EN BANC

[G.R. No. 156039. August 14, 2003.]

HON. KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, HON. JOSE F. ERESTAIN, JR.,

and HON. WALDEMAR V. VALMORES, in their capacities as
Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, of the CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION , petitioners, vs . ZENAIDA D. PANGANDAMAN-GANIA ,
respondent.

Solicitor General for petitioners.

SYNOPSIS

Respondent Zenaida D. Pangandaman-Gania is a Director II and Manila Information

and Liaisoning O cer of the Mindanao State University (MSU). She has been holding the
position after the con rmation of her appointment by the MSU Board of Regents on 1 June
1995. However, in October 1998, respondent received a copy of a Special Order
designating a certain Agnes Mangondato as Acting Director in her place in view of the
alleged expiration of her term and was no longer allowed to report for work. She veri ed
the status of her appointment and found out that her appointment was not submitted to
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) for attestation. Respondent immediately brought the
matter to the CSC for a ruling on the validity of the termination of her employment. The
CSC upheld her dismissal for lack of attestation and prolonged absence without o cial
Ieave, but on motion for reconsideration, the CSC found merit in her motion, declared her
removal from o ce as illegal, exonerated her from the charge of being absent without
o cial leave and ordered her reinstatement to her position, but disallowed the payment of
back salaries for the period she was not working as a result of the illegal dismissal.
Respondent did not seek a review of any of the CSC resolutions including the order
denying back salaries and other bene ts for the period she was out of work which became
nal and executory. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which ruled that back
wages should be paid to respondent from the time of her illegal dismissal until she was
ordered reinstated by the CSC on 8 March 2001, but excluded the period after the CSC had
ordered MSU to admit respondent back to work. The OSG led the present petition for
review under Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, allegedly in behalf of the petitioners
named herein, and also signed for them the veri cation and certi cation of non-forum
shopping.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and ordered the payment of respondent's
backwages. According to the Court, it cannot in exibly dwell on the defect of a belated
appeal and coldly thwart a review of the case. The Court noted that even after
acknowledging the nality of Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 , the CSC still
entertained two motions of respondent and promulgated Resolution No. 02-0321 dated
28 February 2002 denying respondent's importunate motions for the reason that she
allegedly did not report for work but not because they were already time-barred. There was
no doubt that the Civil Service Commission was in the legitimate exercise of its mandate
under Sec. 3, Rule I, of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service that "administrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering
strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial
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 proceedings." The Court further declared that to prevent respondent from claiming back
wages would leave incomplete the redress of the illegal dismissal that had been done to
her and amount to endorsing the wrongful refusal of her employer or whoever was
accountable to reinstate her, and a too-rigid application of the pertinent provisions of the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service as well as the Rules of
Court will not be given premium where it would obstruct rather than serve the broader
interests of justice in the light of the prevailing circumstances in the case under
consideration.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL, PROCEDURE; APPEALS; NEITHER THE CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION NOR THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION TO DIRECT
SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT OF THE COMMISSION'S RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS UPON
THE BEHEST OF RESPONDENT; RULE THAT THE COURT LOSES ITS JURISDICTION OVER
A CASE AFTER ALL THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE PERIODS TO APPEAL SHALL HAVE
LAPSED APPLIES SUPPLETORILY IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE. —
Ordinarily, under the foregoing circumstances, neither the Civil Service Commission nor the
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to direct the substantial amendment of CSC's relevant
resolutions upon the behest of respondent. The principle governing ordinary appeal from
the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals applies suppletorily mutatis mutandis — . .
. where all the parties have either thus perfected their appeals by ling their notices of
appeal in due time and the period to le such notice of appeal has lapsed for those who
did not do so, then the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case as of the ling of the last
notice of appeal or the expiration of the period to do so for all the parties. This rule is also
articulated in Associated Bank v. Gonong where we held that only after all the parties'
respective periods to appeal shall have lapsed that the court loses its jurisdiction over the
case. What is left as residual jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission pertains only to
matters for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not
involve any matter litigated by the appeal or the immediate execution of its resolutions
under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. This is to
ensure the orderly disposition of the case at both the levels of the CSC and the appellate
court.
2. ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATION AGAINST NON-FORUM SHOPPING; THE DIFFICULTY
IN SECURING THE ATTENTION AND SIGNATURES OF OFFICIALS IN CHARGE OF
GOVERNMENT OFFICES DOES NOT EXCUSE THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
FROM WANTONLY EXECUTING BY ITSELF THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATE OF NON-
FORUM SHOPPING. — We recognize the occasions when the OSG has di culty in securing
the attention and signatures of officials in charge of government offices for the verification
and certi cate of non-forum-shopping of an initiatory pleading. This predicament is
especially true where the period for ling such pleading is non-extendible or can no longer
be further extended for reasons of public interest such as in applications for the writ of
habeas corpus, in election cases or where sensitive issues are involved. This quandary is
more pronounced where public o cials have stations outside Metro Manila. But this
di cult fact of life within the OSG, equitable as it may seem, does not excuse it from
wantonly executing by itself the veri cation and certi cate of non-forum shopping. If the
OSG is compelled by circumstances to verify and certify the pleading in behalf of a client
agency, the OSG should at least endeavor to inform the courts of its reasons for doing so,
beyond instinctively citing City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella and Commissioner
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 of Internal Revenue v. S. C. Johnson and Son, Inc.
3. ID.; ID.; MATTERS TO BE ALLEGED IN EXCEPTIONAL SITUATIONS WHERE
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL SIGNS THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATE
OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING. — To be able to verify and certify an initiatory pleading for
non-forum shopping when acting as counsel of record for a client agency, the OSG must
(a) allege under oath the circumstances that make signatures of the concerned o cials
impossible to obtain within the period for ling the initiatory pleading; (b) append to the
petition or complaint such authentic document to prove that the-party-petitioner or
complainant authorized the ling of the petition or complaint and understood and adopted
the allegations set forth therein, and an a rmation that no action or claim involving the
same issues has been led or commenced in any court, tribunal or quasi judicial agency;
and, (c) undertake to inform the court promptly and reasonably of any change in the stance
of the client agency. Anent the document that may be annexed to a petition or complaint
under letter (b) hereof, the letter-endorsement of the client agency to the, OSG, or other
correspondence to prove that the subject-matter of the initiatory pleading had been
previously discussed between the OSG and its client, is satisfactory evidence of the facts
under letter (b) above. In this exceptional situation where the OSG signs the veri cation
and certi cate of non-forum shopping, the court reserves the authority to determine the
su ciency of the OSG's action as measured by the equitable considerations discussed
herein.
4. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION'S
LIBERAL ATTITUDE IS JUSTIFIED BY ITS MANDATE THAT ADMINISTRATIVE
INVESTIGATIONS SHALL BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT NECESSARILY ADHERING STRICTLY
TO THE TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS. — We cannot in exibly dwell on the defect of a belated appeal and coldly
thwart a review of the instant case. For it cannot be denied that even after acknowledging
the nality of Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 , the CSC still entertained the
twin motions of respondent on 8 October 2001 and 12 December 2001 to modify the
same resolution and insert therein an order for the payment of back wages. The CSC in
fact promulgated Resolution No. 02-0321 dated 28 February 2002 denying respondent's
importunate motions for the reason that she allegedly did not report for work but not
because they were already time-barred. No doubt, the Civil Service Commission was in the
legitimate exercise of its mandate under Sec. 3, Rule 1, of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service that "[a]dministrative investigations shall be
conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and
evidence applicable to judicial proceedings." This authority is consistent with its powers
and functions to "[p]rescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into
effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws" being the central
personnel agency of the Government.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; A TOO-RIGID APPLICATION OF THE PERTINENT PROVISION OF
THE REVISED UNIFORM RULES ON ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE AS
WELL AS THE RULES OF COURT WILL NOT BE GIVEN PREMIUM WHERE IT WOULD
OBSTRUCT RATHER THAN SERVE THE BROADER INTEREST OF JUSTICE IN THE LIGHT OF
THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASE UNDER CONSIDERATION. —
Furthermore, there are special circumstances in accordance with the tenets of justice and
fair play that warrant such liberal attitude on the part of the CSC and a compassionate like-
minded discernment by this Court. To begin with, respondent was consistently denied
reinstatement by the responsible o cers of MSU and vehemently barred from resuming
her previous position. The rst order for her return to work was issued on 8 March 2001
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 which was followed by repeated personal appeals for the immediate execution of the CSC
resolution. Thereafter, when respondent was still forced out of work, the CSC issued its
second and third orders on 19 July 2001 and 4 October 2001, respectively, for the
President of MSU to restore her to the item from which she was illegally dismissed. As
these private requests and o cial directives were cruelly rejected by her employer and the
period of her unemployment was unduly prolonged, respondent had no choice and was
compelled to ask for back salaries and other bene ts to offset the callous repudiation of
what was due her. To prevent respondent from claiming back wages would leave
incomplete the redress of the illegal dismissal that had been done to her and amount to
endorsing the wrongful refusal of her employer or whoever was accountable to reinstate
her. A too-rigid application of the pertinent provisions of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service as well as the Rules of Court will not be given
premium where it would obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in the
light of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION MAY APPEAL FROM AN
ADVERSE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ONLY WHEN THE RESOLUTION TO BE
REVERSED OR MODIFIED WILL SERIOUSLY PREJUDICE THE CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM. —
That the CSC may appeal from an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals reversing or
modifying its resolutions which may seriously prejudice the civil service system is beyond
doubt. In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy this Court held that the CSC may become
the party adversely affected by such ruling and the aggrieved party who may appeal the
decision to this Court. The situation where the CSC's participation is bene cial and
indispensable often involves complaints for administrative offenses, such as neglect of
duty, being notoriously undesirable, ine ciency and incompetence in the performance of
o cial duties, and the like, where the complainant is more often than not acting merely as
a witness for the government which is the real party injured by the illicit act. In cases of this
nature, a ruling of the Court of Appeals favorable to the respondent employee is
understandably adverse to the government, and unavoidably the CSC as representative of
the government may appeal the decision to this Court to protect the integrity of the civil
service system.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; BY FORCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES, THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION HAS THE STANDING TO INITIATE THE INSTANT PETITION FOR REVIEW
ALTHOUGH THE ASSAILED DECISION DOES NOT IMPAIR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
GOVERNMENT, DAMAGE THE CIVIL SERVICE OR WEAKEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, the CSC is not the
real party-in-interest as this suit confronts the Decision of the Court of Appeals to award
back wages for respondent arising from an illegitimate personnel and non-disciplinary
action of MSU, which is different from an administrative disciplinary proceeding where the
injured party is the government. We fail to see how the assailed Decision can impair the
effectiveness of government, damage the civil service system or weaken the constitutional
authority of the CSC so as to authorize the latter to prosecute this case. As a rule, the
material interest for this purpose belongs to MSU since it instigated the illegal dismissal
and the execution of the Decision devolves upon it. Regrettably, however, respondent
cannot insist that MSU be the indispensable party in the instant petition since the latter
was not designated as respondent in the petition before the Court of Appeals. It would
truly be a case of having her cake and eating it too for respondent to require MSU to
undertake the present appeal from the assailed Decision when it was deprived of standing
in the appellate court proceedings and unilaterally booted out as a prospective litigant
herein. Hence, by force of circumstances, the CSC has the standing to initiate the instant
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 petition for review.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
RULED, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT RESPONDENT DID
NOT ACTUALLY ASSUME AND PERFORM THE DUTIES OF HER POSITION SO AS TO
DEPRIVE HER OF BACKWAGES AND OTHER BENEFITS. — There is more than substantial
evidence in the record consisting of the general payroll and attendance sheets to prove
that petitioner assumed and exercised the functions of Director II and Manila Information
and Liaisoning O cer at MSU as early as June 1995 after the MSU Board of Regents
approved her permanent appointment which was issued earlier on 10 April 1995. It cannot
be refuted that in September 1998 she was terminated from the service on the alleged
ground of expiration of her term and stopped from performing the functions of her
position, and subsequently reinstated to her job upon the declaration of the CSC that her
dismissal from the service was illegal. Clearly, the CSC gravely erred when thereafter it
ruled that respondent did not actually assume and perform the duties of her position so as
to deprive her of back wages and other bene ts. In Gabriel v. Domingo this Court held that
an illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to
back wages and other monetary bene ts from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his
reinstatement. This is only fair and sensible because an employee who is reinstated after
having been illegally dismissed is considered as not having left his o ce and should be
given a comparable compensation at the time of his reinstatement. Respondent cannot be
faulted for her inability to work or to render any service from the time she was illegally
dismissed up to the time of her reinstatement. The policy of "no work, no pay" cannot be
applied to her, for such distressing state of affairs was not of her own making or liking
even as her family suffered tremendously as a consequence of her removal and while she
was jobless. Verily, to withhold her back salaries and other bene ts during her illegal
dismissal would put to naught the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure for those
in the civil service.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE STATE UNIVERSITY CANNOT BE MADE TO PAY ALL
ACCRUING BACK SALARIES AND OTHER BENEFITS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT; THE
SUPERIOR OFFICERS FOUND TO BE IN BAD FAITH OR HAVE ACTED WITH PERSONAL
MALICE WILL BE HELD PERSONALLY ACCOUNTABLE. — We also agree with the Court of
Appeals that MSU cannot be made to pay all accruing back salaries and other bene ts in
favor of respondent. There are allegations to the effect that o cials of MSU disobeyed in
bad faith the writ of execution issued by the CSC. In Gabriel v. Domingo we held that if the
illegal dismissal; including the refusal to reinstate an employee after a nding of unlawful
termination, is found to have been made in bad faith or due to personal malice of the
superior o cers then they will be held personally accountable for the employee's back
salaries; otherwise, the government disburses funds to answer for such arbitrary
dismissal. This rule is also enunciated in Secs. 38 and 39 of Book 1, E.O. 292 , and in Secs.
53, 55, 56 and 58 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO , J : p

"A system of procedure is perverted from its proper function when it multiplies
impediments to justice without the warrant of clear necessity," so says Cardozo — an
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 observation especially apt in the instant case involving the payment of back wages and
other bene ts resulting from the illegal dismissal of an employee due to improper
personnel and non-disciplinary action. The disquieting procedural steps risked by
respondent before the Court of Appeals, the tendency of the appellate court to overlook
most of them, the doggedness of the Solicitor General to venture others, when neither the
court a quo nor the parties to the case appear perturbed that elementary rules of
procedure were either indulgently brushed aside or subtly exploited one after the other, do
not leave us ensnared in borderline technical maneuvers, or so it is said, being too
impotent to address the pith of this controversy.
Respondent Zenaida D. Pangandaman-Gania is a Director II and Manila Information
and Liaisoning O cer of the Mindanao State University (MSU). She has been holding this
position after the con rmation of her appointment by the MSU Board of Regents on 1 June
1995.
On 2 October 1998 respondent received a copy of Special Order No. 477-P dated 28
September 1998 designating a certain Agnes Mangondato as Acting Director in her place
in view of the alleged expiration of her term and was no longer allowed to report for work.
She veri ed the status of her appointment and found out that her appointment was not
submitted to the Civil Service Commission for attestation.
Respondent immediately brought the matter to the CSC for a ruling on the validity of
the termination of her employment. 1 I n Resolution No. 00-1265 dated 24 May 2000 the
CSC upheld her dismissal for lack of attestation and prolonged absence without o cial
leave from the time she was removed from her post in September 1998 as a result of
Special Order No. 477-P.
Respondent moved for reconsideration. In Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March
2001 the CSC found merit in her motion, declared her removal from o ce as illegal,
exonerated her from the charge of being on absence without o cial leave and ordered her
reinstatement as Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning O cer of MSU but
disallowed the payment of back salaries for the period she was not working as a result of
the illegal dismissal. The CSC explained the non-payment of her back wages —
Be that as it may, the incumbency of Dr. Gania is governed by the principle
of "quantum meruit" (as you work so shall you earn). In other words, her
entitlement to compensation depends on her actual performance of work. Short
of approval by the Commission, the appointment while already effective, by itself
is not a basis for payment of salary but the assumption of duties of her o ce . . .
Such being the case, Dr. Gania is not entitled to compensation for the period that
she was not reporting to work. 2

MSU moved for reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March
2001, while respondent moved for its early execution. In Resolution No. 01-1225 dated 19
July 2001, the CSC denied MSU's motion for reconsideration and ordered its President to
allow respondent to assume and exercise the functions of Manila Information and
Liaisoning Officer. CcEHaI

MSU appealed from the denial of its motion for reconsideration under Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-66188, to the Court of Appeals,
but the appellate court did not issue any restraining order or injunction to prevent the
execution of the resolution on appeal.
Respondent did not seek a review of any of the resolutions of the CSC including the
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 order denying back salaries and other bene ts for the period she was out of work. She
instead pursued her prayer for reinstatement but MSU refused to employ her back. Hence,
she was compelled to le a second motion for the execution of CSC Resolution No. 01-
0558 dated 8 March 2001, citing Sec. 82 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, which states that "[t]he ling and pendency of petition for review
with the Court of Appeals or certiorari with the Supreme Court shall not stop the execution
of the nal decision of the Commission unless the Court issues a restraining order or an
injunction."
I n Resolution No. 01-1616 dated 4 October 2001 the CSC granted respondent's
motion and held that "CSC Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 has attained
nality and must be immediately implemented," as it again ordered the MSU President to
reinstate respondent.
On 8 October 2001 respondent for the rst time questioned the portion of CSC
Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 prohibiting the payment of back wages and
other bene ts to her for the period that her employment was terminated, and moved for
the modification of the resolution by granting her the relief prayed for.
On 29 October 2001 the Court of Appeals dismissed MSU's petition for review on
the ground that the certi cate of non-forum shopping was not personally signed by
pertinent o cers of the university but by its counsel of record. 3 MSU moved for
reconsideration of the dismissal.
On 12 December 2001, there being still no action on her request to be paid her back
salaries and other benefits, respondent moved for an immediate ruling thereon.
On 21 February 2002 the Court of Appeals denied MSU's motion for reconsideration
of the dismissal of its petition for review for lack of merit.
On 28 February 2002 the CSC in Resolution No. 02-0321 denied respondent's
motion —
Since nowhere in the records does it show that [respondent Gania] actually
assumed and performed the duties of her position, it logically follows that there
can be no basis for the grant of back salaries in her favor. 4

Without the aid of an attorney, respondent appealed CSC Resolution No. 02-0321
dated 28 February 2002 to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69668. In her petition for review, she did not
mention that she did not seek a review of CSC Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March
2001 which was the real object of her appeal. 5 In addition, she impleaded only the
petitioners herein, Chairperson Karina Constantino-David and Commissioners Jose F.
Erestain Jr. and Waldemar V. Valmores of the CSC, but did not name as party-respondent
the Mindanao State University or any of its officers.
In its Comment before the Court of Appeals, the CSC through the O ce of the
Solicitor General (OSG) rebuffed respondent's claim for back wages since she allegedly
failed to actually assume the position of Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning
O cer of MSU. But the CSC did not assail the procedural in rmities of respondent's
petition and appeared contented to refute just the substantial arguments thereof.
On 28 October 2002 the Court of Appeals partially found merit in respondent's
petition for review. 6 Apparently failing to note that respondent did not appeal from the
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 denial of her claim for payment of back salaries in CSC Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8
March 2001, which she found objectionable, the Court of Appeals concluded that —
. . . petitioner had assumed and had been exercising the functions [at MSU]
as early as June 1995, after the MSU Board of Regents approved her permanent
appointment which was issued earlier . . . on April 10, 1995. It was only in
September 1998, when she was terminated from service on the alleged ground of
expiration of term, that she was prevented from performing the functions of her
position. 7

The Court of Appeals ruled that back wages should be paid to respondent from the
time of her illegal dismissal until she was ordered reinstated by the CSC as Director II of
MSU on 8 March 2001, but excluded the period after the CSC had ordered MSU to admit
respondent back to work since the damages she suffered for that period were chargeable
in the proper forum against the MSU President who in bad faith refused to abide by the
relevant CSC resolutions.
On 3 January 2003 the OSG led the instant petition for review under Rule 45, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, allegedly in behalf of the petitioners named herein, and also
signed for them the veri cation and certi cation of non-forum shopping. The OSG
asserted as grounds for review the principle recognizing nality to factual ndings of
quasi-judicial agencies as well as its puzzling statement that "[w]hile the dismissal of
herein respondent was declared illegal, she was, however, not exonerated from the
charges. Hence, respondent is not entitled to back wages." 8 Once again the OSG did not
call attention to procedural defects in the petition of respondent before the Court of
Appeals.
Respondent led in her own behalf a Comment claiming that the CSC cannot be a
party-petitioner in a case where its decision is the subject of review, citing Civil Service
Commission v. Court of Appeals . 9 As to whether respondent actually assumed the duties
of Director II, she referred not only to the nding of the Court of Appeals that she had
assumed o ce and worked for MSU as early as June 1995 but also to the voluminous
records of MSU showing that she reported for work until her illegal dismissal in September
1998. 1 0 She also manifested that she was reinstated to her job on 18 September 2002
while the proceedings before the Court of Appeals, were ongoing although she was not
paid her salary and other bene ts. In another Manifestation before this Court, she a rmed
that her salary as well as RATA and other bene ts for the month of September 2002 were
paid on 23 April 2003.
We deny the instant petition for review. It is true that respondent had lost the right to
ask for the modi cation of CSC Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 and to
demand compensation for her back salaries and other bene ts. She did not move for the
reconsideration of this resolution within fteen (15) days from receipt thereof 1 1 nor did
she le a petition for its review within the same period under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. 1 2 To be sure, both the CSC and respondent herself admitted the nality of
the Resolution and acted upon it when she was granted an order for its execution.
Meanwhile, MSU led its petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
SP-66188) assailing CSC Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 and CSC Resolution
No. 01-1225 dated 19 July 2001 denying MSU's motion for reconsideration. cDCaTS

Ordinarily, under the foregoing circumstances, neither the Civil Service Commission
nor the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to direct the substantial amendment of CSC's
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 relevant resolutions upon the behest of respondent. 1 3 The principle governing ordinary
appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals applies suppletorily 1 4 mutatis
mutandis —
. . . where all the parties have either thus perfected their appeals by ling
their notices of appeal in due time and the period to le such notice of appeal has
lapsed for those who did not do so, then the trial court loses jurisdiction over the
case as of the ling of the last notice of appeal or the expiration of the period to
do so for all the parties. 1 5

This rule is also articulated in Associated Bank v. Gonong 1 6 where we held that only
after all the parties' respective periods to appeal shall have lapsed that the court loses its
jurisdiction over the case. What is left as residual jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission pertains only to matters for the protection and preservation of the rights of
the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal or the immediate
execution of its resolutions under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service. This is to ensure the orderly disposition of the case at both the levels of
the CSC and the appellate court. 1 7
Nonetheless, we cannot in exibly dwell on the defect of a belated appeal and coldly
thwart a review of the instant case. For it cannot be denied that even after acknowledging
the nality of Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 , the CSC still entertained the
twin motions of respondent on 8 October 2001 and 12 December 2001 to modify the
same resolution and insert therein an order for the payment of back wages. The CSC in
fact promulgated Resolution No. 02-0321 dated 28 February 2002 denying respondent's
importunate motions for the reason that she allegedly did not report for work but not
because they were already time-barred.
No doubt, the Civil Service Commission was in the legitimate exercise of its
mandate under Sec. 3, Rule I, of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service that "[a]dministrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily
adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings." This authority is consistent with its powers and functions to "[p]rescribe,
amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil
Service Law and other pertinent laws" being the central personnel agency of the
Government. 1 8
Furthermore, there are special circumstances in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play that warrant such liberal attitude on the part of the CSC and a
compassionate like-minded discernment by this Court. 1 9 To begin with, respondent was
consistently denied reinstatement by the responsible o cers of MSU and vehemently
barred from resuming her previous position. The rst order for her return to work was
issued on 8 March 2001 which was followed by repeated personal appeals for the
immediate execution of the CSC resolution. 2 0 Thereafter, when respondent was still
forced out of work, the CSC issued its second and third orders on 19 July 2001 and 4
October 2001, respectively, for the President of MSU to restore her to the item from which
she was illegally dismissed. As these private requests and o cial directives were cruelly
rejected by her employer and the period of her unemployment was unduly prolonged,
respondent had no choice and was compelled to ask for back salaries and other bene ts
to offset the callous repudiation of what was due her.
To prevent respondent from claiming back wages would leave incomplete the
redress of the illegal dismissal that had been done to her and amount to endorsing the
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 wrongful refusal of her employer or whoever was accountable to reinstate her. A too-rigid
application of the pertinent provisions of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service as well as the Rules of Court will not be given premium where it
would obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in the light of the
prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.
As commented in Obut v. Court of Appeals , 2 1 "we cannot look with favor on a
course of action which would place the administration of justice in a straightjacket for then
the result would be a poor kind of justice, if there would be justice at all. Verily, judicial
orders . . . are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the
circumstances attending the case may warrant. What should guide judicial action is the
principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of
his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on
technicalities."
The same principle of liberality may also be drawn upon to gloss over the failure of
respondent to implead MSU as party-respondent in the petition before the Court of
Appeals while joining only herein petitioners as Chairman and Commissioners of the CSC
to answer her petition. While as a rule it would have been necessary to adhere to this
practice, 2 2 in the instant case no one among the Court of Appeals, the CSC and the O ce
of the Solicitor General saw it t to name or cause to be included MSU as party-
respondent. Indeed, the Comment of the OSG argued on the merits as if it was acting in
unison with respondent's employer, stressing all possible claims that may be alleged to
defeat respondent's petition. Ultimately, what is crucial is that both CSC and MSU are part
of the same bureaucracy that manages and supervises government personnel, and as
such, represent a common interest on the question raised in the petition to be defended by
the same core of lawyers from the OSG or the O ce of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC). 2 3
Justi ably, where no injury has been done as probably all lines of reasoning to
oppose the petition have been asserted by parties of the same principal and brought to
the fore in the proceedings a quo, and considering further that the underlying principle in
the administration of justice and application of the rules is substance rather than form,
reasonableness and fair play in place of formalities, we deem it apposite to except this
particular case from the rigid operation of the procedure for the joinder of parties.
In any event, none of these procedural defects were raised as an issue on appeal
and are now deemed waived. Of course we are not surprised that the OSG did not touch on
these procedural issues and would seemingly prefer a ruling squarely on the issue of
respondent's entitlement to back wages. As its services are paid for by taxpayers' money,
the OSG ought to be the foremost o cers of the court who in suitable cases must delve
into the real concerns. CSDcTA

Unfortunately, the OSG also treaded upon technically precarious grounds when it
led the petition in the name of the CSC and signed the veri cation and certi cate of non-
forum shopping in behalf of its client. Sure enough, respondent vigorously objects to the
standing of the CSC as party-petitioner in the instant petition, citing our ruling in Civil
Service Commission v. Court of Appeals. 2 4
That the CSC may appeal from an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals
reversing or modifying its resolutions which may seriously prejudice the civil service
system is beyond doubt. In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy 2 5 this Court held that
the CSC may become the party adversely affected by such ruling and the aggrieved party
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 who may appeal the decision to this Court.
The situation where the CSC's participation is bene cial and indispensable often
involves complaints for administrative offenses, such as neglect of duty, being notoriously
undesirable, ine ciency and incompetence in the performance of o cial duties, and the
like, where the complainant is more often than not acting merely as a witness for the
government which is the real party injured by the illicit act. In cases of this nature, a ruling
of the Court of Appeals favorable to the respondent employee is understandably adverse
to the government, and unavoidably the CSC as representative of the government may
appeal the decision to this Court to protect the integrity of the civil service system.
The CSC may also seek a review of the decisions of the Court of Appeals that are
detrimental to its constitutional mandate as the central personnel agency of the
government tasked to establish a career service, adopt measures to promote morale,
e ciency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and courtesy in the civil service,
strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development
programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to
public accountability. Nonetheless, the right of the CSC to appeal the adverse decision
does not preclude the private complainant in appropriate cases from similarly elevating
the decision for review. 2 6
The ruling in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy was further explained in Civil
Service Commission v. Court of Appeals 2 7 where we held that the real party-in-interest in a
case involving the non-renewal of the appointments of contractual employees would be
the person who was allegedly dismissed from work and not the CSC, for it is he who would
be bene ted or injured by his reinstatement or non-reinstatement and who is present,
available and competent to bring the matter on appeal. Like a judge whose order or
decision is being assailed, the CSC should not be joined in the petition as it is not a
combatant in a proceeding where opposing parties may contend their respective positions
without the active participation of the CSC. 2 8
In the instant case, the CSC is not the real party-in-interest as this suit confronts the
Decision of the Court of Appeals to award back wages for respondent arising from an
illegitimate personnel and non-disciplinary action of MSU, which is different from an
administrative disciplinary proceeding where the injured party is the government. We fail to
see how the assailed Decision can impair the effectiveness of government, damage the
civil service system or weaken the constitutional authority of the CSC so as to authorize
the latter to prosecute this case. As a rule, the material interest for this purpose belongs to
MSU since it instigated the illegal dismissal and the execution of the Decision devolves
upon it. 2 9
Regrettably, however, respondent cannot insist that MSU be the indispensable party
in the instant petition since the latter was not designated as respondent in the petition
before the Court of Appeals. It would truly be a case of having her cake and eating it too
for respondent to require MSU to undertake the present appeal from the assailed Decision
when it was deprived of standing in the appellate court proceedings and unilaterally
booted out as a prospective litigant herein. Hence, by force of circumstances, the CSC has
the standing to initiate the instant petition for review.
Moreover, the OSG executed the veri cation and certi cate of non-forum shopping
in behalf of the CSC, citing as bases therefor City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella ,
3 0 a n d Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc . 3 1 Some
clarification is in order to avoid perpetuating a misconception.
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 City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella is not an authority for the OSG to
execute veri cation and certi cation of non-forum shopping on its own as legal
representative of client agencies. The reason is that the OSG was in that case acting as a
"People's Tribune" regardless of the o cial opinion of the relevant government agencies
therein —
That the City Warden appears to have acquiesced in the release order of
the trial court by his compliance therewith does not preclude the Solicitor General
from taking a contrary position and appealing the same. The Solicitor General's
duty is to present what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the
Government 3 2 (italics added).

Hence, there was no necessity for the veri cation and certi cate of non-forum
shopping to be executed by the City Warden himself. To be sure, it would have been
awkward and irregular for the City Warden to do so given that his position was not the
same as those re ected in the petition of the OSG. No doubt, the real party-in-interest is
the OSG itself as representative of the State. 3 3 In Pimentel v. Commission on Elections 3 4
we held —
. . . the Solicitor General may, as it has in instances take a position adverse
and contrary to that of the Government on the reasoning that it is incumbent upon
him to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best
interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's position . . . As
we commented on the role of the Solicitor General in cases pending before this
Court, "This Court does not expect the Solicitor General to waver in the
performance of his duty. As a matter of fact, the Court appreciates the
participation of the Solicitor General in many proceedings and his continued
fealty to his assigned task. He should not therefore desist from appearing before
this Court even in those cases he nds his opinion inconsistent with the
Government or any of its agents he is expected to represent. The Court must be
advised of his position just as well." 3 5

But the rule is different where the OSG is acting as counsel of record for a
government agency. For in such a case it becomes necessary to determine whether the
petitioning government body has authorized the ling of the petition and is espousing the
same stand propounded by the OSG. Verily, it is not improbable for government agencies
to adopt a stand different from the position of the OSG since they weigh not just legal
considerations but policy repercussions as well. They have their respective mandates for
which they are to be held accountable, and the prerogative to determine whether further
resort to a higher court is desirable and indispensable under the circumstances.
The veri cation of a pleading, if signed by the proper o cials of the client agency
itself, would ttingly serve the purpose of attesting that the allegations in the pleading are
true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that
the pleading is led in good faith. Of course, the OSG may opt to le its own petition as a
"People's Tribune" but the representation would not be for a client o ce but for its own
perceived best interest of the State. cCaDSA

The case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc ., is not
also a precedent that may be invoked at all times to allow the OSG to sign the certificate of
non-forum shopping in place of the real party-in-interest. The ruling therein mentions
merely that the certi cation of non-forum shopping executed by the OSG constitutes
substantial compliance with the rule since "the OSG is the only lawyer for the petitioner,
which is a government agency mandated under Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV, of
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 the 1987 Administrative Code (Reiterated under Memorandum Circular No. 152 dated May
17, 1992) to be represented only by the Solicitor General." 3 6
By its very nature, "substantial compliance" is actually inadequate observance of the
requirements of a rule or regulation which are waived under equitable circumstances 3 7 to
facilitate the administration of justice 3 8 there being no damage or injury caused by such
awed compliance. 3 9 This concept is expressed in the statement "the rigidity of a
previous doctrine was thus subjected to an inroad under the concept of substantial
compliance." 4 0 In every inquiry on whether to accept "substantial compliance," the focus is
always on the presence of equitable conditions to administer justice effectively and
efficiently without damage or injury to the spirit of the legal obligation.
We have ruled previously 4 1 that substantial compliance with the certi cate of non-
forum shopping is su cient. The equitable circumstances pleaded to show substantial
compliance include the proximity of the ling of the complaint to the date of the effectivity
of the circular requiring the certi cate and the belated ling thereof, but the mere
submission thereof after the ling of a motion to dismiss does not ipso facto operate as a
substantial compliance. 4 2 As summarized in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of
Appeals, 4 3 "[w]hen a strick and literal application of the rules on non-forum shopping and
veri cation will result in a patent denial of substantial justice and, they may be liberally
construed. This guideline is especially true when the petitioner has satisfactorily explained
the lapse and fulfilled the requirements in its motion for reconsideration.
The fact that the OSG under the 1987 Administrative Code is the only lawyer for a
government agency wanting to le a petition, or com-plaint for that matter, does not
operate per se to vest the OSG with the authority to execute in its name the certi cate of
non-forum shopping for a client o ce. For, in many instances, client agencies of the OSG
have legal departments which at times inadvertently take legal matters requiring court
representation into their own hands without the intervention of the OSG. 4 4 Consequently,
the OSG would have no personal knowledge of the history of a particular case so as to
adequately execute the certi cate of non-forum shopping; and even if the OSG does have
the relevant information, the courts on the other hand would have no way of ascertaining
the accuracy of the OSG's assertion without precise references in the record of the case.
Thus, unless equitable circumstances which are manifest from the record of a case prevail,
it becomes necessary for the concerned government agency or its authorized
representatives to certify for non-forum shopping if only to be sure that no other similar
case or incident is pending before any other court.cDICaS

We recognize the occasions when the OSG has di culty in securing the attention
and signatures of o cials in charge of government o ces for the veri cation and
certi cate of non-forum shopping of an initiatory pleading. This predicament is especially
true where the period for ling such pleading is non-extendible or can no longer be further
extended for reasons of public interest such as in applications for the writ of habeas
corpus, in election cases or where sensitive issues are involved. This quandary is more
pronounced where public officials have stations outside Metro Manila.
But this di cult fact of life within the OSG, equitable as it may seem, does not
excuse it from wantonly executing by itself the veri cation and certi cate of non-forum
shopping. If the OSG is compelled by circumstances to verify and certify the pleading in
behalf of a client agency, the OSG should at least endeavor to inform the courts of its
reasons for doing so, beyond instinctively citing City Warden of the Manila City Jail v.
Estrella and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc.
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 Henceforth, to be able to verify and certify an initiatory pleading for non-forum
shopping when acting as counsel of record for a client agency, the OSG must (a) allege
under oath the circumstances that make signatures of the concerned o cials impossible
to obtain within the period for ling the initiatory pleading; (b) append to the petition or
complaint such authentic document to prove that the party-petitioner or complainant
authorized the ling of the petition or complaint and understood and adopted the
allegations set forth therein, and an a rmation that no action or claim involving the same
issues has been led or commenced in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency; and, (c)
undertake to inform the court promptly and reasonably of any change in the stance of the
client agency.
Anent the document that may be annexed to a petition or complaint under letter (b)
hereof, the letter-endorsement of the client agency to the OSG, or other correspondence to
prove that the subject-matter of the initiatory pleading had been previously discussed
between the OSG and its client, is satisfactory evidence of the facts under letter (b) above.
In this exceptional situation where the OSG signs the veri cation and certi cate of non-
forum shopping, the court reserves the authority to determine the su ciency of the OSG's
action as measured by the equitable considerations discussed herein.
Finally, after our lengthy discourse on the technical imperfections a icting the
instant case, we resolve the substantive issue of whether respondent is entitled to receive
back salaries and other bene ts for the period that she was illegally dismissed. Obviously,
the answer is in the affirmative.
There is more than substantial evidence in the record consisting of the general
payroll and attendance sheets to prove that petitioner assumed and exercised the
functions of Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning O cer at MSU as early as
June 1995 after the MSU Board of Regents approved her permanent appointment which
was issued earlier on 10 April 1995. 4 5 It cannot be refuted that in September 1998 she
was terminated from the service on the alleged ground of expiration of her term and
stopped from performing the functions of her position, and subsequently reinstated to her
job upon the declaration of the CSC that her dismissal from the service was illegal. Clearly,
the CSC gravely erred when thereafter it ruled that respondent did not actually assume and
perform the duties of her position so as to deprive her of back wages and other benefits.
I n Gabriel v. Domingo 4 6 this Court held that an illegally dismissed government
employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to back wages and other monetary
bene ts from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement. This is only fair and
sensible because an employee who is reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is
considered as not having left his o ce and should be given a comparable compensation
at the time of his reinstatement.
Respondent cannot be faulted for her inability to work or to render any service from
the time she was illegally dismissed up to the time of her reinstatement. The policy of "no
work, no pay" cannot be applied to her, for such distressing state of affairs was not of her
own making or liking even as her family suffered tremendously as a consequence of her
removal and while she was jobless. Verily, to withhold her back salaries and other bene ts
during her illegal dismissal would put to naught the constitutional guarantee of security of
tenure for those in the civil service.
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that MSU cannot be made to pay all
accruing back salaries and other bene ts in favor of respondent. There are allegations to
the effect that o cials of MSU disobeyed in bad faith the writ of execution issued by the
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 CSC. In Gabriel v. Domingo 4 7 we held that if the illegal dismissal, including the refusal to
reinstate an employee after a nding of unlawful termination, is found to have been made
in bad faith or due to personal malice of the superior o cers then they will be held
personally accountable for the employee's back salaries; otherwise, the government
disburses funds to answer for such arbitrary dismissal. 4 8 This rule is also enunciated in
Secs. 38 4 9 and 39 5 0 of Book I, E.O. 292 , and in Secs. 53, 5 1 55, 5 2 56 5 3 and 58 5 4 of Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
Accordingly, MSU as a government institution must compensate respondent with
back salaries and other bene ts only from the time of her illegal dismissal, which
according to the case record began sometime in October 1998, until the motion for
reconsideration of the MSU was denied and a writ of execution for respondent's
reinstatement as Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning O cer was issued. The
reckoning period is not 8 March 2001 as determined by the appellate court but 19 July
2001 when CSC Resolution No. 01-1225 was promulgated wherein the motion for
reconsideration of the MSU was denied with nality and the latter was explicitly
commanded to allow respondent to assume and exercise the functions of Director II and
Manila Information and Liaisoning O cer. For, a nal decision of the CSC is immediately
executory unless a motion for reconsideration is filed in the meantime. 5 5
The back wages and other bene ts accruing after 19 July 2001 are to be treated
separately since they must be collected in the proper forum wherein the assertions of
malice and ill will in the failure to reinstate respondent to her post are threshed out and the
concerned parties given the full opportunity to be heard. Until such separate proceeding
has been instituted and decided, it is premature to x the liability for this portion of
respondent's back wages and other bene ts upon either the government as represented
by MSU or the accountable officers thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 28 October 2002 is AFFIRMED except that the cut-off date for the payment
of back salaries to respondent should be adjusted from the date of her illegal dismissal to
"19 July 2001," instead of "8 March 2001," since it was only on 19 July 2001 that MSU's
motion for reconsideration was denied and the order of execution nally issued by the Civil
Service Commission speci cally directing MSU to reinstate respondent Pangandaman-
Gania and exercise the functions of her position with the promulgation of CSC Resolution
No. 01-1225.
This is without prejudice to respondent's claim for back salaries and other bene ts
in the appropriate forum corresponding to the period after 19 July 2001 until she is
actually reinstated as Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer. CAIaHS

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., J ., on leave.

Footnotes
1. The complaint of respondent falls under "Other Personnel and Non-Disciplinary Actions"
of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

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 2. CA Rollo, p. 31.
3. Resolution penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by
Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador of the Seventh
Division.

4. CA Rollo, p. 68.
5. Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court, authorizes a party to litigate his case personally.

6. Decision penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion and concurred in by

Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez Jr. and Sergio L. Pestaño.
7. Rollo, p. 26.
8. Id., p. 7.
9. G.R. No. 126354, 15 December 1999, 320 SCRA 703.
10. See CA Rollo, pp. 119–175.

11. Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule VI, Sec. 80.
12. See Sec. 4.

13. Pefianco v. Moral, G.R. No. 132248, 19 January 2000, 322 SCRA 439; Gloria v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 131012, 21 April 1999, 306 SCRA 287; Manaloto v. Santos, No. L-
21262, 31 December 1965, 15 SCRA 690; Government of the Philippines v. Antonio, No.
L-23736, 19 October 1965, 15 SCRA 119; Montejo v. Cabangon, No. L-17977, 30 May
1962, 5 SCRA 266; Vito v. Lacson, No. L-16173, 23 December 1961, 3 SCRA 666.

14. Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule I, Sec. 3.

15. I F.D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 508 (1997).

16. G.R. No. 77353, 30 July 1987, 152 SCRA 478.

17. Under Sec. 49 of the Civil Service Law (Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. 292), a motion
or petition for reconsideration takes precedence over an appeal where both parties opt to
exercise their respective rights to question the decision in an administrative case, i.e., one
of the parties moves for reconsideration while the other party files an appeal or petition
for review. See Simsim v. Belmonte, No. L-25388, 31 August 1970, 34 SCRA 536.

18. Civil Service Law, Secs. 1 and 12.

19. Republic v. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-31303-04, 31 May 1978, 83 SCRA 453; Paulino v.
Court of Appeals, No. L-46723, 28 October 1977, 80 SCRA 257.
20. The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule VI, Sec. 82,
provides that "[t]he filing and pendency of petition for review with the Court of Appeals or
certiorari with the Supreme Court shall not stop the execution of the final decision of the
Commission unless the Court issues a restraining order or an injunction."
21. No. L-40535, 30 April 1976, 70 SCRA 546, 554.

22. See 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43, Sec. 6 where public respondent is merely a
nominal or formal party; E.O. 292, Bk. VII, Chap. 4, Sec. 25 (3) which provides "[t]he
action for judicial review may be brought against the agency, or its officers, and all
indispensable and necessary parties as defined in the Rules of Court", Pastor v. City of
Pasig, G.R. No. 146873, 9 May 2002; Calderon v. Solicitor General, G.R. Nos. 103752-53,
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 25 November 1992, 215 SCRA 876.

23. The Mindanao State University was incorporated as a State University under RA 1387
(1955) as amended.
24. See Note 9.

25. G.R. No. 135805, 29 April 1999, 306 SCRA 425.

26. Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, G.R. No. 141246, 9 September 2002.
27. See Note 9.

28. See Calderon v. Solicitor General, supra Note 22.

29. See Pastor v. City of Pasig, supra Note 22.

30. G.R. No. 141211, 31 August 2001, 364 SCRA 257.

31. G.R. No. 127105, 25 June 1999, 309 SCRA 87.

32. See Note 30.

33. See C.R. Villacorta, "The Sixteenth Justice: Balancing of Interests in the Office of the
Solicitor General," XIV Law. Rev. 31 July 2001, pp. 4, 6.
34. G.R. No. 126394, 24 April 1998, 289 SCRA 586.

35. Id. at 595 citing Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92561, 12 September 1990,
189 SCRA 459.
36. See Note 31.

37. Ruga v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 72654-61; 22 January 1990,
181 SCRA 266.
38. Porac Trucking v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81093. 6 March 1990, 183 SCRA 45.
39. In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. De Jesus and Bibiana Roxas De
Jesus, Roxas v. De Jesus, No. L-38338, 28 January 1985, 134 SCRA 245; Vda. de Roldan
v. Roldan, No. L-19601, 31 March 1966, 16 SCRA 479.
40. Garcia v. Court of Appeals, No. L-34620, 29 April 1977, 76 SCRA 609.
41. Kavinta v. Castillo, G.R. No. 117083, 27 October 1995, 249 SCRA 604.
42. Ibid.
43. G.R. No. 146923, 30 April 2003.

44. See e.g. CA Rollo, pp. 79–80, 83–86 where the Civil Service Commission filed with the
Court of Appeals its own pleading captioned "Manifestation In Lieu of Comment" which
the Office of the Solicitor General in its counter-manifestation asked the appellate court
to disregard.

45. CA Rollo, pp. 119–175.

46. G.R. No. 87420, 17 September 1990, 189 SCRA 674.

47. Ibid.
48. See also Dumlao v. Court of Appeals, 199 Phil. 442 (1982); Correa v. CFI of Bulacan, L-
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 46096, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 312; Mindanao Realty Corp. v. Kintanar, No. L-17152, 30
November 1962, 6 SCRA 814; Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, No. L-16290, 31 October
1961, 3 SCRA 413.

49. Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. — (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for
acts done in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad
faith, malice or gross negligence. (2) Any public officer who, without just cause, neglects
to perform a duty within a period fixed by law or regulation, or within a reasonable period
if none is fixed, shall be liable for damages to the private party concerned without
prejudice to such other liability as may be prescribed by law. (3) A head of a department
or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty,
negligence, or misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has actually authorized by
written order the specific act or misconduct complained of.

50. Sec. 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. — No subordinate officer or employee shall be
civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties.
However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to
law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acted under orders or
instructions of his superiors.

51. Sec. 53. The head of department or agency or any responsible official who willfully and
deliberately refuses or fails to implement or execute the final resolution or decision of
the Commission to the prejudice of the party affected or the public in general shall be
liable for contempt of the Commission. In case the decision directed payment of back
salaries, the head of the department shall be made liable in his personal capacity for the
payment of said salaries and other monetary benefits corresponding to the period of
delay in the implementation of said decision, order or ruling.

52. Sec. 55. Indirect contempt shall be imposed only after due proceedings. Indirect
contempt may be committed through any of the following acts or omissions; (a)
disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, decision, resolution, ruling,
summons, subpoena or, command of, or injunction of the Commission . . .

53. Sec. 56. If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed
against the Commission, he may be punished by a fine of not more than One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00) for every act of indirect contempt . . . If the contempt consists in the
violation of an injunction or omission to do an act which is still within the power of the
respondent to perform, the respondent shall, in addition, be made liable for all damages
as a consequence thereof.

54. Sec. 58. Damages sustained by the aggrieved party shall refer to the total amount of
his of her salaries and other money benefits which shall have accrued to the latter had
the final order, decision, resolution, ruling, injunction or processes of the Commission
been enforced/implemented immediately.
55. Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule VI, Sec. 80;
Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, Rule XIV, Sec. 50.

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