Straits returned to the full control of
the Turkish forces. On November 1, 1922, the Turkish assembly de
clared that the sultanate had ceased to exist; Mohammed VI fled on a
British warship. The Treaty of Sèvres was now dead. A new agreement
had to be drawn up, but with Turkish delegates who now represented a
victorious cause.
The negotiations commenced in Switzerland in November, 1922, and
resulted in the Treaty of Lausanne of July, 1923. The Turks retained
possession of all of Anatolia, Eastern Thrace, the Straits, and the islands
of Tenedos and Imbros. No reparations were assessed, and the capitula
tions, which had previously caused so many problems for the Ottoman
Empire, were abolished. The most serious discussions concerned the
Straits. Despite Soviet and Turkish efforts, Britain succeeded in securing
a settlement favorable to her interests. The Straits were to be demili
tarized and open to all ships unless Turkey were at war. No single nation
was to be allowed to send into the Black Sea naval tonnage in excess of
that of the largest Black Sea power, Russia. This provision thus allowed
two nations, for instance Britain and France, to bring in twice the tonnage
of Russia.
On October 29, 1923, the Turkish Republic was proclaimed, and
Kemal was elected president. The capital was now changed permanently
to Ankara. In April, 1924, a constitution was adopted. The chief power
in the state was placed in the hands of the assembly, which was elected by
universal male suffrage. This body elected the president, who in turn
chose a cabinet. In the next years Mustafa Kemal dominated the Turkish
political scene.
The real loser in the Anatolian struggle was clearly Greece. Lands that
had been inhabited by Greeks for 2,500 years were evacuated. The
burning of Smyrna and the stream of refugees from Anatolia caused a
strong reaction in Athens. A Revolutionary Committee composed of
army officers and politicians was organized to determine who was re
sponsible for the national disaster. When it demanded that the king ab
dicate, Constantine withdrew in favor of his son, who came to the throne
as George II in September, 1922. Another commission was appointed
to investigate the Anatolian calamity. It quickly returned indictments
against eight ministers and military advisers. A court martial found them
guilty, and on November 28 the commander in chief of the army and
five ministers were executed by a firing squad. The brutality of the ac
tion shocked both Greeks and Europeans.
The military defeat and the domestic turmoil placed the Greeks in a
weak position at the Lausanne negotiations. In addition to the territorial

losses the country had to sign an agreement for the exchange of popula
tions. With the exception of those in Constantinople, all of the Greeks
were to be expelled from Turkey; Muslims in Greece, except those in
Western Thrace, were likewise to be forced to migrate to Turkey. It is es
timated that about one and a half million Greeks and four hundred
thousand Muslims, mostly Turkish but some of Greek or other ethnic
origin, were affected. It was a harsh and radical solution and the first of
its kind in the modern era. For Greece it provided one advantage. Many
of the Anatolian Greeks were settled in the newly acquired Macedonian
lands, some of which only now acquired an overwhelmingly Greek char
acter.
Although Greece thus lost her ethnic hold on western Anatolia, it will
be remembered that the country did acquire Western Thrace from
Bulgaria. This was to be the single positive gain from the First World
War. The Greek government was unable to secure its claims in southern
Albania because of the negative attitude of the Allied great powers.
These states were now determined to restore an independent Albanian
state with its prewar boundaries.
A lbania
O f the Balkan nations Albania held the most difficult position at the
end of the war. Threatened with partition by her neighbors, the state
depended completely on the decisions of the great powers. It will be
remembered that an independent Albania had been established only in
1913. Internal political dissentions had caused the breakdown of the
central government and the expulsion of the first ruler, William of
Wied, in 1914. Thereafter the country reverted to the condition that had
existed for centuries. Each region, group, and clan sought to protect its
own interests. No united opposition could be put up against foreign in
tervention. Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro took advantage of the situa
tion to seize those lands that had been denied them in 1913. Greece im
mediately occupied southern Albania. Although this action was taken
with Allied approval and the understanding that the lands would be
evacuated later, the Greek government soon showed that it had no in
tention of abiding by this agreement. In 1916 deputies from the area
were elected to the Greek assembly, and the region was formally an
nexed. The Greeks insisted that the lands were ethnically theirs. These
claims were based on the fact that there was an indigenous Greek popu
lation, but more important, those Albanians were counted as Greeks
who went to Greek schools, who were Orthodox, or who knew the Greek
language—a policy the Greeks had followed in Macedonia.
Serbia and Montenegro acted in the same manner; both powers still
desired an outlet on the Adriatic and thus seized lands north of the Drim
Map 13. The Balkans alter World War I
River in 1914-15. Meanwhile, Italy, too, moved to take possession of her

claims. In October and December, 1914, the island of Saseno and the
port of Vlorë were occupied. Although the areas seized by the Serbs and
Montenegrins had to be evacuated later after the victories by the Central
Powers, both states hoped to annex the territories should the Allies fi
nally win the war.
The dismemberment of Albania was recognized by the western Allies
in the Treaty of London of 1915. In this pact Italy received full control
of Saseno and Vlorë with its hinterland. In addition it was agreed that
if Italy acquired Trentino, Istria, and Dalmatia, as stipulated in the
pact, then Greece was to take southern Albania, and Serbia and Mon
tenegro could partition northern Albania. Greece and Serbia were also
to establish a common frontier west of Lake Ohrid through the annex
ation of Albanian territory. The central portion was to be set up as an
autonomous, not independent, state, which would be represented in
foreign affairs by Italy.
The fate of Albania was decided at the peace conference during the
prolonged negotiations over the Italian-Yugoslav boundary. Here the
Italian government, as we have seen, agreed to surrender its claims on
Albanian territory, except Saseno and Vlorë, in return for the city of
Fiume. In other words, this port, with its population of 46,391 of whom
only 24,212 were Italian, was more important to Rome than the control
of Albania with its 800,000 inhabitants. In the complicated negotiations
that followed Wilson alone fought against the application of the Treaty
of London, which, of course, the United States had not signed. Greece
and Serbia followed their traditional policies with the exception that
Athens could work with Italy, while the Serbian government strongly
opposed the creation of an Albanian state under Italian control.
The obvious danger to their national lands led the Albanians finally to
take political action. In January, 1920, a group of prominent Albanian
leaders convened a National Congress, which was followed in March by
the summoning of a National Legislative Assembly in Tirana. Here a
regency was established and an army set up. At the same time, Albanian
emigrants living in Europe and the United States had organized. Their
representatives went to Paris to argue for the restoration of their nation.
Again, the American representatives were the most sympathetic.
The final decision of the powers to recreate Albania came as a result of
the previously discussed bargain involving the exchange of Fiume for
Italian concessions on the Albanian question. In August, 1920, the Ital
ian foreign minister, Count Carlo Sforza, called for the restoration of Al
bania with her 1913 boundaries; Saseno and Vlorë were also surren
dered. Italy immediately evacuated the country, but both Greece and
Serbia, despite their formal acceptance of the solution, were reluctant to
abandon their influence in the area. In 1921 Belgrade supported the
Mirdite revolt in northern Albania and was only forced to abandon this
effort when pressured by the great powers. The loss of Anatolia so weak
ened Greece that the state was compelled to yield finally on southern Al
bania. By 1922 the country was thus clear of foreign influence, a condi
tion that was to last only until 1925, when Italian predominance was
established.
Meanwhile, within Albania the organization of the government pro
ceeded. Instead of adopting the provisions of 1914, the Albanian leaders
drafted a new constitution at the Congress of Lushnjë in January, 1920.
This assembly of fifty-six delegates decided that the state should be a
constitutional monarchy. Until a ruler was chosen, his functions were to
be fulfilled by the High Council of State, which was composed of four
regents. Two of these were Muslims, one each from the Bektashi and
Sunni sects; the others were Orthodox and Catholic. To assist the
regency the congress appointed a cabinet responsible not to the regency
but to a thirty-seven man senate, which was given the principal power in
the state. A national assembly was also proposed, but its membership
and functions were not defined until 1922. In April, 1921, elections were
held. In 1922 the Lushnjë Constitution was amended and the number of
the representatives to the assembly was set at seventy-eight to be elected
for four-year terms by the vote of all male citizens. Further measures
were taken to strengthen the power of the legislative branch at the ex
pense of the regency. An independent judiciary was also created.
During the constitutional period factions, or crude political parties,
were formed. The Congress of Lishnjë was dominated by Suleiman Bey
Delvina. His supporters, called the Liberals, sought to exclude from of
fice those Albanians who had been part of the Ottoman administration.
These officials had close ties with and represented the interests chiefly
of the large conservative landowners. After the 1921 elections other par
ties emerged. Among these were the Democratic Party of Bishop Fan
Noli and Luigj Curakuqi and the Popular Party of Sefi Vlamashi and
Eshref Frashëri. All of these men favored economic, social, and political
reform and the introduction of western institutions. Their chief opposi
tion came from the Progressives, led by Shefqet Vërlaci and Ahmet
Zogu. This group stood for the interests of the large landowners and the
upper clergy, and it rejected agrarian reform.
The lack of political experience in the country was soon in evidence. It
proved impossible to maintain a stable government. In June, 1924,
Bishop Noli led a revolt, which was in turn suppressed by a conservative
counterrevolution led by Ahmet Zogu, assisted by Yugoslavia. In 1925
Zogu became president and a new constitution was promulgated. In
1928 he became king. The country was now a royal dictatorship and an
Italian protectorate.
CHAPTER 19
Conclusion
I n 1922 with the formal establishment of the Turkish Republic the last
vestiges of the Ottoman Empire disappeared. Already in October and
November, 1918, the Habsburg Empire had divided into its national
components. The demise of the two great imperial powers of central and
southeastern Europe marked the final victory of the national principle
for the organization of the political life of the area. The change had thus
been made from the concept of a state in which many nationalities with
differing languages, cultures, and religions occupied the same geo
graphic space, although not in an equal relationship, to the more mod
ern idea that one people with one language should have the virtually
exclusive possession of a given area. As we have seen, the basis for the
right of control was principally that of historic claims and national com
position of the population. Most national programs, as enunciated by in
tellectuals and politicians, emphasized the historical arguments and re
ferred back to the medieval kingdoms, or, for the Greeks, the Byzantine
Empire. The right of self-determination played a lesser, although signif
icant role, in particular as a weapon to influence public opinion among
the great powers. In practice each state concentrated on asserting its
prerogatives and not in forwarding the national idea in general. Cer
tainly, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia showed not the slight
est hesitation or moral qualm in planning the partition of Albanian
lands.
With this exclusive concept of national possession the dominant peo
ple in each region looked on the others as interlopers or invaders. The
Christian people without exception regarded the Muslim T urk in this
light, despite the five centuries of occupation. The expulsion of thou
sands of Muslims as a result of the national movements has not been
regarded as an injustice. The great dispute between Romanian and
Hungarian historians over Transylvania has been over who was there
320
Conclusion 321
first, the apparent assumption being that the solution of this question
has direct relevance to its present ownership. After national liberation
no state felt comfortable with its minorities; in the postwar period all
resisted laws guaranteeing the civil rights of these people, who were
uniformly regarded as a source of national weakness and subversion,
which indeed they often were. Despite centuries of humiliation and de
basement at the hands of an alien conquering power, the victorious na
tionalities too often found no better way to treat those under their con
trol than simply to apply the same methods to which they themselves had
been subjected in their period of weakness.
The problems of exclusive national control were most clearly shown in
areas where the dominant nation was in a minority, as in Transylvania
before 1914, or merely held a weak plurality. The great tragedy of mod
ern Balkan history has been the struggle over Macedonia. No practical
program was advanced which, given the intensity of national feeling,
could realistically solve the problem of how an area with a complex eth
nic structure could be governed without one state assuming control. The
culmination of the national idea was the exchange of populations be
tween Greece and Turkey in the 1920s. Here Greeks, whose families had
inhabited Anatolia for literally thousands of years, were returned to
mainland Greece while Muslims, sometimes of Greek ethnic origin, were
expelled from Crete to Anatolia, an area with which they had absolutely
no previous connection.
With the acceptance of the national concept the Balkan people, except
those under Habsburg authority, experienced also a transfer from eccle
siastical to secular control. In the Ottoman Empire the church and state
had been virtually inseparable. The shift from the millet to the national
governments involved a change in the legal as well as in the political
framework of Balkan life. The church was now reduced from being the
principal governing body on the higher level to that of a department in a
secular administration.
Along with these changes all of the Balkan states either adopted or
were endowed by the protecting powers with similar patterns of govern
ment. They thus became constitutional monarchies with highly central
ized administrative systems. The concentration of power in the capital
city often meant the destruction of systems of autonomous local govern
ment that had functioned throughout the Turkish period. In practice
this shift also created a situation in which politics was in fact in the hands
of a small percentage of the population and one that became increas
ingly separated from the mass of the people. As we have seen, in the in
ternal politics of the new states the primary political issue was the strug
gle between the prince and groups of notables or prominent men.
Organized into informal groupings or political parties, these politicians
fought for control of the government. Victory in political struggles car-
ried with it the ability to restaff the administrative system and to use po
litical influence for private profit. Throughout the nineteenth century
the peasant masses of the Balkans played no significant political role in
the actual functioning of the new state apparatuses. It was only on the
eve of the First World War that the organization of peasant parties and
the increasing dissatisfaction over the land situation brought the interests
of the majority of the population into the center of the political stage.
This evolution of Balkan politics paralleled the events in the European
states, which were, after all, the Balkan models. In no country did the
workers or peasants run the state. In all men of property and education
dominated the government. The contrast with the Balkan countries was
a matter of numbers. Lacking the highly developed industrial, commer
cial, and professional middle classes of the West, a much smaller per
centage of the Balkan population played a determining political role.
Moreover, although corruption was indeed an attribute of all political
systems, the heritage of the Balkan states in this direction was far
deeper. Separation from the Ottoman administrative system in no way
assured that the malpractices of that government would not be repeated
in the successor states. The relative poverty of these nations made such
actions more serious in their general effects on the country.
In accepting western political ideas, the Balkan leaders, like their Eu
ropean counterparts, appeared to assume that the adoption of progres
sive political institutions would automatically remedy most economic and
social ills. Undoubtedly, the major problem of the new Balkan nations
was economic, not political, a fact that was neither clearly defined nor
even recognized. From their establishment the states were not truly eco
nomically viable units on a modern level. The autonomous and indepen
dent regimes were from the beginning faced with enormous financial
burdens. They had to find the resources to pay for their wars of national
liberation, for establishing their administrative systems, for internal im
provements, and, most important, for national defense. No nation
wished to remain an oriental backwater; all wished modern improve
ments, like railroads, and the attributes of an advanced culture, such as
libraries, universities, opera houses, and theaters. National pride and
prestige demanded an impressive capital city. Similar feelings together
with real fears for national safety called for the organization of as large
an army as possible, equipped with advanced weapons.
To meet these national tasks the governments had few of the neces
sary resources. Taxation of the basically impoverished population could
not yield the needed revenue. As we have seen, all of the states, includ
ing the Ottoman Empire, resorted to foreign loans. Inexperienced in the
handling of state finances and without the means of repayment, the gov
ernments either carried heavy debts or were in fact bankrupt by the end
of the century. The Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia were
Conclusion 323
all forced to accept a degree of foreign control over their internal fi
nances because of this condition.
The basic economic weakness of all of the nations was, of course, sim
ply a reflection of the poverty of the people. The condition of the peas
ant has been discussed in detail previously. Even where the peasant fam
ilies enjoyed the free use of a plot of land, the quick rise in the
population in the century had resulted in repeated subdivisions so that
too many people were forced to exist on entirely inadequate acreage.
The lack of technical knowledge and of capital to invest in land resulted
in backward methods and low yields. In many areas the peasants were
deeply in debt because they had been forced to borrow continually to
exist from year to year. The entire land problem was complicated by the
fact that the peasant himself preferred traditional methods and solu
tions. His answer was simply the acquisition of more land without meet
ing the problems of increased production or the inevitable consequences
of repeated subdivision.
Although in the postwar years it has been estimated that half of the
peasant population was simply not needed on the land, there was no al
ternative employment for this surplus labor. Steps toward indus
trialization were taken before the war, but these actions in no way met
the basic economic problem. Like agriculture, industrial development in
the Balkans was severely hampered by historical conditions. A backward
area, the peninsula was not prepared to make good use of the domestic
capital available for industrial development nor to attract sufficient
foreign capital for investment. The previous historical experience
had deprived the area of a skilled and disciplined working force for the
factories. In the same manner, the prosperous classes lacked experience
in management and organization. Nor did this group feel any particular
attraction to industrial or commercial pursuits. The majority of students
in the universities took law degrees as a preparation for government
employment.
These conditions necessitated reliance on foreign capital and exper
tise, and this meant, as we have seen, that sectors of the economy that
enriched the investors and not necessarily the country itself were devel
oped. Foreign entrepreneurs were primarily interested in the Balkans as
a source of raw materials and semifinished products, such as Romanian
oil and Serbian nonferrous minerals. The governments of the great
powers similarly wished to maintain the region as a market for their own
goods. The Austrian tariff controversies with Serbia and Romania, in
volving protection for Hungarian agriculture, and the British endeavors
to keep the Ottoman tariff schedules are all examples of these powers
acting in the interests of their own citizens.
Economic intervention on the part of the great powers was, as we have
seen, closely paralleled by similar actions in the diplomatic field. Every
step in the establishment of the Balkan national states was accompanied

by European interference and supervision. This condition arose chiefly
from the fact that in the ninetèenth century the peninsula was one of the
crossroads of the world. The Eastern Question was the single dominant
source of great power conflict from 1815 to 1914. It was the subject of
the one major conflict during that period, the Crimean War, and the
direct cause of the outbreak of the First World War. No power could af
ford to allow a rival to dominate either the decaying Ottoman Empire or
a significant number of the new states. Because of the vital concern of
Europe in the fate of the peninsula, most crises were initiated by the
Balkan states, but were resolved by the powers. The major treaties regu
lating Balkan affairs—Adrianople, Paris, and Berlin—represented ex
clusively great power decisions. Minor matters were usually disposed of
in ambassadorial conferences, held, in general, in London, Paris, or
Constantinople, and in which Balkan representatives were seldom
present. This condition continued through the First World War. The
postwar settlements were the result of discussions between France, Brit
ain, Italy, and the United States. At no time in this narrative did
members of Balkan foreign ministries negotiate on an equal basis with
representatives of the powers.
Not only did the dominant states determine the territorial boundaries
of the Balkan nations and their relationship to the Ottoman Empire, but
they also established the first governments and, except in the case of Ser
bia, named the first ruler. The states became constitutional monarchies
because the great powers approved this form of government. These
regimes represented a middle way between the desires of the Habsburg
and Russian empires for conservative regimes and that of France and
Britain for more liberal forms. Before 1878 European control was for
mal and determined by treaty. The Russian protectorate of Serbia and
the Principalities was the result of the Akkerman convention; the three
power protectorship of Greece was part of the Treaty of London. In
contrast, the Russian domination in Bulgaria and the Austrian hold over
Serbia after 1878 were not spelled out in an agreement, but were clearly
understood in the negotiations carried out between the two powers.
Balkan subordination to foreign dictation resulted primarily from ge
ography rather than from choice, and the effects were unfortunate for
the new states. The temptation for each Balkan government to cooper
ate with a great power against a neighbor and the necessity of maintain
ing a high level of armament were the direct results of the fact that the
peninsula was a prime area of world tension. The percentage of national
income devoted by each nation to war was extremely high. In fact, these
states spent more on arms on a per capita basis than did the great pow
ers. The price paid in deaths and the destruction of property due both to
Conclusion 325
the wars of national liberation and to the resulting diplomatic situation
was tragic.
Although European tutelage was largely imposed, all of the Balkan
national leaders absorbed willingly the current western political doc
trines. In the first part of the century liberalism and nationalism were
regarded in the East as in the West as the progressive ideas of the epoch.
Democratic, populist, and socialist programs became a significant ele
ment in the political scene only at the turn of the century. Although the
political and revolutionary ideology was much the same, the applicability
of these principles in the Balkans could not be the same as in Western or
Central Europe. The national idea obviously worked differently in a na
tion such as Britain, with her vast colonial empire, and France and Ger
many, with their extensive territories and adequate resources for an in
dustrial economy, than in a state such as Greece or Albania. In the same
manner, nineteenth-century liberal thought, at least in the first part of
the period, was tied to laissez-faire economic policy and with the general
idea that the state should not meddle in the personal concerns of its citi
zens. Although the economic doctrines were modified when protective
tariffs and assistance to industry were introduced, Balkan governments
did not devote sufficient efforts to matters such as health, rural educa
tion, or the general problems of extreme poverty and indebtedness in
the countryside. No governments in the nineteenth century, with the
possible exception of Bismarck's Germany, were directed toward social
service, but the Balkan countries might have fared better had they had
more conservative regimes with wider social programs. The great pride
of liberal achievement in the West—constitutions providing for secret
ballots and universal manhood suffrage and containing bills of rights as
suring freedom of speech, press, and association—was only seldom ef
fective in practice jn the Balkans and had less value for a population that
was largely illiterate and whose view of contemporary politics was
parochial.
In studying the history of any country, no matter how powerful or for
tunate, hindsight and a wide historical perspective make it easy to point
out the errors and failures in national development. In regard to the
Balkan states the great accomplishments of the century and the positive
gains from national unification should, in the final analysis, take prece
dence over any reservations or negative judgments. Criticism has been
made of the results of applying the national solution to the peninsula,
but it must be strongly emphasized that no other practical alternative ex
isted at the time. From a purely theoretical standpoint it can be regretted
that no political evolution was possible that would have allowed an adop
tion of a system by which different nationalities could live peacefully
under the same government, but the fact is that in modern times no such
organization has been developed. All advanced states are national in

character.
In the nineteenth century two successful models of political evolution
existed. The first, the European, was based on the subdivision of the
continent into an ever-increasing number of unitary national states. Like
the Balkan nations, the governments of the great powers, France, Ger
many, Italy, and Britain, did not give equal treatment to their consider
able minorities. The second example was the United States, a nation that
became a haven for emigrants from over-crowded Europe, who upon
arrival in their new home immediately were virtually compelled to drop
their national language and heritage and accept that of the Anglo-Saxon
privileged strata. In the educational system Shakespeare became the
principal figure in the literary heritage of children from Italian, Greek,
German, French, Chinese, Japanese, and other such divergent back
grounds. “Self-determination” was never invoked in American immigrant
centers. In fact the bloodiest civil war of the nineteenth century was
fought to prevent the principle from being applied by the southern
states. It is impossible to imagine Woodrow Wilson suggesting that Mex
ican-dominated cities along the southern border of the United States
should be allowed plebiscites to determine if the population would
prefer to join Mexico or to have their schools conducted in Spanish.
It is certainly also to be doubted if any program of reform could have
preserved the Ottoman Empire as a multinational state whose citizens
would have been content to remain within its control. Repeated efforts
were made, as we have seen, to strengthen the state and appease the dis
sident population. Throughout the century, however, the basic problem
remained: the majority of the Balkan peoples, of every nationality and
social level, simply wished to leave the state. The national idea was not
merely a program of intellectuals and politicians; it had, by the end of
the century, become a passionate conviction, a secular religion, for the
majority of the inhabitants of each state. The Muslim Turks themselves
finally accepted this solution for their own political future.
The economic and political weaknesses of the new states have also
received much emphasis in this study. Here too, however, it must be
emphasized that despite their extreme backwardness and the increasing
economic burdens, the individual states did achieve a great deal.
Thrown into a competitive world system, in a difficult geographic posi
tion and with few resources, the new governments nevertheless made
real efforts to lift themselves to the standards of the most advanced Eu
ropean states. Conditions in the new nations at the end of the century
were certainly gready superior to those in the area at the beginning of
that epoch. At that time the Ottoman government was unable to assure
the basic conditions of civil peace in its lands. Not only were the local
governors unrestrained, but bandits, groups of soldiers, and local war-
Conclusion 327
lords with armed retainers made life impossible for the peasant popula
tion, Christian and Muslim alike, in many areas. The national govern
ments not only assured the establishment of an orderly system of
administration, but they initiated measures directed toward the im
provement of general conditions in the country. Educational systems
were established, internal improvements were made commensurate with
the economic resources of the individual states, and by the beginning of
the First World War some social welfare legislation had been introduced.
The great question of land distribution had become a matter of direct
political concern in every state. Much remained to be done, but a begin
ning had been made.
Finally, although the territorial settlement in the peninsula, which had
been the result largely of war and great power bargains, was far from
ideal, it at least was to prove stable. After the great war of 1939 to 1945,
only three territorial changes occurred: the Soviet acquisition of Bes
sarabia, the Bulgarian regaining of southern Dobrudja, and the Yugo
slav annexation of the Istrian peninsula, but without Trieste. Many
problems have remained as causes of friction and conflict. The Mace
donian, Transylvanian, and Bessarabian questions, among others, re
main under discussion, but they have not led to disastrous wars. The years
after 1945 have witnessed repeated crises among the Balkan nations,
including Turkey, and among the great powers. However, in contrast to
the nineteenth century, these disputes have been settled by negotiation
and not on the battlefield.
Bibliographie Essay
T his essay is restricted to a discussion o f works in English, which the authors

believe the read er m ight wish to consult for fu rth er inform ation on specific
topics. In no sense does it cover all o f the material on which this account is based,
n or does it attem pt to cite all of the excellent books and articles in English on
Balkan history. Volume XI of this series will contain a com prehensive bibliogra
phy in all languages.
B ibliographies and J ournals
T h e standard bibliographic guide for the Balkans is Paul L. Horecky, ed.,
Southeastern Europe: A Guide to Basic Publications (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1969). Fifty American and European scholars collaborated with Dr.
Horecky in com piling this annotated listing o f over th ree thousand books in the
Balkan, Russian, and western languages, which is indispensable for any student
o f the area. A work o f similar significance is Südosteuropa-Bibliographie (Munich:
R. O ldenbourg). Published every five years since 1956, this guide contains all
books and articles in the relevant languages. In addition, u n d er the auspices of
the Slavic Division o f the Library o f Congress, the United States G overnm ent
Printing Office has published th ree valuable works: Stephen Fischer-Galati, R u
mania: A Bibliographic Guide (1963); Michael B. Petrovich, Yugoslavia: A Biblio
graphic Guide (1974); and M arin V. Pundeff, Bulgaria: A Bibliographic Guide
(1965). A nother helpful reference is the American Bibliography o f Russian and East
European Studies, an annual publication presenting books and articles in the social
sciences and the hum anities. T h e volumes for 1956 to 1967 were published by
Indiana University; those that appeared thereafter, by O hio State University.
Shirley Howard W eber, Voyages and Trax'els in the Near East made during the XIX
Century (Princeton: A m erican School o f Classical Studies at Athens, 1952) is an
annotated, chronological bibliography o f over twelve h u n d red travel accounts,
many o f which deal with the Balkans.
T h e m ajor journals for the area are: Balkan Studies (Thessaloniki, Greece,
I960-), Canadian-American Slavic Studies (Pittsburg, 1967-), East European Qiiar-
terly (Boulder, Colorado, 1967-), Journal of Central European Affairs (Boulder,
329
1941-1964), Rumanian Studies (Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, 1970- ) , Slavonic and

East European Review (London, 1922-), Slavic Review (Seattle, 1940-), and South
eastern Europe (Pittsburgh, 1974-).'In addition, the following European language
journals often contain significant articles in English: Études balkaniques (Sofia,
1965-), Österreichische Osthefte (Vienna, 1959-), Revue des études sud-est européenes
(Bucharest, 1963-), Südost-Forschungen (Munich, 1936-), Balcanica (Belgrade,
1970-), and Byzantine and M odem Greek Studies (Oxford, 1975-).
G eneral Works on B alkan H istory
The outstanding survey is Leften S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958). Beginning with the fall o f Constan
tinople, the author presents a broad sweep of Balkan history through the Second
World War, concluding with a detailed, annotated bibliography of seventy-five
pages covering the major books and articles published through 1957. Still useful
are the earlier works of Ferdinand Schevill, The History o f the Balkan Peninsula and
the N ear East (1922; reprint ed., New York Arno Press, 1971), and o f William
Miller, The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, 1801-1927 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1936). In 1950 René Ristelhueber, a French diplomat who
served in the Balkans, wrote a survey that has recently been translated by Sher
man David Spector, A History o f the Balkan Peoples (New York: Twayne Pub
lishers, 1971). Shorter similar accounts are L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans,
1815-1914 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963), and Charles and
Barbara Jelavieh, The Balkans (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).
Another survey of a different nature is Traian Stoianovich, A Study in Balkan
Civilization (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1967), a provocative and stimulating work
in which the author shows his keen appreciation o f anthropological, economic,
and sociological factors. In 1960 a conference was held at the University of Cali
fornia, Berkeley, at which thirteen experts on the Balkans analysed the geopoli
tical, religious, literary, social, economic, and political problems o f the area in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These studies are published in Charles and
Barbara Jelavich, eds., The Balkans in Transition: Essays on the Development o f B al
kan L ife and Politics since the Eighteenth Century (1963; reprint ed., Hamden,
Conn.: Archon, 1974).
On the national question, the central issue in Eastern Europe in the nineteenth
century, the early work by Robert W. Seton-Watson, The Rise o f Nationality in the
Balkans (London: Constable, 1917) should still be consulted. The best recent
studies are to be found in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds., Nationalism in
Eastern Europe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), which has
chapters on Albania by T. Zavalani, on Bulgaria by Marin V. Pundeff, on Greece
by Stephen G. Xydis, on Romania by Stephen Fischer-Galati, and on Yugoslavia
by Ivo J. Lederer, together with an introduction by Peter F. Sugar on national
ism in Eastern Europe. The Balkan nationalities in the Habsburg Empire are dis
cussed in three standard works: Robert A. Kann, The M ultinational Empire: N a
tionalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848-1918 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1950), 2 vols; C. A. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire,
1790-1918 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968); and Arthur J. May, The
Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1968). A stimulating article on the same subject is Peter F. Sugar, “The Nature o f
Bibliographie Essay 331
the Non-Germanic Societies under Habsburg Rule,” Slavic Review, 22 (March,
1963) 1:1-30, in which the author deals with the Romanians, Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes. It is accompanied by comments by Stephen Fischer-Galati, “National
ism and Kaisertreue,” Ibid., pp. 31-36 and Hans Kohn, “The Viability of the
Habsburg Monarchy,” Ibid., pp. 37-42. The national question in the empire was
also the theme of a conference held at Indiana University in 1966. The papers
were published under the title “The Nationality Problem in the Habsburg Em
pire in the Nineteenth Century” in volume 3 of Austrian History Yearbook, 3 parts
(1967). Those of particular importance for this study are in part 2 and include
essays on the Romanians by Andrei Otetea and Stephen Fischer-Galati, on the
Serbs by Wayne S. Vucinich and Dimitrije Djordjevic, on the Croats by Charles
Jelavich and Bogdan Krizman, and on the Slovenes by Fran Zwitter.
T he O ttoman Empire
Up until twenty years ago scholarly treatments o f Ottoman history in the west
ern languages were relatively rare; since that time a number o f excellent works
have appeared. A fine introductory survey is to be found in Roderic H. Davison,
Turkey (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968) in which the author gives a
broad sweep of Turkish history from the beginning to the mid-1960s. This may
be supplemented by Wayne S. Vucinich, The Ottoman Empire: Its Record and Legacy
(Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1965), which also contains a documentary supple
ment. For the nineteenth and twentieth century the standard work is Bernard
Lewis, The Emergence o f M odem Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
The nineteenth century British attitude toward the area is reflected in Sir
Charles Eliot, Turkey in Europe (London: Edward Arnold, 1908). Stanford J.
Shaw’s latest contribution, History o f the Ottoman Empire: Empire o f the Gazi's—The
Rise and Decline o f the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1976), vol. 1, is a much needed work. The second volume,
covering the last two centuries, will appear in 1977.
For the eighteenth century background the reader should consult H. A. R.
Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West: A Study o f the Impact o f Western
Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East (London: Oxford University Press,
1950,1957), one volume, 2 parts. The first reform movement is covered in Stan
ford J. Shaw, Between the Old and New: the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III,
1789-1809 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). The reorgani
zation of the army is discussed in two articles by the same author: “The Origins
o f the Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-i Cedid Army o f Selim III,”your-
neU o f M odem History, 37 (September, 1965) 3:291-306, and “The Established
Army Corps under Selim III, 1789-1807,” Der Islam, 2 (1965): 142-84. The ar
ticle by Deena R. Sadat, “Rumeli Ayanlari: The Eighteenth Century”Jou rnal o f
M odem History, 44 (September, 1972) 3:346-63, concerns the problem o f Muslim
opposition to the central government.
The great majority o f the books on the nineteenth century emphasize either
the changes in Ottoman society in the century or the reforms. Of great signifi
cance are the works of three Turkish scholars. The evolution o f Ottoman atti
tudes is discussed in Serif Mardin, The Genesis o f Young Ottoman Thought: A Study
in the Modernization o f Turkish Political Ideas (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1962) and Niyazi Berkes, The Development o f Secularism in Turkey (Montreal:
McGill University Press, 1964). Social and economic aspects are covered in the
work of Kemal Karpat, in An Inquiry into the Social Foundations o f Nationalism in the
Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, From M illet to Nationalism, Research
Monograph No. 39 (Princeton: Center for International Studies, 1973); “Struc
tural Change, Historical Stages of Modernization and the Role of Social Croups
in Turkish Politics” which was published in a volume, edited by Karpat, entitled
Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1973), pp. 11-92; and ‘The Transformation of the Ottoman State,
1789-1908,” International Jou rn al o f M iddle East Studies, 3 (1972):243-81. Similar
issues are discussed in the five articles by Stanford Shaw, Albert Hourani,
Kemal Karpat, Roderic Davison, and Ercumend Kuran in William R. Polk and
Richard L. Chambers, eds., Beginnings o f Modernization in the M iddle East: The
Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).
Among the other books to be recommended Roderic H. Davison,Reform in the
Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) is an
excellent analysis of the complexity of political and administrative problems fac
ing the empire. The problem of reform is also covered in F. E. Bailey, British Pol
icy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942). In addition, Robert De
vereux, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study o f the M idhat Constitution
and Parliament (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963) is a detailed study of the
1876 constitution. The origins, beliefs, and leadership of the Young Turks is
ably treated in Ernest E. Ramsaur, The Young Turks; Prelude to the Revolution o f
1908 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). This story is carried to the
World War in Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee o f Union and Progress
in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969).
The effects of Ottoman rule in the Balkans are the subject of Wayne S. Vucin-
ich, “The Nature of Balkan Society under Ottoman Rule,” Slavic Review, 4
(1962):597-616; Stanford Shaw, ‘The Aims and Achievement of Ottoman Rule
in the Balkans,” Ibid., pp. 617-22; and Traian Stoianovich, “Factors in the De
cline of Ottoman Society in the Balkans,” Ibid., pp. 623-32. These articles should
be supplemented by K. Abu-Jaber, ‘The Millet System in the Nineteenth Cen
tury Ottoman Empire,” Muslim World, 57 (1967):212-23, in which the author
shows the discord and disunity engendered by the millet system, and Roderic H.
Davison, ‘Turkish Attitudes concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nine
teenth Century,” American Historical Review, 59 (July, 1954) 4:844-64. The
significance of travel books for a study of the Balkans is shown in Barbara Jelavich,
“The British Traveller in the Balkans: The Abuses of Ottoman Administration in
the Slavonic Provinces,"Slavonic and East European Review, 33 (1955) 81:396-413.
T he South Slavs
The South Slavs, or Yugoslavs, are yet to have an adequate history in English.
The two most recent works, Phyllis Auty, Yugoslavia (New York: Walker and Co.,
1965) and Stephen Clissold, ed., A Short History o f Yugoslavia from Early Times to
1966 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), are brief générai surveys.
The latter consists mainly of selected portions of the British Naval Intelligence
Handbook on Yugoslavia prepared during the Second World War. The best
general work on the area is Jozo Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics, and Economic
Change in Jugoslavia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955). Although the
economic developments are stressed, information on the politics of the South
Slav peoples is also included. A work that has caused a major controversy in
Yugoslavia is Vladimir Dedijer, Ivan Boiic, Sima Cirkovic, and Milorad Ekmetic,
History o f Yugoslavia (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), which is a translation of
Istorija Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1972). The criticism centers on Ekmeiic’s
interpretation of the nineteenth century and on the fact that he displays a better
understanding of Serbian history than that of the other nationalities, in particular
the Croats and Bosnians.
Instead of writing general histories of the Yugoslav lands as a unit, most au
thors have concentrated on one of the three primary component parts of the
present state—Serbia, Croatia, or Slovenia. Of these, the Serbs have attracted the
most attention since a separate Serbian state did exist in the nineteenth century.
Hitherto the basic work has been H. W. V. Temperley, History o f Serbia (London:
G. Bell and Sons, 1917). This work is superceded by Michael B. Petrovich, A
History o f Modem Serbia, 1804-1918 (New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovano-
vich, 1976). The author dovers all phases of Serbian history; there is noth
ing comparable to it even in the Serbian language.
On specific subjects the only book in English on the Serbian revolution is
Leopold von Ranke, A History o f Servia and the Servian Revolution, translated by
Mrs. Alexander Kerr (London: Bohn, 1853). It is still of value. Roger Viers Pax
ton, “Nationalism and Revolution: A Reexamination of the Origins of the First
Serbian Insurrection, 1804-1807,” East European Quarterly, 6 (September, 1972)
3:337-62 describes the factors that impeded immediate demands for indepen
dence by the Serbs. A fine source for the background and course of the revolu
tion from the viewpoint of a participant is The Memoirs o f Prota M atija Nenadoinc,
tr. and ed. by Lovett F. Edwards (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969). The contribu
tions of the two Serbian scholars who principally influenced the early national
movement, Obradovic and Karadfic, are to be found in George R. Noyes, The
L ife and Adventures o f Dimitrije Obradovic (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1953), a fine translation of Obradovic’s autobiography, and in the biography by
the former British ambassador to Belgrade, Duncan Wilson, The Life and Times o f
Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic, 1784-1864; Literacy, Literature and National Independence
in Serbia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).
For the reign of Milos Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia,
1837-1839: The Mission o f Colonel Hodges (Paris: Mouton, 1961) provides a good
description of general internal conditions in the country in the 1830s. Some of
the issues he raises are further analysed in the excellent article by Traian Stoian-
ovich, “The Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution, 1830-1880," Comparative
Studies in Society and History, 1 (1959) 3:242-72. For the second half of the cen
tury, the first prominent Balkan socialist is the subject of Woodford D. McClel
lan, Svetozar Marhovic and the Origins o f Balkan Socialism (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1964), which is based on Serbian and Russian sources. The dif
ficult position of a Serbia caught in the center of the Russian-Habsburg rivalry in
the Balkans is the subject of Wayne S. Vucinich, Serbia between East and West: The
Events o f 1903-1908 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954). John C.
Adams, Flight in Winter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942) is an ac
count of the hardships endured by the Serbian army as it retreated across north
ern Albania to Corfu in the winter of 1915-16.
For the Croats and Slovenes the reader is first referred to the works on the
Habsburg Empire mentioned previously. In addidon, although somewhat out
dated, Robert W. Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Mon
archy (London: Constable, 1911) is still useful. On particular topics Gunther E.
Rothenburg, The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881 : A Study o f an Im perial Insti
tution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966) deals with a unique organiza-
don in both Habsburg and Croatian history. Its affect on the nationality problem
is analyzed by the same author in “The Croatian Military Border and the Rise of
Yugoslav Nationalism,” Slavonic and East European Review, 43 (December, 1964)
100:34-45. The Napoleonic occupation of South Slav lands is treated in George
J. Prpic, “French Rule in Croatia, 1806-1813,” Balkan Studies, 5 (1964) 2:221-76.
Elinor Murray Despalatovic, Ludovit G aj and the Illyrian Movement (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1975) is a much needed contribution on this vital
subject in Croatian and Yugoslav affairs.
For Slovenia R. Auty, “The Formation of the Slovene Literary Language
against the Background of the Slavonic National Revival,” Slavonic and East Euro
pean Review, 41 (June, 1963) 97:391-402 concerns an important aspect of na
tional development. Two articles by Carole Rogel, “The Slovenes and Cultural
Yugoslavism on the Eve of World War I”, Canadian Slavic Studies, 2 (Spring,
1968) 1:46-67, and “Preporodovci: Slovene Students for an Independent
Yugoslavia, 1912-1914,” Ibid., 5 (Summer, 1971), 2:196-212, show the limited
and restricted response within the Slovene nation to the appeal of the Yugoslav
movement.
G reece
Of the Balkan peoples the Greeks have received the most attention in the
West. Of the numerous surveys of modern Greek history, the three most recent
are by English scholars: John Campbell and Philip Sherrard, M odem Greece (Lon
don: Ernest Benn, 1968), C. M. Woodhouse, The Story o f M odem Greece (London:
Faber and Faber, 1968), and Douglas Dakin, The Unification o f Greece, 1 770-1923
(London: Ernest Benn, 1972). Although somewhat out of date, William Miller,
Greece (London: Ernest Benn, 1928) can be recommended because of the au
thor’s close acquaintance with the country. In the same sense the work of the
nineteenth-century British scholar George Finlay, A History o f Greece from its
Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time, 146 BC to 1864AD (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1877) should be consulted, especially volumes 6 and 7.
By far the greatest amount of attention paid to a particular period has been
on the Greek Revolution. Among the many accounts, the newest is Douglas
Dakin, The Greek Struggle fo r Independence, 1821-1833 (London: B. T. Batsford,
1973). Christopher Woodhouse, The Greek War o f Independence: Its Historical Set
ting (London: Hutchinson, 1952) is an effective, brief account. The diplomacy of
the period is well analyzed in C. W. Crawley, The Question o f Greek Independence: A
Study o f British Policy in the N ear East, 1821-1833 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer
sity Press, 1930). Biographies or memoirs are available concerning the careers of
four of the Greeks most prominent in the revolutionary movement. Stephen G.
Chaconas, Adamatios Korais: A Study in Greek Nationalism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1941) stresses the cultural importance of Koraes as a factor in
the background of the revolution. On Capodistrias C. M. Woodhouse, Capodtis-
tria: The Founder of Greek Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1973)
covers the statesman’s entire career, while William P. Kaldis,John Capodistrias and
the Modem Greek State (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1963)
focuses on his years as president in Greece. Two memoirs, Theodore Koloko-
trones, Memoirsfrom the Greek War of Independence, 1821-1833 (Chicago: Argon
aut Publishers, 1969) and Ioannes Makriyannes, The Memoirs of General
Makriyannis, translated and edited by H. A. Lidderdale (London: Oxford Uni
versity Press, 1966) are indispensable for the study of the revolution.
For the reign of King Othon one of the best books written for any aspect of
Balkan affairs isJohn Anthony Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of
Greece, 1833-1834 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), which covers
thoroughly the political and social development of the first decade of the mod
ern Greek state. The role of Greece in Russian policy is the subject of Barbara
Jelavich, Russia and Greece during the Regency of King Othon, 1832-1835 (Thessa
loniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1962) and Russia and the Greek Revolution of
1843 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1966). The establishment of the Greek national Or
thodox church, independent of the ecumenical patriarchate, is described in
Charles A. Frazee, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 1821-1852 (Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). The overthrow of the Bavarian dy
nasty and the establishment of the Glücksberg ruler, George I, is the subject of a
well-documented study of Eleutherios Prevelakis, British Policy toxvards the Change
in Dynasty in Greece (Athens, 1953); Domna N. Dontas, Greece and the Great Powers,
1863-1875 (Thessaloniki: Institute of Balkan Studies, 1966) continues the sub
ject for the next decade. The Macedonian question from a largely Greek point of
view is presented in Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913
(Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966). The Greek entrance into the
war and the conflict between Venizelos and the king is discussed in George B.
Leon, Greece and the Great Powers, 1914-1917 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan
Studies, 1974) and Christos Theodoulou, Greece and the Entente, August 1,1914-
September 25, 1916 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1971). Although
Venizelos is generally regarded as Greece’s greatest modern statesman, there is
only one reliable study of his career: Doros Vlastos, Venizelos: Patriot, Statesman,
Revolutionary (London: Lund Humphries, 1942).
On other general topics two books should be mentioned: John A. Levandis,
The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers, 1821-1898 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1944) and Nicholas S. Kaltchas, Introduction to the Constitutional
History of Modem Greece (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940). The first
concerns a major problem in Greek domestic and foreign relations; the second
considers the major political changes in the century. In addition, for the devel
opment of modern Greek nationalism the issue of the relative influence of By
zantium and the Slavs is of basic significance, as is discussed in four revealing ar
ticles: Romilly Jenkins, “Byzantium and Byzantinism” in Lectures in Memory of
Louis Taft Temple, first series, 1961-65 (Princeton: Princeton University Press for
the University of Cincinnati, 1967): 137-78; Cyril Mango, “Byzantinism and
Romantic Hellenism,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 28
(1965):29-43; G. G. Arnakis, “Byzantium and Greece,” Balkan Studies, 4 (1963)
2:379-400; and A. P. Vacalopoulos, “Byzantium and Hellenism, Remarks on the

Racial Origin and Intellectual Continuity of the Greek Nation,” Balkan Studies 9
(1968) 1:101-26.
Romania
Like the literature on the South Slavs, that on the Romanians falls generally
into the two categories of those who lived under Ottoman and those who experi
enced Habsburg rule. There is, however, an acceptable, if dated, general history
covering all sections of the modern state: Robert W. Seton-Watson, A History o f
the Rumanians from the Roman Times to the Completion o f Unity (Cambridge: Cam
bridge University Press, 1934). Professor Seton-Watson is sympathetic to the
Romanian viewpoint and critical of the Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman posi-
tions. The book is nevertheless a good introduction to modern Romanian his
tory.
In the material in English principal emphasis has been placed on the history of
Moldavia and Wallachia. For the eighteenth-century background, the cultural
influences are discussed in Vlad Georgescu, Political Ideas and the Enlightenment in
the Romanian Principalities, 1750-1831 (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1971).
The decisive influence of tsarist Russia on the early political development of the
Principalities is the theme of Radu R. N. Florescu, The Struggle against Russia in
the Roumanian Principalities, 1821-1854 (Munich: Societas Academia Dacoro-
mana, 1962). An account of conditions in the country before 1848 from the
viewpoint of a Russian diplomat is given in Charles and Barbara Jelavich, eds.,
The Education o f a Russian Statesman: The Memoirs o f Nicholas Karlovich Giers (Ber
keley: University of California, 1962). The revolutions of 1848 are described in
the book by the Romanian historian Cornelia Bodea, The Romanians’ Struggle fo r
Unification, 1834-1849, translated by Liliana Teodoreanu (Bucharest: Academy
of the Socialist Republic of Romania, 1970). This work also discusses conditions
in Transylvania. The European diplomatic aspects of the unification, based on
extensive archival research are examined in detail in T. W. Riker, The M aking o f
Rumania: a Study o f an International Problem, 1856-1866 (Oxford: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1931). William G. East, The Union o f M oldavia and W allachia, 1859
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929) concerns only the background
of the double election of Cuza. The Russian attitude toward this event is given in
Barbara Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, 1858-1859 (1959; re
print ed., Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1974) and in two articles, “Russia, the Great
Powers and the Recognition of the Double Election of Alexander Cuza,” Ruman
ian Studies, 1 (1970): 3-34, and “The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers and the
Legislative and Administrative Union of the Principalities,” Ibid., 2 (1973):48-83.
The Romanian position in the crisis of the 1870s is presented in three articles:
Richard V. Burks, “Romania and the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878," Jou rn al o f
Central European A ffairs, 2 (July, 1942): 119-34 and Ibid. (October, 1942):310-20;
Barbara Jelavich, “Russia and the Reacqusition of Southern Bessarabia,
1875-78,” Südost-Forschungen, 28 (1969): 199-237; and “Austria-Hungary, Ru
mania, and the Eastern Crisis, 1876-1878,” Ibid., 30 ( 1971 ): 111 — 41. Romania’s
best-known historian, Nicholas Iorga, is ably presented in William O. Oldson, The
Historical and Nationalistic Thought o f Nicolae Iorga (Boulder: East European
Quarterly, 1973).
The great domestic issue in the Principalities, the land question, is the subject
of the classic work by David Mitrany, The Land and the Peasant in Romania: The
War and Agrarian Ref arm, 1917-1921 . (London: Oxford University Press, 1930).
Philip Gabriel Eidelberg, The Great Rumanian Peasant Revolt of 1907: Origins of a
Modern Jacquerie (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974) examines this problem further in con
nection with this extensive peasant rebellion.
For studies on Romanians under Habsburg rule the reader is again referred to
the books previously discussed on the monarchy. In addition, conditions in
Transylvania in the eighteenth century are covered in the study of Romanian
historian D. Prodan, Supplex Libellus Valachorum or The Political Struggle of the
Romanians during the Eighteenth Century, translated by Mary Lazarescu (Bu
charest: Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, 1969). The early nine
teenth century is covered in Keith Hitchins, The Rumanian National Movement in
Transyhania, 1780-1849 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969). The
same author has written four outstanding articles on various aspects of the Tran
sylvanian question and the conflicts with the Hungarian rule: “Andrei $aguna
and the Restoration of the Rumanian Orthodox Metropolis in Transylvania,
1846-1868,” Balkan Studies, 6 (1965) 1:1-20; “The Rumanians of Transylvania
and Constitutional Experiment in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1860-1865,” Ibid., 5
(1964) 1:89-108; “The Rumanians o f Transylvania and the Congress of Nation
alities,” Slavonic and East European Review, 48 (July, 1970) 112:388-402; and
“The Rumanian Question in Hungary: Auriel C. Popovici and the Replica,” Ös
terreichische Osthefte, 14 (1972):282-89. For a current Romanian interpretation of
this period and the union of Transylvania with the Romanian kingdom, see the
collection of articles in Miron Constantinescu and §tefan Pascu, eds., Vnipcation
o f the Romanian State: The Union o f Transylvania with OldRomania (Bucharest: Acad
emy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, 1971).
Romania’s entrance into the war, including the Transylvanian question, is the
subject of two fine articles by Glenn Torrey: “Irredentism and Diplomacy: The
Central Powers and Rumania, August-November, 1914,” Südost-Forschungen, 25
(1966):285-332, and “Rumania’s Decision to Intervene: Brâtianu and the En
tente, June-July,.1916,” Rumanian Studies, 2 (1971-72):3-29. The final year of
the war is discussed in Keith Hitchins, “The Russian Revolution and the Ruman
ian Socialist Movement, 1917-1918,” Slavic Review, 27 (June, 1968) 2:268-289.
B ulgaria
Although there are two general histories of Bulgaria, neither one is quite satis
factory. Mercia Macdermott, A History of Bulgaria, 1393-1885 (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1962) is an uncritical, laudatory account. Dimitur Kosev, H.
Hristov, and D. Angelov, A Short History o f Bulgaria (Sofia: Foreign Languages
Press, 1963) represents the current official view. An older history, Dimitur Mi-
shev, The Btdgarians in the Past, Pages from Bulgarian History (Lausanne: Librairie
Centrale des Nationalités, 1919) has a strong nationalist bent, but is useful for
the period from 1800 to 1878.
For the beginning of the modern national movement, James F. Clarke has
written an informative article, “Father Paisii and Bulgarian History,” in H. S.
Hughes, ed., Teachers o f History (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954),
pp. 258-83. A contribution to the cultural background o f the nationalist revival
338 T he E s t a b l is h m ent of th e B alkan N a t io n a l St a te s
is Philip Shashko, “Greece and the Intellectual Bases o f the Bulgarian Renais
sance,” A merican Contributions to the Seventh International Congress o f Slavicists vol. 3
(History) (Hague: Mouton, 1973)> pp. 91-121. An aspect o f Bulgarian demo
graphy is discussed in Marc Pinson, “Ottoman Colonization o f the Circassians in
Rumili after the Crimean War," Études balkaniques, 3 (1972):71-85. The activities
o f the American missionaries in the country are the subject o f two books: Wil
liam W. Hall, Puritans in the Balkans: The American Board Mission in Bulgaria,
18 7 8 - 1 918 (Sofia, 1938) and James F. Clarke, Bible Societies, American Mis
sionaries, and the National Rei'ival o f Bulgaria (New York: Arno Press and New
York Times, 1971).
As could be expected, the emphasis in historical writing on Bulgaria is on the
crisis o f the 1870s, the establishment o f the autonomous state, and the first de
cade o f its development. Mercia MacDermott has written a eulogistic biography
o f one o f the principal revolutionary leaders: The Apostle o f Freedom: A Portrait o f
Vasil Lei'sky against a Background o f Nineteenth Century Bulgaria (London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1967). The role of Russia in the national movement has been
discussed in an article by Michael P. Petrovich, “The Russian Image in Renas
cence Bulgaria, 1760-1878,” East European Quarterly, 1 (June, 1967) 2:87-105,
and a book on the activities o f the most controversial Russian ambassador o f the
time: Thomas A. Meininger, Ignatiei> and the Establishment o f the Bulgarian Ex
archate, 1 8 6 4 -1872: A Study in Personal Diplomacy (Madison: State Historical Soci
ety o f Wisconsin, 1970). The material on the events o f 1875-78, so important in
Bulgarian history, is given in the section below on diplomacy, but special men
tion should be made here of David Harris, Britain and the Bulgarian Horrors o f
1876 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939). The formation o f the first
modern Bulgarian government is carefully analyzed in C. E. Black, The Establish
ment o f Constitutional Goi'emment in Bulgaria (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1943). This book should be read together with the same author’s article,
“The Influence o f Western Political Thought in Bulgaria, 1850-1885 ,” American
Historical Reinexv, 48 (April, 1943) 3:507-20. The Russian role in Bulgaria during
these years, together with the unification o f 1885 and the rupture o f Russo-
Bulgarian relations is to be found in Charles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan
Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal A ffairs o f Bulgaria and Serbia,
1876-1886 (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1958) and Barbara Jela
vich, “Russia, Britain and the Bulgarian Question, 1885-1888,” Südost-
Forschungen, 32 (1973): 168-91. The biographies o f the first two rulers are by
Egon C. Corti, Alexander von Battenberg (London: Cassell, 1954) and Hans Roger
Madol, Ferdinand o f Bulgaria: The Dream o f Byzantium (London: Hurst 8c Blackett,
1933). Although perhaps overly sympathetic, A. Hulme Beaman, M. Stam buloff
(London: Bliss, Sands and Foster, 1895) may still be read with profit. Bulgaria’s
entrance into the First World War is examined in two articles: Keith Robbins,
“British Diplomacy and Bulgaria, 1914-1915,” Slavonic and East European Review,
49 (October, 1971) 117:560-85 and James M. Potts, “The Loss of Bulgaria” in
Alexander Dallin, et al., Russian Diplomacy and Eastern Europe, 1 9 1 4 - 1917 (New
York: Kings Crown Press, 1963), pp. 194-234.
Economic and social issues facing Bulgaria after 1890 are discussed in Joseph
Rothschild, The Communist Party o f Bulgaria: Origins and Development, 1 8 8 3 -1 9 3 6
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), which centers around the career
of Dimitur Blagoev, and two articles by Marin Pundeff, “Marxism in Bulgaria
before 1891,” Slavic Review, 30 (September, 1971) 3:523-50 and “Nationalism
and Communism in Bulgaria,” Südost-Forschungen, 29 (1970): 128-70.
A lbania
The Balkan state most neglected in historical research is certainly Albania.
Joseph Swire, Albania: the Rise o f a Kingdom (London: William and Ungate, 1929)
is elementary; Khristo Frasheri, The History o f Albania, A B rief Survey (Tirana;
1964) reflects views of the present regime. Two major sources exist for factual
information in the publications, Great Britain, Office o f the Admiralty, Naval
Intelligence Division, A Handbook o f Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and the Adjacent
Parts o f Greece (1920) and Albania: Basic Handbook, 2 parts, (1943-1944). The one
bright spot in this bleak historiographic picture is provided by the volume by
Stavro Skendi, TA*Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1967). One o f the best books on a Balkan national movement,
this work is a careful, detailed analysis of the national development from its
inception at the time of the San Stefano treaty to the final declaration o f
independence in 1912. The author’s article on “The History o f the Albanian
Alphabet: A Case o f Complex Cultural and Political Development,”
Südost-Forschungen, 19 (1960):263-84 concerns an important aspect o f Albanian
cultural revival.
D iplomatic H istory
Because of the importance of the area in the great power conflicts of the nine
teenth century, by far the greatest number of books on the Balkans deal with in
ternational relations. Some of these, primarily covering the foreign policy of one
nation, have already been cited. This section will discuss principally the works on
the foreign relations of the great powers and on intra-Balkan affairs. For a gen
eral background the best study is M. A. Anderson, The Eastern Question,
1774-1923 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966), which includes the events from
the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji to the Treaty of Lausanne. Because of Russian
and Austrian influence on Balkan events the two surveys by Barbara Jelavich, St.
Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy 1814-1974 (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1974) and The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs,
1814-1918 (1969: reprint ed., Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1974) provide a back
ground. Russian activities are further considered in Traian Stoianovich, “Rus
sian Domination in the Balkans,” in Taras Hunczak, ed ., Russian Imperialism from
Ivan the Great to the Revolution (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press,
1974), pp. 198-238, 352-62; in Charles and Barbara Jelavich, “The Danubian
Principalities and Bulgaria under Russian Protectorship,” Jahrbücher fü r Ges
chichte Osteuropas, 9 (October, 1961) 3:349-66; and in the relevant essays in Ivo J.
Lederer, ed., Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1962). An important aspect of the relations between the
Balkan states is examined in Leften S. Stavrianos, Balkan Federation: A History o f
the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modem Times (Northhampton, Mass.: Smith
College Studies in History, 1944).
On the major crises in the century Britain and her role in the Crimean War are
defended in H. W. V. Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (Lon
340 T he E s t a b l is h m ent of th e B alkan N a t io n a l St a te s
don: Longmans, Green 8c Co., 1936) and criticized in Vernon J. Puryear, En
gland, Russia, and the Straits Question, 1844-1856 (Berkeley: University o f Califor
nia Press, 1931). The Straits problem and Ottoman policy in this regard after the
Crimean War are discussed in Barbara Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, the Great
Powers, and the Straits Question, 1870-1887 (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1973). William L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871 -1 8 9 0
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956) provides an excellent background for these
two eventful decades. The crisis o f the 1870s has been studied in a number of
fine books. Russian policy is emphasized in B. H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans,
1 8 7 0-1880 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937) and David MacKenzie, The
Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 1875-1878 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1967). These books should be read in conjunction with Michael B. Petrovich, The
Emergence o f Russian Panslavism, 1 8 5 6 -1870 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1956). Mihailo D. Stojanovic, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1 875-1878
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939) is a balanced, comprehensive
survey. The setdement o f issues at stake between the powers is covered in Wil
liam N. Medlicott, The Congress o f Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History o f the N ear
Eastern Setdement, 1878-1880 (London: Methuen, 1938).
The Macedonian question has produced an enormous number of books and
articles, most o f them polemical in nature. The best introduction to the complex
ities o f the problem is through the unique book by Henry R. Wilkinson, Maps and
Politics: A Review o f the Ethnographic Cartography o f M acedonia (Liverpool: Univer
sity Press, 1951). The author examines about ninety maps, beginning with one o f
1730, to show how the claims to the area were advanced and how individual
maps reflected the interests o f the various ethnic groups and the great powers
regardless o f the facts. O f the general studies available, H. N. Brailsford, Mace
donia: Its Races and their Future (London: Methuen, 1906) defends the Bulgarian
point o f view; the Serbian side is found in.Tihomir R. Georgevitch, M acedonia
(London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1918). The Greek position is reflected in the
previously mentioned book by Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle in M acedonia,
1897-1913. The role that the Macedonian issue played in the Greek national
movement is analyzed by Jerry Augustinos, “The Dynamics o f Modern Greek
Nationalism: The ‘Great Idea’ and the Macedonian Problem,” East European
Quarterly, 6 (January, 1973) 4:444-53. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organization, or IMRO, is the subject o f Joseph Swire, Bulgarian Conspiracy
(London: Hale, 1939).
The two major crises that preceded the outbreak o f the First World War are
treated in Bernadotte D. Schmitt, The Annexation o f Bosnia (Cambridge: Cam
bridge University Press, 1937) and in Ernst C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy o f the
Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), which is
the standard work on the subject. Edward C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alli
ance o f 1912 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965) argues
that Russia was in a stronger position after the Balkan alliances and that Austria
was weakened by the success o f Sazonov’s diplomacy. Ivan E. Geshov, Bulgaria’s
prime minister during the First Balkan War, has defended his course o f action in
The Balkan League, translated by Constantin C. Nincoff (London: J. Murray,
1915).
The events leading to the outbreak o f the World War are depicted in the
three-volume work by Luigi Albertini, The Origins o f the War o f 1914, translated
and edited by Isabella M. Massey (London: Oxford University Press, 1952-57).
Joachim Remak, Sarajevo: The Origins o f a Political Murder (New York: Criterion
Press, 1959) is a well-written account in which the author contends that the assas
sination was planned by the Serbian chief of military intelligence, Colonel Dimi-
trijevic. Rejecting this interpretation; Vladimir Dedijer, The Road to Sarajeim
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966) argues that the plan was exclusively the
work o f the young students who were disaffected by the political, social, and eco
nomic conditions in Bosnia.
A good account of the war years is to be found in both Z. A. B. Zeman, A Diplo
matic History o f the First World War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971)
and in Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918:
A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1957). The Russian actions are examined in C. Jay Smith, The Russian
Struggle fo r Power, 1914-1917: A Study o f Foreign Policy during the First World War
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1956). The Bulgarian, Romanian, and Ser
bian issues in the war as seen through Russian eyes are examined by James M.
Potts, Alfred J. Rieber, and Michael B. Petrovich, respectively, in Alexander
Dallin, et al., Russian Diplomacy and Eastern Europe, 1914-1917, previously cited.
The peace settlements in the Balkans have received considerable attention.
For Yugoslavia the standard work is Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Con
ference: A Study in Frontier-Making (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).
The book concentrates on the disputes with Italy, but it also examines the fron
tier issues with Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Dragan R.
Zivojinovic, America, Italy, and the Birth o f Yugoslavia, 1917-1919 (New York:
East European Quarterly, 1972) also centers on the Italian dispute, but as seen
through Yugoslav eyes. Sherman David Spector, Rumania at the Paris Peace Con
ference: A Study o f the Diplomacy o f loan I. C. Bratianu (New York: Bookman
Associates, 1962) is a critical assessment. Although admiring Bratianu’s succes
ses in achieving the maximum Romanian goals, Spector is less charitable to
ward the man, his tactics, and his diplomacy. Georgi P. Genov, Bulgaria and the
Treaty o f Neuilly (Sofia: H. G. Danov, 1935) describes why the settlement was not
the “just” peace that Wilson and the Allies had promised.
The settlement with the Ottoman Empire and the Greek-Turkish conflict has
been well covered. Harry N. Howard, The Partition o f Turkey: A Diplomatic History,
1913-1923 (Norman, Okla.: Oklahoma University Press, 1931) provides a broad
sweep o f Ottoman affairs since the Balkan Wars. It should be supplemented by
Laurence Evans, United States Policy and the Partition o f Turkey, 1914-1924 (Bal
timore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965). Both volumes examine carefully the diplo
macy of the treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne. A recent book by Paul C.
Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres: The Partition o f the Ottoman Empire at the Peace
Conference o f 1919-1920 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974), is a de
tailed, thorough study of a setdement that was never implemented, but gave im
petus to Rental's eventual nadonalist victory. The Greek Anatolian plans are
carefully documented in Alexander A. Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture and After:
A Survey o f the Diplomatic and Political Aspects o f the Greek Expedition to Asia Minor,
1915-1922 (London: Methuen, 1937). The legacy of that disaster is described in
Stephen P. Ladas, The Exchange o f Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey (New
342 T he E s t a b l is h m ent of th e B alkan N a t io n a l Sta tes
York: Macmillan, 1932) and Dimitri Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange o f Min
orities and Its Impact on Greece (Paris: Mouton, 1962). Greece’s other defeat is
recorded in Edith Pierpont Stickney, Southern Albania or Northern Epirus in Euro
pean International A ffairs, 1912-1913 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1926).
Economic and Social H istory

This field in Balkan history has been relatively neglected when compared to
the material available on political and diplomatic developments. Only two books
present a broad coverage. Nicolas Spulber, The State and Economic Development in
Eastern Europe (New York: Random House, 1966) explores the role and function
o f the state in the economies o f the Balkan nations with more attention given to
the twentieth century than the nineteenth. The most recent work, by two well-
known Hungarian economic historians, Ivan T. Berend and Gyorgy Ranki, Eco
nomic Development in East Central Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1974) is a translation of a book first pub
lished in Budapest in 1969. The authors examine demographic problems,
agrarian changes, credit and transport, investments and foreign capital, manu
facturing, and the emergence of capitalism. Although the emphasis is on the
Habsburg lands, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria are discussed, but not
Greece or Albania.
On specific topics Traian Stoianovich, “The Conquering Balkan Orthodox
Merchant,” Jou rn al o f Economic History, 20 (June, 1960) 2:234-313 concerns
chiefly commercial developments in the eighteenth century. The Bulgarian
scholar Nikolai Todorov, “The Genesis o f Capitalism in the Balkan Provinces o f
the Ottoman Empire in the Nineteenth Century,” Explorations in Economic His
tory, 7 (1970):313-24 argues that the growth of capitalism in the Balkans was re
tarded because o f the nature o f the Ottoman system. In another article, “The
Balkan Town in the Second Half o f the Nineteenth Century,” Études balkaniques,
5 (1969) 2:31-50, the same author gives interesting statistics on urban popula
tion, ethnic composition, occupations and taxation.
On the individual states the financial plight o f the Ottoman Empire and steps
by which it became the economic ward o f the European powers are described in
two books: D. C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Em pire: A
Study o f the Establishment, Activities, and Significance o f the Ottoman Public Debt (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1929) and Herbert Feis, Europe the World’s
Banker, 1870-1914, (New York: A. M. Kelley, 1961), pp. 258-361. The second
book contains information on Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece. Whereas these tides
deal largely with the second half o f the century, the first is briefly examined in E.
Clark, “The Ottoman Industrial Revolution,” International Jou rn al o f Middle East
Studies, 5 (1964):65-76.
For the South Slavs the outstanding work is the previously cited Jozo Tomase-
vich, Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia. Toussaint Ho£evar, The
Structure o f the Slovenian Economy, 1848-1963 (New York: Studia Slovenica, 1965)
is a general, informative survey. Peter F. Sugar, Industrialization o f Bosnia-H er-
cegovina, 1878-1918 (Seatde: University of Washington Press, 1963) provides a
careful assessment of both the economic and political developments within a
province whose fate helped precipitate the First World War. John R. Lampe,
“Serbia, 1878-1912,” in Rondo Cameron, ed., Banking and Economic Development:
Some Lessons o f History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 122-67
describes how the Belgrade affiliates of the big European banks were used politi
cally for purposes of foreign and military policy rather than to promote indus
trialization.
For Romania the emphasis is on the land problem. The works of David Mi-
trany, The Land and the Peasant in Rumania, and Philip Eidelberg, The Great Ru
manian Peasant Rei'olt o f 1907, have already been cited. There is also Ifor L.
Evans, Agrarian Revolution in Rumania (Cambridge: University Press, 1924).
Less is available on Bulgaria. Aside from the information in Spulber and
Berend and Ranki, Alexander Gerschenkron, “Some Aspects of Indus
trialization in Bulgaria,” in his book Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspec
tive: A Book o f Essays (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1962), pp. 198-234 deserves
particular mention.
For Greece A. A. Pepelasis, “The Legal System and the Economic Develop
ment o f Greece,”Jou rn al o f Economic History, 19 (June, 1959) 2:173-98 concen
trates on showing how the Greek legal system was a contributing factor to the na
tion’s economic backwardness. In another article, “Greece,” in a volume which
the same author edited with Leon Mears and Irma Adelman, Economic Develop
ment: Analysis and Case Studies (New York: Harper 8c Bros., 1961), pp. 500-22,
Pepelasis argues that it was not so much the lack of capital as its improper use
that caused many of Greece’s problems in the nineteenth century.
For general social conditions the most useful books available are those on
village and peasant life. Although most of the works cited deal with the twentieth
century, they also reflect conditions and attitudes common in the previous
period. For Bulgaria Irwin T. Sanders, Balkan Village (Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 1949) is recommended. Sanders is also the author of Rainbow in
the Rock: The People o f Rural Greece (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961),
a book that should be read with Ernestine Friedl, Vasilika: a Village in M odem
Greece (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962). John K. Campbell,
Honor, Family, and Patronage: A Study o f Institutions and M oral Values in a Greek
Mountain Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) is a sociological-
anthropological study of villages in Epirus. For Serbia two basic works are Joel
M. Halpem’s A Serbian Village (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958)
and, with his wife Barbara Kerewsky Halpern, his A Serbian Village in Historical
Perspective (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972). They should be sup
plemented with Eugene A. Hammel, “The Balkan Peasant—A View from Ser
bia,” in Philip K. Bock, ed., Peasants in the Contemporary World (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1969); Hammel deals with Serbian peasant cul
ture here and in his “Economic Change, Social Mobility, and Kinship in Serbia,”
Southwestern Jou rnal o f Anthropology, 25 (1969): 188-97. For Slovenia there is Irene
Winner, A Slovenian Village: Zerovnica (Providence: Brown University Press,
1971).
For an understanding of conditions in the Balkans in the nineteenth century,
contemporary accounts and travel books can be most useful. A collection dealing
with Bulgaria, Romania, the South Slav lands, and Hungary is to be found in
Doreen Warriner, Contrasts in Emerging Societies: Readings in the Social and Eco
nomic History o f South-Eastern Europe in the Nineteenth Century (Bloomington: In
diana University Press, 1965). Of the travel accounts among the best are G. Muir
344 T he E s t a b l is h m ent of th e B alkan N a t io n a l States
Mackenzie and A. P. Irby, Travels in the Slavonic Provinces o f Turkey-in-Europe

(London: Alexander Strahan, 1866) and William M. Leake, Travels in Northern
Greece (London: J. Rodwell, 1845),- 4 vols.
L iterature
A brief general survey in English is available for every country: Antun Barac,
A History o f Yugoslav Literature, translated by Petar Mijuskovic (Ann Arbor: Mi
chigan Slavic Publications, 1973); C. Th. Dimaras,/4 History o f M odem Greek Liter
ature translated by Mary P. Gianos (Albany: State University o f New York Press,
1972); Stuart E. Mann, Albanian Literature: An Outline o f Prose, Poetry, and Drama
(London: Bernard Quaritch, 1955); Charles A. Moser, A History o f Bulgarian Lit
erature, 8 6 5 -1 9 4 4 (Hague: Mouton, 1972), and Basil M untca.no, M odem Rouman
ian Literature (Bucharest: Editura Cuvântul, 1943).
Index
Abdul Aziz, Sultan, 109, 112, 145 Albanian Writings, Society for the Printing
Abdul Hamid II, Sultan, 112,147,211,213, of, 225-26
214, 215, 229 Albert, Prince of Britain, 82
Abdul Mejid, Sultan, 104, 105 Alecsandri, Vasile, 270
Abel, Karl von, 68-69 Aleko Pasha, 163, 164
Abu Bekir Pasha, 31 Alexander, Prince-Regent of Serbia. See
Adalia: Italian claim to, 311 Karadjordjevic, Alexander, Prince-
Administration: Ottoman, 3-4, 10, 36, 111; Regent of Serbia
Serbian and Ottoman cooperation in, Alexander, King of Serbia. See Obrenovic,
36-37; Serbian, 37, 58-59; in Bulgaria, Alexander, King of Serbia
160-61; in Balkans, 322. See also indi Alexander, King of Greece, 296, 313
vidual countries Alexander I, Tsar, 34, 40, 48; at Tilsit, 33,
Adrianople, Treaty of, of 1829, 55, 102, 86; and Principalities, 41-42; and Greece,
107; terms of, 49-50, 89-90 47
Aegean Islands: claimed by Greece, 77 Alexander II, Tsar, 161, 162, 179
Aehrenthal, Count Alois von, 215, 257 Alexander III, Tsar, 162, 168; and Pan
Agrarian Union (of Bulgaria), 194, 204 slavism, 146; and Bulgaria, 162-63, 165,
Agriculture: Balkan, 7-8; Romanian, 91-92; 167; and Aleko Pasha, 164
in Greece, 172; Bulgarian, 194; in Balkan Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of Bul
states, 201, 202. See also Peasantry garia, 185, 188; and Bulgarian Liberals,
Akkerman, Convention of, 44,55, 102,324; 161-62; and German influence, 162; and
provisions of, 89 Alexander III, 162-63, 166-67; and
Alba Iulia: national assembly at, 297, 306 Rumelia, 165; defeats Serbs, 166
Albania, 142, 171,299,316-19; Muslims in, Alexandrescu, Gregory, 270
4; Ali Pasha of Janina in, 18; invaded by Algeria: France in, 23
Serb forces, 219; independence of, 221, Ali Pasha, of Janina, 39, 41, 46, 103, 108,
229; national movement in, 222, 224-25; 142, 223; activities of, 18-19; position of,
government of, 223, 318, 319; education 42-43; death of, 44, 109; and Mahmud
in, 223, 226-27; and Treaty of San II, 101; and Young Ottomans, 112
Stefano, 223-24; and Congress of Berlin, Alliance Israelite, 179
224; cultural awakening in, 225-26; and Allies, 286; and Treaty of London, 287-88;
Macedonia, 227-28; and Young Turks, and Bulgaria, 288, 289; and Romania,
229; establishment of, 230-31; Interna 290-93; and Greece, 294-96; and Turkish
tional Control Commission in, 232; con revolution, 315; and Albania, 316.5^ also
stitution of, 232-33; during World War I, individual countries
297; and Italy, 302; Mirdite revolt in, 319 Amalia of Oldenburg, Queen of Greece, 73,
Albanian League, 224, 225, 227 81
Albanians, 222, 223, 227; in Macedonia, Aman, Theodore, 280
207, 211 Anatolia: division of, 313, 315
343
346 Index
Andjelkovic, Ko£a: rebellion of, 27 Balkan League, 216, 218, 220, 229
Andrassy, Count Julius, 147, 155 Balkans: legal systems in, 5; rural life in, 8;
Andrescu, Ion, 280 social and economic changes in, 11-16;
Antim I, Exarch, 134 Slavic unity in, 137; boundaries in, 142;
Anton, Prince Karl, 122 mid-1870s in, 144; irredenta in, 171; 1908
Apponyi, Count Albert, 245 crisis in, Î 76; and First World War, 284
Aprilov, Vasil, 130, 272 Balkan states: political, social, and economic
Arad: bishopric at, 242 patterns in, 170; military in, 171, 205;
Architecture: Balkan, 9, 281 aspirations of, 196-97; industrialization
Aristocracy: Serbian, 247; Croatian, 247, of, 199,203; agriculture in, 201-2; culture
248, 250; Hungarian, 248, 250. See also of, 273; economies of, 322-23; impor
Ayans\ Boyars; Notables tance of war in, 324-25; achievements of,
Armansperg, Count Joseph von, 68, 69, 74 326-27; territorial settlements of, 327. See
Armenia, 312, 314 also individual states
Armenians, 10, 51, 129 Balkan Wars of 1912, 1913, 216-21; men
Army. See Military tioned, 204, 229, 230, 247, 285, 289, 290,
Arsenije III, Patriarch, 26 296, 311
Art: Balkan, 280-81 Balta Liman, Treaty of, 97, 105
Artisans, 14, 88 Banat, 142, 236, 302; Serbs in, 248; and
Asachi, George, 270 Romania, 290, 293, 297, 305, 306
Askerc, Anton, 277 Be£ic, Vladimir, 280
Athens: archbishop of, 72; New School of, Begs: revolt of, 143
278 Bektaski Dervish order, 101, 282
Ausgleich of 1867, 146, 181, 245, 276; Belgrade, pashalik of, 19, 26, 30, 35
provisions of, 243; and Croats, 253 Benkovski, George: uprising of, 139
Austerlitz, Battle of, 32 Berchtold, Count Leopold von, 264
Australia, 201 Berlin, Congress of, 155-56, 157, 171, 196;
Austria, 89; and Ottoman Empire, 19-20, and Bulgaria, 158, 159; and commercial
26-27; and Venice, 20; and Serbia, 26-27, agreements, 186; and Albania, 224; men
53; Karadjordje and, 34; and Crimean tioned, 208, 210, 230, 233, 276, 282
War, 107; and Ausgleich, 243; and Yugo Berlin, Treaty of, 165, 167, 179, 193; terms
slav frontiers, 302, See also Austria- of, 156-57; and Eastern Rumelia, 164;
Hungary; Great powers; Habsburg and Romania, 178-79; and tariffs, 200;
monarchy and Bosnia-Hercegovina, 215; and Al
Austria-Hungary: and Three Emperors’ Al bania, 224
liance, 146; and San Stefano, 155; and Beron, Dr. Peter, 272
Serbia, 155-56, 186-87, 191, 192; and Bessarabia, 142, 147, 178, 246; and Russia,
Bosnia-Hercegovina, 157, 195; and 20, 87, 153, 157; and Romania, 108, 114,
Romania, 181-83; and Ottoman Empire, 127, 181, 290, 291, 294, 305, 306, 307,
218; and Albania, 229-30, 232, 297; at 308, 309
war, 265; dissolution of, 298. See also Bibescu, George, 93-96
Austria; Central Powers; Habsburg Bismarck, Otto von, 122, 124, 181
monarchy Black Hand society (Ujedinjenje ili Smrt or
Austro-French war of 1859, 81 Crna Ruka), 259-60, 263
Austro-Prussian War, 122, 146 Black Sea: neutralization of, 107, 109, 114,
Avakumovic, Jovan, 191 146
Averescu, Alexander, 184, 293, 308, 309 Blagoev, Dimitur, 204
Ayans, 27, 101, 143; and Christian notables, Blaj: resolution of, 240-41
13; threat of, to Porte, 16-19. See also Bolintineanu, Dimitrie, 270
Notables Bontoux, E., Company, 186, 188
Aynali Kavak, Convention of, 86 Bopp, F., 225
Boris III, King of Bulgaria, 169, 310
Bosnia,3,4,7, 13,32, 109, 174, 185,263.5**
Ba£ka, 302; Serbs in, 248 also Bosnia-Hercegovina
Bakunin, Michael, 261 Bosnia-Hercegovina, 142, 236; uprising in,
Bälcescu, Nicholas, 95, 270, 275; and land 127; peasantry in, 143-44; and Austria-
reform, 97 Hungary, 147, 157, 210; annexation of,
Bäleanu, E., 96 195,212,215-16; conversions in, 222; and
Index 347
Croatia, 247, 254; and Serbia, 247, 259; tenberg, Prince of Bulgaria; Macedonia;
dialect of, 250; population of, 254; situa San Stefano, T reaty of ; Stambolov, Stefan
tion in, 255; and South Slavs, 256-57; Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Commit
Serbs in, 287; liberation of, 297 tee, 138
Botev, Khristo, 136, 138-40, 272, 277 Bulgarians, 4, 40; in Ottoman Empire, 11,
Boyars, 84-93; aim of, 97; and Dedicated 51; in Constantinople, 131-32; revolu
Monasteries,! 19 tionary activities of, 136-37, 140, 144;
Bozveli, Neofit, 131 in Romania, 137
Brancusi, Constantine, 281 Burmov, T. S., 162
Brätianu, Dumitru, 95, 179 Byron, Lord, 48
Brätianu, Ion, 95, 118, 121, 122, 123, Byzantium: and Greek national program,
149-50, 179; on Bessarabia, 151; and 77
Congress of Berlin, 156; death of, 183
Brätianu, Ion I.C., 309, 311; diplomacy of, Callimachi, Scarlat, 87
291-93; territorial goals of, 305-7 Calvinists: in Transylvania, 237
Britain, 98, 183, 196, 265; and Ottoman Camarda, Demetrio, 282
Empire, 20, 22, 32, 47, 99, 101, 105; and Campo Formio, Treaty of, 20
Greece, 46, 47-48, 50, 52, 74, 76, 78, 152, Canning, George, 47, 48, 49
153, 173, 313; and Serbia, 53, 191; and Canning, Stratford, 107
Romania, 93, 115, 125, 179; and Crimean Cantacuzino, Constantine, 97
War, 107; and Bosnian revolt, 147; and Capodistrias, Agostino, 50, 51, 70, 74
San Stefano, 155; and World War I, Capodistrias, John, 40
285-86; and Yugoslav Committee, 287; Caragea, loan, 87
and Yugoslav frontier, 301 ; and Treaty of Caragiale, Ion Luca, 275
Sèvres, 314. See also Allies; Great powers Caransebes: bishopric at, 242
Brusilov: offensive of, 292, 293 Carp, Peter, 179, 182, 291
Bucharest, Treaty of, 1812, 20, 87, 101; Castlereagh, Robert, 48
Article 8 of, and Serbia, 34-35, 36, 38,48, Catargiu, Barbu, 118
55 Catargiu, Lascar, 121, 124, 149, 179
Bucharest, Treaty of, 1913, 221, 289 Catholic church: in Serbian lands, 26; in
Bucharest, Treaty of, 1916, 302, 308 Albania, 222, 226; in Transylvania, 237;
Bucharest, Treaty of, 1918, 293-94, 308 in Croatia-Slavonia, 248
Bukovina, 142,236,246; and Romania, 127, Cavafy, Constantine, 278
290, 291, 293, 305, 308 Central Powers: and Balkans, 286-93
Bulgaria, 147, 158, 170, 176, 192-96, 228, Charles, King of Romania, 149, 161, 179,
233, 299; and Greek-dominated church, 180,183,184,187,193,246; character of,
100, 129; revolts in, 127, 135-39, 140, 123; and Russo-Turkish War, 150-51;
144; and Russia, 128, 156, 158, 162, 163, and German nations, 290-91; death of,
166-69, 181; sociäl structure of, 129; and 292
Romania, 129,247,305; and Greece, 129, Charles X, King of France, 49
217; national movement of, 130-31, 138, Cherniaev, General M. G., 145
140; education in, 130-31; national Chernyshevsky, N. G., 136, 261
church of, 131-33, 134, 140, 208-9; and Cheta organizations, 135-37
Greeks, 133-34; political status of, 134-35; Chiftliks, 7-8, 12, 13-14; and Serbs, 28; in
and Serbo-Turkish War, 145; greater, Danubian Principalities, 84; in Bulgaria,
153-54; Tumovo constitution of, 159-61, 129
162, 163, 196; and Rumelia, 164, 165, Chios: massacre at, 44
169; coup d'état in, 167; and Macedonia, Chorbadzhiis, 2, 129, 135
169, 207, 208, 209-10, 211, 212; neutral Christians, 9, 22, 36, 320; in Ottoman Em
ity of, 175; Serbian radicals in, 188; Serbia pire, 4, 5-6, 28, 105; and Tanzimat re
and, 192, 216-17; political parties in, 193, forms, 110, 111. See also Catholic church;
204-5; economy of, 193-94, 198, 199-200, Church; Orthodox church
201-3; independence of, 195,214-15; and Church, 4, 8; in Transylvania, 245; and
Balkan Wars, 218-19; expansion of, 220, Balkan culture, 280; and national gov
221, 293; literature of, 272; and World ernments, 321
War 1,288-90,292,296-97; and Yugoslav Church, Sir Richard, 50
frontier, 302-4; losses of, 310-11; and Churchill, Winston, 285-86
Albania, 320. See also Alexander of Bat Church Slavonic, 130, 131
348 Index
Clain, Ion Inochentie, 239 Dalmatia, 171, 236, 254, 301, 302; to
Clain (Micu), Samuel, 239, 270 Austria, 20; social structure in, 247-48;
Cochrane, Alexander, 50 dialect of, 250; Serbs and Croats in, 256,
Constantine, King of Greece, 174, 175, 176, 267; and Italy, 286, 288
294, 296,313,314,315 Danilo I of Montenegro, 143
Constantinople, patriarchate of, 4, 9, 10, D’Annunzio, Gabriel, 302
119, 134; and Greek church, 71; and Danube River: internationalization of, 108,
Bulgarian church, 132, 134 181
Constantinople Conference, 147, 152 Danubian Principalities, 135, 136; and Rus
Corfu: Serbs in, 290, 295; Declaration of, sia, 20, 48-50, 85, 87, 90, 91, 92, 94, 108,
300, 304 142; and Greek revolution, 39,41-42,44,
Corneille, Pierre, 270 88-89; government of, 58, 76, 86, 89,
Corvée. See Peasantry 90-93,115-16,118,119,121,122-23; land
Cosbuc, George, 278 system of, 75; aristocracy of, 84; national
Costaforu, George, 124-25 movement in, 84-85, 94; and Habsburg
Courts. See Judiciary Empire, 85; peasantry in, 85, 90-91, 97;
Creangä, Ion, 275 Greek influence in, 86, 88, 269; and
Crete, 3, 147; Muslims in, 4; and Moham Convention of Akkerman, 89; and Treaty
med Ali, 46; revolt in, 75, 78, 109, 174; of Adrianople, 89-90; 1848 revolution in,
and Greece, 77, 151, 156, 171, 174, 176, 95-96, 97; Austro-Turkish occupation of,
209, 219, 294; Greek writers in, 267; 107; unification of, 109, 115; agrarian
Venizelos on, 296 reform in, 118-20; education in, 121;
Cretulescu, Nicholas, 118 economy of, 121, 202; civil code in, 121;
Crimean War, 78, 85, 91, 98, 114, 116; railroad scandal in, 124; national church
outbreak of, 107; mentioned, 74, 108, in, 131; Jews in, 178-79. See also Moldavia;
131, 135, 142, 146, 147, 153, 265, 324 Romania; Wallachia
Croatia, 247-58; history of, 247; social struc Dardanelles, campaign of the, 286, 295
ture in, 247-48; magyarization in, 250; Dashkov, Prince I. A., 90
national program of, 251 -52; Nagodba of, Daudet, Alphonse, 276
253; internal politics of, 253-58,276,304; Davydov, A. P., 162
and Bosnian crisis, 254; literary language Deâk, Francis, 243
of, 271 Dedicated Monasteries, 88, 119, 132, 133
Croatian Military Frontier, 236, 248, 254 Delegeorges, Epaminondas, 81, 82
Croatians: in Habsburg Empire, 236; relig Deliyannes, Theodore, 153, 156, 172, 173,
ion of, 248; and Illyrian movement, 250; 175
and Serbs, 254-58; and Magyars, 255; Delvina, Suleiman Bey, 319
political goals of, 258; and federalism, 304 Densusianu, Ovid, 279
Croatian-Serbian Coalition, 256-57, 260, Dervish Pasha, 225
304, 305 Deutsche Bank, Berlin, 194
Croatia-Slavonia, 171, 236. See also Croatia Devshirme system, 12
Culture: Greek, 14-15,273,274; Romanian, Dimitrescu, Stefan, 280
15-16; Bulgarian, 15-16; Serbian, 15,271, Dimitrijevic, Colonel Dragutin (Apis), 259,
276; Albanian, 225-26; Balkan, 266-67, 260, 263
268, 280, 282-83. See also Education; Lit Dimitrov, Vladimir, the Master, 281
erature Disraeli, Benjamin, 147
Cuvaj, Slavko, 258 Djalski, Ksaver Sandor, 277
Cuza, Alexander, Prince of Danubian Prin Dobrnjac, Peter, 30
cipalities, 65, 95, 116, 119, 170; problems Dobrogeanu-Gherea, Constantine, 204,278
of, 117-18; and Agrarian Law, 120; abdi Dobroliubov, N. A., 136, 276
cation of, 121, 122 Dobrovsky, J., 250
Cyprus, 294; claimed by Greece, 77; Con Dobrudja, 142, 151,210,220,221,247,292,
vention, 157 311; and Romania, 153, 178, 181, 306;
Cyril and Methodius Society, 211 and Bulgaria, 289, 290; and Central Pow
Czartoryski, Adam, 32 ers, 294
Czechoslovakia, 308 Dodecanese Islands: Italian control of, 294,
Czechs: in Habsburg Empire, 236 312
Dondukov-Korsakov, Prince A. M., 159
Dacians, 238, 239 Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 261
Dahis, 29, 31, 32, 128 Dragasani, Battle of, 42
Index 349
Dragoumes, Ion, 176 Franciscans: in Albania, 226
Dual Monarchy: dissolution of, 297. See also Franco-Austrian War, 117
Austria-Hungary; Habsburg monarchy Franco-Prussian War, 123-24, 146
Duiic, Jovan, 279 Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, heir to Habs-
Dumas, Alexandre, 261 burg throne, 258, 261-63
DuSan, Tsar of Serbia, 63 Franz Joseph, Emperor of Austria-
Hungary. 242, 244, 245, 257; and
Eastern Question. See Crimean War; Great Macedonia, 212, 213; program of, 264
powers Frasheri, Abdul, 224
Economy: in Balkans, 11-12; of Balkan Frasheri, Eshref, 319
states, 201, 322-23. See also Agriculture; Frasheri, Naim, 282
Industrialization; Peasantry; individual French Revolution, 14, 45, 130, 240
countries Friedjung trial, 257
Education: Greek role in, 14-15; in Serbia, Fuad Pasha, 103, 108-9
60-61, 66-67; in Romania, 94, 121,
269; Ottoman, 103, 109; in Albania,
223; in Hungary, 243, 244, 245; in Cro Gaj, Ljudevit, 250, 251, 271, 276
atia, 250; secular, 268-69. See also Culture Galati: massacre at, 42, 88
Egypt, 23,49, 78, 104; and Mohammed Ali, Gallipoli, campaign of, 286, 288, 290, 292,
19; Greeks in, 80 295
Elizabeth, Queen of Romania, 123, 233 GaraSanin, Ilija, 61, 63, 64, 65, 250, 253
Elizabeth of Wied (Carmen Sylva). See Gegs. See Albanians
Elizabeth, Queen of Romania George I, King of Greece, 82, 83, 152, 172,
Eminescu, Michael, 274-75, 283 174, 175
Enescu, George, 281 George II, King of Greece, 175, 176, 315
Enlightenment, 14, 269-70 Georgiev, Mihalaki, 277
Entente. See Allies Germanos, Bishop, 40, 44
Enver Pasha, 285 Germans: in Habsburg Empire, 235; in
Eötvös, Joseph, 243 Banat, 306. See also Saxons
Epirus, 209, 219n, 221, 224, 232; and Ali Germany, 146,265,285,298; and Romania,
Pasha of Janina, 18; and Greece, 77, 151, 125; and Bulgaria, 194-95; and Bosnian
152, 153, 171, 173, 174, 294 crisis, 216. See also Central Powers; Great
Epureanu, Emanoil, 95 powers
Erfurt: meeting at, 86 Gerov, Naiden, 272
Esad Pasha Toptani, 232, 233 Geshov, E., 195
Ethnike Hetairia (National Society), 174, Ghica, Alexander, 92, 93
211 Ghica, Gregory A., Prince of Moldavia, 97
Ghica, Gregory D., Prince of Wallachia, 89
Falkenhayn, General Erich von, 293 Ghica, Ion, 97, 121
Fallmerayer, Jacob P., 77 Giers, N. K., 159
Fénélon, François, 282 GliSic, Milovan, 276
Ferdinand of Coburg, King of Bulgaria, Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 268
168, 192-96, 215, 288-89 Gogol, Nikolai, 276
Ferdinand of Hohenzollern, King of Golescu, Nicholas, 95, 121, 124
Romania, 179, 305, 307, 310 Golescu, Rada, 95, 121
Filaret, metropolitan of Moscow, 133 Golescu, §tefan, 95, 121
Finlay, George, 78 Gorchakov, A. M., 147
Fishta, Father Gjergj, 282 Gorky, Maxim, 261
Fiume (Rijeka), 301, 302, 318 Great powers: and Ottoman Empire, 19-25,
France, 109, 196,265; and Porte, 17,20,22, 102, 104, 109, 311; and Greece, 47-48,
32, 33, 101; and Ali Pasha of Janina, 18; 50-52, 68, 69, 78, 80-82, 142; and
and Karadjordje, 34; and Greece, 47, 49, Serbia, 58; and Tanzimat reforms,
50, 74, 76, 273, 312; and Serbia, 53, 279; 111-12; and Romania, 123, 124, 149-50,
and Romania, 93, 122, 125,270,280; and 179; and Balkan governments, 142; and
Ottoman reformers, 106, 109; and Cri Serbo-Turkish War of 1876, 145; and
mean War, 107; Ottoman exiles in, 214; Balkans, 155, 157, 197-98, 205, 323-24;
and Southern Slavs, 287, 301; and Al and Eastern Rumelia, 163; and Bulgaria,
bania, 297; and Mustafa Kemal, 314. See 165-66; and Greek-Turkish War of 1897,
also Allies; Great powers 175; and Macedonia, 208, 209, 210, 212;
350 Index
Great powers (continued) Hajdudorog: Greek-Catholic bishopric of,

and Balkan Wars, 219; and Albania, 245
229-33; and peace treaties, 297-98 Halepa Pact, 174
Greece, 170, 233, 253, 299; revolts in, 19, Haralambie, Colonel N., 121
38-41, 75, 81; Great Idea (Megale Idea) Ha^deu, Bogdan, 275
in, 77-78, 174; population of, 51, 202; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 274
Bavarian influence in, -68-69; internal Heideck, Major General Karl von, 68, 69
politics of, 70-71, 75-77, 80, 81-83, Hercegovina, 142; Muslims in, 4; and Ser
172-73, 175-78,294,295,296^military in, bian leaders, 32; insurrection in, 109. See
72, 176; legal system in, 73; economy of, also Bosnia-Hercegovina
73, 75, 80, 171-72, 175, 184, 197-200; Herzen, Alexander, 136, 276
expansion of, 78-79, 221 ; national church Hetairia. See Philike Hetairia
in, 131, 132; national movement in, 141; History: and literature in Balkans, 268,
and Serbo-Turkish War of 1876,145; and 270-71, 272
Bosnian crisis, 151-53; and San Stefano, Holy Alliance, 42, 89
153; and Congress of Berlin, 156; and Hospodars, 85, 86-87, 89, 91, 97, 115
Crete, 174-75, 176, 219; and Macedonia, Hötzendorf, Conrad von, 264
207, 208-9, 211,212, 220; and Bulgaria, Hristic, Nicholas, 188
217; and Balkan Wars, 218-19; and Al Hugo, Victor, 276
bania, 222, 232, 297, 316, 318-19, 320; Hungarians: in Constantinople, 108; in
literature in, 278; and World War I, Habsburg Empire, 236; in Transylvania,
294-96; and Serbia, 295; and Ottoman 237, 246, 306; and magyarization, 240,
territory, 311-12,313,314; Revolutionary 243-44, 245, 250; and Croatia-Slavonia,
Committee in, 315; and exchange of 253; in Banat, 306. See also Magyars
populations, 316, 321. See also Culture; Hungary: Revolution of 1848 in, 240-41,
George I and II; Great powers; 251,252; union of Transylvania and, 242,
Macedonia; Othon; Philike Hetairia 245-46; internal politics of, 243; educa
Greeks, 4, 9-11, 13, 39, 51, 80; in Balkan tion in, 245; and Croatia, 247; and Yugo
culture, 14-15,269,278; massacres of, 44; slav frontiers, 302; Bela Kun in, 306;
in Bulgaria, 129, 133-34; in Macedonia, and Romania, 307, 308
316
Greiner, Johann, 69 Ibrahim Pasha, 19, 46, 104
Grekov, Dimitur P., 159, 194 Ibraileanu, G., 279
Grigorescu, Nicholas, 280 Ibsen, Henrik, 261
Grujic, Jevrem, 144, 145 Ignatiev, Count N. P., 133, 134, 146
Grujic, General Sava, 190 Ignjatovic, Jakov, 276
Grunwald, Bela, 243 Ikonomov, Todor, 159
Greek-Turkish War of 1897, 175, 212 Ilarion, Bishop, 134
Gurakuqi, Luigi, 319 Ilinden Uprising, 212, 213
Gypsies: in Macedonia, 207 Illyrian movement, 250-51, 252, 271, 276,
Gyzes, Nicholas, 281 280
Imbros: to Greece, 312; to Turks, 315
Habsburg Empire: government in, 58, 241, Industrialization: in Balkans, 13-14,
242; center of Serbian cultural life, 61, 199-201
271; culture in, 282; dismemberment of, Internal Macedonian Revolutionary O r
320 ganization (IMRO), 211-12
Habsburg Free Corps, 27, 29 Ionian Islands, 20,47, 81,82; revolts in, 78;
Habsburg monarchy: and Serbs, 26,31 ; and and Greece, 202, 273; Greek writers in,
Romania, 115, 125, 149-50, 291; and 267
Albania, 230; and Croatia, 247; and Iorga, Nicholas, 275, 278-79
Croatian-Serbian Coalition, 257; and Iovkov, Iordan, 279
Yugoslav danger, 263,264; ultimatum of, Islam: mass conversions to, 143. See also
to Serbia, 264-65. See also Austria- Muslims
Hungary; Franz Joseph Islaz: manifesto of, 95, 96
Hadji, Mustafa Pasha, 28, 29 Istanbul, University of, 213
Hadzivulkov, Vasil, 135 Istria, 301, 302; and Italy, 286, 288
Hafiz, Pasha, 32 Isvolsky, A. P., 215
Hahn, J. G. von, 225 Italians: in Albanian schools, 226; in Habs-
Haiduk s, 14 burg Empire, 236; and Croats, 256
Index 351
Italo-Ottoman War, 216, 229 Karl Anton, Count, 122
Italy, 89, 117, 196; and Albania, 219, Karlowitz (Sremski Karlovci), Treaty of, 238
229-30, 232, 297, 318; neutrality of, 265; Kaulbars, General N. V., 167-68
and South Slav lands, 286, 287, 301-2; Kavalla: and Bulgaria, 288-89, 310
and Ottoman territory, 311,315. See also Kemal, Ismail, 228, 229, 232
Allies Kemal, Mustafa (Ataturk), 312-15
Ivankovo, Battle of, 32 Kersnik, Janko, 277
Khuen-Hédervary, Charles, Ban of Croatia,
254, 255
JakSic, Djura, 276, 280 Kiselev, Count Paul, 90, 158
Janissary corps, 12,30,31, 101-2; powersof, Klephts, 14, 32
17, 18; and Serbian population, 26-27,28, Kliment, Metropolitan, 167, 169
29; in Serbia, 31,32,36,42; and massacre
Kola’s rebellion, 27
of Greeks, 44; abolition of, 48-49; in
Bulgaria, 128 Kogälniceanu, Michael, 95, 149, 151, 156,
270, 275; ministry of, 118-21; death of,
Janovic, Slobodan, 277
183
Jassy; Treaty of, 20, 27; massacre in, 42,88 Kolettes, John, 46, 50, 74, 81; government
Jelalic, Josip, 251, 252 of, 76-77; and Great Idea, 78
Jena, Battle of, 32
Kollar, Jan, 250, 271
Jerusalem: Holy Places in, 106; patriarch of, Kolokotrones, Theodore, 39,40,45,46, 50,
and Bulgarian church, 134
74,135
Jesuits: in Albania, 226 Konstantinov, Aleko, 277
Jews: in Ottoman Empire, 4, 10, 13; in
Konya, Battle of, 102
Danubian Principalities, 178-79; in
Koraes, Adamantios, 15, 269
Macedonia, 207, 208 Kosovo, Battle of, 261; songs about, 268,
Joseph II, Emperor of Austria, 235, 239, 271
250, 269 Kossuth, Louis, 240, 241, 243, 251
Jovanovic, Paja, 280 Kostic, Laza, 276
Jovanovic, Peter, 59 Kotsebu, K. E., 93
Jovanovic, Slobodan, 277 Koumoundouros, Alexander, 81, 82, 152,
Jovanovic-Zmaj, Jovan, 276 153, 173
Judiciary: Ottoman, 3; Serbian, 36 Kountouriotes, George, 46, 50
Junimea (Youth) group, 274-75, 278; mem
Kovalic, Ante, 277
bers of, 179-80, 182, 185 Kraljevic, Miroslav, 280
Krastev, Krastiu, 279
Kaljevic, Ljubomir, 144 Krizman, Bogdan, 26 In
Kallay, Benjamin, 255, 257 Krstic, George, 280
Kalvos, Andreas, 274 Krustevich, Gavril Efendi, 164, 165
Kanares, Admiral »Constantine, 81, 82, Kuchuk Kainardji, Treaty of, 10, 22, 90;
152 provisions of, 85-86
Kant, Immanuel, 274 Kumküc, Evgenij, 277
Karadjordje, Petrovic, 29-37, 40, 54, 55, 56, Kun, Bela, 306, 307
135 Kutuzov, M. I., Marshal, 34
Karadjordje vie, Alexander, Prince of Serbia Kvaternik, Eugen, 252, 253
(1842-58), 61-63, 75, 191, 251
Karadjordjevic, Alexander, Prince Regent Laibach (Ljubljana), Congress of, 41-42
of Serbia, King of Yugoslavia (1921-34), Lamartine, Alphonse de, 94, 282
263, 290, 300, 301 Landholding: Balkan, 11-12. See also
Karadjordjevic, Peter, King of Serbia, 189, Chiftliks\ Peasantry; Timars
191, 192, 210, 215, 246, 255, 259, 263, Language: Greek, 15, 72-73, 269, 273, 274,
290 278; Serbo-Croatian, 15,271 ; in Ottoman
Karadjordjevic dynasty: and Yugoslav state, Empire, 103; in Albania, 225-26. See also
300 Culture; Education
KaradÄc, Vuk, 15, 239, 251, 271, 275 Lausanne, Treaty of, 315, 316
Karaiskakes, George, 39 Law: ecclesiastical, 5; Ottoman, 5, 105, 106,
Karas, Vjekoslav, 280 108, 109, 131, 132
Karavelov, Liuben, 136, 137, 272, 277 Lazär, George, 270
Karavelov, Petko, 160, 193, 194 Laza re vie, Lazar, 276
Karkavitsas, Andreas, 278 Lebanon: France in, 23; revolt in, 109
352 Index
Leopold, Emperor of Austria: diploma of, Markovic, Svetozar, 276, 278

238 Masaryk, Thomas G., 255
Leopold II, King of Belgium, 121 MaSina, Draga, 190-91
Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, 51 Masons, 39
Levski, Vasil, 136, 137-38 Matavulj, Simo, 276
Levstik, Fran, 272 MatoS, Antun Gustav, 279
Linhart, Anton, 271 Maurer, George Ludwig von, 68,69, 73, 76
Literature: oral, 267-68; themes of, 268-69; Mavrocordat, Constantine, 87
and history, 268, 270-71; romanticism in, Mavrocordatos, Alexander, 45, 74, 76, 79
268-73; Greek, 269-70, 273-74, 278; Mavromichales, Kyriakoules, 175, 177
Slovenian, 271-72, 277; Bulgarian, Mavromichales, Petrobey, 40
272-73,277,279; social problems in, 273; Maiuranic, Ivan, 253, 276
Romanian, 274-75, 278-79; Serbian, Menshikov, Prince Alexander, 106-7
275-76, 277, 279; Croatian, 276, 277; Merchants: Greek, 10, 13, 80, 81; Serbian,
South Slav, 279; Turkish, 281-82; Alba 60
nian, 282 MeStrovic, Ivan, 281
London, Treaty of: of 1827,49; of 1830,51 ; Metaxas, Andrew, 74, 76
of 1913,219; of 1915, 287-88,299,301-2, Metternich, Prince, 42
311, 318, 324 Michael, metropolitan of Serbia, 188
Luchain, Stefan, 280 Michael, Prince of Serbia. See Obrenovic,
Ludwig I, King of Bavaria, 48, 51, 68, 69 Michael
Lutherans: in Transylvania, 237 Michelet, Jules, 94
Lystras, Nicephoros, 281 Mickiewicz, Adam, 268
Midhat Pasha, 112
Macedonia, 19, 142, 167, 207-13, 237; and Mihajlovic, Stevia, 144
Greeks, 77, 151, 152, 153, 171, 174, 176, Mijatovic, Cedomil, 186
220, 294, 316; population of, 134, 207-8, Milan, King of Serbia. See Obrenovic, Milan
211,321; and Ottoman Empire, 156,214; Military: Ottoman, 3, 12, 17, 102-3, 214;
and Treaty of Berlin, 158; and Serbia, Greek, 38, 39, 176; in Balkan states, 171,
165, 187, 216-17, 219-20; Bulgarian 198, 205
bishoprics in, 168; and Bulgaria, 169, Miliutin, D. A., 159, 162, 164
195-96,216,220,288,289; and Romania, Millets, 4, 7, 321
181 ; and great powers, 208, 212; national Minorities, 307, 308-9, 321
societies in, 211-12; and Mürzsteg re Mohammed VI, Sultan, 312, 315
forms, 213, 214; and Albania, 227-28; Mohammed Ali of Egypt, 18, 19, 46, 48, 55,
communist support in, 305 101, 102, 103, 104
Macedonian Supreme Committee, 211-12 Moldavia, 3, 142, 236; landholding in, 7;
Macedonski, Alexander, 279 and Serbian leaders, 32; estates in, 92;
Macedo-Slavs, 220 and Russia, 93; and revolution of 1848,
Mackensen, Field Marshal August von, 293 95; and Bessarabia, 108, 114; elections in,
Magyars, 243, 271; and Illyrian movement, 116. See also Danubian Principalities;
251; and Croatians, 252, 253, 255, 256. Romania
See also Hungarians; Hungary Molière, 270
Mahmud II, Sultan, 18, 33, 36, 39, 42, 43, Moltke, Helmut von, 102
46, 48-49, 129; accomplishments of, Montenegrin Committee in Paris, 300
101-4 Montenegro: and Ottoman Empire, 127,
Mahmud Nedim, 109 145, 218-19; and Bulgaria, 138, 217; role
Maior, Peter, 239, 270 of, in Balkans, 142-43; rulers of, 142-43;
Maiorescu, Titu, 179, 274 and Serbia, 143, 217; independence of,
Makariopolski, Ilarion, 131-33 156; and Serbo-Greek Macedonian agree
Makriyannes, S., 273 ment, 220; and Second Balkan War,
Maniu, Julius, 309 221; and Albania, 224, 232, 297, 316-18,
Marasli Ali Pasha, 36, 37, 56 320; and Yugoslav goal, 301; communist
Marghiloman, Alexander, 179-80, 293, 305 support in, 305
Maria Theresa, Empress of Austria, 235 Moruzi, Alexander, 86
Marie of Edinburgh, Queen of Romania, Moscow Slavic Benevolent Society, 136
179 Mrkvichka, Ivan, 280
Marko, Prince (Marko Kraljevic, Krali Münchengrätz, Treaty of, 92-93
Marko), 268 Murad V, Sultan, 112, 145, 147
Index 353
Mürzsteg: meeting at, 212-13 Novakovic, Stojan,-277
Muslims, 4, 5, 6-7, 9; asayans, 13; in Serbia, Novi Pazar, Sanjak of, 34, 145, 147, 207,
36; in Ottoman government, 103; non- 212, 216, 221
Turkish, 105; in Macedonia, 211; in Al
bania, 222-23, 226; Bektasi sect of, 223; Obradovic, Dositej, 15, 239, 271
Sunni sect of, 223; Bosnian, 305; expelled Obrenovic, Alexander, King of Serbia,
by Christians, 320 189- 91, 210
Mustafa IV, Sultan, 17 Obrenovic, Marie, 121
Mustafa Pasha Bayrakdar, 17-18 Obrenovic, Michael, Prince of Serbia, 109,
Mustafa Reshid Pasha, 105 123, 137, 144, 253, 270; reigns of, 61,
64-65
Nachevich, Gregory D., 159 Obrenovic, Milan (brother of MiloS), 54
Namik Kemal, 112 Obrenovic, Milan (son of MiloS), Prince of
Napoleon, 19,20,28,32,35,36; at Tilsit, 33, Serbia (1839), 61
86 Obrenovic, Milan, Prince of Serbia
Napoleon III, 98, 114, 122 ( 1868-82), King of Serbia ( 1882-89), 121,
Napoleonic Wars, 23, 128 193, 210, 254; reign of, 65-66; and
Narodniks, 277, 279 Bosnia-Hercegovina, 144, 145; and Bul
Natalia, Queen of Serbia, 189, 190-91 garia, 165-66; character of, 185; and
Nationalities: Christian, 9; in Habsburg Austria-Hungary, 186-87; and church,
Empire, 181, 235-36; in Hungary, 188; abdication of, 189; and Alexander,
236-37, 243 190- 91
Nationalities, Congress of, in Budapest, 245 Obrenovic, MiloS, Prince of Serbia, 37, 53,
Nationalities, Congress of Oppressed, in 64, 65, 70, 141; and Porte, 36; and Greek
Rome, 300 revolt, 40-41; government of, 54; wealth
Nationalities, Law of, in Hungary, 243 of, 54-55; achievements of, 55-61 ; return
National movements, 11, 23, 25, 141-42, of, 62; death of, 63
320-21; and Orthodox church, 14; and Obshti, Dimitur, 138
cultural awakening, 15-16; Bulgarian, Odessa: Greeks in, 39
136-37; Serbian, 136-37; Slavic Macedo Odobescu, Alexander, 275
nian, 210-11; Albanian, 222-23,228,229; Odobescu, Colonel loan, 96
centers of, in Austria-Hungary, 236-37; Ohrid: archbishopric at, 4, 9, 134
in South Slav lands, 246, 248; Yugoslav, Oil: Romanian, 183,199,201,290,292,294,
250-51; Turkish, 312-13 323
—Romanian: and Greeks, 10-11; periodiza Olga, Grand Duchess, 82, 174
tion of, 85; roots of, 94; Transylvanian, Omer Pasha, 143
238-39, 239-40, 246; restrictions on, Oriental Company, 194
246-47 Orlando, V. E., 300
—Greek, 10, 47, 141; Megale Idea (Great Orthodox church, 4, 5-6, 14; Russian pro
Idea) of, 77-78 tection of, 40,47,48; Serbian, 53,59, 134;
Nauplion, 46; revolt in, 81 Greek, 71-72, 133-34; Romanian, 87-88,
Navarino, Battle of, 49 134; Bulgarian, 129, 130, 132-34, 139-40;
Nazor, Vladimir, 279 in Albania, 222, 226, 227; in Transyl
Negruzzi, Constantine, 270 vania, 237, 238-39, 241, 242; in Croatia-
Nenadovic, Jakov, 30 Slavonia, 248; and Balkan culture, 267;
Nenadovic, Matija, 32 % ties of Serbian, with Russia, 271
Neofit, Metropolitan, 95 Othon, King of Greece (Otto of Bavaria), 45,
Netherlands, 191 51,68-76, 123, 170, 174; discontent with,
Nicholas I (Nikita) of Montenegro, 143,144, 80; abdication of, 81
, 189,301 Ottoman Empire: population of, 3; and
Nicholas I, Tsar, 48, 76 Christians, 5-6, 28; military reorganiza
Nicholas II, Tsar, 168, 212, 213, 291 tion in, 17; and Congress of Vienna, 20;
Ni8, Battle of, 34 and Russia, 22-23,49, 102, 153; and great
NjegoS, Peter Petrovic, 275-76 powers, 23,25,104-5; and Austria, 26-27;
Notables: Balkan, 4-5, 8; Christian, com British policy toward, 47; Greeks in, 51.
pared with ayans, 13; Serbian, 29, 56; 80; reforms in, 99,108-9,213-14; territor
Greek, 19, 38, 43, 44, 45, 81; Bulgarian, ial losses of, 102; languages in, 103; gov
129; in Bosnia, 143. See also Ayans ernment of, 103, 106, 109, 113, 313;
Novak, Vjenceslav, 277 economy of, 108-10; education in, 109;
354 Index
Ottoman Empire (continued) Petrovich, Michael B., 26 In

and Bulgarian uprising, 139-40; lands Phanariotes, 10, 38, 129, 273; in Prin
controlled by, 207; and Second Balkan cipalities, 41, 88, 89, 119
War, 221; and Albanians, 223, 224; Bal Pheraios, Rhigas, 15, 269
kan culture under, 267-68, 283; and Philhellenism, 47-48, 73, 77
World War I, 285-86; dissolution of, 297, Philike Hetairia, 39-43
320; and Serbia, 304; xlefeat of, 311; Philip, Count of Flanders, 121-22
Greek invasion of, 313, 314.S** also Cen Pig War, 192, 200, 219
tral Powers; Mahmud II; Tanrimat; indi Piro£anac, Milan, 186, 187
vidual peoples Pisarev, D. I., 136
Ottomanism, 213 Plesoianu, Nicolas, 95
Pleven, Battle of, 148, 150, 152
Pacifico, Don, 78 Ploesti: uprising in, 124
Paisii, Father, 16, 272 Plovdiv, 8, 9, 86, 90
Palamas, Kostes, 274 Poe, Edgar Allan, 261
Palmerston, Lord, 78 Poland, 20, 308
Pan-Islamism, 213 Poles, 108, 236
Panslavism, 146-47, 148, 251 Polites, Kosmas, 278
Pan-Turanianism, 213 Polites, Nicholas, 274
Papadiamantes, Alexander, 278 Political parties: Serbian, 61-62, 185, 188,
Paparregopoulos, Constantine, 77,273,275 191-92,256; Romanian, 115-16,244,307;
Paraschos, Achilles, 273 Greek, 172, 175-76; Bulgarian, 193; Cro
Parensov, P. D., 162 atian, 251-58; Slovenian, 258; in King
Paris, Treaty of, 108, 114, 124, 142, 146; dom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 304;
terms of, 107 in Transylvania, 310; Albanian, 319
Parthenes, Constantine, 281 Politics: Balkan, and culture, 266-67; and
PaSic, Nikola, 185, 188, 190, 263, 287, 290, literature, 272-73, 274, 275, 278; Balkan,
305; and Yugoslavism, 260, 300 321-22, 326
Pasvanoglu Osman Pasha, 86, 101, 128; Popovic, Jovan Sterija, 276
career of, 18; and Serbs, 28; and Selim Popovici, Aurel, 244
III, 28-29 Porte: and great powers, 19-25; and Russia,
Paul, Prince of Greece, 313 23, 32, 33, 34, 92; and Serbia, 54, 55;
Paulucci, Colonel F. O., 33 and constitutions, 58; and Principalities,
Peasantry: Balkan, 6, 7-8, 12, 13, 14, 202-3, 89,96, 114, 122, 125; military reforms of,
322, 323; Greek, 38, 39, 73-74; in Serbia, 101; and Bulgarian Exarchate, 134. See
59-60; Romanian, 85-86, 87, 88, 90-91, also Ottoman Empire; Tanzimat
97, 119-21, 183-84; Ottoman, position of, Potiorek, General, 261
110-11; Bulgarian, 129, 135, 194,202-3, Predic, Uro5, 280
289; revolt of, in Bosnia and Her PreSeren, France, 272
cegovina, 142-44; in Eastern Rumelia, Pribi£evic, Svetozar, 256, 257-58, 305
164; 1907 Romanian uprising of, 184, Princip, Gavrilo, 261
203-4, 246; Albanian, 222-23; in Transyl Principalities. See Danubian Principalities;
vania, 238; in South Slav lands, 247-48; Moldavia; Romania; Wallachia
culture of, 267-68, 280 Prizren, League of. See Albanian League
Pec, patriarchate of, 4, 9, 134 Prussia, 146, 183. See also Great powers
Pelin, Elin, 279 Psychares, John, 274
Peloponnesus: autonomy of, 15; revolt in, Pushkin, A. S., 268
43-46
Peter, King of Serbia. See Karadjordjevic, Quinet, Edgar, 94
Peter, King of Serbia
Peter 11 (NjegoS) of Montenegro, 143 Rafic, Joseph, 280
Peter the Great, Tsar, 10 Racine, Jean Baptiste, 281
Petkov, Dimitur, 193 Ra£ki, Franjo, Canon, 252, 253, 277
Petkov, Nicholas, 281 Ra£ki, Franjo, Christian, 204
Petra$cu, George, 280 Rada, Girolamo de, 282
Petrobey, 44 Radie, Stjepan, 258, 305
Petronijevic, Avram, 61 Radi£evic, Branko, 276
Petrovic, Peter I, 142-43 Radonic, Jovan, 277
Index 355
Radoslavov, Vasil, L93, 194, 288-89, 310 Roufos, Venizelos, 81
Rädulescu, Ion Eliade, 270 Rudhardt, Ignaz von, 69
Railroads: in Balkans, 108-9, 197-98 Rumelia,3,18,38,39; Eastern, 77,147,156,
Rajatic, Josip, 251 157, 158, 159, 163, 201; unionist move
Rakic, Milan, 279 ment in, 164-65
Rakonic, Novak, 280 Russia, 35, 48, 58, 107, 196, 265; and
Rakovski, George, 136-37, 272 Ottoman Empire, 19-20, 22-23, 31, 32,
Ralles, Demetrios, 175, 177 33, 47, 49, 99, 101, 102, 105, 153, 218;
Rangaves, Alexander Rizos, 273 and Ionian Islands, 20; and Serbia, 35,36,
Rauch, Levin, ban of Croatia-SIavonia, 253 49-50, 53, 142, 145, 191; as protector of
Reform. See Tanzimat; individual countries Balkan orthodoxy, 40; and Greece, 41,
Regny, Artemonis de, 75 47, 71,74,88-89, 152, 153; and Romania,
Reichstadt Convention: provisions of, 147 41-42, 85, 86, 92, 97, 107, 114, 118, 122,
Religion: importance of, in politics, 99-100. 125, 142, 149-50, 181, 291-92; and
See also Catholic church; Church; Mus Greek Orthodox church, 71; and Habs-
lims; Orthodox church burg monarchy, 92-93, 264; and Holy
Ressu, Camil, 280 Places of Jerusalem, 106; and neutraliza
Rijeka (Fiume) Resolution, 256 tion of Black Sea, 109; and Dedicated
Rikman (Rückmann), P. I., 93 Monasteries, 119; and Bulgaria, 128, 145,
Rilski, Neofit, 272 156, 158-59, 160-65 passim, 167-69, 289;
Ristic, Jovan, 144, 145, 155, 184, 186, 190 and Bulgarian national church, 132, 133,
Rodin, Auguste, 281 134, 140; and Bosnia, 144, 145, 146-47;
Rodofinikin, Constantine, 34 215-16; in Three Emperors’ Alliance,
Roides, Emmanuel, 273 146; and Jews, 179; and Macedonia, 195,
Romania, 170, 249, 253, 305-10; economy 209; and Balkan Wars, 220; and Albania,
of, 87, 125, 182, 184, 197, 198, 199, 200, 230, 232; and Serbian Orthodox church,
201; internal politics of, 98, 117, 119, 271; and Balkan culture, 283; and World
122-25, 127, 149, 179, 180,182, 183, 184, War I, 285, 296, 298, 299; revolution in,
190, 204, 233, 244-45, 246, 274, 309; 299, 305, 308. See also Allies; Great pow
national movement of, 98, 141-42, ers; Serbia
246-47; territorial goals of, 127,221,290, Russo-Ottoman War of 1809, 34
291, 305-9; Bulgarians in, 137; and Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29, 19, 102,
Serlx>-Turkish War of 1876, 145; in crisis 113, 143, 158
of 1877-78, 148-49; foreign policy of, Russo-Turkish War of 1877, 148, 150, 151,
148-50, 180-81, 265, 290-92, 297; and 181
Russia, 150, 153, 181, 291-92; and Bes Ruthenians, 236
sarabia, 151; and Treaty of San Stefano,
153, 155; and Congress of Berlin, 156; Sadoveanu, Michael, 279
and Treaty of Berlin, 178; landownership St. Jean de Maurienne: accord of, 311
in, 179; reforms in, 183, 184; peasantry St. Petersburg, Convention of, 92
in, 183-84, 203, 204, 246; and Germany, St. Petersburg, Protocol of, 48
197; and Macedonia, 209-10, 220; and St. Sava, Society of, 211
Second Balkan War, 221; culture of, Sakaria, Battle of, 314
269-70, 278-79, 280; and World War I, Sakazov, Ianko, 204
293, 297; and Banat, 297, 302; minorities San Stefano, Treaty of: terms of, 153-54;
in, 307, 308-9. See also Danubian Prin and Bulgarian nationalists, 158; and
cipalities; Moldavia; Transylvania; Wal- Greeks, 171; and Albania, 223-24; men
lachia tioned, 168, 169, 208, 209
Romanian Cultural League, 244 Sarajevo, 8, 261-65
Romanians, 97, 98, 236, 306; in Ottoman Saseno, island of: and Italy, 288, 318
Empire, 10-11; and Philike Hetairia, 40; Savinskii, A. A., 289
and Greek-dominated church, 100; in Saxons: national goals of, 237,241,242,246
Transylvania, 237-38, 239, 241-43, 244, Sazanov, S. D.: and Brätianu, 287, 291,292
245, 250; and Hungarian revolution of Schiller, Johann, 270
1848, 240-41; and Ausgleich, 243 Schiro, Giuseppe, 282
Rome, Pact of: and Yugoslav goals, 300 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 274
Rosetti, C. A., 95 Scott, Sir Walter, 263
Rosetti, Theodore, 179, 182 Sebastiani, General François H. B., 33
356 Index
Self-determination: principle of, 299, 320, of, 251; and Croats, 254-55, 255-58; cul
326 tural revival of, 271; in Banat, 306
Selim III, Sultan, 19, 27, 29, 32, 33, 143; Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Kingdom of,
reforms of, 17, 101; and Serbs, 27-28, 297, 300-5, 307
31-33; and janissaries, 42 Serembe, Giuseppe, 282
Serbia, 17, 135, 136, 170, 185-92,221,265; Sèvres, Treaty of, 312-15 passim
and Russia, 20, 33, 34, 3$, 36, 48-49, 142, Sforza, Count Carlo, 318
153, 191, 197; and Ottoman Empire, Shakespeare, William, 270, 326
27-28,31-33,65, 127, 145; and Treaty of Sheik-ul-Islam, 215
Bucharest, 35; and Greek revolt, 40-41; Shelley, Percy B.: and Greek revolution, 48
and revolution in Danubian Principalities, Shipping: Greek, 38, 80, 199
41-42; education in, 42, 61-62, 66-67; Sibiu: metropolitanate at, 242
Russian protectorship over, 49-50, 108, Sikelianos, Angelos, 278
142; foreign relations of, 53, 65, 175; Sinope, Battle of, 107
economy of, 53-54,59-60,66, 80, 155-56, Sistova, Peace of, 20, 27, 29
198, 199, 200-1, 205; internal politics of, Skerlecz, Ivo, 258
53, 54, 56-58, 61-66, 92, 184-85, 191-92, Skopje: bishopric at, 211
205, 256; autonomous state of, 55; and Slaveikov, Pencho, 279
great powers, 58, 191; Turkish Constitu Slaveikov, Petko R., 160, 272
tion of, 58; church in, 59, 131; peasantry Slavici, Ion, 275
in, 59-60, 203; civil code in, 62; army in, Slavonia, 236; social structure in, 247-48. S**
65, 176; population of, 65, 201; and also Croatia; Croatia-Slavonia
Bulgarian exarchate, 134; and Bulgaria, Slivnitsa, Battle of, 189
136,138,192; national movement in, 141; Slobozia: armistice of, 33, 34
and Montenegro, 143; and Bosnia- Slovaks, 236, 245
Hercegovina, 144, 247, 259; and Russo- Slovenes, 236, 250, 255, 260, 304
Turkish War and Treaty of San Stefano, Slovenia, 258-59, 271-72. See also Serbs,
153, 155; independence of, 156; railroads Croats, and Slovenes, Kingdom of
in, 186, 198; and Austria-Hungary, Smiliklas, Tadija, 277
186-87, 192, 197; becomes kingdom, 187; Smodlaka, Josip, 256
reforms in, 188; 1901 constitution of, Smyrna (Izmir), 80, 311,315; administered
191; and Macedonia, 207, 208, 210, 211, by Greece, 312
212, 220; and Bosnian crisis, 215-16; Social Democrats, 203-5, 256, 299
alliance between Bulgaria and, 216-17; Socialist Union of Romania, 204
and Balkan Wars, 219; and Greece, 220, Sofronii, Bishop of Vratsa, 16, 272
295; and Albania, 230, 232, 297, 316-19, Solomon, loan, 96
320; aristocracy of, 247; and Romania, Solomos, Dionysios, 273-74, 283
247; and Strossmayer, 253; culture of, Sonnino, Baron Sidney, 300-1
253, 276; concept of Greater Serbia, 254, South Slavs, 247-61; location of, 236; and
287; Pan-Serbianism in, 259-60, 261; and Ausgleich, 243; and Hungarian revolu
South Slav state, 259, 300, 304; and assas tion of 1848, 251; activities of, in Bel
sination of Franz Ferdinand, 263; and grade, 255; and Trialism, 258. See also
Habsburg ultimatum, 264-65; and Yugo Croatian-Serbian Coalition; Yugoslavism;
slav Committee, 287; and World War I, individual peoples
284-87, 290, 292. See also Croatian- Soutsos, Alexander, 273
Serbian Coalition; Serbs, Croats, and Soviet Union: and Mustafa Kemal, 314; and
Slovenes, Kingdom of Straits, 315
Serbian Royal Academy of Sciences: estab Spahis, 12
lishment of, 67 Stambolisky, Alexander, 310
Serbo-Bulgarian War, 188-89 Stambolov, Stefan, 138, 160, 192, 277; lead
Serbo-Turkish War, 145 ership of, 167, 168, 169
Serbs, 4, 11, 13; and Habsburg monarch, Stanojevic, Stanoje, 277
26-27, 236; and Selim III, 27-28, 31-33; Starievic, Ante, 252-54 passim
and Philike Hetairia, 40-41; and Greek- Steriadi, Jean Al., 280
dominated church, 100; in Transylvania, Stoilov, Constantine, 159, 192, 193, 194
241; and Congress of Nationalities, 245; Stojkovic, Milenko, 30, 41
in Croatia-Slavonia, 248; and Illyrian Straits: internationalization of, 312, 315;
movement, 250-51 ; Austro-Slav program Convention of, of 1841, 104-5
Index 357
Strossmayer, JosipJuraj, bishop of Djakovo, Torre, Dr. Andrea, 300
255, 277; and Yugoslavism, 252-58 Tosks. See Albanians
Strousberg affair, 124, 186 Trade: in Ottoman Empire, 8, 13; Serbian,
Sturdza, Dimitrie A., 183 36. See also economy under individual
Sturdza, Ionitsa, 89 countries
Sturdza, Michael, 92, 95 Trade Union Federation, General Workers
Styria, 236, 302 (of Bulgaria), 205
Sudan: Mohammed Ali in, 19 Trandafilov, Alexander, 93
Suleiman Pasha, 36, 96 Transylvania, 142, 171, 236, 237-47. 251;
Supilo, Frano, 256, 257, 287 and revolution of 1848, 95; and Roma
Sutu (Soutsos), Michael, 41 nian aspirations, 127, 181; three nations
Switzerland: Ottoman exiles in, 214 and four religions of, 237-38; political
Sykes-Picot agreements, 311 organization of, 238, 241, 242, 309-10;
Syria, 23, 102, 109 culture in, 239, 270; education in, 241,
Szeklers, 237, 242 245; union of Hungary and, 242; and
Romania, 244, 246, 290, 291, 292, 293,
Saguna, Andreiu, Bishop, 241-42 297, 305-7; church in, 245; and min
Sapca, Radu, 95 orities, 321
Sincai, George, 239, 270 Transylvanian School, 239
Stirbey, Barbu, 97 Treaties: secret, 299, 311; minorities, 308
Trentino, 301; and Italy, 286, 288
§afafik, P. J., 250 Trianon, Treaty of, 306
Senoa, August, 277 Trieste, 301; and Italy, 288
SiSic, Ferdo, 277 Trikoupes, Charilaos, 152, 172-73
Trikoupes, Spyridon, 76
Tanzimat: reforms, 105, 109-11, 112, 129 Triple Alliance, 157, 181, 246, 265, 286
Tariffs, 200, 313; Romanian, 182 Tripoli, 216
Tatic, Vladislav, 135 Tripolitsa: massacre in, 44; meeting at, 44
Tav£ar, Ivan, 277 Triune Kingdom, 254, 256.Seealso Croatia;
Taxes, 3, 6, 7, 12, 13; in Serbia, 31, 36, Dalmatia; Slavonia
59-60; in Greece, 73-74, 173; in Bosnia Trumbic, Ante, 256, 287, 300
and Hercegovina, 143-44 Tsankov, Dragan, 160
Tell, Christian, 95 Tserkovski, Tsanko, 277
Tenedos: to Greece, 312; to Turks, 315 Turgenev, Ivan, 276
Tenkovic, Milo£, 280 Turkey, Republic of, 299, 314, 315, 320;
Thebes, 45 and exchange of population, 316, 321
Theodosius, metropolitan of Serbia, 188 Turks: in Macedonia, 207, 208, 211
Theotakes, Constantine, 278 Tyrol, South, 301; and Italy, 286, 288
Theotokes, George,* 173, 175
Thessaloniki, 8, 9, 80, 295, 296, 310; claims Ulema: and reform, 100
on, 217 Uniate church, 133, 238-39, 241, 242, 245
Thessaly, 7, 18,77, 147, 151, 152, 153, 156, Unitarians: in Transylvania, 237
171, 172, 175, 177, 202, 209 United Principalities of Moldavia and Wal-
Thrace, 77, 152, 156, 171, 221, 294, 312, lachia, 115. See also Danubian Prin
315, 316 cipalities
Three Emperors’ Alliance, 125, 146, 147, United States, 196, 201; and Yugoslav
157, 195, 207; strain of Bulgarian Union Committee, 287; and Yugoslav frontier,
on, 165 301; and Bessarabia, 308; and Bulgaria,
Three Emperors’ League. See Three Em 311 ; and Greek claims, 312 ; and Treaty of
perors’ Alliance London,318
Tilsit: Treaty of, 33; meeting at, 86 University of Athens: establishment of, 72
Timors, 12, 84 Unkiar Iskelesi, Treaty of, 23, 92, 102, 104
Tisza, Koloman, 243
Tisza, Count Stephen, 264 Väcärescu, lancu, 270
Todorov, Petko, 279 Värärescu, Theodore, 96
Todorovic, Pera, 185 Vaida-Voievod, Alexander, 307-9
Todorovic, Stevan, 280 Väitoianu, General Arthur, 307
Tonchev, Dimitur, 193 Varna, 8, 86, 168
358 Index
Vazov, Ivan, 277 Wilson, Woodrow, 299, 302, 318, 326

Veles, diocese of, 134 World War I: role of Balkans in, 284;
Velichkov, Constantine, 277 Balkan campaigns of, 292-93
Venelin, luri, 130-31
Venice: and Austria, 20
Xenopol, Alexander, 275
Venizelos, Eleutherios, 176, 294; first gov Xenopoulos, Gregory, 278
ernment of, 177-78; and Ottoman terri
tory, 311-12; defeat of, 313-14
Verlad, Shefqet, 319 Young Ottoman Society: program of, 112
Vesin, Iaroslav, 280 Young Turks: 176, 195, 282; revolution of,
Victoria, Queen of England, 81, 179 213-15; and Albania, 226,228; regime of,
Vidin, 8, 18, 87 227, 228, 229
Vienna, Congress of, 20 Ypsilantes, Alexander, 40-42, 88-89
Vlachs (Kutzo-Vlachs), 13, 181, 207, 210 Ypsilantes, Constantine, 86
Vladimirescu, T udor, 41,42,85,88,89,135 Ypsilantes, Demetrios, 45
Vlahu^ä, Alexander, 278 Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences,
Vlaikov, Todor, 277 252
Vlamashi, Sefi, 319 Yugoslav Committee, 287, 300, 301
Vlorë; and Italy, 287, 288, 318 Yugoslavia, 299: idea of, 245; and Bulgaria,
Vodnik, Valentin, 271 310; and Albania, 319. See also Serbs,
Vogorides, Nicholas, 117 Croats, and Slovenes, Kingdom of
Vojnovic, Ivo, 279 Yugoslavism, 248, 255, 287; goals of, 252;
Vojvodina, 236; Karadjordje in, 29; Serbs popularity of, 258; and Serbia, 259, 260.
in, 248, 251 ; liberation of, 297 See also Illyrian movement
Volonakes, Constantine, 281
Voltaire, 282
Zadar Resolution, 256
Voulgares, Dimitrios, 80, 81, 82 Zadruga, 60
Vratsa, 90
Zagreb: dialect of, 250; trial at, 257
Vu£ic-Peri5ic, Toma, 61
Zaimes, Alexander, 176
Zaimes, Andrew, 46, 50
Wallachia, 3, 142, 236; landholding in, 7,
Zaimes, Thrasyvoulos, 80, 81
92; and Serbian leaders, 32; and Revolu Zamfirescu, Duiliu, 275
tion of 1848, 85, 95; under Russian pro
Zographos, Constantine, 69
tectorate, 93; culture in, 94; internal poli
tics of, 116. See also Danubian Prin Zogu Ahmet (Zog), king of Albania, 319
Zola, Emil, 276
cipalities; Romania
Zorbas, Colonel N. K., 177
Wellington, Duke of, 48, 49
Wilde, Oscar, 261 Zorka, princess of Montenegro, 189, 191
Zwitter, Fran: on Yugoslav idea, 26In
William II, emperor of Germany, 265
William of Wied, prince of Albania, 233,
297, 316 Zerajic, Bogdan, 263

Charles Jelavich - Barbara Jelavich - The Establishment of The Balkan National States, 1804-1920-University of Washington Press (1986)

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A History of East Central Europe

I. The Beginnings of History in East Central Europe

II. Byzantium and the Balkans in the Middle Ages, 400-1453

III. Northeast Central Europe in the High Middle Ages, 1000-1530

IV. Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 1000-1795

V. Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804

VI. The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands, 1526-1918

VII. The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918

VIII. The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920

IX. East Central Europe between the Two World Wars

X. East Central Europe since 1939

XI. Historical Atlas, General Index, and Bibliography

The Establishment of the Balkan

CHARLES and BARBARA JELAVICH

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON PRESS

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

1. The Ottoman Background. 3

2. The Serbian Revolution 26

3. The Greek Revolution 38

4. The Autonomous Serbian State 53

5. The Greek Kingdom 68

6. Wallachia and Moldavia before 1853 84

7. The Ottoman Empire to 1876: the Reforms 99

8. The United Principalities to 1876 114

9. The Bulgarian National Movement to 1876 128

10. The Crisis of the Seventies 141

11. Autonomous Bulgaria to 1896 158

12. The Balkan States: Internal Political Developments to 1914 170

13. The Expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from Europe 207

14. The Establishment of Albania 222

15. Balkan Nationalities in the Habsburg Empire 235

17. The First World War 284

18. The Postwar Settlements 298

19. Conclusion 320

Bibliographic Essay 329

1. The Ottoman Empire, 1815 21

The Establishment of the Balkan

The Ottoman Background

G eneral Conditions of Life

Most of the conditions to which the Christian population objected had

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE: THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL EFFECTS

The Serbian Revolution

T h e center of the first successful revolt of a Balkan people against Ot­

The Greek Revolution

I n contrast to the Serbian revolution, which made little impression on

The Autonomous Serbian State

bringing their extremely backward country into the modern world.

Presentation Constitution. The provisions called for the establishment of

Those in opposition to the prince wished to resolve this crisis by sum­

The transriparian Serbs regarded themselves as distinguished bearers of

Their domination was not, however, to last. Although higher educa­

the advocates of the supremacy of the assembly; the Conservatives fa­

formulated without outside interference even though Serbia was still a

The Greek Kingdom

synod whose president was the Archbishop of Athens. No decision was

Othon agreed to the demands of the revolutionaries. A constitutional as­

The classic statement on the Great Idea was delivered by Kolettes

ritory. Although the Ottoman forces were capable of subduing these

the protecting powers had approved the departure of Othon. Thereaf­

T h e center of the first successful revolt of a Balkan people against Ot

Those in opposition to the prince wished to resolve this crisis by sum

Their domination was not, however, to last. Although higher educa

the advocates of the supremacy of the assembly; the Conservatives fa

Othon agreed to the demands of the revolutionaries. A constitutional as

the protecting powers had approved the departure of Othon. Thereaf

In the preceding chapters we have seen two national liberation move

Danube were to be evacuated. Ottoman subjects were to leave the prov

antees were offered to all Ottoman citizens regardless of religion. It is in

measures were not bringing Balkan peoples under Ottoman administra

out the Bulgarian lands. In 1869 he went to Bulgaria to set up commit

D espite the establishment of a separate Bulgarian church and the cre

olutionary programs. So far as the constitution was concerned they be

garian government found itself under constant pressure from conces

lightened nations have been . . . civilized by writings in their own lan

indeed become an Italian sea. If, conversely, Austrian influence pre

of cooperating for national defense, Albanians from different geo

the absolute majority in the province. Hungarian and Romanian histo

developed strong feelings of national self-consciousness, made particu

awarded Romania Bessarabia, but it assigned all of Dobrudja to the Cen

cross Greece to join this encampment. Finally, in May, 1916, no resis