G.R. No. 179535. June 9, 2014.*

 
JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO ESPINELI, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Under

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence
would be sufficient to convict the offender “if i) there is more than
one circumstance; ii) the facts from which the inference is derived
are proven; and iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”—Truly, “direct
evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from
which a court may draw its finding of guilt.” The rules of evidence
allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its
conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence
“which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference
which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established.” Under
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence
would be sufficient to convict the offender “if i) there is more than
one circumstance; ii) the facts from which the inference is derived
are proven; and iii) the combination of all circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.” All the
circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same
time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus,
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld
provided that the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that
points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty
person.
Same; Same; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Evidence is hearsay
when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the
competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness
by whom it is sought to produce.—Evidence is hearsay when its
probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency and
credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is
sought to produce. However, while the testimony of a witness
regarding a state-

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

 
 
366

ment made by another person given for the purpose of

establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is
clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing
the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that
the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made.
Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is
relevant is the fact that such statement has been made, the
hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As
a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a
fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of
such a fact. This is known as the doctrine of independently
relevant statements.
Same; Same; Independently Relevant Statements; The
testimony of National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent
Segunial is in the nature of an independently relevant statement
where what is relevant is the fact that Reyes made such statement
and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial.—The testimony of
NBI Agent Segunial that while he was investigating Reyes, the
latter confided to him that he (Reyes) heard petitioner telling
Sotero “Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon” and
that he saw the two (petitioner and Sotero) armed with a .45
caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a red
car, cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence. This is considering
that NBI Agent Segunial’s testimony was not presented to prove
the truth of such statement but only for the purpose of
establishing that on February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn
statement containing such narration of facts. This is clear from
the offer of the witness’ oral testimony. Moreover, NBI Agent
Segunial himself candidly admitted that he is incompetent to
testify on the truthfulness of Reyes’ statement. Verily then, what
the prosecution sought to be admitted was the fact that Reyes
made such narration of facts in his sworn statement and not
necessarily to prove the truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI
Agent Segunial is in the nature of an independently relevant
statement where what is relevant is the fact that Reyes made
such statement and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In
such a case, the statement of the witness is admissible as
evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply.
Same; Same; Notarized Documents; The written statement of
Reyes is a notarized document having been duly subscribed and

 
 
367

sworn to before Atty. Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent of the

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). As such, it may be
presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the due execution
of this instrument or document involved pursuant to Section 30 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.—The written statement of Reyes is
a notarized document having been duly subscribed and sworn to
before Atty. Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent of the NBI. As
such, it may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the
due execution of this instrument or document involved pursuant
to Section 30 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. As held in
Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza, 607 SCRA 807 (2009), a notarized
document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and
due execution which must be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence. Here, no clear and convincing evidence was presented
by petitioner to overcome such presumption. Clearly, therefore,
the CA did not err in its appreciation of Reyes’ sworn statement
as testified to by NBI Agent Segunial.
Criminal Law; Homicide; The Supreme Court (SC) agrees
with the Court of Appeals (CA) that petitioner is guilty only of the
crime of homicide in view of the prosecution’s failure to prove any
of the alleged attendant circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and nighttime.—The Court agrees with the CA that
petitioner is guilty only of the crime of homicide in view of the
prosecution’s failure to prove any of the alleged attendant
circumstances of abuse of superior strength and nighttime. As
aptly observed by the appellate court: The circumstance of abuse
of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of
forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation
of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the
aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in the commission
of the crime. However, as none of the prosecution witnesses saw
how the killing was perpetrated, abuse of superior strength
cannot be appreciated in this case. Neither can nighttime serve as
an aggravating circumstance, the time of the commission of the
crime was not even alleged in the Information.
Same; Damages; Moral Damages; Moral damages are
mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the
death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder
or homicide.—While the CA correctly imposed the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil

 
 
368

indemnity, it failed, however, to award moral damages. These

awards are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other
than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission
of murder or homicide. Thus, for moral damages, the award of
P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim is only proper.
Same; Same; Interest Rates; In addition and in conformity
with current policy, an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum
is imposed on all the monetary awards for damages from date of
finality of the judgment until fully paid.—In addition and in
conformity with current policy, an interest at the legal rate of 6%
per annum is imposed on all the monetary awards for damages
from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
  Godofredo Q. Asuncion for petitioner.
  Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

 
RESOLUTION
 
DEL CASTILLO,  J.:

Jurisprudence teaches us that “for circumstantial

evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty,
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent x  x  x.”1 Thus, conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.2

_______________

1 People v. Lopez, 371 Phil. 852, 860; 313 SCRA 114, 120 (1999).
2 People v. Abdulah, 596 Phil. 870, 876; 576 SCRA 797, 803 (2009).

 
 
369

Assailed in the present Petition for Review on

Certiorari3 is the July 6, 2007 Decision4 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02252 which
modified the August 31, 1999 Decision5 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90, by finding
petitioner Jose Espineli a.k.a. Danilo “Danny” Espineli
(petitioner) guilty of the crime of homicide instead of
murder. Also questioned is the CA’s September 14, 2007
Resolution6 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. 7
 
Factual Antecedents
 
On June 24, 1997, an Information8 charging petitioner
with the crime of murder was filed before the RTC,9 the
accusatory portion of which reads as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of December, 1996 in the

Municipality of Imus, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
together with one (1) Sotero Paredes and three (3) other
unidentified persons, whose real names, identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, said Sotero Paredes having been
earlier charged with the same offense, and is now undergoing
trial before Branch 90, of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, then
armed with firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation and taking advantage of supe-

_______________

3 Rollo, pp. 10-39.

4 CA Rollo, 119-142; penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama,
Jr. (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices
Noel G. Tijam and Sesinando S. Villon.
 5 Records, pp. 183-196; penned by Executive Judge Dolores L. Español.
6 CA Rollo, p. 164.
7 Id., at pp. 147-152.
8 Records, pp. 1-2.
9 Later docketed as Criminal Case No. 4898-97.

 
 
370

rior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously, attack, assault and shoot one Alberto Berbon y
Downie with the use of said firearms, thereby inflicting upon the
latter multiple gunshot wounds on his head and different parts of
his body which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said Alberto Berbon y Downie.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10

 
Petitioner was arrested on July 1, 1997 and when
arraigned on July 7, 1997 with the assistance of counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty.11
The facts show that in the early evening of December 15,
1996, Alberto Berbon y Downie (Alberto), a 49-year old
Senior Desk Coordinator of the radio station DZMM, was
shot in the head and different parts of the body in front of
his house in Imus, Cavite by unidentified malefactors who
immediately fled the crime scene on board a waiting car.
Meanwhile, the group of Atty. Orly Dizon (Atty. Dizon)
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) arrested and
took into custody one Romeo Reyes (Reyes) for the crime of
Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon. Reyes confided to the
group of Atty. Dizon that he was willing to give vital
information regarding the Berbon case. In due course, NBI
Agent Dave Segunial (NBI Agent Segunial) interviewed
Reyes on February 10, 1997 and reduced his statement into
writing whereby Reyes claimed that on December 15, 1996,
he saw petitioner and Sotero Paredes (Paredes) board a red
car while armed with a .45 caliber firearm and armalite,
respectively; and that petitioner told Paredes that “ayaw ko
nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon.”12 Subsequently,
Reyes posted bail and was released on February 14, 1997.
Thenceforth, he jumped

_______________

10 Records, p. 1.
11 Id., at pp. 30, 32.
 12 Id., at p. 36.

 
 
371

bail and was never again heard of. NBI Agent Segunial
testified on these facts during the trial.
The victim’s widow, Sabina Berbon (Sabina) likewise
testified. According to her, sometime in the third week of
February 1997 Reyes sought financial help so he could
transfer his family to the province and protect them from
any untoward consequence that may result from his giving
information to the NBI regarding the death of Sabina’s
husband. Sabina gave him the total amount of P1,500.00
and promised to help him in applying for the witness
protection program. This was affirmed on the witness
stand by Sabina’s brother, Bartolome Pakingan. After that,
however, Reyes never came back.
Another prosecution witness, Rodolfo Dayao (Rodolfo),
testified that he sold his red Ford Escort car to three
persons who came to his residence in the afternoon of
September 1, 1996. He later identified the said car from the
photographs presented to him by the police officers.
Dr. Ludivino J. Lagat (Dr. Lagat), the NBI Medico-Legal
Officer who conducted a post-mortem examination on
Alberto, declared in his Autopsy Report that the victim
suffered multiple gunshot wounds in the head and body. He
also stated that based on the size of the gunshot wounds or
entrance, high-powered guns were used in the killing.
Petitioner, on the other hand, did not adduce evidence
for his defense. Instead, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence13
without leave of court. As no action whatsoever was taken
thereon by the trial court, petitioner just moved that the
case be deemed submitted for decision.
 
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
 
 In its Decision14 dated August 31, 1999, the trial court
adjudged petitioner guilty of murder, thus:

_______________

13 Id., at pp. 133-136.

14 Id., at pp. 183-196.

 
 
 372

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused JOSE ESPINELI

a.k.a. DANILO “Danny” ESPINELI, is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing the crime of “Murder” as charged.
He is, therefore, sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, and is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Alberto
Berbon y Downie, the civil indemnity of P50,000.00, and actual
and compensatory damages in the total amount of P135,000.00 as
funeral expenses (Exhibit “H”), interment fee of P8,360.00
(Exhibit “C”), medical expenses in the total amount of P1,519.45
(Exhibit[s] “D,” “D-1” and “D-2”) and for the contract fees of
Memorial Park Care the amount of P15,700.00 (Exhibit “E”).
Furthermore, considering that he is a high risk prisoner, his
transfer to the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa City, Metro
Manila, is immediately ordered.
SO ORDERED.15

 
Petitioner seasonably appealed his conviction before this
Court. Pursuant, however, to the Court’s pronouncement in
People v. Mateo,16 the case was ordered transferred to the
CA for appropriate action and disposition through a
Resolution17 dated March 22, 2006.
 
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
 
In its Decision18 promulgated on July 6, 2007, the CA
affirmed with modification the findings of the trial court. It
ratiocinated that since none of the prosecution witnesses
saw how the killing of the victim was perpetrated, the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
cannot be appreciated. Neither can nighttime serve as an
aggravating circumstance as the time of the commission of
the crime was not

_______________

15 Id., at p. 196.
16 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
17 CA Rollo, pp. 39-40.
18 Id., at pp. 119-142.

 
 
373
even alleged in the Information. In view thereof, the CA
found petitioner guilty only of homicide instead of murder.
The decretal portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is

hereby DISMISSED. The appealed Decision dated August 31,
1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-
appellant is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide and is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years of prisión mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
In all other respects, the said decision STANDS.
In the service of his sentence, accused-appellant shall be
credited in full with the period of his preventive imprisonment.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.19

 
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration20 which the CA denied in its Resolution21
dated September 14, 2007.
Hence, this Petition.
 
Arguments of the Parties
 
Petitioner posits that the CA should not have affirmed
the Decision of RTC as the latter erred:

1.       x x x [in admitting, considering and giving] probative value

to Exhibit “A,” the “Sinumpaang Salay-

_______________

19 Id., at p. 141.
20 Id., at pp. 147-152.
21 Id., at p. 164.

 
 
374

say” of [Reyes] because [he] was not presented in court to confirm,

affirm and authenticate the contents of his sworn statement. It
resulted in the denial of petitioner’s constitutional right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers.22
2.            x  x  x [in convicting] the [petitioner] based on unproven,
inadmissible circumstantial evidence.23
3.            x  x  x in not acquitting the petitioner for failure of the
prosecution to prove [his guilt] beyond reasonable doubt x x x.24

 
In sum, petitioner anchors his quest for the reversal of
his conviction on the alleged erroneous admission in
evidence of the Sinumpaang Salaysay25 of Reyes for being
hearsay and inadmissible. He avers that the said sworn
statement should not have been given probative value
because its contents were neither confirmed nor
authenticated by the affiant. Thus, all circumstances
emanating from or included in the sworn statement must
be totally brushed aside as lacking any evidentiary and
probative value. Petitioner emphasizes that as found by the
courts below, there was no direct evidence linking him to
the crime; therefore, he wants this Court to review the
sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence upon which his
conviction was based as he believes that the same failed to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing respondent People of the Philippines, concurs
with the petitioner and recommends his acquittal.26 It is
also of the view that the prosecution failed to discharge its
burden of proving petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

_______________

22 Rollo, p. 29.
23 Id., at p. 32.
24 Id., at p. 35.
25 Records, pp. 36-37.
26 See the OSG’s Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, Rollo,
pp. 142-157.

 
 
375

The Court’s Ruling

 
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Truly, “direct evidence of the commission of a crime is
not the only basis from which a court may draw its finding
of guilt.”27 The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely
on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of
guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence “which
indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which
the fact-finder draws from the evidence established.”28
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict the
offender “if i) there is more than one circumstance; ii) the
facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and
iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”29 All the
circumstances must be consistent with one another,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances
proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.30
In this case, the circumstances found by the CA as
forming an unbroken chain leading to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that petitioner, to the exclusion of all
others, is the guilty person are the following:

_______________

27 People v. Manchu, 593 Phil. 398, 406; 572 SCRA 752, 759 (2008).
28 People v. Osianas, 588 Phil. 615, 627; 567 SCRA 319, 329 (2008).
29 People v. Gaffud, Jr., 587 Phil. 521, 530; 566 SCRA 76, 85 (2008).
30 Supra note 2.

 
 
376

1.  In the morning of December 15, 1996, petitioner was

heard telling his co-accused Sotero Paredes (Sotero) “ayaw
ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon” before
boarding a red car. Sotero was holding an armalite rifle
while petitioner was armed with a .45 caliber pistol;
2.  The said red car was identified or recognized by
prosecution witness Rodolfo to be the same car he had sold
to Sotero for P10,000.00 in September 1996;
3.  The victim Alberto was fatally shot later in the day
(December 15, 1996) by unidentified gunmen who
thereafter immediately fled riding a red car; and
4.  Post-mortem examination of the victim’s body
showed that he sustained multiple gunshot wounds, the
nature, severity and characteristics of which indicate that
they were inflicted using high-powered guns, possibly an
armalite rifle and .22 caliber pistol.31
 The records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the
actual killing of Alberto. Thus the courts below were forced
to render their verdict of conviction on circumstantial
evidence as sanctioned under Section 4, Rule 13332 of the
Rules of Court. The central issue now confronting this
Court is whether the prosecution has amply proved by
circumstantial evidence petitioner’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

_______________

31 CA Rollo, pp. 138-139.

32 Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.—Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if:
(a)  There is more than one circumstance;
(b)  The facts from which the inference are derived are proven; and
(c)  The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

 
 
377

The circumstantial evidence relied

upon by the Court of Appeals suffi-

ciently support petitioner’s conviction.

 
The Court has carefully scrutinized the evidence
presented in this case in the light of the standards
discussed above and finds the foregoing circumstantial
evidence sufficient to support a judgment of conviction.
Several reasons deserve our acceptance of the
circumstances upon which petitioner’s conviction was
based, to wit:
First, NBI Agent Segunial testified that he had
investigated Reyes and reduced the latter’s statement into
writing declaring, among others, that in the morning of
December 15, 1996, he (Reyes) overheard petitioner telling
Sotero “Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon”
and saw them armed with .45 caliber pistol and an
armalite, respectively, before boarding a red car. The CA
gave weight to Reyes’ sworn statement in this wise:

The probative value of Romeo Reyes’ sworn statement as to the

words spoken by appellant to his co-accused Sotero Paredes in the
morning of December 15, 1996 cannot be disputed. x x x33

 
 Petitioner takes vigorous exception to the said findings,
insisting that the said sworn statement belongs to the
category of hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible.
He asserts that its contents were never confirmed or
authenticated by Reyes, thus, it lacks probative value.
The Court is unconvinced.
The hearsay evidence rule as provided under Section 36,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:

_______________

33 CA Rollo, p. 139.

 
 
378

Sec.  36.  Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;

hearsay excluded.—A witness can testify only to those facts which
he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules.

 
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in
whole or in part on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to
produce. However, while the testimony of a witness
regarding a statement made by another person given for
the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in
the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if
the purpose of placing the statement on the record is
merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor
of such statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or
falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact
that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule does
not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of
fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as
to the existence of such a fact.34 This is known as the
doctrine of independently relevant statements.35
In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent
Segunial that while he was investigating Reyes, the latter
confided to him that he (Reyes) heard petitioner telling
Sotero “Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon”
and that he saw the two (petitioner and Sotero) armed with
a .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before
boarding a red car, cannot be regarded as hearsay
evidence. This is considering that NBI Agent Segunial’s
testimony was not presented to prove the truth of such
statement but only for the purpose of establishing that on
February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn

_______________

34 Republic v. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr., 441 Phil. 656, 672; 393
SCRA 361, 371 (2002).
35 Id.

 
 
379

statement containing such narration of facts. This is clear

from the offer of the witness’ oral testimony.36 Moreover,
NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted that he is
incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes’
statement.37 Verily then, what the prosecution sought to be
admitted was the fact that Reyes made such narration of
facts in his sworn statement and not necessarily to prove
the truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent
Segunial is in the nature of an independently relevant
statement where what is relevant is the fact that Reyes
made such statement and the truth and falsity thereof is
immaterial. In such a case, the statement of the witness is
admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule does not
apply.38 Moreover, the written statement of Reyes is a
notarized document having been duly subscribed and
sworn to before Atty. Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent
of the NBI. As such, it may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment
being a prima facie evidence of the due execution of this
instrument or document involved pursuant to Section 30 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. As held in Gutierrez v.
Mendoza-Plaza,39 a notarized document enjoys a prima
facie presumption of authenticity and due execution which
must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Here,
no clear and convincing evidence was presented by
petitioner to overcome such presumption. Clearly,
therefore, the CA did not err in its appreciation of Reyes’
sworn statement as testified to by NBI Agent Segunial.
Second, the identification and recognition through
photograph by Rodolfo of the 1971 Ford Escort red colored
car as the same car he had sold to Sotero in September
1996 clearly and convincingly prove that it was the very
same red car used in the killing of Alberto on December 15,
1996.

_______________

36 TSN, August 1, 1993, p. 3.

37 Id., at p. 25.
38 People v. Gumimba, 545 Phil. 627, 652; 517 SCRA 25, 49 (2007).
39 G.R. No. 185477, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 807, 817.

 
 
380

Third, Alberto was shot and killed on December 15,

1996 and the gunmen immediately fled the scene riding a
red car which was identified as the same car previously
sold by Rodolfo to Sotero.
Fourth, though the testimony of Dr. Lagat was limited
to the post-mortem examination of the cadaver of Alberto,
his findings that the victim suffered multiple gunshot
wounds and that the same were caused by high-powered
guns, served as corroborative evidence and contributed in a
significant way in establishing the level of proof that the
law requires in convicting petitioner.
Lastly, petitioner’s escape from detention on August 26,
1998 while the case was pending can also be considered as
another circumstance since it is a strong indication of his
guilt.
All told, this Court finds the concordant combination
and cumulative effect of the alleged established
circumstances, which essentially were the same
circumstances found by the trial court and the appellate
court, to have satisfied the requirement of Section 4, Rule
133 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, the incriminating
circumstances, when taken together, constitute an
unbroken chain of events enough to arrive at the conclusion
that petitioner was responsible for the killing of the victim.
Besides, it is “[a]n established rule in appellate review x
x x that the trial court’s factual findings, including its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the
probative weight of their testimonies, as well as the
conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded
respect, if not conclusive effect. These factual findings and
conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by
the CA,”40 as in this case.
_______________

40 People v. Villasan, 618 Phil. 240, 251; 603 SCRA 241, 253 (2009).

 
 
381

The Crime Committed and the

Proper Penalty.

 
The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner is guilty
only of the crime of homicide in view of the prosecution’s
failure to prove any of the alleged attendant circumstances
of abuse of superior strength and nighttime. As aptly
observed by the appellate court:

The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present

whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes
advantage of it in the commission of the crime. However, as none
of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing was perpetrated,
abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this case.
Neither can nighttime serve as an aggravating circumstance, the
time of the commission of the crime was not even alleged in the
Information.41 (Citations omitted)

 
The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide
is reclusion temporal.42 In view of the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the
sentence should be within the range of reclusion temporal
in its medium term which has a duration of fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months, while the minimum should be
within the range of prisión mayor which has a duration of
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)

_______________

41 CA Rollo, p. 140.
42 Revised Penal Code, Article 249.
Art.  249.  Homicide.—Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any
of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be
deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
  
 
382

years. Thus, the imposition by the CA of an indeterminate

prison term of ten (10) years of prisión mayor, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, is in order.
 
Petitioner’s Civil liability
 
While the CA correctly imposed the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, it failed, however, to award
moral damages. These awards are mandatory without need
of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim,
owing to the fact of the commission of murder or
homicide.43 Thus, for moral damages, the award of
P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim is only proper.
Anent the award of actual damages, this Court sees no
reason to disturb the amount awarded by the trial court as
upheld by the CA since the itemized medical and burial
expenses were duly supported by receipts and other
documentary evidence.
The CA did not grant any award of damages for loss of
earning capacity and rightly so. Though Sabina testified as
to the monthly salary of the deceased, the same remains
unsubstantiated. “Such indemnity cannot be awarded in
the absence of documentary evidence except where the
victim was either self­-employed or a daily wage worker
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws.”44 The exceptions find no application in this case.
In addition and in conformity with current policy, an
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all
the monetary awards for damages from date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid.

_______________

43 People v. Orias, G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 417, 437-
438.
44 People v. Mamaruncas, G.R. No. 179497, January 25, 2012, 664
SCRA 182, 202.

 
 
383
 WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Petition
is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 6, 2007 and
Resolution dated September 14, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02252 are AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATIONS that petitioner JOSE
ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO “DANNY” ESPINELI is further
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim ALBERTO BERBON
y DOWNIE P50,000.00 as moral damages as well as
interest on all the damages assessed at the legal rate of 6%
per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe,

JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed with

modifications.

Notes.—Newspaper clippings are hearsay if they were

offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter
alleged. (Viloria vs. Continental Airlines, Inc., 663 SCRA 57
[2012])
A witness may not testify on matters which he or she
merely learned from others either because said witness was
told or read or heard those matters. (Malayan Insurance
Co., Inc. vs. Alberto, 664 SCRA 791 [2012])
 
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