EUFRACIO D. ROJAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. CONSTANCIO B. MAGLANA, Facts
EUFRACIO D. ROJAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. CONSTANCIO B. MAGLANA, Facts
EUFRACIO D. ROJAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. CONSTANCIO B. MAGLANA, Facts
Facts
Issue
The main issue in this case is the nature of the partnership and legal relationship of the
Maglana-Rojas after Pahamotang retired from the second partnership.
Held
it was not the intention of the partners to dissolve the first partnership, upon the
constitution of the second one, which they unmistakably called an "Additional Agreement"
(Exhibit "9-B") (Brief for Defendant-Appellee, pp. 24-25). Except for the fact that they took
in one industrial partner; gave him an equal share in the profits and fixed the term of the
second partnership to thirty (30) years, everything else was the same. Thus, they adopted
the same name, EASTCOAST DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISES, they pursued the same
purposes and the capital contributions of Rojas and Maglana as stipulated in both
partnerships call for the same amounts. Just as important is the fact that all subsequent
renewals of Timber License No. 35-36 were secured in favor of the First Partnership, the
original licensee. To all intents and purposes therefore, the First Articles of Partnership were
only amended, in the form of Supplementary Articles of Co-Partnership (Exhibit "C") which
was never registered (Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 5). Otherwise stated, even during the
existence of the second partnership, all business transactions were carried out under the
duly registered articles. As found by the trial court, it is an admitted fact that even up to
now, there are still subsisting obligations and contracts of the latter (Decision, R.A. pp. 950-
957). No rights and obligations accrued in the name of the second partnership except in
favor of Pahamotang which was fully paid by the duly registered partnership
On the other hand, there is no dispute that the second partnership was dissolved by
common consent. Said dissolution did not affect the first partnership which continued to
exist. Significantly, Maglana and Rojas agreed to purchase the interest, share and
participation in the second partnership of Pahamotang and that thereafter, the two (Maglana
and Rojas) became the owners of equipment contributed by Pahamotang. Even more
convincing, is the fact that Maglana on March 17, 1957, wrote Rojas, reminding the latter of
his obligation to contribute either in cash or in equipment, to the capital investment of the
partnership as well as his obligation to perform his duties as logging superintendent. This
reminder cannot refer to any other but to the provisions of the duly registered Articles of
Co-Partnership. As earlier stated, Rojas replied that he will not be able to comply with the
promised contributions and he will not work as logging superintendent. By such statements,
it is obvious that Roxas understood what Maglana was referring to and left no room for
doubt that both considered themselves governed by the articles of the duly registered
partnership
Under the circumstances, the relationship of Rojas and Maglana after the withdrawal of
Pahamotang can neither be considered as a De Facto Partnership, nor a Partnership at Will,
for as stressed, there is an existing partnership, duly registered.