The Prelude To Bolshevism - Kerensky (1919)
The Prelude To Bolshevism - Kerensky (1919)
The Prelude To Bolshevism - Kerensky (1919)
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THE
PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM
THE KORNILOV RISING
BY
A. F. KERENSKY
Former Prime Minister of Russia, Minister of
War and Marine and Commander-m
Chief of the Russian Army
WITH FRONTISPIECE
NEW YORK
DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY
1919
PUBLISHED, 1919* iw U. S. A,,
BY DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY, INC.
A. F. KERENSKY'S PREFACE TO THE KORNILOV
AFFAIR
DEAR FRIENDS,
I send you the stenographic copies of my fundamental
statement on the Kornilov affair which have been saved
from destruction, with supplementary remarks and explana-
tions which have now made. I place this manuscript at
I
your disposal and ask you if possible to publish it, but ex-
actly in its present form. This is necessary, though I my*
self see all its imperfectionsfrom a literary point of view.
"
But not a literary production, not
this is memoirs " for
history, not the fruit of my unfettered creative faculty.
This is only a document, a bit of real life, a document which
can give to those who are really anxious to discover the
truth about the Kornilov affair, more information than a
whole volume of " memoirs," because, without forcing any
one to form an opinion, it gives every one the opportunity
of acting on the lines of a commission of inquiry, of doing
the work of such a commission himself, sorting out the
most important facts of the Kornilov affair, and drawing
hisown conclusions about it.
To enable the reader to judge fairly is my only desire.
My latest notes supplement the statement received by the
Commission of Inquiry with additional matter which may in
part have been forgotten by or unknown to those who will
read the official report of my examination.
Certainly in these notes I have been unable to confine
myself all the time strictly to the mere facts of the case,
and to the narrow limits of the story of Kornilov's at-
have seen and studied too many people, not to know the real
value of popular love and hatred. At the time when I was
at my height, and the crowd bowed before me, 1 quietly said
**
to my friends Wait, ancl they will come and vSmite me/'
:
PS, A
few words about the stenographed copy. I
gave evidence on October 8, 1917. It took several days to
decipher the notes of the evidence, and only five or six days
before October 25th I received it to revise and sign. I had
not time to do so. The final official text of my evidence be-
fore the Commission of Inquiry was not ready when the
Bolshevik havoc began.
Having at length an opportunity to look through this text,
I had the right to correct it editorially and stylisti-
felt I
T1U PREFACE
here and there, and in some places to add
cally, to shorten it
a few additional words, of course without changing the
meaning and tone of the evidence; in two places I found it
point.
I think that the publication of the whole original official
report of the Inquiry will be useful also as a picture of the
judicial examination of one whom General Alexeiev called
"
the Master of Destiny." It will enable every one to recall
that period, still near but already so distant, when judicial
inquiry and courts of justice were absolutely free and inde-
pendent of those in power, that brief chapter in the history
" "
of Russia when this bourgeois prejudice in favour of im-
partial justice was not trampled on to speed a return to the
traditional Moscow period of " Shemiaka trial." *
name of Prince Demetrius Shemiaka of Halitsh (1420-53)
stands in Russia for a dishonest, venal, partial judge.
CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION v
INTRODUCTION xiii
CHAPTER I
CHAPTER ITI
PAGE
23. Kerensky's appeal to the population. Kormlov's at-
tempt to justify his actions by the appearance of this
appeal. Rebellious actions of Kornilov before the
appeal. Text of Kerensky's and Kornilov's appeals.
Impossibility of delay in view of the presence of Kor-
nilovists in Petrograd 177
24. The days of the rebellion. Conduct of Miliukov.
Terestchenko, Nekrassov and others 183
25. Filonenko' s role. Divulgence on the 2Qth of August
of his activities at Headquarters. His participation in
the schemes for a dictatorship. His ambiguous posi-
tion at Headquarters 199
26. Savinskov's role. His friendship with Filonenko. His
non-participation in the conspiracy. His deception by
Kornilov. Transgression by Savinkov of his powers.
His resignation 210
27. Definition of the crime. The accomplices . , . .
219
28. Liquidation of the rebellion. Movements of the mili-
tary against Headquarters. Excitement of the democ-
racy. Slowness of General Alexeiev. Successful ef-
forts of the Provisional Government to suppress the
rebellion without bloodshed 224
29. Kornilov's accomplices. General Alexeiev's letter.
Accusations against Kerensky, Savinkov and Filonenko.
Participation of financial circles and the reality of an
organized conspiracy 229
30. Summoning of the troops and the Soviets. Savinkov's
statement Represenattives of the Soviets in the Pro-
visional Government 233
31. Some details about the conspiracy. Participation of
Cossacks and officers. Arrest of Lvov. Zavoiko's
character 236
32. Political situation of Russia at the time of the rebellion.
Impossibility of a dictatorship; necessity of a coalition 240
33. Various details The text of Lvov's statement.
:
CHAPTER IV
KEKENSKY AND KORNILOV
A reply 249
A "WHO'S AND "WHERE'S WHERE " OF PEOPLE AND PLACES
WHO"
OCCURRING IN THE Too: 279
INTRODUCTION l
AFTER the breaking of the Russian front near Tarnopol
on the i pth of July, 1917, it was decided to
replace the
Commander of the South-western front, General Gutor,
and later also the Commander-in-Chief, General Brus-
silov, and the choice fell- on General Kornilov, Kornilov's
was easy to deal with it. Kornilov was not backed by a sin-
gle important political organization, nor could he rely upon
the force of any class. Owing to their political inexperience,
Kornilov and those of the officers who were with him mis-
took for a real force the grumbling of the "man in the
street/' irritated by the Revolution, but passive by nature,
pected. An
adventure of a small group was transformed
in the inflamed imagination of the masses to a conspiracy
of the whole of the bourgeoisie and of all the upper classes
ing a majority there for the first time during the whole
period of the Revolution. The same happened everywhere
with lightning rapidity. Massacres of officers again began ;
CHAPTER I
1
[THE Investigation Commission specially appointed by the
Provisional Government for the Kornilov affair planned its
work upon a very broad basis, embracing the whole period
and beginning from the 8th of July,
preceding the revolt
when General Kornilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief
of the South-western front.
Although strictly speaking, none of the events preceding
the August days had direct connection with General Korni-
lov's movement of the 26th-3Oth of August, as subject to
prosecution, yet this widening of the scope of judicial inves-
tigation to include the terrible days of the 3rd-5th of July
had a profound inner meaning.
The scope of action of the Investigation Commission could
not be narrowed, because the events of those July days
(3rd~6th), days of the first Bolshevik riot, days of the
1 The
square brackets denote the explanations and supplements
added by A. F. Kerensky to the stenographic report of the examination,
All English words in italics are underlined by A. F. K.
1
2 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM
Tarnopol disgrace, promoted General Kornilov to the high-
est post in thearmy, and created throughout Russia that
novel atmosphere of wounded patriotism which originated
the subsequent events of the 26th-30th of August.
I will not dwell in detail upon the events which preceded
omitted.
General Gutor, whose name is mentioned at the beginning
of the deposition, had in May been appointed Commander-
in-Chief of the South-western front. The commanders of
the other fronts were : Northern front, General Klembov-
sky Western, General Denikin ; Rumanian, General Stcher-
;
as all-sufficient.
[The decision to exercise actively the extensive rights
of a military commander, the daring to act without fear
of responsibility, without hiding behind another's back
these were the qualities most needed at the time. Un-
fortunately, these qualities were seldom to be found among
otir higher army command. It must be remembered that
refuse to risk their lives for their country, for land and
of hate for all things new had gone to those old wise
heads. Russia and the Provisional Government obtained
no counsel, no aid from the military chiefs. On the other
hand, here for the first time General Denikin outlined the
"
program of the "revanche" that music of the future"
of military reaction, which inspired many and many a
partisan of Kornilov's movement Some points of Deni-
program had already been presented to the Provisional
kin's
Government in the form of demands. Thus at the very
beginning of the Tarnopol break through the Main Com-
5
mittee of the Army and Navy League, in a highly
Officers
my considerations."]
. In the midst of all the disheartening opinions and pro-
U THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM
posals expressed by all the generals present, the telegram
from Kornilov seemed to shed a faint ray of light. It
was deeply oppressive, but still it contained a more im-
partial attitude towards the soldier mass and the com-
manding staff. I must say, that all the generals, particu-
larly Alexeiev, Ruzsky and Denikin, evinced a complete
lack of strategical and political insight. According to them
the state of mind of the private soldiers lay at the root
of all the evil. For instance, one of them considered that
the only reform necessary to prevent soldiers from deserting
was the immediate re-establishment of the salute.
[The general alluded to in the last sentence was not
Denikin.]
Such were the judgments expressed. And upon such a
background General Kornilov's opinion, that the present
calamities were not solely due to the soldiers' demoraliza-
tion, but also to the original and long-standing deficiency
of the commanding staff; that therefore, simultaneously,
with punitive measures immediate steps should be taken
for the purifying of the commanding body such a view
tended to produce the impression that here was a man
with a deeper and wider outlook upon the situation than
that of his compeers. Lately it became obvious to me,
by the style of the telegram, that it had not been drafted
by him. Strange to say, all General Kornilov's appoint-
ments after he became Generalissimo were based upon an
inverted principle. He immediately began to promote and
reinstate men belonging to the oldest traditions. Take,
for instance, the wholesale dismissal of the commanding
staff of theSouth- western front, which occurred as soon
as General Kornilov transferred thither Generals Denikin
and Markov* They started a general' removal of all com-
manders sympathizing with the new army organizations*
THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 15
Kerensky. Yes.
Chairman. He stated that his views upon the imme-
diate reforms needed in the army received your approval.
directions, etc.
[The scheme of the offensive of July, 1917, consisted of
a series of attacks to be delivered against the enemy on
all the fronts in succession,
thereby preventing the con-
centration of his forces on the point of attack. The suc-
cess of this general offensive depended upon its rapid devel-
opment, but in reality all calculations were upset from the
start, the connection between the operations at various fronts
"
irresponsible advisers/' which ran as follows : I became
convinced that both N. V. Nekrassov and M. I. Terestchenko
with Kerensky's knowledge interfere in the affairs of the
Military Department." But both Nekrassov and Terest-
chenko were fully constituted members of the Provisional
"
Government and as such had full right to interfere/' even
"
without my knowledge/' in the affairs of any department.
They not only possessed that right, but it was their duty to
do so, as members of the Provisional Government jointly
responsible for each other. Besides, V. N. Nekrassov was
then my Deputy, and M. I. Terestchenko Minister for For-
eign Affairs. Military problems touched them both very
closely. I consulted them upon questions of military policy
more frequently than any other ministers. Only a man very
u
unversed in statesmanship could in this case speak of irre-
"
sponsible influences." Besides which," continues Savinko,
"
I became convinced that A. F. Kerensky is advised upon
affairs of state by persons not belonging to the Provisional
cally (the cadets having only just left it) had to cope with
all at once.
rators also worked like convicts when not on the train. And
now such a railway-respite assumes historical significance,
the chance companions of a casual talk upon the burning
attheStavka. . . ."
ff
On the igth of July I was appointed Generalissimo by
30 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM
order of the Provisional Government. I telegraphed a re-
bit in the course of its preparation, and that in any case the
contents of the report were known to the Prime Minister."
In reality I was only informed of the first clause relating to
"
the introduction of military courts-martial at the rear/'
However, Savinkov in his deposition changes the definite
" " "
word contents into the vague term substance of ."
"This memorandum," says Savinkov, "apart from the
projects of bills of Committees and Commissaries, contains
within itself other projected measures: (i) The establish-
ment of revolutionary courts-martial at the rear; (2) the
restoration of disciplinary powers to commanding officers ;
in the fact that it would have thrown towards the Left the
leaders of democratic circles which at this juncture were
said.
namely that he was something like the head of the plot, and
had not the prejudice against him some foundation?
Kerensky. I must confess that the incident relating to
saw that the essence of the matter had been laid before
us. ...
KrokhmaL There was not in it a thought of the neces-
sity of secrecy?
Kerensky. I had no such thought.
Simply, if it had
happened to be a member of the Provisional Government
"
or an intimate friend, I should have said Ivan Ivanovitch,
:
note.
from Savinkov, and that I did receive such a note from the
latter, which note I immediately tore up (I remember so
They did not grasp the reasons for the apparent slowness
with which Government exercised a cooling influence on
these elements, nor realize that
any imprudent measure might
only enable these elements to break out afresh and sweep
everybody before them, and first of all the officers and, with
them, the entire Russian army.
In the fiery atmosphere of revolution, as in the torrid
desert, many saw mirages before them, and in their efforts
to reach them, they unhappily brought disaster not only
on themselves. That the Central Committee of the League
of Officers should run after a mirage was dangerous, be-
cause the Committee spoke in the name of the whole per-
sonnel of the officers, calling itself " the representative " of
'1
creed was the cult of all the officers, and setting its seal
upon the entire corporation. This was too risky a game.
It was playing with fire
like on the edge of the powder
magazine. And
if we take into consideration that the Cen-
cers who differed from its political views; set up its own
commissions of inquiry; expressed its approbation or dis-
approval, etc. ; if, as I say, we take all these facts into con*
sideration, it will, on the one hand, be evident
why the
proceedings of the Central Committee of the League as-
" '*
sumed a highly officious character, and, on the other
hand, why the responsibility for the actions not even of
the whole League, but only of its Central Committee, was
attached to all the Russian officers jointly and individually.
I will cite a clear example of the embarrassing relations
between the military powers and the Central Committee
which prevailed last summer and required the intervention
of the Ministry of War. Savinkov then telegraphed to
"
Kornilov as follows : Your instructions obliging the staffs
to provide the Central Committee of the League with lists
of Bolshevik officers may lead to most undesirable misun-
derstandings, because these orders will result in setting up
a certain control by the Central Committee over the party
organizations and activities of the officers, which control
certainly is not a function of the Central Committee; and
the right of such a control can only belong to the Commis-
saries and to competent tribunals. In view of the above
considerations, I would suggest the desirability of cancel-
the people. The first days of joy passed a hard task was ;
they had relations with some civil elements ; they had abun-
dant resources. Quite a series of newspapers appeared
some of them are flourishing to this day which started
to attack the Provisional Government, and myself person-
"
ally. They were all organs of the partisans of a strong
"
rule : the Jivoe Slovo, Narodnaya Gasctta, Novaya Russ,
Vechernce Vremya, etc. I cannot, naturally, furnish at this
Shavlovsky. The
creating of a suitable public opinion
in certain circles, by means of a propaganda in the Press?
Kerensky, Yes.
Shablovsky. But were there any indications as to the
immediate object in view?
Kerensky, To seize the power and arrest the Provisional
Government A typical counter-revolution was being pre-
pared; not a mass movement, but a coup d'etat.
Shablovsky. On what could "they" rely?
" "
Kerensky. They had links with Headquarters. At
THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 61
selves upon the Jews, soundly beat them, and tore up their
banners."
" " " "
On this July non-party organizations
soil, sprang
up like mushrooms, and soon began to form themselves
into various circles and groups, which proceeded to take
" "
Well," I remarked, and that will lead inevitably to a
"
fresh massacre of the officers." I foresee that possibility,
but at least those who are left alive will have the soldiers
in hand," Kornilov replied with decision.]
"
formed me," says Savinkov, touching on this subject, that
I was not invited to attend at the Palace that day,") How
then, under such circumstances, could Savinkov have re-
solved to call on me that evening, and how could he count
on being received?]
Chairman. That is to say, it has been assumed then
that Kornilov's lack of tact was due to Savinkov?
"
I signed the declaration of the rights of the soldiers/'
which I received fully prepared as a legacy from my pred-
ecessors. To refuse to sign it when its existence was
already known in the remotest corners of the front and
it was actually in practice, would have been to act upon
an "ostrich-policy," to believe that the reality disappears
because one shuts one's eyes to it. I took upon myself
the formal responsibility for it; and at the same time I
demanded categorically that it should include not an im-
plicit assumption but a
clear and open statement of the
'
ultimate ruin.]
Chairman. Who, besides yourself, took part in this
Council, of August loth?
74 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM
Kerensky. Terestchenko, Nekrassov and Kornilov him-
self.
ensky"!]
Chairman. At the Moscow Conference you set forth
in your version the whole of Kornilov's report except the
question of the death-penalty at the rear ?
Kerensky. Yes, with that exception, because at the sit-
10
"
On the evening of August I3th I asked General Kornilov
whether he had prepared the speech which he intended
making at the sitting of the I4th, and upon being told that
it was not ready, I offered him my help in sketching out
its contents. Apart from my desire to be of assistance to
General Kornilov, I thought it to be my duty, in view of
the responsibility which was incumbent
upon me for all
acts of a political nature by the Commander-in-Chief.
Similar help was also offered to the General by Zavoiko,
who met General Kornilov. Zavoiko's assistance consisted
in his writing down at my dictation the text of the
speech
that I had previously discussed in a general with Gen-
way
eral Kornilov. With a few additions, dealing purely with
THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 83
11
"
Kerensky. Yes, from the Right/' There is no doubt
this officer was well-informed, but I never clearly could make
out whether he came to me
as a scout or simply to betray
others and earn something for himself. Only one thing
is perfectly obvious to me he was quite au courant.
Chairman. He did not name Kornilov or any one else
at the time?
Kerensky. He did not name Kornilov, but he named
others closely associated with the latter Zavoiko, and
others whose names I forget, who were intimate with Kor-
86
THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 87
12
*
against the labour classes (read Bolsheviks ') and their
organizations; abolition of the death-penalty at the front
and restoration of complete liberty of propaganda and of all
democratic army organizations ..." etc.
At this same meeting of the Central Executive Commit-
"
tee, even Dan
protested already against the irresponsi-
bility" of the Provisional Government, and declared that
"
the authorities have no right to take any repressive meas-
ures (against workmen) without a previous discussion with
our Commission for the struggle against the counter-revolu-
tion/' The same meeting of the Central Executive Commit-
tee of the Soviet adopteda resolution of protest against the
suppression of two Bolshevik papers which were carrying on
an injurious campaign against the officers.
The Red Guard was created, and developed so rapidly
that its statute was worked out in Moscow by the 5th of
"
of the counter-revolution sprang up in all quarters, openly
refusing to obey my orders to stop their activity after the
"
suppression of the Kornilov revolt The so-called Inter-
**
regional Conference at Petrograd on the 6th of September
"
declared that, having discussed Kerensky's order, we de-
cide not to dissolve the revolutionary organizations for the
13
things had been changed only seven months ago and that I
had no reason for adhering to such a separation of the
Petrograd district considering decided to pursue
all that, I
following that
: at any rate Petrograd and its nearest neigh-
bourhood should be detached and constitute a separate dis-
trict military subordinated to the Government. I firmly
fied even now, and they cannot be fortified in the near fu-
ture. It was decided to dismantle the Kronstadt fortress
in June, or July at latest, and to transform Kronstadt into
a base for supplies, stores, etc.
Shablovsky. Was not the fortress considered of no
value for military purposes, and was not the coast considered
to be of more importance?
Kerensky. Yes, this is why all that was suggested
the removal of the guns and the dismantling of the fortress.
All this was intended for purely military and strategical
reasons,
Liber. And the removal of the Kronstadt garrison?
quences.
Kerensky. Nonsense !
"
[" A deliberate act the member of the Commission of
Inquiry has greatly softened General Kornilov's meaning.
" "
The limitation of fortification work in Finland is con-
sidered by General Kornilov as a proof of the Provisional
Government's acting in full accord with the plans of the
" "
German General Staff. The story of the note transmit-
ted at the meeting of the 3rd of August was, so to speak, a
preparation for attack. The Finland story is a bombard-
ment from a 48-inch gun. I am not revolted, nor indignant :
14
Kerensky. Yes.
Krokhmal. Was not there some kind of talk between
you and Savinkov to the effect that this corps was meant for
a possible suppression of a Bolshevik revolt and is anything;
to you.
Chairman. You gave me the order.
Kerensky. me that he
After this, General Krimov told
had been at the Stavka, where they had drafted the disposi-
tion and the statute for proclaiming a state of siege at
fess his own part in the affair, and secondly, clause 4 of the
"
order begins with the words From communications of the
:
"
For me to receive a definite reply from General Kor-
THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 121
happening to Krimov."
Even Kornilov himself admits that only at the moment
"
when I learned from a conversation over the direct wire
of General Krimov's death did I take measures to settle my
conflict with the Prime Minister Kerensky in a bloodless
and painless way as far as the country and the army were
concerned."
These are the facts. There is one which I wish to em-
phasize. As Prime Minister I suggested that a detachment
of troops should be sent and placed at the disposal of the
Provisional Government on certain terms. This suggestion
was not carried out by the Generalissimo, so that the march
of Krimov's detachment cannot be explained as being the
" "
an agreement with the Government
result of
Andthen arises the pertinent question, why these troops
were marching on Petrograd even before the evening of
August 26th.]
15
KrokhmaL Was
the question of bringing up additional
troops considered by the Provisional Government, or at a
private conference of some of its members?
Kerensky. think the matter was settled by conversa-
I
"
Mironov has come with my permission/' retorted Savin-
"
kov. Kerensky did not even know that he was going with
me. . . /*
"
All the same, I warn you, If Mironov dares to arrest
Kerensky* The
military authorities were always against
the exclusion of Petrograd, as were also lakubovitch and
Prince Tunianov at the meeting in my room mentioned
above. But for considerations of my own, I desired to
make the military aspect of the question clear to Kornilov,
and as all here were more or less unanimous, Baranovsky
was sent to Headquarters to defend my point of view.
16
"
that." I asked him who we " were, what he could do,
in whose name he was speaking. To these questions he
I am only author-
**
replied : I have no right to tell you.
ized to ask you whether you are willing to enter into dis-
cussion/' I could see from what he said that he came on
17
ready prepared mine, two days before the time fixed for
it" (August ^8th), and it was just because of the events
of that evening that General Kornilov talked of "great
provocation/ and all his followers conducted against me
7
Headquarters?"
I do not know why, but this question stabbed me, put
me on my guard, and almost involuntarily I replied, " Cer-
tainly not. Do you really think that I can be Minister of
"
Justice under Kornilov?
Here something strange happened,
136 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM
Lvov sprang up; his face brightened as he exclaimed:
"
You are right ! You
are right ! Don't go there. A trap
is set for you; he will arrest you. Go away some-
where far away; but get out of Petrograd you must They
hate you.*' Lvov said this excitedly.
" "
We then decided that Kornilov should learn by tele-
" '*
The above is a specimen of a code
classical conversa-
tion in which the one who answers understands from half
a word the one who questions,
because the subject of the
conversation is known to them
both. For instance, take
the first and second answers,
"
Confirming again," etc.,
where everything is puzzling to the outsider and clear only
to the initiated, who knows the real point of the dialogue.
There is not a single leading question, not a single question
whence one could gather what is already known by the
questioner about the subject of his interrogation. Never-
theless the answers were precisely what were expected.
18
**
On August 26th General Kornilov sent V. Lvov, mem-
ber of the Duma, with a demand for the handing over
of the whole civil and military power of the Provisional
1
'Yes.'" Why?
So was not a "lie" when I declared that General
it
appointed time.
19
first part; it was not I who sent the member of the Duma,
V. Lvov, to the Provisional Government, but Lvov came
to me as an envoy of the Prime Minister, as Aladin, an-
other member of the Duma, can witness. And so a great
act of provocation was committed, which placed at stake
the fate of the country." Howcan the direct meaning of
these lines be understood on comparing them with my tele-
gram No. 4163? There the Prime Minister states (i)
"
Lvov came to me on behalf of General Kornilov. (2)
He called upon the Provisional Government to hand over
the power to Kornilov. (3) Kornilov confirmed that he
had given Lvov the necessary authorization." " All that
is an absolute lie/' replies the Kornilov manifesto, whence
the simple-minded reader will conclude (i) that Lvov did
not come at all to Kerensky; (2) that he did not communi-
THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 147
trive to see me
otherwise than through the usual channels
of our communications with Headquarters (through Savin-
kov or Baranovsky). Aladin knew by his own experience
THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 149
Headquarters.
It must be said that \vhen giving evidence before
later,
20
this conviction at the time, that this was perhaps the only
whole affair.
Chairman. Did Virubov see that note?
"
Kerensky. I handed it to him and said :Read/'
Chairman. What impression did it make on Virubov?
Kerensky. He said, "What is to be done?" I told
him what steps I was taking. Later in the evening Lvov
was arrested.
Chairman. So Lvov was not there at the time?
Kerensky. Lvov went out, Virubov came in. I had
asked Virubov to be in good time for eight o'clock p. M.
at the direct wire in the house of the War Minister. After-
wards Balavinsky and Kosmin, the Deputy Commander
of the Petrograd Military District, were asked to attend.
In a word, I made all the preparation necessary duly to
"
establish the fact"
on the tape.
"
Raupakh. Is necessary for me to come
it ." . .
"
Kerensky. Only in the event of the Bolshevik action
or in any event?" Reply: "In any event." Thus the
two men Kornilov and Lvov, hundreds of miles away from
one another and not being aware what the other was saying,
gave the same replies to the same questions. And then a
third time, when I and Lvov were returning from the direct
wire, I put the same question in Balavinsky's presence.
Chairman. To Lvov?
Kerensky. Yes. Whether I was to leave in any event
or only in case the Bolsheviks acted. I myself knew for
certain that on August 27th there would not be any move
by the Bolsheviks.
Chairman. So that you decided to have Lvov arrested
after your conversation with Kornilov and in connection
with that imminent journey?
Kerensky. No, it was in connection with my growing
conviction that this man was a party to something or knew
exceptionally important.
Kojokolov. And did Lvov know that Balavinsky was
there?
Kerensky. He did not.
[Only now when I can pass in review the
whole of the
campaign which is carried on against me by both the extreme
wings who are making capital out of the Kornilov affair,
only now do I appreciate the great importance of the fact
that on the 26th, in the whirl of events, I was able to see
21
quarters.
Nevertheless, next day, August 27th, after Savinkov's
conversation with Kornilov about 6 p. M., the version is
"
being spread in Petrograd that Lvov simply made a mess
of it," that a "misunderstanding" arose. That version
finds many
energetic supporters. The same Savinkov, in-
sisting on Filonenko's leaving Headquarters, was telling him
"
in the morning Believe me that I am better informed than
:
you are, and that you have been unaware of many things,
just as I was when I was last time at Headquarters.'* But
after his conversation with Kornilov, Savinkov proceeds
about 8 P. M. to the Winter Palace and insists on the neces-
"
sity of attempting to clear up the misunderstanding and
of entering into negotiations with General Kornilov." This
in spite of the fact that, in the course of that conversation,
Kornilov not only stated that he refused to give up the
command, but acknowledged that he had sent Lvov to make
164 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM
a statement as to the dictatorship. He only explained that
that statement was a reply to my proposal. What, then,
was the misunderstanding that made negotiations desirable?
The Cummander-in-Chief of all the active armies in the field,
who informs the Government of an immediate proclama-
tion of his dictatorship, cannot be left at the head of the
armies by any Government for one minute, whilst a general
who, in these circumstances, refuses to hand over his com-
mand is committing the weightiest of crimes against
clearly
"
the State. The onlymisunderstanding," if Kornilov were
to be believed, that in the circumstances could have happened,
would be either that I really made such a proposal to him
and afterwards repudiated it or that some one had caused
General Kornilov to form a mistaken idea of my proposal
To those now who literally accepted Kornilov's words and
accordingly considered me an accomplice, I say that any
negotiations should have been conducted not with myself,
but with the Provisional Government, who should have been
asked to order my arrest.
Those who supposed that a bona fide error was made by
General Kornilov could have held to that supposition until
the moment when it was made clear to Kornilov that Lvov
did not have and could not have any instructions from me
for General Kornilov.
In any case, August 27th it was possible to be-
if until
was evident. It should have been obvious for them that any
possibility of pourparlers had disappeared. When Savin-
kov, towards the morning of August 28th, learnt not only
that Kornilov had refused to hand over his command, but
that he had detained Filonenko and sent the ** Savage Di-
vision
f>
m the van of the cavalry corps and had appointed
Krimov commander of the corps that is to say, that Kor-
nilov had broken his promise even Savinkov understood
" "
that in the circumstances it was no longer possible to
in the original.
"
General Alexeiev attributes to the invisible participators
23
24
"
it on/ Here is the text of this telegram, which has become known to
me only now:
"
On a sober estimate of the position, one has to admit that the whole
personnel in command, the overwhelming majority of the officers, and
the best part of the army at the front will follow Kornilov.
In the
rear there will stand on his side the whole of
Cossackdom, the majority
of the military schools, as well as the best elements of the
troops. To
their physicalpower must be added the superiority of a military or-
ganization over the weakness of the Government
organs, the moral
sympathy of all non-Socialist elements of the population, the ever-
growing discontent with the existing order among the lowest classes,
THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 185
and, among the majority of the popular and urban masses, who have
"become blunted in regard to everything, the indifference which obeys
the stroke of tk<t whip. An enormous number of those who were So-
cialists in March will doubtless pass over immediately to their side.
On the other hand, the latest events at the front and in the rear, espe-
cially at Kazan, have demonstrated with unmistakable clearness the
picture of the complete bankruptcy of the present order of things and
the inevitability of a catastrophe unless a crisis takes place at once.
tt
This consideration seems to be decisive for General Kornilov, who
isaware that only by resoluteness is it possible to stop Russia at the edge
of the abyss into which it will otherwise roll It is neither here nor
there to say that Kornilov is preparing the triumph of the Kaiser, when
there will soon remain nothing for the German troops to overcome
except our wide expanses. It depends on the men now in power
whether they will meet the inevitable crisis half-way, thus rendering
it painless and preserving the real guarantees of popular freedom, or
the ranks of the army and into the country is great. There
is once more a great danger threatening the fate of the
25
diately.
[Filonenko arrived at Petrograd from Headquarters on
the night of August 28th. Early in the morning of the
^9th there called on me V. T. Lebedev (the former Deputy
Minister of Marine, whom I had appointed on August 28th
to be Assistant to the Governor-General of Petrograd).
He appeared quite alarmed, and told me that, together with
Colonel Bagratuni (the Chief of Staff of Petrograd Mili-
tary District), he had heard Filonenko using quite an in-
admissible phrase in his conversation with Savinkov. I or-
dered Filonenko to be arrested. Shortly afterwards Savin-
kov on me, requesting me either to arrest him together
called
with Filonenko or to examine Filonenko's accusers in the
presence of both of us. I thereupon ordered Lebedev, Bag-
"*
Never, never A question was raised and passed as
!
to the formation of a
" "
Council of Defence [rather a
War Cabinet than a Council of Defence] from the midst
of the Provisional Government itself, for concentrating
in its hands the defence of the whole country, after the
THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 208
26
ought to stand.
In order to illustrate the character of the mutual relations
of Kornilov and Savinkov and of my own part in their
quote a few extracts from Savinkov's
relationship, I shall
conversations with Kornilov, as written down by Savinkov
himself :
"Lavr Georgievitch," Savinkov said to Kornilov on
"
August 23rd, I should like to speak with you in private."
(At these words, Lukomsky and Filonenko got up and left
the room.) "The matter is this: the telegrams lately re-
ceived by the Ministry and signed by various
persons be-
longing to the Headquarters Staff, I must tell you frankly,
inspire me with alarm.
These telegrams frequently treat
of questions of a political character, and that in an inadmis-
sible tone. I have stated to you already that I am convinced
that you will loyally
support the Provisional Government,
and will not go against it. But I cannot say the same about
your Staff/'
Kornilov. "I must tell you that I do not trust any
longer Kerensky and the Provisional Government The
latter has not the
strength to stand on the ground of firm
authority which alone can save the country. As for Ker-
ensky, he is not only weak and vacillating, but even insincere.
He insulted me
undeservedly [at the Moscow Conference].
Moreover, he carried on conversations behind my back with
Tcheremissov, and wanted to appoint him Supreme Com-
mander-in-Chief." [Nothing of the kind ever happened.
A. K.]
THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 213
"
Sawnkov. It seems to me that in questions of State
opinion/
"
Kornilov. It is necessary that Kerensky should not
meddle with affairs/'
"
Savinkov. This is impossible at present, even if it were
necessary."
"
Kornilov. It is necessary that Alexeiev, Plekhanov
and Argunov should be in the Government."
"
Sai'inkav. necessary rather that the Soviet So-
It is
"
Savinkov. This is not correct. Allow me to inform
you that during the six days that elapsed since the Moscow
Conference, at which Kerensky declared that he was adopt-
ing methods of firm authority, the Ministry of War did
much, namely . . /'
any one who seeks the truth impartially, this day of August
24th throws a deeper light on the events than a whole
bundle of documents. He would perceive how, while he
<k "
was conversing with Savinkov, matters were
sincerely
not being talked about but being done with Krimov,
Zavoiko, and other initiated persons.
Savinkov is guilty indeed, but not of any conspiracy with
Kornilov, nor, as Alexeiev imagines, of my having been
previously "informed'' through him of Kornilov's move;
his guilt was that while being utterly unconscious of the
character and the real intentions of Kornilov, he unwittingly
assisted him in his struggle for power by putting forward
Kornilov as a political force with rights equal to those of
the Government. He is also guilty of having, while at
27
definition consists.
"
the secret rendezvous where the conspirators reported/'
and so on. The moment before the competent authorities
arrived at his flat to search it and arrest him, he started
for Finland. Unfortunately, the technical side of the con-
spiracy for preparing the movement has remained, so far
as I know, utterly neglected in the labours of the Com-
mission of Inquiry, That is why the personalities of
Zavoiko, Aladin, and similar persons have become excess-
ively prominent in this case. It is only the episode with
Krimov that lifts a little the curtain from the technical
side of the case. This blank may be explained, not only
by the great cohesion of that milieu which directed the
military and technical side of the conspiracy, but also by
the fact that, under the influence of the " counter-attacks "
("provocations," ''misunderstandings/' etc.), made at the
time,and of the clever campaign of defence carried out
in the Press, in
conformity to the German rule that "an
offensive is the best defensive/' the attention of the Com-
mission of Inquiry was, in
spite of themselves, chiefly con-
centrated on those sides of the affair in which
public opinion
had taken a particular interest at the time. In the mean-
time, the possibility of penetrating by the still fresh traces
into the very
laboratory of the conspiracy vanished. In
referring to Semiterre, as a reply to the question about
Novossiltsev, I meant to lay stress on my havinghad no
doubt as to Novossiltsev's
participation in Kornilov's move-
ment, and to point out at the same time to the Commission
of Inquiry what solid
grounds we considered absolutely
indispensable before proceeding to take measures of
pre-
caution by administrative order.
28
among the masses, who had not yet recovered their senses
from the panic that had seized them. On this ground,
" " " "
the disposition to start by themselves to do away with
Kornilov was growing more rapidly from hour to hour,
since the authorities either could not "clear him away"
" "
from Headquarters or were in collusion with him
!
29
it in the Press. . . .
Kerensky's participation is indisput-
able/'
First of General Alexeiev ought to have started, not
all,
people with whom he was acting, what were the real aims
he was pursuing, and how at the critical moment, abandoned
by all, he appeared with a small number of officers before a
hurried tribunal . .This is the substance of my appeal
.
to you."
When one not in possession of any weighty proofs,
is
30
from me. But the mood in which he retired from the Pro-
visional Government pointed to the possibility of his having
gone against me from the outset. Then again, how about
Aladin? I am not sure whether you are aware of Aladm's
visit to Prince G, E. Lvov at Moscow. Just before V. N,
Lvov called on me, Virubov informed me, on behalf of
Prince G. E. Lvov, that Aladin had called on the Prince,
to whom he said quite seriously: "Let Kerensky bear in
mind that henceforward there must be no changes within
the Government without the consent of Headquarters.'*
This had made an impression on the Prince. Now, with
regard to agrarian reform. I was aware that they were
engaged in preparing an agrarian manifesto or law; I for-
was the man who exercised the greatest inftueiice upon Gen-
eral Kornilov. At the South-western front, Savinkov had
once succeeded in removing him from there, as Zavoiko's
influencewas already injurious at the time. But he after-
wards returned, and was, moreover, joined by Aladin.
[On his relations to Zavoiko, General Kornilov's evidence
was to the following effect :
"
I made the acquaintance of V. S. Zavoiko in April last
at Petrograd. According to the information in my pos-
session, he was a few years ago the Marshal of Nobility of
the Haysin district, in the Government of Podolia. He had
been working at the naphtha mines round Baku, and, as he
told me,was engaged in exploring the mineral resources of
Turkestan and Western Siberia* In the month of May he
arrived at Tchernovitsy and, after having joined as a volun-
teer the Daguestan cavalry regiment, he remained at the
Staff of the army in the capacity of my personal orderly.
He wields the pen with perfection. I therefore entrusted
3*
pected from the Right and others from the Left. In their
" "
joyless love of the Coalition they were dreaming of a
" *
painless parting/' They were waiting all the time for
u "
the moment when I should leave at last, while they them-
selves would not let me go, as they were afraid of the re-
sponsibility. But while retaining me, they wanted somebody
to come and overthrow me, in the hope of taking advantage
of somebody else's crime for their own political interests.
From October 24th to November ist I observed that trem-
"
bling expectation among my friends "of the Left, just
as I had noticed the same trembling expectancy in the Kbr-
" "
nilov days among some of the adherents of the Coalition
on the Right Those who accuse me of not having
" "
left in time, and of having somehow stood in
33
Ukraintsev. You
only paid attention to the points?
Kerensky. Yes, just to the points, and then I put it in
my pocket. The very circumstances of the conversation
were so convincing to me. Indeed, I never dreamt at the
time that public opinion would ever see fit to make me out
a sort of accomplice of the Kornilov conspiracy or of a
rather unintelligible and equivocal personage. Had I been
able to foresee anything of the kind, I should perhaps have
nary rapidity.
Ukraintsev. Were you in possession of aijy information
to the effect that General Kornilov had precisely charged the
more and for the last time to betray this party by his
weakness, at best and consequently the task of saving the
country also.
Unfortunately lack of space prevents me from analysing
the opening portion of Mr. Wilcox's work, and from show-
ing fact by fact that his exposition does not correspond with
reality. All his first article is artificial^ connected by Mr.
Wilcox with the events of September 8th-i2th by the fol-
lowing phrase :
**
Savinkov states that he was charged by the Minister Presi-
dent: . . .
(3) to obtain Kornilov's consent to the formation of
a distinct military district out of Petrograd and its immediate
environs, so that a state of war might be declared in that area
separately."
"
I asked the Commander-in-Chief for a cavalry corps at the
demand of the Prime Minister in order to establish martial
law in reality in Petrograd. This was called for by the
strategic necessity of subordinating the Petrograd military
district to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in view of
the last happenings at the front. The plan of declaring
martial law in Petrograd was approved by the Provisional
Government." It is obvious that this cavalry corps, as it
was to be at the disposal of the Provisional Government,
was meant to defend it from all the attempts to overthrow
it, from whichever side they might come, as, for example,
party, two were directed directly against his party, and the
two others were called for, as I have already said, by the
necessity to protect the Provisional Government from all
attacks both from the Left and from the Right. Mn
Wilcox would not pervert the meaning of my instructions
to Savinkov thus if he had not been dealing with the mate-
rials collectedby the Kornilovists, or if, at least, he had been
able to deal with it critically. But yet, on page 503, our
author has a passage which might lead one to doubt his im-
partiality and the genuineness of his desire to discover the
true meaning of the events. Quoting the conversation in
THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 259
"Of the plan thus outlined only one feature was the result of
Savinkov's independent initiative: that was the request that the
cavalry corps should not be under Krimov. Also, on his own re-
' * ' '
Savinkov urged that the wild or savage division,
sponsibility,
which was composed of semi-civilized tribesmen, should not be in-
cluded in the forces sent to Petrograd."
Yet, without doubt, Mr. Wilcox had at his disposal the text
of Kornilov's private interview with Savinkov, passages
from which are mentioned by the author on pages 502-503,
from which it is plain that Savinkov was speaking about
General Krimov and the savage division not on his own
" " "
independent initiative and on his own responsibility,"
but exclusively by my instructions. Even if Mr. Wilcox
had not had before his eyes the text of Kornilov's conversa-
tion with Savinkov, even so he need not have spoken of the
" "
independent initiative of Savinkov, since he will not find
.
"
He states that Kornilov promised to fulfil both these requests,
which, however, he failed to do."
260 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM
Trifles, indeed, to which not worth while to pay at-
it is
tention !
Probably the reader of Mr. Wilcox's articles has
simply passed over this phrase "promised to fulfil" but
" "
failed to do so. Nevertheless, this promise and non-ful-
filment have a huge significance in the whole history of the
page 514:
"
In the Army Orders which he posted in Mohilev on September
loth and nth> but which he was prevented by the Government pro-
262 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM
hibition from circulating further, and in the statement prepared by
him for the Judicial Commission, Kornilov gives a very full exposi-
tion of his motives for refusing to surrender the Chief Command
and attempting to compel the Government by force of arms to
carry out his program/'
" *
be fatal/ Kornilov, hav-
Feeling that further hesitation would
ing assured himself of the support of most of the other command-
ing generals, decided to use the 3rd Cavalry Corps to compel the
Government ..."
But the conspirators and, like them, Mr. Wilcox are only un-
successful in their attempts to represent all this story in such
a way as to suggest that the decision to "use" the 3rd
Cavalry Corps came into the head of General Kornilov
"suddenly/' when he was convinced that Kerensky was
endeavouring to break his arrangement with him and that
the Government had again fallen under the influence of
"
the Bolshevist majority in the Soviets."
In the first place, there was never any close personal friend-
*' *
Kornilov submitted to him no kind of ultimatum/ and what
'
passed between them was a simple conversation/ in the course
of which various desires in the sense of strengthening the Gov-
ernment were discussed."
against myself?
The matter is easily explained. Neither those who sent
Lvov to me, nor'Lvov himself, knew until afterwards that
my Lvov on September 8th, which they
conversation with
supposed had taken place between us two alone, had in
actual fact been overheard, unknown to Lvov,
by a third
THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 269
nilov. . . .
Further, Lvov and every
said that the public
one at Headquarters were so roused against Kerensky and
the Provisional Government that General Kornilov could
not answer for Kerensky's personal safety in any place
in Russia, and therefore Kerensky's and Savinkov's jour-
Thus, if Mr. Wilcox had made use of all the materials, and
not only of the evidence cunningly shuffled by the conspira-
tors, he himself could have shown that Lvov had not simply
"
jotted down a few detached thoughts/' but set out in an
accurate form General Kornilov's proposal, that I did not
snatch the document and put it into my own pocket in order
not to give Lvov the opportunity to become acquainted
with what he himself had written, but, on the contrary,
that I read him his document and he confirmed its correct-
ness; that although Lvov was arrested, this was not imme-
diately after his setting out on paper General Kornilov's
proposal, but only after this had been confirmed on the
direct wire by General Kornilov himself.
I would advise the reader now to read again my conversa-
tion on September 8th with General Kornilov on the direct
wire (October issue, pp, 507-508), and to compare it with
" "
these detached thoughts of Lvov and with the above
declaration made by our witness who was present with us
during our conversation. Then every one will see plainly
that I had good reason, after all these conversations, to
conclude that Lvov was acting as a plenipotentiary for Gen-
eral Kornilov, and that General Kornilov himself confirmed
to a sufficient degree what Lvov had said to me. "
Yester-
day evening during my conversation with the Prime Min-
THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 271
"
The Minister-President asked for, and received, a confirmation
of Lvov's message, but neither of the two speakers indicated what
the message was, except so far as the single point of the journey
to Headquarters was concerned."
"
Kerensky must bear the entire responsibility for everything
that was done in the name of the Government during those days.
In particular his appointment as Commander-in-Chief must have
been his own work, and not, as it was officially announced to be,
a Cabinet decision."
days lies upon me, and I am quite prepared to bear it. But
still, I did not ask forpowers for myself on September
full
I was given powers
9th, nor did I receive the same; but
"
only to take quick and decisive measures to cut off at the
roots all attempts upon the sovereign power of the coun-
try and upon the civil rights which have been won by the
Revolution," as was stated in my official proclamation to
the population. Therefore my taking over the duties of
Commander-in-Chief was not "my own work/' but was
274 THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM
the common decision of the members of the Provisional
Government, brought about by special circumstances of
which this is not the place nor the time to speak.
think that I have sufficiently established the lack of
I
lution was wearing off, and the Soviets were losing their
exclusive significance in the life of the masses. This healthy
and normal evolution was acclaimed in the Press by the most
active members of the Central Executive Committee of the
Soviets themselves. The absurd attempt of General Kor-
nilov to force matters to a 'crisis destroyed all this intense
doned Kornilov.
Permit me in conclusion to make a somewhat long quo-
tation from a of General Alexeiev written on Sep-
letter
*' *
The Kornilov affair was not the affair of a group of adven-
turers, and you know to a certain degree that certain circles of
our society not only knew all about it, not only sympathized with
the idea, but helped Kornilov as far as they could. . I have .
Comment is needless.
A. KEREttSKx,
1Well-known Russian financiers who stood at the head of a certain
group of Banks. A. K.
A "WHO'S WHO" AND "WHERE'S WHERE"
OF PEOPLE AND PLACES OCCURRING IN
THE TEXT
ALADIN. Member (for the Gov- period of the present war, under
ernment of Simbirsk) of the the Grand Duke Nicholas as
first Duma. Belonged to the Commander-in-Chief, General
Toil Party* Acquired popular- Alexeiev directed the operations
ity and renown through his of the North-western front and
speeches in the Duma. On the distinguished himself by his or-
eve of the dissolution of the ganizing ability and by the skill
first Duma, Aladin went to Eng- with which he managed to ex-
land as a member of the dele- tricate his troops from awk-
gation sent by the Duma for ward and critical positions.
the purpose of conveying its After the grave situation of
message of sympathy to the 1915, when the Grand Duke
British Parliament, and when Nicholas was relieved of the
the Duma was dissolved he re- post of Generalissimo, General
mained in country. His
that Alexeiev took over the Supreme
subsequent activity was of such Command in the capacity of
a character that it changed al- Chief of the Staff of the nom-
together the attitude towards inal Commander-in-Chief the
Aladin of his political friends, late Tsar Nicholas. At the de-
so that he soon lost his pres- cisive moment of the Revolu-
tige and even the esteem he tion, Alexeiev lent his support
formerly enjoyed in the Russian to the Duma and, together with
democratic and intellectual cir- other generals, advised the Tsar
cles. During the latter years of to abdicate according to the de-
his sojourn in England he even mand of the Duma, The Pro-
became the London correspond- visional Government appointed
ent of the Novoie Vremia. Alexeiev Commander-in-Chief,
Aladin has been formally struck which office he held until the
out from the rolls of the Toil end of May, 1917. Immediately
Party. In the summer of 1917 after Kornilov's rebellion, Alex-
Aladin returned to Russia. eiev resumed for a short period
his military activity in the ca-
Govern-
against the Provisional idea of a Coalition Government.
ment. Gotz returned to Russia after
the Revolution from Siberia,
ERDELLI. General. An
exemplary where he was imprisoned with
Guards During
officer. the hard labour.
third year of the war com-
manded an army at the South- GUTCHKOV, A. T. A representa-
western front. A
typical rep- tive of the wealthy Moscow
resentative of the high military merchant circles of old stand-
bureaucracy, who managed to ing. One of the foremost Mos-
adapt himself for some time to
cow Conservative public men.
the new state of things in the During the Japanese War,
army. After the Revolution Gutchkov was the representa-
and before August, 1917, Erdelli tive at the front of the Red
was considered as one of the Cross. Fought in the South-
liberal generals and a friend of African War as a volunteer in
the elected soldiers'
organiza- the Boer army. During the
tions. However, after the ap- liberation movement of 1905-6,
pointment of General Denikin Gutchkov placed himself at the
to the post of Commander of head of the bourgeois ele-
the South-western front, Er- ments which opposed that move-
THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 285
good time.
IVERSKAIA. The especially re-
GUTER. General. Was in com-
vered ikon of Our Lady
mand of an army on the South-
of Iversk, which is kept in
western front under Brussilov.
Moscow in a special chapel near
In the spring of 1917, when
one of the gates of the Krem-
Brussilov was appointed Com-
lin. It was the customary pro-
mander-in-Chief, Gutor, upon
the recommendation of the ceeding of the Tsars, when
coming to Moscow, to visit that
latter, was entrusted with the
chapel on their way to the Pal-
command of the South-western
ace in order to pray before the
(Galician) front, which he held
ikon.
when the July offensive began.
After the German break through
at Tarnopol, Gutor was de-
KALEDIN. General. A Cossack.
Took an important part in this
prived of his command for
war. After the old rights of
reasons explained later in the
book itself, and his place was self-government, of which the
taken by General Kornilov. autocracy deprived the Cos-
sacks, were restored to them
IAKUBOVITCH. General. A young by the Provisional Government,
officer of the General Staff. Kaledin was elected the first
Took part in the Japanese War, Ataman of the Don Cossacks,
particularly in the defence of i.e., head of the executive power
Port Arthur. At the most in the territories on the River
critical moment of the Revolu- Don inhabited by Cossacks.
tion, lakubovitch, together with According to the old Cossack
a few other officers of the Gen- law, every district is governed
eral Staff, reported to the Revo- by the "circle," a sort of elec-
lutionary Committee of the ted body with both administra-
Duma and put himself at its tive and legislative functions,
disposal for the fight for free- which nominates for a certain
dom, lakubovitch was ap- period all the officials, with the
THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM 287
crat and a member of the Cen- that the Austro- German troops
tral Committee of that party. succeeded on the ipth of July
He member for Petrograd
waft a 1917, at the very moment of the
of the second Duma. In his Bolshevik revolt in Petrograd,
evolution from Social Democ- in breaking through the Rus-
STXTTCHKA. A
Lett barrister, a Committee; publicist As a
violent Bolshevik. After the political refugee has spent
Bolshevik coup d'etat Stutchka many years abroad, in France,
took a very active part in the and especially in Switzerland.
destruction of the Russian ju- On his return to Russia after
dicial machinery. The absurd the Revolution he became (in
"
and barbarian courts" estab- May, 1917), member of the Pro-
THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM
visional Government as Minister of Prime Minister, proposed
of Agriculture, in which office (together with several other
he remained until the Kornilov persons) that Terestchenko
rebellion, when he joined the should be made Minister of
opposition, demanding the for- Finance Thus Terestchenko
mation of a homogeneous So- became a member of the first
cialist Government. Before the Revolutionary Government,
Bolshevik coup d'etat Tchernov where he was the only one who
carried on a personal campaign had never before been elected to
r
against Kerensk3 trying to in-
,
a Legislative Chamber. After
duce his party to come to an Mihukov left the Government,
agreement with the Bolsheviks Terestchenko accepted the port-
and occupying a somewhat am- folio of Minister for Foreign
biguous position towards the Affairs, in which office he re-
question of the continuance of mained until the Bolshevik coup
the war. d'etat. Having been arrested
by the Bolsheviks at the sitting
TCHERNOVITSI ( CzERNOVICH ) . of the Cabinet, Terestchenko
The capital of the Austrian was imprisoned m the fortress
Province of Bukovina. of SS. Peter and Paul, where
he remained for several months.
TERESTCHENKO. Belongs to a
well-known Russian family of TROTZKY BRONSTEIN ) .Well-
(