Lawrence Bin Masuni at Fairus Bin Abdullah & Anor V Public Prosecutor (2018) Supp MLJ 63
Lawrence Bin Masuni at Fairus Bin Abdullah & Anor V Public Prosecutor (2018) Supp MLJ 63
Lawrence Bin Masuni at Fairus Bin Abdullah & Anor V Public Prosecutor (2018) Supp MLJ 63
Both the appellants were charged with the murder of one Willy Tuoh Ching
Chai (‘the deceased’), an offence punishable under s 302 of the Penal Code
G (‘the Code’), read together with s 34 of the same Code. The High Court found
the appellants guilty and sentenced them to death. On appeal, the Court of
Appeal affirmed the decision of the High Court, hence the present appeals. The
grounds of appeal as submitted by the appellants were: (a) that the learned
Court of Appeal judges erred in fact and in law in ruling that PW14 was not an
H accomplice; and (b) that the learned Court of Appeal judges erred in fact and
in law in failing to consider the non-corroboration of PW14’s evidence. In the
present appeal, the appellants prayed that their conviction and sentence be set
aside or alternatively that their conviction be substituted with a lesser offence
and sentence. The appellants’ contention that PW14 was an accomplice was
I based primarily on the facts that: PW14 had accompanied them to the scene of
the crime with prior knowledge that a crime might have been committed by the
first appellant; it was PW14 who then swung the wooden planks which killed
the deceased; PW14 failed to report to the police about the said offence; even
if he did not swing the fatal blow on the deceased, he did nothing to prevent the
64 Malayan Law Journal [2018] Supp MLJ
persons inflicting the blows; and PW14 shared in the benefit of their crime. A
Held, dismissing the appellants’ appeal and affirming the conviction and
sentence imposed on both the appellants:
(1) In the present appeal, there was no evidence that there was any agreement B
between the first and second appellants and PW14 to commit the crime
in ‘finishing off ’ the deceased when all three of them went to the
cul-de-sac opposite Jalan Kaka Kg Dato Baru where the deceased had
fallen. Thus, in the absence of such agreement, PW14’s mere presence at
the scene of the crime could not be said to be an ‘encouragement’ (see C
paras 75–76).
(2) The contents of the cautioned statement P64 in no way implicated
PW14 in the hatching of the idea to ‘finish off ’ the deceased, or in the
actual infliction of further injuries on him. In fact, P64 made no mention
whatsoever of PW14. The inculpatory part of P64 related to the D
admission by the first appellant that the second appellant hit the deceased
with a plank, which in itself was a confession that the offence involved
only the two appellants. The only inference could only be that the
deceased’s death was caused by the acts of the first and second appellants
and not by PW14, as was correctly held by the learned trial judge (see E
paras 77–79 & 81).
(3) PW14 had no prior knowledge of the crime to be committed. He was no
doubt present at the scene, but there was no overt act by him in the
commission of the offence. He was a passive witness. In any event, even F
if PW14 was an accessory after the fact (which was not the case in the
instant appeal), ‘strictly speaking, an accessory after the fact cannot be an
accomplice as he is not concerned in the commission of the original
offence’ (per Augustine Paul JCA) as quoted in Nomezam Apandy Abu
Hassan v Public Prosecutor [2010] 1 MLJU 2180. In any case, failure to G
report to the police about the offence charged was insufficient ground to
make PW14 an accomplice. Moreover, the learned trial judge made a
finding that PW14 was a credible witness, whose testimony was firm and
unshakeable even in the face of rigorous cross-examination. The Federal
Court as an appellate court should be slow in interfering with such H
finding (see paras 86 & 89–92).
(4) The court agreed with the learned trial judge that having considered the
evidence in its entirety including the statements from the dock of the
appellants, the prosecution had succeeded in proving its case against the
appellants beyond all reasonable doubt. The court therefore agreed with I
the learned trial judge’s finding that PW14 was not an accomplice nor
was he an accessory after the fact and therefore his evidence was to be
regarded as that of an ordinary witness requiring no corroboration (see
paras 102 & 112).
Lawrence bin Masuni @ Fairus bin Abdullah & Anor v Public
[2018] Supp MLJ Prosecutor (Zainun Ali FCJ) 65
pertama dan kedua dan bukan oleh PW14, sepertimana yang diputuskan A
dengan tepat oleh hakim bicara yang bijaksana (lihat perenggan 77–79 &
81).
(3) PW14 tidak mempunyai pengetahuan awal tentang jenayah yang akan
dilakukan. Adalah tidak diragui bahawa dia hadir di tempat kejadian, B
namun tiada tindakan terbuka olehnya dalam melakukan kesalahan itu.
Dia adalah saksi pasif. Jika pun PW14 adalah aksesori selepas fakta
(bukan dalam rayuan semasa), ‘strictly speaking, an accessory after the
fact cannot be an accomplice as he is not concerned in the commission of
the original offence’ (Augustine Paul JCA) seperti yang disebutkan di C
dalam kes Nomezam Apandy Abu Hassan v Public Prosecutor [2010] 1
MLJU 2180. Dalam hal apapun, kegagalan untuk melaporkan kepada
polis tentang kesalahan yang dituduh adalah alasan yang tidak
mencukupi untuk menjadikan PW14 sebagai seorang rakan sejenayah.
Selain itu, hakim bicara yang bijaksana telah membuat keputusan D
bahawa PW14 adalah saksi yang boleh dipercayai, yang keterangannya
kukuh dan tidak tergugat walaupun menghadapi pemeriksaan balas yang
bertubi-tubi. Mahkamah Persekutuan sebagai mahkamah rayuan harus
lebih perlahan dalam mengganggu keputusan tersebut (lihat perenggan
86 & 89–92). E
Notes
For cases on corroboration, see 7(1) Mallal’s Digest (5th Ed, 2017 Reissue)
paras 6–37.
For cases on whether witness an accomplice, see 5(1) Mallal’s Digest (5th Ed, H
2017 Reissue) paras 19–27.
Cases referred to
Alimuddin v R 23 C 361 (refd)
Davies v Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] AC 378, HL (refd) I
Director of Public Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] 1 All ER 440; [1973] AC
729, HL (refd)
Francis Antonysamy v PP [2005] 3 MLJ 389, FC (refd)
Gunadhar Das And Ors v State AIR 1952 Cal 618, HC (refd)
Lawrence bin Masuni @ Fairus bin Abdullah & Anor v Public
[2018] Supp MLJ Prosecutor (Zainun Ali FCJ) 67
A Harcharan Singh & Anor v PP [2005] 1 MLJ 593; [2005] 1 CLJ 11, CA
(distd)
Jayalal Anandagoda v The Queen [1962] 1 WLR 817, PC (refd)
Kuan Ted Fatt v PP [1985] 1 MLJ 211, FC (refd)
Lemanit v PP [1965] 2 MLJ 26; [1965] 1 LNS 89, FC (refd)
B Loo Chuan Huat v PP [1971] 2 MLJ 167b, FC (refd)
Mohamed Salleh v PP [1969] 1 MLJ 104, FC (refd)
Muniandy & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1973] 1 MLJ 179, FC (refd)
Nomezam Apandy Abu Hassan v PP [2010] 1 MLJU 2180; [2011] 3 CLJ 868,
CA (refd)
C
Periasamy s/o Sinnappan & Anor v PP [1996] 2 MLJ 557, CA (refd)
PP v Teong Lung Chiong & Ors [2010] 5 MLJ 193, FC (refd)
PP v Sarjeet Singh & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 290, HC (refd)
R v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 (refd)
D Ramachandran v PP [1972] 2 MLJ 183 (refd)
Smith v Reynolds [1986] Crim LR 559 (refd)
Legislation referred to
Evidence Act 1950 ss 30, 30(1), 133
E
Appeal from: Civil Appeal No Q-05–105 of 2004(A) and (Q)-05–105 of
2004 (Court of Appeal, Putrajaya)
Ali Basah (Ali Basah & Partners) for the first appellant.
F Yap Yau Sin (Wan Junaidi & Co) for the second appellant.
Awang Armadajaya Awang Mahmud (Deputy Public Prosecutor, Attorney
General’s Chambers) for the respondent.
[2] In the High Court, both the appellants were charged with the murder of
one Willy Tuoh Ching Chai (M) (‘the deceased Ah Chai’), where the amended
I charge reads as follows:
That you, in furtherance of the common intention of you all, on the 7th day of
August 1998, between 1.30a.m. to 6.00a.m., at an unnamed road, off Jalan Kaka,
Kampung Dato Baru, in the District of Sibu in the State of Sarawak, committed
murder by causing the death of one WILLY TUOH CHING CHAI (M) and thereby
68 Malayan Law Journal [2018] Supp MLJ
committed an offence punishable under section 302 of the Penal Code, read A
together with section 34 of the same code.
[3] The appellants pleaded not guilty and were tried by the High Court. The
learned trial judge in the High Court after evaluating the evidence adduced,
found them guilty as charged and sentenced them to death. B
[4] On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the High Court.
[5] Aggrieved with the decision, the appellants gave their notices of appeal to
C
this court on 18 July 2010. The grounds of appeal of the appellants can be
summarised thus:
(a) that the learned Court of Appeal judges erred in fact and in law in ruling
that PW14 (Jormie Ryan bin Joe Menawan) aka ‘Andy’ was not an
accomplice; and D
(b) that the learned Court of Appeal judges erred in fact and in law in failing
to consider the non-corroboration of PW14’s evidence.
[6] The appellants therefore prayed that their conviction and sentence be set E
aside or alternatively that their conviction be substituted with a lesser offence
and sentence.
FACTS
F
[7] The background facts as can be gleaned from the records were that both
the appellants were drinking liquor, talking and playing cards with about nine
or ten other persons in Kampong Bandong on the evening of 6 August 1998.
Earlier, Frederik bin Jiri (‘PW11’) and Uddin went to the first appellant’s
house. They were joined there by the second appellant. Then all of them came G
up with some money and bought liquor and drank it. Then all five of them
went to Kg Bandong where they were joined by others.
[8] At about midnight, the deceased came by, riding on a motor scooter. As
narrated by PW11, the first appellant approached the deceased. After chatting H
for about two to three minutes, the first appellant hopped on the deceased’s
motor scooter and they went away, returning about 30 minutes later.
[9] The pair of them (the first appellant and the deceased) then went off
again on the motor scooter for the second time that night. The group then I
broke up and left the venue.
[10] The abovesaid event was related by both PW11 (Frederik bin Jiri) and
PW13 (Eddy Syarizan bin Azman). PW14 substantially corroborated the
Lawrence bin Masuni @ Fairus bin Abdullah & Anor v Public
[2018] Supp MLJ Prosecutor (Zainun Ali FCJ) 69
A evidence of PW11 and PW13. PW13 said that he then left the place.
According to PW14, after the first appellant and the deceased went off together
for the second time that night, he and the second appellant went to the first
appellant’s house, to rest and relax. However upon their arrival, they discovered
that the first appellant was not home.
B
[11] It is PW14’s evidence that, both he and the second appellant then
waited for a while at the first appellant’s house. When the first appellant finally
returned home alone on the deceased’s motor scooter, PW14 said that the first
appellant looked distressed and told PW14 that he had beaten up the deceased.
C
According to PW14, the first appellant then took him and the second appellant
to the scene of the crime, which was a dead end lane, opposite Jalan Kaka Kg
Dato Baru. To get there, the first appellant rode the deceased’s scooter while
PW14 and the second appellant rode on the latter’s motorcycle with PW14
D riding pillion.
[12] Upon reaching the scene of the crime, PW14 said that he saw the
deceased ‘lying with his face downward, and that he was still breathing and
groaning’. PW14 testified that he then saw each of the appellants taking a plank
E which was by the edge of the road, and that they both repeatedly hit the
deceased’s head. PW14 testified that the two planks were about three feet long
and about an inch thick. PW14 said that the deceased groaned when he was hit
by the appellants but that after sometime his groans stopped altogether.
F [13] It is PW14’s evidence that he could positively identify that the body
lying on the road was that of the deceased. PW14 said it was possible to
determine this as it was a moonlit night and there was a street light about 30 ft
away from where the deceased was lying.
G
[14] PW14 testified further that after the first and second appellants took
turns to hit the deceased, he saw the first appellant opening the compartment
under the seat of the deceased’s scooter and taking out a handbag from it.
H [15] PW14 also testified that he saw the second appellant taking a necklace
from the deceased’s neck.
[16] Subsequently all of them went back to the first appellant’s house on the
second appellant’s motorcycle. They left the deceased’s motor scooter at the
I scene.
[17] It was at the first appellant’s house that the items taken from the
deceased were shared between them.
70 Malayan Law Journal [2018] Supp MLJ
[18] From the deceased’s handbag, the first appellant took out cash of A
RM130, two gold rings, one bank card and some papers.
[19] The first appellant then threw the handbag and its content into the river
behind the first appellant’s house.
B
[20] According to PW14, the first appellant and second appellant went out
to try to use the bank card. They returned shortly after that and complained
that the bank card was unable to be used as it got ‘stuck’ in the machine.
C
[21] The next morning the items taken from the deceased were later
distributed between the three of them. The first appellant took RM50 of the
deceased’s money of RM130, and the second appellant and PW14 took RM40
each.
D
[22] PW14 said that the first appellant kept the deceased’s two gold rings and
necklace.
[23] In court, PW14 identified the relevant exhibits ie, the photographs of
E
the deceased (P5E), the deceased’s motor scooter (P3E), the photograph of
Jalan Kampong Dato Baru and Jalan Kaka (P3A and P3B) respectively, the
dead end lane (P3C), the second appellant’s motorcycle (P5G) and the two
planks allegedly used in the crime (ED 17A) and (IDI 18A), the gold rings and
the necklace (contents of ID 14). F
[24] As regards the injuries inflicted on the deceased, Dr Myint Soe the
pathologist (‘PW3’) conducted the post-mortem and prepared the report, and
identified three serious wounds ie, 5 x 1 x 1 cm wound in the deceased’s lower
jaw with a fracture of the jaw bone; four lacerated wounds the largest being 10 G
x 2 x 1 on the back right side of the head with a fracture of the skull and two
lacerated wounds, the largest being 3 x 2 x 1 cm on the back left side of the head
with fracture of the skull.
[25] The cause of death according to PW3 is severe head injuries, in which H
the four lacerated wounds on the back right side of the head with a fracture of
the skull and two lacerated wounds on the back left side of the head with a
fracture of the skull, were the probable cause of death.
I
[26] The learned trial judge ordered both the appellants to enter their
defence, on being satisfied that a prima facie case had been established by the
prosecution.
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[2018] Supp MLJ Prosecutor (Zainun Ali FCJ) 71
A [27] Both the appellants upon being called to enter their respective defence,
elected to give unsworn statements from the dock. Although it is their right to
do so, their statements being unsworn, must be less than their being evidence
given from the witness box (see Mohamed Salleh v Public Prosecutor [1969] 1
MLJ 104 ).
B
THE FIRST APPELLANT’S DEFENCE
[28] The first appellant in his unsworn statement denied culpability to the
charge. He denied that he was the one who assaulted the deceased with the
C plank which caused his death. The first appellant admitted that he had beaten
the deceased but that it was done to thwart the latter’s sexual advances on him.
In putting across his version, the first appellant stated that he became
increasingly angry when the deceased persisted with his amorous overtures. He
D
said that he punched the deceased on the face because of the deceased’s
persistence and the deceased’s refusal to respond to the first appellant’s request
to go home. The first appellant said that the deceased doggedly insisted on
lingering there for a while. All this added up to the first appellant’s anger
towards the deceased.
E
[29] In defending his version of events, the crucial part of the first appellant’s
unsworn statement reads as follows:
After I punched him on his face Ah Chai (the deceased) fell down to the ground on
the tarred road. He got up and tried to fight back. He pulled at my shirt and tried
F to fight me. I pushed him away. I noticed a piece of wood nearby. He tried to fight
with me, then I did not notice whether I hit him front or back. I just hit him. After
hitting Ah Chai once or twice Ah Chai fell to the ground again. I hit Ah Chai again
with a piece of wood I had used earlier at his back. After hitting him on his back I
felt nervous. Then I started the engine of the scooter and went to look for my friend.
G
[30] From the material before this court, it could be seen that after his
altercation with the deceased the first appellant then went home, where he met
the second appellant and PW14 who were waiting for him. After telling PW14
that he had quarrelled with the deceased and that he had hit him, he asked
H
them what he should do. The first appellant then took the second appellant and
PW14 to the scene where the deceased had fallen after being beaten by him. All
of them took a closer look at the deceased and found the deceased groaning in
pain and nursing his head with his hands.
I
[31] At this point in his testimony, the first appellant’s story took a different
turn. The first appellant said that he then went over to the deceased’s scooter
where a while later, he not only heard the sound of hitting but that, he also
heard the second appellant asking PW14 why PW14 was hitting the deceased.
72 Malayan Law Journal [2018] Supp MLJ
The first appellant said that he turned around and saw PW14 holding a piece A
of wood. The first appellant said that he then snatched the piece of wood from
PW14 and tossed it aside.
[33] According to the second appellant, the first appellant then snatched the
piece of wood from PW14 and threw it away before going back to the scooter. D
[34] The second appellant said that when he asked PW14 why he hit the
deceased, PW14’s reply was that since the deceased knew him (PW14), and
knew where he lived, the deceased would cause trouble to him (PW14). The
second appellant said that PW14 then assured him that nothing adverse will E
happen to them in view of what had taken place. The second appellant said that
PW14 then asked him to take the gold chain from the deceased’s neck before
going home.
[35] As is clear, each party had their own versions of the event. But the F
learned trial judge after evaluating all the evidence adduced, found that the
prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt against the first and
second appellants.
The learned trial judge found both the appellants guilty of the charge against G
them and convicted them accordingly and passed the sentence of death. On
appeal, the Court of Appeal unanimously held that the learned trial judge had
not misdirected himself in arriving at his decision and affirmed the conviction
and sentence against the appellants.
H
[36] In the appeal before this court, it would be helpful to briefly outline the
findings made by the learned trial judge.
A all in the first appellant’s cautioned statement (P64), and that the second
appellant’s explanation in his cautioned statement (P67) was not consistent
with his innocence.
[38] The trial judge found that the nature of the wounds inflicted as
B indicated from the evidence of PW14 and the evidence of the first appellant
himself in P64, was such that when inflicted the blows must have been
intended to kill the person on whom they were inflicted.
[41] In this regard, the case of Gunadhar Das And Ors v State AIR 1952 Cal
F
618 is instructive. Trevor Harries CJ observed, inter alia, that:
… the correct direction appears to me that the confession may be used to
corroborate the other evidence. In short, the conviction must be based on the other
evidence. The confession can only be used to help to satisfy a court that the other
evidence is true.
G
[42] Thus s 30 of the Evidence Act 1950 properly applies so that the
confession may be taken into consideration as against other persons jointly
tried for the same offence which are affected thereby (see Public Prosecutor v
H Teong Lung Chiong & Ors [2010] 5 MLJ 193).
[43] The trial judge in accepting the evidence of PW14 found that the
contention of the appellants that the former was an accomplice was untenable,
in view of the facts adduced and surrounding circumstances.
I
[44] Since the thrust of this appeal is only concerned with the narrow issue of
whether PW14 was an accomplice and that the court had failed to consider the
non-corroboration of PW14’s evidence, it suffice to say that the Court of
Appeal agreed with the learned trial judge that there was nothing in the
74 Malayan Law Journal [2018] Supp MLJ
[45] In fact the Court of Appeal accepted the learned trial judge’s finding
that PW14’s evidence was not inherently incredible as to be accepted. B
[46] As a corollary, the Court of Appeal also accepted the trial judge’s finding
that on the issue of common intention, P64 did not implicate PW14 in the
planning of the idea to ‘finish the deceased off ’ and that neither was PW14 C
involved in the actual infliction of further injuries on the deceased; that it was
the acts of the first and second appellants themselves which indicates common
intention on their part to snuff the life out of the deceased.
[47] Now, the issue raised before this court is simply whether PW14 is an D
accomplice and the court had failed to consider the non-corroboration of his
evidence. Counsel for both appellants had submitted that the trial judge and
the Court of Appeal judges erred in fact and in law in ruling that PW14 was not
an accomplice and that the courts below failed to consider the non-
corroboration of PW14’s evidence. It was the first appellant’s submission that E
there were conflicting evidence as to who delivered the fatal blow(s) on the
deceased since all three of them were present at the scene. According to the first
appellant each of them (the first and second appellants) gave their own versions
of the event as to who dealt the fatal blow. The first appellant argued that since
F
the second appellant had implicated PW14, the latter should have been
charged together with them (the first and second accuseds).
[48] It was also the contention of the first appellant that given the fact that
PW14 had been implicated, the learned trial judge ought to have scrutinised G
the testimonies of both PW17 (ASP Peter ak Embuas) the investigating officer
of the case and PW18 (Chief Insp Mohd Shahar bin Md Yunus). This was
especially crucial since PW17 hardly testified regarding the investigation that
he and his assistant PW18 had done in respect of PW14.
H
[49] The first appellant’s further submission is that since PW14 was a witness
to the final moments of the attack on the deceased, a thorough investigation
should have been made on PW14.
[50] The first appellant said that even if the lower courts did not believe the I
second appellant’s version of events (that PW14 delivered the final blow), firstly
the fact remained that in witnessing the deceased’s final moments, PW14 did
not prevent or attempt to stop either of the appellants from delivering the
blows on the deceased. Secondly, PW14 received part of the deceased’s money
Lawrence bin Masuni @ Fairus bin Abdullah & Anor v Public
[2018] Supp MLJ Prosecutor (Zainun Ali FCJ) 75
A and thirdly, PW14 did not inform anyone of what he had seen or known of the
offence purportedly committed by the appellants against the deceased.
[51] Based on the above facts, both the first and second appellants contended
that PW14 was therefore at the very least, an accessory after the fact and that his
B evidence must be considered on the same principles as that of an accomplice
since the role he played was not passive (Harcharan Singh & Anor v Public
Prosecutor [2005] 1 MLJ 593; [2005] 1 CLJ 11).
[57] The learned trial judge found that the potentially incriminating reply A
made by PW14 during cross-examination (ie, when PW14 said ‘I agree’, to the
question that he agreed to testify to avoid criminal proceedings against him)
was neutralised in PW14’s answer during re-examination.
[58] The prosecution agreed with the trial judge that there appeared to be B
nothing in the evidence including those elicited during cross-examination to
indicate that PW14 had taken part or even intended to participate in the
common intention of the first and second appellants in inflicting injuries on
the deceased leading to his death.
C
[59] In fact the prosecution’s case is that the evidence led by PW11 was
substantially similar to the evidence of PW14 and thus the former’s evidence
had substantially corroborated the evidence of the latter (PW14).
D
[60] The prosecution agreed with the learned trial judge that the suggestions
made by the appellants that it was PW14 who suggested that the ‘appellants
should hit the deceased and finished him off ’ had no basis, based on the
evidence. It is clear from the cautioned statement found in P64 (which the first
appellant made to ASP Tan Boon Sing (PW16) on 10 August 1998 ie, about E
three days after the incident) that there was no such suggestion made by PW14.
[61] The prosecution quoted the judgment of the learned High Court judge
in extenso which tended to indicate that although PW14 was present at the
scene of the crime and witnessed the assault on the deceased by the appellants, F
his non-participation in the deed was reflective of his state of mind, in that
there was no common intention on the part of the appellants and PW14 in
furtherance of the crime committed.
[64] The issue before this court is simply this — whether PW14 was an
accomplice and if so, whether the court below had failed to consider the
non-corroboration of his evidence.
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[2018] Supp MLJ Prosecutor (Zainun Ali FCJ) 77
IS PW14 AN ACCOMPLICE?
C
[67] The word ‘accomplice’ has its roots in common law, where its Latin
equivalent, that of ‘particeps criminis’, gives an indication of its meaning ie,
one who participates in the commission of crime.
A [69] Given the varying definitions, it is clear that in looking to see whether a
witness is an accomplice or otherwise, the investigation must, of necessity,
include an assessment of the mens rea of not only the perpetrator of the offence,
but also the person charged with aiding and abetting or encouraging the
offence.
B
[70] Given the fact that aiding and abetting is synonymous with the
concepts of giving assistance and encouragement to the principal offender, is
there such consensus and a causal link of PW14 between the aiding and
C
abetting and the commission of the completed crime by the principal offenders
(the appellants) in the instant appeal? These are some of the fundamentals
which have to be considered in meeting the appellants’ grounds of appeal.
[71] The contention of the appellants that PW14 was an accomplice is based
D primarily on his accompanying them to the scene of the crime with prior
knowledge that a crime may have been committed by the first appellant; that it
was PW14 who then swung the wooden planks which killed the deceased; that
PW14 failed to report to the police about the said offence; that even if he did
not swing the fatal blow on the deceased, he did nothing to prevent the person
E or persons inflicting the blows; and that PW14 shared in the benefit of their
crime when he got RM40 of the deceased’s money.
I There must also, inter alia, according to Megan LJ in Clarkson [1971] 3 All ER 344,
‘be an intention to encourage and there must also be encouragement in fact’. (See
also: Francis Antonysamy).
80 Malayan Law Journal [2018] Supp MLJ
[73] PW14’s presence at the scene of the crime may come under the category A
of ‘encouragement’ in circumstances where the parties (PW14 and the
appellants) have agreed that a crime be committed, even though PW14 does
nothing by way of a positive act.
[75] But in the instant appeal, there is no evidence that there was any D
agreement between the first and second appellants and PW14 to commit the
crime in ‘finishing off ’ the deceased when all three of them went to the
cul-de-sac opposite Jalan Kaka Kg Dato Baru where the deceased had fallen.
[76] Thus in the absence of such agreement, PW14’s mere presence at the E
scene of the crime cannot be said to be an ‘encouragement’ as envisaged in
authorities such as Smith v Reynolds.
[79] In fact the inculpatory part of the cautioned statement P64 relates to the
admission by the first appellant that the second appellant hit the deceased with
a plank, which in itself is a confession that the offence involves only the two
appellants. It also operates as evidence against them (Lemanit v Public I
Prosecutor [1965] 2 MLJ 26; [1965] 1 LNS 89).
[80] In view of the above, the first appellant’s allegation that it was PW14’s
idea to ‘finish off ’ the deceased all but fell to the ground.
Lawrence bin Masuni @ Fairus bin Abdullah & Anor v Public
[2018] Supp MLJ Prosecutor (Zainun Ali FCJ) 81
A [81] It is undisputed that the deceased was still alive and groaning in pain
when the appellants and PW14 reached the scene of the crime. It is also
undisputed that the deceased stopped groaning when the appellants traded
blows on his head with the wooden planks. The only inference could only be
that the deceased’s death was caused by the acts of the first and second
B appellants and not by PW14, as was correctly held by the learned trial judge.
[82] As evidence revealed, the testimony of the chemist PW3 was consistent
with the evidence given by PW14 that when he arrived at the scene of the crime
C
the deceased was found lying with his face down.
[83] In this court’s view the findings of the learned trial judge is correct. The
evidence of PW3 is unchallenged in that the nature of the wounds inflicted by
those blows must have been intended to kill the person on whom they were
D inflicted.
[84] Thus the question posed in the courts below of whether there was
common intention between the appellants to kill the deceased was answered by
the above fact.
E
[85] On the question of whether not reporting the crime to the police and in
sharing the loot with the appellants, PW14 is therefore considered to be an
accessory after the fact, the answer to that question is this.
F
[86] PW14 had no prior knowledge of the crime to be committed. He was
no doubt present at the scene, but there was no overt act by him in the
commission of the offence. He was a passive witness. The role he played is
distinguishable from that played by the so-called ‘accomplice’ in Harcharan
G Singh & Anor v Public Prosecutor and Alimuddin v R 23 C 361.
[87] Unlike the accomplice (PW9) in Harcharan Singh & Anor v Public
Prosecutor who helped loosen the rope around the deceased’s neck and not
reporting the crime to anyone, and admitting that he was not charged because
H he agreed to testify for the prosecution, PW14’s role in the instant appeal
differed materially.
[88] Thus it can safely be said that the role played by the accomplice in
Harcharan Singh and that played by PW14 are poles apart.
I
[89] In any event, even if PW14 was an accessory after the fact (which is not
the case in the instant appeal), ‘strictly speaking, an accessory after the fact
cannot be an accomplice as he is not concerned in the commission of the
original offence’ (per Augustine Paul JCA) as quoted in Nomezam Apandy Abu
82 Malayan Law Journal [2018] Supp MLJ
[90] In any case, failure to report to the police about the offence charged is
insufficient ground to make PW14 an accomplice (see Kuan Ted Fatt v Public
Prosecutor [1985] 1 MLJ 211).
B
[91] Moreover, the learned trial judge, made a finding that PW14 was a
credible witness, whose testimony was firm and unshakeable even in the face of
rigorous cross-examination.
C
[92] This court as an appellate court should be slow in interfering with such
finding (see Periasamy s/o Sinnappan & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 MLJ
557).
[93] Thus the learned trial judge’s finding in this appeal on this point should D
be accepted as true of PW14.
[95] In view of the appellants’ contention that the trial judge erred in
accepting the evidence of PW14 without there being independent and material
corroboration and that too much weight was given to PW14’s evidence and F
P64, it is this court’s view that the facts and evidence adduced would have to be
viewed in its entirety.
[96] To begin with, the question of corroboration only arises in the event
that PW14 is considered an accomplice, thus necessitating the need to G
corroborate his evidence. However it is trite that to convict on accomplice
evidence per se is not illegal as s 133 of the Evidence Act 1950 allows it.
Section 133 reads:
133 Accomplice H
An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person, and a
conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice.
A evidence unless it is materially corroborated, and that it is the long established and
universal practice both in India and England for judges to guard their minds
carefully against acting upon such evidence when uncorroborated. The rule as to
corroboration has become a settled rule of practice of so universal an application
that it has now assumed the force of a rule of law.
B
[98] It is also significant to add that the said corroborative evidence must also
implicate the appellants (whether directly or otherwise) with the crime.
[104] There was of course the medical evidence of PW3, the forensic
I
pathologist that the cause of death to the deceased was due to severe head
injuries. This evidence was confirmed by PW18, the investigating officer. The
injuries to the deceased as reported by both PW3 and PW18 were consistent
with the testimony given by PW14.
84 Malayan Law Journal [2018] Supp MLJ
[106] Then there is already the evidence contained in P64 and P67 which C
neatly put in place the details of what PW14 had testified in court.
[108] It is apparent that the learned trial judge had in mind the issues relating
to corroboration even if he found PW14 to be a non-accomplice.
F
[109] This court is of the view that the learned trial judge was entitled to
believe PW14’s evidence albeit when he found corroborative evidence as had
been alluded to above.
G
[110] It is apparent from the evidence adduced that there was no consensus
between the appellants and PW14.
[111] Thus having subjected PW14’s evidence to careful scrutiny, this court
finds no reason to depart from or interfere in the learned trial judge’s finding H
regarding PW14’s evidence since that finding is not amply supported by the
evidence before him.
[112] This court agrees with the learned trial judge that having considered the
evidence in its entirety including the statements from the dock of the I
appellants, the prosecution had succeeded in proving its case against the
appellants beyond all reasonable doubt. This court consequentially agrees with
the learned trial judge’s finding that PW14 was not an accomplice nor was he
an accessory after the fact and therefore his evidence is to be regarded as that of
Lawrence bin Masuni @ Fairus bin Abdullah & Anor v Public
[2018] Supp MLJ Prosecutor (Zainun Ali FCJ) 85
[113] The appellants’ appeals are therefore dismissed. This court affirms the
conviction and sentence imposed on both the appellants.
B
Appellants’ appeal dismissed; conviction and sentence imposed on both appellants
affirmed.