Mirasol v. CA, 3 51 SCRA 44 (2001)

G.R. No.
128448 February 1, 2001
SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MlRASOL and LILIA E. MIRASOL, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL and PHILIPPINE
EXCHANGE CO., INC., respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Doctrine:
As a rule, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy
can be settled on other grounds.17 The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are
valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to
sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. This
means that the measure had first been carefully studied by the legislative and
executive departments and found to be in accord with the Constitution before it was
finally enacted and approved.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a case for accounting, specific performance and damages against
PNB involving a crop loan financing scheme they had availed from the said bank.
PNB argued that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said
law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National
Government and were subject to the disposition of the President of the Philippines
for public purposes.
Without notice to the Solicitor General, the RTC declared P.D. 579 unconstitutional
and ruled in favor of petitioners. Upon appeal by petitioners on the ground that the
trial court failed to award them their full money claims and damages, the Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC and ruled that it was improper for the trial court to have
declared P.D. No. 579 unconstitutional since petitioners had not complied with Rule
63, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. -Petitioners then went to the Supreme Court via
Rule 45.
Petitioners’ contention: Rule 63, Section 3, of the Rules of Court (regarding notice to
the OSG) specifically refers only to actions for declaratory relief and not to an
ordinary action for accounting, specific performance, and damages. Hence, notice to
the Solicitor General is not required.
ISSUE:
Whether or not notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory in cases involving the
validity of any treaty, law, executive order or proclamation.
RULING:
Yes. Rule 63, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides: “SEC. 3. Notice to Solicitor
General.
In any action which involves the validity of a statute, or executive order or

regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute,
executive order, or regulation, and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question.”
This should be read in relation to Section 1 [c] of P.D. No. 478,13 which states in part:
“SECTION 1. Functions and Organizations
(1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall have the following specific powers and
functions: x x x x “[c] Appear in any court in any action involving the validity of any
treaty, law, executive order or proclamation, rule or regulation when in his judgment
his intervention is necessary or when requested by the court.” x x x x It is basic legal
construction that where words of command such as “shall,” “must,” or “ought” are
employed, they are generally and ordinarily regarded as mandatory. Thus, where, as
in Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the word “shall” is used, a mandatory
duty is imposed, which the courts ought to enforce.” The purpose of the mandatory
Notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not
his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To
deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his
day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners’ stand, the mandatory
notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar
remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in “any action” and not
just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words
used in the true, there is no room for construction. In all actions assailing the validity
of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor
General is mandatory. In this case, the Solicitor General was never notified about
Civil Case No. 14725. Nor did the trial court ever require him to appear in person or
by a representative or to file any pleading or memorandum on the constitutionality
of the assailed decree. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that lack of
the required notice made it improper for the trial court to pass upon the
constitutional validity of the questioned presidential decrees.

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G.R. No.

SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MlRASOL and LILIA E. MIRASOL, petitioners,

In any action which involves the validity of a statute, or executive order or

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