Daf Ditty Megillah 25: Divine Mercy or Decree?

1
MISHNA: If one says in his prayers:

May the good bless You, this is a path of heresy, as heretics divide the world into two domains,
good and evil. If one says the following in his prayers: Just as Your mercy is extended to a bird’s
nest, as You have commanded us to send away the mother before taking her chicks or eggs:

‫ֵﬠץ אוֹ‬-‫ ְבָּכל‬U‫ ַבֶּדֶּר‬R‫ִצפּוֹר ְלָפֶני‬-‫ו ִכּי ִיָקֵּרא ַקן‬ 6 If a bird's nest chance to be before thee in the way, in
‫ ְוָהֵאם ֹרֶבֶצת‬,‫ ֶאְפֹרִחים אוֹ ֵביִצים‬,‫ָהָאֶרץ‬-‫ַﬠל‬ any tree or on the ground, with young ones or eggs, and
‫ִתַקּח‬-‫ל ֹא‬--‫ַהֵבּיִצים‬-‫ אוֹ ַﬠל‬,‫ָהֶאְפֹרִחים‬-‫ַﬠל‬ the dam sitting upon the young, or upon the eggs, thou
.‫ַהָבּ ִנים‬-‫ ַﬠל‬,‫ָהֵאם‬ shalt not take the dam with the young;

-‫ַהָבּ ִנים ִתַּקּח‬-‫ ְוֶאת‬,‫ָהֵאם‬-‫ז ַשֵׁלַּח ְתַּשַׁלּח ֶאת‬ 7 thou shalt in any wise let the dam go, but the young
{‫ }ס‬.‫ ְוַהֲאַרְכָתּ ָיִמים‬,U‫ ְלַמַﬠן ִייַטב ָל‬,U‫ָל‬ thou mayest take unto thyself; that it may be well with
thee, and that thou mayest prolong thy days. {S}
Deut 22:6-7

so too extend Your mercy to us; or: May Your name be mentioned with the good; or: We give
thanks, we give thanks, twice, he is suspected of heretical beliefs and they silence him.

RASHI

‫ת וס פ ות ד " ה יב ר כ וך ט וב י ם‬
Tosfos explains why this is improper.
‫פי' שמוציא את הפושעים מן הכלל‬
(a)

2
 [This is improper because] he excludes sinners from the category [of people who should
bless Hashem].
.‫אי נמי משום דמחזי כשתי רשויות כלומר אלהים טובים‬
(b)
He connotes that there are two Powers, i.e. good G-ds.

If one modifies the text while reading the laws of forbidden sexual relations, i.e., he introduces
euphemisms out of a sense of propriety, they silence him. Similarly, if one says while translating
the verse:

;U‫ ְלַהֲﬠִביר ַלֹמֶּל‬,‫ִתֵתּן‬-‫ ל ֹא‬R‫כא וִּמַזּ ְרֲﬠ‬ 21 And thou shalt not give any of thy seed to set them apart
.‫ ֲא ִני ְיהָוה‬,R‫ֵשׁם ֱא{ֶהי‬-‫ְול ֹא ְתַחֵלּל ֶאת‬ to Molech, neither shalt thou profane the name of thy God: I
am the LORD.
Lev 18:21

“And you shall not give any of your seed to set them apart to Molekh” And you shall not give
any of your seed to impregnate an Aramean woman, he is silenced with rebuke.

RASHI

Steinzaltz

3
GEMARA: The mishna cites three instances where the communal prayer leader is silenced. The
Gemara clarifies: Granted, they silence one who repeats: We give thanks, we give thanks, as it
appears like he is acknowledging and praying to two authorities. And, granted, they also silence
one who says: May Your name be mentioned with the good, as this formulation indicates one
is thanking God only for the good and not for the bad, and we learned in a mishna (Berakhot
54a): One is obligated to bless God for the bad just as he blesses Him for the good. However,
in the case of one who recites: Just as Your mercy is extended to a bird’s nest, what is the
reason that they silence him?

Two amora’im in the West, Eretz Yisrael, disagree about this question, Rabbi Yosei bar Avin
and Rabbi Yosei bar Zevida. One said that this was because one who says this engenders
jealousy among God’s creations, as it appears as though he is indicating that God favored one
creature over all others. And one said that saying this is prohibited because one transforms the
attributes of the Holy One, Blessed be He, into expressions of mercy, and they are nothing
but decrees of the King that must be fulfilled without inquiring into the reasons behind them.

4
The Gemara relates that a particular individual descended before the ark as prayer leader in the
presence of Rabba, and said in his prayers: You have shown mercy to birds, as expressed
through the mitzva to chase away the mother bird before taking eggs from its nest; have mercy
and pity upon us. You have shown mercy to animals, as expressed through the prohibition
against slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day; have mercy and pity upon us.
Rabba said: How much does this rabbi know to appease the Lord, his Master! Abaye said to
him: Didn’t we learn in the mishna that they silence him?

The Gemara explains: And Rabba, too, held in accordance with this mishna but merely acted
this way because he wanted to hone Abaye’s intellect. Rabba did not make his statement to
praise the rabbi, but simply to test his nephew and student, Abaye, and to encourage him to
articulate what he knows about the mishna.

With regard to additions to prayers formulated by the Sages, the Gemara relates that a particular
individual descended before the ark as prayer leader in the presence of Rabbi Ḥanina. He
extended his prayer and said: God, the great, the mighty, and the awesome, the powerful, and
the strong, and the fearless.

5
When he finished, Rabbi Ḥanina said to him: Have you concluded all of the praises of your
Master? Even these three praises that we recite: The great, the mighty, and the awesome, had
Moses our teacher not written them in the Torah (Deuteronomy 10:17), and had the members
of the Great Assembly not come and incorporated them into the Amida prayer (see Nehemiah
9:32), we would not be permitted to recite them. And you went on and recited all of these. It
is comparable to a man who possessed many thousands of golden dinars, yet they were
praising him for owning a thousand silver ones. Isn’t that deprecatory toward him? All of the
praises one can lavish upon the Lord are nothing but a few silver dinars relative to many thousands
of gold dinars. Reciting a litany of praise does not enhance God’s honor.

Tangentially, the Gemara cites an additional statement by Rabbi Ḥanina, concerning principles of
faith. Rabbi Ḥanina said: Everything is in the hands of Heaven, except for fear of Heaven.
Man has free will to serve God or not, as it is stated:

‫שֵׁאל‬ֹ ,s‫ֶהי‬q‫ָמה ְיהָוה ֱא‬--‫ ִיְשׂ ָרֵאל‬,‫יב ְוַﬠָתּה‬ 12 And now, Israel, what doth the LORD thy God
s‫ֶהי‬q‫ ְיהָוה ֱא‬-‫ְל ִי ְרָאה ֶאת‬-‫ ִכּי ִאם‬:w‫ֵמִﬠָמּ‬ require of thee, but to fear the LORD thy God, to
-‫ ְוַלֲﬠֹבד ֶאת‬,‫ וְּלַאֲהָבה ֹאתוֹ‬,‫ְדּ ָרָכיו‬-‫ָלֶלֶכת ְבָּכל‬ walk in all His ways, and to love Him, and to serve
.s‫ַנְפֶשׁ‬-‫ וְּבָכל‬s‫ְלָבְב‬-‫ ְבָּכל‬,s‫ֶהי‬q‫ְיהָוה ֱא‬ the LORD thy God with all thy heart and with all
thy soul;
Deut:10:12

“And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God ask of you other than to fear the Lord your
God” The fact that God asks man to fear Him indicates that it is in man’s ability to do so.

The Gemara notes: This proves by inference that fear of Heaven is a minor matter, as the verse
is formulated as though God is not asking anything significant. Can it in fact be maintained that
fear of Heaven is a minor matter? The Gemara responds: Indeed, for Moses our teacher, fear of
Heaven is a minor matter. It is comparable to one who is asked for a large vessel and he has
one; it seems to him like a small vessel because he owns it. However, one who is asked for just
a small vessel and he does not have one, it seems to him like a large vessel. Therefore, Moses
could say: What does the Lord your God ask of you other than to fear, because in his eyes it was
a minor matter.

6
Rabbi Zeira said: One who repeats himself while reciting Shema and says: Listen Israel, listen
Israel, is like one who says: We give thanks, we give thanks.

The Gemara raises an objection: It was taught in a baraita: One who recites Shema and repeats
it, it is reprehensible. One may infer: It is reprehensible, but they do not silence him. The
Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This case, where one repeats Shema and it is reprehensible
but they do not silence him, is referring to one who recites and repeats each individual word.
In so doing, he ruins the recitation of Shema. However, that case, where Rabbi Zeira holds that
they silence one who repeats Shema, is referring to one who recites and repeats an entire verse,
as it appears that he is worshipping separate authorities.

Summary

Introduction1

This mishnah continues to identify heretical behavior. In yesterday’s mishnah we saw heretical
behavior involving what a person wears, be it clothing, footwear or tefillin. In today’s mishnah we
see heretical behavior involving things a person says while leading the prayers or translating the
Torah.

If one says, “May the good bless you,” this is the way of heresy.

The heresy here seems to be one of dualism. Saying “May the good bless you” sounds as if there
are two gods, one that governs the good and one that governs the bad. This was a common theology
at the time of the Mishnah, especially among groups dubbed “Gnostics” by modern scholars. The
rabbis were insistent that one God was responsible for both evil and good.

1
https://www.sefaria.org/Megillah.25a.2?lang=bi&p2=Mishnah_Megillah.4.9&lang2=bi&w2=English%20Explanation%20of%
20Mishnah&lang3=en

7
[If one says], “May Your mercy reach the nest of a bird,” “May Your name be mentioned
for the good,” “We give thanks, we give thanks,” they silence him.

There are three “heretical” saying in this mishnah. I’ll try to explain them one at a time.

The mishnah says that for each “they silence him.” This implies that the mishnah is describing one
who “passes before the ark,” meaning one who leads the Amidah prayer. If he tries to enter in one
of these prayers they remove him as prayer leader. ““May Your mercy reach the nest of a bird:”
This line is explained in the Talmud in several different ways. One is that he is complaining to
God saying, “Your mercy is on the nest of this bird” but not on me. God commanded shooing
away the mother bird before taking the young, an act of mercy for the mother (Deuteronomy 22:6).

The person praying complains that God has not shown similar mercy to him. A different
explanation is that this saying understands God’s commandments as being only about mercy, when
really they are decrees which we are to obey without questioning their reasoning. Another
explanation is that he says “Your mercy reaches only to this nest” but cannot extend any further.
In such a way he limits God’s power. “May Your name be mentioned for the good:”

This implies that God’s name should not be connected with the bad or the evil. As in the first
section, this might imply some sort of dualism we thank God for the good and don’t mention the
evil because its source is a different god. “We give thanks, we give thanks:”

Again the problem seems to be one of dualism giving thanks twice sounds like it is being given to
two different gods. However, in this section the dualism may not be of a good god and a bad god,
but simply two gods. There were ancient sects of Jews (including Christians) who while professing
monotheism, gave divine roles to other characters, such as God’s word (the Logos), God’s spirit
or Jesus.

One who uses euphemisms in the portion dealing with forbidden marriages, he is silenced.

Leviticus 18:7 says, “you shall not uncover the nakedness of your father.” If a person translates
this as “you shall not uncover the nakedness of his father,” in an attempt to use a more innocuous
third person, he is silenced. The translation of the Torah is to be literal, and even in the section
concerning forbidden relations.

If he says, [instead of] “And you shall not give any of your seed to be passed to Moloch,”
(Leviticus 18:21) “You shall not give [your seed] to pass to a Gentile woman,” he silenced
with a rebuke.

The Torah prohibits “passing one’s child to Moloch.” Some ancient translators understood this as
a prohibition against impregnating or having sexual relations with a Gentile (Aramean) woman or
perhaps against giving one’s child to a Gentile to raise. Since passing one’s child to Moloch is a
capital crime, this might imply that having sexual relations with is a capital crime. Therefore the
rabbis insisted upon a literal translation of the verse.

8
 "MAY THE GOOD BLESS YOU"
Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:2
The Mishnah states that one who says, "May the good bless You," acts in the manner of heretics.
What is considered heretical about praising Hashem by saying that the good ones should bless
Him?

RASHI explains that when one says, "Yevarechucha Tovim" -- "May the good bless You," he
implies that only Tzadikim are fit to bless Hashem, while Resha'im have no right to bless Him.
The Chachamim, however, teach that when we praise Hashem we must invite the Resha'im to join
us. This requirement is derived from the ingredients in the Ketores. Just as the Torah commands
that the Ketores include Chelbenah, a foul-smelling spice, Hashem requires that our Tefilah must
include the prayers of the sinners (Tefilah is compared to Ketores in Tehilim 141:2). We also
allude to this requirement when we hold the Arba'as ha'Minim on Sukos. While the Lulav,
Hadasim, and Esrog have either a nice smell, nice taste, or both, the Aravos have neither smell nor
taste, and thus they represent the Resha'im. Nevertheless, they must be included with all of the
other people in praising Hashem.

The heretics (Minim) maintained that Resha'im must be excluded from praising Hashem. The
Minim rejected the concept of Teshuvah and maintained that once a person sins, he is irrevocably
condemned and cannot participate in praising Hashem.

The TALMIDEI RABEINU YONAH in Berachos (34a) suggest a similar, but not identical,
explanation. They assert that the problem with saying, "May the good bless You," is not that the
statement implies that the Resha'im may not participate in praising Hashem due to the absence of
the concept of Teshuvah. Rather, it implies that the Resha'im are evil from their inception and thus
they do not have the ability to bless Hashem. This is the belief of the heretics who maintain that
man has no free will; an evil person was destined from birth to remain evil.

The RASHBA questions Rashi's explanation. A number of verses depict the praise of Hashem
sung by Tzadikim without Resha'im. "Yoducha Hashem Kol Ma'asecha, va'Chasidecha
Yevarechucha" -- "All Your works will thank You, Hashem, and Your righteous ones will bless
you" (Tehilim 145:10). Another verse says, "Ach Tzadikim Yodu li'Shmecha" -- "... but the
righteous will give thanks to Your name" (Tehilim 140:14; the Ibn Ezra and Radak write that the
word "but" specifically excludes Resha'im from praising Hashem!). These verses imply that the
statement that Tzadikim alone praise Hashem is justifiable.

Perhaps in the specific context of these verses it indeed is appropriate to say that only Tzadikim
praise Hashem. In the verse of "Yoducha Hashem...," the praise of "all Your works" is contrasted

2
https://dafyomi.co.il/megilah/insites/mg-dt-025.htm

9
with the praise of the Tzadikim. The verse says that "all Your works will [merely] thank You,"
and then it says, "but the Tzadikim will bless You [*even more*]."

Similarly, the verses which precede "Ach Tzadikim" discuss the punishment which Hashem will
bring upon the Resha'im while He protects the Tzadikim. The Tzadikim will give thanks to
Hashem for not being punished. Obviously, this statement is fitting only for the Tzadikim. In
contrast, a person who says "Yevarechucha Tovim" implies that the only ones who are ever fit to
praise Hashem are the "Tovim," which is incorrect.

TOSFOS explains that the word "Tovim" in the statement "Yevarechucha Tovim" may be
misunderstood to mean the "good powers" ("Elohim Tovim"), and it appears as though the person
is saying, "May the good powers bless you (my friend)." The belief in multiple deities clearly is
the way of the heretics.

The RAN says that "Tovim" does not refer to "the good people" but to "the people to whom
Hashem does good." When one says, "Yevarechucha Tovim," his statement means, "May those to
whom You do good bless You," which may be misinterpreted as an implication that there is one
power which bestows good and another power which is in control of evil, and the recipients of
good are able to bless only the power that bestows good. That was the philosophy of the heretics
who believed that there are two powers, one of good and one of evil.

The TALMIDEI RABEINU YONAH give another explanation. "Tovim" means "the people to
whom You have given plenty of food" and who are satiated, as in the verse, "v'Nisba Lechem
va'Niheyeh Tovim" -- "and we were satiated with bread and we had it all good" (Yirmeyahu 44:17).
The statement implies that the only one who needs to bless Hashem is he who is satiated with
blessing, which was the attitude of the heretics.

This explanation is particularly appropriate according to the Girsa of the RAMBAM in the
Mishnah. Instead of the words, "this is Derech ha'Minus," the Rambam's text reads, "this is Derech
ha'Tzedukim." The Tzedukim accepted only the literal interpretation of the verses in the Torah and
rejected the enactments of the Rabanan, including the enactment that one must recite Birkas
ha'Mazon after he eats even a k'Zayis or k'Beitzah of bread. The verse says, "v'Achalta v'Savata
u'Verachta" -- "You will eat, be satisfied, and bless" (Devarim 8:10), which the Tzedukim
misinterpret to mean that only one who is satiated is required to bless Hashem.

PITY ON THE MOTHER BIRD: ARE THERE REASONS FOR THE

MITZVOS?

The Mishnah states that one who says, "Hashem's mercy reaches the mother bird," must be
silenced. The Gemara explains (in the second reason) that this is because the Mitzvos are purely
Gezeiros, "heavenly decrees incumbent upon us to fulfill," and they are not given to us as
expressions of Hashem's mercy.

However, the Gemara in a number of places (see Yevamos 23a and elsewhere) quotes Rebbi
Shimon who explicitly states that all of the Mitzvos have reasons. Can the Mishnah here be
reconciled with the view of Rebbi Shimon?

10
(a) The RASHBA (Teshuvos 1:94), in a response to someone who offered an explanation for the
Mitzvah of Shilu'ach ha'Ken, writes that he doubts that anyone living in his generation is qualified
to offer a valid reason for this Mitzvah, as it contains many hidden elements of the Torah that no
one can fathom. The Rashba concludes that during the times of the Beis ha'Mikdash, when
Yerushalayim was a gathering place for prophets and scholars, the rationale for the Mitzvos was
readily accessible. Now that we are in exile, however, the gates of wisdom have been locked. All
Mitzvos must be performed regardless of whether or not we comprehend the reasons for them.

In a similar vein, the MAHARSHA in Berachos (33b) writes that although one may ponder the
reasons behind the Mitzvah of Shilu'ach ha'Ken, during its actual performance he should have in
mind that he is performing the Mitzvah as one performs all other Chukim -- exclusively to fulfill
Hashem's command.

The Maharsha apparently maintains that applying human logic to Chukim may corrupt the manner
in which the Mitzvah is performed. Support for the Maharsha's opinion may be found in the
Gemara in Sanhedrin (21b) which states that Shlomo ha'Melech's justification for his violation of
a Mitzvah in the Torah when he married the daughter of Pharaoh was his assumption that he
understood the motivation behind the prohibition. This incident teaches that one must exercise
caution and restraint when tempted to apply his own logic to determine the reasons for the Mitzvos.
(b) The RAMBAM in Moreh Nevuchim (3:26, 3:48) explains that the Gemara here indeed argues
with Rebbi Shimon and maintains that there are no fathomable reasons for the Mitzvos.
Nevertheless, the Rambam (end of Hilchos Temurah) writes that although one is obligated to
perform Mitzvos that have no apparent reason, it is nevertheless praiseworthy to offer appropriate
explanations for them.

Following the Rambam's approach, a number of Rishonim and Acharonim offer various reasons
for the Mitzvah of Shilu'ach ha'Ken. (The following discussion is based on Rabbi Naftali
Weinberger's book, SEFER SHALE'ACH TESHALACH, a comprehensive treatise covering
the laws and meanings of the Mitzvah of Shilu'ach ha'Ken.)

1. The RAMBAN (Devarim 22:6) explains that when the Gemara says that the reason behind the
Mitzvah of sending away the mother bird is not in order to have mercy, it means that it is not
Hashem's intent to have mercy on the bird. Rather, it is a "Gezeirah" (a decree upon us, for our
benefit) in order to inculcate the trait of mercy in us. One who accustoms himself to act with cruelty
to beasts becomes cruel by nature, even to people. This is also the approach of the SEFER
HA'CHINUCH (#545), ME'IRI (Berachos 33b), IBN EZRA, CHIZKUNI, and others.

2. RABEINU BACHYE (Devarim 22:7), the SEFER HA'CHINUCH, and

the RALBAG explain that while the Torah permits the consumption and utilization of birds, it
prohibits their complete extinction. To take the mother and her offspring simultaneously would be
tantamount to destroying the nest, which could be viewed as a step, albeit a small one, toward the
destruction of the entire species. Therefore, the Torah requires that the mother first be sent away
and then her offspring may be taken.

11
In reward for observing the Mitzvos and performing Hashem's will, Hashem will watch over us,
protect us, and grant us long life in this world and everlasting life in the World to Come.

3. The RAMBAM in Moreh Nevuchim compares the Mitzvah of Shilu'ach ha'Ken with the
prohibition of "Oso v'Es Beno" (Vayikra 22:28), which forbids the slaughter of an animal and her
offspring on the same day. The Rambam explains that both of these Mitzvos show that animals
have feelings towards their young, and those feelings must be respected. Maternal compassion is
not a logical emotion, but rather an inborn, instinctive one. Consequently, if the offspring is taken
in the presence of its mother, the mother naturally will suffer pain and anguish. The Torah therefore
instructs us to demonstrate compassion and to send the mother away before we take the eggs,
thereby sparing her the anguish of watching her offspring taken away.

This explanation of the Rambam seems to contradict the Mishnah here that says that we silence
one who says that Shilu'ach ha'Ken is done for reasons of compassion. The Rishonim and
Acharonim explain that the Rambam understands the Mishnah as a specific prohibition to say the
words, "Al Kan Tzipor Yagi'a Rachamecha," as a prayer. Making such a request from Hashem
through prayer gives the appearance as though this reason is the only one, while in truth there may
be many other explanations for the Mitzvah. However, to suggest compassion as one possible
rationale for the Mitzvah is surely permissible.

4. The Yerushalmi records an opinion (quoted in KOL ELIYAHU #17; see Yerushalmi Berachos
5:3, "Ad Kan Tzipor...") that asserts that the Mitzvah of Shilu'ach ha'Ken is not intended as an
expression of mercy for the mother bird at all. The mother bird certainly experiences pain when
sent away from her hatchlings. Rather, the Mitzvah is intended to involve a certain, limited degree
of cruelty.

The Zohar, as quoted by RABEINU BACHYE and TESHUVOS CHACHAM TZVI (#86), says
that when the mother bird cries for her hatchlings it arouses Hashem's mercy for his own children,
the Jewish people.

5. The ABARBANEL explains that even though one is prohibited from destroying objects that
bear fruit (Devarim 20:7), nevertheless one is permitted to eat the fruit. Similarly, one is prohibited
from harming the source of the hatchlings, the mother bird, yet one is permitted to consume her
offspring. When one spares the mother bird, he enables her to build another nest and to produce
additional offspring.

6. The CHASAM SOFER (Chulin 139b) explains that according to the Rambam (Hilchos
Shechitah 3:7) the reason for this Mitzvah is to ensure that a level of moral justice is maintained
in the world. When a mother bird stays behind to protect her young from a hunter, it is not morally
condonable that she should suffer harm as a result. Therefore, the hunter is not allowed to take
advantage of the mother's love for her young and capture the mother, but rather he must send her
away.

Similarly, the AVNEI NEZER explains that the reason why human beings are permitted to kill
animals is because Hashem created humans with intellect, and thus made them superior to animals.
However, a mother bird displays human-like emotions when she shows concern for her offspring

12
as a human does. In this respect, therefore, humans are not superior to animals; permission to kill
the animal is suspended when the animal displays an element of humanity. Therefore, a person
must send the bird away.

Although many Rishonim and Acharonim offer various explanations for the Mitzvah, they
nevertheless concede that Shilu'ach ha'Ken, like all other Mitzvos, incorporates many hidden parts
of the Torah and thereby renders a comprehensive understanding of it impossible. For example,
the BA'AL HA'AKEIDAH and the ABARBANEL both mention that the mother bird symbolizes
the human soul.

The Ramban (loc. cit.) quotes the SEFER HAKANAH (a very early work which discusses the
concept of hidden aspects of Torah, written by the Tana, Rebbi Nechunya ben Hakanah) which
also states that many secrets of the Torah are incorporated in this Mitzvah. He writes, for example,
that even the Mitzvah of Sukah is inherent in the Mitzvah of Shilu'ach ha'Ken. Rebbi Nechunya
ben Hakanah writes that since the reward attributed to this Mitzvah is so great, it must be that the
performance of Shilu'ach ha'Ken touches upon many other Mitzvos as well.

SILENCING ONE WHO MISINTERPRETS VERSES

The Mishnah states that one who is "Mechaneh b'Arayos" must be silenced. The Gemara explains
that this refers to one who says that the verse, "Do not uncover your father's nakedness" (Vayikra
18:7), is not to be taken literally but means that one should not reveal any disgraceful thing about
his father. Such a person must be silenced.

The Mishnah then states that one who says that the verse, "Do not give any of your children to be
passed through Molech" (Vayikra 18:21), means that one should not give his child to an Arami in
marriage (lest his children learn to worship idols such as Molech), must be silenced with
censure ("b'Nezifah").

Why in the second case does the Mishnah say that he must be silenced with censure, "b'Nezifah"?
In both cases, the person ascribes an improper meaning to a verse, as Rashi explains. In both cases,
the person attributes a Chiyuv Misah to an act for which there is no Chiyuv Misah. What, then, is
the difference between the two cases?

(a) Perhaps the difference is that in the second case, the person's interpretation of the verse of
Molech as a prohibition against giving his child to a Nochri in marriage seems reasonable. People
might accept his interpretation and be misled. They will think that such a transgression is
punishable with death, as giving one's child to a Nochri in marriage indeed is a severe
transgression. Therefore, he must be silenced with Nezifah. In contrast, in the first case, when the
person interprets the verse of Arayos as a prohibition against revealing the shame of one's father,
people will not accept his interpretation because it is unreasonable that revealing disgraceful
aspects of one's father should be punishable with death. Therefore, he must be silenced but not
with Nezifah.

13
(b) Some Rishonim disagree with Rashi's explanation of the Mishnah. Rashi understands that the
person's misinterpretation of the verse of Molech is a stringency -- the person attributes a Chiyuv
Misah to an act for which one is not Chayav Misah. According to other Rishonim, the person's
misinterpretation is a leniency. Since he is being lenient he must be silenced with Nezifah.
In what way does his misinterpretation of the verse result in a leniency? The ARUCH (Erech
"Aram") explains that by saying that the verse forbids marriage to an Arami, one prohibits marriage
only to a Nochri who worships Molech, such as an Arami, but he permits marriage to any other
type of Nochri.

RASHI on the Rif explains that by interpreting the verse as a prohibition against giving one's child
to an idol-worshipper in marriage because she will bear children and teach them to worship
Molech, one is saying that the prohibition applies only if the woman he marries is able to give
birth. This implies that if she is an older woman or unable to give birth for some other reason, he
is permitted to marry her. Therefore, he must be silenced with Nezifah.

(c) RABEINU CHANANEL and the RAMBAM (in Perush ha'Mishnayos) explain "Mechaneh
b'Arayos" differently. "Mechaneh" means that one alters the wording of the verse: he changes the
verse from "Do not uncover your father's nakedness (Ervas Avicha)" to "Do not
uncover his father's nakedness (Ervas Aviv)" in order to express the prohibition in a more polite
way. He must be silenced because if the Torah expresses the prohibition in a certain way, there
must be reasons behind it and no one is entitled to alter it.3

In that case, the change in the verse "Ervas Avicha" does not affect the Halachah, but only the
syntax of the verse. In the second case, the person's misinterpretation actually changes the
Halachah, and therefore he must be silenced with Nezifah.

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:

The Mishnah teaches that a number of seemingly innocuous expressions should be avoided. Here
are two examples:

• Yevarkhukha tovim – “Good people should bless You” – is seen as a form of heresy.

Rashi explains the heresy as stemming from the fact that we should be including all of the Jewish
people in praise of God, not merely good people.

The R”id, Rabbenu Yehonatan and others suggest that this teaching is based on the passage
in Sefer Yirmiyahu (44:17) from where we can see that tovim can be interpreted as seve’im –
satiated – and the heresy stems from the suggestion that only those people who are fully satisfied
need to bless God, while those less fortunate do not. Another approach is suggested by the Me’iri,

3
Their Girsa in the Gemara includes the extra word, as recorded in DIDUKEI SOFRIM, "Mishum Kalon Avicha," which implies
that Kalon Avicha ([preventing] the shame of your father) is the motivation for why he changes the verse, but it is not the change
itself.

14
who understood tovim to mean the angels – making the expression Yevarkhukha tovim mean that
only heavenly creatures praise God and, as such, removing Him from connection with this world.

• Al kan tzipor yagi’u rahamekha – “Your mercy should extend to the bird’s nest” – is a
statement that should not be said. (See Devarim 22:6 for the source of such a statement.)

Two reasons for this are posed by the Gemara. One suggestion is that this statement will create
envy among the creations, i.e. that it appears as though God shows favoritism to one creature over
the rest.

The other opinion in the Gemara is that one who says this is, in effect, suggesting that God’s
commandments are based on mercy, when, in fact, they are gezerot – laws whose reasoning is not
ours to understand. This statement, which appears to limit any study of te’amei ha-mitzvot (the
“taste of,” or reasoning behind, the commandments), is the subject of much discussion among
Jewish thinkers and philosophers. In response to this argument, the Me’iri, for example, explains
that the intent of the Gemara is not to deny the mercy of a given commandment; rather it is to
emphasize that the end goal is not God’s mercy in this case, but an educational goal of teaching us
mercy by means of performing this mitzvah.

The Yerushalmi suggests yet another approach – that this statement puts limits on God’s abilities
in that He shows mercy only to birds and similar creatures.

We often daven to Hashem and ask that we be granted fear of Heaven. For example, in
we beg, “May you set into our heart love and reverence for You.”4

Yet the Gemara clearly tells us: “Everything is in the hands of Heaven, except for the fear of
Heaven.” How, then, can we ask for something that is only in our own hands, and not in the hands
of Hashem?

Using an innovative interpretation, Chiddushei HaRim explains that prayer is always necessary to
access the multitude of gifts which Hashem showers upon us. It is our responsibility to ask for
health, peace and prosperity.

At that point, whether or not our prayers will be answered, and the degree to which we will find
favor in Hashem’s eyes, is totally “in the hands of Heaven.” We must do our part, and Hashem
determines everything else.

4
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Megilla%20025.pdf

15
However, in the realm of fear of Heaven, once we sincerely ask that our spirituality be increased,
this is something that Hashem is obliged to grant. This is what is meant when we say “fear of
Heaven is not in the hands of Hashem,” because once we yearn and strive to achieve it, Hashem
cannot withhold it from us.

Sefer HaChasidim (131) adds: “If a person asks for something in the realm of learning Torah
or anything in the area of spirituality, and he truly pours out his soul to beg for it, Hashem will
fulfill his request, even if he is otherwise unworthy.” When a person davens for physical
blessings, the request should be made in finite terms, because one can never be certain that his
desires are worthy.

However, when asking for blessings in spiritual endeavors, a person is assured that his goals are
favorable. Here, a person can ask for unlimited blessings, as the verse confirms (Tehillim 81:11),
“Open wide your mouth, and I will fill it.” This gesture is in reference to spiritual endeavors, and
Hashem promises that He will grant any heartfelt petition.

Finally, we find in the sefer “Sifsei Tzaddik” (Rosh Hashana, 8) where the author pointed out that
his grandfather always used to quote the words of the Zohar on the verse (Tehillim 84:6):
“Praiseworthy is the man whose strength is in You, those whose hearts focus on upwards paths.”
Here, we recognize that a person is at an advantage when his heart aims to achieve goals in the
area of the service of God, for this is the place where his desires will be met.

R’ Zeira said: One who says, “Shema - Shema” is like one who says, “Modim – Modim.”

Shulchan Aruch (1) rules that there is a prohibition against repeating the word, “Shema” as well
as against repeating the entire sentence entire sentence is repeated. There are two ways to
understand the second prohibition. One way is that the restriction is violated when a person reads
the entire verse and then repeats the entire verse. If he merely repeats each word as he reads the
pasuk (Shema – Shema, Yisroel – Yisroel, etc.), his behavior is improper, but he is not silenced.

The second understanding is that the restriction is to be understood the opposite way. It is only
when someone repeats the sentence word by word that he is silenced, as this is what is prohibited.
According to this, if he repeats the entire verse, although it is improper behavior, he does not have
to be silenced.

Rav Yechiel Michel Epstein (2), the Aruch HaShulchan, offers a rationalization for the improper
practice of the chazzan repeating words during the repetition on the amidah from our Gemara. Our
Gemara states that a person who repeats “Shema” is silenced, implying that one who repeats other
words does not have to be silenced.

Rav Moshe Shik (3), the Maharam Shik, derives the opposite conclusion from our Gemara. He
writes at length against the practice of repeating words during the chazan’s repetition, and he
presents five different arguments to support his opposition to the practice. One of his arguments is

16
that our Gemara prohibits the repetition of Shema and the same restriction applies to Shemoneh
Esrei whose words were carefully composed and counted by the Men of the great Assembly who
composed the prayers.

Additional reasons are suggested by other Poskim who oppose the practice. Teshuvas Ben Porat
(4) writes that the repeated words constitute an interruption in the prayer. Furthermore, if the
intention of the prayer is to direct one’s thoughts to Hashem and the chazzan has his attention
focused on his voice and singing the tune in a melodious fashion he undermines the necessary
intent of the prayer.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (5) also wrote in opposition to the practice.

Someone once asked the Divrei Torah of Munkatch, zt”l, “There appears to be a contradiction
between two statements of Chazal.

In Sukkah 52b, we find that every day a person’s evil inclination is strengthened and tries to kill
him by causing him to sin. Were it not for the help of Hashem, a person would be overcome. This
implies that main way to attain is through heavenly assistance.

In our daf Megillah 25a, however, Chazal tell us that everything is in the hands of heaven except
the fear of heaven. How can both statements be true?” The Rebbe explained, “The truth is that fear
of heaven is also in the hands of heaven. Hashem does not help us to achieve unless
we do our part. Doing our part means opening our hearts to the best of our ability.

The Midrash speaks of this on the verse in Shir Hashirim 5:2, ‘The voice of my Beloved knocks;
open to me my sister, my love…’ We must open our hearts— even if we only manage to open it
as wide as the eye of a needle, Hashem then helps us to attain .

The Rebbe continued, “But we still have free will. When we choose to make an effort to become
better, our evil inclination becomes stronger too. This is the meaning of the Gemara in Sukkah.
Chazal first state that every day one’s evil inclination becomes stronger; only then did they write
that if were not for Hashem helping, one would not succeed in overcoming one’s yetzer.
As one ascends, one needs more and more ‫! דשמיא סייעתא‬

17
The Rebbe of Sadigora, zt”l, explained this differently. “There are two separate statements being
said here. The first is that everything is in the hands of heaven. The second is that even worldly
and ‘external matters’ (matters of ) in which we are engaged, pursuits like our jobs, should
also flow from the inner state of yiras shamayim.

Julie Seltzer writes:5

The rabbis were, of course, extraordinarily familiar with Judaism’s sacred texts and therefore
aware that it’s not all puppies and roses. Our biblical heroes do not always act admirably, and some
narrative twists are not only not family friendly, they’re downright disturbing. Today’s page
addresses how much of this “dirty laundry” should be aired.

The Talmud discusses three categories of biblical text: sections that are read and translated,
sections that are read but not translated, and sections that are neither read nor translated. By “read,”
the Talmud means read out loud in a public forum. In ancient times, public Torah readings included
a meturgaman, a person who translated the Hebrew text into the vernacular. But according to the
rabbis, not every word of the Bible needs to be publicized to the masses.

The rabbis were not heavy censors. The first category, texts read aloud and translated, encompasses
almost everything in the Bible. But, the rabbis comment, some sections that are singled out for
public translation might have reasonably fallen into one of the more limited categories. One of
these is the story of creation. But isn’t it obvious, asks the Gemara, that creation should be read
out loud? What is the potential issue?

Lest you say that people will come to ask: What is above and what is below? What was before
creation and what is after?

The Talmud explains that we might have thought that translating this section would invite difficult
questions about the origins of the universe — questions that are better not asked. (Yes, despite
their enthusiasm for asking questions, the rabbis do have limits.)

Another example is the story, related in chapter 19 of Genesis, in which Lot’s daughters, having
witnessed the destruction of their home city and now hiding in a cave with no potential suitors,
have sexual relations with their father in a misguided effort to continue his lineage. One might
have thought that since Lot is Abraham’s nephew, the story would bring shame to the Jewish
patriarch. But the Talmud assures us that Abraham’s reputation is not soiled by association.

However, there’s no getting around the fact that the story of the Golden Calf does bring shame to
Israel. Nonetheless, it is both read and translated, despite this fact — at least in part. (The second
half of the story, in which Aaron recounts the events, is not translated.) Indeed, argues the Talmud,
we intentionally translate it so that our collective shame can lead to atonement.

5
Myjewishlearning.com

18
The second category comprises sections that are read out loud but not translated. One of these is
the story of Reuven, who has sex with his father’s concubine. A more surprising inclusion is the
priestly blessing. The Talmud explains that we do not translate the priestly blessing for fear that
listeners might interpret it as divine favoritism shown toward God’s chosen people. The rabbis
themselves may indeed have understood these verses as divine favoritism, but there’s no need for
other nations to resent the Jews for it.

The final category is sections that are neither read nor translated. The result is what we refer to as
a kri/ktiv — words in the Bible that are read (kri) differently than they are written (ktiv). Most of
these are grammatical in nature, such as a word written in the plural but read in the singular because
the latter simply makes more sense in context. (For example, Exodus 32:19 reads “[Moses] hurled
the tablets from his hand” which is changed, when read, to “from his hands.”) But some are words
that the rabbis considered too crude for the average ear. Torah readers may be familiar with some
of these examples, which are still adhered to, including replacing the word yishgalena (“he
revealed her”) with the more gentle yishkavena (“he slept with her”) (Deuteronomy 28:30) and
replacing the word afelim with tehorim, a more palatable term for hemorrhoids (Deuteronomy
28:27).

The rabbis seem to be implying that the better versed you are in the Bible, the less likely you are
to be offended by it. But they’re really protecting the text more than they’re protecting the people.
They see a danger in people jumping to conclusions about the whole while only having familiarity
with the part. And so instead of trusting that people can handle the truth, the rabbis fall back on
the idea of hamavin yavin: those who know, know. And those who don’t know, don’t need to.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:6

Our daf (Megillah 25a-b) contains two Mishnaic teachings that – on first glance - are
contradictory, while – at the same time - just one of these teachings is regularly cited as the basis
for educational policies in numerous schools and communities notwithstanding the fact that this
teaching is almost always misinterpreted.

We begin with the first teaching (Mishna Megillah 4:9) which states that ‫המכנה בעריות משתקין אותו‬
– ‘someone who deliberately misreads or who, instead of teaching verses literally, offers
euphemistic interpretations to Torah verses about forbidden (eg. incestuous) relationships should
be silenced’. As the Aruch explains, by doing so a person is being disingenuous about Torah
because they purport to say words of the Torah that Moshe Rabbeinu did not say.

Admittedly, such behaviour would be equally wrong when misreading or misinterpreting any verse
of the Torah. Nevertheless, as numerous commentaries point out, the Mishna specifically mentions
verses concerning forbidden relationships since there is a greater sense of unease felt by many
people in discussing these laws than necessarily any other laws in the Torah. Yet notwithstanding
this, from here we learn that we should approach and explain all the laws of the Torah honestly
and transparently.

6
www.rabbijohnnysolomon.com

19
Yet immediately following this, we are taught in a further Mishna (Mishna Megillah 4:10) that
‫‘ – מעשה ראובן נקרא ולא מיתרגם‬the episode of Reuven [who bedded Bilhah, his father’s concubine -
see Bereishit 35:22] is read but not translated’ – which is often mistaught to mean that there are
parts of the Torah which we should overlook, not address, not explain, and not translate.

However, what many people fail to quote is the words of the Mishna that immediately follow
these: ‫‘ – מעשה תמר נקרא ומיתרגם‬the story (told in Bereishit Ch. 38) of [Yehuda having sexual
relations with his daughter-in-law] Tamar [who he presumed was a prostitute] is read and
translated’. Of course, this then begs the question of why the former story is ‘read and not
translated’, while the latter is ‘read and translated’?

The answer, it seems, is that it was feared that a simple translation of the first story could lead to
a misunderstanding of what occurred between Reuven and Bilhah. Therefore, rather than
misrepresenting the story with a faulty translation, it was read in synagogue but not translated.
However, as no such fear existed for the story of Yehuda and Tamar, this story was both read and
translated.

What we see from here is that instead of the second Mishna justifying avoiding difficult biblical
stories, what it does is try and prevent those stories being mistaught and misrepresented. Still,
having explained this, two important points must be made. Firstly, even the verses involving
Reuven and Bilhah must be read out loud in a synagogue. What this means is that we don’t pretend
that events don’t occur even if there is some debate about how to interpret them. And secondly,
while the second Mishna refers to the Torah reading in a synagogue, no such limitation exists in
homes or in schools. As such, it is the responsibility of parents and educators to help their students
understand every word of the Torah including - and especially - those which are not sufficiently
explained and addressed elsewhere.

Censoring the Torah

Jeremy Brown writes:7

On our daf of Talmud is a discussion of how the person translating the Torah that was read out
loud should behave. There were, it turns out, portions that were not to be translated, because they
described episodes that were not particularly elevating.

‫ב‬,‫מגילה כה‬

‫מעשה ראובן נקרא ולא מתרגם ומעשה ברבי חנינא בן גמליאל שהלך )ואלו נקרין ולא מתרגמין )רעבד"ן סימן‬
‫לכבול והיה קורא חזן הכנסת ויהי בשכון ישראל ואמר לו למתורגמן )הפסק( אל תתרגם אלא אחרון ושיבחוהו חכמים‬

The Tosefta also states:

7
http://www.talmudology.com/

20
 And these sections are read but are not translated….The Tosefta states that the incident of
Reuben is read but not translated. And there was an incident involving Rabbi Ḥanina ben
Gamliel, who went to the village of Kavul, and the sexton of the synagogue was reading: “And
it came to pass, while Israel dwelt in that land, that Reuben went and lay with Bilhah, his
father’s concubine; and Israel heard of it” (Genesis 35:22). Rabbi Ḥanina said to the translator:
Stop, translate only the end of the verse. And the Sages praised him for this.

Another passage that is not to be translated is that of the Golden Calf:

‫ַמֲﬠֵשׂה ֵﬠֶגל ַהֵשּׁ ִני ִנְק ָרא ְול ֹא ִמַתּ ְרֵגּם‬. ‫ֵאיֶזה ַמֲﬠֵשׂה ֵﬠֶגל ַהֵשּׁ ִני — ִמן ״ַויּ ֹאֶמר ֹמֶשׁה״ ַﬠד ״ַוַיּ ְרא ֹמֶשׁה״‬

The second narrative of the incident of the Golden Calf is read but not translated. What is the
second narrative of the incident of the Golden Calf? Aaron’s account of what had taken place,
from “And Moses said to Aaron” (Exodus 32:21) until “And Moses saw” (Exodus 32:25).

Some holy words in the Torah are best left untranslated. It is an odd way of viewing what is, after
all, considered by traditional Judaism to be the word of God, but it is a view that goes back to the
Talmud itself. And it has some surprising modern correlates.

MODERN EXAMPLES OF CENSORING THE TORAH

In what is popularly called the Silberman English translation of Rashi published in London in1929,
the risque Rashis were not translated. But more recently the Jewish censorship of the Torah was
taken to a whole new level by the Hasidim of New Square in New York.

As David Assaf pointed out several years ago, the Hasidim of New Square published their own
version of the Torah, in which several sections are just missing. It was (not surprisingly) published
“for girls.”

21
22
Here, for example is the story of Lot and his daughters. You may recall that in the Torah, Lot’s
two daughters get Lot drunk and seduce him, committing a horrible act of incest. Twice. Here is
the story as told in the Torah:

‫בראשית יט‬: 29–38

( ‫ )לב( ְלָכה ַנְשֶׁקה ֶאת ָאִבינוּ ַי ִין‬.‫ ָכּל ָהָאֶרץ‬U‫לא( ַותּ ֹאֶמר ַהְבִּכיָרה ֶאל ַהְצִּﬠיָרה ָאִבינוּ ָזֵקן ְוִאישׁ ֵאין ָבָּאֶרץ ָלבוֹא ָﬠֵלינוּ ְכֶּדֶר‬
‫ )לג( ַוַתְּשֶׁקין ָ ֶאת ֲאִביֶהן ַי ִין ַבַּלּ ְיָלה הוּא ַוָתּב ֹא ַהְבִּכיָרה ַוִתְּשַׁכּב ֶאת ָאִביָה ְול ֹא ָיַדע ְבִּשְׁכָבהּ‬.‫ְו ִנְשְׁכָּבה ִﬠמּוֹ וּ ְנַחֶיּה ֵמָאִבינוּ ָזַרע‬
‫ )לד( ַו ְיִהי ִמָמֳּחָרת ַותּ ֹאֶמר ַהְבִּכיָרה ֶאל ַהְצִּﬠיָרה ֵהן ָשַׁכְבִתּי ֶאֶמשׁ ֶאת ָאִבי ַנְשֶׁקנּוּ ַי ִין ַגּם ַהַלּ ְיָלה וֹּבִאי ִשְׁכִבי ִﬠמּוֹ‬.‫וְּבקוָּמהּ‬
(‫ )לו‬.‫ )לה( ַוַתְּשֶׁקין ָ ַגּם ַבַּלּ ְיָלה ַההוּא ֶאת ֲאִביֶהן ָי ִין ַוָתָּקם ַהְצִּﬠיָרה ַוִתְּשַׁכּב ִﬠמּוֹ ְול ֹא ָיַדע ְבִּשְׁכָבהּ וְּבֻקָמהּ‬.‫וּ ְנַחֶיּה ֵמָאִבינוּ ָזַרע‬
‫ )לח( ְוַהְצִּﬠיָרה ַגם ִהוא‬.‫ )לז( ַוֵתֶּלד ַהְבִּכיָרה ֵבּן ַוִתְּקָרא ְשׁמוֹ מוָֹאב הוּא ֲאִבי מוָֹאב ַﬠד ַהיּוֹם‬.‫ַוַתֲּהֶרין ָ ְשֵׁתּי ְבנוֹת לוֹט ֵמֲאִביֶהן‬
‫ָיְלָדה ֵבּן ַוִתְּקָרא ְשׁמוֹ ֶבּן ַﬠִמּי הוּא ֲאִבי ְבֵני ַﬠמּוֹן ַﬠד ַהיּוֹם‬.

Thus it was that, when God destroyed the cities of the Plain and annihilated the cities where Lot
dwelt, God was mindful of Abraham and removed Lot from the midst of the upheaval. Lot went
up from Zoar and settled in the hill country with his two daughters, for he was afraid to dwell
in Zoar; and he and his two daughters lived in a cave. And the older one said to the younger,
“Our father is old, and there is not a man on earth to consort with us in the way of all the world.
Come, let us make our father drink wine, and let us lie with him, that we may maintain life
through our father.” That night they made their father drink wine, and the older one went in
and lay with her father; he did not know when she lay down or when she rose. The next day the
older one said to the younger, “See, I lay with Father last night; let us make him drink wine
tonight also, and you go and lie with him, that we may maintain life through our father.” That
night also they made their father drink wine, and the younger one went and lay with him; he
did not know when she lay down or when she rose. Thus the two daughters of Lot came to be
with child by their father. The older one bore a son and named him Moab;dAs though me-’ab
“from (my) father.” he is the father of the Moabites of today. And the younger also bore a son,
and she called him Ben-ammi; As though “son of my (paternal) kindred.” he is the father of the
Ammonites of today.

And here is the passage as printed in the Square Chumash for Girls:

23
Can you see what they did? The text jumps from 19:30 to chapter 20, skipping the eight verses
that describe the incestuous encounter.

Want another example? Ok, how about the passage in Genesis 38 that describes Yehudah’s
encounter with a prostitute, who turns out to be his daughter-in-law, who he then condemns to
death until she produces proof that Yehudah had in fact been the one to get her pregnant. It’s not
exactly material for young ears. So in Square, they censored it. As you can see below, their version
of the Torah for Girls jumps from chapter 37 straight to chapter 39. No prostitution here.

24
SILLY, OR EDUCATIONAL?

But before we condemn this as silly, let us pause for a minute. The rabbinic leaders in Square
(which, incidentally, is named after Skver or Skvyra, in present-day Ukraine) had a precedent from
today’s page of Talmud: the translator would just leave these passages untranslated. Of course,
then, the original text of the Torah was still being read out loud, but if no-one understood it (which
is why there needed to be a translator in the first place) that doesn’t really do very much.

If you are a parent or a grandparent or a teacher, would you choose to read these stories from the
Torah to your young charges? If not, why not? And if not, what’s wrong with not including them
in a children’s’ Torah? Perhaps, not very much.

Rambam Moreh Nevuchim 3:48

The same reason applies to the law which enjoins that we should let the mother fly away when
we take the young.

The eggs over which the bird sits, and the young that are in need of their mother, are generally
unfit for food, and when the mother is sent away, she does not see the taking of her young ones,
and does not feel any pain.

In most cases, however, this commandment will cause man to leave the whole nest untouched,
because [the young or the eggs], which he is allowed to take, are, as a rule, unfit for food. If the
Law provides that such grief should not be caused to cattle or birds, how much more careful
must we be that we should not cause grief to our fellowmen.

25
When in the Talmud (Ber. p. 33b) those are blamed who use in their prayer the phrase, "Thy
mercy extendeth to young birds," it is the expression of the one of the two opinions mentioned
by us, namely, that the precepts of the Law have no other reason but the Divine will. We follow
the other opinion.

Learning from God: The Interplay Between Prayer and Action

Rabbi Elie Kaunfer writes:8

The experience of saying the Amidah, the quintessential rabbinic prayer, 3 times a day, can be
exhausting. Even the most exciting parts of our liturgy can grow stale, not to mention those lines
to which we don’t connect at all. But perhaps a fresh look at a neglected phrase can breathe new
life into prayer.

Take, for instance, the beginning of the Amidah. After describing God as God of our ancestors,
we then recite this line of praise: ‫“ – האל הגדול הגבור והנורא‬the great, mighty and awesome God.”
On its face, this seems yet another attempt to heap adjectives of praise onto God. What, in fact, is
the difference between “mighty” and “great”? How can I possibly relate to God through these
words?

8
https://www.wexnerfoundation.org/parashat-ekev-learning-from-god-the-interplay-between-prayer-and-action/

26
This is an age-old problem. The Talmud (Bavli Megilah 25a) reports a story of a hazan who got
carried away at this point in the recitation of the Amidah, adding more adjectives to the line: “The
great, mighty, awesome, powerful, strong, courageous God.”
The Talmud reports: “Rabbi Haninah said to him: Have you exhausted all the possible praise of
your Master? Were it not that they were written by Moses in the Torah and affixed by the Men of
the Great Assembly, we would not even dare to utter those three[descriptions]! But you go on
adding all of these?! It may be compared to a human king who had thousands upon thousands of
gold coins, and people praised him for owning silver. Isn’t that a terrible degradation of him?”

Rabbi Haninah points to the futility of attempting to describe God. God cannot be captured through
language, so adding more adjectives won’t help. Why, then, do we bother at all? Rabbi Haninah
notes that the phrase in our Amidah is actually a quote from the Torah, from this week’s parsha:
Ekev. Had Moses not used these descriptions, we could not conceive of using any language to
describe God.

Recognizing that the Talmud was aware that the Amidah was alluding to the Biblical verse, it is
worth asking: what does “great, mighty and awesome God” mean in the original context? The full
text reads as follows:

“For God your God is the God of gods and the Lord of lords. The great, mighty, and awesome God
who shows no favor and takes no bribe; who does justice for the orphan and widow, and loves the
stranger, providing him with food and clothing – You too must love the stranger, for you were
strangers in the Land of Egypt” (Deuteronomy 10:17-19).

In the Biblical context, it is clear “great, might and awesome” refers to God’s justice. God is great
because God is fair and protects the weak. Not only that, but the Biblical text enjoins people to
follow in God’s ways: to be great, mighty and awesome by loving the stranger, just as God did.

I had occasion to think about this line in the amidah very intensely this summer. Together with
Wexner Graduate Fellowship alumni Ethan Tucker and Shai Held, I founded Yeshivat Hadar
(www.mechonhadar.org/Yeshivathadar), the first independent egalitarian intensive yeshiva in the
United States. Eighteen men and women, ages 21-28, spent 60 hours a week for eight weeks
learning Jewish texts, davening, and engaging in social action. Often, these activities can seem
atomized in our understanding of Jewish practice: either one studies, one prays, or one acts. But
as the Biblical intertext of this line in the Amidah demonstrates, these are not individual boxes to
check while moving through life. They make up a world, an integrated whole, in which each text
leads to prayer which leads to action, and reverse.

We just concluded our first summer, but already the students have pointed to the special character
of this world. As one put it: “I have had the opportunity to be a part of a spiritually rich community
that has helped me to achieve a deeper understanding of what it means to be both a human being

27
and member of a community as a Jew. Through our intense study, prayer, and social action, I feel
the infinite value of being truly present in the moment has been perpetually revealed. My
experience has ultimately shone light on the oneness of Torah and Action.”

It is my prayer that when saying the Amidah, we will be able to experience the confluence of
prayer, study and action implied by the words: “great, mighty and awesome.

Birds of Praise

A meditation on winged creatures, mercy, and duty

RICHARD HIDARY writes:9

Before the siddur became a fixed text, the hazan leading the community prayer would choose from
various liturgical traditions or improvise wording of his own. The Rabbis therefore listed several

9
https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/birds-of-praise

28
prohibited payers lest a rogue or sectarian prayer leader insert a heretical belief into the liturgy.
Mishnah Berakhot 5:3 thus legislates:

While these praises may seem innocent enough, the last two indicated dualistic beliefs in late
antique circles widely influenced by Gnosticism. A double “we thank,” more than a mere stutter,
is suspect of offering gratitude to both the good and evil divine beings. Praising God only for the
good He performs suggests that a rival being causes bad events in the world. As strict monotheists,
the Rabbis are always careful to praise God for loss as much as for gain, for an ominous sunset as
much as for a hopeful sunrise.

The Talmud, however, questions what is wrong with praising God’s mercy over a bird’s nest. After
all, Deuteronomy 22 commands: “Do not take the mother together with her young. Shoo the
mother away and then take only the young.”

The Bavli offers two explanations for the Mishnah’s prohibition to reference this law in praising
God’s mercy:

The first response, in the name of one of the sages from the land of Israel, explains that singling
out the mercy God shows for the birds may give the impression that He does not feel the same
compassion over other animals for whom this law does not apply.

While the Bavli formulates this idea by personifying the animals as feeling jealousy, the
Yerushalmi includes a similar explanation that this hazan “is like one who reproaches God’s traits
saying, ‘Your mercy reached a bird’s nest, but Your mercy did not reach so-and-so.’” In other
words, the human petitioner himself is the creature who feels jealous over God’s care for birds
over his own human needs. His praise encodes an irreverent backhanded jab at God’s unjust and
indifferent treatment of people in need.

The Yerushalmi records a fascinating variant formulation of this teaching: this hazan “is like one
who limits God’s attributes saying, ‘Your mercy reaches only to a bird’s nest’” but not beyond.
All of the explanations so far agree that the commandment to shoo away the mother bird stems
from God’s compassion, but that using this as a basis of liturgical praise is inappropriate because
it falls short of incorporating God’s mercy for all creatures.

The second response in the Bavli, also paralleled in the Yerushalmi, argues more fundamentally
that one may not describe God as merciful at all because that presumes too much about God’s
nature. All we can say is that He acts as He decrees according to His will. This, however, is

29
astonishing considering the many forms of praise of God as Merciful in the mouths of everyone
from Moses to my grandmothers. Why would the Talmuds consider problematic a praise of God’s
mercy inspired by the law of shooing away the mother bird?

Rashi’s commentary here has informed generations of committed Jews regarding blind observance
of mitzvot:

Rashi generalizes from this one Mishnah that mitzvot have no inherent purpose other than to
express and deepen subservience to God. By contrast, Rashbam (Rashi’s grandson) lists this
commandment as one of a trio with “Do not slaughter an animal and its young on the same day,”
and “Do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk,” to protect intergenerational destruction at the three
stages of trapping, slaughtering, and cooking. Along the same lines, Maimonides argues that these
commandments are all rooted in instilling ethical sensibilities for the feelings of birds and animals;
he therefore favors the first opinion in the Bavli.

Perhaps, however, the Bavli’s second opinion actually encodes a much deeper message, not about
the lack of reasons for commandments as Rashi writes, but about the roles of God and humans in
the world. Considering that the Mishnah banned the other two formulas because they promote
dualistic beliefs, it stands to reason that praising God’s mercy for birds also challenges a
monotheistic viewpoint. If God shows compassionate over birds, then who created the violence
embedded in the food chain that governs the rest of nature? Why would a merciful God allow a
chicken’s egg to fall prey to a fox?

The Bavli’s second opinion finds theological safety in saying God’s ways are neither merciful nor
malicious but simply inscrutable decrees. Strict monotheism requires that the Creator of light and
good must also have created darkness and evil. Precisely for this reason, the Torah teaches that the
job falls to human beings to bring order and justice to the chaotic violence in the world. When
anarchy and entropy threaten destruction and suffering, we humans are called upon to infuse it
with goodness, compassion, and respect for all life.

All opinions of the Talmud thus agree that the goal of the law to send away the mother bird is for
us to show compassion to this species of living beings. Under dispute is only why it is problematic
to mention this law of birds as praise. The first set of opinions argues that such praise falls short
in that it limits the extent of God’s infinite mercy. The second opinion worries that such praise
goes too far because it implies that all good in the world comes from God, but its imperfections
and built-in brutality derive from an opposing primordial force.

For the first opinion, humans emulate God’s merciful attribute as assistants to enact His good will
in the world. For the second, the ultimate responsibility to maintain order in the world and mercy
over all of life falls squarely on human beings, commanded to do so by an omnipotent, unique, but
therefore morally nondescript Creator. This insistence on God’s absolute unity paradoxically
engenders a radically humanist moral obligation.

30
 When Rambam Met the Izhbitser Rebbe: Response to a Straussian
Reading of Hilkhot Teshuvah

Bezalel Naor writes:10

The renowned German Jewish scholar Leo Strauss revolutionized intellectual history when he
published in 1952 his book Persecution and the Art of Writing. Strauss made the bold claim that
some of our great authors wrote on two levels within the same work. For the masses, they wrote
on the exoteric level, but they tucked away another, esoteric level available only to the cognoscenti,

10
https://thelehrhaus.com/scholarship/when-rambam-met-the-izhbitser-rebbe-response-to-a-straussian-reading-of-hilkhot-
teshuvah/

31
and it is the latter level that contains their true opinion. The three paradigms Strauss provided are
three of Judaism’s greatest thinkers: Judah Halevi, Maimonides, and Spinoza.

A decade later, in 1963, the University of Chicago Press published an edition of Maimonides’ The
Guide of the Perplexed containing Shlomo Pines’ English translation of the Arabic, and a
sprawling introductory essay by Strauss, “How To Begin To Study The Guide of the Perplexed,”
employing his hermeneutic. As this edition became the standard English edition of the Guide, it
certainly contributed to the mainstreaming of Strauss’ ideas.

Forty years after the appearance of Strauss’ seminal work, another Maimonidean scholar, Bezalel
Safran, offered an application of Strauss’ method to Maimonides’ halakhic work, Mishneh Torah.
Safran’s article, “Maimonides on Free Will, Determinism and Esotericism,”[1] attempts to
demonstrate that not only in the philosophic work, Guide of the Perplexed, did Maimonides write
for two very different audiences, but in the Commentary to the Mishnah and in Mishneh Torah as
well.[2]The departure point for the discussion is the perhaps enigmatic passage in Mishneh
Torah, Hilkhot Teshuvah [Laws of Return] 6:4, which dwells on King David’s guilt-ridden
spiritual struggle with sin. The paragraph reads (in Safran’s translation):

Safran argues that this paragraph flies in the face of the preceding paragraph. Whereas what
precedes forcefully argues for free will, this paragraph—when decoded by utilizing Straussian
cryptology—sends the exact opposite message of determinism. But again, this true opinion of
Maimonides is privileged information reserved for the elite, of which there were very few, even
among Maimonides’ rabbinic peers.[4]

Safran puzzles over the fact that three times in the single paragraph of Hilkhot Teshuvah 6:4
Maimonides repeats the term “derekh ha-emet” (the Way of Truth). For Safran, this is more than
just a terminus technicus; this is the proverbial smoking gun. “The Way of Truth” is a term loaded
with esoteric significance.

After noting the term’s earlier appearance in Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 1:3, Safran traces it back to its
biblical root in Genesis 24:48, where Abraham’s servant Eliezer expresses gratitude to God “who
guided me on a Way of Truth (derekh emet) to take the daughter of my master’s brother for his
son.”[5] And just as in the context of Rebekah’s marriage to Isaac, the gist is clearly deterministic,
so too in Maimonides’ lexicon, the “Way of Truth” harbors an esoteric truth, whereby the patina
of man’s free will is peeled away to reveal the reality of divine preordination.

32
This is the secret message that Safran has unpacked from the passage in Hilkhot Teshuvah: King
David was praying for some sort of epiphany by which there would be revealed to him that his sin
with Bathsheba was in reality engineered from Above, and that he was, so to speak, merely a pawn
on a divine chessboard.[6]

The author of the article finds confirmation for his theory that in truth Maimonides subscribes to
determinism, in a self-declaredly esoteric passage in the earlier Commentary to the Mishnah, Rosh
Hashanah 1:2. There, Maimonides writes concerning the judgment meted out to earth’s
inhabitants on the New Year:

There too, Safran assumes that Maimonides alludes to his deterministic theory, in direct opposition
to what he writes elsewhere in his Commentary to the Mishnah. The entire final chapter of
the Shemonah Perakim/Eight Chapters, Maimonides’ introduction to Avot, champions man’s free
will.

By the time Safran concludes his study of Maimonides, the reader is nudged to the realization that
Maimonides’ true opinion is not so far removed from (though not identical with) the philosophy
of Rabbi Mordecai Joseph Leiner (the Rebbe of Izbica), famously typecast by Joseph Weiss as
“religious determinism.”[8]

Let us attempt to deconstruct Safran’s argument and offer a counter-interpretation of the

Maimonidean texts.

First, while in principle I do not find objectionable Safran’s method of searching for biblical
precedent to Maimonides’ lexicology, I do find it highly unlikely that a term as generic and
sweeping as “the Way of Truth” must be reduced to the rather unique situation of Eliezer’s
experience in searching for a spouse to suit Isaac.[9]

Besides the impracticality of subordinating every occurrence of the term “the Way of Truth” in
Maimonides’ oeuvre to Eliezer’s narrative,[10] it just so happens that Maimonides penned a
responsum in which he disabuses the questioner of the notion that marriages are divinely
preordained. The upshot of Maimonides’ response is that in general, matches are not made in
heaven but on earth; only in isolated instances is there divine orchestration. (Though one may wish
to argue that in Maimonides’ estimation his addressee, Obadiah the Proselyte, was not worthy of
being privy to Maimonides’ true opinion on the matter, the effusive praise that Maimonides heaps
upon his correspondent would seem to indicate otherwise.)

So germane is this responsum to our discussion that it bears reproduction here (in my translation):

33
Question: Regarding [the statement] “All is in the hands of heaven except for the fear of
heaven.”[11]

Answer: Regarding that which you said, that all of mankind’s deeds are not decreed beforehand
by the Creator. That is the impeccable truth, and therefore reward is given if one goes on a good
way, and punishment is exacted if one goes on a bad way. All mankind’s deeds come under the
rubric of “fear of heaven,” for in the final analysis, all mankind’s deeds produce either
[fulfillment of] a commandment or a sin. When the Rabbis, of blessed memory, said, “All is in
the hands of heaven,” [they were referring to] the natural order of the world, such as species of
trees and wildlife, and the science of the heavenly spheres, and the angels. We have already
expanded on this subject in the commentary to Tractate Avot,[12] and brought proofs. Also at the
beginning of the magnum opus which we composed of all the commandments.[13]

Whoever leaves behind the things we explained, that are constructed upon the foundations of
the world, and sets out to seek in a haggadah or midrash, or in the words of one of the Geonim,
of blessed memory, a single word that would refute our words, words of knowledge and
understanding—is committing suicide, and what he has wreaked to himself is sufficient
[punishment].

This [saying] that your Rabbi quoted to you, “[A heavenly voice goes out, saying:] ‘The daughter
of so-and-so [is destined to be wed] to so-and-so.’”[14] If it applies universally to all, and is to be
taken literally, then why does it state in the Torah, “[Who is the man who has betrothed a woman
and not married her? Let him go and return to his house,] lest he die in battle and another man
marry her”?[15] Is there in the world a rational person who would entertain doubt in this matter
after what is written in the Torah? Rather it is worthy for one who is understanding and whose
heart is prepared to adopt the Way of Truth (derekh ha-emet),[16] that he make this matter
explicit in the Torah the fundament and the foundation, so that the building not collapse and
the tent-peg not come loose. And if one finds a verse in the Prophets or a maxim of the Rabbis,
of blessed memory, that assails this fundament and tears down this premise, let one seek out
with the mind’s eye until one has understood the words of the prophet or the sage. If their words
are found compatible with that made explicit in the Torah, good! And if not, let one say that: “I
do not know the words of this prophet or this sage. They are esoteric and not literal.”

That which the sage said, “The daughter of so-and-so [is destined to be wed] to so-and-so,”
refers to the way of reward or the way of punishment. If this man or this woman performed a
commandment for which the proper reward is a harmonious marriage, then the Holy One,
blessed be He, matches them together. And by the same token, if their due punishment is an
acrimonious marriage, He matches them. This is akin to the saying of the Rabbis, of blessed
memory: “If there be but one mamzer (male bastard) at one end of the world, and but
one mamzeret (female bastard) at the other end of the world, the Holy One, blessed be He, brings
them together and matches them.”[17] This does not apply universally to all, rather to those
deserving of reward or punishment, as is just in the eyes of God.

34
All these matters are built upon what we explained in the Commentary to the Mishnah, Avot, as
you understood. You are a great wise man and you have an understanding heart by which you
understood the things and knew the straight way.

Moses ben Maimon [18]

It would be difficult to imagine that Maimonides was posturing in this responsum, while truly
subscribing to a determinist philosophy. The responsum is a forthright presentation of
Maimonides’ firm belief in free will as opposed to predestination. It sums up what has been
elucidated previously in the Commentary to the Mishnah and Mishneh Torah. As for the
recipient’s intellectual acumen, Maimonides closes by saying: “You are a great wise man and you
have an understanding heart by which you understood the things and knew the straight way.”

And then there is the passage in the Commentary to the Mishnah, Rosh Hashanah, which alludes
to some esoterica. Safran believes that the allusion is to a theory of determinism. However, it is
much more likely that the issue at stake is not determinism versus free will, but rather general
divine supervision (hashgahah kelalit) versus individual divine supervision (hashgahah
peratit).[19]

The verse from Psalms 33:15 adduced by the Mishnah, “Who forms together their heart, Who
understands all their deeds,” follows on the heels of the previous verse: “From the place of His
habitation He supervised (hishgiah) all the inhabitants of the earth.” And our own verse
of Psalms 33:15 is quoted by Maimonides in the Guide III, 17 in his discussion of this very issue
of individual divine providence (see Pines ed., p. 472).

One might counter that unlike the doctrine of determinism, there is nothing esoteric about the
doctrine of hashgahah peratit or individual providence. Not so fast! What Maimonides dispenses
in the very next chapter of the Guide (III, 18) eminently qualifies as “esoterica.” I am referring to
Maimonides’ belief that there are degrees of providence commensurate with how intently one
focuses one’s mind on the divine. Those whose intellects are riveted to the divine merit more
divine supervision; those easily distracted receive less divine attention. How do I know that
Maimonides considers this topic esoteric? He says so explicitly:

A most extraordinary speculation has occurred to me just now through which doubts may be
dispelled and divine secrets[20] revealed. We have already explained in the chapters concerning
providence[21] that providence watches over everyone endowed with intellect proportionately to
the measure of his intellect. Thus providence always watches over an individual endowed with
perfect apprehension, whose intellect never ceases from being occupied with God. On the other
hand, an individual endowed with perfect apprehension, whose thought sometimes for a certain
time is emptied of God, is watched over by providence only during the time when he thinks of
God; providence withdraws from him during the time when he is occupied with something else.[22]

Let us summarize our findings:

35
Safran suggests that the paragraph in Hilkhot Teshuvah 6:4 possesses an esoteric meaning: David
is aspiring to a level of esoteric knowledge, to an epiphany, whereby it will be revealed to him that
his misdeeds were movements in a divine symphony. But it is possible that there is nothing esoteric
about this paragraph at all. David prays that on account of his grievous misdeeds he not be barred
from the Way of Return (Teshuvah), as were some of the most vile miscreants in human history
discussed in the previous halakhah (the prime example being the Pharaoh of the Exodus). This is
the straightforward reading of the halakhah.

Whatever “the Way of Truth” signifies for Maimonides, we shall not find the answer in the
peroration of Eliezer servant of Abraham. Maimonides’ opening categorical statement—“Free will
is bestowed on every human being. If one desires to turn towards the good way and be righteous,
he is at liberty to do so; and if one wishes to turn towards the evil way and be wicked, he is at
liberty to do so.”[23]—was never intended as a useful, provisional belief to be discarded upon
attaining philosophic maturity. And it is well-nigh inconceivable that Maimonides—like later the
Izhbitser Rebbe—was a religious determinist.

[1]
Published in Porat Yosef: Studies Presented to Rabbi Dr. Joseph Safran, ed. Bezalel Safran and Eliyahu Safran (Hoboken, New
Jersey: Ktav, 1992), pp. 111-128.

[2]
Actually, Strauss had already extended his method to Mishneh Torah. See L. Strauss, “Notes on Maimonides’ Book of
Knowledge,” in Studies in Mysticism and Religion Presented to Gershom G. Scholem (Jerusalem, 1967), pp. 269-283. Safran credits
Prof. Arthur Hyman with reminding him of this article, “a pioneering mode of esoteric reading of Mishneh Torah” (Safran, p. 127,
n. 27).

[3]
Safran, p. 112.

[4]
After positing that the two halakhot (Hil. Teshuvah 6:3 and 6:4) are contradictory (a supposition that I reject), Safran chalks up
the contradiction to Maimonides’ “seventh cause” in the Introduction to The Guide of the Perplexed: “In speaking about very
obscure matters it is necessary to conceal some parts and to disclose others… In such cases the vulgar must in no way be aware of
the contradiction; the author accordingly uses some device to conceal it by all means” (Pines ed., p. 18). Maimonides goes on to
say: “Divergences that are to be found in this Treatise are due to the fifth cause and the seventh” (ibid., p. 20).

[5]
Though nowhere in the story (Genesis 24) is the servant of Abraham named “Eliezer,” I follow Maimonides’ lead
in Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 11:4 where the protagonist of the story is referred to as “Eliezer ‘eved Avraham” (“Eliezer servant of
Abraham”).

[6]
See Avodah Zarah 4b-5a. Rashi (ibid., s.v. lomar lekha) writes: “It was the decree of the King” (“Gezeirat melekh hi”). Quoted
by Safran, p. 124, n. 17.

Safran’s reading of the halakhah in Maimonides is most reminiscent of a passage in the writings of Rabbi Zadok Hakohen
[Rabinowitz] of Lublin: “The main Return (Teshuvah) is [not accomplished] until the Lord will enlighten his eyes, [whereby] the
sins become merits, which is to say, that he will recognize and understand that whatever sin he committed was also the will of the
Lord, blessed be He…” (Zidkat ha-Zaddik [Lublin, 1913], par. 40 [6a]). Rabbi Zadok was the eminent disciple of Rabbi Mordecai
Joseph Leiner of Izbica (author of Mei ha-Shilo’ah).

For a discussion of Rabbi Zadok’s determinism as well as that of Rav Kook, see my article, “‘Zedonot Na‘asot ke-Zakhuyot’ be-
Mishnato shel Harav Kook” (“‘Sins Become as Merits’ in the Philosophy of Rav Kook”), in Ofer ha-Ayyalim: Sefer Zikaron le-
ha-Kadosh Ofer Eliyahu Cohen, ed. Dani Kokhav (Koch) (Jerusalem, 1994), pp. 299-312.

36
[7]
Safran’s English translation (pp. 119-120), based on Kapah’s Hebrew translation from the Arabic, in his edition of Mishnah ‘im
Peirush Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Jerusalem, 1965).

[8]
See Safran, p. 125, n. 21. In that same endnote, “another great determinist, Hasdai Crescas” is referenced.

[9]
When I read Rabbi Abraham Maimonides’ commentary to the story of Abraham’s servant and Rebekah, at first blush it seemed
to confirm Safran’s contention that “the Way of Truth” is at the very least a terminus technicus in the Maimonidean lexicon of both
father and son. In his commentary to Genesis 24:7, s.v. malakho, Rabbi Abraham Maimonides writes:

Praised be the one who has guided us in the Way of Truth (be-derekh ha-emet) to every correct and fine reason, whose end is
beyond our intellect, by opening [for us] a gate to what is written in the Torah. (Peirush Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha-Rambam ‘al
Bereishit u-Shemot, ed. Wiesenberg [London: L. Honig & Sons, 1958], p. 54)

One who reads the Hebrew translation might think that Rabbi Abraham Maimonides embedded the Hebrew words “be-derekh ha-
emet” in his Judeo-Arabic statement (especially because of its close proximity to Abraham’s servant’s utterance some verses later).
However, if one consults the Judeo-Arabic (provided in that edition), one is in for a surprise. The phrase “in the Way of Truth”
simply does not occur! In the Judeo-Arabic (f.14r. of the Oxford ms.; p. 55 of the London edition) the phrase reads tout court:
“Praised be the one who has guided us to every correct, fine reason…”

This was confirmed for me by my dear friend Rabbi Moshe Maimon, who is in the process of preparing for publication a new
Hebrew translation of Abraham Maimonides’ commentary to the Pentateuch. (The Oxford manuscript, Huntington 166, is a
unicum.)

Evidently, the translator (according to the introduction of the publisher, Rabbi Solomon Sasoon, the Book of Genesis was translated
by Hakham Yosef ben Salah Dori, and the Book of Exodus by Rabbi Efraim Yehudah Wiesenberg), took the literary license of
adding the flourish “be-derekh ha-emet” (the Way of Truth) to Rabbi Abraham Maimonides’ statement of gratitude, perhaps in
emulation of Abraham’s servant’s peroration a few verses later.

[10]
Unnoted by Safran, the term “derekh ha-emet” (“the Way of Truth”) occurs also in Hilkhot Teshuvah 4:2.

[11]
Berakhot 33b, Megillah 25a, Niddah 16b.

[12]
Maimonides’ Introduction to Tractate Avot, Shemonah Perakim (Eight Chapters), chap. 8; and Avot 1:13 (Kapah ed., p. 271),
3:18, 19 (Kapah ed., pp. 284-285), 4:28 (Kapah ed., p. 295).

[13]
While the editor Joshua Blau is certainly correct that the reference is to Mishneh Torah and not Sefer ha-Mitzvot, he mistakenly
directs the reader to the beginning of Hilkhot De‘ot, while the proper address is chapters 5-6 of Hilkhot Teshuvah. See Yitzhak
Shilat (Greenspan), Igrot ha-Rambam, vol. 1 (Jerusalem, 1995), p. 236, n. 15.

[14]
Sotah 2a; Mo‘ed Katan 18b.

[15]
Deuteronomy 20:7. In the final chapter of Shemonah Perakim (Kapah ed., p. 262), Maimonides marshals a different proof that
marrying a certain woman cannot be divinely ordained but must rather be a matter of choice: Marriage is a mitzvah and God does
not preordain that one perform a commandment. Cf. Sefer ha-Mitzvot, positive commandment 213; Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot
Ishut 1:1-2; and Abraham Maimonides’ responsum in Birkat Avraham, ed. Baer Goldberg (Lyck, 1859), no. 44. (However,
Rabbeinu Asher disagrees with Maimonides. For Rabbeinu Asher, only procreation [periyah u-reviyah] is a mitzvah; marriage per
se is not a mitzvah. See Rabbeinu Asher, Ketubot 1:12 [Ketubot 7b].)

[16]
Yitzhak Shilat is convinced that unlike the vast majority of Maimonides’ responsa which were penned in Arabic, the responsa
to Obadiah the Proselyte were written in Hebrew. Assuming that Shilat is correct in his pronouncement, and the term “derekh ha-
emet” in our responsum is Maimonides’ own language and not a translation, we are certainly justified in making capital of the
expression. Clearly, within the context of the responsum, “the Way of Truth” lies on the side of free will and not on the side of
causality. See Yitzhak Shilat, Igrot ha-Rambam, vol. 1, p. 231.

37
[17]
Yerushalmi Kiddushin 3:12; Genesis Rabbah 65:2.

[18]
Teshuvot ha-Rambam, ed. Joshua Blau, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Mekitzei Nirdamim, 1960), no. 436 (pp. 714-716).

[19]
See Rabbi Yom Tov Lipmann Heller, Tosefot Yom Tov to Rosh Hashanah 1:2, and Rabbi Samuel Edels, Hiddushei
Aggadot, Rosh Hashanah 18a, s.v. ke-ma‘alot Beit Horon.

[20]
The Hebrew translators (Ibn Tibbon, Kapah, Schwarz) render this: “sodot elohiyim.”

[21]
Guide III, chaps. 17 and 18.

[22]
Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed III, 51 (Pines ed., pp. 624-625). Various commentators of the Guide grapple
with the problem of why the rehashing of this doctrine in chapter 51 is considered by Maimonides more wonderful than its earlier
presentation in the “Pirkei ha-Hashgahah” (i.e., chapters 17-18). See, e.g., Kapah’s translation of Moreh ha-Nevukhim (Jerusalem:
Mossad Harav Kook, 1977), p. 408, n. 75.

One notes with interest that Nahmanides, the great medieval representative of the kabbalistic tradition, quotes approvingly this
novel doctrine of the Guide. See Nahmanides’ commentary to Job 36:7; in Kitvei Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nahman, ed. C.B. Chavel
(Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1968), vol. 1, pp. 108-109; and in the new Sefer Iyov ‘im Peirush ha-Ramban, ed. Yehudah Leib
Friedman (Israel: Feldheim, 2018), pp. 451-458.

[23]
Maimonides, Hilkhot Teshuvah 5:1 (Moses Hyamson translation).

It’s for the Birds – The Mitzvah of Shiluach Hakein

38
Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff writes:11

Question #1: Required???

"Must I physically send away the mother bird? I am squeamish!"

Question #2: Keep the Babies

"Must I take the young to fulfill the mitzvah?"

Question #3: Educated!

"I am so excited about the opportunity to fulfill this special mitzvah, with all its rewards, but I
want to make sure I do it properly. Can you please enlighten me?"

Well known and poorly understood

The Torah teaches that when we happen to find a nest of birds, we are to send away the mother
and keep the young; that is, either the baby birds or the eggs. An entire chapter of Mishnah and
Gemara, the twelfth and last perek of Chullin, is devoted to understanding this mitzvah, which
actually involves two mitzvos, a lo saaseh, a prohibition against taking the mother, and a mitzvas
aseih, a positive mitzvah to send away the mother. At the same time, the Torah itself teaches of a
very specific reward gained by someone who observes this mitzvah. We will therefore begin the
study of this fascinating mitzvah in this article.

Let us rephrase briefly the first two of our opening questions:

1. Should I find such a nest, may I simply ignore it and continue on my way, or is doing so
ignoring a requirement to fulfill a mitzvah?

2. "Must I take the young to fulfill the mitzvah?" When I send away the mother bird, am I
required to keep the young, or, at least, to physically lift up the eggs or baby birds, thereby taking
possession of them? Or have I completed the performance of the mitzvah simply by sending
away the mother?

Introduction:

At this point, we should read the words of the Torah very carefully, because answering some of
our questions will depend on properly understanding these words.

11
https://www.yeshiva.co/midrash/42839

39
Ki yikarei kan tzipor lefanecha baderech, bechol eitz oh al ha’aretz, efrochim oh beitzim,
veha’eim rovetzes al ha’efrochim oh al habeitzim, lo sikach ha’eim al habanim. Shalei’ach
teshalach es ha’eim, ve’es habanim tikach loch, lemaan yitav loch veha’archata yamim.

"If a bird’s nest, containing either chicks or eggs, happens to be before you on the road,
whether it (the nest) is in a tree or on the ground, and the mother is nesting upon the chicks
or upon the eggs, you shall not take the mother from/with the offspring.

(I will explain shortly why I left the translation this way.) You shall certainly send away the
mother and take the young for yourself, so that it will be good for you, and you shall lengthen
your days"

Deut 22:6-7

Off the derech

Several points in these pesukim are uncertain. The Torah states that the nest must be on the derech,
which means on the way or road. Why does the Torah need to tell you that it was on the road?
Does this mitzvah not apply if the mother bird is off the derech?

The Gemara first suggests that the Torah is teaching that there is no mitzvah of shiluach hakein if
the bird built her nest on the water. However, the Gemara demonstrates that this halacha is
inaccurate -- a waterway is also called a derech, and, should one find a nest on a waterway, the
mitzvah of shiluach hakein applies.

So, what case is exempt, because mommy bird is "off the derech"? The Gemara concludes that
there is no mitzvah of shiluach hakein should the nest be on your property, since this is not called
"on the way," which implies an ownerless area (Chullin 139b).

The Mishnah states that geese or chickens that set up their nests in an orchard are included in the
mitzvah of shiluach hakein, whereas there is no requirement to send away the mother goose or hen
if she set up her nest in the house. The Mishnah’s term "chickens that set up their nests in an
orchard" means that they have run away from the owner’s jurisdiction. However, if the chickens
or geese are "rebellious," occasionally wandering beyond the confines of their usual home, but still
returning to the owner’s barn for nesting, they are still considered "owned." Similarly, the laws of
shiluach hakein apply to an ownerless bird that nests on your property (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh
Deah 292:2).

Late poskim explain that you are exempt from performing the mitzvah on birds that could easily
become yours, even if at the moment they are not your property. Without delving into the halachic

40
analysis entailed, they conclude that the mitzvah of shiluach hakein does not apply to chickens and
similar domesticated species, unless this particular bird refuses to be domesticated (Shu"t Imrei
Yosher #158; Minchas Shelomoh 2:97:26).

On the other hand, the mitzvah does apply, in general, to doves and pigeons, which, even when
kept in dovecotes, are not as domesticated as chickens. However, one is exempt from performing
the mitzvah of shiluach hakein in the case of homing pigeons, which accept human domination.
This means that someone can remove chickens or homing pigeons roosting on a nest and bring
them to the shocheit.

Mommy or daddy

There are species of birds in which the father roosts on the nest, or the two parents take turns. In
this instance, does the mitzvah apply, regardless as to which parent is on the nest, or is the mitzvah
gender-specific, applying only if the mother bird is on the nest? This question is debated in the
Mishnah and discussed in the Gemara. Normative halacha rules that the mitzvah applies only if
mother bird is on the nest. This conclusion is implied by the posuk when it says veha’eim rovetzes,
"and the mother is nesting."

Therefore, in order to fulfill the mitzvah of shiluach hakein, one must first determine that the
nesting bird is, indeed, the mother. One does not require a DNA test to verify these facts – usually
a bit of observation will show you whether one bird or two are nesting.

This question is germane to pigeons, who present the most common contemporary application of
shiluach hakein, since non-domesticated ones often create their nests near or in human habitation.
Pigeons, which are loyal to their mates for life, take turns roosting on the nest. Usually, the daddy
bird takes day shift and mommy does the night shift. (During their time off, each parent goes out
to earn a living. Not many social-life options in a full nest.)

There are several halachic ramifications to this social knowledge of pigeon family structure, of
which I will share two. Should someone be interested in harvesting both a pigeon parent and its
eggs or young, he can determine which parent is male, and then, at the appropriate time, seize
daddy bird and the young at the same time without violating any prohibition of the Torah.

A second ramification applies to someone eager to fulfill the mitzvah of shiluach hakein. Before
sending away the nesting bird, one should determine whether, at the moment, mommy or daddy is
roosting there. If it is daddy, no mitzvah is fulfilled by sending him away, even if you are a father’s
rights activist.

41
From or with?

Allow me to return to the laws that we derive from understanding the posuk. The Torah writes, lo
sikach ha’eim al habanim, which can be translated and explained in more than one way. It could
mean that you should not take the mommy from the young, which would mean that the prohibition
is taking the mother, even should you leave the offspring, which is the way Rashi explains the
verse (as explained by Maharal; note that Mizrachi seems to have understood Rashi differently).
On the other hand, the Rambam (Sefer Hamitzvos, Lo Saaseh #306) translates the phrase ha’eim
al habanim as with the young, meaning that one violates the lo saaseh prohibition only if one takes
both mother and offspring. Should someone take the mother and not the offspring, in the
Rambam’s opinion, he violated the mitzvas aseih commanding him to send away the mother, but
not the lo saaseh. According to Rashi, this person also violated the lo saaseh. Thus, we see that a
halachic difference can hinge on how you translate the preposition al.

Earlier in this article, I translated this passage as "You shall not take the mother from/with the
young." This was in order to avoid biasing someone from translating the posuk in a way that
supports either side of the dispute between rishonim.

Required???

Our opening question was: "Must I physically send away the mother bird? I am squeamish!" Or,
as I explained it: Should I find such a nest, may I simply ignore it and continue on my way, or
would I thereby be ignoring a requirement to fulfill a mitzvah?

To explain this a bit better: The Torah includes mitzvos that I am required to observe, such as
putting on tefillin and eating matzoh on Pesach. Shiluach hakein is certainly not such a mitzvah,
since it depends upon circumstance and applies only when I find a nest. However, among mitzvos
of the Torah that are non-obligatory, there are different levels of requirement. Some mitzvos are
simply a matir, they permit me to do something, but I have no obligation to do them, whereas
others become obligatory when certain circumstances apply.

Some examples will make our explanation clearer. Here is an example of a mitzvah that is not
required: shechitah. I am not required to walk down the street looking for animals to shecht. Even
if I am a shocheit and someone asks me to shecht for them, it is not a requirement. The mitzvah is
simply: If you want to eat meat, the animal must be shechted in a specific way. If one does not
shecht it correctly, one may not eat the meat.

This type of mitzvah is a matir. There is no requirement to observe the mitzvah, but if I want to
gain a certain benefit, the Torah provides me with specific instruction how to permit it.

42
If we understand shiluach hakein to be a matir, then what the Torah instructed is that if I find a
nesting bird, I may not take both the young and their mother for my purposes. If I want to take the
young, I must first send away the mother. (By the way, it is forbidden to take the mother, even if
I do not want to take the young.)

Required

There is another way to understand shiluach hakein, which holds that this mitzvah is not a matir,
but a requirement, should I encounter the appropriate situation. I will explain the second approach
by comparison to a different mitzvah.

One of the Torah’s mitzvos is to return lost objects. There is no requirement for me to try to find
lost objects in order to return them to their owner. However, once I see a lost object, I am required
to retrieve the item and return it. If one understands that the mitzvah of shiluach hakein is
comparable to hashavas aveidah, then, although I am not required to go looking for nesting birds,
should I find one, I am required to send away the mother.

Based on Talmudic sources, early acharonim discuss whether shiluach hakein should be
considered a matir or a requirement. If it is a matir, then our squeamish questioner is not required
to fulfill the mitzvah. However, if it is a requirement, then it is a mitzvah that must be fulfilled.
Halachically, it will be approximately equivalent to living in a house and not putting mezuzos on
the doors.

Shalei’ach

The question is how one explains the words of the posuk, which says Shalei’ach teshalach es
ha’eim, "You shall certainly send away the mother." Here are two ways:

There is no requirement to send away the mother, but should I happen upon a nest and want to eat
the mother bird, the young, or both, I may not take the mother, but must send her away. The act of
sending away the mother permits me to keep the young, should I want to take them. According to
this approach, the mitzvah of shiluach hakein is similar to shechitah. There is no requirement to
shecht, but should I want to eat meat, this is the way to do so.

On the other hand, perhaps the mitzvah of shiluach hakein is similar to the mitzvah of hashavas
aveidah. This would mean that should I find a nest, I am now required to send away the mother.

Among the early acharonim, we find a responsum from the Chavos Ya’ir (#67) discussing this

43
issue. To quote the Chavos Yair: "I was asked: if someone comes across a nest while he is walking
through a field, is he required to send away the mother, or may he just continue on his way without
doing anything?"

The Chavos Yair analyzes several passages of the Gemara in his attempt to prove which approach
is correct. Based on his analysis of several texts of Chazal, he concludes that shiluach hakein is
like hashavas aveidah, and, should one find a nest that meets the halachic requirements, there is an
obligation to send away the mother, even though one has no interest in the young. This position is
also accepted by several other prominent, later poskim (Shu"t Chacham Zvi #83; Rabbi Akiva
Eiger to Yoreh Deah 292:1; Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh De'ah 292:1-2).

On the other hand, there are several prominent poskim who dispute this ruling, concluding that
shiluach hakein is a matir, like shechitah (Sefer Hamitzvos Hakatzar [of the Chofetz Chayim]
Mitzvos Aseh #74; Chazon Ish (Yoreh De'ah 175:2); Shu"t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim #48;
Minchas Shelomoh 2:5:4 [5760 edition].

Keep the babies

Our second question that I quoted above was: "Must I take the young to fulfill the mitzvah?" I
explained that the question is: When I send away the mother bird, am I required to keep the young,
or, at least, to physically lift up the eggs or baby birds, thereby taking possession of them? Or have
I completed the performance of the mitzvah simply by sending away the mother?

This is another halachic question that is dependent on the translation of a word of the posuk: The
Torah says "You shall certainly send away the mother and take the young for yourself." Does the
Torah mean that you may take the young for yourself or that you are required to take the young?
According to the second approach, the mitzvah is fulfilled only if one picks up the eggs or baby
birds. If one does not pick them up, one has not fulfilled the mitzvah. According to the first
approach, the mitzvah is fulfilled by sending away the mother. Once one has sent her away and
fulfilled the mitzvah, one may pick up the eggs, should one want them, or leave them as is.

Again, the correct interpretation depends on a proper understanding of the posuk.

The Torah states, ve’es habanim tikach loch, "And take the young for yourself." Is this part of the
requirement of the mitzvah? In other words, did the Torah command that we perform two steps,
send away the mother and take the young? Or, more simply, the Torah instructed that once you
sent away the mother, you are permitted to keep the young for yourself.

This question is discussed by a prominent, early acharon, the Chacham Tzvi (Shu"t Chacham Tzvi
#83). To quote him: "That which you asked me: One who sends away both the mother and the
offspring, did he fulfill the mitzvah of shiluach hakein? Do we say that the words of the Torah,

44
send away the mother and keep the young, must be fulfilled literally to fulfill the mitzvah, or not?
You wrote me that the great scholars of Lublin were uncertain about this."

The Chacham Tzvi rallies source material from the Gemara that the mitzvah is to send away the
mother, and one fulfills the mitzvah, even if one does not take the young. Therefore, taking the
young is not a requirement for the fulfillment of the mitzvah, but presents an option for the
individual performing the mitzvah. He compares this to the words of the Torah, "Six days shall
you work, and do all your melacha." Clearly, the Torah is not requiring one to work, but limiting
one’s work time to six days of the seven-day week. Similarly, shiluach hakein should be
understood that should you want to take the young, you may do so only after sending away the
mother, but there is no requirement to take the young. Put in other terms, sending away the mother
is a matir that permits taking the young, similar to shechitah being the matir permitting one to
consume the meat. Just as shechitah does not require that someone eat the meat, so too, it is not
required to take the young, and one fulfills the mitzvah without taking them.

Other acharonim disagree, demonstrating from the Zohar that one is supposed to take the offspring
(Beis Lechem Yehudah). The Aruch Hashulchan (Yoreh Deah 292:3-4) concludes, like the
Chacham Tzvi, that there is no requirement to take the offspring. Nevertheless, since the posuk
implies that one should, and there is evidence of this approach from some rishonim, the Aruch
Hashulchan concludes that the proper approach is to make a kinyan on the young, such as by lifting
them up. Furthermore, he notes that, according to the reason for the mitzvah of shiluach hakein
proposed by many early authorities, which I hope to discuss in a future article, one should take the
young.

Conclusion

The mitzvah we have just studied teaches that although we may eat kosher birds, we are prohibited
to take a mother bird when she is in her nest tending to her young. In explanation of the reason for
this mitzvah, Rav Hirsch sees a lesson to be learned regarding the sacred role of motherhood. To
quote him: "The respect that a nation accords to the woman’s calling is a reliable barometer of that
nation’s moral level… the paramount importance the Torah attaches to the woman’s activities…
traces even into the sphere of animal life. It assures protection for a mother bird while she is
engaged in her activity as a mother and it demands that everyone… should demonstrate through
his actions this appreciation of the female as she carries out her task."

45
 The Attribute of Rachamim - Mercy

Rav Avigdor Meyerowitz writes:12

The month of Elul is commonly known as the month of "rachamim and selichot", mercy and
forgiveness.

The theme of rachamim is very prevalent in our tefilah the whole year round; however from the
beginning of Elul through to Yom Kippur it becomes almost predominant in all the additions and
special tefilot for these days. The thirteen attributes of rachamim form the backbone of our selichot
and we find ourselves constantly beseeching Hashem to relate to and judge us with mercy,
rachamim.

However, it would seem that rachamim is not suitable when we are expected to be involved in the
process of doing teshuva, repentance. When doing teshuva we are expected to be fully aware of

12
https://harova.org/torah/view.asp?id=1932

46
what we have done, regret it and accept upon ourselves never to return to those things for which
we are repenting.[2] Teshuva is first and foremost admitting responsibility. Rachamim on the other
hand seems to be a request for ungrounded, gratuitous forgiveness. How do these two concepts
come together at a time when we are supposed to be committed to answerability for our actions?

Furthermore, in this week's Parsha, Ki Tetze, apparently we find an adverse attitude of Chazal
towards employing the attribute of mercy in our tefilah. The Mishnah states that one who says in
their prayer "Hashem, have mercy upon us just like You have mercy on the bird's nest" (a reference
to the Mitzvah of Shiluach Haken, the sending away of the mother bird before taking the baby
birds or eggs) must be silenced. This type of speech in tefilah is forbidden and must be stopped
immediately.

The gemara proceeds to ask why such a thing is prohibited and one of the answers given is:
"because he makes God's attributes mercy, and they are but decrees." Many different explanations
have been given for this gemara and it also became the basis of a big argument between the
Rambam and Ramban regarding Ta'amei Mitzvot, reasons for the Mitzvot, however, in the context
of our discussion regarding the attribute of mercy and it's place in tefilah I would like to share with
you the comments of Rav Kook[3] on this gemara.

Usually we understand the concept of rachamim as being an act of kindness towards someone who
is undeserving of it[4]. However, Chazal always contrast rachamim against din, judgment. Din
depicts the notion of looking at something for what it is at present, no more and no less. The gemara
states that a judge can only rule based on what his eyes see.[5] He cannot speculate about things
which are not apparent or certain or might happen in the future.

Rachamim on the other hand, explains Rav Shimshon Rephael Hirsch, comes from the word
"rechem" – womb.

The womb is the place where new life starts and is nurtured for its fantastic future. The womb
epitomizes the concept of nurturing something small and preparing it for its eventual full potential.

When we employ the attribute of mercy in our tefilah, it is not a request for ungrounded,
undeserving compassion, rather it is to awaken in ourselves the awareness that despite what we
have done, and despite our shortcomings, we must be conscious of the ability for us to make

47
amends and continue to progress and realize our full potential. The core theme of teshuva is to
always strive to continue to progress to the next level of who we can become and not remain
stagnant in the place that we were a year, month, day or even a moment ago. Teshuva and
rachamim go hand in hand in our attempt to cause the shechina to move from the "chair" of din
and judge us from the "chair" of rachamim.

The reason why Chazal in the Mishna forbid one to evoke the attribute of rachamim in tefilah is
because if one recognizes rachamim only expressed in the pity Hashem has for the mother bird, it
means that one has reduced rachamim to its distorted meaning of "rachmones" – baseless
compassion. The truth, says Rav Kook, is that rachamim, the true understanding of it, ie: the eternal
evolvement of life and reality to its full potential, permeates our whole existence and is to be found
everywhere.

[1] Kitzur Shukchan Aruch 128;1.

[2] Rambam, Hilchot Teshuva 1;1.

[3] Shemonah Kevatzim 7;183.

[4] "compassionate treatment especially towards someone who is undeserving of it" Merriam-Webster: Dictionary

[5] Sanhedrin 6;b.

[6] Rav Hirsch, commentary on Bereishit 43;14.

48
 The Shiluach HaKen Dilemma

Efraim Palvanov writes:13

If a bird’s nest happens upon you on the way, in any tree or on the ground, chicks or eggs, and the
mother-bird is sitting over the chicks or the eggs, do not take the mother together with her young.
You shall surely send away the mother bird, and take the young for yourself, so that it will be good
for you and your days will be lengthened. (Deuteronomy 22:6-7)

There are actually two mitzvahs here: not taking the mother together with her children (a negative
mitzvah), and sending away the mother bird before taking the children (a positive mitzvah). The
Torah does not explain the rationale here, but for most of history the message seemed quite
obvious: don’t be cruel! It was so obvious that the Mishnah (Berakhot 5:3) states we should stop
people from requesting in their prayers that since God has mercy on birds, He should also have
mercy on us. The Rambam (Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon, 1138-1204) comments here that the reason
one shouldn’t pray this way is because it is seemingly giving a reason for the mitzvah, yet we do
not know the true reason for the mitzvah, except that it is God’s Will. Moreover, the Rambam

13
https://www.mayimachronim.com/the-shiluach-haken-dilemma/

49
points out that if it is a matter of mercy, then God should have commanded us not to slaughter or
eat any animals at all!

Having said that, in Moreh Nevukhim (III:48), the Rambam notes that it really is about being
compassionate. While we cannot presume to know the true intent of the mitzvot “other than the
will of God alone, still we are inclined to follow the other view”. The Rambam adds that this
mitzvah only applies when a person really wants (or needs) to eat those eggs or chicks. “In most
cases, this commandment will cause man to leave the whole nest untouched, because [the eggs]
which he is allowed to take are, as a rule, unfit for food.” So, if a person does not intend to actually
eat the birds, it is best to leave the nest alone.

Despite this, in many Orthodox circles today it has become common to think about this mitzvah
in a totally opposite way—that it has nothing to do with compassion, and that there is a mitzvah to
shoo away the bird whether a person will eat the eggs or not. This turns the whole mitzvah on its
head and, instead of being an act of compassion, appears to be an act of unnecessary cruelty! This
puzzling development is not particularly new, and in his monumental Torah Temimah, Rabbi
Baruch Epstein (1860-1941) noted on the verses in question:

In general, I am in astonishment. How could someone possibly think that the Torah commanded
us to do this even against His will regarding the outcome? For it is clear and beyond all doubt, that
of the foundational reasons in this mitzvah in general is that we should not be cruel and take the
mother while she is sitting on her young; and it is only because, at the end of the day, the goal of
all creatures is that they were created for man, just as slaughtering an animal [for food] is permitted,
that the Torah permitted man to take the young in this way, via sending away the mother
beforehand so that she should not see her young being taken. And if so, it is clear that the Torah is
only granting an allowance with this, but with someone who does not at all want to involve himself,
it is certain that he is permitted to simply pass it by. In fact, he is making things even better for the
mother and young by leaving them together.

For Rabbi Epstein, the issue here is so obvious that he is simply dumbfounded by how it has come
to be understood in opposite fashion. He concludes that, of course, the best thing is simply to leave
the nest alone! We find that the vast majority of poskim throughout history understood it in similar
fashion, that it is ultimately about compassion, and there is no need to take away the eggs unless
one absolutely intends to make use of them. (For an extensive list of the sources, see here for Rabbi
Natan Slifkin’s excellent in-depth analysis.)14

If the shiluach haken issue is so clear, why is it that such a vastly opposing interpretation has
developed? The main reason is probably due to a couple of passages in the Zohar. The first passage,
in Zohar Chadash (Midrash Ruth, Ma’amar Kan Tzippor), interprets the Torah verses
metaphorically:

“If a bird’s nest happens upon you on the way…” the ‘nest’ is teshuvah, the ‘way’ is Rachel… ‘in
any tree’ this is the Shekhinah, ‘or on the ground’ refers to this lower world, ‘chicks’ refers to the
Twelve Tribes of Israel above, while ‘eggs’ refers to Israel here below… And the Shekhinah cries

14
http://www.zootorah.com/RationalistJudaism/ShiluachHaKein.pdf

50
out over her children, and it is written, “You shall surely send [shaleach teshalach]”—the two
mentions of “send away” refer to the First and Second Temples…

In other words, the chicks or eggs refers to the souls of Israel, and the fact that they are sitting in
their nest, on their home tree, under the wings of their mother bird, symbolizes Israel doing
teshuvah and clinging to the Divine Presence. Yet, when the mother is sent away, and her babies
are taken, she cries for her children, just as the exiled Shekhinah cries for the exiled souls of Israel.
(Similarly, the soul of Rachel Imenu, who was buried “on the way”, cries for her children in exile,
as in Jeremiah 31:15.) The Zohar here continues to say that when the mother bird is shooed away,
God’s mercy is aroused, for “His mercy is upon all His creations” (Psalm 145:9), and He then has
compassion on Israel as well.

Thus, from a Kabbalistic perspective, sending away the mother bird really is cruel, but serves to
arouse God’s mercy upon Israel. As such, fulfilling this mitzvah may serve to hasten the Final
Redemption. Because of this, some of the more mystically-inclined authorities insisted
that shiluach haken be done, regardless of whether a person needs the eggs or not. At the same
time, though, one of the first of the 613 mitzvot is to emulate God’s ways, and “just as God is
merciful, you should be merciful” (Sefer HaMitzvot, #8). So, a person who happens upon a bird’s
nest, and restrains himself from harming the innocent creatures, is being merciful “upon all His
creations”, and thereby fulfilling a Torah mitzvah, too! Besides, the Zohar says the chicks in the
nest represent Israel doing teshuvah and clinging to God, so wouldn’t it better to leave them there,
hovering under God’s wings (Deuteronomy 32:11), than to send them into exile?

The Temple: God’s Nest

According to at least one tradition (as in Yemenite Torah scrolls), the letter kuf in the
word ken (“nest”) is written enlarged. This mirrors the large kuf that is enlarged in the word ken of
Psalm 84:4, according to all traditions. That verse in Psalms is “Even the bird has found a home,
and the swallow a nest for herself in which to set her young, near Your altar, Lord of Hosts, my
King and God.” Like the birds, we wish to have a “nest” right next to God. The very next verse in
this Psalm is the opening line of Ashrei, “Fortunate are those who dwell in Your house; they
forever praise You, selah!” Although Ashrei is Psalm 145, we always introduce it with Psalm
84:5. Of course, it is in Psalm 145 where we read that God is merciful “upon all His creations”, as
frequently cited in discussions of shiluach haken. The idea behind these linked Psalms is that we
all wish to dwell in God’s house forever, under His wings, for He is “like an eagle who rouses His
nest, and hovers over His chicks…” (Deuteronomy 32:11) The “nest” is symbolic of God’s
dwelling place, and on Earth that place is the Temple, as implied by Psalm 84:4. Rabbeinu Bechaye
(1255-1340) teaches that this is the secret meaning of the large kuf in the “nest” of that Psalm
verse. To properly understand this, we have to look back at another special kuf, in Genesis.

In Genesis 27:46, Rivka Imenu calls out that she has absolutely had it (‫ ) ַ֣קְצִתּי ְבַחַ֔יּי‬with the
immorality that was brought into her home. The kuf in the word katzti is always written small, and
Rabbeinu Bechaye comments here that this is because Rebecca prophetically foresaw that
destruction of the Temples caused by such immorality. The kuf, with a value of 100, symbolizes
the Temple which was 100 cubits long. (Megaleh Amukot adds, as cited by Rabbi Dovid Leitner
in his Understanding the Alef-Beis, that the milui of kuf, ‫קוף‬, is 186, the value of ‫מקום‬, one of the

51
Names of God, denoting His presence within space.) Rabbeinu Bechaye then introduces the large
kuf in Psalm 84 to teach that it is something of an antidote to the small kuf in Genesis 27. While
the small kuf in Genesis represents the Temple’s destruction, the large kuf in Psalms signifies its
future reconstruction.

For the time being, God’s “dwelling place” remains in the Heavens, surrounded by the souls of the
righteous. Indeed, the Zohar (III, 196b) says the verse in Psalm 84 about the birds in the nest is
referring to all the righteous souls in Heaven. Elsewhere (Zohar II, 7b), we are told that the soul
of Mashiach is in a Heavenly place called kan tzippor, the “Bird’s Nest”, awaiting the time when
he will be summoned to usher in the Redemption. A lot more detail is given in Zohar III, 164b,
where it is said that whenever Mashiach wishes to read from the Torah, two eagles fly over him
and adorn him with a golden crown (as in Psalm 21:4). The doves sent by Noah are there, too, as
are ‘ofin dinur, flaming phoenixes. And the time will soon come for Mashiach’s soul to descend
to this world and rebuild the Temple—God’s “nest” on Earth. In short, all of this mystical imagery
comes to teach that shiluach haken is deeply symbolic of Israel’s current exile and future
redemption.

So, how do we piece this all together? What is the proper thing to do with a bird’s nest? On the
one hand, we do not want to be needlessly cruel to a living creature, nor do we want to eat the eggs
or chicks anyway. On the other hand, there really is something mystical about arousing God’s
compassion and hastening the Redemption. It is important to remember that the compassion is
aroused specifically when the mother bird flies away in distress. There is no reason why she cannot
return shortly after, and be happily reunited with her chicks. The Mishnah confirms that there is
no necessity to take away the young, and one has still fulfilled the mitzvah if the mother returns to
her children (Chullin 12:3). In fact, based on the mystical Shekhinah symbolism above, that would
be the ideal way to go! Let the souls of Israel be reunited with the Divine Presence. That’s the
whole point after all, as we hope for the exile to end and the Temple to be rebuilt.

With that in mind, perhaps we can propose the following: if happening upon a nest, you may get
just close enough to cause the mother bird to fly away, but not so close that it will cause any
damage, or prevent the mother bird from returning.* Based on careful consideration of all the
sources, I believe this is enough to fulfil the mitzvah, and simultaneously fulfil the mitzvah of
emulating God’s compassion (#8), as well as triggering the arousal of divine mercy as described
by the Zohar, and also be at peace with nature in general.

On an halakhic note, shiluach haken should ideally be done when happening upon a nest on the
way, as the Torah states, and not on one’s property. If the nest is on your property, then you may
actually be considered its rightful owner. However, some halakhic authorities state that as long as
you never intended to own it, it isn’t yours and, either way, you may declare the bird’s nest on
your property to be hefker, and then you can indeed fulfill the mitzvah of shiluach haken. Finally,
keep in mind that the mitzvah can only be fulfilled with a kosher, non-domesticated bird species
(Chullin 12:1-2).

May we all merit to witness the Final Redemption soon!

52
Rabbi Nathan Slifkin writes:15

15
http://www.zootorah.com/RationalistJudaism/ShiluachHaKein.pdf

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
 Sending Away The Mother

Gil Student writes:16

16
https://www.torahmusings.com/2010/08/sending-away-the-mother/

63
Ostensibly, the command to send away a mother bird before taking her eggs is a basic lesson in
compassion to all creatures.

Yet the Mishnah’s denunciation (twice!) of this attitude towards a divine command complicates
our view of this mitzvah (Berakhos 33b; Megillah 25a). R. Natan Slifkin, the “Zoo Rabbi,” has e-
published a booklet about this commandment in which he explores approaches to understanding
this mitzvah (link to booklet) see above.

The booklet is a study of rationales offered for the command, examining and categorizing the
different approaches throughout history and concluding with practical ramifications. Namely, does
it make sense to send away the mother bird if you do not want the eggs.

R. Slifkin is a careful researcher who has uncovered many important sources on this subject,
explaining them in his characteristically clear and accessible way. His grasp reaches the gamut of
sources from the Medieval until today, including traditional rabbinic studies, academic
discussions, and the basics of Kabbalah. His treatment is not encyclopedic, which is for the best
because that would render the booklet unwieldy. It is, rather, a thorough study, highlighting the
important trends in interpretation and application.

In general, R. Slifkin distinguishes between what he calls Rationalist and Mystical approaches,
those that speak of the humanistic impact of the mitzvah and those that refer to the metaphysical
effect. In R. Slifkin’s reading, these two approaches are irreconcilable.
According to the Rationalists, sending away a mother bird induces compassion in a person. Yes,
you may need the eggs, but at least show mercy to the mother bird and send her away first. If you
do not desire the eggs then there cannot be a mitzvah. According to the Mystics, when you send
the bird away, the angels cry over the bird’s exile from its nest which leads God to show
compassion to the Jews who are also in exile. Even when you do not need the eggs, the cosmic
impact of the mitzvah remains.

While I find his study useful, I am unconvinced by R. Slifkin’s dichotomy. These two approaches
are not mutually exclusive. Yes, one sees the sending away of the mother as an act of compassion
and the other as an act of cruelty, but they can both be true. It is, from a bird’s perspective, tragic
that her eggs are taken and she is sent away, but it is still a more merciful and compassionate way
of taking the eggs. Consider a similar talmudic case of choosing the most painless way of executing
a condemned criminal (Sanhedrin 44a). Why? Because we are commanded to love our fellow as
ourselves. We must even perform an act of necessary cruelty — the execution of a criminal — in
a merciful way.

Indeed, as R. Slifkin points out (p. 17), the Ramban appears to adopt both Rationalist and Mystical
approaches. Following the Ramban, R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik quotes his grandfather, R. Chaim,
as saying that the rationales offered for the commandments are not intended as underlying reasons.
They are “tastes,” ways in which we can relate and aspects we can understand of the divine intent.
For example, in Exalted Evening (pp. 97-99):

64
See also Man of Faith in the Modern World, pp. 96-98.

The upshot is that the Rationalist and Mystical approaches are not mutually exclusive. Mitzvah
observance can improve a person’s character and also have metaphysical resonance. The
dichotomy is exaggerated because there is also a middle ground, a multi-dimensional approach
that is evident within tradition and accepts the conclusions of multiple streams in Jewish thought.

65
 17

17
https://people.ucalgary.ca/~elsegal/PDFs/BirdsNest.pdf

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
Sending the mother bird: a window into the soul of Judaism

Ecohasid meets Rambam

77
David Seidenberg writes:18

What is our responsibility toward other species? What are their rights? And how can they thrive
alongside us? The Torah portion of Ki Teitzei includes an extraordinary mitzvah that has been the
ground for intense debate related to questions like these over millenia. Deuteronomy 22:6-
7 instructs us:

The debate about the purpose of this mitzvah, called shiluach haken, starts with the question of
whether the commandment to send away a parent bird before taking the eggs or babies is an
expression of compassion for the bird. More broadly, is shiluach haken an examplar of the
prohibition against causing pain to animals, tza’ar baalei chayyim, or does it serve other
ecological, psychological or spiritual purposes?

There are at least eight other interpretations of shiluach haken that cover a whole range
of possibilities. They pretty much map out the history of Jewish thought, and the range of ideas
about ecology and animals, from the most ecologically sensitive to the most extreme lack of
sensitivity.
Before you read further, though, think for a moment about your own interpretation. Why is this
mitzvah specifically about birds? How does it relate to other mitzvot or ideas about our
relationships to animals? Most people would connect shiluach haken to the mitzvah to not

18
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/sending-the-mother-bird-a-window-into-the-soul-of-judaism/

78
slaughter an animal and its child on the same day, and many also connect it to the mitzvah to not
mix milk and meat. What do these three mitzvot say about the significance of motherhood?
One factor to consider is that the Torah permits us to eat from warm-blooded species that have
strong parent-child bonds among (land) animals, that is, only mammals and birds. Most of our
ancestors’ interactions with domesticated animals would have been with mammals, but a greater
proportion of their interactions with wild animals might have been with birds, as reflected in the
verse, where one stumbles upon a nest in the wild.

This might lead you to the most obvious interpretation – even if we are taking the bird’s offspring,
we should have compassion for the feelings of the parent bird, and protect her in some small way
from the suffering she would feel at seeing her children taken. This is the interpretation given by
Moses Maimonides, also called Rambam (Rabbi Moshe Ben Maimon, 12th century), and it is the
occasion for his famous comment:

But if compassion were the main goal, why should we be allowed to take the eggs or babies in the
first place? In fact, Maimonides thinks that we really shouldn’t. He believes the complications
created by shiluach haken have the intent of leading most people to “leave everything alone”.

How generous, and perhaps naïve, that sentiment seems today. But it also seemed naïve to some
of the people who commented on Maimonides. Nachmanides or Ramban
(Rabbi Moshe Ben Nachman, 13th century) critiqued Maimonides’ interpretation from both sides.
First, he asked, if the Torah cares primarily about the feelings of a parent for its child, shouldn’t
we be allowed to kill the parent first and then the child afterwards? But more importantly, if the
animal’s pain is our main concern, why are we allowed to slaughter the young or take the eggs at
all? Why are we allowed to kill any animal?

79
We might sharpen that question further: if Torah wants us to have compassion for the animals we
use, then why are we only permitted to eat the types of animals—mammals and birds—that have
strong bonds with each other, where our action might cause them to suffer the most?

In rejecting Maimonides’ reasoning, Nachmanides brings three alternative interpretations in quick

order. The second interpretation he gives is the one that matters the most for ecology, and therefore
the one I will start with:

Nachmanides is not literally concerned with whether the slaughter of a particular mother and child
would have an impact on a whole species. Rather, the very idea that one could act in a way that
would ultimately kill a species is abhorrent. He is applying something like Kant’s categorical
imperative that any action must be “universalizable”: if everyone were to take both parent and
child, then the species would eventually become extinct. Therefore, no one may take both parent
and child.

There’s a term for this that comes from the lingo of resource management: “sustainable yield”.
One can only take from a natural grouping—i.e., an ecosystem or species—what that grouping can
replace naturally. For Nachmanides, this didn’t just apply just in cases where a species is
endangered. It applied to all species at all times.

It occurred to me years ago that Nachmanides’ reasoning should apply to any kind of harvesting
that destroys an ecosystem, like clearcutting a forest, because by taking and destroying everything,
these methods of “harvest” also take every single parent and child at the same time. It would not
matter whether the species in that ecosystem were rare or endangered or precious to us; in all cases
such destruction would be forbidden.

80
The same reasoning would also forbid removing a mountaintop for coal-mining, or diverting the
entire flow of a river for agriculture. This part of Ramban’s interpretation is exciting and significant
for the challenges we are facing. It also doesn’t contradict Maimonides’s explanation. Rather, it
raises compassion to a higher level: we are called to have compassion upon whole species, rather
than just upon individual animals.

But that was not the part of his interpretation that excited the imaginations of most Jewish writers
through the centuries, before ecology became a science, and before our awareness of climate
disruption, environmental crisis, and the sixth mass extinction. In fact, until fairly recently in
Western civilization, no one even imagined that a species could become extinct, because they
believed that God watched over and protected every species.

Instead, what excited people about Ramban’s interpretation was his first explanation for the
mitzvah:

Various medieval and modern Jewish thinkers, extrapolating from this sentiment, declared that the
purpose of laws commanding kindness or compassion toward non-human animals,
including shiluach haken, was purely instrumental, for the sake of character formation. Many
people inferred that this was also Ramban’s position—ignoring his second and third reasons for
the mitzvah.

This reading of Ramban still predominates, especially in Orthodox circles. Here are two
contemporary examples of this way of thinking. The first comes from an article on animal suffering
found on the website of the Orthodox environmental group Canfei Nesharim:

81
But this interpretation is wildly incorrect. Ramban gives no indication that he believes animals
cannot suffer, he only says that mitigating suffering is not the purpose of the mitzvah. The authors
of this article further state that “humans are prohibited from treating [animals] sadistically in order
to cultivate the qualities of mercy and environmentalism.” By referencing “environmentalism”,
these authors give glancing acknowledgment of the second reason Ramban gives, which is
certainly better than nothing. But they make a tragic leap from Ramban’s complex position to a
reductionist interpretation that denies animals any subjectivity.

The second example, from a mainstream article about Judaism’s supposed position on animal,
states the following:

It seems plainly silly, even idiotic, knowing what we know about how complex and wondrous the
world is, to say that every other being is here to serve us. However, even though it is easy to come
up with teachings that contradict this position, it is also true that there were many traditional Jewish
thinkers who saw animals that way.

One of our main religious tasks today is to reject these interpretations in favor of a view that
includes the multiple reasons for shiluach haken, tzaar baalei chayyim, and
other mitzvot governing our relationships with the other animals around us, including the reasons
given by Maimonides and by Nachmanides.

82
Before we get to the next two interpretations, there is one more “anti-interpretation” that is widely
disseminated: we chase away the mother bird simply because the Torah says to, or in rabbinic
idiom, “g’zeirah hi”. There is no special meaning or teaching embedded in the mitzvah. Rather,
God is testing us to see if we will be obedient. Sefer Chinukh argues against this position at length,
using Rambam and Ramban to show that even when the greatest sages disagreed about the reason
for the mitzvah, they still thought the mitzvah had a reason (Mitzvah 545).

Given how easy it is to come up with reasons for this mitzvah, it seems like a cop-out to throw up
one’s hands. But there is a long tradition that interprets shiluach haken this way, and it is rooted
in two early rabbinic statements. One is that when someone is leading prayer, they shouldn’t ask
for God to be compassionate toward us by reminding God of God’s compassion toward nesting
birds (Mishnah Berachot 5:3 and Megillah 4:9). The other is that God didn’t tell the Jewish
people to slaughter by cutting the throat instead of the neck for any other reason than to refine
them by enjoining obedience (Genesis Rabbah 44:1).

What may be surprising is that Maimonides in his compendium of law called Mishneh Torah also
says that shiluach haken is simply a divine decree. He wrote the Mishneh Torah when he was a
young man, and this is one of many examples where Maimonides rejected his youthful position
after he had matured. Instead, he insisted, more strongly than any other Jewish thinker before or
after, that an animal’s subjective experience mattered to God and to the Torah. Maimonides’s
respect for animals appears elsewhere in the Guide for the Perplexed — he even insists on talking
about humanity and “the other animals”, including humanity as one animal species, every place
where he discusses animals.

The next two interpretations of shiluach haken are Kabbalistic, but they are polar opposites.
Ramban’s third hypothesis for why we send the mother bird away is that we are “honoring the
mother of the world”, which in Kabbalistic terms is the divine quality called Binah or
Understanding. According to Kabbalah, Binah, the third Sefirah sometimes called mother, became

83
a kind of womb through which the divine unfolded and developed, leading to the birth of this
Creation that we inhabit. This reason is ready and waiting to be woven into a feminist spirituality.
It also aligns with a revolution in ethics that emerges in many writings of the Kabbalah: the
ultimate value is not human life, but the principle of Life itself.

But the Zohar undoes all that great good when it gives a truly perverse reason for shiluach haken.
According to Tikkunei Zohar 23a, we send away the mother bird and take the eggs in order to
cause the mother to suffer and cry out, because when the mother cries out, this arouses
the Shekhinah (the divine feminine presence that nurtures the world), and that arouses the Holy
One (the divine masculine) to have mercy on the Shekhinah. It is this last interpretation from the
Zohar that lends itself to the obsessive quest in some Haredi circles to find a nest and take the eggs.
Anything to do a mitzvah that promises long life.

One could scarcely imagine an interpretation of this mitzvah that would be more contradictory to
Maimonides, to common sense, and to ethical human development. However, when people
actually do the mitzvah for this reason, they usually use pigeons nesting on Brooklyn windowsills,
sometimes paying good money to file through an apartment, take the eggs in hand, and put them
back, so the ecological impact is minimal. But the Zohar isn’t just coming up with a crazy rational
for the mitzvah – it is also admitting that birds have real emotions, emotions that are important
enough to impact the world and God’s relationship with the world.

There is a midrash from the 9th century that gives similar credence to the reality of the mother bird.
According to Deuteronomy Rabbah 6:5, the reason it is necessary for shiluach haken appear in the
Torah is that the Holy One said, “Since she (the bird) busies herself with building the world (or:
the glory of the world) and maintaining the world / binyano shel olam v’tikkuno shel olam, it is
right/worthwhile that she would be saved.” The mother bird’s actions measure up to human moral
standards, and command our respect and God’s. Her actions and her feelings are morally

84
substantive, and they create in us an obligation to protect her, and to protect her work, her tikkun,
which is to create a living and livable world.

The reason you probably never heard of this text, however, is that the people who first published
the midrash didn’t believe that it could be saying what it was saying. So they rewrote it, by just
dropping one letter, the heh at the end of the phrase “she busies herself / nit’askah”. They just
thought they were correcting a mistake: a bird can’t be a moral actor, so the midrash must be
referring to the person shooing the bird away. It must really be saying “he busies himself
/ nit’asek”. Since the (male) person is involved in building the world through his meritorious
actions, it is right for him to accrue even greater merit by letting the bird fly away.

If you’re scratching your head about what that means – the answer is that you’re right, it doesn’t
really make sense. But it made more sense to many medieval and modern Jewish thinkers than the
idea that a bird’s feelings and actions were morally and psychologically significant.

Like Maimonides, we have matured beyond that perspective. Science has also matured: virtually
all scientists now reject the Enlightenment and Cartesian idea that only humans have true emotions
and awareness. Yet such ideology strangely enough became mainstream in the Orthodox Jewish
world, even though it is utterly alien to ancient Judaism. Thankfully, there are giants of Orthodoxy
like Rav Avraham Itzhak Kook and Rav Joseph Soloveitchik who have blazed trails that lead to a
larger vista.

Following the Maimonides of the Guide, we also need to reject interpretations that arise from the
immature perspective that the world revolves around us. We need to grow up in our relation to the
Earth, to enter into mutual relationships, to cherish kinship with all life, rather than reward
exploitation. How we interpret shiluach haken offers us a window into our own souls and a
yardstick to measure how far we have come along that path.

85
So we have three deep reasons for shiluach haken– compassion for another animal mother’s
suffering, refusal to do anything that might cause extinction, and honoring the principle of Life
itself. We have one overarching ethical reason: because acting with compassion is a good thing for
human beings to do. We have two shallower ones: because it says so, and because it will teach us
not to be cruel to people. And we have one wild one: chase the bird away and steal her babies so
that she will suffer and God will take pity on the world.

“So we have three deep reasons… We have one wild one: chase the bird away and steal her babies
so that she will suffer and God will take pity on the world. And we have the interpretation that a
bird, like a human being, can be a moral and practical agent of tikkun olam.

But to me, the only interpretation of shiluach haken that seems rational is one that integrates the
best of these reasons, which we might also see as enfolded in the midrash’s idea of tikkun olam.
The Torah values compassion for individual animals and their feelings, and it values compassion
and responsibility for species and their survival, and it values human needs. In the case of shiluach
haken, one may not take the mother bird along with the young, because we may only take from
other species in a way that enables them to thrive. One must also chase away the mother so that
she cannot see, because we care about suffering, and we accept that animals have minds and
emotions that allow them to suffer and to have agency.”

(Neither goal is achievable in CAFO’s [concentrated animal feeding operations] or in the factory-
farm system in general, which is why it is correct to say that factory-farmed meat is treif.)

The Torah and Judaism call us to be cognizant of individual animals and animal species, and to
take what we need from the natural world in a way that is sustainable. We call that sustainablity,
but we could just as well call that behaving compassionately toward our fellow species. Taking
our needs from the world around us may never spring from an attitude that we have a right to cause

86
harm. Rather, our relationships with the other animals, however we use them, should be symbiotic,
meaning we must strive to fulfill both our needs and the needs of other species.

That is why we cannot say that shiluach haken is only about compassion or only about
sustainability. And if sending away the mother also teaches us to be better people, as Ramban
taught, why would this reason contradict or limit the other reasons?

Why after all do we do this mitzvah, or any mitzvah? The end of the verse about shiluach
haken hints at the ultimate reason: “that it will be well for you, and you will lengthen days”.

This phrase appears uniquely in conjunction with shiluach haken. A similar phrase also describes
the reward for honoring one’s parents, with a subtle but important difference. The verse about
parents says “lengthen your days”. With respect to shiluach haken, and the Torah as a whole, the
meaning is much broader: lengthen not just your own days, but also lengthen all days, the days of
society and humanity, of ecosystem and field and forest, of Life, and of all those creatures
participating in life. Do this for the sake of all Creation, for all our relations, and for all the
creatures, which includes both the mother bird and you.

That’s why we are commanded, “Choose Life!” Choose not your own lives, but Life itself – for
that is how “it will go well for you”.19

For further reading:

The Ecological Message of the Torah: Knowledge, Concepts and Laws which Made Survival in a land of Milk and Honey Possible,

by Aloys Hfttermann

A Vision of Eden, by David Sears

Kabbalah and Ecology: God’s Image in the More-Than-Human World, by David Mevorach Seidenberg

19
An early version of this article was published in jewschool in 2016.

87
Man and Beast: Our Relationships with Animals in Jewish Law and Thought, by Natan Slifkin

“Veganism and Covenantalism: Contrasting and Overlapping Moralities” by David Mevorach Seidenberg, in Jewish Veganism and

Vegetarianism

“Animal Rights in the Jewish Tradition” by David Mevorach Seidenberg, in Ecyclopedia of Religion and Nature

Birds, Compassion and the Month of Elul

The mitzvah of sending away the mother bird before taking her eggs or chicks has always intrigued
me. This week I’m sending away the ‘mother bird’ of my grandchildren and taking my three
rambunctious fledging granddaughters aged 5, 7 and 8 for a full three-day stint, so their mother
can be “free” to fly to work while school hasn’t yet begun.

As an endearing nickname, I actually call each of my granddaughters ‫אפרוח‬/efroach – chick, to

their great delight. Birds symbolize spirituality. They are light, refined and fly in the sky. The bird
is associated with life because of its swift movements, which are completely alive. This is the
opposite of death without movement (Maharal, Gevurat Hashem 19).

88
 ‫ז‬-‫ו‬:‫ספר דברים פרק כב‬

“If you come across a bird’s nest on the road, on any tree or on the ground, with baby birds or
eggs, and the mother is sitting on the chicks or eggs, you must not take the mother along with her
young. You shall surely send away the mother, and only then may you take the young for yourself,
so that it may go well with you, and you may prolong your days” (Devarim 22:6-7).

This peculiar mitzvah prompts many questions such as why does the Torah forbid taking the
mother together with its young in the nest? Why do we have to send away the mother bird, if we
want to take her eggs or chicks? What is so kind about sending away the mother-bird in order to
take her young ones, won’t she feel pain when she returns to find her nest empty? Why is the
reward of this mitzvah to live a good long life?

In my chicken coop, I go daily to collect eggs without sending away any of the hens. Am I then
neglecting the favorable mitzvah of sending away the mother-bird? Rashi explains that this is not
the case, for it states, “If a bird’s nest chance before you on the way” this excludes a bird’s nest or
a chicken coop, which is in your property. Rambam explains that the purpose of the mitzvah of
sending away the mother bird is to teach us compassion. Taking the child within the sight of her
mother causes the mother acute pain. Animal mothers, just as human mothers, suffer when their
offspring is harmed. “There is no real distinction between the pain of humans and the pain of
animals, because a mother’s love and compassion for her young is not reasoned intellectually, but
is connected with emotions and instincts.

These are found among animals no less than among human beings… when the mother is sent away
since she does not see her young ones being taken, she does not feel any pain. In most cases,
however, this commandment will cause us to leave the whole nest untouched, because the young
or the eggs, which we are allowed to take, are, as a rule, unfit for food. If the Law provides that
such grief should not be caused to animals, how much more careful must we be not to cause grief
to our fellow human beings.” (Rambam, The Guide to the Perplexed, Part 3, Chapter 48).

By performing the mitzvah of sending away the mother-bird, we are training ourselves to feel
empathy and compassion for all G-d’s creations. This fits in with the theme of the month of Elul
when the heavenly Gates of Compassion are open.

The Purpose of All Mitzvot is to Instill Good Character-traits and Compassion

There is a subtle difference between the approach of the Rambam and the Ramban. Ramban holds
that compassion for the mother-bird herself is not the motive for this mitzvah. The fact that the
Torah permits eating certain animals proves that human needs override those of animals. He
explains that this mitzvah is related to another mitzvah which prohibits us from killing a mother

89
animal and her young on the same day (Vayikra 22:28). If these mitzvot were for the sake of
showing compassion toward the animals then it should be prohibited to slaughter the mother first
and afterwards her calf, or to take the chicks at all. Rather both of these mitzvot have the following
educational goal: to teach us not to be cruel-hearted. The focus of these mitzvot is therefore on
‘us’ rather than on the animals – to help us develop the trait of compassion by acting
compassionately. Through these two mitzvot, the Torah is teaching us that our need should not
become greed; thus, we are to avoid any action, which could lead to the destruction of an entire
species. A similar explanation is given by the Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 435). From the mitzvah
to send away the mother-bird, with its reward of a good and long life, we learn a general principle
about the purpose of all the mitzvot: To instill within us good character-traits such as compassion
and to avoid cruelty.

Relating to Animals as Living Feeling Creatures

According to Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak Kook, the mitzvah to send away the mother bird, the
mitzvah, which prohibits us from killing a mother animal and her young on the same day, and the
mitzvah to take the life of the animal in a humane way, all lead to the proper attitude towards
animals. “We must take to heart that we are not involved with a random object that moves about
like an automation, but with a living, feeling creature. We must become attuned to its senses, even
to its emotions, to the feeling it has for the life of its family members, and to its compassion for its
own offspring” (Chazon HaTzimchonut V’HaShalom).

Judaism is filled with beautiful and powerful teachings about showing compassion to animals.
Rivkah’s kindness of watering ten camels made her the worthy wife for the patriarch Yitzchak.
Moshe and King David were selected to be leaders of the Jewish people because of their
compassionate treatment of sheep. Many Torah laws mandate treating animals kindly. We may
not muzzle an ox while it is working in the field nor yoke a strong and a weak animal together.
Animals, as well as people, are to rest on Shabbat. We are prohibited from causing tza’ar ba’alei
chayim – any unnecessary pain, including psychological pain, to living creatures.

Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch explains:

Chorev 60:416

Today, unfortunately, animals are treated cruelly in many ways. Rather than being treated as
“living souls,” they are frequently treated as machines, as useful tools from which profits can be
made. In fact, modern intensive livestock agriculture is often called, “factory farming.” In the US
over a quarter-billion, male chicks are killed annually by suffocation instantly after birth, because
they do not produce eggs, and they do not provide sufficient meat to justify raising them to
maturity. This is just one symptom of how far we have moved from having compassion for birds.

90
Beyond Compassion

Although the ‘mother-bird mitzvah’ seems to derive from the noble consideration of mercy, we
may not assume that we understand its true reason. All the mitzvot are Divine decrees, beyond
human logic. The Mishna mentions that we must silence someone who prays to G-d to show him
compassion, because G-d’s compassion extends even to a mother bird.

Rabbi Yossi bar Zvida explains that in highlighting the ‘mother-bird mitzvah,’the worshipper
presents G-d’s laws as “springing from compassion, whereas they are only decrees” (Babylonian
Talmud, Berachot 33b). The Rabbis ruled that we may not limit the reason for the mitzvah. In
reality it may have many reasons, and compassion for the mother-bird is but one facet. (Tosfot
Yom Tov Berachot 5:3).

Nevertheless, Rabbi Shlomo Riskin goes along with the Rambam and stresses that G-d is known
as the compassionate one. In the attributes of G-d indicated in the Torah (Shemot 34:6), the first
attribute, after omnipotence, is mercy. There are numerous additional examples of G-d’s mercy in
the Torah. He explains that the Mishna’s ruling is meant to prevent us from limiting Hashem’s
great compassion, for sending away the mother bird is not a complete act of compassion.

The true act of compassion would be to prohibit us from taking the eggs and the chicks as well.
Permission to take the nestlings after sending away the mother- bird is a concession. The Torah’s
ultimate goal is that we become so sensitive that we won’t want to disturb the nest at all. Yet, the
Torah deals with reality, with the human instinct to take it all, mother and child. While the
commandment to send away the mother bird aims to sensitize us to the feelings of animals, it can’t
be invoked as an ideal of compassion based on which we can plead for G-d’s mercy.

The Pain of the Mother-bird Arouses Heavenly Mercy

The Zohar does not consider sending away the mother-bird as an act of compassion. When the
mother bird is driven out of her nest, she cries bitterly over her separation from her young. The
angel appointed over this species appears before the heavenly throne and complains: “Merciful
One, why has Your Torah ordered such a heartless act?”

The angels designated over the other bird species protest, objecting to their birds meeting the same
fate. G-d then reprimands all the heavenly hosts saying, “Why do the angels in charge of the birds
complain against the birds’ plight while none of you expressed concern over the anguish of My
sons and the Shechinah (Divine Presence)? “The Shechinah is exiled. She is alienated from Her
nest and home, the Holy Temple. My sons, the fledglings, dwell alone among their enemies, the
nations of the world. Yet, none among you cry out to arouse My compassion for them! “For My
own sake, then, I will redeem them!” (Tikunei Zohar 23a, cited by Chana Weisberg).

91
Thus, this mitzvah has a profound cosmic impact by arousing heavenly mercy for the Jewish
people. The mother-bird’s distress elicits Hashem’s compassion, and causes Him to shower His
mercy on Klal Yisrael and individuals in need. In turn, Hashem then rewards the person who
brought this about.

Mothers and Motherhood

We learned from the Zohar that the mitzvah of the mother-bird awakens the cry of the Divine
mother for her children. Thus, motherly devotion is a Divine trait embodied by the Shechina – the
Divine Female Indwelling presence. A mother’s love and self-sacrifice for her children extends
from the highest Shechina to the lowest animal kingdom.

As part of her motherly instinct, she will risk her life to save her young. It is therefore, specifically
while the mother-bird is engaged in her activities of motherhood that she will be vulnerable to the
hunter. Consequently, we must guard this noble character-trait and never exploit it. “If you are
faced with the possibility of acquiring a bird which may be used for food, but you find it in free
creation, serving its cosmic purpose – in that moment you should have respect for it as a servant
of creation; do not appropriate it at the moment of its service to its species” (Rabbi Samson Raphael
Hirsch, Chorev).

In his commentary on the mitzvah which prohibits us from killing a mother animal and its young
on the same day, Rabbi Hirsch comments: We venture to say that this idea reflects that aspect of
animal life that shows the beginning of a resemblance to human character. Although egotism, love
and concern for self is the powerful drive that stimulates animal life, the selfless love and care of
the animal mother for its young comprise the first elevation to that selflessness that characterizes
true human love – the godliest trait in the human character. We are to therefore emphasize and
respect this elevated trait when we find it among other creatures (Rabbi Yosef Ben Shlomo
Hakohen).

Earning a Long Life for Respecting the Mother

In spite of the limited compassion involved in the mitzvah of sending away the mother-bird, the
Torah promises a great reward, a long life, to those who fulfill it (Devarim 22:7). Rashi comments
that although it is a relatively easy mitzvah to carry out, involving little hardship or cost, we earn
the tremendous reward of long life through its performance. We can, therefore, only imagine how
great the reward will be for more difficult mitzvot.

The only other mitzvah for which long life is promised is for honoring our parents in the Ten
Commandments. Many are puzzled why the same reward is promised for the extremely difficult
mitzvah of honoring parents and the relatively simple mitzvah of sending away a mother-bird. Kli
Yakar explains that both of these mitzvot strengthen our belief in the creation of the world. They
both teach us that no being comes into the world without a mother giving birth.

This chain of motherhood leads us all the way back to Hashem – the original Mother, Who gave
birth to the world. Had the world been eternal, without a Creator, there would be no reason to
respect our parents. Yet, we believe that the first Mother shared her honor with all mothers

92
emanating from her. Therefore, we must honor our parents, and send away the mother bird. Since
both of these mitzvot strengthen our belief in the creation of the world, their reward is to live a
long life in this world. This is the foundation of emunah, as it states, “…the righteous person lives
by his faith” (Chavakuk 2:4). By means of emunah, we cleave to the source of life and therefore,
the reward for this is to live a long life (Women at the Crossroads pp. 176-177).

Simply, when a child sees his parents showing compassion to a mother-bird, she will be reminded
of her obligations to her own parents. A number of Midrashim state that fulfillment of this mitzvah
is a segulah (spiritual remedy) for having children. We learn this from the wording “that you may
you take the young for yourself” (Midrash Devarim Rabbah 6:6, Yalkut Shimoni 930). The
mitzvah is also a segulah for getting married and for acquiring a new house, since these two
mitzvot are juxtaposed to the mitzvah of sending away the mother-bird (Devarim 22:8, 22:13).

Sending Away the Mother-bird Brings the Mashiach

There is an even more incredible reward associated with this mitzvah. “If you fulfill the law of
kindness to birds (by sending away the mother bird), you will also fulfill the law of freeing
Hebrew slaves… and you will thereby hasten the advent of Mashiach” (Midrash Devarim
Rabbah 6.3).

The connection between sending away the mother-bird and hastening Mashiach is also alluded to
in the Hebrew letters that comprise the wording. “You shall surely send away the mother” – ‫ַשֵׁלַּח‬
‫ְתַּשַׁלּח ֶאת ָהֵאם‬. The last five letters which mean, “the mother” – ‫א”ת הא”ם‬/et ha’em can be read as an
acronym for ‫ – א’ליהו ת’שבי המבשר א’ת מ’שיח‬Eliyahu tisbi hamevaser et Mashiach – Eliyahu the
Tishbite who will herald the Mashiach (Rav Tzvi Elimelech of Dubno, Agra d’Kalah, Parashat Ki
Tetze).

How can the simple act of sending away a mother bird before taking the nestlings speed up the
arrival of the Mashiach? In the Garden of Eden, there was harmony between people and animals.
In spite of the Torah’s beautiful and powerful teachings about showing compassion to animals,
this harmony no longer exists.

The Torah relates that after the flood in the time of Noach, animals began to dread human beings
(Bereishit 9:2). In the Messianic era, the harmony between people and animals that existed in the
Garden of Eden will be restored. It will be a time when “…the wolf shall dwell with the lamb…
the lion shall eat straw like the ox… and no one shall hurt nor destroy in all of My (G-d’s) holy
mountain” (Yesha’yahu 11: 6-9).

In order to hasten the coming of Mashiach we must start to act out the conditions that will prevail
during the Messianic times. When we show compassion to a mother-bird it will lead to greater
concern also for people and one aspect of this will be freeing of slaves. For, as Rambam taught,
the Torah mandates that we should not cause grief to cattle or birds, how much more careful must
we be that we do not cause grief to fellow human beings. Finally, this increased compassion for
all of G-d creatures will lead to a greater appreciation of the Creator, and hence a greater

93
commitment to performing all of G-d’s mitzvot, and finally to that ideal time of justice,
compassion, and harmony embodied by the Messianic vision.20

20
Dr. Richard Schwartz, Ph.D., Collection on Judaism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights

94