1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

REVIEW PETITION (CRL.) NO. 453 OF 2012

IN
WRIT PETITION (CRL.) 135 OF 2008

Kamlesh Verma .... Petitioner (s)

Versus

Mayawati & Ors. .... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

P.Sathasivam, CJI.

1) This petition has been filed by the petitioner herein-

Kamlesh Verma seeking review of the judgment and order dated

06.07.2012 passed in Mayawati vs. Union of India & Ors. (2012) 8

SCC 106 (Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 135 of 2008).

2) Brief Facts:

(a) This Court, by order dated 16.07.2003 in I.A. No. 387 of

2003 in Writ Petition (C) No. 13381 of 1984 titled M.C. Mehta

vs. Union of India & Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 706, directed the CBI to

conduct an inquiry on the basis of the I.A. filed in the

aforesaid writ petition alleging various irregularities

committed by the officers/persons concerned in the Taj Heritage

Corridor Project and to submit a Preliminary Report. By means

of an order dated 21.08.2003 in M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India

 2
(2003) 8 SCC 711, this Court issued certain directions to the

CBI to interrogate and verify the assets of the persons

concerned with regard to outflow of Rs. 17 crores which was

alleged to have been released without proper sanction for the

said Project.

(b) The CBI-Respondent No. 2 therein submitted a report on

11.09.2003 before this Court which formed the basis of order

dated 18.09.2003 titled M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India and

Others, (2003) 8 SCC 696 wherein the CBI was directed to conduct

an inquiry with respect to the execution of the Taj Heritage

Corridor Project under Taj Trapezium Zone (TTZ) Area at Agra

which culminated into the registration of an FIR being No.

0062003A0018 of 2003 dated 05.10.2003 under Section 120-B read

with Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 (in short ‘the IPC’) and under Section 13(2) read with

Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in

short ‘the PC Act’) against several persons including Ms.

Mayawati-Respondent No. 1 herein.

(c) On the very same date, i.e., on 05.10.2003, Shri K.N.

Tewari, Superintendent of Police, CBI/ACP, Lucknow lodged

another FIR being RC No. 0062003A0019 of 2003 under Section

13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act only against Ms.

Mayawati (petitioner therein) alleging that in pursuance of the

orders dated 21.08.2003, 11.09.2003 and 18.09.2003 passed by

this Court, the CBI conducted an inquiry with regard to the

 3
acquisition of disproportionate movable and immovable assets of

Ms. Mayawati and her close relatives on the basis of which, the

CBI has lodged the said FIR. Pursuant to the same, the CBI

conducted raids, search and seizure operations at all the

premises of the petitioner therein and her relatives and seized

all the bank accounts.

(d) Aggrieved by the filing of the FIR being RC No.

0062003A0019 of 2003, Ms. Mayawati-the petitioner therein and

Respondent No. 1 herein preferred Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 135

of 2008 before this Court. In the said petition, one Shri

Kamlesh Verma (the petitioner herein) also moved an application

for intervention being I.A. No. 8 of 2010.

(e) This Court, by order dated 06.07.2012, quashed the FIR

being No. 0062003A0019 of 2003 dated 05.10.2003 holding that the

order dated 18.09.2003 does not contain any specific direction

regarding lodging of FIR in the matter of disproportionate

assets case against Ms. Mayawati (the petitioner therein) and

the CBI exceeded its jurisdiction in lodging the same and also

allowed the application for intervention.

(f) Aggrieved by the order of quashing of the FIR being No.

0062003A0019 of 2003 dated 05.10.2003, Shri Kamlesh Verma-the

petitioner herein/the intervenor therein has filed the above

review petition.

3) Heard Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the

petitioner, Mr. Satish Chandra Mishra, learned senior counsel

 4
for Respondent No. 1 herein and Mr. Mohan Parasaran, learned

Solicitor General for the CBI.

Discussion:

4) The only point for consideration in this petition is

whether the review petitioner has made out a case for reviewing

the judgment and order dated 06.07.2012 and satisfies the

criteria for entertaining the same in review jurisdiction?

Review Jurisdiction:

5) Article 137 of the Constitution of India provides for

review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court which reads

as under:

“Subject to the provisions of any law made by

Parliament or any rules made under Article 145,
the Supreme Court shall have power to review any
judgment pronounced or order made by it.”

6) Order XLVII, Rule 1(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908, provides for an application for review which reads as

under:

“Any person considering himself aggrieved-

a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is
allowed, but from which no appeal has been
preferred,
b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is
allowed, or
c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of
Small Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and important
matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not
 5
be produced by him at the time when the decree was
passed or order made, or on account of some mistake
or error apparent on the face of the record, or for
any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a
review of the decree passed or order made against
him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court
which passed the decree or made the order.”

7) Further, Part VIII Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules,

1966 deals with the review and consists of four rules. Rule 1 is

important for our purpose which reads as under:

“The Court may review its judgment or order, but

no application for review will be entertained in
a civil proceeding except on the ground mentioned
in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code and in a
criminal proceeding except on the ground of an
error apparent on the face of the record.”

8) This Court has repeatedly held in various judgments that

the jurisdiction and scope of review is not that of an appeal

and it can be entertained only if there is an error apparent on

the face of the record. A mere repetition through different

counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over

ineffectually covered grounds or minor mistakes of

inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. This Court,

in Sow Chandra Kante & Anr. vs. Sheikh Habib (1975) 1 SCC 674,

held as under:

“1. Mr Daphtary, learned counsel for the

petitioners, has argued at length all the points
which were urged at the earlier stage when we
refused special leave thus making out that a
review proceeding virtually amounts to a re-
hearing. May be, we were not right is refusing
special leave in the first round; but, once an
order has been passed by this Court, a review
 6
thereof must be subject to the rules of the game
and cannot be lightly entertained. A review of a
judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort
to it is proper only where a glaring omission or
patent mistake or like grave error has crept in
earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere
repetition, through different counsel, of old and
overruled arguments, a second trip over
ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of
inconsequential import are obviously
insufficient. The very strict need for compliance
with these factors is the rationale behind the
insistence of counsel's certificate which should
not be a routine affair or a habitual step. It is
neither fairness to the Court which decided nor
awareness of the precious public time lost what
with a huge backlog of dockets waiting in the
queue for disposal, for counsel to issue easy
certificates for entertainment of review and
fight over again the same battle which has been
fought and lost. The Bench and the Bar, we are
sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation
of judicial time for maximum use. We regret to
say that this case is typical of the unfortunate
but frequent phenomenon of repeat performance
with the review label as passport. Nothing which
we did not hear then has been heard now, except a
couple of rulings on points earlier put forward.
May be, as counsel now urges and then pressed,
our order refusing special leave was capable of a
different course. The present stage is not a
virgin ground but review of an earlier order
which has the normal feature of finality.”

9) In a criminal proceeding, review is permissible on the

ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. A review

proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the

case. In M/s Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. vs. Lt.

Governor of Delhi, (1980) 2 SCC 167, this Court, in paragraph

Nos. 8 & 9 held as under:

“8. It is well-settled that a party is not

entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered
by this Court merely for the purpose of a
 7
rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The
normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by
the Court is final, and departure from that
principle is justified only when circumstances of
a substantial and compelling character make it
necessary to do so: Sajjan Singh v. State of
Rajasthan. For instance, if the attention of the
Court is not drawn to a material statutory
provision during the original hearing, the Court
will review its judgment: G.L. Gupta v. D.N.
Mehta. The Court may also reopen its judgment if
a manifest wrong has been done and it is
necessary to pass an order to do full and
effective justice: O.N. Mohindroo v. Distt.
Judge, Delhi. Power to review its judgments has
been conferred on the Supreme Court by Article
137 of the Constitution, and that power is
subject to the provisions of any law made by
Parliament or the rules made under Article 145.
In a civil proceeding, an application for review
is entertained only on a ground mentioned in
Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an
error apparent on the face of the record (Order
40 Rule 1, Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But
whatever the nature of the proceeding, it is
beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be
equated with the original hearing of the case,
and the finality of the judgment delivered by the
Court will not be reconsidered except “where a
glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave
error has crept in earlier by judicial
fallibility”: Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib.

9. Now, besides the fact that most of the legal

material so assiduously collected and placed
before us by the learned Additional Solicitor
General, who has now been entrusted to appear for
the respondent, was never brought to our
attention when the appeals were heard, we may
also examine whether the judgment suffers from an
error apparent on the face of the record. Such an
error exists if of two or more views canvassed on
the point it is possible to hold that the
controversy can be said to admit of only one of
them. If the view adopted by the Court in the
original judgment is a possible view having
regard to what the record states, it is difficult
to hold that there is an error apparent on the
 8
face of the record.”

10) Review of the earlier order cannot be done unless the

court is satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of

the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of

justice. This Court, in Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon vs. Union of

India & Ors. 1980 (Supp) SCC 562, held as under:

“12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we

resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove
any feeling that the party has been hurt without
being heard. But we cannot review our earlier
order unless satisfied that material error,
manifest on the face of the order, undermines its
soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib this Court
observed :

“A review of a judgment is a serious

step and reluctant resort to it is
proper only where a glaring omission or
patent mistake or like grave error has
crept in earlier by judicial
fallibility.... The present stage is
not a virgin ground but review of an
earlier order which has the normal
feature of finality.”

11) An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected

by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error

apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to

exercise its power of review. A review is by no means an appeal

in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and

corrected, but lies only for patent error. This Court, in

Parsion Devi & Ors. vs. Sumitri Devi & Ors., (1997) 8 SCC 715,

held as under:
 9
“7. It is well settled that review
proceedings have to be strictly confined to the
ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In
Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.
this Court opined:
“What, however, we are now concerned with is
whether the statement in the order of September
1959 that the case did not involve any
substantial question of law is an ‘error apparent
on the face of the record’). The fact that on the
earlier occasion the Court held on an identical
state of facts that a substantial question of law
arose would not per se be conclusive, for the
earlier order itself might be erroneous.
Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it
would not follow that it was an ‘error apparent
on the face of the record’, for there is a
distinction which is real, though it might not
always be capable of exposition, between a mere
erroneous decision and a decision which could be
characterised as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A
review is by no means an appeal in disguise
whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and
corrected, but lies only for patent
error.”(emphasis ours)

8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari

Choudhury while quoting with approval a passage
from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak
Sharma this Court once again held that review
proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have
to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may

be open to review inter alia if there is a
mistake or an error apparent on the face of the
record. An error which is not self-evident and
has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can
hardly be said to be an error apparent on the
face of the record justifying the court to
exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule
1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an
erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”.
A review petition, it must be remembered has a
limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an
appeal in disguise”.
 10

12) Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is

apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to

be fished out and searched. It must be an error of

inadvertence. The power of review can be exercised for

correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere

possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for

review. This Court, in Lily Thomas & Ors. vs. Union of India &

Ors., (2000) 6 SCC 224, held as under:

“54. Article 137 empowers this Court to review

its judgments subject to the provisions of any
law made by Parliament or any rules made under
Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme
Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under
Article 145 of the Constitution prescribe that in
civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds
specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which provides:
“1. Application for review of judgment.—(1)
Any person considering himself aggrieved—
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal
is allowed, but from which no appeal has been
preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal
is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court
of Small Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and important
matter or evidence which, after the exercise of
due diligence, was not within his knowledge or
could not be produced by him at the time when the
decree was passed or order made, or on account of
some mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record, or for any other sufficient reason,
desires to obtain a review of the decree passed
or order made against him, may apply for a review
of judgment to the court which passed the decree
or made the order.”

Under Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules

 11
no review lies except on the ground of error
apparent on the face of the record in criminal
cases. Order XL Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules
provides that after an application for review has
been disposed of no further application shall be
entertained in the same matter.

56. It follows, therefore, that the power of

review can be exercised for correction of a
mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers
can be exercised within the limits of the statute
dealing with the exercise of power. The review
cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The
mere possibility of two views on the subject is
not a ground for review. Once a review petition
is dismissed no further petition of review can be
entertained. The rule of law of following the
practice of the binding nature of the larger
Benches and not taking different views by the
Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal
strength has to be followed and practised.
However, this Court in exercise of its powers
under Article 136 or Article 32 of the
Constitution and upon satisfaction that the
earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of
fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created
under any other statute, can take a different
view notwithstanding the earlier judgment.

58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged

under Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules read
with Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure has
been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed
before us during the arguments for the purposes
of reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case,
(1995) 3 SCC 635 It is not the case of the
petitioners that they have discovered any new and
important matter which after the exercise of due
diligence was not within their knowledge or could
not be brought to the notice of the Court at the
time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised
before us were in fact addressed for and on
behalf of the petitioners before the Bench which,
after considering those pleas, passed the
judgment in Sarla Mudgal case. We have also not
found any mistake or error apparent on the face
of the record requiring a review. Error
contemplated under the rule must be such which is
apparent on the face of the record and not an
 12
error which has to be fished out and searched. It
must be an error of inadvertence. No such error
has been pointed out by the learned counsel
appearing for the parties seeking review of the
judgment. The only arguments advanced were that
the judgment interpreting Section 494 amounted to
violation of some of the fundamental rights. No
other sufficient cause has been shown for
reviewing the judgment. The words “any other
sufficient reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1
CPC” must mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at
least analogous to those specified in the rule”
as was held in Chhajju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1922 PC
112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar
Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose
Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 Error apparent on the
face of the proceedings is an error which is
based on clear ignorance or disregard of the
provisions of law. In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa,
AIR 1954 SC 440 this Court held that such error
is an error which is a patent error and not a
mere wrong decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v.
Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233, it was held:
“[I]t is essential that it should be
something more than a mere error; it must be one
which must be manifest on the face of the record.
The real difficulty with reference to this
matter, however, is not so much in the statement
of the principle as in its application to the
facts of a particular case. When does an error
cease to be mere error, and become an error
apparent on the face of the record? Learned
counsel on either side were unable to suggest any
clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the
two classes of errors could be demarcated.
Mr Pathak for the first respondent contended
on the strength of certain observations of
Chagla, C.J. in — ‘Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Borough
Municipality,AIR 1953 Bom 133’ that no error
could be said to be apparent on the face of the
record if it was not self-evident and if it
required an examination or argument to establish
it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis
for decision in the majority of cases. But there
must be cases in which even this test might break
down, because judicial opinions also differ, and
an error that might be considered by one Judge as
self-evident might not be so considered by
another. The fact is that what is an error
 13
apparent on the face of the record cannot be
defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an
element of indefiniteness inherent in its very
nature, and it must be left to be determined
judicially on the facts of each case.”
Therefore, it can safely be held that the
petitioners have not made out any case within the
meaning of Article 137 read with Order XL of the
Supreme Court Rules and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC for
reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case. The
petition is misconceived and bereft of any
substance.”

13) In a review petition, it is not open to the Court to re-

appreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even

if that is possible. Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of

evidence cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is

shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record

or for some reason akin thereto. This Court, in Kerala State

Electricity Board vs. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. &

Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 651, held as under:

“10. ………In a review petition it is not open

to this Court to reappreciate the evidence and
reach a different conclusion, even if that is
possible. Learned counsel for the Board at best
sought to impress us that the correspondence
exchanged between the parties did not support the
conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid
such a submission cannot be permitted to be
advanced in a review petition. The appreciation
of evidence on record is fully within the domain
of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the
evidence produced, the court records a finding of
fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion
cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it
is shown that there is an error apparent on the
face of the record or for some reason akin
thereto. It has not been contended before us that
there is any error apparent on the face of the
record. To permit the review petitioner to argue
on a question of appreciation of evidence would
 14
amount to converting a review petition into an
appeal in disguise.”

14) Review is not re-hearing of an original matter. The

power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which

enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a

subordinate court. A repetition of old and overruled argument

is not enough to re-open concluded adjudications. This Court,

in Jain Studios Ltd. vs. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd., (2006)

5 SCC 501, held as under:

“11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on

merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the
opponent is right in submitting that virtually
the applicant seeks the same relief which had
been sought at the time of arguing the main
matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer
had been refused, no review petition would lie
which would convert rehearing of the original
matter. It is settled law that the power of
review cannot be confused with appellate power
which enables a superior court to correct all
errors committed by a subordinate court. It is
not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition
of old and overruled argument is not enough to
reopen concluded adjudications. The power of
review can be exercised with extreme care,
caution and circumspection and only in
exceptional cases.

12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the

applicant herein had been made at the time when
the arbitration petition was heard and was
rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an
indirect method by filing a review petition. Such
petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of
“second innings” which is impermissible and
unwarranted and cannot be granted.”

15) Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have

to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII

 15
Rule 1 of CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with

the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the

same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered,

the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment

in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the

review jurisdiction.

Summary of the Principles:

16) Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of

review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

(A) When the review will be maintainable:-

(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,

after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of

the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

(iii) Any other sufficient reason.

The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in

Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court

in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose

Athanasius & Ors., (1955) 1 SCR 520, to mean “a reason

sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in

the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of

India vs. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors., JT 2013 (8)

SC 275.
 16
(B) When the review will not be maintainable:-

(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough

to reopen concluded adjudications.

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original

hearing of the case.

(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error,

manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or

results in miscarriage of justice.

(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an

erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for

patent error.

(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot

be a ground for review.

(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not

be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within

the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be

advanced in the review petition.

(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at

the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.

17) Keeping the above principles in mind, let us consider the

claim of the petitioner and find out whether a case has been

made out for interference exercising review jurisdiction.

 17
18) Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the

petitioner, once again took us through various earlier orders

passed by this Court in respect of Taj Corridor Project and

submitted that even if there is any invalidity of investigation

and breach of mandatory provision, it is the duty of the Court

exercising jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution of

India to take necessary steps by ordering the investigating

agency to proceed further and take action in accordance with

law. For the same, he relied on the judgments of this Court in

H.N. Rishbud & Inder Singh vs. The State of Delhi, 1955 (1) SCR

1150 at page 1164 and Vineet Narain & Ors. vs. Union of India

& Anr.,, (1998) 1 SCC 226. In H.N. Rishbud (supra), the

following observation/conclusion is pressed into service:

“…..It does not follow, however, that the

invalidity of the investigation is to be
completely ignored by the Court during trial.
When the breach of such a mandatory provision is
brought to the knowledge of the Court at a
sufficiently early stage, the Court, while not
declining cognizance, will have to take the
necessary steps to get the illegality cured and
the defect rectified, by ordering such
reinvestigation as the circumstances of an
individual case may call for.”

19) In Vineet Narain (supra), by drawing our attention to

paragraph 55, it was argued that the CBI must be allowed to

investigate and the offender against whom a prima facie case is

made out should be prosecuted expeditiously. In other words,

according to him, it is the duty of the judiciary to enforce the

 18
rule of law and to guard against erosion of the rule of law. We

make it clear that there is no second opinion on the above

direction and we also reiterate the same.

20) Based on the above, at the foremost, it is submitted by

Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the petitioner

that on a reading of various orders of this Court, it is clear

that FIR being RC No. 0062003A0019 of 2003 was lodged under the

orders and directions of this Court. In order to substantiate

the above argument, Mr. Shanti Bhushan, once again, took us

through earlier orders which were passed at the time of original

hearing. In fact, the very same orders and arguments were

advanced by the then Additional Solicitor General for CBI as

well as Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, learned counsel on behalf of the

intervener. In paragraph Nos. 18 to 23 of the order dated

06.07.2012, the very same contentions have been made, dealt with

and duly considered at length and it was clarified that anything

beyond the Taj Corridor matter was not the subject matter of

reference before the Taj Corridor Bench and the CBI is not

justifying in proceeding with FIR being RC No. 0062003A0019 of

2003 dated 05.10.2003 since the order dated 18.09.2003 does not

contain any specific direction regarding lodging of FIR in the

matter of disproportionate assets case against Ms. Mayawati-

Respondent No. 1 herein.

21) After dealing with all those orders exhaustively, the

contents of the FIR dated 05.10.2003 and taking note of the

 19
principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in State of West

Bengal & Ors. vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights,

West Bengal & Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 571, this Court, in Mayawati

vs. Union of India (2012) 8 SCC 106 arrived at the following

conclusion:

“39. As discussed above and after reading all the

orders of this Court which are available in the
“compilation”, we are satisfied that this Court
being the ultimate custodian of the fundamental
rights did not issue any direction to CBI to
conduct a roving inquiry against the assets of
the petitioner commencing from 1995 to 2003 even
though the Taj Heritage Corridor Project was
conceived only in July 2002 and an amount of Rs
17 crores was released in August/September 2002.
The method adopted by CBI is unwarranted and
without jurisdiction. We are also satisfied that
CBI has proceeded without proper understanding of
various orders dated 16-7-2003, 21-8-2003, 18-9-
2003, 25-10-2004 and 7-8-2006 passed by this
Court. We are also satisfied that there was no
such direction relating to second FIR, namely,
FIR No. RC 0062003A0019 dated 5-10-2003.

40. We have already referred to the

Constitution Bench decision of this Court in
Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights
wherein this Court observed that only when this
Court after considering the material on record
comes to a conclusion that such material does
disclose a prima facie case calling for
investigation by CBI for the alleged offence, an
order directing inquiry by CBI could be passed
and that too after giving opportunity of hearing
to the affected person. We are satisfied that
there was no such finding or satisfaction
recorded by this Court in the matter of
disproportionate assets of the petitioner on the
basis of the status report dated 11-9-2003 and,
in fact, the petitioner was not a party before
this Court in the case in question. From the
perusal of those orders, we are also satisfied
that there could not have been any material
 20
before this Court about the disproportionate
assets case of the petitioner beyond the Taj
Corridor Project case and there was no such
question or issue about disproportionate assets
of the petitioner. In view of the same, giving
any direction to lodge FIR relating to
disproportionate assets case did not arise.

41. We finally conclude that anything beyond

the Taj Corridor matter was not the subject-
matter of reference before the Taj Corridor
Bench,. Since the order dated 18-9-2003 does not
contain any specific direction regarding lodging
of FIR in the matter of disproportionate assets
case against the petitioner, CBI is not justified
in proceeding with FIR No. RC 0062003A0019 dated
5-10-2003. In view of the above discussion, we
are satisfied that CBI exceeded its jurisdiction
in lodging FIR No. RC 0062003A0019 dated 5-10-
2003 in the absence of any direction from this
Court in the order dated 18-9-2003 or in any
subsequent orders.”

Inasmuch as the very same point has been urged once again, in

the light of the principles noted above, we are of the view that

the same are impermissible.

22) We have also noted the principles enunciated in H.N.

Rishbud (supra) as well as in Vineet Narain (supra). For the

sake of repetition, we are pointing out that we have disposed of

the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner therein

(respondent herein) based on the relief sought for, contents of

the FIR dated 05.10.2003, earlier directions relating to Taj

Heritage Corridor Project and arrived at such conclusion.

23) It is also made clear that we have not gone into any

other aspect relating to the claim of the CBI, intervener or the

 21
stand of the writ petitioner therein (respondent herein) except

the directions relating to Taj Heritage Corridor Project which

was the only lis before us in Writ Petition being No. 135 of

2008. In such circumstances and in the light of enormous

decisions, we find that there is no material within the

parameters of review jurisdiction to go into the earlier order

dated 06.07.2012.

24) In the light of the above discussion, we once again

reiterate that our decision is based on earlier directions

relating to Taj Heritage Corridor Project, particularly, the

order dated 18.09.2003, the contents of FIR being RC No.

0062003A0019 dated 05.10.2003, the relief prayed in the writ

petition filed before this Court and we have not said or

expressed anything beyond the subject matter of the dispute.

25) In the light of the above discussion, the review petition

is disposed of with the above observation.

……….…………………………CJI.
(P. SATHASIVAM)

………….…………………………J.
(DIPAK MISRA)

NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 8, 2013.
 22
ITEM NO.1A COURT NO.1 SECTION X
(For judgment)

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

REVIEW PETITION (CRL.) NO.453/2012 IN W.P.(CRL.) NO.135/2008

KAMLESH VERMA Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

MAYAWATI & ORS. Respondent(s)

Date: 08/08/2013 This Petition was called up for Judgment today.

For petitioner(s) Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, AOR

For respondent(s)/ Mr. T.A. Khan, Adv.

C.B.I. Mr. D.L. Chidanand, Adv.
Mr. B.V. Balramdas, AOR

Mr. Shail Kumar Dwivedi, AOR

Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, pronounced the

judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble
Mr. Justice Dipak Misra.

In terms of the signed reportable judgment, the

review petition is disposed of.

(Chetan Kumar) (Savita Sainani)

Court Master Court Master
(Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)