A.

Katarungang Pambarangay

(a) There is hereby created in each barangay a lupong tagapamayapa, hereinafter referred to as
the lupon, composed of the punong barangay, as chairman and ten (10) to twenty (20)
members. The lupon shall be constituted every three (3) years in the manner provided herein.

B. Cases:

1. Caasi v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990

Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local elections of January 18,
1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by Mateo Caasi on the ground that under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code Miguel was not qualified because he is a green card
holder, hence, a permanent resident of the USA and not of Bolinao.

ISSUE:

a. Whether or not green card is a proof that one is a permanent resident of the US

b. Whether Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting

himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988 local elections,
waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States

c. Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office

HELD:

a. Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and
his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the United States. In the "Application for Immigrant Visa and
Alien Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the
US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's
answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if
permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently."
b. No. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that
the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country." The waiver of his green card should be
manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for
elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for
any elective office."
c. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the
United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one
 year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor
of that municipality on January 18, 1988.

2. Jalover v. Osmena GR No. 209286 September 23, 2014

FACTS:

In this case, petitioners sought the cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy of Osmena.

Petitioners claimed that Osmeña falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already
been a resident of Toledo City fifteen (15) years prior to the scheduled May 13, 2013 local
elections.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Osmeña satisfied residency requirement.

HELD:

Yes. Yes. The Supreme Court held that, similarly, the fact that Osmeña has no registered
property under his name does not belie his actual residence in Toledo City because property
ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for local election. It is enough
that he should livein the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative.

Ratio: To rule otherwise, would imply that only the landed can establish compliance with the
residency requirement.

3. Moreno v Comelec GR 168550 August 10, 2006

FACTS:

Respondent seeks for the disqualification of the petitioner from running for Punong Barangay
as the latter was convicted of the crime of Arbitrary Detention with a penalty of imprisonment
of 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months.

Petitioner argued that he was granted probation and hence imposition of sentence and its
accessory penalties were suspended.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Moreno is disqualified.

HELD:

NO. The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase “within
two years after serving sentence” found in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code.
It appears that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put
on hold for the duration of the probation. Clearly, the period within which a person is under
probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged

When Moreno was final discharged upon the court’s finding that he has fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for
public office.

4. Maquiling v. Comelec et al GR No. 195649

FACTS:

Arnado, a natural born Filipino lost his Filipino citizenship then later applied for repatriation
under RA No. 9225 and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the PH In 2008. On the
same day, Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.

Respondent, who garnered the highest number of lawful votes, assailed that Arnado be
disqualified as the latter has been using a foreign passport after such renunciation.

ISSUE:

a. WoN intervention is allowed in a disqualification case

b. WoN the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects oneʼs
qualifications to run for public office
c. WoN the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.
HELD:

a. Yes. Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has
not yet been any proclamation of the winner.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987,
which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification

even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.

The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only
after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the
disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.
 b. Yes. The use of foreign passport after renouncing oneʼs foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to oneʼs nationality and citizenship; it does not
divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously.

c. No. The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. Thus, Maquiling is
not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the
qualified candidates.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.

The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and
must also be respected.

5. Socrates v. Comelec 391 SCRA 457 2002

FACTS:

A preparatory recall assembly was initiated for the recall of Mayor Socrates. Mr. Hagedorn filed
his COC. Several petitions were filed to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election
on the ground that he will be running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and
having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the
instant recall election for the same post.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Hagedorn is qualified to run as mayor in the recall election.

HELD:

Yes. A recall election mid-way in a term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent
election but not an immediate re-election after the third term. In the case of Hagedorn, his
candidacy in the recall election in 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third
consecutive term which ended in 2001.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a
fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election,
is no longer covered by the prohibition.
6. Montebon on v. Comelec GR No. 180444 April 9 2008

FACTS:

Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan,
Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. However, in January 2004, or during his second
term, Montebon succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the
incumbent vice-mayor retired. When Montebon filed his certificate of candidacy againas
municipal councilor, a petition for disqualification was filed against him based on the three-
term limit rule.

ISSUE:

WoN such assumption of office by succession is an interruption.

HELD:

Yes. In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that the two conditions for the
application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected
for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2) that he has FULLY
served three consecutive terms.

Thus, for the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been elected three
consecutive times; he must also have served three consecutive terms in the same position
(Borja v. COMELEC).

Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since
it involves the performance of a public duty by a government official, the non-performance of
which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty
and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and
obligatory rather than voluntary (Montebon v. Comelec)

Succession in local government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary

severance from office.

7. Aldovino v. Comelec GR 184836

FACTS:

Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive
terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of
office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in
relation to a criminal case.

Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification
was sought by herein petitioners

ISSUE:

WoN preventive suspension constitutes interruption of term.

HELD:

No. Preventive suspension –whether under the Local Government Code, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, or the Ombudsman Act–is an interim remedial measure to address
the situation of an official who have been charged administratively or criminally, where the
evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from
performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but
does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only
results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability. This was what exactly happened to Asilo.
Hence, the preventive suspension of public officials (Asilo) does not interrupt their term for
purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code (RA 7160).

8. City of Barangay v. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation GR 195003 June 7 2017

FACTS:

Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted the Assailed Ordinance. City Ordinance No. 3, S. 2001
contravenes Presidential Decree No. 1067, better known as "The Water Code of the
Philippines" as it is an encroachment into the authority of the [NWRB].

It directs installation of plants for purpose of utilizing water without requisite water permit
from the NWRB. (The ordinance requires heavy industries operating along the portions of
Batangas Bay within the territorial jurisdiction of Batangas City to construct desalination plants
to facilitate the use of seawater as coolant for their industrial facilities).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ordinance is void.

HELD:
The assailed ordinance is void for being ultra vires.

The requisites for a valid ordinance are well established. Time and again, the Court has ruled
that in order for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the concerned LGU to enact, but must also be passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. Moreover, substantively, the ordinance (i) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (ii) must not be unfair or oppressive; (iii) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (iv) must not prohibit, but may regulate trade; (v) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (vi) must not be unreasonable

Batangas City claims that the enactment of the Assailed Ordinance constitutes a valid exercise
of its police power. This claim is erroneous.

Since LGUs exercise delegated police power as agents of the State, it is incumbent upon them
to act in conformity to the will of their principal, the State

9. Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals GR No. 217126-27 November 10, 2015

FACTS:

Binay and other public officers were accused of committing the crime of Plunder and violation
of RA 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) in connection with the five (5) phases of
the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking
Building).

The Ombudsman issued preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive
suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB
Cases.

The CA then issued a Resolution granting Binay, Jr.’s prayer for a TRO. It was mainly grounded
on the condonation doctrine.

ISSUE:

a. Whether or not issuance of TRO on the ground of condonation doctrine was correct
b. Whether or not condonation doctrine should be abandoned

HELD:

a. The Ca did not gravely abuse its discretion since it was merely following settled
precedents on the condonation doctrine.
 b. Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions led the
Supreme Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation was actually bereft of
legal bases.

The condonation doctrine which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment
of liability is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation.

The Constitution upholds that public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.

Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code states that those removed from office as a
result of an administrative case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local
position. In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service provides that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

10. The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos, et al. v. Martinez GR No.
170626, 3/3/2008

FACTS:

Punong Barangay, Martinez was charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption before the
Sandiganbayan. The SB placed Martinez under preventive suspension for 60 days. It then
rendered its Decision which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from
office.

HELD:

No, the Sangguniang Bayan is not empowered to do so. Section 60 of the Local Government
Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials from office. During
the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code, the intent to confine to the
court’s jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local officials was evident.

The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from
office is intended as a check against partisan activity.

Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official would merit the penalty of
removal from office, the case should be filed with the RTC.
On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
Bayan may impose on the elective official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the
official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court.

11. Galeos v. People of the Philippines GR No. 174730-37

FACTS:

Ong, as mayor, appointed two of his relatives to work in the government. The two said in their
SALNs that they weren’t relatives of his. This was administered by Ong. Ong also certified a
document stating that they have complied with the rule against non-nepotism.
Ong is liable for RPC 171(4) as the SALN and the certification he made had an untruthful
statement – that they weren’t relatives. The 3 requirements of 171(4) were met:

A narration of untruthful facts in a public document – The SALN is a public document

 A legal obligation to be truthful – the SALN law as well as other laws governing the
eligibility for a position in the government require it.
 The fact be absolutely untruthful – They were absolutely relatives

ISSUE:

(1)W/N there is a violation of RPC 171? –YES

(2)W/N Ong is guilty for certifying the document re: nepotism? - YES
(3)W/N there was merely a narration of law and not of facts - NO (4)W/N Good faith is a
defense against 171(4) – NO

HELD:

(1) The requirements of 171 (4) were met – There was a legal obligation to narrate
truthfully because of the SALN law, it was made in a public document as the SALN is
public, and the facts were absolutely untruthful.
(2) Ong is guilty for the certification made by an authorized officer is tantamount to an
express affirmation of the truthfulness of the statement. Thus, the untruthfullness of
the statements certified is untruthfullness on the part of the officer
(3) Discussions of law are those made by authorities regarding the applicability of laws in
certain cases. In this case, there was merely a yes/no question regarding the fact of
consanguinity/affinity.
(4) There is a Filipino Tradition of Strong Kinship and valuing extended family ties. It would
not be likely for Galeon to not know that such a bigtime politician was a relative of his!

Things to remember - Rivera is dead so the judgment doesn’t apply to him (Imprisonment for 2
years, 4 months, and 1 day UP TO 8 years, 1 day, and a fine of 5,000 pesos).
12. Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation GR
203754 6/16/2015

FACTS:

This case involves the conflicting mandates of Cebu City’s Ordinance No. 69 and RA 9167.
Section 13. Privileges of Graded Films. Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittance
All revenue from the amusement tax on the graded film which may otherwise accrue to the
cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly urbanized and independent
component cities in the Philippines pursuant to Section 140 of Republic Act. No. 7160 during
the period the graded film is exhibited, shall be deducted and withheld by the proprietors,
operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted within thirty (30) days from the
termination of... the exhibition to the Council which shall reward the corresponding
amusement tax to the producers of the graded film within fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.

ISSUE:

WoN 9167 is unconstitutional

HELD:

Yes. In Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. The Province of Benguet, 30the Court alluded to the
fundamental principles governing the taxing powers of LGUs as laid out in Section 130 of the
LGC, to wit:

…..4. The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of the LGC shall inure solely to the
benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the LGU levying the tax, fee, charge or
other imposition unless otherwise specifically provided by the LGC.

It is in the application of the adverted fourth rule, that is —all revenue collected
pursuant to the provisions of the LGCshall inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the
disposition by, the LGU levying the tax, fee, charge orother imposition unless otherwise
specifically provided by the LGC—upon which the present controversy grew.