Colombia

Learning Institutions Enable

Integrated Response
By Thomas A. Marks

C
urrent emphasis in irregular warfare highlights whole-of-government response and the
imperative for learning institutions. Only by being the latter can the former engage in
the timely, flexible mastery of constantly changing circumstances imperative for successful
implementation of the ends-ways-means methodology. Few countries have worked harder or made
greater steps in this direction than Colombia.
Though Colombian progress toward an acceptable steady-state has been much remarked upon,1
especially several of the more spectacular Colombian special operations that have in recent years
seriously damaged the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),2 there is much more that
can be learned from Bogotas experience.

Colombia as New War Battleground3

It seems almost ancient history to recall that little more than a decade ago, many analysts had
all but written off Colombia as both a failed state and a lost cause.4 In the years before the turn of
the millennium, an insurgency that had its roots in the aftermath of the bloody civil warcalled
simply The Violence (La Violencia), 19481958/1960had grown to the point that massed FARC
columns of multiple-battalion strength proved capable of overrunning or mauling army units of
reinforced company strength and in seizing distant points, such as the most remote state capital in
Colombia, Mitu, which was held for 3 days in mid-1998.
It was therefore a daunting situation that confronted the administration of President Andrs
Pastrana (19982002), which took office even as such disasters began to take on momentum.
Internal dislocation caused by the growing drug trade, U.S. efforts to punish Colombia during
the Ernesto Samper administration (19941998) for inadequate cooperation in counternarcotics

Dr. Thomas A. Marks is Chair of the Irregular Warfare Department in the College of
International Security Affairs at the National Defense University.

PRISM 1, no. 4 From the field | 127

 Form Approved
Report Documentation Page OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it
does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED

2. REPORT TYPE
SEP 2010 00-00-2010 to 00-00-2010
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Colombia: Learning Institutions Enable Integrated Response 5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER
National Defense University Press,Prism,260 Fifth Ave., Bldg. 64, Rm
3605, Fort McNair,Washington,DC,20319-5066
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITORS ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITORS REPORT

NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 20
unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR)

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
 efforts, and mediocre senior military leadership base and encouraged insurgent behavior that
had all combined to cripple a state response. appalled most potential supporters, domestic
A misguided Pastrana strategy of negotiations or international. Essentially, the combatants
was to be enabled by military pressure, but there became the movement, but their independent
was no effective coordination between the two funding profile allowed just enough connection
pillars of strategy. with marginalized population fragments (such as
Even as negotiations foundered because migrant workers in the drug fields) that expan-
of FARC insincerity, one of the most effective sion was all but guaranteed.
and capable irregular warfare militaries in the Similarly, FARC ideology was illustra-
world today was built. This was accomplished tive of the new world order. Though commu-
within the space of 4 years in the face of daunt- nism itself had seemingly collapsed with the
ing odds and a profound shortage of means. end of the Cold War, in reality, it was alive
Virtually every aspect of the military as an and well. 5 Latin American regional context
was considerably more favorable to left-wing
approaches than one would have expected
so-called new socialism meshed with the based on international circumstances.
more traditional strongman populism of So-called new socialism meshed with the more
an earlier, military-dominated era traditional strongman populism (caudillismo)
of an earlier, military-dominated era to morph
institution was touched by a sweeping reform into the neo-Marxism of Bolivarianism most
movement driven by Colombian officers. In prominently in Colombias neighbors, but
the field, FARC efforts to move from maneuver especially Venezuela.6 This favorable context
warfare (using large units capable of fighting the further enabled FARC by providing sanctu-
military to a standstill) to war of position (lib- aries, secure supply lines, and state support,
erating and holding the emerging counterstate) both overt (for example, at solidarity confer-
were soundly defeated. ences) and covert (the Venezuelan but also the
Though FARC sought to project its Ecuadoran effort).
strength through the usual tripartite division Further assisting the FARC counterstate
of Marxist-Leninist structurea party (the were traditional nonstate actors with non-Marx-
Clandestine Communist Party of Colombia), ist ideologies, but ideologies nevertheless built
an army (which FARC itself claimed to be, the upon a powerful sense of ideological-nationalist
Popular Army, or FARCEjrcito del Pueblo), grievance. These groups sought force multiplica-
and a united front (the Bolivarian Movement tion in Colombia through a meeting of minds
for a New Colombia)it was a new war phe- and capabilities. The likes of the Provisional
nomenon independent of external state aid. Irish Republican Army of Northern Ireland
Instead, it relied upon exploitation of the drug and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna of Spain secretly
trade (mainly cocaine), kidnapping, extortion, sent numerous teams to work with FARC. In
and criminality (cattle rustling and vehicle exchange for FARC solidarity, they offered
theft) for generating funds. This allowed it funds, training spaces, and lethal contributions
not only to exist but also to grow, regardless of from their own violent repertoires, such as the
societal shifts that increasingly shrank its social mechanics of mass casualty bombing.7

128 | From the field PRISM 1, no. 4

 To this traditional challenge was added a and funding that were neither transparent nor
more nontraditional threat, lawfare, waged by accountable, the parastates claimed to have a
parastates implacably hostile to the Colombian more accurate view of reality and worked tire-
state itself.8 What Bogota had early on labeled lessly to eliminate or cripple the Colombian
the human rights cartel comprised interna- counterinsurgency, as well as its American
tional human rights groups, functioning in alli- assistance. They were supported by elements
ance with thousands of local cause-oriented within the U.S. polity. Though such had also
groups (often with interlocking leadership been the case during the Cold War, the new
directorates and processes), which claimed a war environment saw the process accelerate
certain sovereign immunity by virtue of the as it was enabled by the extreme fragmenta-
nobility of their cause (often termed the halo tion of American foreign policy consensus and
effect) to wage a sustained assault on state dwindling agreement on the economic, social,
processes and legitimacy. They used publicity and political fundamentals toward which any
(invariably framed in legal and activist jargon), society should work. Consequently, there was
links to certain important members of Western little empathy in some key circles of policy
political establishments, and the law itself in for the challenges of an emerging state such
tactical and often noncontextual ways to chal- as Colombia. Ironically, the state was seen as
lenge the right of the state to self-defense. legitimate by its own population, as could be
Indispensable for the successful use of law- discerned by any metric.
fare was shaping the battlefield by a determined Nevertheless, in the pre-1998 years,
effort of framing and narrative; that is, the cre- FARC grew steadily in strength, filling the
ation of a negative picture and accompanying vacuum that was Colombian rural space, most
storyline that cast the Colombian state as the particularly in the large area of the llanos and
bad guys, thus altering the very nature of the amazonas, the jungle and true jungle of east-
field of battle.9 The goal was to fill those virtual ern Colombia, with 60 percent of the national
spaces of legitimacy that the state had simply territory but only 4 percent of the population.
never thought about or sought to fill. FARCs Long before ungoverned spaces and failed/failing
struggle, then, was framed as quasi-legitimate states became terms driving academic analysis,11
rebellion by the oppressed and marginalized Latin American realities dictated that almost
against an imperfect, brutal state (enabled by any insurgent group could for a time find secure
the usual suspects in the West). The narrative base areas in the hinterland. Che Guevara was
described the frame in various ways but always
with the goal of portraying the Colombian state
as both suspect and murderous, especially its
critical was Colombian abandonment of
security forces.
U.S. military operations other than war
In reality, multiple, regular surveys in the
doctrine, with its division of conflict into
period under discussion showed the Colombian war and other than war
security forces (the military and police) to be
among the most positively viewed segments in perhaps only singularly unlucky in attracting
the country, with the military invariably at the both the notoriety and the competent response
very top in popular esteem.10 Yet with processes that led to his being hunted down and killed

PRISM 1, no. 4 From the field | 129

in southeastern Bolivia in 1967. FARC expe- was FARC structures, the counterstate (that
rienced no such fate until the events of the is, the clandestine infrastructure of Vietnam-
Pastrana administration forced it to go on the era terminology) because by 1998 FARCs
strategic defensive. combatants essentially were the insurgency.
Critical to this reversal was Colombian The mass base of FARC doctrine and ideology
military abandonment of U.S. military opera- did not exist.14 The key to counterinsurgency,
tions other than war doctrine, with its division then, was security for the population.
of conflict into war and other than war. The It should not be surprising that this
revised Colombian approach enabled the emer- approach, articulated formally by the
gence of a new holistic approach to conflict.12 Colombians, is essentially that of U.S. irregu-
It was built upon a correct assessment of the lar warfare best known through Field Manual
threat. Previously, FARC had been categorized 324, Counterinsurgency.15 Any irregular conflict
as a problem of public order, which necessar- that has progressed to the point Colombia had
ily (and legally) involved a law enforcement by mid-1998 (or Afghanistan today16) neces-
response. Correctly recognizing that any strug- sitates commitment of military power adequate
gle in which massed guerrilla units seized towns to establishing security for the population, even
could hardly be equated with a struggle against as state reform addresses the roots of conflict.17
criminals, the military reframed the battle as Colombian forces, of course, were on home
war. More accurately, it was a particular type ground, so they faced no language or cultural
of war, a Marxist-Leninist insurgency using issues or lack of national will to prosecute the
Peoples War doctrine to advance on multiple fight. There was no hostile diaspora to contrib-
lines of effort with the ultimate objective of ute to the insurgent cause. Instead, the central
seizing power. Recruiting from a limited social obstacle to success was strategic confusion.
base was accompanied by criminal fundraising, This was ended by lvaro Uribe, a third
but the political project was the focus of all party candidate for the presidency in 2002, who
FARC strategic plans and efforts.13 tapped public frustration with Pastranas years of
This assessment stood in stark con- unsuccessful negotiations with FARC to sweep
trast to the U.S. strategic view during the into power with a first-round electoral victory.
Clinton administration (19922000), which When he took office in mid-year, Uribe quickly
it sought to impose upon the Colombians. made good on his promise to proceed forcefully
In Clausewitzian terms, the United States to the extent of moving beyond whole-of-gov-
saw the drug trade as the center of gravity. ernment18 to what can only be labeled whole-
Counternarcotics, in fact, was the sole ratio- of-society warfighting.
nale for most assistance provided under Plan
Colombia (an amount ultimately in excess of Conceptualizing Whole-of-Society
$1 billion). The Colombian counterassessment Response
argued that this confused an operational cen- Uribes administration began even as
ter of gravity with the strategic center of grav- the profound shock of 9/11 had led to a dra-
itylegitimacy, or the support of the people. matic evolution away from the U.S. approach
Indeed, if funding was one operational center during the Clinton years. In effect, under
of gravity, argued the Colombians, a second President George W. Bush, the barrier that

130 | From the field PRISM 1, no. 4

had separated counternarcotics from coun- of the citizen without the assistance of the
terinsurgency was dropped. Among the most State. Rather, it is the protection of the citi-
significant new initiatives was the deploy- zen and democracy by the State with the
ment of 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) solidarity and co-operation of the whole of
personnel to embattled Arauca Department society. . . . This is, in short, a policy for
to train a new infrastructure protection bri- the protection of the population.19
gade. Indeed, an indicator of just how seri-
ously the Bush administration took the prob- The policy stated that threatening the
lems of Colombia was its issuing of National stability of the country and its citizens was an
Security Presidential Directive 18, Supporting explosive combination of terrorism; the ille-
Democracy in Colombia, which called for the gal drugs trade; illicit finance; traffic of arms,
State Department to write and implement a ammunition, and explosives; kidnapping and
U.S. political-military plan in direct support of extortion; and homicide. 20 The hitherto
a Colombian national security strategy. intractable nature of Colombias security
With U.S. encouragement, Uribe, early conundrum stemmed from the interlocking
in his administration, created a true counter- nature of these threats.
insurgency plan. Unlike Plan Colombia of the The strategic objectives of the Democratic
Pastrana/Clinton years (all but written by the Security and Defence Policy were therefore pub-
United States), which had been a catalogue of lished as:
national ills with proposed solutions beyond c onsolidation of state control through-
Bogotas ability to operationalize or fund, the out Colombia
new Democratic Security and Defence Policy (offi-
cially released in June 2003) was intended as protection of the population
a course of action. As such, it was built upon e limination of the illegal drug trade in
three basic tenets: Colombia
A
 lack of personal security is at the maintenance of a deterrent capability
root of Colombias social, economic, t ransparent and efficient management
and political ills. of resources.
T
 his lack of personal security stems
These, in turn, led to six courses of action:
from the absence of the state in large
swaths of the national territory. coordinating state action

T
 herefore, all elements of national strengthening state institutions
power need to be directed toward end- c onsolidating control of national ter-
ing this lack of national integration. ritory
p rotecting the rights of all Colombians
Addressing this assessment was the policy and the nations infrastructure
itself, the thrust of which is stated directly:
cooperating for the security of all
Security is not regarded primarily as the c ommunicating state policy and
security of the State, nor as the security action.

PRISM 1, no. 4 From the field | 131

 Each of these courses of action had inte- Peru.21 It further outlined precisely the strategic
gral components. Co-ordinating state action, approach to be used:22
for instance, stated that a National Defence  The Government will gradually
and Security Council would be established to restore state presence and the author-
ensure co-ordinated and unified action by all ity of state institutions, starting in stra-
state bodies. No longer, in other words, was tegically important areas.
counterinsurgency a duty assigned by the state
only to the security forces (mainly the army).  Once the Armed Forces and the
Regional authorities were directed to set National Police have re-established
up similar bodies, with their membership left control over an area, units comprising
to local circumstances. A Joint Intelligence professional soldiers, campesino soldiers
Committee was also established, and the [that is, local forces] and National
Ministry of Defence was explicitly charged Police carabineros [police field force]
will maintain security and protect the
civilian population. This will enable
state organizations and criminal investi-
no longer was counterinsurgency a duty
gation authorities to work in the area.
assigned by the state only to the security
forces (mainly the army)  Once a basic level of security has
been established, the State will
embark upon a policy of territorial
with coordinating the activities of both the consolidation, re-establishing the
armed forces and police (a statutory arrange- normal operation of the justice sys-
ment that had been largely ignored under the tem, strengthening local democracy,
most recent pre-Uribe administrations). meeting the most urgent needs of the
Other components in the policy further population, broadening state services
highlighted the Uribe administrations aware- and initiating medium to long term
ness of the multidimensional nature of counter- projects aimed at creating sustain-
insurgency. Strengthening state institutions, able development.
for instance, began with a discussion of the need
to bolster the judicial system; moved on to ana- Operationalizing the Plan
lyze strengthening the armed forces, police, and
intelligence; and concluded by examining ways Necessarily, given the nature of the irreg-
to strengthen state finances. ular threat, the security forces undertook the
If one course of action stood out as cen- most prominent and difficult tasks. Though
tral to the whole, it was consolidating control responsibilities were tasked to all state minis-
of national territory, as mentioned above, as tries and bodies, it was the security forces that
the indispensable element of any counterin- were to provide the shield behind which resto-
surgency. A cycle of recovery was detailed ration of legitimate government writ took place.
that evoked images of the approach used in Hence, it was the security forces that had to
successful counterinsurgencies such as those engage in institutional learning and adaptation
of Thailand, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and beyond anything seen in nearly a century.

132 | From the field PRISM 1, no. 4

 A small group of officers was dominant dur- the Democratic Security and Defence Policy. Both
ing the 8 years of the Pastrana (19982002) and the militarys Joint Command and police (Policia
first Uribe (20022006) terms. FARCs efforts to Nacional) were subordinate to MDN and used
launch major attacks had been shattered by the as their guide the strategic document drawn up
commander of IV Division, Major General Carlos by the ministry. Their product was issued as a
Alberto Ospina Ovalle, who worked intimately 4-year vision applicable to the entire Uribe first
with his superior, Comandante del Ejercito General term (20022006).25 The original five strategic
Jorge Enrique Mora Rangel, and Comando General objectives were reworked to seven (specific to
de las Fuerzes Militares23 (Commanding General the defense sector),26 a total that returned to
[CG], Joint Command) General Fernando Tapias five in the Joint Command strategic guidance
Stahelin. Mora eventually took the place of Tapias and command policy publication.27 The armys
upon the latters retirement when Uribe became objectives were for all practical purposes those
president; Ospina became army commander. of the Joint Command.28
When Mora himself retired in November 2003,
Ospina became CG Joint Command.
What these officers shared was both the- working under Tapias, Mora and Ospina
oretical and practical maturity, significantly fashioned highly effective army annual
enhanced by force of character and personal campaign plans that forced FARC into
bravery. Mora and Ospina were noteworthy for the strategic defensive
their close working relationship and the general
esteem with which they were held throughout
not only the army but also the armed forces. Discrepancies were not serious 29 and
Both had proven themselves tactically time and became moot when considered in conjunction
again as they had advanced through the junior with explanatory material.30 They apparently
ranks, then operationally as more senior com- stemmed primarily from what was the near-
manders. Ospina was apparently the most com- simultaneous (though coordinated) preparation
bat-decorated officer in the army at the time driven by the beginning of a new administra-
he became CG Joint Command, in addition to tion. The central elements remained protec-
being generally regarded as the armys premier tion of the population and elimination of the
strategist, with a deep knowledge of insurgency illegal drugs trade in Colombia, to be accom-
and counterinsurgency. Together, working under plished through the application of national will,
Tapias, Mora and Ospina fashioned highly effec- resources, and power. As the premier element
tive army annual campaign plans that, as they of national power in the internal war at hand,
were instituted, forced FARC into the strate- therefore, the military clarified its role further in
gic defensive. Their correct appreciation of the a general military strategy issued by CG Joint
situation, though, could not be translated into a Command, General Mora.31 This remained the
true counterinsurgency, with a whole-of-society key document for the application of military
approach, until the election of Uribe. action to support the presidents democratic
Under the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio security counterinsurgency approach.
de Defensa Nacional, or MDN24), the security Therein, the Joint Commands origi-
forces prepared their own plans to implement nal five strategic objectives became six more

PRISM 1, no. 4 From the field | 133

detailed General Military Strategic Components and Objectives, divided into two groups of
three, offensive and defensive (see below). The defensive components had the objective of coun-
tering the protracted war of the Narcoterrorist Organizations [ONTs].32 The offensive compo-
nents had the objective of implementing a war of decisive action and rapid resolution against
these same ONTs. The final strategic objective, toward which both offensive and defensive com-
ponents were directed, was to end the will of the ONTs to continue armed struggle. In turn, each
component (or campaign) had a number of subcomponents. A foundation for the whole was
provided by support components.33 Thus:

Offensive Components: Implement War of Decisive Action and Rapid Resolution

Neutralize ONT finances

implement Plan Colombia (that is, counternarcotics)
facilitate end of domination (in areas by ONT)
take action against kidnapping and extortion
Exercise (establish) territorial control
dominate and control strategic areas
dominate mobility corridors
institute a neighborhood watch network34
control population and resources
facilitate presence of the state
Neutralize ONT plans and armed capacity
dismantle militias
attrite armed groups (through attrition, diminish armed groups)
capture leaders
neutralize informants
neutralize traffic of arms, munitions, and explosives.

Defensive Components: Counter Protracted War of the ONT

Protect the population and human rights

establish units with mission of local security
engage in counterterrorist actions
guarantee security and mobility of population
enhance respect for human rights and international humanitarian rights

134 | From the field PRISM 1, no. 4

 Protect economic infrastructure presence to rural areas. They were integrated
within regular battalions for command and con-
s ecure transportation infra-
trol purposes and manned by volunteers from
structure
the annual draft levy. The battalions them-
secure energy infrastructure selves, the face of the much bigger ground forces
s ecure communications infra- (together with the marines), were also draftees,
structure but the strike units were manned completely
Strengthen deterrent capacity by volunteers. These counterguerrilla battal-
ions, grouped into mobile brigades, conducted
stockpile strategic materials relentless operations that in the main task force
stand up covering forces areathe FARC strategic rearguard in the
Support components jungles of eastern Colombialasted for years
(using block leave procedures to sustain per-
s trengthen and modernize
manent presence). The result was a relentless
forces
grinding down of FARC strength.
c onduct integral action (civic Units of all types were brought into the
action) force structure according to plans predating
c onduct combined and spe- Uribe but now funded: new counterguerrilla
cial operations. battalions and mobile brigades; urban special
forces35 (joining rural special forces, the tra-
Specific responsibilities (taskings) were ditional mode of operation); special transporta-
not enumerated in this document, such hav- tion network protection units (Plan Meteoro,
ing previously become a matter of operational or Plan Meteor); high mountain battalions
reality before publication, with the armys force specifically situated and equipped to block
dispositions and programs driving the whole. insurgent mobility corridors through hitherto
Predictably, when army strategic objectives were
aligned with their Joint Command counterparts
(as per above, they are essentially the same), the local forces platoons were formed
breaking out of subtasks and responsibilities did, and augmented by thousands of
in fact, become even more specific, though only neighborhood watch participants,
to the extent of assigning missions to opera- extending permanent government
tional units or Director of Operations. presence to rural areas
The professional transformation of the
security forces that had taken place during the
Pastrana years meant that Uribes approach inaccessible heights; strengthened infrastruc-
required no substantial changes on their part. ture protection units; and local forces to provide
Instead, they could build on what existed. Some security, in particular, for rural urban centers.36
600 local forces platoons were formed, based in Simultaneously, from the same funding source,
medium and small towns and augmented by enhancement of individual effectiveness was
tens of thousands of neighborhood watch to be improved by converting draftee slots to
participants, extending permanent government volunteers at the rate of 10,000 per yearan

PRISM 1, no. 4 From the field | 135

 expensive undertaking since it costs approxi- its substantial agricultural sector, Colombia
mately 10 times more for a volunteer than for is classified as approximately three-quarters
a draftee.37 urban, and the troopsinitially called Soldados
All components related to each other. Campesinos (Peasant Soldiers), a name they
Standing up local forces platoons, for instance, themselves dislikedwere universally located
though intended initially as a step to enhance in rural towns. Hence, Soldados de mi Pueblo
security of the population, was soon found to (Home Guards would be the most useful ren-
produce greatly enhanced information flow to dering) came to be used simultaneously.
the forces and thus served as the basis for more Local forces had all the more impact
accurate and intense employment of regular and because the police, using the same approach
strike units. Greater activity in an area forced as the Soldados de mi Pueblo program, system-
the insurgents to move, especially the leader- atically established presence in every municipio
ship, presenting targets for enhanced special (county) in the country. Those areas from
operations capability. Loss of leaders led to which they had been driven, or which histori-
surrenders, which allowed psychological war- cally had been considered too dangerous for
fare units to exploit defections with a variety police presence, were manned by what effec-
of innovative programs, from rallies to radio tively was a police field force, though under
broadcasts. Fewer insurgents meant greater regular police jurisdiction. They functioned in
freedom of movement, and special units secured units of the same size and nature as the army
the transportation arteries, just as they did the local forces but were more mobile and often
critical infrastructure. Business picked up, the better armed. Where necessary, veritable forts
economy improved, kidnappings and murders were constructed to allow secure stations for the
dropped substantially, social tension dimin- projection of state presence. Backing them up
ished, and political participation increased. was a highly trained reaction force.38
Such police involvement as an integral com-
ponent of the counterinsurgency highlights a fur-
in the field, the security forces opened ther development in adaptation: the increasingly
up the space for the invigoration and joint nature of Colombian operations. Though
reform of Colombian democracy answering to a CG Joint Command, the mili-
tary services themselves had functioned together
more as a matter of courtesy than command. This
If there was one element in the approach had not posed any insuperable problems, particu-
that provided the missing link, it was the larly given the armys dominance, but it was not
deployment of local forces. These were indis- the ideal way to conduct counterinsurgency,
pensable to establishing state presence in where unity of command was crucial. It was espe-
affected areas and neatly sidestepped legal cially the case that the police, under Pastrana,
objections (and fierce opposition from the para- were not integrated at the national level in any
states) by utilizing a 1940s era law, discovered of the counterinsurgency planning. This ended
still on the books, which allowed a portion of under Uribe.39
the national draft levy to opt for service in their Within the military itself, a clear trend
home townsin local defense units. Despite toward greater jointness had emerged under

136 | From the field PRISM 1, no. 4

Tapias, as CG Joint Command had matured year as to approach less than 1 percent (except
under Mora (during the Uribe administra- for occasional 3 percent spikes among activist
tion) and then blossomed under Ospina. Plans sub-populations, such as university students).
to implement joint operational commands in Building on this and still further secu-
place of the exclusively army divisional areas rity force enhancements, state presence was
were tabled in summer 2004. They were met steadily expanded. All national territory and
with fierce resistance in parochial circles but population were incorporated to an extent
had the support of the president and began to never seen in Colombian history, with the
be implemented in December 2004, when 1st same perhaps true of the extent to which
Division became a joint command.40 Colombian democracy reflected mass partici-
pation and the will of the electorate.
Learning Organizations If there was irony, it was that the spec-
If this discussion appears unduly focused tacular levels of support displayed by the public
on military elements, it is because in Colombia for the state and its representatives throughout
circumstances dictated precisely what we see the entire 8 years of Uribes two terms were
in the U.S. case: domination of operational all but ignored in the approach and publica-
and budget facets of internal warfighting by the tions of the human rights cartel. The frames
defense establishment. In the field, however, whereby the parastates assessed the conflict
the security forces in fact opened up the space remained virtually unchanged, and in some
for the invigoration and reform of Colombian cases, their narratives actually became more
democracy. In particular, Uribe, in his first shrill in judging the Uribe years as little save
4-year term, held numerous 1-day town hall an unmitigated disaster for the country. Unlike
meetings in various parts of the country. In all the past, though, the state did not simply cede
cases, he was accompanied by key cabinet-level virtual space to its attackers. Rather, both
representatives to include agents from the mili- state and civil society aggressively defended
tary high command. A general session with a national policies and strategies.
question-and-answer period featured not only In constructing his own frame, Uribe was
the president and other national officials but consistent in his portrayal of Colombia as a
also the local and state officials concerned. legitimate democracy challenged by illegiti-
Democratic process was on display as govern- mate terrorism in the form of FARC, a group
ment was shown to be transparent and account- that had no mass following and had to sustain
able. Breakout sessions followed, devoted to itself wholly through criminal activity that
development and security. targeted the people themselves. The national
Reassembly saw courses of action tabled narrativewhich increasingly reflected the
and acted upon on the spot by consensus of reality of reformed, enhanced democracy
the whole. The impact of these sessions was was that the state and its security forces were
substantial and led to astonishing levels of sup- at one with the population in resisting those
port for the president and his government (as who would oppress them. Significant effort
measured by polls). Legitimacy was captured so went into facilitating access of (in particular)
completely that polls found such minimal levels the Colombian media and to disseminating the
of support (in any form) for FARC year after state version of events.

PRISM 1, no. 4 From the field | 137

 Abroad, Colombian embassies pursued considerable and relentless, was accompanied
much the approach of the state at home, by incorporation. New coordination bodies
interacting regularly and often with impor- were stood up with U.S. assistance and funding.
tant constituencies, especially in the United Other concerns were of equal moment, in
States. Uribe and his ministers were frequent particular explosive revelations that the pres-
visitors to Washington, where their own facil- sure for results had caused certain military ele-
ity in English allowed them to engage with ments to cut corners and deliver kills by the
both supporters and critics. Enhanced cooper- subterfuge of false positives (that is, dressing
ation led to further pressure on FARCs exter- vagrants or other innocents in combatant garb
nal links, which increasingly were forced to and killing them, then passing off the victims as
rely on the assistance of sympathetic govern- dead insurgents). Until 2006, it is unlikely this
ments in the newly declared Bolivarian states, would have been possible due to the relegation
especially Venezuela. of killed-in-action/wounded-in-action insur-
By the end of the first Uribe term, all gents to very low priority in the daily metrics
patterns had been set that continued into tallies. Favored instead were indicators of ini-
tiative (for example, FARC initiation of major
actions, such as attacks on towns) and security
regardless of the prominence of U.S.
(for example, whether local officials were able
aidwhich remained overwhelmingly
to remain in their towns overnight). Changes
dedicated to counternarcotics in personalities and metrics, however, fostered a
throughoutBogota had primacy in all new dynamic that led to the scandal.43
matters of strategy and operational art Yet it is the nature of the states reac-
tion that highlights how far both Colombia
the second term. New military leadership in and its counterinsurgency forces have come.
2006 ushered in a Consolidating Democratic Investigation, prosecution, and enhance-
Security plan, but there were no essential ment of oversight mechanisms have occurred.
changes.41 What was enhanced was the special Dramatically enhancing the legal means tasked
operations component of the original strategy with ensuring adherence to rule of law goes far
because FARC no longer was capable (in most beyond merely reacting vigorously to the alleged
areas and circumstances) of massing forces. crimes. In but one prominent example, lawyers
Thus, its smaller, fleeing units were followed have now been assigned to battalion level in
relentlessly. It was within this special opera- all ground forces.44 Likewise, in other challeng-
tions command that the Raul Reyes and Jaque ing situations, where circumstances could eas-
operations occurred.42 ily have led to more trouble, the security forces
State presence and functions were normal- sought new legal means to enable their efforts.
ized as FARC was driven from areas. Concerns They thus avoided makeshift and problem-
that the civil component of the effort was not atic courses of action.45 Such action is not the
robust enough led to greater emphasis on impact exception but generally the rule.
efforts that would kick-start local governance. Even this brief discussion has high-
There continued to be apprehension about the lighted the degree to which Colombia and its
degree to which progress in security, which was forces have engaged in a constant dialectic of

138 | From the field PRISM 1, no. 4

 Three U.S. Government contractors held hostage
by FARC and rescued by Colombian security
forces are transported safely to the United States
U.S. Air Force (Lance Cheung)

adaptation driven by the changing dynamic and context of the conflict. What has been stated
above but bears emphasis is that the Colombians were fighting for and in their own country. Just
as crucial, regardless of the prominence of U.S. aidwhich remained overwhelmingly dedicated
to counternarcotics throughoutBogota had primacy in all matters of strategy and operational art.
Indeed, as noted earlier, the Colombian leadership displayed a greater understanding not only of
their own irregular war but also often of the principles of irregular warfare in general throughout
the conflict.
Contributing still further to this process was possibly the most overlooked adaptation of the
entire conflict: the transformation of Colombias civil-military relations. Tapias, Mora, and Ospina
each contributed in his own way to the implementation of a balanced civil-military partnership
that took the place of the previously separate spheres of conceptualization and execution. Ospina,
in particular, demonstrated an astute understanding of an elected presidents needs. While focusing
on the military domination of local areas and the pursuit of FARC into its base areas, he delivered
progress in whatever form necessary to Uribes viability as a wartime leader.46 Thus, even as FARCs
peoples war foundered, Colombian democracy emerged more vibrant than perhaps at any time
in its history.

Conclusion
The preceding sentence, it could be argued, is just part of my own narrative that proceeds from
an incorrect framing of the insurgency discussed herein. Certainly, a contending narrative continues
to be put forth by some who remain bitter foes of all that the Uribe administration has attempted.
This would seem to miss the mark. From a position of absolute weakness, the Colombian state
and its institutions, notably the security forces, went through a process of learning and adaptation
that culminated in implementation of what I have argued elsewhere can in many ways be seen as
a textbook case of counterinsurgency.47 Whether we use the terminology whole-of-government or
whole-of-society to describe the Democratic Security and Defence Policy plan, it has been a masterpiece
of ends-ways-means in action.

PRISM 1, no. 4 From the field | 139

 Has it been perfect? The query is misplaced. The fog of war, as Clausewitz would certainly
observe, makes that impossible. Indeed, Colombia, though it has one of the leading economies of
Latin America, remains but the equivalent of a middling U.S. state in its available fiscal resources
hence, in the mobilization it can effect in the face of a still dangerous enemy, FARC.
Faced with crushing defeat, the insurgents have sought to relocate to secure refuges where they
can regenerate. These lairs have been both in marginal, difficult terrain within the country, such as
high mountain territory, and outside Colombias borders. Simultaneously, FARC has dramatically
upped its international effort to receive a legitimacy from fellow travelers that it has been unable
to gain from Colombians themselves. It remains a major player in the narcotics industry and has
apparently expanded its distribution networks to West Africa so as to facilitate movement of more
product to the lucrative European market.
Yet Colombia has proved equally adaptable. Whether in doctrinal shifts or rapid changes in
individual course content, the security forces have kept pace with their foes. The very attraction of
Colombian society has served to create a hemorrhage of defectors from FARCs ranks, even as the
state has continued to mature in incorporating its physical and popular elements. It is possibly more
cohesive and more representative than at any time in its history.
Most decisively, the Colombian case demonstrates that even in a new war battleground, certain
fundamental principles of counterinsurgency continue to hold. The strategic goal is legitimacy; the
operational goal is the neutralization of the insurgent counterstate; the tactical goal is the domination
of human terrain (that is, the security of the people). In reaching this last goal, the Colombian case
is noteworthy because the population has demonstrated extraordinary support for the administra-
tion throughout the Uribe years, even as the assault by the parastates discussed above has continued
unabated. The lesson is sobering, as states ranging from Israel to Sri Lanka have discovered.
Beyond traditional modes of adaptation such as we have seen carried out by Colombian forces
and the state, therefore, there must be an appreciation that irregular warfare in todays world-histori-
cal context and moment faces an alignment of foes that extends far beyond the immediate battlefield.
The intangible dimension that is virtual space is balanced in importance with the effort to establish
facts on the ground. And the foes in that intangible dimension are every bit as lethal as a FARC
is in the tangible dimension that is physical space. Dealing with both dimensions requires careful
consideration and planning if adaptation and integrated response are to be effective. Colombia has
demonstrated that this is possible. PRISM

Notes
1
My most recent contribution to this literature is Regaining the Initiative: Colombia Versus the FARC
Insurgency, in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 2d ed., ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (New
York: Osprey, 2010), 209232. See also Robert D. Ramsey III, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque:
The Colombian Security Force Experience, 19982008, Occasional Paper 34 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army
Combined Arms Center, December 2009), available at <www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA514131
&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>.
2
Best known are the March 2008 precision guided munitions killing of FARC second-in-command, Raul
Reyes, inside Ecuador, and the July 2008 rescue, inside Colombia, of the most high-value hostages held by the

140 | From the field PRISM 1, no. 4

insurgents. Benefit from the Reyes strike went far beyond his elimination because the subsequent sweep of the
ground by Colombian special operations personnel resulted in the capture of what essentially were FARCs
electronic master-files, the exploitation of which continues. The rescue effort, Operation Jaque (Checkmate),
ended FARCs most concerted effort to use prisoners, who included three Americans, to force concessions from
the government. Widely available on the rescue (in Spanish) is Juan Carlos Torres, Operactin Jaque (Bogota:
Planeta, 2009); from the American viewpoint of the three hostages, see Marc Gonsalves et al., Out of Captivity:
Surviving 1,967 Days in the Colombian Jungle (New York: William Morrow/HarperCollins, 2009).
3
Extant theory sees what were once simply termed internal warsas opposed to traditional state-versus-
state warsas new due to the manner in which they are embedded in the postCold War global context,
which has unleashed a host of forces that revolve around an individual and group search for identity. What
once was local now invariably becomes international, and normally can only be dealt with through a marshaling
of multifaceted international response. Furthermore, the means, especially funding, are drawn from nontra-
ditional sources such as criminal activity. Necessarily dealing with new wars calls for skill sets that extend
beyond kinetic action. See Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 2d ed. (Palo
Alto: Stanford University Press, 2007). This may be usefully supplemented by Donald M. Snow, Uncivil Wars:
International Security and the New Internal Conflicts (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996); Isabelle Duyvesteyn
and Jan Angstrom, Rethinking the Nature of War (New York: Frank Cass, 2005); and Herfried Mnkler, The
New Wars (Malden, MA: Polity, 2005). On groups themselves, see Querine Hanlon, Globalization and the
Transformation of Armed Groups, in Pirates, Terrorists, and Warlords: The History, Influence, and Future of
Armed Groups around the World, ed. Jeffrey H. Norwitz (New York: Skyhouse, 2009), 124134.
4
The subject of failed/failing states has generated a body of literature perhaps more voluminous than
that of new wars. Another postCold War concept, it holds that there are states that fail on any number
of metrics and consequently do not perform as stable states. Whether a state has failed or is merely failing
depends on the metrics chosen, on which there is no agreement (Colombia is invariably listed as either
failed or failing). There are cases, though, such as Somalia, where there is acceptance that the state has
collapsed. Useful references, mercifully devoid of histrionics, include I. William Zartman, ed., Collapsed
States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Robert
I. Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004);
and Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). Rotberg has edited a collection of case studies in State Failure
and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). Valuable is his
introduction, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators. Pre-Uribe administra-
tion Colombia is specifically discussed in Harvey F. Kline, Colombia: Lawlessness, Drug Trafficking, and
Carving up the State, 161182.
5
This was especially the case in South Asia, where a Maoist upsurge has produced a failed state in Nepal
and has been deemed by Indias prime minister as the greatest threat to that countrys security. For details,
see Thomas A. Marks, Return of the Nightmare, India and Global Affairs (New Delhi) 2, no. 2 (AprilJune
2009), 7885.
6
For a sympathetic treatment of this synthesis, to which (it can be argued) FARC aspires, see Sujatha
Fernandes, Who Can Stop the Drums? Urban Social Movements in Chavezs Venezuela (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2010).

PRISM 1, no. 4 From the field | 141

 7
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) even attempted to impart to FARC the mechanics of
using poison gas in shells launched from improvised mortars, ramplas, the firing mechanism for which PIRA
itself had originally been responsible, but which had made its way to Colombia in perfected form via the FMLN
(Farabundo Mart National Liberation Front) of El Salvador. Indeed, FARC warfighting doctrine was essentially
borrowed from the FMLN, which had taken it from the Vietnamese. At least twice, Vietnamese personnel
trained their fellow Marxists, FARC, inside Colombia.
8
Use of the term parastate has moved beyond original reference to any substate challenge, legal or
(more often) illegal, to an existing state. It is now more widely used for organizations that have taken unto
themselves many of the attributes of states but exist in a parasitic or (forced) symbiotic relationship with
the host state or states. Structural examples would be organized crime or major international human rights
organizations, which can exist as both tangible and intangible (virtual) phenomena. International human
rights organizations, for example, are often as much virtual as physical realities. Parastates, then, differ from
counterstates in that they do not seek the overthrow of the state but cohabitation or even domination (as in
the case of organized crime in Mexico). In contrast, counterstates advance a rival new order that seeks to
replace the old order. Intriguing for analysts is the situation of numerous (especially but not solely) African
quasi-states, variants of the failing (for example, Congo) or failed (Somalia) category discussed earlier. Quasi-
states are those lacking one or more key attributes that allow them to be true states (such as a resource base
or a functioning government possessing a monopoly of violence). The critical distinction between them and
failing/failed states may be that the inadequacies are structural, thus little amenable to remediation through
human agency. See Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
9
Frames create the boundaries within which an event is interpreted, while narratives provide the plot.
The concept has leaped to our present official consciousness through the ongoing discussion concerning
winning the battle of the narrative. See, for instance, Akil N. Awan, Success of the Meta-Narrative:
How Jihadists Maintain Legitimacy, CTC Sentinel 2, no. 11 (November 2009), 68; or Dutch National
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Countering Violent Extremist Narratives (January 2010). For a general
treatment, see Pippa Norris, Montague Kern, and Marion Just, eds., Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the
Government, and the Public (New York: Routledge, 2003). Background on concepts may be found in Karen
S. Johnson-Cartee, News Narratives and News Framing: Constructing Political Reality (Lanham: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2005).
10
The easiest way around this reality was to attack the credibility of the surveys themselves and to claim
they were part of the states assault on the legitimate representatives of the revolution, FARC.
11
Excellent on the general subject are Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, eds., Ungoverned Spaces:
Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).
12
For a discussion of this process by one of its central figures, ultimately commanding general of first the
army, then the armed forces themselves, see Carlos Ospina Ovalle, Insights from Colombias Long War:
Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned, Counterterrorism 12, no. 3 (Fall 2006), 2633. His key observation is: We
were using American doctrine, where we conceptualized the continuum as war and other than war. This was
absolutely incorrect. There is only war, with the enemy fielding different mixes of the elements of war (29).
U.S. doctrine in question may be found in Joint Publication 307, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other
Than War (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 16, 1995).

142 | From the field PRISM 1, no. 4

 13
The information upon which Colombian intelligence was based was voluminous and all-source.
Necessarily, it was primarily drawn from human sources, which meant that it was strongest precisely where
U.S. capabilities were (and remain) weakest.
14
Activists, as well as cause-oriented and solidarity groups, deny that this is so. See, for example, the quite
different analysis contained in James Petras, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: The Origin and Direction of
the FARCEP (New York: Pluto Press, 2010). Interestingly, the parastates, while hostile to the Colombian state,
generally do not go so far as to support an analysis such as that of Petras, who sees Colombia on the verge of a
revolution with FARC in the lead. Nevertheless, the parastates make quite clear that they see state agency as the
heart of Colombias woes as opposed, say, to structural issues or the dislocation caused by the insurgents themselves.
15
Most easily available is the version published by the University of Chicago Press in 2007. Unfortunately,
the reality that politics, armed or otherwise, can only take place among the populace has given way in the
U.S. military to an often acrimonious debate on the varied interpretations of the short-hand label population-
centric. See Gian P. Gentile, A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army, Parameters
(Autumn 2009), 517. The United States (principally the Army) is increasingly faulted as having allowed
physical protection of the population to overshadow necessary kinetic action. Of more importance, perhaps,
is the obvious conflation of economic development with governance in virtual negation of the central
strategic role political development plays in counterinsurgency.
16
A comparison of the Afghanistan situation now to that of Colombia during the period under discussion
may be constructed by exploring two current references: Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, Thugs, and
Crime Are Reshaping the Afghan War (New York: Picador, 2010); and Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Opium: Uncovering
the Politics of the Poppy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).
17
Though discussed, the personal and professional experiences that prepared General David Petraeus for
successful command in counterinsurgency have not been explored in depth. It would seem logical to examine
course content at West Point while Petraeus was a cadet (19701974) since the relevant handouts and readings
were universally focused upon balancing kinetic and nonkinetic facets of response. The same could be said of the
U.S. doctrinal approach to counterinsurgency in El Salvador, which at one point was under the command of U.S.
Southern Command commander and Petraeuss mentor, General Jack Galvin. Petraeus spent 6 weeks with Galvin
and his command between his first and second years as a social sciences instructor at West Point. For details, see
David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army
(New York: Crown Publishers, 2009), 6067. For the metanarrative, see David Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency
Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009).
18
Whole-of-government is simple in theory but has led to rather less discussion in fact. The most tangible
expression of what whole-of-government means is the application of the instruments of national power. The
instruments are most commonly equated in the U.S. construction with the acronym MIDLIFE, indicating
military, intelligence, diplomacy, law enforcement, information, finance, economics. This is a formulation
perhaps appropriate for the United States in expeditionary mode but necessarily incomplete for a state fighting
within its own boundaries. There, a more accurate approximation of the instruments of national power might
be government ministries and the elements of civil society that can be called upon in the struggle. This was
the Colombian interpretation.
19
Presidency of the Republic/Ministry of Defence, Democratic Security and Defence Policy (Bogota:
Ministry of Defence, 2003), 1314 (English version). The original Spanish version, Politica de Defensa y

PRISM 1, no. 4 From the field | 143

Seguridad Democratica, requires slightly more pages for its presentation but is identical to the English edition
in all other respects.
20
Ibid., 2330.
21
For details, see Thomas A. Marks, Maoist Peoples War in Post-Vietnam Asia (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2007).
22
Colombian strategic documents are normally unclassified and accurate in their presentation of plans,
courses of action, and particulars. They are quite straightforward in approach and abundant in detail. For the
three quoted elements that follow, see Democratic Security and Defence Policy, 42.
23
Literally, Commanding General of the Military Forces, which accurately defines the authority and
responsibility inherent to the position. It is rendered as CG Joint Command to facilitate the analysis pre-
sented here.
24
Recent official documents drop national in their translations.
25
See Presidencia de la Republic/Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Sector Defensa: Una Vision, Una
MisionPlan Estrategico 20022006 (Bogota: Ministry of National Defence, undated), in Spanish only.
26
Ibid., 5051.
27
Comandante General Fuerzas Militares (Jorge Enrique Mora Rangel), Direccionamiento Estrategico y
Politicas de Comando 2003 (Bogota: Joint Command, undated), 26 [sic]; in Spanish only. An outline chart
comparing the three sets of strategic objectivesnational, defense, and militaryis found at 48 [sic].
28
Comandante del Ejercito (Carlos Alberto Ospina Ovalle), Guia Operacional y Politicas de Comando 2003
(Bogota: COLAR, undated), 2223; in Spanish only. The strategic alignment of the objectives for all levels
discussed thus farnational, defense, military, and armyis found at 3435.
29
Though not always persuasive: for instance, as extracted from the national document, Consolidation of
state control throughout Colombia is combined in the Defence document with maintenance of a deterrent
capability to establish security force presence throughout the country (lograr presencia fuerza publica en todo
territorio nacional). Though a discussion accompanies the conflation (52), it does not clear up the combining
of these apples and oranges.
30
In the Defence document, this discussion takes the form of strategies [for implementation], Sector
Defensa, 5255; for the joint forces, discussion forms the entirety of Direccionamiento Estrategico 2003.
31
Fuerzes Militares de Colombia, Estrategia Militar General 2003 (Bogota: Joint Command, undated); in
Spanish only.
32
Use of the label narcoterrorist organizations (ONT) stems from two sources: first, Colombias long-
standing desire to find a viable term for the insurgents, such as the CT (communist terrorists) used by
the British during the Malayan Emergency (19481960); and second, Bogotas awareness that its terminol-
ogy needed to be in harmony with that of its principal benefactor, the United States. If, in Washington,
insurgents were to be called terrorists, Bogota was willing to go along tacticallywhile operationally
and strategically it sought to avoid the analytical confusion that appeared at times to bedevil the U.S.-led
global war on terror.
33
The six components and their relationship to the political objectives of democratic security and the
national interests are on page 20. They appear again on pages 1213 as part of the framework under discussion
here. The version used here is from pages 1213, since it is self-evidently the more correct. The translation
is intended to convey the sense in which the elements are understood by the Colombian forces, rather than
proceeding literally (verbs, for instance, are often absent in the original Spanish version).

144 | From the field PRISM 1, no. 4

 34
This is not the most literal translation, which is institute a network of those who cooperate, also
rendered as institute an informant network. Yet neighborhood watch is closest to what is desired by the
concept and is the term used in English by CG Joint Command.
35
Urban security was singled out for special consideration in Democratic Security and Defence Policy. While
recognizing that local authorities themselves had to take the lead, the same principles were emphasized that
inform the document as a whole: coordinated, appropriate action. The innovative, highly successful Local
Security Front initiated by the Bogota mayor was used for illustration. For details of the Bogota effort, see
John Marulanda, Plan Maestro Defensa Ajustado, support package prepared in the course of implementing the
Bogota Local Security Front.
36
This was not as straightforward as it should have been, because, upon taking office, the Uribe team
discovered that the previous administrations borrowing from next years budget to pay this years expenses
had created a serious defense deficit. This had a stunning impact on Plan de Choque because the division of
the $670 million windfall from the one-time war tax had been calculated to be spread over the 4 years of
the Uribe presidency. The 2002 shortfall had been $138 million, but the 2003 budget structurally included an
additional $109 million deficit. Thus, the 2002 Plan de Choque expenditures of $118 million, combined with
the 2003 Plan costs of $149 million, used up more than three-quarters of what was intended to last 4 years. This
could only be made good by appropriating funds from the regular budget or relying on unrestricted U.S. aid.
37
To illustrate: The lowest rank in COLAR, Cabo Tercero (C3), equivalent to a U.S. private, E1, had a
monthly base pay of pesos 538,060, or ~$207 (at the August 1, 2004 exchange rate of pesos 2,600/U.S. $1).
An entry level draftee historically made slightly less than 10 percent of that figure.
38
For details on the program (but not the reaction force), see Policia Nacional, Direccion Operativa,
Programa Escuadrons Movils de Carabineros, PowerPoint presentation, undated.
39
A fascinating illustration of just how far matters have progressed is provided by the situation in 3d
Division area, centered on Cali, Colombias third largest city. There, in March 2010, Colombian air force offi-
cials noted that 80 percent of their missions were being generated by police intelligence and participationa
sea change, as the air force officials concerned were quick to note.
40
This transformation alone would have been enough to produce a measure of turmoil within the mili-
tary, regardless of the myriad other changes inherent to the reform movement. Even the existence of a special
task force, Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta, dedicated solely to dominating FARCs critical base areas, its strategic
rearguard, had generated disquiet in some circles, particularly as it became clear that it was a model of what
was to come. Now, as still ongoing plans are pushed through, the individual services will become more service
providers in the U.S. sense, while CG Joint Command will exercise operational control of joint forces that
resemble U.S. combatant commands (for example, U.S. Southern Command, which supports Colombias effort).
Such a development would be entirely logical in waging counterinsurgency but is a considerable change in the
way Colombian services have functioned throughout their history.
41
See Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security (Bogota: Ministry of National Defense, 2007),
available at <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Colombia_English-2007.pdf>.
42
The operations are placed in the context of the rapid and complex developments of the time in John
Otis, Law of the Jungle: The Hunt for Colombian Guerrillas, American Hostages, and Buried Treasure (New York:
William Morrow/HarperCollins, 2010). Its gaudy title notwithstanding, the volume is a solid examination of
the subject.

PRISM 1, no. 4 From the field | 145

 43
By late March 2010 (my most recent visit to Colombia), the number of individuals under investigation
numbered roughly a thousand, though the count of alleged murders was smaller. This stemmed from unit action,
for which all implicated members were charged as accessories.
44
As an illustration, Marine battalions have two lawyers assigned, one to handle operations, the other to
look after disciplinary matters. At the brigade level (the highest level for the Marines), there are four lawyers,
the same two as listed for the battalion plus a general legal advisor and a human rights advisor.
45
This is well illustrated by the prominent role played by the navy in passing legislation needed to address
the widespread use of submersibles by FARC (and other illegal armed groups) for moving drugs. Scuttling of the
craft upon discovery confronted the intercepting units with a rescue mission and a complete lack of evidence
for prosecution. Thus, laws had to be passed that made illegal certain specific actions, such as owning and
operating a submarine, which could be prosecuted using eyewitness testimony.
46
Indispensable for a general treatment of this subjectan elected presidents needs in wartimeis
Herman Hattaway and J. Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1991).
47
See, for example, Thomas A. Marks, A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribes Colombia (20022006) vs.
FARC, Military Review 87, no. 2 (MarchApril 2007), 4156.

146 | From the field PRISM 1, no. 4