Operations in Jammu and

Kashmir 1947-481
ROHIT SINGH

General
At the time of Independence, Jammu and Kashmir with a geographical area of
 SQ KM WAS THE LARGEST 0RINCELY 3TATE OF )NDIA "UT THIS LARGE AREA WAS
inhabited with only 39 towns and 8903 villages. The total population in 1947 was
ESTIMATED AT ABOUT  MILLION 4HE DENSITY OF POPULATION WAS  PERSONS PER SQ
km. The main mountain ranges, viz, the Karakoram, Great Himalayas and the Pir
Panjal divide the state into three distinct geographical regions: Jammu and the
outer hills; the valley of Kashmir and the high mountainous regions of the North.2

Demography
Demographically, the outer hills of Jammu region were occupied by a race
of warlike and sturdy Rajputs who were both Hindus and Muslims. The areas
around Jammu were mostly occupied by the Hindu Dogras whereas converted
Muslims were present in areas towards the west. They were called the Chibs in
Bhimbar and Mirpur, and Sudhans in Poonch. The Hindu and Muslim Rajputs of
the Jammu region provided a large number of soldiers to the British Indian Army
and the armies of the Dogra Maharajas. Apart from these races, the Pir Panjals
were also populated by the Hindu Gaddis and Khakas, Bambas and Gujjars of the
Muslim faith.
The population of the Kashmir valley was predominantly Muslim with some
Hindu Brahmins. The Brahmins or the Kashmiri Pandits were a highly intellectual

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and industrious people who went outside the state in large numbers to earn their
livelihood. The Muslims were primarily engaged in agriculture or were engaged
as artisans in small trades like carpet weaving, etc. The population of Srinagar
city was 207,787 in 1941 and was the highest in the state.
The western portion of the mountainous North was predominantly Muslim with
a number of other ethnic groups. The people of Gilgit shared a common affinity with
the population of Afghanistan. The eastern part of this region, namely Kargil and
Ladakh were inhabited mainly by the Buddhists of Tibetan ancestry.

Communications
)N  NO FULLY EQUIPPED AIRPORT EXISTED IN THE STATE THOUGH EMERGENCY LANDING
strips were there at Gilgit, Chilas, Srinagar and Jammu. A railway line connected
Jammu from Sialkot.
The major all-weather roads that existed in 1947 were:-
z 2AWALPINDI -UZZAFARABAD 3RINAGAR 4HE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE STATES
boundary at Kohala and Srinagar was 205 km. Running along the Jhelum
river, this was the most convenient axis to enter the Kashmir valley.
z Jammu-Srinagar: This 320 Km long road crossed the Pir Panjal range at
Banihal Pass was the only road link connecting the valley of Kashmir to the
REST OF THE COUNTRY AFTER 0AKISTANS TRIBAL INVASION
z *AMMU 0ATHANKOT 4HIS TENUOUS TRACK OF  +M WAS )NDIAS ONLY ROAD LINK TO
the state of Jammu and Kashmir after partition.
z From Srinagar, a number of roads led to Tangmarg, Bandipur and Pahalgam.
Jammu was also connected to Akhnoor, Rajouri and Poonch by a motorable
road. A fair weather road connected Uri and Poonch over the Haji Pir Pass.

The most important of the non-motorable tracks was the one connecting
Srinagar and Leh. This 389 km long track crossed the mighty Himalayas at the
FORMIDABLE :OJI ,A 0ASS  M AHEAD OF 3ONAMARG AND "ALTAL !HEAD OF ,EH
this ancient caravan route went over the Karakoram Pass to Yarkand in Xinijang.
Another 365 km track connected Srinagar and Gilgit via Bandipur, Razdhan Pass
AND 'UREZ 4HIS ROUTE WAS USED BY THE -AHARAJAS FORCES TO MAINTAIN THE GARRISONS
around Gilgit and at Skardu.

Administration
The Maharaja was the Head of the Government as well as the C-in-C of the State
army. The Paramountcy of the British was maintained through a Resident who

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had the powers to control almost every affair of the state. The summer capital of
the state was Srinagar and Jammu was the winter capital. The state was divided
into four provinces, namely, Jammu, Srinagar, Gilgit and Ladakh, each under a
Governor. Poonch was a feudal jagir under its own raja whereas Gilgit was held
on lease by the Government of India till August 1947.

Genesis of the problem

At the time of independence, nearly 565 minor and major princely states existed
in the country. These states were given the option to join either of the two
independent dominions of India and Pakistan. The newly formed Government
of India did not consider them independent. However, Mohammed Ali Jinnah,
the first President of Pakistan in order to foment troubles for India declared that
the princely states could also remain independent, if they so desired. While most
of the princely states merged with the Union of India, Jammu & Kashmir and
Hyderabad vacillated in order to retain their independent status. The Maharaja
of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari Singh, signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan
in August 1947. The postal and telegraph facilities of J&K were placed under
the control of Pakistan and the latter also agreed to continue with the existing
arrangements for the supply of essential commodities like fuel oil, kerosene oil,
wheat, cloth and ammunition to the state.

Pangs of Partition
Jammu and Kashmir could not remain isolated from the ghastly communal
violence that had engulfed Punjab in August 1947. Hindu and Sikh refugees from
Pakistan and Muslims from India began to pour into the state. Soon, communal
clashes were reported from different provinces of the state. The situation took an
ugly turn when the state army took action against some Muslim trouble-makers
in Poonch. The Muslim League of West Punjab and some newspapers saw this as
a deliberate aim by the Maharaja to harass the Muslim community. On 27 August,
a telegram was sent to the Maharaja from Hazara threatening to attack the state
if atrocities against the Muslims were not controlled. By September, bands of
raiders ranging from 200-500 men carried out harassing raids and looting of
Hindu villages and refugees at Kotha, Chak Haria and Ranbirsinghpura in Jammu
province. On 4 October 1947, an aircraft carried out reconnaissance activity over
Kohala and Palandari. The raiders started harassing the state army contingents
by carrying out hit-and-run attacks at Chirala and Bagh in Rawalkot and also
began infiltrating into Poonch.

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All negotiations
Economic Blockade and Negotiations
with Pakistan by the state
By September, Pakistan had put in place a loose
government to
economic blockade of J&K by holding up supplies of open up supplies
essential commodities. It had also snapped the post from Pakistan
and telegraph links to the state. All negotiations by the failed with the
state government to open up supplies from Pakistan latter citing its
failed with the latter citing its inability to provide inability to provide
escorts for supply columns. The state government escorts for supply
sent desperate telegrams to Pakistan and the British columns.
government on 15, 18 and 22 October 1947 in order to
ease the situation but to no avail. By mid-October, large concentrations of raiders
were sited around Bhimbar, Mangla, Mirpur and Fort Owen near Poonch had to
be evacuated by the state forces.
Therefore, with an economic blockade and increasing raids by marauders,
Pakistan had set the stage for a full-fledged invasion of Jammu and Kashmir.

Op Gulmarg – The Tribal Invasion

The Islamic nation of Pakistan was formed on the basis of the two-nation theory
which advocated a separate nation for Muslims carved out of the Muslim-
majority areas of the then undivided India. Based on this reasoning, Pakistan saw
it natural for a Muslim-majority Kashmir to be part of Pakistan. Another motive
for launching the tribal invasion of Jammu and Kashmir was to maintain control
over the restive North Western Frontier Provinces (NWFP). If the aspirations
for independence of the Pathans could not be checked, then the very basis of
Pakistan – formed on a distinct Islamic identity would have collapsed. During
THE TIME OF PARTITION +HAN !BDUL 'HAFFAR +HANS "ADHSHAH +HAN ALSO KNOWN AS
@&RONTIER 'ANDHI 0ATHANISTAN MOVEMENT HAD BEGUN TO GAIN STEAM )T IS BELIEVED
that one of the primary motives of launching the tribal invasion of Jammu and
Kashmir was to create a diversion for the Pathans by luring them towards the
wealth and prosperity of Kashmir. A communal twist was given to the events in
J&K to portray that the Hindu rulers were oppressing the Muslim subjects of the
state.

Op Gulmarg – The Plan

Op Gulmarg was conceived at the Pakistan Army HQ in Rawalpindi soon after
independence. DO letters detailing the operational instruction had the stamp of

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approval of the then British C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, Gen Sir Frank Messervy.
According to the plan, lashkars of 1000 pathans each were to be raised by
every pathan tribe. For this purpose, separate instructions were issued to the
Deputy Commissioners and Political Agents. Once recruited, these lashkars were
to concentrate at Bannu, Wana, Peshawar, Kohat, Thal and Naushera by the first
week of September 1947.
4HE "RIGADE #OMMANDERS AT THESE PLACES WERE TO THEN EQUIP THEM WITH ARMS
ammunition and some clothing. On paper, these issues were shown against
regular Pakistan Army units.
Each Tribal laskhar was commanded by a Major of the Pakistan Army who was
to act as the advisor to the Malik or the nominal commander of the lashkar. The
Major had a Captain and 10 JCOs under his command. Each irregular company
was commanded by a JCO. All the Pakistan Army regulars were pathans. Each
Lashkar were provided with at least four guides/informers.
Forward ammunition dumps were to be established at Abbottabad on 18
/CTOBER AND SUBSEQUENTLY MOVED TO -UZZAFFARABAD AND $OMEL AFTER $ $AY
4HE INVASION FORCE WAS LED BY -AJ 'EN !KBAR +HAN CODE NAME 4ARIQ AND
assisted by Brig Sher Khan. Their HQ was located inside the Pakistan Army HQ
in Rawalpindi.
All laskhars were instructed to travel in civil buses at night and concentrate at
Abbottabad by 18 October 1947.
The operations were to progress as under:-
z The main force of Six lashkars was to advance on to Srinagar from Domel on
the Muzzaffarabad-Uri-Baramulla-Srinagar road.
z A force of two lashkars would provide flank protection to the main force by
moving on to Gulmarg via the Haji Pir Pass.
z Another force of two lashkars was to capture Handwara, Sopore and Bandipur
by crossing the Nastachun Pass beyond Tithwal.
z A force of 10 laskhars was earmarked for the Bhimbar, Rawalkot and Poonch
areas with the objective of capturing Rajouri and Poonch and then advancing
on to Jammu.
z 7 Infantry Division of Pakistan Army was asked to concentrate in area Murree-
Abbottabad by last light 21 October and be ready to move immediately into
J&K to support the tribal militias and consolidate their positions. One Infantry
Brigade was put on readiness at Sialkot for moving on to Jammu.
z The D Day for Op Gulmarg was 22 October 1947.3,4

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The Disposition of state forces of J&K on 22 October 1947 were:-

Jammu Brigade
Bde HQ
J&K Rifles Regt Centre - Jammu

5 J&K Rifles
J&K Body Guard Cavalry less
ONE SQN SPREAD IN SUB UNITS FROM +ATHUA TO "HIMBAR
Four garrison police companies

Kashmir Brigade
Bde HQ
J&K Trg School
/NE 3QN *+ "ODY 'UARD #AVALRY "ADAMI "AGH #ANTONMENT 3RINAGAR
7 J&K Rifles less two companies - Srinagar

4 J&K Rifles less two companies - Domel

Coy - Kohala
Coy - Spread in gen area Keran

6 J&K Rifles less two companies - Bunji

Coy less one platoon - Leh
Two Platoons - Kargil
Coy less one platoon - Skardu

Poonch Area
Force HQ - Punch
1 J&K Rifles - Spread in base area
8 J&K Rifles
(relieving 1st Bn)
9 J&K Rifles
Two Companies 7 J&K Rifles - Rawalkot (spread in sub-units)

Mirpur Brigade
Bde HQ

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One Platoon 2 J&K Rifles

One Platoon 3 J&K Rifles
One garrison police company - Dharamsal-Jhangar
2 J&K Rifles less one platoon - Naushara and its outposts
3 J&K Rifles - Mirpur and its outposts

* Note: The J&K Infantry (KI) battalions mentioned above were later merged with the regular
Indian Army and formed the Jammu and Kashmir Rifles. The J&K Militia were converted into the
Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry.

The first strike

The raiders launched a frontal assault along the Jhelum valley road and captured
the Lohar Gali and Ramkot outposts arriving in 200 civilian lorries. The Muslim
COMPANY OF  +ASHMIR )NFANTRY +) JOINED THE RAIDERS 4HE $OGRA PICQUET
located at a school ground in Muzzaffarabad held on for a while inflicting heavy
casualties on the raiders. The Muslim troops at Domel also joined ranks with the
enemy. By night fall, the Battalion HQ of 4 KI at Domel along with its outposts
were overwhelmed. A detachment managed to retreat to Bagh (escorting 9000
refugees) and another one reached Srinagar. A composite detachment of 150
troops from Srinagar led by Brig Rajendra Singh, the officiating Chief of the State
Forces had reached Uri by the evening of 22 October. But, heavily outnumbered
by the raiders, they had to withdraw to Mahura. Brig Rajendra Singh was killed
while encountering a roadblock between Mahura and Baramulla. He was
posthumously awarded the Maha Vir Chakra for delaying the enemy advance
to Baramulla by four days. The raiders entered Baramulla on the evening of 26
October 1947 and indulged in mass pillage and looting of the town. Col Dykes, a
British officer and his assistants at a missionary were also not spared.

J&K accedes to the Union of India

On the evening of 24 October, the Government of India received an emergency
telegram from Srinagar informing them about the invasion with urgent pleas for
dispatch of Indian troops. VP Menon, Secretary of States, Government of India flew
to Srinagar the next day and reported on the grave situation prevailing in Srinagar.
He accompanied the Prime Minister of Kashmir State to New Delhi. On 26 October
1947, the Instrument of Accession was signed by Maharaja Hari Singh in Jammu.
VP Menon carried the document to New Delhi on the same day and the merger of
the state of Jammu and Kashmir with the Union of India was completed.

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Operation Jak
Brig Kalwant Singh, the acting CGS of the Indian Army earmarked 1 Sikh, located
at Gurgaon to fly-in to Srinagar and secure the aerodrome and the wireless station
there. The first Dakota carrying Lt Col DR Rai, CO, 1 Sikh landed at Srinagar
airfield at 0830 h on 27 Oct 1947. By the end of the day, the remaining three flights
of Dakotas were completed and 1 Sikh had concentrated at the Srinagar airfield.
A company of 1 Sikh was dispatched to support two platoons of state forces who
WERE HOLDING THE ENEMYS ADVANCE AT A HIGH GROUND  KM EAST OF "ARAMULLA /N
the morning of 28 Oct, Lt Col Rai went forward with two more companies of 1
Sikh. On assessing the precarious situation and the overwhelming numbers of
the raiders, he decided to fall back to a stronger position 8 km north of Srinagar.
Lt Col Rai while overseeing the withdrawal of the last screen died after being hit
by a stray bullet in the neck. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra posthumously.
1 Sikh suffered 6 fatal casualties in their first contact with the raiders near
Baramulla. The high ground, east of Pattan at Milestone 16 was being held by 1
Sikh, 13 Battery Royal Indian Artillery and six Machine Guns of 3/15 Punjab. A
Company of 1 (Para) Kumaon was holding the Srinagar airfield.
By 31 Oct, HQ 161 Brigade was air-lifted to Srinagar while a battalion 3
(Para) Rajput with a company of 1 Mahar (MMG) had linked up with the Jammu
garrison by road from Pathankot. On 01 Nov, the disposition of Indian troops was
as under.
HQ 161 Bde and one coy 4 Kumaon – Near Srinagar Airfield
1 (Para) Kumaon less one coy – Airfield
Coy 1 (Para) Kumaon – Road Junction Narbal
1/2 Punjab – Road Junction Shalateng
One Coy 1 Sikh – Hill east of Pattan
One Coy 1 Sikh – Srinagar Airfield

Advance HQ 50 Para Bde, 1 Coy

3 (Para) Rajput, 1 Coy Mahar (MMG) – Jammu
One Coy 3 (Para) Rajput – Samba
One Coy 3 (Para) Rajput – Madhopur

India’s first Param Vir Chakra (PVC)

On 3 Nov, One Company of 1 (Para) Kumaon and two Companies of 4 Kumaon
went on a reconnaissance of Budgam. While returning, D Coy of 4 Kumaon was
ambushed by about 700 raiders at a point just north of Budgam in an attempt

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The enemy are

to press towards Srinagar airfield. Some of the raiders
only 50 yards had merged with the population in Budgam village. In
from us. We the fierce engagement, the Kumaon company suffered
are heavily 15 fatal and 26 non-fatal casualties. One ammunition
outnumbered. truck was also looted by the raiders who dispersed after
We are under being strafed from the air. Maj Somnath Sharma, who
devastating fire. was earlier wounded continued to fight till the last and
WAS POSTHUMOUSLY AWARDED )NDIAS lRST 06# n THE HIGHEST
honour of the land. His last message to the Bde HQ was – “The enemy are only 50
yards from us. We are heavily outnumbered. We are under devastating fire. I shall
not withdraw an inch but will fight to the last man and the last round.” After this
major action, a series of probes and sneak-ins were carried out by the enemy into
Srinagar while 161 Bde consolidated its position at Shalateng.

The recapture of Baramulla and Uri

On the morning of 7 Nov, 161 Bde supported by aerial strafing managed to break
the large enemy concentration around Shalateng. Two troops of armoured cars
and one rifle troop of 7 Cavalry attacked the enemy from the rear after turning left
on the Pattan-Srinagar road at Krahom from Sumbal. 1 (Para) Kumaon attacked
the right flank of the enemy. The rout began and the enemy fled in just 20 minutes
LEAVING BEHIND AT LEAST  DEAD  0ARA +UMAON THEN CLEARED :AINKUT RIDGE
and 1 Sikh passed through their position. By 1830 hrs, 1 Sikh had destroyed the
enemy HQ near MS 7 and opened the road up to Pattan. Lack of fuel stalled the
further advance of Indian troops. On 08 Nov, the advance was resumed and by
evening, 161 Bde had established its HQ at Baramulla.
The Indian advance resumed on 10 Nov after mopping up the enemy from
Baramulla and was held up due to the destruction of the Mahura bridge by the
fleeing raiders. The Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) continued to target the enemy
by aerial strafing all along the Baramulla-Muzzaffarabad road. The obstacle
around Mahura was by-passed and the Indian advance reached MS 79 ahead of
Mahura on 12 Nov. Nine spitfires and two Harvard sorties were flown on that day
to bomb Domel, Kotli, Mirpur and Uri. Mahura was captured by dawn on 12 Nov.
The Rampur brigde was repaired and made usable for 3-ton traffic. 1 Sikh and
1 (Para) Kumaon edged forward and re-captured Uri by the evening of 13 Nov.
Thus, the threat to Srinagar was completely removed and the raiders driven back
from the valley.

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Situation in the Jammu division

While the threat to the valley was removed by 13 Nov, the situation in the Jammu
division had worsened considerably. The Muslim components of the State Forces
in Mirpur and Poonch had deserted and the garrisons were encircled by 18 Oct.
Aerial supplies were dropped on Kotli on 28 Oct. The primarily responsibility of
50 Para Brigade which had arrived at Jammu was to keep open the Pathankot-
Jammu-Srinagar line of communication and to reinforce the Srinagar brigade if
REQUIRED 4HEREFORE NO RELIEF COULD BE PROVIDED TO THE 3TATE &ORCES GARRISONS AT
Kotli, Mirpur, Bagh, Rawalkot and Poonch. Several thousand Hindus had been
slaughtered in these areas and refugees were fleeing towards Jammu in hordes.
In Rajouri alone, 30,000 non-Muslims had been killed. 1 Patiala and elements of
7 Light Cavalry had advanced only 30 km from Jammu reaching Akhnoor by the
evening of 13 Nov.

Naushara and Kotli are relieved

With the arrival of 268 Brigade, 50 Para Brigade could finally concentrate on the
task of relieving the beleaguered garrisons in Jammu division while the former
took over line of communication duties from Kathua to Srinagar. On 16 Nov,
B Coy of 1 Patiala secured Beri Pattan Bridge to enable the advance of 50 Para
Bde towards Naushara. On 18 Nov, the forward battalion of 50 Para Brigade
had entered Naushara. 1/2 Punjab now advanced towards Kotli from Jhangar
and contacted the garrison on 26 Nov after clearing several roadblocks and
encountering enemy sniping around Dungi and Ban.
Mirpur could not be relieved and the garrison there was evacuated on 25 Nov.
Several refugees from Mirpur were escorted by Indian troops to Jhangar.

Setback at Kahuta
The attempts to relief Poonch from Uri received a setback when the State Forces
PICQUET AT +AHUTA SET lRE TO THE BRIDGE MISTAKING THE RELIEF COLUMN OF  "RIGADE
for the enemy. On 21 Nov, this column was ambushed at a road bend killing 16
and wounding 14 soldiers. 24 vehicles also got damaged in this ambush. During
the night of 22/23 Nov, about 900 raiders launched a frontal attack on an isolated
PICQUET OF  3IKH ACROSS THE *HELUM RIVER IN 5RI "UT THE PICQUET MANNED BY ONLY
20 men under a spirited JCO beat back several waves of enemy assaults despite
being cut-off from the rest of the battalion. Meanwhile, 1 (Para) Kumaon less
one company had linked up with the Poonch garrison after fording the river at
Kahuta.

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Appreciation of the situation

By the end of November, initial operations had been completed and Army HQ
had carried out an appreciation of the situation. Preparations were underway to
maintain troops during the winter months and consolidate the position as west
as possible from Uri. It was decided not to evacuate the garrison at Poonch in
order to prevent the population from being massacred by the enemy. With the
arrival of an additional brigade group in Jammu plans to mop up positions north
and south of Akhnoor were underway. The strength of the enemy was estimated
to be around 15,000, organised in small groups and employing guerilla tactics.

The enemy strikes back

Even as the Indian Army was digging in and planning to carry out more deliberate
and effective offensive operations, the enemy struck first at Uri and then at
Jhangar towards the end of Dec 1947. At this time, 161 Brigade held Uri with 1 Sikh,
 +UMAON A SQUADRON OF  #AVALRY AND COMPANIES EACH OF  0ARA +UMAON 
Punjab, 1 Mahar (MMG), a troop of 32 Field Battery and one platoon of 32 Assault
Field Company. 2 Dogra was spread along the line of communication between
Uri and Baramulla and 6 Rajputana Rifles was based in Srinagar along with rear
elements of the brigade.
!N ENEMY ATTACK ON $IAMOND PICQUET ON THE 3ANK RIDGE WAS REPULSED BY 
+UMAON ON  $EC AND ANOTHER ON A PICQUET ACROSS THE *HELUM ON  $EC /N 
Dec, 4 Kumaon cleared the enemy from the village of Mukdam Saiyidan. D Coy
carried out an attack on Muhri Doba while C Coy with one platoon of 1 (Para)
Kumaon attacked the main Sank ridge. These operations were highly successful
and the enemy suffered heavy casualties of 80 killed and 50 wounded. An enemy
COUNTER ATTACK ON *ITTER PICQUET WAS BEATEN BACK

The Bhatgiran Affair

1 Sikh less A Coy had launched an attack to drive out the heavy concentration of
raiders on the high ridges overlooking Uri. The attack was launched on 12 Dec and
the top of the ridge was reached without encountering much opposition. But as
the assault party started coming down towards Uri, it was fired upon by the raiders
from three sides. The Sikhs managed to extricate themselves under tremendous
odds but not without suffering heavy casualties in the process. The Commanding
Officer, Lt Col Sampooran Bachan Singh and his company commander, Maj Ajaib
Singh were wounded. The total casualties were 60 killed and 59 wounded. 1 Sikh
was relieved by 6 Rajputana Rifles and moved to Srinagar for rest.

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80 Brigade had arrived in Jammu on 13 Dec and took over responsibility of

the Akhnoor-Chamb sector. Several small-scale actions were carried out by 1
Patiala (before being reverted to 268 Brigade), 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, 3 Royal Garhwal
Rifles, 4 Rajput and 2 Jat in this sector. On 20/21 Dec, 1/9 Gorkha Rifles and 2
Jat dislodged the enemy from Kali Dhar ridge ahead of Akhnoor killing 40 and
wounding around 79 raiders. 50 Para Brigade under Brig Mohammad Usman had
advanced up to Chingas from Jhangar.

The fall of Jhangar

The enemy had begun probing the defences of 1/2 Punjab at Jhangar on 09 Dec.
It also carried out ambushes to disrupt the lines of communication between
Naushara and Jhangar and between Chauki and Beri Pattan. On 23 Dec, around
1000 raiders had established four roadblocks on the Naushara-Jhangar road and
engaged columns of 1 Rajput at two places. The columns fought back repeated
waves of enemy attacks throughout the day.
On 24 Dec, a band of more than 2000 raiders launched their main assault
on Jhangar from the south-west. A second wave of 1000 raiders pushed on from
the north-west. The Pir Matalsi ridge was captured by afternoon forcing the rest
OF *HANGARS DEFENCES TO WITHDRAW TO .AUSHARA 4HE ENEMY HAD ALSO CUT OFF THE
Jhangar-Naushara road link, preventing the arrival of a relief column. The fall of
Jhangar was a tremendous setback and the Indian casualties were 60, including
two officers killed and 56 wounded. A large number of assorted weapons
including 70 rifles, 17 pieces of three and five-inch mortars, 4 MMGs, 14 LMGs
along were four armoured cars were lost in the fighting at Jhangar. The enemy
attack on Naushara was thwarted.
After the fall of Jhangar, the strength of the Jammu and Kashmir Force
was built-up by moving two additional battalions from Delhi and East Punjab
Command. It was decided to hold firm bases at Uri and Akhnoor-Naushara
and protect the precarious lines of communication to prevent the enemy from
attacking Srinagar and Jammu.

The Battle of Naushara

The month of January was spent in several raids and counter-raids which were
BASICALLY PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS TO PROBE EACH OTHERS DEFENCES  "RIGADE
now established its Tac HQ at Chhaon, 8 km short of Naushara to reinforce 50
0ARA "DE 4HIS FORCE WAS CALLED : "DE 'P AND COMPRISED OF  'ORKHA 2IFLES

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3 (Para) Mahratta Light Infantry, 1 Patiala less two companies, one platoon
of 1 Mahar (MMG) and support elements. The road Beri Pattan-Naushara
was finally cleared on 10 January. 50 Para Bde undertook offensive patrolling
ahead of Beri Pattan and Naushara. 2 Jat carried out Op Satyanas to mop up
the enemy concentration around Beri Pattan and 7 Cavalry along with 1/7
Rajput struck at the enemy base at Assar/Kadala inflicting 300 casualties on
them.

Op Kipper
The aim of Op Kipper (which was the nick-name of Lt Gen KM Carriapa,
Western Army Cdr) was to clear the ridge 9 Km North East of Naushara. This
ridge overlooked the Naushara-Tawi valley. The objective was Kot, the highest
point on the ridge. On 31 Jan 1948, 2 Jat was launched on boats and made to
demonstrate towards Lamberi forest in order to deceive the enemy into believing
that an attack on Jhangar was in progress. In the Meanwhile, 2/2 Punjab moved
towards their objective Pt.3227 and Kot from the left and 3 (Para) Mahrratta Light
Infantry advanced towards Pt.3284, Pathradi and Uparla Dandesar from the
right. The objectives were captured on 01 Feb. Several enemy counter-attacks on
these features were repulsed throughout the day. Tempest aircrafts from Jammu
provided air support for Op Kipper. The artillery also played a decisive role in
softening up the positions before the Infantry attack went in. 156 enemy were
killed and 201 wounded.

The enemy counter-attack on Naushara

Refusing to get bogged down after the loss of Kot, the enemy with a strength
of about 3000 Pathans from Swat and Dir and 3000 Sudhans launched a major
counter-attack on Kot and Tain Dhar ridges ahead of Naushara. Waves after waves
OF ENEMY ASSAULTS WERE BEATEN BACK  OUT OF  MEN MANNING A POST OF 0ICQUET
No.2 on Tain Dhar Ridge had died after valiantly holding three enemy attacks at
the wire-perimeter of the post. It was in this action that Nk Jadhu Nath Singh was
posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra (PVC) for his act of unparalleled
bravery and raw courage in defending the post. A company of 3 (Para) Rajput
ARRIVED JUST IN TIME TO PREVENT THE PICQUET FROM FALLING INTO ENEMY HANDS WHICH
would have made the defence of Naushara untenable.
The enemy also launched an attack on the Kangota feature and had also
invested the Naushara valley. Brig Usman now decided to strike at the enemy
concentration south-west of Naushara to weaken their attack. 3 (Para) Mahratta

142 ³ AUTUMN 2012 ³  

  

Light Infantry which was out on ROP duties was pressed The Battle of
into battle to clear the Naushara valley. The battalion Naushara was
occupied Redian and cleared the enemy from Nunial a turning point
and Bhajnoa. 200 enemy were killed in the Naushara of the campaign
valley. Eight 25 Pounder guns and two 3.7 inch Howitzers in the Jammu
PLAYED A CRUCIAL ROLE IN BREAKING THE ENEMYS ASSAULT province and
and inflicting heavy casualties on them throughout the broke the resolve
battle of Naushara. At one place, around 500 pathans of the enemy.
were caught in the open and air-burst rounds were
brought down on them. The artillery fire also held the enemy at the perimeter
defences of Naushara when 3 (Para) Mahratta Light Infantry was out on Line
of Communication duties towards Beri Pattan. 963 dead bodies of the enemy
were counted after the fighting was over. Brig Usman made a modest estimate
of at least 2000 enemy fatal casualties. 50 Para Brigade suffered 33 killed and
102 wounded in the actions. The Battle of Naushara was a turning point of the
campaign in the Jammu province and broke the resolve of the enemy.

Jhangar is re-captured
The operation to re-capture Jhangar was divided into three phases. In the first
phase (7-29 Feb), the enemy defences were probed.1 Kumaon Rifles and 4 Dogra
carried out offensive sweeps towards Manpur and Kalal. In the second phase
(1-4 Mar), a double-thrust was directed against Ambli Dhar and Kaman Kosha
Gala. The Tain Dhar and Ambi Dhar features were part of a 6 km long ridge which
overlooked Naushara from the North. 50 Para Brigade captured Ambi Dhar which
was held by the enemy and 19 Brigade made a thrust towards Kaman Kosha
Gala. 2/2 Punjab supported by 4 Dogra of 19 Brigade secured their objectives
by 01 March. 1 Rajput while securing a bump near Katora Khori suffered 11 fatal
casualties.

Op Vijay
In the third and final phase, Jhangar was to be entered on 18 March. The operation
was to progress in two phases. In the first phase, 19 Brigade with 1 Rajput, 4
Dogra, 1 Kumaon Rifles and support units were to capture Pt. 3327 and Pt. 3283
and exploit towards Nakka gap. In Phase 2, 50 Para Brigade consisting of 3 (Para)
Mahratta Light Infantry, 3 (Para) Rajput, 1 Patiala was to secure Pt. 2701, Jhangar,
Pt. 3399 and Pt.3374. 2 Jat, 2/2 Punjab and 2 Rajputana Rifles were earmarked for
the defence of the Naushara garrison. Op Vijay was launched on 15 March. An

  ³ AUTUMN 2012 ³ 143

  

enemy Brigade held Pir Thil Nakka which was attacked by 3 (Para) Mahratta and
1 Patiala of 50 (Para) Brigade with artillery support. The objective was secured on
17 March while 19 Brigade had advanced upto Gaikot forest.
Jhangar was entered on 18 March by the two battalions of 50 Para Brigade. C
3QUADRON OF  #AVALRY ALSO ARRIVED IN *HANGAR AFTER THE ROAD FROM .AUSHARA WAS
opened. After consolidating their positions, 19 Brigade and 50 Para Brigade were
holding Naushara while another Brigade (King Brigade) was at Naushara.

Op Ranjit
19 Brigade launched Op Ranjit to capture Chingas and Rajouri on 8 April. The
battalions had made good progress and by 9 April, 2 Rajputana Rifles had secured
Mal Contour and 4 Dogra after capturing Barwali Ridge had progressed to Rani
forest and Chor Ban on the right flank. 2 Jat and 1 Kumaon Rifles had progressed
upto Chakli on the left. Chingas was occupied on 11 Apr and 4 Dogra entered
Rajouri on 13 April. 500 enemy were killed in these operations. To support Op
Ranjit, 50 Para Brigade and 80 Brigade carried out diversionary operations in
Beri Pattan and Jhangar. On 16 April, the enemy launched coordinated counter
attacks on Naushara, Jhangar and Rajouri. All these attacks were repulsed but
at Jhangar the fighting had been intense with the enemy managing to reach 450
m from the main defences. On 02 May, 1 Kumaon Rifles carried out Op Birbal
AND CAPTURED 4HANAMANDI )N SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS  AND  "RIGADES DROVE
out the enemy from Chhawa ridge and Sadabad-Samani thereby permanently
removing the threat to the Jammu-Naushara line of communication.
On 10/11 May an enemy brigade sized attack on Jhangar was beaten back.
An attack by 50 Para Brigade on Sabzkot and MG Hill was met with failure as the
enemy managed to beat back the Indian assaults.

The Lion of Naushara is Martyred

On the evening of 3 July 1948, the enemy began to shell Jhangar camp. Brig
Mohammad Usman was directing own artillery fire on Pt. 3150 when a 25
pounder shell landed near the door of a bunker he was about to enter. Thus
WAS MARTYRED THE @,ION OF .AUSHARA WHO HAD RESOLUTELY LED  0ARA "RIGADE
in capturing Naushara and Jhangar. 3 (Para) Mahratta captured Khambah
fort, a feature from where enemy artillery fire was being directed and 1 Rajput
cleared Gari forest. 50 Para Brigade was finally relieved by 268 Brigade at
Jhangar.

144 ³ AUTUMN 2012 ³  

  

The Relief of Poonch

The Poonch garrison under Lt Col Pritam Singh with 2500 state forces and
elements of 1 (Para) Kumaon and 3/9 Gorkha Rifles had valiantly held on for
one year despite being surrounded and harassed by the enemy from all sides.
The garrison on its own initiative had carried out several offensive operations
to prevent the enemy from closing its ring around the garrison. The air force
had established a landing ground at Poonch which helped in provisioning the
GARRISON WITH SUPPLIES FROM AIR @/P %ASY TO LINK UP WITH 0OONCH WAS LAUNCHED
on 08 Oct.
The advance began with 268 Brigade comprising of 1/1 Gorkha Rifles, 1/2
Punjab and 1 (Para) Kumaon securing Pir Badesar and 5 Brigade with 4 Madras,
1/4 Gorkha Rifles and 5 Rajputana Rifles capturing the Pir Kalewa ridge line by 27
Oct. By 9 Nov, the advance of 5 and 19 Brigades had reached Mendhar after the
capture of Bhimbar Gali 6/8 Gorkha Rifles and 4 Madras captured Naghun and
Pt. 6480 respectively thereby securing the flanks of the two columns advancing
on to Bhimbar Gali. The advance of the relief columns through Poonch via Topa,
Pt.5982 and Danna-na-Pir progressed according to plan while the column from
Poonch moved southwards and cleared the enemy from Pir Margot Ghazi. This
column shook hands with 1/4 Gorkha Rifles on 20 Nov thus completing the link-
up with Poonch.

Progress of operations in the Kashmir valley

In the first week of February 1948, the enemy had occupied Tangdhar and
4REHGAM VALLEY AFTER CROSSING THE 3HAMSABARI 2ANGE AT 0HARKIAN +I 'ALI : &ORCE
LATER RENAMED  "RIGADE WAS OPENED AT 3RINAGAR FOR OPERATIONS ACROSS THE :OJI
La. In Feb 1948, 1 Sikh, 7 Sikh, 1 Bihar and 7 Kashmir Infantry of this formation
were tasked to operate on the Sopore-Handwara-Kupwara axis. 1 and 7 Sikh had
MANAGED TO OCCUPY PICQUETS AT (ANDWARA +UPWARA AND 4RAHGAM BY THE END OF
April. But the enemy came back to evict the Indian troops from Trahgam, Shulur
and Sonamul.

The Capture of Tithwal

By the first week of May, several enemy raids to cut off the line of communications
between Uri and Baramulla were countered and the threat to Uri and Mahura
were finally removed. By 13 May, preparations were in full swing for the re-
capture of Domel and 161 Brigade was earmarked for the offensive. The defences
around Uri were taken over by 77 Para Brigade.

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163 Brigade was tasked to make a diversionary push towards Tithwal from
Handwara and Kupwara. The strength of the enemy in the Handwara-Tithwal
sector was estimated to be around 6000. The Handwara column comprising of 1
Madras and 1 Sikh had driven off the enemy across the Kahmil river and occupied
the Dogarpur ridge by 18 May. The Kupwara column of 3 Royal Garhwal Rifles
secured the Trahgam ridge after suffering initial reverses by 18 May. In Phase 2 of
the operations, 163 Brigade occupied Panzgam ridge on 19 May and Chowkibal
by 20 May. In the final phase, Nastachun Pass was occupied on 21 May without
facing much opposition.
From the pass, 1 Sikh carried out a night advance along Chhamkot-Baltal
track along the watershed and secured the spur overlooking Tithwal by first light
23 May. 1 Madras secured the high ground on the left. The enemy fled in disarray
leaving behind huge stocks of ammunition and supplies.
On the Uri front, preliminary operations for the thrust towards Domel had
begun. 4 Kumaon had captured Chota Kazinag and Pandu by 20 May while 2
Dogra reinforced by 6 Rajputana Rifles failed to drive out the enemy from
Salamabad. 7 Sikh secured Urusa, south of the Jhelum river. The advance on the
Uri-Domel road was met with stiff resistance from the enemy who had occupied
STRONG FEATURES ALONG THE ROAD 4HE PROGRESS WAS ALSO SLOWED DUE TO THE ENEMYS
ability to bring down withering artillery fire on the road and burning of bridges.
Maj Gen Thimmaya, the Kashmir force commander now decided to switch the
axis of attack and harass the enemy west of Pandu, north of the Jhelum. 77 Para
Brigade was launched on a two-pronged thrust. After bitter fighting, 4 Kumaon
captured Pt. 6873, Chinari and Kathai but 2 Dogra could not dislodge the enemy
from Pt.10027 and Pt. 6065.
Meanwhile, 161 Brigade managed to get behind the enemy on Chakothi and
Bandi forest. Sawai Man Guards (later 17 Rajputana Rifles) advanced from Uri-
Salamabad-Pt. 9768 towards Ledi Gali while 6 Rajputana Rifles advanced from
Urusa to Pt.9356. 2/3 Gorkha Rifles finally secured Pir Kanthi and Ledi Ridge
by 20 June. 2 (Para) Madras also failed in completing the left hook of the main
offensive towards Domel. On 17 June, the advance of the battalion to capture
Haji Pir Pass was beaten back by effective withering fire from the enemy who
was in a dominating position due to its occupation of Kiran feature and both the
flanks astride the Uri-Haji Pir road. In a surprise attack on Pandu launched by the
enemy on 23 Jun, 4 Kumaon suffered 13 killed and three wounded. The enemy
finally managed to re-capture Pandu on 24 July by carrying out a two-pronged
attack on the feature. After beating back several attacks by nearly two battalions

146 ³ AUTUMN 2012 ³  

  

of the enemy, 2 Bihar (which had relieved 4 Kumaon) had to withdraw to Uri after
running out of ammunition.
4HE ADVANCE TO $OMEL FROM 4ITHWAL n @/P 3URYA COULD ALSO NOT BE LAUNCHED
DUE TO INADEQUATE FORCE AVAILABLE WITH  "RIGADE "UT THE "RIGADE DECIDED
to keep up the pressure on the enemy by remaining on the offensive. 3 Royal
Garhwal Rifles had captured Keran on 9 June. It launched at attack on Mussargate
on the Mir Kalsi ridge but it was met with stiff opposition from the enemy. The
enemy also succeeded in driving out 1 Madras from the Ring Contour feature.
163 Brigade launched several counter-attacks to reclaim the feature but could
not succeed in the absence of fire support. The fall of Ring Contour was a serious
setback and 163 Brigade had to fall back across the Kishanganga river. 163
Brigade now held the line at Tithwal ridge.

Param Vir Chakra Action of Sep Piru Singh

On 11/12 July, 6 Rajputana Rifles was ordered to capture the two Ring Contours
on the ridge towards Raniwala Dana. The first feature was occupied without
facing any opposition. However, on the second feature, the advance was met
with stiff resistance at a narrow path which was only three metre wide with sheer
falls on both sides. The enemy which held the feature in strength pinned down
the Indian troops by bringing down effective fire from three medium machine
guns. It was here, that Sepoy Piru Singh cleared the first machine gun position
with his sten. A grenade caused splinter injuries on his face. He then leaped
forward and threw a grenade into the second machine gun position. He was hit
by a bullet on the head while coming out of the second trench but succeeded in
lobbing a grenade inside the third trench. Sepoy Piru Singh made the supreme
sacrifice but not before silencing all the three machine gun positions which had
stalled the Indian advance. 6 Rajputana Rifles suffered 15 killed and 58 wounded
in this attack while seven others were missing. On 20 July, the enemy attempted
to dislodge A Company of 1 Sikh from Richhmar Gali. The attack was however
repulsed and the enemy retreated after suffering casualties of 30 killed and 60
wounded.

The fall of Gilgit and Skardu

By the end of Oct 1947, the raiders had begun to pour into the Northern Areas
of J&K. A gradual effort was made to incite the local Muslim population to rebel
against the administrator of Gilgit. On 01 Nov, their efforts bore fruit and Gilgit
was seized in a coup led by Maj Brown and Lt Haider Khan and Sub Maj Babar

  ³ AUTUMN 2012 ³ 147

  

Khan and 100 men of the Gilgit Scouts who had sided with the raiders. At Skardu,
the situation was increasingly becoming tense and the five jagirs of Rondhu,
Khapalu, Shigar, Kharmarg and Skardu were being progressively instigated to
move against Skardu. In view of the deteriorating situation, a force of 75 other
ranks of Kashmir Infantry led by Maj Sher Jung Thapa arrived at Skardu from Leh.
By 14 Feb 1948, the total strength of the Skardu garrison was 160.
On 09/10 Feb, a 600 strong force led by Maj Ehsan Ali, a deserter from 6
Kashmir Infantry (KI) at Gilgit launched their attack. All the Sikh troops of KI
manning an outpost at Tsari were killed. The Muslim troops at another outpost
across the river sided with the raiders and pressed on towards Skardu. However,
the attackers were beaten back at Skardu and suffered seven fatal casualties. By
15 Feb, Maj Thapa had organised his defences in and around Skardu fort with
285 men and 271 refugees. The enemy took up positions across these defences
and also occupied Pt. 8853, a hill feature overlooking the fort. For ten months,
the Skardu garrison and the enemy ring around it were locked in continuous
sniping and mortar shelling. Several attacks on the forward pickets of the fort
were beaten back.

Attempts to relieve Skardu ends in failure

By the first week of May, two relief columns from Srinagar comprising of troops
from 5 and 7 Kashmir Infantry were advancing towards Skardu from Kargil. Earlier
on 20 April, a column led by Maj Coutts of 6 Rajputana Rifles was ambushed at
Parkutta leaving six soldiers dead and nine injured. The relief columns spread out
between Bagicha and Parkutta and had occupied defences along the Shingo river
instead of occupying the flanks on either side of the river. Both these columns
were subjected to regular sniping from the enemy thereby stalling their advance.

The enemy captures Kargil and Drass

On 10 May, the enemy carried out a brilliant right hook attack on Kargil and
Drass. On 28 Apr, a feint attack was launched across the Razdan Pass threatening
Bandipur. Another column set fire to the bridges between Kangan and Sonamarg
WHILE A THIRD COLUMN ATTACKED $RASS !T +ARGIL THE RAIDERS lRST LIQUIDATED A
Gorkha platoon post at Kharal bridge and then pressed their offensive on Kargil
after subjecting it to shelling by 3-inch mortars.

Fate of the relief columns to Skardu

Meanwhile, as the main attack was launched on Kargil and Drass, the enemy

148 ³ AUTUMN 2012 ³  

  

had infiltrated in between the relief columns between Skardu and Parkutta. Both
the columns disintegrated and were in retreat. Lt Col Sampooran Bachan Singh
and Maj Coutts swam across the Indus and reached Leh on 15 May. The Sugar
Column of Lt Col Kripal Singh and 150 men surfaced at Sonamarg on 15 Jun.
Thus ended the attempts to relieve the besieged garrison at Skardu.
On 21 May, 1 Patiala in an attempt to link up with the besieged platoon of
Kashmir Infantry at Drass encountered stiff resistance from the enemy at Gumri
suffering 12 fatal casualties. The force recoiled to Matayan. Capt Kashmir Singh
and two platoons of 5 KI crept out of Drass on 6 June. By 25 June, 1 Patiala
concentrated at Baltal and one company of 2 (Para) Madras was at Matayan.

Fall of the Skardu Garrison

Maj Gen KS Thimmaya, GOC Sri Force had ordered Maj Thapa to break out
towards Olthingthang on 16 May but the latter expressed his inability to do so in
face of the heavy enemy presence. Tempest aircrafts of the RIAF dropped aerial
supplies at Skardu on 28 Jun and 01 Jul. On 19 Jun and 07 Aug, the tempests
BOMBED THE ENEMY HEADQUARTERS AT /LTHING AND 3ONDUS 4HE 3KARDU GARRISON
finally surrendered on 14 Aug after running low on supplies and ammunition.
The garrison had valiantly held out for 10 months on their own in the hope of
being relieved.

Operations in the Gurais valley

On 27 May, 1 Indian Grenadiers had secured the Razdan Pass. Op Erase was
launched on 26 Jun for the re-capture of Gurais. 1 Indian Grenadiers advanced
from Kuljian Gali towards the Viji Pass. The advance ahead of Viji Pass was
resumed after clearing the flanks of the pass viz, Camel and Sausage ridges.
By 26 Jun, 1 Indian Grenadiers had driven out the enemy from Gurais and 2/4
Gorkha Rifles had reached Kanzalwan while advancing across the Razdan Pass
and Charpathar. The enemy attempted to take back Kanzalwan by surrounding
the two Gorkha companies there. The siege was broken with elements of 1 Indian
Grenadiers moving along the Kishanganga from the east. The enemy was now
in full retreat and the threat to Srinagar from the north (Kishanganga valley in
Gurais) was permanently removed.

The Defence of Leh

After capturing Kargil, the enemy had advanced along the Indus towards Leh. On
22 May, they had reached Khaltse bridge which was destroyed by own troops. On

  ³ AUTUMN 2012 ³ 149

  

24 May, the first Dakota landed at Leh piloted by the legendary Cmde Mehar Singh
and accompanied by Maj Gen Thimmaya. This act boosted the morale of the tiny
Leh garrison and the citizens of Ladakh. On 01 Jun, D Coy of 2/4 Gorkha Rifles was
air-landed at Leh. On 26 Jul, nearly 600 raiders attacked a position being held by the
Gorkhas at Dumkur out of which 30 were killed. But the Gorkhas withdrew 24 kms
to Nurla. On 05 Jul, elements of 2/8 Gorkha Rifles arrived at Leh from the Manali
ROUTE "Y  *UL THE RAIDERS HAD CAPTURED (EMIS /N  3EP THE @!RJUN #OLUMN
made of B and C Companies of 2/8 GR arrived at Leh from Ferozpur via Manali. The
strength of the Leh garrison was nearly two battalions strong and the enemy forces
were 6 and 13 kms away from Leh. Lt Col HS Parab, CO, 2/8 GR was appointed the
Military Governor of Leh with instructions to hold Leh at any cost. Maj Hari Chand
had organised a guerrilla company with local men and elements of 7 Kashmir
Infantry. This force carried out several raids by silently creeping behind the lines
of the enemy. In one such raid, a 3.7 inch howitzer said to have been captured by
the enemy at Skardu was destroyed at Bagso. On 20 Nov, a force organised into X
and Y Companies under the command of Maj RC Mathur advanced on Tharu after
re-occupying Chilling. Khaltse and Lamayuru were reached on 22 Nov. The force
had advanced 80 kms in three days. In the Shyok valley, Thoise was re-taken and
the advance was halted 8 km west of Biagdangdo on 23 Nov.
On 24 Nov, Col Kharab linked up with Brig KL Atal at Kargil.

The re-capture of Drass and Kargil

After pressure was relieved from the major operations in the Uri and Tithwal
sectors, 77 Para Brigade was fully made available for launching an offensive
ACROSS THE :OJI ,A TO RE CAPTURE $RASS AND +ARGIL AND RELIEVE THE PRESSURE ON ,EH
1 Patiala, 3 Jat (later relieved by 4 Rajput), 5 Mahratta, 1/5 Royal Gorkha Rifles
&& WERE CONCENTRATED AT SEVERAL PLACES BETWEEN 3ONAMARG AND :OJI ,A -AJ 'EN
Thimmaya had originally planned to attack Drass and Kargil from the right by
advancing from Khanabal and crossing the Amarnath Hills at either Bobang or
Lovilad Pass. But this plan of employing two battalions could not fructify due to
the inability of supplying such a large force over such a long marching axis. By 14
3EP TWO WELL PLANNED ATTACKS ON THE RIGHT mANK OF :OJI ,A AT -UKAND AND LEFT AT
Chabutra had ended in failure.

Op Sparrow
An ingenious plan to push tanks across the nearly 12,000 ft high and snow swept
:OJI ,A WAS MADE AND # 3QUADRON OF  #AVALRY LED BY ITS #/ ,T #OL 2AJENDRA

150 ³ AUTUMN 2012 ³  

  

Singh (whose nick-name was sparrow) bore result. The Stuart tanks were secretly
hauled up to Baltal in by the end of October. On 01 Nov 1948, Op Sparrow was
LAUNCHED AND  '2 OCCUPIED BOTH THE mANKS OF THE :OJI ,A WITHOUT FACING ANY
major opposition from the enemy. The RIAF Dakotas had softened up the enemy
BY BOMBING THEIR POSITION AT 0INDRAS "Y THE AFTERNOON OF  .OV # 3QUADRON
of 7 Cavalry was at Gumri. The enemy, fazed by the sudden appearance of tanks
was in flight. The tanks were also able to clear stiff opposition due to armour
protection against small arms fire and the ability to bring down a high velocity
of fire on fortified enemy positions. By 02 Nov, 77 Brigade had concentrated at
Machoi. On 04 Nov, 4 Rajput passed through 1 Patiala after the latter had cleared
the Island feature and arrived at Matayan. In the next phase, 4 Rajput captured
Batkundi Hill while 1/5 GR held Pt.12967. On 15 Nov, two ridges, Anant and
Kumar were captured by 1/5 GR. 1 Patiala captured Brown hill and 77 Brigade
entered Drass on 15 Nov.
The dash to Kargil was resumed on 18 Nov with 1 Patiala reaching Kharbou
the next day. On 21 Nov, 1 Patiala was at the junction of Drass and Shingo rivers.
C Coy of 1/5 GR fell back on Kharbu and crossed over to the right bank of the
Drass river but they were ambushed at Kharal brigde suffering 18 dead. On 22/23
Nov, a platoon of the Gorkhas drove out the enemy from Kharal brigde while
another party entered Kargil from a short-cut, climbing straight up a steep hill
feature. Thus, Kargil was re-occupied by Indian troops and the link up with the
Leh column was affected on 24 Nov. The attempts to push on towards Marol
received a setback after a Gorkha column was ambushed at Gangam on 29 Nov.
The column having suffered six casualties fell back to Kargil.

Casualties
1103 personnel of the Indian Army made the supreme sacrifice during the 1947-
48 Operations in J&K. This included 76 officers, 31 JCOs and 996 Other Ranks.
3152 men were wounded. In addition, 1990 officers and men of the J&K State
Forces were martyred in the campaign. 9 officers and 23 men of the Royal Indian
Air Force also laid down their lives in the defence of the motherland.
According to an estimate, the enemy suffered 20,000 casualties including
6000 killed.

Awards & Decorations

The Government of India conferred a large number of gallantry awards to
personnel of the Indian Army, Air Force, J&K State Forces and a few civilians for

  ³ AUTUMN 2012 ³ 151

  

their acts of valour in the campaign. A total of 5 Param Vir Chakras (PVC), 53
Maha Vir Chakras (MVC) and 313 Vir Chakras were awarded.

Force Levels
The total concentration of forces in the J&K theatre towards the end of the
operations was as under:-
India Pakistan
Div HQ Srinagar Div 7 Inf Div
Jammu Div 9 Frontier Div
Elements of 8 Inf Div

Brigades Jammu Div: 10,25,100,101,102 Bdes +

5,80,19, 50 Para and Jammu SF 14 Para Bde & 3 Armd Bde + 7 Bdes of
Bdes Azad Kashmir Forces

Sri Div
161,163,165, 77 and Srinagar SF
Bdes

L of C Sub Area (responsible

for protecting the L of C from
Pathankot to Srinagar)
Total 2 Divisions; 12 Infantry Brigades; 3 Divisions, 14 Infantry Brigades, 23
50 Infantry Battalions (including Infantry Battalions; 40 Battalions of Azad
Indian State Forces Battalions); 14 Kashmir Forces
Battalions of J&K and East Punjab (comprised of 4000 men of Gilgit Scouts &
Militia Chitral Body Guards; 15,000 tribal raiders)

Deductions

Political
z !T THE TIME OF )NDEPENDENCE )NDIAS NEWLY ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT FAILED
TO ANTICIPATE 0AKISTANS DESIGNS OVER *AMMU AND +ASHMIR 4HE )NDIAN
GOVERNMENT ALSO DID NOT RESPOND TO THE *+ GOVERNMENTS PROPOSAL OF SIGNING
a standstill agreement. If the merger of J&K with the Union of India had been
predicted, more efforts could have been made towards gathering intelligence
ON 0AKISTANS OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR THE INVASION INSTRUCTIONS FOR WHICH HAD
been issued to Pakistan Army units as early as on 20 August 1947. Even the
INFORMATION ON @/P 'ULMARG PROVIDED BY -AJ /3 +ALKAT WAS NOT GIVEN MUCH
seriousness at the time. In such a scenario, the process of merger could have
BEEN HASTENED 4HE GOVERNMENT OF *+ WAS ALSO NOT FULLY AWARE OF 0AKISTANS
actual designs when it had carried out a partial economic blockade of the

152 ³ AUTUMN 2012 ³  

  

The political
state. If it did, then it should have not vacillated
till the end before finally agreeing to sign the
leadership ignored
instrument of accession with India.
the military advice
z If the tribal invasion backed by the Pakistan Army
and agreed to cease
had been anticipated well in time more elaborate operations at a time
and detailed plans could have been made for when the Indian
reinforcing the state forces of J&K. Army was poised for
z No clear cut politico-military directives were an offensive towards
given to the Armed Forces for achieving the Muzzaffarabad.
desired end state. The confused thinking in the
government was reflected in the operational instruction issued to Lt Col DR
Rai, CO, 1 Sikh.
z Even when the operations progressed, the government could not clearly
decide on whether the final objective should be to wrest the entire state from
THE ENEMYS CONTROL OR TO DEFEND THE EXISTING POSITIONS
z The political leadership ignored the military advice and agreed to cease
operations at a time when the Indian Army was poised for an offensive
towards Muzzaffarabad.
z If advance notice had been given to the military leadership on the
GOVERNMENTS INTENTION OF AGREEING TO A CEASE lRE THE ARMY COULD HAVE
positioned itself favourably along the cease-fire line by occupying certain
tactically advantageous features.

Military
z The aerial dispatch of troops to Srinagar was achieved within 72 hrs of the
receipt of the emergency telegram from the J&K state. This was a remarkable
achievement of the General Staff in Delhi which could muster the logistics
and troops at such short notice.
z With no clear-cut politico-military directives, the hastily organised force in
Srinagar cleared the raiders from the Kashmir valley within a fortnight of
being deployed.
z As priority was accorded to wresting control of the Kashmir valley, the advance
from Jammu had covered only 30 kms in 15 days. This delay proved fatal and
had sealed the fate of Mirpur and Kotli forever. Even in the valley, operations
were being conducted by only one brigade (161 Brigade) till December 1948.
z The pace of operations in all sectors was slow due to unavailability of troops
at the right time. The shortage of troops was due to the apprehension of

  ³ AUTUMN 2012 ³ 153

  

The pace of
hostilities breaking out with Pakistan along the Punjab
operations in border and commitment of troops for the liberation of
all sectors was Hyderabad.
slow due to z The long lines of communication and the location of
unavailability major supply bases in the plains of Northern India also
of troops at the hindered the progress of operations.
right time. z A combination of factors precluded a rapid Indian
advance on all fronts. Some of these were: establishing
lRM BASES BEFORE EXPLOITING A BREAKTHROUGH INADEQUATE AVAILABILITY OF
troops and supplies; commitment of troops for protecting the long lines of
communications. Lack of supplies and logistics also prevented the Indian
troops from relentlessly pursuing the enemy when it was in retreat and to
further the advance.
z On several occasions, a major Indian offensive was stalled due to the adoption
of guerrilla tactics by the enemy. It had the ability to infiltrate between own
columns or harass the newly-established garrisons from the rear.
z The slow pace of operations is reflected in the following:
 In the valley sector, the Indian advance remained where it was on 13 Nov
1947 at the time of the ceasefire on 1 Jan 1949. This is despite the fact that
initially, priority was accorded to the operations in the Kashmir valley. . If
more forces had been concentrated before the total onset of winters and
blocking of passes, the successes achieved till 13 Nov could have been
extended till Muzzaffarabad without giving the enemy enough time to
regroup.
 In the Jammu sector, effective operations could be launched only after
the complete concentration of 50 and 80 Brigades and later 19 Brigade
to the Jammu Division. Till December 1947, the situation had remained
grim with the enemy managing to re-capture Jhangar. The first major
breakthrough in this sector could be achieved only on 01 Feb after 50
Para Brigade had inflicted a crushing blow to the enemy at Naushara.
Even after this major success, the enemy managed to prevent the Indians
from consolidating their positions and dig-in for launching an offensive
to either relieve the Poonch garrison or re-capture Mirpur or Kotli.
 The garrisons at Drass-Kargil, Leh and Skardu could not be relieved in
time and troops (77 Bde) could be concentrated only after June 1948 when
the pressure of enemy counter-attacks on Uri and Tithwal had abated.

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The air force

z )T WAS DUE TO EXTREMELY HIGH QUALITIES OF LEADERSHIP
and the ability of a small contingent of battle-
despite its limited
hardened men to prevail under adverse conditions
resources carried
that the garrisons at Poonch and Skardu managed out numerous
to withstand repeated onslaughts by the enemy. supply and aerial
z Due credit must also be given to the Indian Army strafing missions
Engineers who by their ingenuity had managed to from their base.
bridge the Ravi, Chenab and Tawi rivers enabling
their crossing by troops and mechanical transport columns.
z The Indian Air Force played a decisive role in the war by air-lifting troops to
Srinagar, Poonch and Leh. On 27 Oct 1947, Srinagar could have been saved
from the invaders only by air as an advance along the road from Jammu would
have decided an outcome in favour of the enemy. The air force despite its
limited resources carried out numerous supply and aerial strafing missions
from their base in Amritsar and the newly established air fields in Jammu and
Srinagar.
z The Indian Army drew several lessons from the campaigns of 1947-48. The
EXPERIENCE GAINED WAS TO PROVE USEFUL IN PLANNING SUBSEQUENT DEPLOYMENT
and maintenance of troops in mountainous terrain.
z The major Indian supply base for the J&K theatre was established at Pathankot
after the war. The operations in the Ladakh sector also led to the opening of
an alternate land route (Manali-Leh) highway for reinforcing the region. This
ROUTE HAS NOW ACQUIRED IMMENSE STRATEGIC SIGNIlCANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
threat posed by our Northern neighbour in that sector. It is also protected by
high mountain ranges on both sides and unlike the Srinagar-Leh route does
not run close to the line of control.
z The enemy forces enjoyed numerous tactical advantages over the Indian
Army:-
 Op Gulmarg was planned well in advance and all the arrangements for
EQUIPPING SUPPLYING AND LAUNCHING THE VARIOUS FORCES %VEN THE REGULAR
FORMATIONS OF THE 0AKISTAN !RMY WERE ALLOTTED TASKS THEY WERE REQUIRED TO
carry out after the marauders had executed their invasion. Thus, Pakistan
used the element of surprise to their favour and caught the state force of
J&K completely off-guard.
 The Pakistani forces enjoyed considerable advantage as their supply
bases were located close to the theatre of operations and had shorter lines
of communications. Pakistan had a good network of roads and tracks

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leading to the places where their forces were concentrated. It therefore

ENABLED THEM TO RE GROUP RE EQUIP AND RE SUPPLY THEIR FORCES QUICKLY AND
in a sustained manner.
 The Pakistani forces also enjoyed numerical superiority over the Indian
forces deployed in J&K.
 The Indian Army was superior in training and valour than the Pakistani
forces. But the enemy overcame this deficiency by employing guerrilla
tactics and did not present open and large targets to the Indian Army.
In addition to harassing the vulnerable Indian lines of communications,
the enemy maintained regular contact with the Indian defences and
GARRISONS THEREBY PREVENTING THEM TO DIG IN lRMLY OR GIVE ADEQUATE TIME
to regroup for launching a decisive or all-out offensive.

Conclusion
In the ultimate analysis, the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir from the tribal
raiders supported by the Pakistan Army was a remarkable feet achieved by the
Indian Army under extremely difficult circumstances. The operations were
mostly planned and led by Indian officers at a time when a new nation was
in its nascent stages of formation. This would provide them with tremendous
experience and confidence in organising the Indian Army later. The Invasion
of J&K posed the first major challenge to the Indian Army immediately after
achieving Independence. The Army not only stood up to this challenge but the
high standards of training, valour and sacrifice displayed by the men helped in
maintaining its reputation of being one of the finest fighting forces of the world.
The Indian troops were also battle-hardened and achieved tremendous fame
and success due to their exploits in Italy, North Africa and Burma during the
Second World War.
However, the ultimate legacy of the operations of 1947-48 is that the enemy
managed to wrest control of nearly 37 per cent of the total land area of Jammu
AND +ASHMIR 4HE FAILURE TO RE CLAIM 3KARDU LED TO THE SEVERING OF )NDIAS
geographical linkages with Afghanistan and Central Asia. This takes us back to
May-June 1948, a crucial stage in the operations when a two-pronged offensive
from Uri and Tithwal was launched to capture Muzzaffarabad. The Indian
advance from Uri got bogged down whereas the offensive from Tithwal could
not even be launched. It is debatable whether at this time more troops should
BEEN RELEASED FOR THE OFFENSIVE ACROSS THE :OJI ,A AND TO LINK UP WITH THE BESIEGED
garrison at Skardu by moving across the Burzil Pass from Gurez. None of these

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objectives could be met and Drass and Kargil were cleared only in November
 4HIS BRINGS US TO THE QUESTION WHETHER THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AT THAT TIME
had clearly understood the strategic significance of the Gilgit-Skardu region or
whether more priority was accorded for securing the Muzzaffarabad valley. The
operations in the Jammu division also progressed at a slow pace and no offensive
was planned to re-take either Mirpur or Rawalkot. The link-up with Poonch was
also achieved only towards the end of November. It was also felt at that time that
threatening Mirpur would have threatened the Mangla reservoir provoking an
all-out war with Pakistan.
Mountains consume troops and both the divisions in J&K had limited
resources available for taking decisive offensive actions to liberate the entire
state and defend the cleared areas simultaneously. Again, it may have been a
gamble to deploy more brigades from the Western Command for operations in
J&K. At that time, 29 Infantry battalions of the Indian Army were deployed for
the defence of East Punjab and 19 Infantry battalions were kept in readiness for
the impending operations in Hyderabad. Military analysts also believe that the
Pakistan Army could have been easily defeated in a full-scale war fought in the
plains of Punjab where massed targets could have been presented to the Indian
Army. But, Prime Minister Nehru had already sought the intervention of the
United Nations and had hoped that the two neighbours could live in peace after
hostilities had ceased in J&K. But history was to belie his hopes and Jammu and
Kashmir continues to be a major source of discontent and perpetual conflict
between India and Pakistan.

Rohit Singh is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies.

Notes
1. Source: Operations in Jammu & Kashmir, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government
of India, Nataraj Publishers, Reprinted edition in 2005.
2. For detailed terrain analysis, please see Scholar Warrior, vol. ii, Spring 2011.
3. A DO letter marked Personal/Top Secret from Gen Frank Messervy addressed to the Pakistan
Army Brigade Commander of the Bannu Frontier Brigade Group was personally received
and opened by Maj (later Maj-Gen) Omkar Singh Kalkat on 20 August 1947 in the absence
of the Brigade Commander. Maj OS Kalkat was then the Brigade Major the Brigade Group.
4HIS LETTER PROVIDED A DETAILED PLAN OF @/P 'ULMARG AND BEARS TESTIMONY TO THE ACTIVE
involvement of the Pakistan Army in the operation. p. 17, Operations in Jammu & Kashmir:
1947-48, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Natraj Publishers

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4. Another source which indicated the active involvement of the Pakistan Army was Shri GK
Reddy, an Indian journalist based in Lahore who had inadvertently received a phone call
to API Lahore from Lt Col Alavai. Alavi stated in his phone call that the attack on Ramkot (a
BORDER OUT POST WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY @!ZAD +ASHMIR &ORCES ON  /CTOBER  0 
Operations in Jammu & Kashmir..

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