Heirs of Malabanan vs.

 Republic
G.R. No. 179987
Facts:
1. On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for original registration of title covering a parcel of
land in Silang, Cavite which he purchased from Eduardo Velazco and that he and his predecessors in interest had
been in open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of the said land for more than 30 years.
2. Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his great-grandfather which passed down to
his four sons. By 1966, one of the sons became the administrator of the properties which the son of the latter
succeeded his parents. One of the properties therein was the one sold by the Velazco.
1. They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to be alienable and disposable by the DENR
on March 15, 1982.
3. The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the case of Republic v Hebierto.

Issue: Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed

Held: No. Given the length discussions of questions of law, we would need to dissect them. The case settles down the
correct interpretation of Sec. 14 (1) and (2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141
1. It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section 48 (b) vests the right to ownership to those who
satisfy its prerequisites, while PD 1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes such rights. One did not repeal the other.
2. It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and disposable” from “agricultural” by PD 1073 did
limit the lands to be registered, as we may take a look at Sec. 9 of CA 141.
The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is Naguit, not Herbierto, the latter being only an orbiter
dicta to a case where the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to settle the original registration. Thus:
1. The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is satisfied when at the time of the application, the
land is already classified as alienable and disposable. Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur
sentencia. (The antecedent bears relation to what follows next, unless it destroys the meaning of the sentence.)
2. A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the presumption of the right nugatory and the provision
inoperative, aggravated by the fact that at the time the Philippine is still not an independent state.
3. The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper
to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. If the reverse is true, then there is already an intention on the part of the
State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and Art. 420-
422 of the New Civil Code.
1. It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the commerce of men and the patrimonial property of the
State can be subject to acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
2. It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public dominion when no longer in use, is converted into
patrimonial property, if and only if, as held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia, there is a
positive act of the executive or legislative declaring lands to be such.
3. Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is a positive act, regardless if the land was
classified as alienable and disposable, that the land sought to be registered, can be acquired through prescription.
Applying to the case at bar:
1. Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented was 1948. No other substantive evidence was
presented.
2. Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under
Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Petition Denied.
REPUBLIC VS. CA AND NAGUIT

FACTS:
Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which seeks judicial confirmation of her imperfect title over
a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly
and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she
filed her application for registration. The MCTC rendered a decision confirming the title in the name of Naguit upon
failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial after filing his formal opposition to the petition.

The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration on the
grounds that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Naguit
could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since the subject land was declared as alienable and disposable
only on October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first
classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even
start.

RULING:
Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of title is filed.

There are three requirements for registration of title, (1) that the subject property is alienable and disposable; (2)
that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession and
occupation, and; (3) that the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

There must be a positive act of the government through a statute or proclamation stating the intention of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property, thus, declaring the land as alienable and disposable. However, if
there has been none, it is presumed that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property and the possession
of the land no matter how long would not ripen into ownership through acquisitive prescription.

To follow the Solicitor General’s argument in the construction of Section 14 (1) would render the paragraph 1 of
the said provision inoperative for it would mean that all lands of public domain which were not declared as
alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the
length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. In effect, it precludes the government from enforcing the
said provision as it decides to reclassify lands as alienable and disposable.

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty
years old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural.
There is no impediment to the application of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Naguit had the
right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land
since 1945.
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For,
unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the
land actually looks like.
DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO v. CA, GR No. 98045, 1996-06-26
Facts:
Petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno Tapia challenge the decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' complaint by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch
22. The complaint was for... annulment of the verification, report and recommendation, decision and order of the Bureau
of Lands regarding a parcel of public land.
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City. Said land
was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river.
The case was remanded to the municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the same became final and
executory. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, Branch 24 which dismissed the same. Antonio
Nazareno and petitioners again moved for execution of judgment but private respondents filed another case for
certiorari with prayer for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, Branch 25 which was likewise... dismissed. The decision of the lower court was finally enforced with the private
respondents being ejected from
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan designated as
Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved
survey plan could be released to the applicant,... however, it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of
Lands.
Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands Roberto Hilario rendered a decision
ordering the amendment of the survey plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied
by the private respondents who, if qualified, may... file public land applications covering their respective portions.
Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with respondent Rolleo Ignacio, Undersecretary of the
Department of Natural Resources and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands who denied the motion. Respondent
Director of Lands Abelardo Palad then ordered him to vacate... the portions adjudicated to private respondents and remove
whatever improvements they have introduced thereon. He also ordered that private respondents be placed in possession
thereof.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies which resulted... in the finality of
the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint. Applying Section 4
of C.A. No. 141, as amended, it contended that the approval of the survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of
Lands. Hence, factual findings made by the
Metropolitan Trial Court respecting the subject land cannot be held to be controlling as the preparation and
approval of said survey plans belong to the Director of Lands and the same shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.[1]
Furthermore, the appellate court contended that the motion for reconsideration filed by Antonio Nazareno cannot
be considered as an appeal to the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as mandated by C.A. No.
141 inasmuch as the same had been acted upon by... respondent Undersecretary Ignacio in his capacity as Officer-in-
Charge of the Bureau of Lands and not as Undersecretary acting for the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
For the failure of Antonio Nazareno to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the present case does not fall within the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. It also held that there was no showing of oppressiveness in the manner in which the orders were issued and
executed.
 Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457
of the Civil Code which provides:
"To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters."
Issues:
Question of whether or not the subject land is public land.
Ruling:
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the above-mentioned requisites
must be present. However, they admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling
materials on portions of the Balacanas
Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land.[3] It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of
such boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the
current of the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of Manila,[4] this Court held that the word "current"
indicates the participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide.
Petitioners' submission not having met the first and second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot
claim the rights of a riparian owner.
I... any case, this court agrees with private respondents that petitioners are estopped from denying the public
character of the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his
Miscellaneous Sales Application MSA (G-6)
571.[5] The mere filing of said Application constituted an admission that the land being applied for was public
land, having been the subject of Survey Plan No. MSI-10-06-000571-D (Equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad-237) which
was conducted as a consequence... of Antonio Nazareno's Miscellaneous Sales Application wherein said land was
described as an orchard. Said description by Antonio Nazareno was, however, controverted by respondent Labis in his
investigation report to respondent Hilario based on the findings of his ocular... inspection that said land actually covers a
dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River. The investigation report also states that except
for the swampy portion which is fully planted to nipa palms, the whole area is fully occupied by a part of a big... concrete
bodega of petitioners and several residential houses made of light materials, including those of private respondents which
were erected by themselves sometime in the early part of 1978.[6]
Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of sawdust in the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Lands.[7]
This Court... has often enough held that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality.[8] Again, when said
factual findings are... affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this
Court.[9]
In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co.
consequent to its sawmill operations.[12] Even if this Court were to take into consideration petitioners' submission that the
accretion site... was the result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other
filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land,[13] the same would still be part of the
public domain.
Bureau of Lands, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have Jurisdiction
over the same in accordance with the Public Land Law. Accordingly, the court a quo dismissed... petitioners' complaint
for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies which ruling the Court of Appeals affirmed.
However, this Court agrees with petitioners that administrative remedies have been exhausted. Petitioners could
not have intended to a... s Director of lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control over any form of
concession, disposition and management of the lands of the public domain.[18] He may issue decisions and orders as he
may see fit under the circumstances as... long as they are based on the findings of fact.
Principles:
Meneses v. CA,[2] this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil
Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and...
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a
case, give to the... owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the
effects of the current of waters.
It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made or artificial. In Republic v. CA,[10]
this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river... is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it
differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et... al.,[11] where the
land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the
consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such,... part of
the public domain.

It has been held that for someone to be entitled of an easement of right of way, 4 requisites must be present. (1)
the estate must be surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway (2) after payment
of the proper indemnity (3) the isolation is not due to the propietor’s own acts and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point
least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest.

Panganiban has all 4 requisites. With regard to the 1st requisite, his land is bounded on all sides by immovables,
the lands of Baltazar, Legaspi and Calimon and by the river. The 2nd requisite is settled by a remand to the lower court for
the determination of the proper indemnity. As regards the 3rd requisite, it was found that Panganiban bought the land from
the Baltazars therefore its isolation was not due to his own acts. And with regard to the 4th requisite, the passage claimed
is the shortest distance from his lot to Braulio Street. Panganiban was established all 4 requisites therefore is entitled to the
easement.
REPUBLIC v. SPS. DANILO GO AND AMORLINA GO, GR No. 197297, 2017-08-02
Facts:
 On August 26, 2006
 (the Spouses Go) applied for the registration and confirmation of title over Cadastral Lot No. 4699-B
 The Spouses Go registered Lot No. 4699-B in their names for taxation purposes
 They had also established a funeral parlor, San Sebastian Funeral Homes, on the lot.[4] According to them, there
were no other claimants over the property.
 The Spouses Go claimed to be in an open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and actual possession of the property
for seven (7) years since they bought it.
 Sometime in 1945,... the Spouses de Torres),[8] owned Lot No. 4699,[9] a bigger property where Lot No. 4699-B
came from.
 In the 1960s, Anselmo and his siblings inherited Lot No. 4699 from their parents upon their deaths
 One of Anselmo's sisters, Cristina Almero de Torres Corlit (Cristina), then built a residential house on Lot No.
4699-B,[13] declaring this parcel of land under her name for tax purposes,... Meanwhile, Anselmo and his other
siblings built their homes on another portion of Lot No. 4699.[
 On January 26, 2000, the Spouses Go bought Lot No. 4699-B from the previous owners, siblings Anselmo,
Bernardo Almero de Torres, Leonila Almero de Torres Morada, and Cristina, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale.
 On November 3, 2006, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) opposed respondents' application for
registration for the following reasons: 1) Lot No. 4699-B was part of the public domain; 2) neither the Spouses Go
nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the property since June 12, 1945 or even before then; 3) the tax declaration and payment were not
competent or sufficient proof of ownership, especially considering that these were relatively recent.
 Anselmo and his siblings had no proof of their inheritance. He claimed that the office having custody of the
documentary proof of their inheritance was burned... he Municipal Trial Court in Cities confirmed the title of the
lot in the name of the Spouses Go.
 Petitioner appealed directly to the Court of Appeals. In the Decision... dated January 21, 2011, the Court of
Appeals denied the appeal
 Petitioner elevated[32] the case before this Court, arguing that Maglinao testified having investigated only 200
square meters of the 1,000-square-meter land for registration.[33] She also admitted that her certification was
based on the approved plan and not on the Land Classification Map. She certified the lot only to determine "the
point or monument of the entire or whole area" and not to identify its alienable character. Thus, petitioner argues
that Maglinao's certification should not have been used to determine that the land was alienable and disposable.
 Petitioner argues that a CENRO Certification is insufficient to establish that a land applied for registration is
alienable.
 In the Resolution dated August 15, 2011, this Court required respondents to submit a certified true copy of any
Presidential or DENR Secretary's issuance stating Lot No. 4699-B as alienable and disposable.
 dated September 25, 2011,... the Spouses Go attached a certified photocopy of the CENRO Certification dated
January 29, 2008,[39] which this Court noted.[40] In the Resolution dated November 14, 2011, this Court
informed the Spouses Go that the CENRO Certification was not the submission required of them.
 The Spouses Go manifested that they had already complied with this Court's Resolution through their September
25, 2011 Compliance.[43] They re-attached the CENRO Certification dated January 29, 2008.
 Issues:
 For resolution before this Court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in issuing the Spouses Go a Decree of
Registration over Lot No. 4699-B.
 Ruling:
 Classifying a land of the public domain as agricultural is essential only to establish the applicant's "eligibility for
land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
 Thus, the land may be declared alienable and disposable at any time, not necessarily before June 12, 1945. The
moment that the land is declared alienable and disposable, an applicant may then initiate the proceedings for the
judicial confirmation of title.
 On the other hand, for the requisite duration of possession, an applicant must have had possession of the property
under a bona fide claim of ownership or acquisition, from June 12, 1945 or earlier. Such possession must have
also been open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious.
 under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529, Filipino citizens applying for the judicial confirmation and registration of an imperfect title must prove
several requisites. First, they must prove that they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property. Second, it must be settled that the
applicants' occupation is under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
immediately before the application was filed. Third, it should be established that the land is an agricultural land of
public domain. Finally, it has to be shown that the land has been declared alienable and disposable.
 The Spouses Go's possession, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, does not meet the statutory
requirements.
 The evidence the Spouses Go submitted to prove their required length of possession consist of Anselmo's
testimony, Cristina's sole Tax Declaration, and the Spouses Go's sole Tax Declaration. Other than these pieces of
evidence, the Spouses Go could not support their claim of possession in the concept of an owner, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
 Even assuming that there is sufficient evidence to establish their claim of possession in the concept of an owner
since June 12, 1945, the Spouses Go nevertheless failed to prove the alienable and disposable character of the
land.
 an applicant has the burden of proving that the public land has been classified as alienable and disposable.[78] To
do this, the applicant must show a positive act from the government declassifying the land from the public
domain[79] and converting it into an alienable and disposable land.[80] "[T]he exclusive prerogative to classify
public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department."... before an inalienable land of the public
domain becomes private land, the DENR Secretary must first approve the land classification into an agricultural
land and release it as alienable and disposable.[87] The DENR Secretary's official acts "may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy."... in its Decision[94] dated December 12, 2008, the Court of Appeals concluded that the January 29, 2008
CENRO Certification, which stated that Lot No. 4699-B was within alienable and disposable zone, was
conclusive proof that this land applied for registration was alienable. This Court disagrees.
 To establish that a land is indeed alienable and disposable, applicants must submit the application for original
registration with the CENRO certification and a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
 The pieces of evidence the Spouses Go adduced fall short of the requirements of the law.
 First, the Spouses Go failed to present a certified true copy of the original classification of the DENR Secretary.
 Second, although the Spouses Go submitted a CENRO certification stating that the land was verified to be within
alienable and disposable zone under Project No. 13, Land Classification Map No. 718, Maglinao, the person who
issued the CENRO Certification, testified otherwise. She admitted in her testimony that, she certified the lot only
to determine "the point or monument of the entire or whole area" and not to identify its alienable character.
 The Spouses Go have the burden to show that the land for registration is alienable or disposable,[109] which they
miserably failed to do so. Without the original land classification approved by the DENR Secretary, the Spouses
Go's application for registration must be denied.[110] The land remains inalienable.
 In sum, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the trial court's Decision that granted the Spouses Go's
application for registration of Lot No. 4699-B. The Spouses Go failed to adequately prove their claim of
possession in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945. They likewise failed to establish that the land applied
for registration is alienable and disposable. Thus, their occupation of this land, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into ownership and cannot be registered as a title.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated January 21, 2011 and
Resolution dated June 6, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 93000, which affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities dated December 12, 2008, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration of
the Spouses Danilo Go and Amorlina Go of Lot No. 4699-B of Subdivision Plan Csd-04-022290-D is DENIED
for lack of merit.
 Principles:
 Public land remains inalienable unless it is shown to have been reclassified and alienated to a private person.