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Advantages and Disadvantages of HAZOP Advantages of HAZOP

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Advantages and Disadvantages of HAZOP

Advantages of HAZOP

The main benefit of doing a highly organized, systematic, and thorough study is that the

resulting analysis is quite detailed. HAZOP is, as stated, mainly used for the determination and

evaluation of protection and operational hazards in ongoing process processes and sequential

operations. HAZOP has, overall, been a common technique in several industries (e.g.,

petrochemical, offshore) and procedures[ CITATION Kot12 \l 1033 ]. For simultaneous

activities and evaluation of evacuation systems, HAZOP is commonly used. However, the design

stage, the knowledge available, and the expertise of the team will make other Hazid techniques

more effective for many marine hazards

The HAZOP research often includes feedback from a variety of disciplines that leads to

a more balanced analysis. The team methodology expected by HAZOP fosters many views and

guarantees that the study will include a wide spectrum of possible concerns. The procedure itself

is generally simple to grasp and not extremely complex, which means that the team member who

participates in the study does not need rigorous preparation[ CITATION Pér13 \l 1033 ].

HAZOP does a specifically recorded review, which identifies the risks, probable failures, the

possible triggers of failures. The following are some advantages of HAZOP


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1. The complex method or a difficult protocol is more appropriate for the analysis.

2. It lets vast research systems and assesses them in depth. One of the advantages of this service

is that experienced engineers involved in the operation, commissioning, and related plant

life usually get upside down.

3. The analysis of protection as well as operability issues is the most appropriate procedure.

Additionally, although often single rail code produces the same features in the protection

stages, the engineers prefer not to carry out nominal risk evaluation since the

consequences affecting facilities, external parts, or driver defects in rather specific

situations are not publicly taken into account.

4. The decision on control mechanisms or precautions is the most sensible, which gives a

constructive outcome.

5. It is widespread and is well understand and familiar with its advantages and drawbacks. Also,

it uses the expertise of the staff in the team

6. It is systemic and complete and can recognize all dangerous deviations both in nature and

operability terms.

7. It works with technological glitches as well as human mistakes. It recognizes and formulates

guidelines on current protections for further protection

8. The team strategy makes the relationship of multiple disciplines or organizations especially

suitable

9. It offers a way to evaluate risks until a device becomes operational. Besides, the approach

facilitates the derivation in the scheme of correction and prevention steps.


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Disadvantages of HAZOP

The disadvantages of HAZOP are that the study focuses solely on individual failure

situations rather than variations of circumstances that can contribute to failure. Failure always

arises from many failure inputs, but HAZOP cannot capture these scenarios. The HAZOP

method may take time, be too thorough and complicated, and need expert support[ CITATION

Sin19 \l 1033 ]. HAZOP often relates to the study using "guide terms," future errors cannot

necessarily be attributed to "guide words," which is why the analysis of HAZOP risks failing.

1. It's a time-consuming and complex procedure since the obvious framework of the HAZOP

study provides a deceptive sense of security.

2. Intensive and demanding study sessions might be required when a full review is needed.

3. Observe chronic or professional risks in general. As the connection between the HAZOP

method's shortcomings and professionals' human weaknesses

4. Instead of protection, people may take time to discuss organizational problems in the

Inductive/deductive starting point for scenario identification that is counterintuitive

5. Their effectiveness relies on the leader's support and the team's expertise. The HAZOP leader

must have a detailed understanding of the batch mechanism before the analysis starts. Otherwise,

during the team analysis, it may be inefficient whether most other team members recognize the

method

6. It is optimized for process dangers. It requires a change to cover other risk types, including

several facets of design purpose that must be addressed for a full analysis, and defining them

may be challenging.
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7. One technique is known as a phase by step for a batch HAZOP. Every batch operation, in turn,

is done, and the system's guideword analysis is performed for this stage. The remaining measures

are taken sequentially using the same technology after the analysis is completed for the first

stage. The methodology may be very routine but must be systemic and full

8. It constitutes a method for a thorough review and includes the preparation of procedural

descriptions and access to comprehensive design and organizational details, sometimes

inadequate in-depth. These records can, however, profit from the usage of the methodology

9. Lengthy documentation (for complete recording); therefore, the method is time-consuming

and work-intensive since several experts in different subject areas are needed

10. The approach cannot offer sufficient design alternatives to human mistakes, it highlights

since the identification of significant deviations is difficult. Due to the many, composite and

recurrent deviations are all taken into consideration.

11. It concentrates on the identification of individual errors. Not all case combinations –

comprehensive strategies including fault tree analysis might be needed.

12. The emphasis on deviations and the propagation of deviations

Guide terms' limitations are a lack of guidance about identifying the origins of anomalies and the

activities that lead to them. Focusing on particular hazards may be difficult as chemical reactivity

risks and procedure modifications pose significant challenges.

In businesses such as the manufacturing, chemical, oil or gas, pharmaceuticals and

electricity generation industries, and elsewhere, the detected dangers would certainly be

remedied to deter injury, deaths, and equipment destruction. When speaking about strengthening
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occupational protection, HAZOP may be a useful guide for employers[ CITATION Pér13 \l

1033 ]. It is designed in a manner that looks at step-by-step operations and operational intentions,

and anomalies. HAZOP identifies all the possible unintended steps to determine potential threats.

Unlike other conventional processes to identify hazards, HAZOP goes beyond only looking at

what happens when everything goes according to schedule.

In cessation, Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) is the most suitable method for studying

the complicated process for the identification of potential hazards and possible problems in the

engineered process by analyzing the triggers of process variance and the related harm and

examine precautions to avoid incidents at the operational stage of hazard and operability

(HAZOP). The HAZOP team should be experienced and knowledgeable about the PHA (Process

Hazard Analysis) methodology headed by the decision-making facilitator. For the whole HAZOP

report and each decision, tasks and obligations must be held until the study is closed.
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References

Dunjó, Jordi, et al. "Hazard and operability (HAZOP) analysis. A literature review." Journal of

hazardous materials 173.1-3 (2010): 19-32.

Kotek, L., and M. Tabas. "HAZOP study with qualitative risk analysis for prioritization of

corrective and preventive actions." Procedia Engineering 42 (2012): 808-815.

Nolan, Dennis P. Safety and security review for the process industries: Application of HAZOP,

PHA, what-if and SVA reviews. William Andrew, 2011.

Pérez-Marín, M., and M. A. Rodríguez-Toral. "HAZOP–Local approach in the Mexican oil &

gas industry." Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26.5 (2013): 936-940.

Single, Johannes I., Juergen Schmidt, and Jens Denecke. "State of research on the automation of

HAZOP studies." Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 62 (2019):

103952.

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