[G.R. No. 152392.

May 26, 2005]

SECRETARYS/RESIDENT AGENTS CERTIFICATE
EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES, respondents.
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
61000 dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by Expertravel and Tours, Inc. (ETI). I, Mario A. Aguinaldo, of legal age, Filipino, and duly elected and appointed Corporate Secretary and Resident
Agent of KOREAN AIRLINES, a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of
The Antecedents the Republic of Korea and also duly registered and authorized to do business in the Philippines, with office address
at Ground Floor, LPL Plaza Building, 124 Alfaro St., Salcedo Village, Makati City, HEREBY CERTIFY that during a
Korean Airlines (KAL) is a corporation established and registered in the Republic of South Korea and licensed to do special meeting of the Board of Directors of the Corporation held on June 25, 1999 at which a quorum was present,
business in the Philippines. Its general manager in the Philippines is Suk Kyoo Kim, while its appointed counsel was the said Board unanimously passed, voted upon and approved the following resolution which is now in full force and
Atty. Mario Aguinaldo and his law firm. effect, to wit:

On September 6, 1999, KAL, through Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint[2] against ETI with the Regional Trial Court RESOLVED, that Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A. Aguinaldo & Associates or any of its lawyers are hereby
(RTC) of Manila, for the collection of the principal amount of P260,150.00, plus attorneys fees and exemplary appointed and authorized to take with whatever legal action necessary to effect the collection of the unpaid account
damages. The verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo, who indicated of Expert Travel & Tours. They are hereby specifically authorized to prosecute, litigate, defend, sign and execute
therein that he was the resident agent and legal counsel of KAL and had caused the preparation of the complaint. any document or paper necessary to the filing and prosecution of said claim in Court, attend the Pre-Trial
Proceedings and enter into a compromise agreement relative to the above-mentioned claim.
ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to execute the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. KAL IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 10th day of January, 1999, in the City of Manila,
opposed the motion, contending that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent and was registered as such with the Philippines.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as required by the Corporation Code of the Philippines. It was further
alleged that Atty. Aguinaldo was also the corporate secretary of KAL. Appended to the said opposition was the (Sgd.)
identification card of Atty. Aguinaldo, showing that he was the lawyer of KAL.
MARIO A. AGUINALDO
During the hearing of January 28, 2000, Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the complaint
through a resolution of the KAL Board of Directors approved during a special meeting held on June 25, 1999. Upon Resident Agent
his motion, KAL was given a period of 10 days within which to submit a copy of the said resolution. The trial court
granted the motion. Atty. Aguinaldo subsequently filed other similar motions, which the trial court granted. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 10th day of January, 1999, Atty. Mario A. Aguinaldo exhibiting to me
his Community Tax Certificate No. 14914545, issued on January 7, 2000 at Manila, Philippines.
Finally, KAL submitted on March 6, 2000 an Affidavit[3] of even date, executed by its general manager Suk Kyoo
Kim, alleging that the board of directors conducted a special teleconference on June 25, 1999, which he and Atty. (Sgd.)
Aguinaldo attended. It was also averred that in that same teleconference, the board of directors approved a
resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the complaint. Suk Doc. No. 119; ATTY. HENRY D. ADASA
Kyoo Kim also alleged, however, that the corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution.
Page No. 25; Notary Public
On April 12, 2000, the trial court issued an Order[4] denying the motion to dismiss, giving credence to the claims of
Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim that the KAL Board of Directors indeed conducted a teleconference on June 25, Book No. XXIV Until December 31, 2000
1999, during which it approved a resolution as quoted in the submitted affidavit. Series of 2000. PTR #889583/MLA 1/3/2000[6]

ETI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order, contending that it was inappropriate for the court to take On December 18, 2001, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition, ruling that the verification and certificate
judicial notice of the said teleconference without any prior hearing. The trial court denied the motion in its Order[5] of non-forum shopping executed by Atty. Aguinaldo was sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court. According to
dated August 8, 2000. the appellate court, Atty. Aguinaldo had been duly authorized by the board resolution approved on June 25, 1999,
and was the resident agent of KAL. As such, the RTC could not be faulted for taking judicial notice of the said
ETI then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the orders of the RTC. In its comment on the petition, teleconference of the KAL Board of Directors.
KAL appended a certificate signed by Atty. Aguinaldo dated January 10, 2000, worded as follows:
1
ETI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the CA denied. Thus, ETI, now the petitioner, The petitioner insists that the teleconference and resolution adverted to by the respondent in its pleadings were
comes to the Court by way of petition for review on certiorari and raises the following issue: mere fabrications foisted by the
respondent and its counsel on the RTC, the CA and this Court.
DID PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DEPART FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT RENDERED ITS QUESTIONED DECISION AND WHEN IT ISSUED ITS The petition is meritorious.
QUESTIONED RESOLUTION, ANNEXES A AND B OF THE INSTANT PETITION?[7]
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides:
The petitioner asserts that compliance with Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court can be determined only from the
contents of the complaint and not by documents or pleadings outside thereof. Hence, the trial court committed SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, and the CA erred in considering the affidavit of the or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
respondents general manager, as well as the Secretarys/Resident Agents Certification and the resolution of the filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
board of directors contained therein, as proof of compliance with the requirements of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
of Court. The petitioner also maintains that the RTC cannot take judicial notice of the said teleconference without pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
prior hearing, nor any motion therefor. The petitioner reiterates its submission that the teleconference and the thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he
resolution adverted to by the respondent was a mere fabrication. shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading
has been filed.
The respondent, for its part, avers that the issue of whether modern technology is used in the field of business is a
factual issue; hence, cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. On Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
the merits of the petition, it insists that Atty. Aguinaldo, as the resident agent and corporate secretary, is authorized other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
to sign and execute the certificate of non-forum shopping required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, on top provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
of the board resolution approved during the teleconference of June 25, 1999. The respondent insists that undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
technological advances in this time and age are as commonplace as daybreak. Hence, the courts may take judicial administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
notice that the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. had provided a record of corporate conferences forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
and meetings through FiberNet using fiber-optic transmission technology, and that such technology facilitates voice contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
and image transmission with ease; this makes constant communication between a foreign-based office and its
Philippine-based branches faster and easier, allowing for cost-cutting in terms of travel concerns. It points out that It is settled that the requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory[8] and that the failure to
even the E-Commerce Law has recognized this modern technology. The respondent posits that the courts are comply with this requirement cannot be excused. The certification is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the
aware of this development in technology; hence, may take judicial notice thereof without need of hearings. Even if party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the
such hearing is required, the requirement is nevertheless satisfied if a party is allowed to file pleadings by way of same parties, issues and causes of action. Hence, the certification must be accomplished by the party himself
comment or opposition thereto. because he has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in different
courts or tribunals. Even his counsel may be unaware of such facts.[9] Hence, the requisite certification executed by
In its reply, the petitioner pointed out that there are no rulings on the matter of teleconferencing as a means of the plaintiffs counsel will not suffice.[10]
conducting meetings of board of directors for purposes of passing a resolution; until and after teleconferencing is
recognized as a legitimate means of gathering a quorum of board of directors, such cannot be taken judicial notice In a case where the plaintiff is a private corporation, the certification may be signed, for and on behalf of the said
of by the court. It asserts that safeguards must first be set up to prevent any mischief on the public or to protect the corporation, by a specifically authorized person, including its retained counsel, who has personal knowledge of the
general public from any possible fraud. It further proposes possible amendments to the Corporation Code to give facts required to be established by the documents. The reason was explained by the Court in National Steel
recognition to such manner of board meetings to transact business for the corporation, or other related corporate Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[11] as follows:
matters; until then, the petitioner asserts, teleconferencing cannot be the subject of judicial notice.
Unlike natural persons, corporations may perform physical actions only through properly delegated individuals;
The petitioner further avers that the supposed holding of a special meeting on June 25, 1999 through namely, its officers and/or agents.
teleconferencing where Atty. Aguinaldo was supposedly given such an authority is a farce, considering that there
was no mention of where it was held, whether in this country or elsewhere. It insists that the Corporation Code The corporation, such as the petitioner, has no powers except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation
requires board resolutions of corporations to be submitted to the SEC. Even assuming that there was such a Code and those that are implied by or are incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers
teleconference, it would be against the provisions of the Corporation Code not to have any record thereof. through its board of directors and/or its duly-authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of
documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly-authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by
specific act of the board of directors. All acts within the powers of a corporation may be performed by agents of its
2
selection; and except so far as limitations or restrictions which may be imposed by special charter, by-law, or CITY OF MANILA
statutory provisions, the same general principles of law which govern the relation of agency for a natural person
govern the officer or agent of a corporation, of whatever status or rank, in respect to his power to act for the SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30th day of August, 1999, affiant exhibiting to me his Community
corporation; and agents once appointed, or members acting in their stead, are subject to the same rules, liabilities Tax Certificate No. 00671047 issued on January 7, 1999 at Manila, Philippines.
and incapacities as are agents of individuals and private persons.
(Sgd.)
For who else knows of the circumstances required in the Certificate but its own retained counsel. Its regular officers,
like its board chairman and president, may not even know the details required therein. Doc. No. 1005; ATTY. HENRY D. ADASA

Indeed, the certificate of non-forum shopping may be incorporated in the complaint or appended thereto as an Page No. 198; Notary Public
integral part of the complaint. The rule is that compliance with the rule after the filing of the complaint, or the
dismissal of a complaint based on its non-compliance with the rule, is impermissible. However, in exceptional Book No. XXI Until December 31, 2000
circumstances, the court may allow subsequent compliance with the rule.[12] If the authority of a partys counsel to
execute a certificate of non-forum shopping is disputed by the adverse party, the former is required to show proof of Series of 1999. PTR No. 320501 Mla. 1/4/99[13]
such authority or representation.
As gleaned from the aforequoted certification, there was no allegation that Atty. Aguinaldo had been authorized to
In this case, the petitioner, as the defendant in the RTC, assailed the authority of Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the execute the certificate of non-forum shopping by the respondents Board of Directors; moreover, no such board
requisite verification and certificate of non-forum shopping as the resident agent and counsel of the respondent. It resolution was appended thereto or incorporated therein.
was, thus, incumbent upon the respondent, as the plaintiff, to allege and establish that Atty. Aguinaldo had such
authority to execute the requisite verification and certification for and in its behalf. The respondent, however, failed While Atty. Aguinaldo is the resident agent of the respondent in the Philippines, this does not mean that he is
to do so. authorized to execute the requisite certification against forum shopping. Under Section 127, in relation to Section
128 of the Corporation Code, the authority of the resident agent of a foreign corporation with license to do business
The verification and certificate of non-forum shopping which was incorporated in the complaint and signed by Atty. in the Philippines is to receive, for and in behalf of the foreign corporation, services and other legal processes in all
Aguinaldo reads: actions and other legal proceedings against such corporation, thus:

I, Mario A. Aguinaldo of legal age, Filipino, with office address at Suite 210 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini cor. P. SEC. 127. Who may be a resident agent. A resident agent may either be an individual residing in the Philippines or
Gil Sts., Ermita, Manila, after having sworn to in accordance with law hereby deposes and say: THAT - a domestic corporation lawfully transacting business in the Philippines: Provided, That in the case of an individual,
he must be of good moral character and of sound financial standing.
1. I am the Resident Agent and Legal Counsel of the plaintiff in the above entitled case and have caused the
preparation of the above complaint; SEC. 128. Resident agent; service of process. The Securities and Exchange Commission shall require as a
condition precedent to the issuance of the license to transact business in the Philippines by any foreign corporation
2. I have read the complaint and that all the allegations contained therein are true and correct based on the records that such corporation file with the Securities and Exchange Commission a written power of attorney designating
on files; some persons who must be a resident of the Philippines, on whom any summons and other legal processes may be
served in all actions or other legal proceedings against such corporation, and consenting that service upon such
3. I hereby further certify that I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in resident agent shall be admitted and held as valid as if served upon the duly-authorized officers of the foreign
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency. If I corporation as its home office.[14]
subsequently learned that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any tribunal or agency, I will notify the court, tribunal or agency Under the law, Atty. Aguinaldo was not specifically authorized to execute a certificate of non-forum shopping as
within five (5) days from such notice/knowledge. required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. This is because while a resident agent may be aware of actions
filed against his principal (a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines), such resident may not be aware
(Sgd.) of actions initiated by its principal, whether in the Philippines against a domestic corporation or private individual, or
in the country where such corporation was organized and registered, against a Philippine registered corporation or
MARIO A. AGUINALDO a Filipino citizen.

Affiant The respondent knew that its counsel, Atty. Aguinaldo, as its resident agent, was not specifically authorized to
execute the said certification. It attempted to show its compliance with the rule subsequent to the filing of its
3
complaint by submitting, on March 6, 2000, a resolution purporting to have been approved by its Board of Directors 1. People (including outside guest speakers) who wouldnt normally attend a distant FTF meeting can participate.
during a teleconference held on June 25, 1999, allegedly with Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim in attendance.
However, such attempt of the respondent casts veritable doubt not only on its claim that such a teleconference was 2. Follow-up to earlier meetings can be done with relative ease and little expense.
held, but also on the approval by the Board of Directors of the resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the
certificate of non-forum shopping. 3. Socializing is minimal compared to an FTF meeting; therefore, meetings are shorter and more oriented to the
primary purpose of the meeting.
In its April 12, 2000 Order, the RTC took judicial notice that because of the onset of modern technology, persons in
one location may confer with other persons in other places, and, based on the said premise, concluded that Suk 4. Some routine meetings are more effective since one can audio-conference from any location equipped with a
Kyoo Kim and Atty. Aguinaldo had a teleconference with the respondents Board of Directors in South Korea on telephone.
June 25, 1999. The CA, likewise, gave credence to the respondents claim that such a teleconference took place, as
contained in the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim, as well as Atty. Aguinaldos certification. 5. Communication between the home office and field staffs is maximized.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common 6. Severe climate and/or unreliable transportation may necessitate teleconferencing.
and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must
be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be 7. Participants are generally better prepared than for FTF meetings.
assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.[15] Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not 8. It is particularly satisfactory for simple problem-solving, information exchange, and procedural tasks.
subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot 9. Group members participate more equally in well-moderated teleconferences than an FTF meeting.[21]
reasonably be questionable.[16]
On the other hand, other private corporations opt not to hold teleconferences because of the following
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in disadvantages:
the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as
true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which 1. Technical failures with equipment, including connections that arent made.
may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common 2. Unsatisfactory for complex interpersonal communication, such as negotiation or bargaining.
knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular
facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of 3. Impersonal, less easy to create an atmosphere of group rapport.
any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no
constructive knowledge.[17] 4. Lack of participant familiarity with the equipment, the medium itself, and meeting skills.

In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may be made by 5. Acoustical problems within the teleconferencing rooms.
individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group communication (three or more people in
two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms, teleconferencing can bring people together 6. Difficulty in determining participant speaking order; frequently one person monopolizes the meeting
under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds of miles.[18] This type of group communication may be 7. Greater participant preparation time needed.
used in a number of ways, and have three basic types: (1) video conferencing - television-like communication
augmented with sound; (2) computer conferencing - printed communication through keyboard terminals, and (3) 8. Informal, one-to-one, social interaction not possible.[22]
audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with optional capacity for telewriting or telecopying.[19]
Indeed, teleconferencing can only facilitate the linking of people; it does not alter the complexity of group
A teleconference represents a unique alternative to face-to-face (FTF) meetings. It was first introduced in the 1960s communication. Although it may be easier to communicate via teleconferencing, it may also be easier to
with American Telephone and Telegraphs Picturephone. At that time, however, no demand existed for the new miscommunicate. Teleconferencing cannot satisfy the individual needs of every type of meeting.[23]
technology. Travel costs were reasonable and consumers were unwilling to pay the monthly service charge for
using the picturephone, which was regarded as more of a novelty than as an actual means for everyday In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of directors of private corporations
communication.[20] In time, people found it advantageous to hold teleconferencing in the course of business and is a reality, in light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and Exchange Commission issued SEC Memorandum
corporate governance, because of the money saved, among other advantages include: Circular No. 15, on November 30, 2001, providing the guidelines to be complied with related to such conferences.

4
[24] Thus, the Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of its resolution was with its main office in Korea, only to allege later that no written copy existed. It was only on March
persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or corporate governance. 6, 2000 that the respondent alleged, for the first time, that the meeting of the Board of Directors where the
resolution was approved was held via teleconference.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a teleconference along with the
respondents Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted; even if there had been one, the Worse still, it appears that as early as January 10, 1999, Atty. Aguinaldo had signed a Secretarys/Resident Agents
Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file Certificate alleging that the board of directors held a teleconference on June 25, 1999. No such certificate was
the complaint and execute the required certification against forum shopping. appended to the complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1999. More importantly, the respondent did not explain
why the said certificate was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo as early as January 9, 1999, and yet was notarized one year
The records show that the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the respondent failed later (on January 10, 2000); it also did not explain its failure to append the said certificate to the complaint, as well
to comply with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The respondent opposed the motion on December 1, 1999, as to its Compliance dated March 6, 2000. It was only on January 26, 2001 when the respondent filed its comment
on its contention that Atty. Aguinaldo, its resident agent, was duly authorized to sue in its behalf. The respondent, in the CA that it submitted the Secretarys/Resident Agents Certificate[30] dated January 10, 2000.
however, failed to establish its claim that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent in the Philippines. Even the
identification card[25] of Atty. Aguinaldo which the respondent appended to its pleading merely showed that he is The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference on June 25, 1999 never took place, and
the company lawyer of the respondents Manila Regional Office. that the resolution allegedly approved by the respondents Board of Directors during the said teleconference was a
mere concoction purposefully foisted on the RTC, the CA and this Court, to avert the dismissal of its complaint
The respondent, through Atty. Aguinaldo, announced the holding of the teleconference only during the hearing of against the petitioner.
January 28, 2000; Atty. Aguinaldo then prayed for ten days, or until February 8, 2000, within which to submit the
board resolution purportedly authorizing him to file the complaint and execute the required certification against IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
forum shopping. The court granted the motion.[26] The respondent, however, failed to comply, and instead prayed SP No. 61000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is hereby ORDERED to dismiss,
for 15 more days to submit the said resolution, contending that it was with its main office in Korea. The court without prejudice, the complaint of the respondent.
granted the motion per its Order[27] dated February 11, 2000. The respondent again prayed for an extension within
which to submit the said resolution, until March 6, 2000.[28] It was on the said date that the respondent submitted SO ORDERED.
an affidavit of its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, stating, inter alia, that he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended the said
teleconference on June 25, 1999, where the Board of Directors supposedly approved the following resolution:

RESOLVED, that Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A. Aguinaldo & Associates or any of its lawyers are hereby
appointed and authorized to take with whatever legal action necessary to effect the collection of the unpaid account
of Expert Travel & Tours. They are hereby specifically authorized to prosecute, litigate, defend, sign and execute
any document or paper necessary to the filing and prosecution of said claim in Court, attend the Pre-trial
Proceedings and enter into a compromise agreement relative to the above-mentioned claim.[29]

But then, in the same affidavit, Suk Kyoo Kim declared that the respondent do[es] not keep a written copy of the
aforesaid Resolution because no records of board resolutions approved during teleconferences were kept. This OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,
belied the respondents earlier allegation in its February 10, 2000 motion for extension of time to submit the
questioned resolution that it was in the custody of its main office in Korea. The respondent gave the trial court the - versus -
impression that it needed time to secure a copy of the resolution kept in Korea, only to allege later (via the affidavit
of Suk Kyoo Kim) that it had no such written copy. Moreover, Suk Kyoo Kim stated in his affidavit that the resolution LOURDES F. BERMEJO, COURT STENOGRAPHER II, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, PUERTO
was embodied in the Secretarys/Resident Agents Certificate signed by Atty. Aguinaldo. However, no such PRINCESA CITY,
resolution was appended to the said certificate.

The respondents allegation that its board of directors conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999 and approved A.M. No. P-05-2004
the said resolution (with Atty. Aguinaldo in attendance) is incredible, given the additional fact that no such allegation (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2086-P)
was made in the complaint. If the resolution had indeed been approved on June 25, 1999, long before the complaint
was filed, the respondent should have incorporated it in its complaint, or at least appended a copy thereof. The March 14, 2008
respondent failed to do so. It was only on January 28, 2000 that the respondent claimed, for the first time, that there
was such a meeting of the Board of Directors held on June 25, 1999; it even represented to the Court that a copy of x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
5
PER CURIAM: After investigation, the OCA submitted its evaluation and recommendation,[2] stating thus:

Before this Court is an administrative case for Dishonesty against Lourdes F. Bermejo, Court Stenographer II, EVALUATION: The focal issue here is factual i.e., whether or not another person actually took the Civil Service
stationed at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. Commission Sub-Professional eligibility test at San Fernando, Pampanga on 27 May 1998, using the name Lourdes
F. Bermejo. In the affirmative, the corollary legal issue proceeds i.e., whether or not it constitutes dishonesty as
On January 20, 2004, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.[1] received a letter from Consolacion C. would merit a finding of administrative liability on the part of respondent.
Santos, Director IV of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Regional Office No. 3, San Fernando, Pampanga,
referring to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an undated letter from a concerned citizen accusing At bar is an anonymous complaint, which respondent suspects is the handiwork of her husbands []other woman[.]
Bermejo of using another name in taking her Civil Service Eligibility Examination, while another person took the In evidence is a certified copy of the Seat Plan of the examination concerned. Said document is of public record and
same exam using Bermejos name. Attached to the letter is a Memorandum dated August 14, 2003 of Nora S. indicates that it was duly checked and certified by the room examiner as well as counter-checked by the supervising
Castro, Chief Personnel Specialist of the same CSC regional office, reporting that upon verification of the pictures examiner. The same indubitably bears out a different person appearing to take the exam using the name Lourdes F.
attached to the anonymous letter and that of the Picture Seat Plan used during the exam, the person who Bermejo, whereas the real Lourdes F. Bermejo (whose picture matches the respondents) is the one seated beside
purportedly impersonated Bermejo and the picture of the person in the seat plan using the name of Bermejo was her. Respondent fails to overcome this evidence. Aside from the presumption of regularity in the execution of official
the same person. The letter also states that because of this impersonation, Bermejo passed the exam and was able documents, respondent in her two letters did not categorically deny the genuineness and due execution of the Seat
to use said eligibility to obtain a permanent appointment as a stenographer at the Puerto Princesa City MTCC. The Plan. Instead, she impliedly admitted the same by her defense that she could not anymore locate the person
real Bermejo allegedly also took the same exam under a different name, but failed. appearing atop her name.

In an Indorsement dated March 15, 2004, Court Administrator Velasco referred the anonymous letter to Bermejo for We note that it took more than five (5) years for the supposed concerned citizen to assail the anomaly, and that the
comment. In her handwritten Comment, Bermejo denied the allegations and said that she went through the proper alleged motive imputed to complainant probably holds water. However, these, at best, are merely persuasive,
process to obtain her civil service eligibility. She alleged that the charges were the handiwork of her husbands circumstantial, and do not suffice to discount an evidence which tend directly to prove the fact in issue.
mistress who had been threatening to have her removed from the service. As regards the photographs attached to
the letter, Bermejo said that she had inquired into the identity of the person who allegedly used her name in the Coming to the next issue, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances constitute dishonesty, given the
exam and found that she was a childhood friend of her husband, but was currently serving sentence for adultery at following considerations:
the Correctional Institute for Women.
1) Respondents insistent line is that she actually took the exam which is misleading since she indeed
Bermejo also explained why she took the test in San Fernando, Pampanga. She allegedly applied to take the exam took the same but she kept mum on that (sic) she let another person use her name in taking the civil service
in Manila since her appointment was set to expire on July 15, 1998. However, she was informed that the next exam examination;
was on June 16, 1998. Learning that there was an exam scheduled earlier in San Fernando, she went there to see
if she could take the exam there instead. And she did. 2) Respondent asserts that the person who purportedly took the exam using the name Lourdes F.
Bermejo was her husbands childhood peer who is now allegedly serving sentence for adultery and whose locality of
Subsequently, on July 16, 2004, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez directed Bermejo to explain the origin was razed by fire. How she was able to figure out the details of said person, when she only supposedly met
discrepancy between the picture on her personnel file and the picture of the person who took the examination using her briefly during [the] exam that took place more than five years ago, at a far place where respondent was a
her name. According to DCA Perez, records of the OCA and of the CSC showed that Bermejo was not the same complete stranger, is suspect;
person who used Bermejos name and took the sub-professional examination on May 27, 1998 in San Fernando,
Pampanga. 3) It should be stressed that as a matter of procedure, the room examiners assigned to supervise the
conduct of a Civil Service examination closely examine the pictures submitted and affixed on the Picture Seat Plan
In her reply, Bermejo alleged that she could not explain the discrepancy. She said that she personally took the (CSC Resolution No. 95-3964, Obedencio, Jaime A.). The examiners carefully compare the appearance of each of
exam and attached proof of her travel from Palawan to Manila and from Manila to Pampanga, as well as her the examinees with the person in the picture submitted and affixed on the Picture Seat Plan. In cases where the
Application Receipt to take the May 27, 2008 exam in San Fernando, with her name and picture appearing therein. examinee does not look like the person in the picture submitted and attached on (sic) the PSP, the examiner will not
allow the said person to take the examination (CSC Resolution No. 95-5195, Taguinay, Ma. Theresa).
Bermejo stated that the person she suspected to be behind the case, her husbands mistress, had already passed
away. She maintained that she did not know the person in the picture and said she could not find the same person, Hence, it is clear that somebody else took the CSC exam for respondent Lourdes F. Bermejo. For her to deny it and
as the place where the latter allegedly lived had been razed by fire. She said that the only discrepancy she could actually reap the benefits of passing the same, when in fact somebody else took it for her, constitutes dishonesty.
own up to was that pertaining to her birth date, listed in her Certificate of Eligibility as May 13, 1965, while her birth
certificate indicated May 13, 1968.
6
In similar cases, the Honorable Court is consistent in imposing the stern penalty of dismissal, pursuant to Section civil service exam under that name. The CSC and the Court of Appeals both found that the picture of Donato
23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. [Pls. see: CSC vs. Zenaida appeared on the Picture Seat Plan on top of the name Gil Arce. On the other hand, Arce admitted that he might
T. Sta. Ana, A.M. No. P-03-1696 (April 20, 2003); Cruz and Paitim vs. CSC, G.R. No. 144464 (Nov. 27, 2001); have mistakenly submitted Donatos picture during the exam. The Court rejected Donatos claim that the case was
Floria vs. Sunga A.M. No. CA-01-10-PI (Nov. 14, 2001)]. merely the handiwork of his former principal who allegedly had an axe to grind against him in the face of positive
evidence against him and Arce. Accordingly, the Court upheld the dismissal of both Arce and Donato.
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for consideration of the Honorable Court is our recommendation that:
In the case at bar, respondent Bermejo attributes the anonymous complaint to her husbands mistress and alleges
1. the instant complaint be docketed as a regular administrative matter; and that the woman whose picture appears with her name on the Seat Plan is her husbands childhood friend. However,
she fails to explain how the two, who apparently also live in Palawan, were able to manipulate and influence the
2. respondent Lourdes F. Bermejo, (sic) be found guilty of dishonesty and accordingly DISMISSED as CSC personnel in San Fernando, Pampanga in order to come up with the charges against her, or how they were
Court Stenographer II, MTCC, Puerto Princesa City, with forfeiture of all her retirement benefits, except accrued able to coax another person allegedly her husbands childhood friend into impersonating her to take the exam.
leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including Besides, it seems to us a little too convenient for respondent to pin the blame on persons who are no longer around
government-owned or controlled corporations. to defend themselves.

The OCAs recommendation is well-taken. Respondent also fails to refute the documentary evidence against her. It is a settled rule in our jurisdiction that the
duly accomplished form of the Civil Service is an official document of the Commission, which, by its very nature, is
This Court has had occasion to rule on similar cases in the past. In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana,[3] the considered in the same category as that of a public document, admissible in evidence without need of further proof.
Court found, thus: As an official document, the entries thereof made in the course of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.[5]
After a thorough review of the matter, the Court finds that respondent is indeed guilty of dishonesty. An
examination of respondents Personal Data Sheet reveals that her signature and picture on it are different from Instead, respondent tries to support her arguments with documents of her own. Unfortunately, the evidence she
those in her CAT Application and Picture Seat Plan. Respondent attributes such discrepancy to unknown persons adduces does not negate the veracity of the CSCs Picture Seat Plan. Worse, these documents even strengthen the
who may have been committing such anomaly and irregularity in the examination procedure of the CSC. However, case against her. The picture in her passport is that of the person whose name in the Seat Plan is indicated as
this Court agrees with the observation of the executive judge that the irregularity should not be attributed to the CSC Julieta M. Padrones, who happens to be seated beside the person purportedly named Lourdes F. Bermejo.
which had no motive in tampering with such documents. Even if such irregularity was attributable to error or
oversight, respondent did not present any proof that it occurred during the examination and, thus, the CSC officials
who supervised the exam enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty. Besides, for
the CSC to commit such a mistake - mixing up the pictures and signatures of examinees - was unlikely due to the It is difficult to believe that respondent could not have noticed that her picture was put on top of a different name
strict procedures it follows during civil service examinations. In a similar case, this Court approved the findings of and that her name was accompanied by the picture of another person. There was a space provided for the
the CSC regarding procedures during examinations: signature of the examinee. Thus, respondent could not have missed that she was signing if indeed she was signing
her own name the box with a different picture. She proffers no sufficient explanation for this discrepancy.
It should be stressed that as a matter of procedure, the room examiners assigned to supervise the conduct of a
Civil Service examination closely examine the pictures submitted and affixed on the Picture Seat Plan (CSC In Donato, this Court quoted with approval the CSCs findings, to wit:
Resolution No. 95-3694, Obedencio, Jaime A.). The examiners carefully compare the appearance of each of the
examinees with the person in the picture submitted and affixed on the PSP. In cases where the examinee does not In the offense of impersonation, there are always two persons involved. The offense cannot prosper without the
look like the person in the picture submitted and attached on the PSP, the examiner will not allow the said person to active participation of both persons (CSC Resolution No. 94-6582). Further, by engaging or colluding with another
take the examination (CSC Resolution No. 95-5195, Taguinay, Ma. Theresa). person to take the test in his behalf and thereafter by claiming the resultant passing rate as his, clinches the case
against him. In cases of impersonation, the Commission has consistently rejected claims of good faith, for it is
Thus, the irregularity in respondents Personal Data Sheet, CAT Application and Picture Seat Plan cannot be contrary to human nature that a person will do (impersonation) without the consent of the person being
attributed to error on the CSCs part. It is clear that somebody else took the CSC exam for respondent Sta. Ana. impersonated. (CSC resolution No. 94-0826)[6]

For respondent to claim that she herself took the CSC exam when in fact somebody else took it for her constitutes Finally, respondents allegations fail to controvert the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
dishonesty. of the CSC personnel. The Court has noted in previous cases the procedure followed during the conduct of the Civil
Service Exams, as quoted by the OCA in its evaluation.[7] Respondent does not even allege that the CSC Regional
On the other hand, in Donato v. Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 1,[4] Alejandro Donato, Jr. was Office No. 3 personnel who administered the exam departed from this established procedure or that any irregularity
charged with dishonesty and falsification of public documents for representing himself as Gil Arce and taking the attended the conduct of the exam.
7
 penalties provided by law, and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), Philippine Currency, and to
Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement on any material fact, or practicing or attempting to pay the costs of suit.
practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, appointment or registration.[8] Dishonesty is a serious
offense which reflects a persons character and exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys his honor, virtue The 4,000 grams, more or less of marijuana is hereby confiscated in favor of the government and to be disposed of
and integrity. It is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary, as no other office in the government service in accordance with law.
exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from an employee than a position in the judiciary.[9]
SO ORDERED.[7]
We conclude that there is substantial evidence to hold that respondent committed the act of dishonesty imputed to
her. Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[10] dishonesty is classified as a grave Evidence for the People upon which the trial court anchored its finding of guilt, consisted of the testimonies of: 1)
offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense. ROGELIO S. DE VERA, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned at the 3rd Regional Field Unit,
Nueva Ecija-Aurora Narcotics Command (NARCOM) District Office in Cabanatuan City; 2) Police Senior Inspector
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, respondent LOURDES F. BERMEJO is found GUILTY of ANDREI FELIX, the Provincial Officer of the NARCOM for Aurora and Nueva Ecija; 3) SPO1 NESTOR PINEDA, an
dishonesty and DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, officer of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) assigned at Cabanatuan City; 4) DANILO TUMANGAN, Barangay
and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government- Captain of Bantug Norte, Cabanatuan City; and 5) P/Capt. DAISY P. BABOR, a forensic chemist assigned at the
owned or controlled corporations. SO ORDERED. PNP Camp Olivas in San Fernando, Pampanga.

The facts and circumstances sued upon are stated by the Solicitor General in the Consolidated Appellees Brief[8]
[G.R. No. 124077. September 5, 2000] as follows:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ADORACION SEVILLA y JOSON @ BABY and JOEL On September 15, 1995, at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, a team of police officers composed of P/Sr. Insp.
GASPAR y CABRAL, accused-appellants. Andrei Felix and SPO3 Rogelio de Vera of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM), and SPO2 Padilla and SPO1
Pineda of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS), arrived at 904 Martinez Street, Bantug Norte, Cabanatuan City, to
For automatic review here is a decision[1] handed down by Branch 26[2] of the Regional Trial Court in Cabanatuan effect the arrest of Adoracion Sevilla (TSN, October 9, 1995, p. 12).
City, convicting appellants Adoracion Sevilla y Joson @ Baby and Joel Gaspar y Cabral for violation of Section 8,
Article II, Republic Act No. 6425[3] as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,[4] and sentencing both appellants to the Prior to the operation, P/Sr. Insp. Felix, being the Provincial Officer of the NARCOM for the provinces of Aurora and
supreme penalty of death. Nueva Ecija, had disseminated to his confidential agents a list of suspected drug dealers. Among those in the list
was Adoracion Sevilla who had a warrant for her arrest issued in Criminal Case No. 1317 for violation of
Filed on September 17, 1995 by Prosecutor Amelia C. Tiu, the Information indicting the appellants, Adoracion Presidential Decree No. 6425 (TSN, October 9, 1995, p. 8).
Sevilla y Joson @ Baby and Joel Gaspar y Cabral, alleges:
Thus, when P/Sr. Insp. Felix was informed by one of his confidential agents at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of
That on or about the 15th day of September, 1995, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines and within September 15, 1995, of the exact whereabouts of Adoracion Sevilla, he immediately instructed one of his men to
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding verify from the CIS if the warrant of arrest issued in Criminal Case No. 1317 was still unserved. On being told that it
and abetting each other, without authority of law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their was still unserved, he then coordinated with the CIS to effect the arrest of Adoracion Sevilla. Thus, the composite
possession, control and custody four (4) bricks of marijuana dried leaves with fruiting tops approximately weighing team of police officers from NARCOM and CIS was formed and proceeded to 904 Martinez Street, Bantug Norte,
four thousand (4,000) grams. Cabanatuan City (TSN, October 9, 1995, pp. 8-10).

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5] The police officers, who were in civilian clothes, were allowed inside the house by Adoracion Sevilla herself who
was seated at the sala. She had a male companion, later identified as Joel Gaspar, who was standing near the
Upon arraignment[6] on October 6, 1995 with the assistance of their respective lawyers, appellants pleaded NOT stairs. After the police officers had introduced themselves and stated their purpose, P/Sr. Insp. Felix observed
GUILTY to the charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, resulting in the rendition of the judgment of Adoracion Sevilla instructing Joel Gaspar to bring upstairs a box of Ginebra San Miguel which was lying on the floor
conviction disposing thus: beside him. Suspecting the box to contain illegal drugs, P/Sr. Insp. Felix followed Joel Gaspar upstairs and there
asked the latter what were the contents of the box. Joel Gaspar readily replied that the box contained marijuana.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and finding both accused Adoracion Sevilla Y Joson and accused Joel Gaspar Y Joel Gaspar then opened the box and voluntarily handed it to P/ Sr. Insp. Felix, telling the latter that the box
Cabral guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 8, Art. II, Republic Act 6425, as amended belonged to Adoracion Sevilla. Inside the box were four (4) bricks of dried marijuana leaves and flowering tops
by Republic Act 7659, both of them are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH with all the accessory (TSN, October 9, 1995, pp. 12-15).

8
Both Adoracion Sevilla and Joel Gaspar were arrested and the bricks of dried marijuana leaves and flowering tops
confiscated. Adoracion Sevilla was brought directly to the office of the CIS while Joel Gaspar was first brought to Appellant Adoracion Sevilla urges the Court to acquit her on the sole assignment of error, that:
the Barangay Hall where his arrest was blottered and, in the presence of the Barangay officials, the bricks of dried
marijuana leaves and flowering tops were inventoried and a receipt therefor prepared (TSN, October 9, 1995, pp. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ADORACION SEVILLA GUILTY
15-16). The confiscated articles were consequently turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Upon physical, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.[19]
chemical and confirmatory tests conducted by P/Capt. Daisy P. Babor, a forensic chemist, the articles were found to
be marijuana, a prohibited drug (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 12-13; Exhibit E)[9] Appellant Joel Gaspar theorized that:

For the defense, appellants took the witness stand. 1. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED INSPITE OF THE ABSENCE OF SEARCH WARRANT;

Expectedly, appellant Sevilla presented a different version of what led to the indictment. In her Appellants Brief,[10] 2. THAT EVEN ASSUMING FOR ARGUENDO (SIC) THAT JOEL GASPAR Y CABRAL WAS IN POSSESSION OF
Sevilla theorized: BOX (SIC) CONTAINING PROHIBITED DRUGS BUT HE WAS ONLY INSTRUCTED BY ADORACION SEVILLA
TO BRING UPSTAIRS (SIC) AND NO PROOF HE HAS KNOWLEDGE OF THIS BOX (SIC).[20]
xxx she was in Cabanatuan City on September 15,1995, particularly at Bantug Norte in the apartment of her
daughter Micaela Santos. She had just arrived from the PJGMRMC hospital where she had gone for treatment as After meticulous examination of the records and evidence on hand, the Court is of the finding and conclusion that a
she was then bleeding. She had just seated in the sala resting for about ten minutes when several persons reversal of the decision a quo under review is in order.
numbering about twelve, came, introduced themselves as NARCOM agents and presented her a warrant of arrest.
Some of the agents went at the back of the house and at the kitchen where they searched every cabinet overturning
in the process, the two (2) boxes under the stairs. Others went upstairs. She did not know what they did upstairs but
she heard noise. She asked the agents if they had a search warrant but they answered that there is no need for a
search warrant. The agents stayed there for 15 to 20 minutes. When they left, Adoracion Sevilla and her companion Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution reads:
were brought with them. Sevilla was first brought to the CIS Office, then at the NARCOM office. Thereat, the agents
typed some papers which they forced her to sign but she refused because it was stated therein that the house as Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
well as the marijuana belonged to her. She denied seeing the box presented by the prosecution and claimed that searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
she only saw it in Court. She likewise denied owning the box containing the marijuana. She did not know who of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
owned the same (TSN, October 23, 1995, pp. 2-11).[11] oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
For his part, appellant Gaspar recounted that he was inside the toilet washing his clothes at the time of the incident,
when he heard Sevilla conversing with someone. Upon opening the door of the toilet, he saw a man standing in From the aforecited constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that as a general rule, the procurement of a
front of Sevilla and several other men on the stairs going up the second floor of the apartment. Then, the men warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any
descended from the upper portion of the house with a carton box which contained the marijuana complained of.[12] individual. In People vs. Aruta,[21] this Court ruled that this constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition
Gaspar averred that the men were already searching the house when he saw them.[13] against all searches and seizures as it operates only against unreasonable searches and seizures. The plain import
of the language of the Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the
Gaspar testified that he did not see who carried the said box upstairs even as he denied any knowledge regarding same time prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable
the source thereof. According to him, it was only on that day that he went to the house at Bantug Norte, unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest.
Cabanatuan City. He had just arrived from Bulacan with the son of his co-accused,[14] who he had befriended at
the Luneta Park in Manila when he was a stow-away during the previous summer. To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental right of an individual against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the Constitution of this Republic succinctly declares under its Article III, Section 3(2) that
Additionally, Gaspar declared that he was forced to sign a document stating that the box containing marijuana any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
belonged to his co-accused, Adoracion Sevilla,[15] and was requested to point at the marijuana leaves spread on a in any proceeding. Consequently, evidence derived from an illegal search is placed beyond the Courts
table at the CIS office so that pictures of the same could be taken.[16] He stressed that he was not informed of his consideration, as a practical means to enforce the constitutional injunction and to discourage violations of basic civil
constitutional rights nor was he given an opportunity to engage the services of a lawyer during the questioning at rights under the guise of legitimate law enforcement.
the barangay hall[17] and at the CIS office.[18]
Of course, there are certain cases where the law itself allows a search even in the absence of a warrant.
Relying on the presumption that the arresting officers performed their official duties regularly and rejecting Jurisprudence mentions the following instances under which a warrantless search and seizure may be effected, to
appellants defense of denial, the trial court convicted appellants and sentenced them to DEATH. wit:
9
1. Search which is incidental to a lawful arrest ( Rule 126, Section 12, Rules of Court); No basis, Your Honor.

2. Seizure of evidence in plain view; FISCAL MACARAIG:

3. Search of a moving vehicle; The witness has testified that they served the warrant of arrest, we are asking the manner or implementation, Your
Honor.
4. Consented warrantless search;
COURT:
5. Customs search;
Witness may answer.
6. Stop and Frisk;
We served it at her residence in Bantug, Sir.
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[22]
FISCAL MACARAIG:
The enumeration above being exceptions to the general rule, their application must be limited to the situations
clearly falling within their contemplation. Furthermore, what is sought to be protected by the proscription being a Q. How do you know that it is her residence?
basic right guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land, no less, the requirement of a warrant must be construed
strictly and cannot lightly be disregarded. To do otherwise would unnecessarily infringe upon individuals personal A. We were accompanied by an informant who stayed in that house, Sir.
liberty and encroach upon a basic right so deserving of full protection and vindication.[23]
COURT:
In the case at bar, the prosecution posits that the search conducted in subject house at Bantug Norte, which yielded
the corpus delicti of the present accusation, is incidental to the lawful arrest of Sevilla who had been long wanted by Who stated that she is staying in that house?
the police in Criminal Case No. 1317. It is the theory of the State that the act of Gaspar in picking up the box
containing the marijuana in question and bringing it to the second floor of said apartment, allegedly upon Sevillas A. It was the informant who told us, Your Honor.
instruction, gave the arresting officers probable cause to act upon the idea that prohibited drugs were in such box.
FISCAL MACARAIG:
First of all, the Court does not fully subscribe to the submission of the prosecution that the search was in the course
of a lawful arrest. With respect thereto, the Court finds the evidence for the People to be conflicting. While P/Sr. Q. Were you alone in serving the warrant of arrest?
Inspector Felix and SPO3 De Vera are steadfast in their claim that the search they conducted was borne of a
reasonable suspicion that the box which Gaspar carted away contained marijuana, SPO1 Pineda, on the other A. We were four (4), Sir.
hand, declared quite candidly that the NARCOM officers joined them in serving the warrant on Sevilla for the
specific purpose of making a search. Pineda testified thus: Q. Who were your companions in serving the warrant of arrest?

xxx xxx xxx A. SPOII Padilla, Capt. Felix and SPOIII Rivera,[24] a member of the NARCOM, Sir.

FISCAL MACARAIG: Q. Who in particular among this group are the members of the Narcotics Command?

Q. When was the time this particular warrant of arrest against Adoracion Sevilla for Violation of Republic Act No. A. Capt. Felix and SPOIII Rivera, Sir.
6425 served ?
Q. How about SPOII Padilla?
A. September 15, 1995 at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Sir.
A. He is a member of the 302nd CISC, Sir.
Q. Will you please state how was or what was the manner this particular warrant of arrest implemented (sic) ?
Q. Aside from the fact that your office has a copy of the warrant of arrest against four (4) criminal cases (sic),
ATTORNEY BANSALE: against Adoracion Sevilla, how were you able to effect the warrant of arrest?
10
A. Because according to the informant, she lives there and so we went in Bantug, Sir. A. Two (2) vehicles, Sir.

Q. Is this informant that you are talking about, is he or she an informant of the CIS?(sic) ATTY. BANSALE:

A. No, Sir. Q. What kind of vehicles?

Q. To your knowledge, was he or she an informant of the NARCOM? A. Two (2) owner type jeeps, Sir.

A. No also, Sir. Q. How many persons were riding in that jeep when you served the warrant of arrest on September 15, 1995?

Q. Why were the NARCOM elements became (sic) a member of the composite team who served the warrant of A. Two (2) passengers for every jeep, Sir.
arrest against Adoracion Sevilla?
COURT:
A. Because according to our informant, there is marijuana in the house of Adoracion Sevilla, Sir.
Q. You mean the Narcom Officers were in a jeep and the members of the CIS were also in another jeep?
Q. In other words, it is a joint group undertaken (sic) in the office of the Narcom and CIS regarding the serving of the
warrant of arrest? A. Yes, Your Honor.

ATTY. BANSALE: ATTY. BANSALE:

Leading, Your Honor. Q. Does that include the driver?

COURT: A. Yes, Sir.

Witness may answer. Q. You said that you were accompanied by an informant, how come that you were saying that there were only two
(2) occupants in a jeep?
A. Yes, Sir. [25]
A. The informant went ahead and was riding in a tricycle, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So that, in serving the warrant of arrest, you used three (3) vehicles, including the tricycle?
CROSS EXAMINATION CONDUCTED BY ATTY. RAUL N. BANSALE:
A. Yes, Sir.
ATTY. BANSALE:
COURT:
Q. How many vehicles did you use in going to the house where you arrested Adoracion Sevilla on September 15,
1995? Q. What did you think of using two (2) vehicles when you were only to serve a warrant of arrest?

FISCAL MACARAIG: A. Because there was also a marijuana (sic) in their house, Sir.

May we know the materiality of this question, Your Honor because the question has not testified by the witness ATTY. BANSALE:
(sic), as to whether there were vehicles used!
Q. And because of that report, that was the reason why the Narcom agents joined your team ?
COURT :
A. Yes, Sir.
Witness may answer.
11
Q. And the purpose of the Narcom agents in joining your team is to search and get the marijuana? ATTY. BANSALE:

A. Yes, Sir.[26] Q. Did they search the other parts of the house?

xxx xxx xxx FISCAL MACARAIG:

ATTY. BANSALE: He is incompetent, Your Honor. How can he knows (sic) if he is guarding Adoracion Sevilla?

Q. When did this informant inform you about this Adoracion Sevilla? COURT:

A. On that same day we served the warrant of arrest, Sir. Sustained. Do not use him as your witness.

Q. You said that this informant is not connected with the Philippine National Police, do you know the reason why ATTY. BANSALE:
said informant gave you the information regarding the whereabouts of Adoracion Sevilla, as well as the marijuana in
the house of Adoracion Sevilla? That would be all, Your Honor.[28]

A. I do not know the reason, Sir. As can be gathered from the above testimony, the NARCOM officers had every intention of conducting a search in
subject house at Bantug Norte even before they proceeded to the place to arrest Sevilla. Per SPO1 Pinedas
Q. Did you try to secure a search warrant with respect to the information of marijuana by the informant? account, they received prior information that there was marijuana in the said house at Bantug Norte and it was
precisely on the basis of such information the NARCOM officers joined in the service of the warrant. In short, the
A. No, Sir. NARCOM officers were of the impression that they were to search the house and yet, they failed to even try to
secure a search warrant as required by law although there was opportunity to do so.
Q. You did not advise the Narcom agents to secure a search warrant with respect to the seizure of marijuana?
Then too, except for the admission that no search warrant was ever procured, SPO1 Pinedas revelation traversed
A. No, sir, what we are concerned only is the warrant of arrest (sic).[27] that of SPO3 De Vera who declared that their only purpose of going to Bantug Norte was to arrest Sevilla.[29] Also,
SPO3 De Vera made it appear in his testimony that it was upon the prodding of the CIS operatives that they
xxx xxx xxx decided to join forces, which was not what SPO1 Pineda recounted. SPO3 De Veras account was as follows:

ATTY. BANSALE: xxx xxx xxx

Q. What happened after you served the warrant of arrest against Adoracion Sevilla? ATTY. BANSALE:

A. The Narcom agents searched the house, Sir. Q. The only purpose why you went to Bantug Norte on September 15, 1995 is to arrest Adoracion Sevilla, is it not?

Q. Did they also search the upper portion of the house? A. Yes, sir.

FISCAL MACARAIG: Q. At the time, you were only armed with a warrant of arrest dated August 1989, is it not?

Your Honor, the witness is no longer in the position to answer that. A. Yes, sir.

COURT: Q. You were not there to conduct a buy-bust operation, is it not?

Okey, what did you understand to (sic) the word search? A. Yes, sir.

A. Searching of the house, Your Honor. Q. How many were you when you served the warrant of arrest against Adoracion Sevilla on September 15, 1995?

12
A. We were four (4), sir. Q. Why did you conduct a surveillance against Adoracion Sevilla?

Q. Who are those four (4)? A. Because many reports were reaching to our office (sic) that she is allegedly involved in transporting and selling of
marijuana dried leaves in the city.[30]
A. Me and Police Senior Inspector Andrei Felix, both of NARCOM and two (2) members of the CIC namely, SPO2
Padilla and SPO1 Pineda. In light of the testimonies aforecited and evidence on record, the Court entertains serious doubts over the
circumstances under which the NARCOM agents conducted the search. What appears more probable is that having
Q. You said that your only purpose is to serve a warrant of arrest against Adoracion Sevilla: My question to you is been informed of Sevillas presence as well as the existence of the contraband in subject house, the NARCOM
this: Is it your Standard Operating Procedures (sic) when you serve a warrant of arrest to have assistance from the agents joined the arresting team and forthwith turned the whole place upside-down under the assumption that a
CIC considering that the person you are going to arrest is a woman? search warrant was not needed - a conclusion consistent with Sevillas narration of the events and scenario she was
in.
A. Not all, sir.
The Court is not impressed with the Peoples stance that the search was incidental to a lawful arrest and therefore
ATTY. BANSALE: did not require the procurement of a search warrant. The facts establishing a probable cause for the law enforcers
to conduct a warrantless search, as theorized upon by the prosecution, do not seem to accord with human nature
Q. Why did you ask assistance from the CIC on that particular date when the one you are going to arrest is a and experience. While there is no hard and fast rule to determine the truthfulness of ones testimony, that which
woman only? conforms, however, to the quotidian knowledge, observation and experience of man is often deemed to be reliable.
[31]
A. I referred to the members of the CIS the copy of the warrant of arrest considering that the said document is dated
1989, sir. The Court finds it hard to believe that appellant Sevilla, supposedly a notorious drug pusher who had a standing
warrant for her arrest, would casually allow and even ask the police officers to enter the house after introducing
COURT: themselves.[32] If Sevilla had indeed something to hide or be wary of, it would have been a more natural reaction
for her to evade the police officers or at least exert an effort to conceal the box in which the prohibited article was
Q. What was the reaction to you of their office when you referred that date (sic)? kept before allowing the arresting officers to enter the premises. The evidence shows that Sevilla did neither and
was even seated at the sala, apparently unaffected by the arrival of the four men who entered the house to serve
A. According to the members of the CIC, the warrant of arrest is still valid to serve against the person. the warrant.[33]

Q. Aside from the statement that it is still valid, what was, if any, is the reaction of that office to whom you referred All things viewed in proper perspective, the Court is inclined to believe the posture of the defense that over the
(sic)? objection and protestation of Sevilla, the arresting officers just barged into the place and searched the house
straightaway. This conclusion is more logical and consistent with the evidence on record especially in the face of
A. According to them, it was one of their functions, so, we better join forces. appellants insistence that such transpired on that fateful day.

ATTY. BANSALE: Also hard to believe is the tale of P/Sr. Inspector Felix that after having introduced themselves as police authorities,
Sevilla instructed Gaspar to bring the carton box to the second floor.[34] It is difficult to imagine why Sevilla would
Q. In the warrant of arrest, it was stated there that the address was MS Garcia. How were you able to know that arouse more suspicion by doing such a thing in the presence of the four arresting officers.
accused Adoracion Sevilla is at Bantug Norte?
Neither can the Court perceive any plausibility in the allegation that appellant Gaspar readily admitted that the
A. Based on the report by a civilian informant that Adoracion Sevilla is now residing at Bantug Norte. contents of the carton box were marijuana and the latter voluntarily handed over the same to the NARCOM officers
while confessing that the illegal substance belonged to Sevilla. Suffice it to note such averment too convenient for
Q. You said a while ago that you conducted surveillance for months against Adoracion Sevilla, when did you comfort considering the vehement denial by Gaspar as well as the improbability of the same.
conduct said surveillance?
Then too, a thorough scrutiny of the testimonial evidence offered by the People reveals inconsistencies and
A. I cannot remember the exact date but it is this year only, sir. absurdities which, when viewed in isolation, seem trivial and unimportant. Taken as a whole, however, the
conflicting accounts and improbabilities cast doubt over the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and veracity of
ATTY. BANSALE: their narrations. In People vs. Noay,[35] the Court held that where the testimonies of key witnesses cannot stand
together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie and their story a mere concoction.
13
De Vera, the first prosecution witness to take the stand, categorically declared that he noticed Gaspar immediately In view of the foregoing, the Court does not see its way clear to give full faith and credence to the prosecution
and instinctively cart upstairs a medium-sized carton box when Gaspar learned that they were officers of the law. evidence on hand. It is not unmindful of the settled doctrine that the assessment by the trial court of the credibility of
[36] On the other hand, P/Sr. Inspector Felix later disclosed that it was only upon receiving instructions from Sevilla the witnesses and their testimonies, as a rule, is binding on appellate courts, absent any fact or circumstance of
that Gaspar carried the carton box upstairs.[37] weight and substance that had been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.[45] In the present case, however,
and for the reasons already advanced, the Court finds it proper to apply the exception rather than the general rule
The discrepancy in such testimonies is disturbing given the fact that the same are crucial to the prosecution of because although declarations of law enforcers are accorded weight, their testimonies, to be worthy of belief, must
Sevilla, whose only link to the said carton box is the instruction which she allegedly gave to Gaspar. It is noteworthy themselves be credible and not suspect.[46]
that apart from the suggestion made by Prosecutor Macaraig in the course of questioning that an instruction was
given by Sevilla (to which the defense counsel timely objected on the ground that the prosecutor was leading the Not only that, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations or
witness), SPO3 De Vera made no mention whatsoever of the purported instruction which would establish the interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt,
connection between Sevilla and the controverted box. It was only when the second prosecution witness (Felix) was the evidence does not meet or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction.[47] Consequently, the
called to the witness stand that the incriminating assertion was made, giving the Court the impression that the acquittal of appellants is indicated.
prosecution tailored Felixs testimony to suit that of De Vera in support of the theory the prosecution wanted to
project. The illegal search conducted by the NARCOM agents is not the only constitutional infirmity tainting the case. An
exhaustive review of the records discloses that appellants were not duly informed of their constitutional rights after
As regards the manner in which entrance was effected in the house at Bantug Norte and how the warrant of arrest their arrest. Neither were they assisted by counsel at any stage of the custodial investigation, despite the lack of
was served on Sevilla, P/Sr. Inspector Felix, SPO3 De Vera and SPO1 Pineda could not even agree on their waiver of their right to counsel. In his testimony, P/Sr. Inspector Felix admitted thus:
respective tales.
FISCAL MACARAIG:
For instance, Felix disclosed that when they arrived, the gate was slightly open, Sevilla was standing by the gate
and even asked them to enter the house.[38] De Vera, on the other hand, testified that Sevilla was merely seated xxx xxx xxx
inside the house when they arrived.[39] To add to the uncertainty, Pinedas account completely clashed with Felixs
and De Veras story when the former testified that the door was closed, that they had to knock on the door of the Q. Before the accused who goes by the name alias Joel at that time he confessed as to who is the owner of the
house and that they arrested Sevilla by the door when the latter opened the same.[40] marijuana bricks, in connection of your duty what step or steps did you do (sic)?

Equally sketchy are the subsequent events which happened when Sevilla and Gaspar were taken into custody by A. As a police officer, after hearing that the contents of the box is marijuana I apprehended him and I told him that I
the PNP and NARCOM officers. will bring him to the Office for investigation and after saying that you are under arrest and you have the right to
remain silent and if you wish we can provide you with a lawyer (sic), sir.
SPO1 Pineda recounted that after the arrest of the two appellants, they were directly brought to the CIS at the same
time for booking and that they did not stop at any place in between.[41] Meanwhile, De Vera and Felix maintain that Q. So, in other words Mr. Witness, at that point in time after you arrested the accused and before the same was
Gaspar was initially investigated at the barangay hall while Sevilla was first brought to the NARCOM district office. effected you would like to impress the Court the constitutional right of the accused at that time was stated by you to
[42] him (sic)?

According to SPO3 De Vera, Sevilla was not brought to the barangay hall because she refused to acknowledge that A. Yes, sir.
she knew anything about the marijuana.[43] P/Sr. Inspector Felix, on the other hand, disclosed that the reason
Sevilla was not brought to the barangay hall, which, according to De Vera, is a standard operating procedure,[44] Q. What happened afterwards, Mr. Witness?
was because she was in an angry mood, and wanted to escape. Yet strangely, Felix also revealed that Sevilla and
Gaspar reached the NARCOM district office at the same time because the vehicle and troop which accompanied A. Afterwards, I called my investigator SPO3 de Vera upstairs and gave to him the marijuana for proper receipts, sir.
Sevilla stopped along the highway to wait for Gaspar, who was then being investigated at the barangay hall. If the
investigation at the barangay hall was a standard operating procedure, why was Sevilla not investigated considering Q. After doing so, what happened afterwards?
that Sevilla had to wait for Gaspar along the highway?
A. Afterwards, we went downstairs and left, the others proceeded to the office while we brought Joel Gaspar at the
The Court cannot also understand why the NARCOM agents could not conclusively state when and how the Barangay Hall, sir.
surveillance was undertaken on the person of appellant Sevilla. If a surveillance had in fact taken place, they would
have discovered that the house did not belong to Sevilla but to her daughter, Micaela. Q. What about the other accused Adoracion Sevilla was she ever arrested on that occasion?
14
A. Yes, sir. Q. How about the other accused Joel Gaspar?

Q. And where was she brought in particular after the arrest was made? A. Only his confession, sir.

A. In the district office of the NARCOM, sir. xxx xxx xxx

Q. What happened after Adoracion Sevilla was brought over to the Narcom District Office? Q. Upon being informed that both the witness refused to give their statement on their own, what step did SPO3 de
Vera undertook (sic) afterwards?
A. After bringing to the Narcom District Office we sent her to the Narcom Office for booking blotter, sir.
A. He continued conducting the investigation, sir.[49]
COURT:
xxx xxx xxx
How about the other accused Joel Gaspar?
CROSS EXAMINATION:
A. We brought Joel Gaspar to our office for investigation, we separated them, sir.[48]
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERRER:
Q. What happened after both of them were already at your office?
xxx xxx xxx
A. The investigation was conducted, sir.
Q. The investigation was conducted by the CIS, am I correct in the person of Joel Gaspar (sic)?
Q. And who conducted the investigation?
A. No, sir.
A. SPO3 de Vera, sir.
Q. Who conducted the investigation?
Q. Was that investigation conducted in your presence?
A. SPO3 de Vera, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The investigation was put in writing?
Q. Before the investigation was made what particular steps did SPO3 de Vera undertook (sic)?
A. Typewritten, sir.
A. de Vera appraised them the constitutional right (sic), sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Will you please state what is the constitutional right read or appraised (sic) before the two accused?
Q. During the investigation conducted in your office, were you present?
A. That they have the right to remain silent and if they wanted a lawyer they can have their own lawyer, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from these two, were there any other constitution right (sic) that were stated before the two accused?
Q. And you noticed that there was no lawyer representing the person of Joel Gaspar?
A. Yes, sir, we further read the constitutional right, sir.
A. Yes, sir, Joel Gaspar stated that he knows nothing.
Q. After the appraisal (sic) of the constitutional right of the accused, what happened afterwards Mr. witness?
Q. During the whole investigation conducted in your office you were present?
A. They remained silent while Adoracion Sevilla did not give any statement, sir.
15
A. Yes, sir. telephone if possible, or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged
Q. And there was no lawyer? by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
A. Yes, sir. made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there was no lawyer present during the interrogation at the NARCOM district office leads the Court to
FISCAL MACARAIG: question the law enforcers adherence to the constitutional mandate relating to persons held for the commission of a
crime. It reinforces the Courts conclusion that the NARCOM officers did transgress appellants constitutional rights
Only one re-direct, Your Honor. during, and after their arrest. It does not matter that no force or coercion was ever employed by them during the
investigation, as the prosecution is wont to insist, because in the absence of any showing that the arresting officers
COURT: properly complied with what was incumbent upon them in the performance of their functions, any importunings to
that effect would be futile.
Proceed.
Given the attendant circumstances, the Court cannot uphold the trial courts conclusion that the policemen regularly
FISCAL MACARAIG: performed their duties as public officers. Such presumption has been effectively rebutted by evidence to the
contrary. Besides, as correctly argued by appellant Sevilla in her brief,[53] the presumption of regularity in the
Mr. Witness, when the investigation was conducted at your office and according to the defense there was no performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt
counsel despite the reading of constitutional right, please tell us categorically, was there any forced (sic) made upon beyond reasonable doubt.[54] It must be emphasized that even granting that appellants were allegedly drug
the person of the accused while this investigation was conducted? pushers, they would nonetheless be entitled to their basic constitutional rights.

A. None, sir. [50] In sum, the Court is of the irresistible conclusion that there was no probable cause for conducting an extensive
search in the house occupied by appellants. The truthfulness of the facts in support of probable cause is doubtful
xxx xxx xxx and the Court is of the impression that the search in question was not at all incidental to the lawful arrest of Sevilla
but rather, pre-planned. Therefore, any evidence obtained in the course thereof must be excluded.
Therefrom, it can be deduced that appellants were not clearly informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent
and to independent and competent counsel, when they were arrested and investigated in connection with the The confession allegedly given by Gaspar during custodial interrogation must likewise be rejected for having been
offense charged. Simply stating the rights to which the arrestee is entitled to or reading the same to him did not extracted without the assistance of counsel or a valid waiver of legal assistance. As a side note, it bears
suffice. Under the rulings of this Court, the right to be informed of ones right contemplates the transmission of emphasizing that Gaspar did not execute a "confession". More accurately, what the prosecution elicited from
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional Gaspar was actually an admission, the difference being that in a confession, an accused acknowledges his guilt.
principle.[51] The right to be informed consists of no less than effective communication which results in a full There is no such acknowledgment of guilt in an "admission".[55]
understanding of what is conveyed.
Furthermore, the totality of the prosecution evidence before the Court does not measure up to the requisite
The investigating officer is tasked to explain to the person under custody the significance as well as the quantum of proof for conviction. It is a legal truism that an accused in a criminal case is entitled to an acquittal
consequences of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution and should not simply assume that the unless the prosecution shows that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It is incumbent upon the State to establish
person arrested fully comprehended the same. To merely say that you have the right to remain silent and if you its case with that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind with evidence which stands or
want, you can have your own lawyer is not enough. It is not the appraisal of rights required by law. falls on its own merits. The prosecution cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defenses
evidence for it has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused - ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui
Worth stressing upon are the following guidelines laid down by this Court[52] regarding the procedure to be negat - he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.[56]
observed by police officers in effecting an arrest and conducting an investigation:
Needless to state, the trial court should have exercised due diligence and prudence in deliberating upon appellants
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest guilt. It should have given more serious consideration to the pros and cons of the evidence offered by both the
and he must be shown the warrant of arrest if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent defense and the State and many loose ends should have been settled by the trial court in determining the merits of
and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the present case. The Court is not unaware that in some instances law enforcers resort to the practice of planting
the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by
16
evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians. Consequently, the court must be extra vigilant in trying
drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.[57] Dr. Bienvenida Palongpalong, Municipal Health Officer of San Jose, Negros Oriental, was able to conduct a post-
mortem examination of the cadaver of Abundio Sido and it was found that the latter sustained gunshot wounds at
WHEREFORE, the Decision under automatic review is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and appellants ADORACION the deltoid region and at the back lumber vertebrae which caused severe hemorrhage resulting in his death (p. 10,
SEVILLA Y JOSON @ BABY and JOEL GASPAR Y CABRAL are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The tsn, May 23, 1990)."
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellants unless they are being
lawfully held for another cause, and to inform the court of the date of their release, or the ground for their continued Following police investigation, a criminal complaint for murder[3] was filed against all six (6) accused. At the
confinement, within ten days from notice. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED preliminary investigation, they waived the filing of counter-affidavits.[4] The Municipal Trial Judge issued a
Resolution[5] finding sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court has been committed and that accused are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial, and
[G.R. No. 106282. January 20, 2000] forwarded the records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental for the filing of
the appropriate Information. The six (6) accused were accused of murder under an Information,[6] which pertinently
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. QUINCIANO RENDOQUE, SR. y AMORES, VICTORINO reads as follows:
BACUAC y QUISEL, FELIX ESTRELLADO y BACUAC, PABLITO RENDOQUE y ABIO, QUINCIANO RENDOQUE,
JR. y ABIO, and ESPERATO SALAQUIN y BACUAC, accused, n or about the 21st day of April, 1988, at Barangay Basere willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
shoot Abundio Sido with the use of home made firearms, thereby inflicting upon the body of Abundio Sido the
PABLITO RENDOQUE y ABIO, QUINCIANO RENDOQUE, JR. y ABIO, and ESPERATO SALAQUIN y BACUAC, following injuries, to wit:
accused-appellants.
1. Gunshot wounds 8 in number, 1 cm. in diameter, (L) Deltoid region;

Appellants assail the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 36,[1] in Criminal Case No. 2. 8 gunshot wounds 1 cm. in diameter x 3 inc depthness, back (not legible) 2nd and 3rd and 4th Lumbar vertebrae.
8341, convicting them of the crime of murder, imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering
them to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P30,000.00, and to pay the costs. Their co-accused which directly caused the death of Abundio Sido immediately thereafter.
Quinciano Rendoque, Sr. y Amores, Victorino Bacuac y Quisel, and Felix Estrellado y Bacuac were acquitted for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

The facts, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General and which we find to be supported by the records, Dumaguete City, Philippines, August 26, 1988."
are as follows:[2]
Upon arraignment, the accused, duly assisted by counsel, entered pleas of "not guilty."[7] Through counsel, they
"On or about 8:00 oclock in the evening of April 21, 1988, Abundio Sido and the members of his family were resting filed a Motion for Consolidation[8] with another criminal case against the same accused, for murder involving the
inside their house at Barangay Basiao, Municipality of San Jose, Negros Oriental. All of a sudden, a group of armed brother of the victim herein, committed on the same night. In its Order dated November 24, 1988,[9] the trial court,
men, six in number, arrived. One of them shouted "Abundio Sido lumabas kayo, mga military kami" (pp. 7-8, tsn, however, denied said Motion because the proceedings had already reached different stages. Sppedsc
March 1, 1989; p. 5-6, tsn, June 14, 1989). In return, Abundio answered, "you come up, we will talk upstairs" (p. 9,
tsn, March 1, 1989). The group however, insisted that he comes (sic) down and so, Abundio instructed his wife The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Elvie Sido, the 15 year-old daughter of the victim; (2) Florida
Florida to open the door. The latter, accompanied by her daughter Elvie who was holding a kerosene lamp, Sido, the widow of the victim, both eyewitnesses to the shooting incident; (3) Dra. Bienvenida Palongpalong,
proceeded towards the door to open it. When the door was opened, Florida and her daughter by the aid of the Municipal Health Officer of San Jose, Negros Oriental, who conducted the post-mortem examination on the victim
kerosene lamp were able to recognize the six armed men standing in front of their house wearing fatigue uniforms and testified that the cause of death was "severe hemorrhage resulting from the (gunshot) wounds of the
as Pablito Rendoque, Esperato Salaquin, Quinciano Rendoque, Sr., Quinciano Rendoque, Jr., Victorino Bacuac victim."[10]
and Felix Estrellado. With the exception of Quinciano Rendoque, Sr. who was seen carrying a revolver, the rest
were all armed with shotguns (pp. 10-11, tsn, March 1, 1989; p. 8, tsn, June 14, 1989). Jj lex Testifying on their behalf, appellants interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. Appellant Pablito Rendoque
claimed that on April 21, 1988, from 7 oclock in the evening until 7:00 the following morning, he was on duty as a
On that occasion when the door was opened, Pablito Rendoque shouted "fire" to his companions. In obedience to security guard at Master Footwear in Dumaguete City.[11] His testimony was supported by the testimonies of
his order, Esperato Salaquin and Quinciano Rendoque, Jr. aimed and fired their respective shotguns towards the several witnesses. Eduardo Dingal, his co-security guard, testified that appellant Pablito Rendoque relieved him
direction of the wall inside the house where Abundio was sitting. As a result, the victim was hit at the back and on from duty at 7:00 P.M. of April 21, 1988.[12] Dingals wife, also testified that she visited her husband at Master
the left shoulder by pellets which caused his death (pp. 11-12, tsn, March 1, 1989; pp. 9-10, tsn, June 14, 1989). Footwear at 7:00 P.M., and saw appellant Pablito Rendoque take over her husbands post.[13] Ernesto Amistoso, a
Thereafter, the armed group left leaving Abundios dead body behind (id.) member of the PNP, San Jose, Negros Oriental, also testified that the day after the incident, he confirmed with
17
Dingal that appellant Pablito Rendoque relieved him from duty the previous night.[14] Aniano Eliseo, Officer-In- II. THAT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN GIVING MORE CREDENCE TO THE
Charge of the Sherlock Security Agency, testified that he conducted an inspection of the guards of the agency and TESTIMONIES OF ELVIE SIDO AND FLORIDA SIDO AND TO DISREGARDED (sic) THE ALIBI OF THE
saw appellant Pablito Rendoque at his post in Master Footwear at around 7:00 on the night of the incident.[15] ACCUSED PABLITO RENDOQUE, SUPPORTED BY THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES ELISEO ANIANO,
OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF SHERLOCK AGENCY WITH DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, ELSAULA DINGAL,
The other five accused testified that on April 21, 1988, from 6 oclock in the evening until around 8 oclock the EDUARDO DINGAL AND ERNESTO AMISTOSO.
following morning, they were in the house of Placido Despojo at Sto. Nio, San Jose, Negros Oriental to attend an
"Anti-Communist Trust In Oriental Negros" (ACTION) seminar, which however, was postponed to the following day. III. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CONSIDERATION OF THE ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED
[16] Placido Despojo confirmed this fact.[17] Millard Generoso, the District Commander of ACTION, testified that on QUINCIANO RENDOQUE, JR., ESPERATO SALAQUIN, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AND CORROBORATED BY
April 22, 1988, the day after the incident, the five accused, except for appellant Pablito Rendoque, were at his THE REST OF THE ACCUSED AND SUPPORTED BY THE TESTIMONIES OF PLACIDO DESPOJO AND
house in Calindagan, Dumaguete City from around 8 oclock in the morning up to 11 oclock in the evening attending MILLARD GENEROSO."
the seminar.[18] Misj uris
Appellants brief contends that the trial court erred in not considering the entry in the police logbook, and the
The defense also presented as its witness Patrolman Fred Redira, who testified that on the night of the incident, testimonies of the custodian and the entrant thereof that the victims wife asked Celso Turtal to report to the
one Celso Turtal reported to him that he (Turtal) was requested by the wife of the victim to inform the authorities authorities that her husband was shot by "unidentified men" while sitting on the porch of their house. Appellants
that the victim was shot by "unidentified men."[19] The defense also presented Patrolman Antonio Ramirez, the claim that the statement of the widow should have been considered as part of the res gestae under Section 42 of
Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station,[20] and the custodian of the police logbook containing the aforesaid report. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Further, appellants insist that the trial court erred in not considering the Affidavit of
Patrolman Ramirez testified that he prepared the affidavits of Elvie and Florida Sido wherein they stated that the Confirmation executed by Celso Turtal regarding the incident. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in not
persons who shot the victim were Pablito Rendoque and Esperato Salaquin only. However, Patrolman Ramirez allowing the defense to present Florida Sido as a hostile witness. The foregoing evidence, appellants claim, if
claimed that the Municipal Mayor borrowed the affidavits and never returned them again. He also testified that the properly considered, would destroy the positive identification of appellants and co-accused as the perpetrators of
affidavits of Elvie and Florida Sido which were presented to him in court for identification were new affidavits, and the shooting incident. Appellants also fault the trial court for not giving due credence to the defenses of denial and
not the ones which he prepared.[21] alibi of appellants considering that these were sufficiently supported by the testimonies of their numerous witnesses.
Mi sedp
On January 6, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision[22] convicting the three (3) appellants. As already stated,
their three (3) co-accused were acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issues raised pertain to the credibility of
The dispositive portion of the decision reads: witnesses, the assessment of which is within the province of the trial court. In fact, the defense failed to point any
significant flaw in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The OSG further asserts that the entries in the
"FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this court finds the accused Esperato Salaquin, Quinciano police logbook cannot be correlated to the alleged Affidavit of Confirmation of one Celso Turtal because the latters
Rendoque, Jr., and Pablito Rendoque guilty beyond doubt of the crime of murder defined and penalized under affidavit is inadmissible for being hearsay. The OSG also contends that the trial court could not be faulted for
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences each one of them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, denying the request of the defense to make Florida Sido a hostile witness since the defense already cross-
to indemnify the heirs of the offended party of the sum of P30,000.00 and to pay the cost. The instruments used if examined said witness extensively regarding her identification of the assailants. On the defenses of denial and alibi,
confiscated by the government are deemed forfeited. The accused Quinciano Rendoque, Sr., Victorino Bacuac and the OSG cites the finding of the trial court that the place of work of Pablito Rendoque and the house of Placido
Felix Estrellado whose guilt are not established beyond doubt are acquitted. Despojo are a mere eight (8) kilometers away from the locus criminis. The OSG likewise prays that the award of
death indemnity be increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 pursuant to existing jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED."
The crucial issue raised by appellants, in our view, pertains solely to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. In
Hence, the present appeal. In their consolidated brief, appellants assign the following errors: particular, we have to consider the positive identification of appellants as the perpetrators of the offense as against
their defenses of denial and alibi.
"I. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE AND MORE WEIGHT TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ELVIE SIDO AND FLORIDA SIDO AND DID NOT CONSIDER In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently held that the determination of credibility of a witness is properly
THE TESTIMONIES OF P/CPL ANTONIO RAMIREZ AND PATROLMAN FRED REDIRA REGARDING THE within the domain of the trial court as it is in the best position to observe his demeanor and bodily movements.[23]
ENTRY IN THE LOGBOOK ON APRIL 21, 1988, AS REPORTED BY A CERTAIN CELSO TURTAL, EXHIBIT "1" Findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great
FOR THE DEFENSE WHICH WAS NOT ADMITTED BY THE COURT AND THE VEHEMENT REFUSAL AND respect, and even finality,[24] unless said findings are arbitrary, or facts and circumstances of weight and influence
OBJECTION OF THE COURT TO ALLOW FLORIDA SIDO TO TESTIFY IN COURT PERTINENT TO EXHIBIT "1", have been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied by the trial judge which, if considered, would have affected the
AS A HOSTILE WITNESS, DESPITE THE CONFORMITY OF FISCAL EDUVIGIS VERGARA IN OPEN COURT. case.[25] In the present appeal, after a thorough review of the records, no cogent reason justifies our departure
Ed p from the aforecited salutory rule. We are constrained not to disturb the factual findings of the trial court.

18
The two eyewitnesses, Elvie and Florida Sido, positively identified appellants as the perpetrators of the fatal Though the testimony of Placido Despojo sought to support them, their defense is far from persuasive. As observed
shooting.[26] Both clearly narrated on the witness stand the extent of the appellants participation in the incident. by the trial court, there is no proof of physical impossibility for these appellants to be present in the locus criminis.
They categorically testified that appellant Pablito Rendoque gave the order to "fire,"[27] and in obedience to such Well settled is the doctrine that alibi is a weak defense and should be rejected when the identities of the accused,
order, appellants Esperato Salaquin and Quinciano Rendoque, Jr., fired their guns (known locally as bali-ontod) as in this case, have been sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to the offense.[41] Hence, in the
against the victim.[28] Witness Elvie Sido said that as the shooting was going on, she was rooted on the spot, light of the positive identification of appellants by two eyewitnesses as the perpetrators of the crime, their defenses
looking at the faces of the men firing at her father.[29] Although the incident occurred at nighttime, the house of the of denial and alibi could not prosper.[42]
victim was sufficiently illuminated by two kerosene lamps (lamparillas), one carried by the daughter of the victim and
another located near the victim,[30] which cast enough light for purposes of identification. Numerous cases have As proved, the crime committed by the three appellants is murder, since the killing was qualified by treachery.
held that illumination coming from a kerosene lamp (also called "gasera") is sufficient for purposes of identification Treachery attended the killing because at the time of the shooting, the victim was unarmed, sitting inside his house,
of an assailant.[31] Aside from the sufficient lighting, the two eyewitnesses were familiar with the faces of the and was evidently not in a position to defend himself.[43] Further, appellants consciously adopted the particular
assailants because they were townmates,[32] and appellants did not even bother to hide their identities by covering means, method or form of attack employed by them when they went to the house of the victim armed with shotguns.
their faces.[33] S djad [44]

Appellants admitted that they could not ascribe any ill-motive against the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify The generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the killing, but is already absorbed in
against them.[34] Absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the treachery.[45] Evident premeditation while alleged in the Information was not sufficiently proven by the prosecution,
logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and and therefore cannot be appreciated.
credit.[35] The fact that the witnesses were the daughter and the widow of the deceased could not impair their
credibility. Blood or conjugal relationship between a witness and the victim does not per se impair the credibility of But since the victim was killed inside his house, even though the assailants were outside the house, the aggravating
the witness. On the contrary, relationship itself could strengthen credibility in a particular case, for it is unnatural for circumstance of dwelling should be appreciated.[46] Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance because
an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit. The earnest desire to seek justice for primarily of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode.[47]
a dead kin is not served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence to blame one who is innocent of
the crime.[36] As to the actual participation of appellants in the crime charged, appellant Pablito Rendoque, having given the order
to shoot at the victim, is liable as a principal under Article 17, No. 1 and No. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. His
Failing to demolish the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants now make a belated attempt to participation is direct; at the same time he induced his co-appellants Esperato Salaquin and Quinciano Rendoque,
impeach their testimonies. Appellants fault the trial court for not considering the Affidavit of Celso Turtal that Florida Jr. to commit the offense. These co-appellants obeyed the order by firing their shotguns at the victim, hence they
Sido told him that the assailants were "unidentified men." The trial court correctly disregarded said affidavit for being acted as principals by direct participation under Article 17, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The three appellants
hearsay since Turtal did not testify in court. An affidavit is generally hearsay, and has no probative value unless the acted in concert and helped each other accomplish the nefarious deed.talions
affiant himself is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.[37] Hence, the trial court correctly rejected the
admission of such affidavit in evidence. The award of death indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 should be increased to P50,000.00, pursuant to existing
jurisprudence.[48] No moral damages can be awarded since the wife and daughter of the victim did not testify with
As to the police logbook which was presented in evidence to prove the contents thereof, we have held that entries regard to moral damages. In view of the attendance of an aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article 2230 of the
in the police blotter should not be given undue significance or probative value, as they do not constitute conclusive Civil Code, exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 should be awarded.[49]
proof of the truth thereof.[38] Entries in police blotters, although regularly done in the course of the performance of
official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth stated in such entries and should not be given undue significance WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding appellants PABLITO RENDOQUE, ESPERATO SALAQUIN
or probative value because they are usually incomplete and inaccurate. Sometimes they are based on partial AND QUINCIANO RENDOQUE, JR. guilty of the crime of MURDER and sentencing them to RECLUSION
suggestion or inaccurate reporting and hearsay, untested in the crucible of a trial on the merits.[39] LEX PERPETUA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to damages. Appellants are hereby ordered to pay the heirs of
the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against
Appellant Pablito Rendoques defenses of denial and alibi, in our view, could not be sustained. Although supported appellants.
by testimonies of his superior and the guard who relieved him on the night of the incident, as well as the guards
wife, they do not exculpate him. We have already ruled that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that SO ORDERED.
appellant was somewhere else when the offense was committed. It must likewise be shown that he was so far away
that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORPORATION,, versus - AUTOCORP GROUP and PAUL Y. RODRIGUEZ,
the time of its commission.[40] It should be noted that appellant was seen by said witnesses at his post at 7 oclock
in the evening, while the shooting incident occurred at 8 oclock in the evening. Appellant failed to prove that it was G.R. No. 164326 October 17, 2008
impossible for him to have been physically present in the locus criminis at the very time of its commission. As to
Quinciano Rendoque, Jr. and Esperato Salaquin, the other two appellants, their alibis are equally unavailing.
19
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] Seaoil claims that Rodriguez issued a stop payment order on the ten checks thus constraining the former to also
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 20, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 72193, which had affirmed in toto the order a stop payment order on the PBCOM checks.
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 157, dated September 10, 2001 in Civil Case
No. 64943. In short, Seaoil claims that the real transaction is that Uniline, through Rodriguez, owed money to Focus. In lieu of
payment, Uniline instead agreed to convey the excavator to Focus. This was to be paid by checks issued by Seaoil
The factual antecedents, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: but which in turn were to be funded by checks issued by Uniline. x x x[3]

On September 24, 1994, defendant-appellant Seaoil Petroleum Corporation (Seaoil, for brevity) purchased one unit As narrated above, respondent Autocorp filed a Complaint for Recovery of Personal Property with Damages and
of ROBEX 200 LC Excavator, Model 1994 from plaintiff-appellee Autocorp Group (Autocorp for short). The original Replevin[4] against Seaoil before the RTC of Pasig City. In its September 10, 2001 Decision, the RTC ruled that the
cost of the unit was P2,500,000.00 but was increased to P3,112,519.94 because it was paid in 12 monthly transaction between Autocorp and Seaoil was a simple contract of sale payable in installments.[5] It also held that
installments up to September 30, 1995. The sales agreement was embodied in the Vehicle Sales Invoice No. A- the obligation to pay plaintiff the remainder of the purchase price of the excavator solely devolves on Seaoil. Paul
0209 and Vehicle Sales Confirmation No. 258. Both documents were signed by Francis Yu (Yu for short), president Rodriguez, not being a party to the sale of the excavator, could not be held liable therefor. The decretal portion of
of Seaoil, on behalf of said corporation. Furthermore, it was agreed that despite delivery of the excavator, the trial courts Decision reads, thus:
ownership thereof was to remain with Autocorp until the obligation is fully settled. In this light, Seaoils contractor,
Romeo Valera, issued 12 postdated checks. However, Autocorp refused to accept the checks because they were WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Autocorp Group and against defendant Seaoil
not under Seaoils name. Hence, Yu, on behalf of Seaoil, signed and issued 12 postdated checks for P259,376.62 Petroleum Corporation which is hereby directed to pay plaintiff:
each with Autocorp as payee.
- P2,389,179.23 plus 3% interest from the time of judicial demand until full payment; and
The excavator was subsequently delivered on September 26, 1994 by Autocorp and was received by Seaoil in its - 25% of the total amount due as attorneys fees and cost of litigation.
depot in Batangas.
The third-party complaint filed by defendant Seaoil Petroleum Corporation against third-party defendant Paul
The relationship started to turn sour when the first check bounced. However, it was remedied when Seaoil replaced Rodriguez is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
it with a good check. The second check likewise was also good when presented for payment. However, the
remaining 10 checks were not honored by the bank since Seaoil requested that payment be stopped. It was SO ORDERED.
downhill from thereon.
Seaoil filed a Petition for Review before the CA. In its assailed Decision, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed
Despite repeated demands, Seaoil refused to pay the remaining balance of P2,593,766.20. Hence, on January 24, the RTCs Decision in toto.[6] It held that the transaction between Yu and Rodriguez was merely verbal. This cannot
1995, Autocorp filed a complaint for recovery of personal property with damages and replevin in the Regional Trial alter the sales contract between Seaoil and Autocorp as this will run counter to the parol evidence rule which
Court of Pasig. The trial court ruled for Autocorp. Hence, this appeal. prohibits the introduction of oral and parol evidence to modify the terms of the contract. The claim that it falls under
the exceptions to the parol evidence rule has not been sufficiently proven. Moreover, it held that Autocorps separate
Seaoil, on the other hand, alleges that the transaction is not as simple as described above. It claims that Seaoil and corporate personality cannot be disregarded and the veil of corporate fiction pierced. Seaoil was not able to show
Autocorp were only utilized as conduits to settle the obligation of one foreign entity named Uniline Asia (herein that Autocorp was merely an alter ego of Uniline or that both corporations were utilized to perpetrate a fraud. Lastly,
referred to as Uniline), in favor of another foreign entity, Focus Point International, Incorporated (Focus for short). it held that the RTC was correct in dismissing the third-party complaint since it did not arise out of the same
Paul Rodriguez (Rodriguez for brevity) is a stockholder and director of Autocorp. He is also the owner of Uniline. On transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is based, or that the third partys claim, although arising out of another
the other hand, Yu is the president and stockholder of Seaoil and is at the same time owner of Focus. Allegedly, transaction, is connected to the plaintiffs claim. Besides, the CA said, such claim may be enforced in a separate
Uniline chartered MV Asia Property (sic) in the amount of $315,711.71 from its owner Focus. Uniline was not able to action.
settle the said amount. Hence, Uniline, through Rodriguez, proposed to settle the obligation through conveyance of
vehicles and heavy equipment. Consequently, four units of Tatamobile pick-up trucks procured from Autocorp were
conveyed to Focus as partial payment. The excavator in controversy was allegedly one part of the vehicles
conveyed to Focus. Seaoil claims that Rodriguez initially issued 12 postdated checks in favor of Autocorp as Seaoil now comes before this Court in a Petition for Review raising the following issues:
payment for the excavator. However, due to the fact that it was company policy for Autocorp not to honor postdated
checks issued by its own directors, Rodriguez requested Yu to issue 12 PBCOM postdated checks in favor of
Autocorp. In turn, said checks would be funded by the corresponding 12 Monte de Piedad postdated checks issued Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in partially applying the parol evidence rule to prove only some terms
by Rodriguez. These Monte de Piedad checks were postdated three days prior to the maturity of the PBCOM contained in one portion of the document but disregarded the rule with respect to another but substantial portion or
checks. entry also contained in the same document which should have proven the true nature of the transaction involved.

20
II The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by testimony or
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in its judgment based on misapprehension of facts when it other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of
declared absence of facts which are contradicted by presence of evidence on record. the written contract.[9]

III This principle notwithstanding, petitioner would have the Court rule that this case falls within the exceptions,
Whether or not the dismissal of the third-party complaint would have the legal effect of res judicata as would particularly that the written agreement failed to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. This argument
unjustly preclude petitioner from enforcing its claim against respondent Rodriguez (third-party defendant) in a is untenable.
separate action.
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the purpose of
IV incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing
Whether or not, given the facts in evidence, the lower courts should have pierced the corporate veil. unless there has been fraud or mistake.[10] Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally
not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.[11]
The Petition lacks merit. We sustain the ruling of the CA.
The Vehicle Sales Invoice[12] is the best evidence of the transaction. A sales invoice is a commercial document.
We find no fault in the trial courts appreciation of the facts of this case. The findings of fact of the trial court are Commercial documents or papers are those used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or
conclusive upon this Court, especially when affirmed by the CA. None of the exceptions to this well-settled rule has credit transactions.[13] Business forms, e.g., order slip, delivery charge invoice and the like, are commonly
been shown to exist in this case. recognized in ordinary commercial transactions as valid between the parties and, at the very least, they serve as an
acknowledgment that a business transaction has in fact transpired.[14] These documents are not mere scraps of
Petitioner does not question the validity of the vehicle sales invoice but merely argues that the same does not paper bereft of probative value, but vital pieces of evidence of commercial transactions. They are written memorials
reflect the true agreement of the parties. However, petitioner only had its bare testimony to back up the alleged of the details of the consummation of contracts.[15]
arrangement with Rodriguez.
The terms of the subject sales invoice are clear. They show that Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit Robex 200 LC
The Monte de Piedad checks the supposedly clear and obvious link[7] between the documentary evidence and the Excavator paid for by checks issued by one Romeo Valera. This does not, however, change the fact that Seaoil
true transaction between the parties are equivocal at best. There is nothing in those checks to establish such link. Petroleum Corporation, as represented by Yu, is the customer or buyer. The moment a party affixes his or her
Rodriguez denies that there is such an agreement. signature thereon, he or she is bound by all the terms stipulated therein and is subject to all the legal obligations
that may arise from their breach.[16]
Unsubstantiated testimony, offered as proof of verbal agreements which tends to vary the terms of a written
agreement, is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.[8] Oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the
case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence.[17]
Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence embodies the parol evidence rule and states:
Hence, petitioners contention that the document falls within the exception to the parol evidence rule is untenable.
SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements.When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is The exception obtains only where the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in- intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and
circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in proper interpretation of the instrument.[18]
issue in his pleading:
Even assuming there is a shred of truth to petitioners contention, the same cannot be made a basis for holding
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; respondents liable therefor.
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or As pointed out by the CA, Rodriguez is a person separate and independent from Autocorp. Whatever obligations
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the Rodriguez contracted cannot be attributed to Autocorp[19] and vice versa. In fact, the obligation that petitioner
written agreement. proffers as its defense under the Lease Purchase Agreement was not even incurred by Rodriguez or by Autocorp
but by Uniline.
The term "agreement" includes wills.

21
The Lease Purchase Agreement[20] clearly shows that the parties thereto are two corporations not parties to this A last point. We reject Seaoils claim that the ownership of the subject excavator, having been legally and
case: Focus Point and Uniline. Under this Lease Purchase Agreement, it is Uniline, as lessee/purchaser, and not completely transferred to Focus Point International, Inc., cannot be subject of replevin and plaintiff [herein
Rodriguez, that incurred the debt to Focus Point. The obligation of Uniline to Focus Point arose out of a transaction respondent Autocorp] is not legally entitled to any writ of replevin.[30] The claim is negated by the sales invoice
completely different from the subject of the instant case. which clearly states that [u]ntil after the vehicle is fully paid inclusive of bank clearing time, it remains the property of
Autocorp Group which reserves the right to take possession of said vehicle at any time and place without prior
It is settled that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its individual stockholders or members, notice.[31]
and is not affected by the personal rights, obligations and transactions of the latter.[21] The corporation may not be
held liable for the obligations of the persons composing it, and neither can its stockholders be held liable for its Considering, first, that Focus Point was not a party to the sale of the excavator and, second, that Seaoil indeed
obligation.[22] failed to pay for the excavator in full, the same still rightfully belongs to Autocorp. Additionally, as the trial court
found, Seaoil had already assigned the same to its contractor for the construction of its depot in Batangas.[32]
Of course, this Court has recognized instances when the corporations separate personality may be disregarded. Hence, Seaoil has already enjoyed the benefit of the transaction even as it has not complied with its obligation. It
However, we have also held that the same may only be done in cases where the corporate vehicle is being used to cannot be permitted to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another.
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime.[23] Moreover, the wrongdoing must be
clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.[24] WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 20, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 72193 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED
To reiterate, the transaction under the Vehicle Sales Invoice is separate and distinct from that under the Lease
Purchase Agreement. In the former, it is Seaoil that owes Autocorp, while in the latter, Uniline incurred obligations
to Focus. There was never any allegation, much less any evidence, that Autocorp was merely an alter ego of
Uniline, or that the two corporations separate personalities were being used as a means to perpetrate fraud or PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs Castro G.R. No. 172874 December 17, 2008
wrongdoing.

Moreover, Rodriguez, as stockholder and director of Uniline, cannot be held personally liable for the debts of the
corporation, which has a separate legal personality of its own. While Section 31 of the Corporation Code[25] lays On appeal is the decision[1] dated February 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00126
down the exceptions to the rule, the same does not apply in this case. Section 31 makes a director personally liable which affirmed in toto an earlier decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 162 in Criminal Case
for corporate debts if he willfully and knowingly votes for or assents to patently unlawful acts of the corporation. No. 117506-H, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and imposing upon
Section 31 also makes a director personally liable if he is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
affairs of the corporation.[26] The bad faith or wrongdoing of the director must be established clearly and
convincingly. Bad faith is never presumed.[27] Consistent with our decision in People v. Cabalquinto,[3] the real name of the rape victim in this case is withheld
and instead, fictitious initials are used to represent her. Also, the personal circumstances of the victim or any other
The burden of proving bad faith or wrongdoing on the part of Rodriguez was, on petitioner, a burden which it failed information tending to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household
to discharge. Thus, it was proper for the trial court to have dismissed the third-party complaint against Rodriguez on members, are not disclosed in this decision.
the ground that he was not a party to the sale of the excavator.
In the court of origin, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape in an Information[4] dated February 2,
Rule 6, Section 11 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure defines a third-party complaint as a claim that a 2000. The crime was alleged to have been committed as follows:
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third-party
defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponents claim. On or about November 11, 1999, in Taguig, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
The purpose of the rule is to permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against a third party which he, intercourse with his sister-in-law, [AAA], a minor, fourteen (14) years of age, against her will and consent. (Word in
otherwise, would assert in another action, thus preventing multiplicity of suits.[28] Had it not been for the rule, the bracket ours)
claim could have been filed separately from the original complaint.[29]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioners claim against Rodriguez was fully ventilated in the proceedings before the trial court, tried and decided
on its merits. The trial courts ruling operates as res judicata against another suit involving the same parties and When arraigned on July 12, 2000, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crime
same cause of action. This is rightly so because the trial court found that Rodriguez was not a party to the sale of charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, in the course of which the prosecution presented the testimony of
the excavator. On the other hand, petitioner Seaoils liability has been successfully established by respondent. the victim herself. The testimony of Jurita Olvido was dispensed with after both parties agreed to stipulate on the
following: (1) that she is a social welfare officer of the Department of Social Welfare and Development; (2) that she
22
assisted the victim in filing a complaint due to her minority; and (3) that the due execution of her statement is On the other hand, the defense relied on the testimony of Margarita Salangsang, a lessee of accused-appellants
admitted.[5] mother at Signal Village in Taguig. She testified that at around 9:30 in the evening on November 11, 1999, accused-
appellant was in her house for her birthday celebration. Accused-appellant did not leave the house at any time from
For its part, the defense presented Margarita Salangsang as its lone witness. Accused-appellant opted not to the moment he arrived at 9:30 in the evening until he finally left around midnight. She knew that accused-appellant
testify. went home straight after the party because she even saw him at his house when she returned the pans she
borrowed from accused-appellants mother. Margarita declared that her house was located just at the back of
The prosecutions version of the incident is succinctly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in its accused-appellants house.[7]
Appellees Brief,[6] to wit:
In a decision[8] dated September 29, 2004, the trial court rendered its decision convicting accused-appellant of the
Private complainant [AAA], is a fourteen (14) year old lass having been born on July 8, 1985. Appellant Mario crime of rape, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Castro is the husband of [BBB], elder sister of [AAA].
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Mario Castro, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
On November 11, 1999 at about 11:00 in the evening, appellant fetched [AAA] from her Aunts house at PNR committed under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by R.A. 8353), and
Compound, Taguig Metro Manila. He said that her elder sister, [BBB], collapsed and was in the clinic. Believing the hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
story, [AAA] went with appellant.
Accused Mario Castro is likewise ordered to indemnify private complainant, [AAA], the amount of fifty thousand
As events turned out, appellant brought [AAA] - - not in the clinic - - but near TEMIC Factory, which is an old pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) by way of moral
abandoned building located at Western Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. As they reached a dark narrow alley, damages with cost de oficio.
appellant suddenly stopped and held [AAA]s left arm. Startled and frightened, [AAA] screamed for help but nobody
seemed to have heard the outcry. Wasting no time, appellant strangled her, with a threat to keep quiet lest he would SO ORDERED.
kill her. [AAA] was cowed into silence. She felt helpless as she knew that appellant had killed someone before.
Pursuant to People v. Mateo,[9] accused-appellant appealed his conviction to the CA via a notice of appeal on
Appellant hurriedly pulled [AAA] to the side of a building and told her to undress. When she refused, appellant September 30, 2004,[10] whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00126.
undressed her, after which, he undressed himself. [AAA] could not run away as appellant pressed her against the
wall of the building and blocked her way. When both of them were already naked, appellant kissed her on the On February 15, 2006, the CA upheld the conviction of accused-appellant and affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
different parts of her body and, in an instant, forced his penis into her vagina until he satisfied his lust. [11]

Once satiated, appellant told [AAA] to dress up and warned her not to tell anybody. Appellant initially brought her to From the CA, the case was then elevated to this Court upon filing by accused-appellant of a notice of appeal on
the bus and jeepney terminal but he later changed his mind. He told [AAA] that they have to go to Kuya Mannys March 10, 2006.[12] In its Resolution[13] of August 9, 2006, the Court resolved to require the parties to submit their
work place. Still overwhelmed with shock and fear, [AAA] could not resist. When appellant learned that Kuya Manny respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire. Both parties, however, manifested that they were dispensing with
was not at work, he brought [AAA] again to the dark narrow alley beside Temic Factory. This time, however, they the filing of a supplemental brief as their arguments have already been substantially discussed in their respective
passed by a different route which is near Pepsi. briefs filed before the appellate court.[14]

As before, appellant asked [AAA] to undress. When she refused, he himself removed her clothes including her
intimate garments. He likewise undressed himself. He then kissed her on the different parts of her body and forced
her down. All the while, she was so frightened and helpless. All she could do was to plead: Wag na po Kuya Mar. In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:
Engulfed by his bestiality, appellant ignored her please; he took liberties on her body as he rammed his penis into I
her vagina. Again, he satisfied his lust. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE HIGHLY
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
Appellant eventually told [AAA] to dress up. He brought her to the terminal of the jeep and allowed her to go home.
II
When [AAA] reached her residence, she immediately took a bath. As she could not contain her grief and misery, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE INSTEAD OF
she told her aunt [CCC] and her grandmother [DDD] that she was raped. After her relatives learned of the incident, THE CRIME OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS.[15]
they brought her to the Barangay Tanod and, later to Camp Crame for medical examination. They also proceeded
to the Police Station located at the Municipal Hall of Taguig to give her statement. (Words in bracket ours) Insisting that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape, accused-
appellant assails the credibility of the complainant branding her testimony as highly improbable and contrary to
23
common human experience. He contends that complainant did not particularly describe the details of the alleged A. My panty was pulled down to the knee, Sir.
rape as to whether she was forced to lie down or whether they were standing when he inserted a part of his organ Q. And after he succeeded in undressing you, what else happened, if any?
into her vagina. Accused-appellant also asserts that complainant failed to categorically state that accused-appellant A. He kissed me at different parts of my body, Sir.
succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina, thus undermining her allegation of consummated rape. Q. After kissing the different parts of your body, what else happened, if any?
A. He was forcing his organ to insert into my organ, Sir.
Accused-appellants contentions relate to the credibility of the testimony of complainant. We have time and again Q. Did he succeed, Madam Witness?
said that the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect since it A. Not all, Sir.
has the opportunity to examine their demeanor on the witness stand.[16] Unless shown that the trial court Q. When you said not all somehow a part of his organ was inserted, would that be correct, Madam Witness?
overlooked or misunderstood some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the result of A. Yes, Sir.[19]
the case, its findings on questions of facts will not be disturbed on appeal.[17] We have reviewed the record of the
instant case and found nothing which would warrant a reversal of the trial courts findings. Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor, as
in this case, because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial and put up with the shame, humiliation
Accused-appellant maintains that complainant failed to mention any pumping motion and whether she was and dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it not to condemn an injustice and have the offender
standing or lying down when she was allegedly raped. These matters, however, have no bearing on the principal apprehended and punished.[20]
question of whether accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. Besides, contrary to appellant's
contention, complainant testified in no uncertain terms during cross-examination that she did not willingly lie down Nor is there any question that accused-appellant in this case committed rape by means of threat and intimidation.
but was forced to do so by accused-appellant: Being 30 years old and the brother-in-law of complainant, accused-appellant exercised not only physical superiority,
but also moral ascendancy over his 14-year old victim such that his threat to inflict physical harm on her effectively
ATTY. JANDUSAY: cowed her into submitting to his lustful designs. In fact, complainant was aware that accused-appellant had killed
someone before[21] which all the more engendered fear in her fear that if she did not yield to accused-appellant's
Q. So are you saying Miss Witness, that you willingly laid down with the accused? demands, he would carry out his threat to kill her.
A. No, Maam.
Q. What did he do, did he force you down? Accused-appellant argues that he cannot be held liable for consummated rape following the ruling in People v.
Campuhan.[22] For this purpose, he cites the testimony of complainant that not all of accused-appellant's organ
A Yes, Maam.[18] was inserted into her vagina.
The argument is misplaced. In Campuhan, it was held that the crime was merely attempted rape because all that
Further, the complainants narration of how accused-appellant perpetrated the sexual assault upon her was the victim said in that case was that accused's penis touched her organ but did not penetrate it.[23] Hence, this
consistent, spontaneous and straightforward, thus: Court concluded:

[The] testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that enshrouds the question of whether rape in this
PROS. CRISOLOGO: case was consummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primo's penis penetrating her vagina, however slight.
Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration. xxx. Nor can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate
Q While you were at the side of the building, what else happened, if any? the victim's organ the penis of the accused touched the middle portion of her vagina and entered the labia of her
A He asked me to undress, Sir. pudendum as the prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts to penetrate Crysthel. Corazon
Q Did you undress, Madam witness? did not say, nay, not even hint that Primo's penis was erect or that he responded with an erection. On the contrary,
A No, Sir Corazon even narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain
Q. What else happened when you refused to undress? an erection to be able to penetrate his victim.[24]
A. He undressed me, Sir.
Q. Did you resist his act of undressing you, Madam Witness? But, in the case at bar, the above-quoted testimony of the complainant herself established the consummation of the
A. Yes, Sir. crime of rape.
Q. Did he succeed in undressing you?
A. Yes, Sir. Clearly, complainant's statement that not all of accused-appellant's organ was inserted simply means that there
Q. When you said he undressed you, do you mean that he was able to undress everything including your was no full penetration. There can be no doubt, however, that there was at least a partial entry, so as to make the
underwear crime consummated rape. As we have said in unnumbered cases, full or deep penetration is not necessary to
A. Yes, Sir. consummate sexual intercourse; it is enough that there is the slightest penetration of the male organ into the female
Q. Would this mean that you were totally naked after he was able to undress you?
24
sex organ.[25] The mere touching by the male organ of the labia of the pudendum of the womans private part is In the present case, the information charging accused-appellant of the crime of rape alleged that the accused, by
sufficient to consummate rape.[26] It was therefore consummated rape which accused-appellant committed. means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse with
his sister-in-law, [AAA], a minor, fourteen (14) years of age, against her will.[34] The prosecution was able to prove
Accused-appellant likewise claims that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime of consummated rape that at the time she was raped, complainant was only 14 years old, having been born on July 8, 1985, as evidenced
despite the prosecutions failure to present the testimony of the examining physician. We find accused-appellants by her birth certificate.[35] The prosecution likewise proved accused-appellant is the brother-in-law of complainant,
contention on this point untenable. The commission of rape against complainant cannot be negated simply because being the husband of complainants elder sister. Accused-appellant, therefore, is complainants relative by affinity
of the absence of the testimony of the doctor who examined the victim. It is well entrenched in our jurisprudence within the third civil degree.
that a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims
testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime.[27] In fact, a doctors certificate is However, we have previously held that if the offender is merely a relation not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or
merely corroborative in character and not an indispensable requirement in proving the commission of rape.[28] guardian or common-law spouse of the mother of the victim it must be alleged in the information that he is a relative
by consanguinity or affinity (as the case may be) within the third civil degree.[36] Thus, in the instant case, the
We are also constrained to agree with the appellate courts observation that there was nothing improbable and allegation that complainant is the sister-in-law of accused-appellant is not specific enough to satisfy the special
preposterous in complainants testimony. Said the CA: qualifying circumstance of relationship. It is necessary to specifically allege that such relationship was by affinity
within the third civil degree.[37] Consequently, due to the defect in the information charging accused-appellant of
This Court finds nothing incredible or fantastic in [AAAs] narration of the events surrounding the rape committed rape, he can only be held liable for simple rape and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
against her by accused-appellant Castro. The details of her story fail to show any telltale indications of falsehood,
inconsistency or improbability, and were all perfectly consistent with the rape of a young innocent girl. Considering Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence on simple rape, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
her relatively tender age and minority, it is well nigh inconceivable for her to have concocted such a serious P50,000.00 as moral damages were correctly awarded by the trial court.[38]
accusation and brazenly impute such a crime to her own brother-in-law, if it were not true. The evidence on record
is bereft of any showing, which would somehow indicate that the private complainant was induced by any ill-motive WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 15, 2006 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00126 is hereby
in filing the case against accused-appellant Castro.[29] AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant Mario Castro is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple
Rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay complainant, civil
Accused-appellants defense of alibi is unavailing. Margarita Salangsang, the lone defense witness, claimed that indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
accused-appellant was in her house from 9:30-11:45 in the evening of November 11, 1999. However, this does not
negate the possibility that he might be present at the TEMIC factory where the crime was committed, since
Margaritas house and the TEMIC factory are both located within Taguig. In fact, Margarita herself declared that the
distance between the two places can easily be negotiated by foot within ten (10) minutes and by tricycle within five SO ORDERED.
(5) minutes.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, vs SPOUSES REYNALDO AND VICTORIA ROYECA,
For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place G.R. No. 176664 July 21, 2008
at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the
crime at the time.[30] Where there is even the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the
defense of alibi will not hold water.[31] Clearly in this case, the physical impossibility of accused-appellants Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) seeks a review of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated July 12, 2006,
presence at the scene of the crime on the date and time of its commission, has not been sufficiently established. and Resolution[2] dated February 13, 2007, which dismissed its complaint for replevin and damages and granted
the respondents counterclaim for damages.
We, thus, sustain the conviction of accused-appellant for the crime of consummated simple rape under Article 266-
A, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty of reclusion perpetua was likewise correctly imposed as The case stems from the following undisputed facts:
the special qualifying circumstance of relationship had not been specifically alleged in the information. Under Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353,[32] qualified rape is committed when, among On August 23, 1993, spouses Reynaldo and Victoria Royeca (respondents) executed and delivered to Toyota
others, the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, Shaw, Inc. a Promissory Note[3] for P577,008.00 payable in 48 equal monthly installments of P12,021.00, with a
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent maturity date of August 18, 1997. The Promissory Note provides for a penalty of 3% for every month or fraction of a
of the victim. It is well-settled that these attendant circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the month that an installment remains unpaid.
offender are special qualifying circumstances which must be specifically alleged in the information and proved with
certainty in order to warrant conviction for the crime of qualified rape and the imposition of the death penalty.[33] To secure the payment of said Promissory Note, respondents executed a Chattel Mortgage[4] in favor of Toyota
over a certain motor vehicle, more particularly described as follows:

25
 Make and Type 1993 Toyota Corolla 1.3 XL b) The sum of PhP30,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages;
Motor No. 2E-2649879 c) The sum of PhP20,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and
Serial No. EE100-9512571 d) To pay the costs of the suit.
Color D.B. Gray Met.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Toyota, with notice to respondents, executed a Deed of Assignment[5] transferring all its rights, title, and interest in
the Chattel Mortgage to Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) set aside the MeTC Decision and ordered the respondents to pay the
amount claimed by the petitioner. The dispositive portion of its Decision[11] dated August 11, 2005 reads:
Claiming that the respondents failed to pay four (4) monthly amortizations covering the period from May 18, 1997 to
August 18, 1997, FEBTC sent a formal demand to respondents on March 14, 2000 asking for the payment thereof, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 9 dated February 23,
plus penalty.[6] The respondents refused to pay on the ground that they had already paid their obligation to FEBTC. 2005 is REVERSED and a new one entered directing the defendants-appellees to pay the plaintiff-appellant, jointly
and severally,
On April 19, 2000, FEBTC filed a Complaint for Replevin and Damages against the respondents with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila praying for the delivery of the vehicle, with an alternative prayer for the 1. The sum of P48,084.00 plus interest and/or late payment charges thereon at the rate of 36% per annum from
payment of P48,084.00 plus interest and/or late payment charges at the rate of 36% per annum from May 18, 1997 May 18, 1997 until fully paid;
until fully paid. The complaint likewise prayed for the payment of P24,462.73 as attorneys fees, liquidated damages, 2. The sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
bonding fees and other expenses incurred in the seizure of the vehicle. The complaint was later amended to 3. The costs of suit.
substitute BPI as plaintiff when it merged with and absorbed FEBTC.[7]
SO ORDERED.[12]
In their Answer, respondents alleged that on May 20, 1997, they delivered to the Auto Financing Department of
FEBTC eight (8) postdated checks in different amounts totaling P97,281.78. The Acknowledgment Receipt,[8]
which they attached to the Answer, showed that FEBTC received the following checks: The RTC denied the respondents motion for reconsideration.[13]

================== The respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for review. They succeeded in
obtaining a favorable judgment when the CA set aside the RTCs Decision and reinstated the MeTCs Decision on
The respondents further averred that they did not receive any notice from the drawee banks or from FEBTC that July 12, 2006.[14] On February 13, 2007, the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.[15]
these checks were dishonored. They explained that, considering this and the fact that the checks were issued three
years ago, they believed in good faith that their obligation had already been fully paid. They alleged that the The issues submitted for resolution in this petition for review are as follows:
complaint is frivolous and plainly vexatious. They then prayed that they be awarded moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and costs of suit.[9] I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS WERE ABLE TO PROVE FULL PAYMENT OF THEIR OBLIGATION
AS ONE OF THEIR AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES.
During trial, Mr. Vicente Magpusao testified that he had been connected with FEBTC since 1994 and had assumed
the position of Account Analyst since its merger with BPI. He admitted that they had, in fact, received the eight II. WHETHER OR NOT TENDER OF CHECKS CONSTITUTES PAYMENT.
checks from the respondents. However, two of these checks (Landbank Check No. 0610947 and FEBTC Check No.
17A00-11551P) amounting to P23,692.00 were dishonored. He recalled that the remaining two checks were not III. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
deposited anymore due to the previous dishonor of the two checks. He said that after deducting these payments, ATTORNEYS FEES.[16]
the total outstanding balance of the obligation was P48,084.00, which represented the last four monthly
installments. The petitioner insists that the respondents did not sufficiently prove the alleged payment. It avers that, under the law
and existing jurisprudence, delivery of checks does not constitute payment. It points out that this principle stands
On February 23, 2005, the MeTC dismissed the case and granted the respondents counterclaim for damages, despite the fact that there was no notice of dishonor of the two checks and the demand to pay was made three
thus: years after default.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action, and on the On the other hand, the respondents postulate that they have established payment of the amount being claimed by
counterclaim, plaintiff is ordered to indemnify the defendants as follows: the petitioner and, unless the petitioner proves that the checks have been dishonored, they should not be made
liable to pay the obligation again.[17]
a) The sum of PhP30,000.00 as and by way of moral damages;
26
The petition is partly meritorious. actually encashed, the respondents could have easily produced the cancelled checks as evidence to prove the
same. Instead, they merely averred that they believed in good faith that the checks were encashed because they
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or were not notified of the dishonor of the checks and three years had already lapsed since they issued the checks.
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
[18] Thus, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the onus to prove his Because of this failure of the respondents to present sufficient proof of payment, it was no longer necessary for the
assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment. For the plaintiff, the burden to prove its positive assertions never petitioner to prove non-payment, particularly proof that the checks were dishonored. The burden of evidence is
parts. For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the shifted only if the party upon whom it is lodged was able to adduce preponderant evidence to prove its claim.[25]
plaintiffs cause of action, but one which, if established, will be a good defense i.e. an avoidance of the claim.[19]
To stress, the obligation to prove that the checks were not dishonored, but were in fact encashed, fell upon the
In Jimenez v. NLRC,[20] cited by both the RTC and the CA, the Court elucidated on who, between the plaintiff and respondents who would benefit from such fact. That payment was effected through the eight checks was the
defendant, has the burden to prove the affirmative defense of payment: respondents affirmative allegation that they had to establish with legal certainty. If the petitioner were seeking to
enforce liability upon the check, the burden to prove that a notice of dishonor was properly given would have
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege non- devolved upon it.[26] The fact is that the petitioners cause of action was based on the original obligation as
payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to evidenced by the Promissory Note and the Chattel Mortgage, and not on the checks issued in payment thereof.
prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been
discharged by payment. Further, it should be noted that the petitioner, as payee, did not have a legal obligation to inform the respondents of
the dishonor of the checks. A notice of dishonor is required only to preserve the right of the payee to recover on the
When the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence contained in the record, the burden of proving check. It preserves the liability of the drawer and the indorsers on the check. Otherwise, if the payee fails to give
that it has been extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such a defense to the claim of the notice to them, they are discharged from their liability thereon, and the payee is precluded from enforcing payment
creditor. Where the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence - on the check. The respondents, therefore, cannot fault the petitioner for not notifying them of the non-payment of
as distinct from the general burden of proof - shifts to the creditor, who is then under a duty of producing some the checks because whatever rights were transgressed by such omission belonged only to the petitioner.
evidence to show non-payment.[21]
In all, we find that the evidence at hand preponderates in favor of the petitioner. The petitioners possession of the
In applying these principles, the CA and the RTC, however, arrived at different conclusions. While both agreed that documents pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses its claim that the obligation has not been extinguished.
the respondents had the burden of proof to establish payment, the two courts did not agree on whether the The creditors possession of the evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not been discharged by payment.[27] A
respondents were able to present sufficient evidence of payment enough to shift the burden of evidence to the promissory note in the hands of the creditor is a proof of indebtedness rather than proof of payment.[28] In an action
petitioner. The RTC found that the respondents failed to discharge this burden because they did not introduce for replevin by a mortgagee, it is prima facie evidence that the promissory note has not been paid.[29] Likewise, an
evidence of payment, considering that mere delivery of checks does not constitute payment.[22] On the other hand, uncanceled mortgage in the possession of the mortgagee gives rise to the presumption that the mortgage debt is
the CA concluded that the respondents introduced sufficient evidence of payment, as opposed to the petitioner, unpaid.[30]
which failed to produce evidence that the checks were in fact dishonored. It noted that the petitioner could have
easily presented the dishonored checks or the advice of dishonor and required respondents to replace the Finally, the respondents posit that the petitioners claim is barred by laches since it has been three years since the
dishonored checks but none was presented. Further, the CA remarked that it is absurd for a bank, such as checks were issued. We do not agree. Laches is a recourse in equity. Equity, however, is applied only in the
petitioner, to demand payment of a failed amortization only after three years from the due date. absence, never in contravention, of statutory law. Thus, laches cannot, as a rule, abate a collection suit filed within
the prescriptive period mandated by the New Civil Code.[31] The petitioners action was filed within the ten-year
The divergence in this conflict of opinions can be narrowed down to the issue of whether the Acknowledgment prescriptive period provided under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code. Hence, there is no room for the application of
Receipt was sufficient proof of payment. As correctly observed by the RTC, this is only proof that respondents laches.
delivered eight checks in payment of the amount due. Apparently, this will not suffice to establish actual payment.
Nonetheless, the Court cannot ignore what the respondents have consistently raised that they were not notified of
Settled is the rule that payment must be made in legal tender. A check is not legal tender and, therefore, cannot the non-payment of the checks. Reasonable banking practice and prudence dictates that, when a check given to a
constitute a valid tender of payment.[23] Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not creditor bank in payment of an obligation is dishonored, the bank should immediately return it to the debtor and
money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment. Mere delivery of checks does not demand its replacement or payment lest it causes any prejudice to the drawer. In light of this and the fact that the
discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the obligation has been partially paid, we deem it just and equitable to reduce the 3% per month penalty charge as
payment by commercial document is actually realized.[24] stipulated in the Promissory Note to 12% per annum.[32] Although a court is not at liberty to ignore the freedom of
the parties to agree on such terms and conditions as they see fit, as long as they contravene no law, morals, good
To establish their defense, the respondents therefore had to present proof, not only that they delivered the checks customs, public order or public policy, a stipulated penalty, nevertheless, may be equitably reduced by the courts if
to the petitioner, but also that the checks were encashed. The respondents failed to do so. Had the checks been it is iniquitous or unconscionable, or if the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with.[33]
27
 Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180 is liable for the torts
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned task. But it is necessary first to establish the
July 12, 2006, and Resolution dated February 13, 2007, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the employment relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee
Regional Trial Court, dated August 11, 2005, is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that respondents are was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the
ordered to deliver the possession of the subject vehicle, or in the alternative, pay the petitioner P48,084.00 plus late defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and
penalty charges/interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from May 18, 1997 until fully paid. SO ORDERED. supervision of the employee as allowed in that article. 3

In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the plaintiff to show that the defendant was the
employer of Nestor Martin at the time of the accident. The trial court merely presumed the existence of the
G.R. No. 82248 January 30, 1992 employer-employee relationship and held that the petitioner had not refuted that presumption. It noted that although
the defendant alleged that he was not Nestor Martin's employer, "he did not present any proof to substantiate his
ERNESTO MARTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY allegation."

This case turns on the proper application of the familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegation. As the trial court put it:

Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing license plate No. NPA-930. At around 2 o'clock in the There is no need to stretch one's imagination to realize that a car owner entrusts his vehicle only to his driver or to
morning of May 11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor Martin, it crashed into a Meralco electric post on Valley Golf anyone whom he allows to drive it. Since neither plaintiff nor defendant has presented any evidence on the status of
Road, in Antipolo, Rizal. The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged. Meralco subsequently demanded Nestor Martin, the Court presumes that he was at the time of the incident, an employee of the defendant. It is
reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the demand was rejected. It thereupon sued him for damages in the Regional elementary that he who makes an allegation is required to prove the same. Defendant alleges that Nestor Martin
Trial Court of Pasig, alleging inter alia that he was liable to it in the sum of P17,352.00 plus attorney's fees and was not his employee but he did not present any proof to substantiate his allegation. While it is true plaintiff did not
litigation costs as the employer of Nestor Martin. The petitioner's main defense was that Nestor Martin was not his present evidence on its allegation that Nestor Martin was defendant's employee, the Court believes and so holds,
employee. that there was no need for such evidence. As above adverted to, the Court can proceed on the presumption that
one who drives the motor vehicle is an employee of the owner thereof.
After the plaintiff had rested, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that no evidence had
been adduced to show that Nestor Martin was his employee. The motion was denied. The case was considered A presumption is defined as an inference as to the existence of a fact not actually known, arising from its usual
submitted for decision with the express waiver by the defendant of his right to pxza eresent his own evidence. connection with another which is known, 4 or a conjecture based on past experience as to what course human
The defendant thus did not rebut the plaintiff's allegation that he was Nestor Martin's employer. affairs ordinarily take. 5 It is either a presumption juris, or of law, or a presumption hominis, or of fact. 6

In the decision dated August 27, 1985, Judge Eutropio Migriño held in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him the There is no law directing the deduction made by the courts below from the particular facts presented to them by the
amount claimed, with 12% interest, and P4,000.00 attorney's fees, plus costs.1 The decision was seasonably parties. Such deduction is not among the conclusive presumptions under Section 2 or the disputable presumptions
elevated to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed it in toto on February 22, 1988, 2 prompting this petition for review. under Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. In other words, it is not a presumption juris.

The petition has merit. Neither is it a presumption hominis, which is a reasonable deduction from the facts proved without an express
direction of law to that effect. 7 The facts proved, or not denied, viz., the ownership of the car and the circumstances
It is important to stress that the complaint for damages was filed by the private respondent against only Ernesto of the accident, are not enough bases for the inference that the petitioner is the employer of Nestor Martin.
Martin as alleged employer of Nestor Martin, the driver of the car at the time of the accident. Nestor Martin was not
impleaded. The action was based on tort under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, providing in part that: In the modern urban society, most male persons know how to drive and do not have to employ others to drive for
them unless this is needed for business reasons. Many cannot afford this luxury, and even if they could, may
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the consider it an unnecessary expense and inconvenience. In the present case, the more plausible assumption is that
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. Nestor Martin is a close relative of Ernesto Martin and on the date in question borrowed the car for some private
purpose. Nestor would probably not have been accommodated if he were a mere employee for employees do not
The above rule is applicable only if there is an employer-employee relationship although it is not necessary that the usually enjoy the use of their employer's car at two o'clock in the morning.
employer be engaged in any business or industry. It differs in this sense from Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, which requires that the employer be engaged in an industry to be subsidiarily liable for the felony committed As the employment relationship between Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not be presumed, it was
by his employee in the course of his employment. necessary for the plaintiff to establish it by evidence. Meralco had the burden of proof, or the duty "to present

28
evidence on the fact in issue necessary to establish his claim" as required by Rule 131, Section 1 of the Revised Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter NORTHWEST), a corporation organized under the laws of the
Rules of Court. Failure to do this was fatal to its action. State of Minnesota, U.S.A., sought to enforce in Civil Case No. 83-17637 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
54, Manila, a judgment rendered in its favor by a Japanese court against private respondent C.F. Sharp &
It was enough for the defendant to deny the alleged employment relationship, without more, for he was not under Company, Inc., (hereinafter SHARP), a corporation incorporated under Philippine laws.
obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. 8 This Court has
consistently applied the ancient rule that "if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, As found by the Court of Appeals in the challenged decision of 10 November 1993, 1 the following are the factual
fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation and procedural antecedents of this controversy:
to prove his exception or defense." 9
On May 9, 1974, plaintiff Northwest Airlines and defendant C.F. Sharp & Company, through its Japan branch,
The case of Amor v. Soberano, 10 a Court of Appeals decision not elevated to this Court, was misapplied by the entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the former authorized the latter to sell
respondent court in support of the petitioner's position. The vehicle involved in that case was a six-by-six truck, its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant on behalf of the
which reasonably raised the factual presumption that it was engaged in business and that its driver was employed plaintiff under the said agreement, plaintiff on March 25, 1980 sued defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the
by the owner of the vehicle. The case at bar involves a private vehicle as its license plate indicates. No evidence unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages.
was ever offered that it was being used for business purposes or that, in any case, its driver at the time of the
accident was an employee of the petitioner. On April 11, 1980, a writ of summons was issued by the 36th Civil Department, Tokyo District Court of Japan
against defendant at its office at the Taiheiyo Building, 3rd floor, 132, Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Yokohoma,
It is worth mentioning in this connection that in Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals, 11 the owner of the Kanagawa Prefecture. The attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful because the bailiff was advised by a
jeep involved in the accident was absolved from liability when it was shown that the driver of the vehicle was not person in the office that Mr. Dinozo, the person believed to be authorized to receive court processes was in Manila
employed as such by the latter but was a "working scholar" as that term is defined by the Omnibus Rules and would be back on April 24, 1980.
Implementing the Labor Code. 12 He was assigned to janitorial duties. Evidence was introduced to establish the
employment relationship but it failed nonetheless to hold the owner responsible. Significantly, no similar evidence On April 24, 1980, bailiff returned to the defendant's office to serve the summons. Mr. Dinozo refused to accept the
was even presented in the case at bar, the private respondent merely relying on its mere allegation that Nestor same claiming that he was no longer an employee of the defendant.
Martin was the petitioner's employee. Allegation is not synonymous with proof.
After the two attempts of service were unsuccessful, the judge of the Tokyo District Court decided to have the
The above observations make it unnecessary to examine the question of the driver's alleged negligence or the lack complaint and the writs of summons served at the head office of the defendant in Manila. On July 11, 1980, the
of diligence on the part of the petitioner in the selection and supervision of his employee. These questions have not Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons through
arisen because the employment relationship contemplated in Article 1860 of the Civil Code has not been diplomatic channels upon the defendant's head office in Manila.
established.
On August 28, 1980, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of summons (p. 276,
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED, and Civil Case No. Records). Despite receipt of the same, defendant failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Thus, the Tokyo Court
48045 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 151, is DISMISSED, with costs against the respondent. It is so proceeded to hear the plaintiff's complaint and on [January 29, 1981], rendered judgment ordering the defendant to
ordered. pay the plaintiff the sum of 83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum from August 28,
1980 up to and until payment is completed (pp. 12-14, Records).
G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995
On March 24, 1981, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the judgment. Defendant not having
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC., appealed the judgment, the same became final and executory.
respondents.
Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence, on May 20, 1983, a suit for enforcement of the
PADILLA, JR., J.: judgment was filed by plaintiff before the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 54.2

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal of On July 16, 1983, defendant filed its answer averring that the judgment of the Japanese Court sought to be
the petitioner's complaint to enforce the judgment of a Japanese court. The principal issue here is whether a enforced is null and void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered without due and proper notice
Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation doing business in Japan by serving summons to the defendant and/or with collusion or fraud and/or upon a clear mistake of law and fact (pp. 41-45, Rec.).
through diplomatic channels on the Philippine corporation at its principal office in Manila after prior attempts to serve
summons in Japan had failed. Unable to settle the case amicably, the case was tried on the merits. After the plaintiff rested its case, defendant on
April 21, 1989, filed a Motion for Judgment on a Demurrer to Evidence based on two grounds:
29
(1) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction and (2) the said judgment is appellee maintains branches in Japan it is considered a resident defendant. Corollarily, personal, substituted or
contrary to Philippine law and public policy and rendered without due process of law. Plaintiff filed its opposition constructive service of summons when made in compliance with the procedural rules is sufficient to give the court
after which the court a quo rendered the now assailed decision dated June 21, 1989 granting the demurrer motion jurisdiction to render judgment in personam.
and dismissing the complaint (Decision, pp. 376-378, Records). In granting the demurrer motion, the trial court held
that: Such an argument does not persuade.

The foreign judgment in the Japanese Court sought in this action is null and void for want of jurisdiction over the It is a general rule that processes of the court cannot lawfully be served outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction
person of the defendant considering that this is an action in personam; the Japanese Court did not acquire of the court from which it issues (Carter vs. Carter; 41 S.E. 2d 532, 201) and this is regardless of the residence or
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant because jurisprudence requires that the defendant be served with citizenship of the party thus served (Iowa-Rahr vs. Rahr, 129 NW 494, 150 Iowa 511, 35 LRC, NS, 292, Am. Case
summons in Japan in order for the Japanese Court to acquire jurisdiction over it, the process of the Court in Japan 1912 D680). There must be actual service within the proper territorial limits on defendant or someone authorized to
sent to the Philippines which is outside Japanese jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction over the defendant in the accept service for him. Thus, a defendant, whether a resident or not in the forum where the action is filed, must be
case before the Japanese Court of the case at bar. Boudard versus Tait 67 Phil. 170. The plaintiff contends that the served with summons within that forum.
Japanese Court acquired jurisdiction because the defendant is a resident of Japan, having four (4) branches doing
business therein and in fact had a permit from the Japanese government to conduct business in Japan (citing the But even assuming a distinction between a resident defendant and non-resident defendant were to be adopted,
exhibits presented by the plaintiff); if this is so then service of summons should have been made upon the such distinction applies only to natural persons and not in the corporations. This finds support in the concept that "a
defendant in Japan in any of these alleged four branches; as admitted by the plaintiff the service of the summons corporation has no home or residence in the sense in which those terms are applied to natural persons" (Claude
issued by the Japanese Court was made in the Philippines thru a Philippine Sheriff. This Court agrees that if the Neon Lights vs. Phil. Advertising Corp., 57 Phil. 607). Thus, as cited by the defendant-appellee in its brief:
defendant in a foreign court is a resident in the court of that foreign court such court could acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant but it must be served upon the defendant in the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign Residence is said to be an attribute of a natural person, and can be predicated on an artificial being only by more or
court. Such is not the case here because the defendant was served with summons in the Philippines and not in less imperfect analogy. Strictly speaking, therefore, a corporation can have no local residence or habitation. It has
Japan. been said that a corporation is a mere ideal existence, subsisting only in contemplation of law — an invisible being
which can have, in fact, no locality and can occupy no space, and therefore cannot have a dwelling place. (18 Am.
Unable to accept the said decision, plaintiff on July 11, 1989 moved for reconsideration of the decision, filing at the Jur. 2d, p. 693 citing Kimmerle v. Topeka, 88 370, 128 p. 367; Wood v. Hartfold F. Ins. Co., 13 Conn 202)
same time a conditional Notice of Appeal, asking the court to treat the said notice of appeal "as in effect after and
upon issuance of the court's denial of the motion for reconsideration." Jurisprudence so holds that the foreign or domestic character of a corporation is to be determined by the place of its
origin where its charter was granted and not by the location of its business activities (Jennings v. Idaho Rail Light &
Defendant opposed the motion for reconsideration to which a Reply dated August 28, 1989 was filed by the plaintiff. P. Co., 26 Idaho 703, 146 p. 101), A corporation is a "resident" and an inhabitant of the state in which it is
incorporated and no other (36 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 49).
On October 16, 1989, the lower court disregarded the Motion for Reconsideration and gave due course to the
plaintiff's Notice of Appeal. 3 Defendant-appellee is a Philippine Corporation duly organized under the Philippine laws. Clearly, its residence is
the Philippines, the place of its incorporation, and not Japan. While defendant-appellee maintains branches in
In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. It agreed with the latter in its reliance upon Boudard Japan, this will not make it a resident of Japan. A corporation does not become a resident of another by engaging in
vs. Tait 4 wherein it was held that "the process of the court has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is business there even though licensed by that state and in terms given all the rights and privileges of a domestic
acquired over the person of the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state." To support its corporation (Galveston H. & S.A.R. Co. vs. Gonzales, 151 US 496, 38 L ed. 248, 4 S Ct. 401).
position, the Court of Appeals further stated:
On this premise, defendant appellee is a non-resident corporation. As such, court processes must be served upon it
In an action strictly in personam, such as the instant case, personal service of summons within the forum is required at a place within the state in which the action is brought and not elsewhere (St. Clair vs. Cox, 106 US 350, 27 L ed.
for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant (Magdalena Estate Inc. vs. Nieto, 125 SCRA 230). To confer 222, 1 S. Ct. 354).5
jurisdiction on the court, personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant not extraterritorial service is
necessary (Dial Corp vs. Soriano, 161 SCRA 739). It then concluded that the service of summons effected in Manila or beyond the territorial boundaries of Japan was
null and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Tokyo District Court over the person of SHARP; hence, its decision was
But while plaintiff-appellant concedes that the collection suit filed is an action in personam, it is its theory that a void.
distinction must be made between an action in personam against a resident defendant and an action in personam
against a non-resident defendant. Jurisdiction is acquired over a non-resident defendant only if he is served Unable to obtain a reconsideration of the decision, NORTHWEST elevated the case to this Court contending that
personally within the jurisdiction of the court and over a resident defendant if by personal, substituted or the respondent court erred in holding that SHARP was not a resident of Japan and that summons on SHARP could
constructive service conformably to statutory authorization. Plaintiff-appellant argues that since the defendant- only be validly served within that country.
30
 SHARP contends that the laws authorizing service of process upon the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is Superintendent of Banks, and the Insurance Commissioner, as the case may be, presuppose a situation wherein
shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.6 the foreign corporation doing business in the country no longer has any branches or offices within the Philippines.
Such contention is belied by the pertinent provisions of the said laws. Thus, Section 128 of the Corporation Code 13
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign and Section 190 of the Insurance Code 14 clearly contemplate two situations: (1) if the corporation had left the
country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and Philippines or had ceased to transact business therein, and (2) if the corporation has no designated agent. Section
their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of 17 of the General Banking Act 15 does not even speak a corporation which had ceased to transact business in the
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule Philippines.
131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty. Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident agent authorized to receive court processes
in Japan. This silence could only mean, or least create an impression, that it had none. Hence, service on the
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.7 designated government official or on any of SHARP's officers or agents in Japan could be availed of. The
Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the respondent, however, insists that only service of any of its officers or employees in its branches in Japan could be
invalidity of such judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of resorted to. We do not agree. As found by the respondent court, two attempts at service were made at SHARP's
summons effected at its home office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Yokohama branch. Both were unsuccessful. On the first attempt, Mr. Dinozo, who was believed to be the person
Court did not, therefore acquire jurisdiction over it. authorized to accept court process, was in Manila. On the second, Mr. Dinozo was present, but to accept the
summons because, according to him, he was no longer an employee of SHARP. While it may be true that service
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant could have been made upon any of the officers or agents of SHARP at its three other branches in Japan, the
are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum.8 In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where availability of such a recourse would not preclude service upon the proper government official, as stated above.
the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on SHARP. As to
what this law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo District Court which ordered that summons for SHARP be
proved like any other fact.9 Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by served at its head office in the Philippine's after the two attempts of service had failed. 16 The Tokyo District Court
an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to requested the Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery of the summons and other legal documents to the
present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial Philippines. Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons together with the other legal
service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan which, in turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy
the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand. in Manila . Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the
Philippines, then to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who
Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its principal office in Manila. This
law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption 10 may be invoked. Applying it, service is equivalent to service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in
the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence, SHARP's contention that such manner of service is not
private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that valid under Philippine laws holds no water.17
if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its resident
agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if there is no such resident agent, on the In deciding against the petitioner, the respondent court sustained the trial court's reliance on Boudard vs. Tait 18
government official designated by law to that effect; or (3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines. where this Court held:

If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over nonresidents, so as to sustain a money judgment, must
summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him. 11 be based upon personal service within the state which renders the judgment.

Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government official designated by law, to xxx xxx xxx
wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks,
in the case of a foreign banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other The process of a court, has no extraterritorial effect, and no jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the defendant
foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Whenever service of process is so made, the by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state. Nor has a judgment of a court of a foreign country against a
government office or official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the summons or other legal proccess to the resident of this country having no property in such foreign country based on process served here, any effect here
corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such copy is a necessary part of the service. 12 against either the defendant personally or his property situated here.

31
Process issuing from the courts of one state or country cannot run into another, and although a nonresident Nonetheless, a corporation formed in one-state may, for certain purposes, be regarded a resident in another state in
defendant may have been personally served with such process in the state or country of his domicile, it will not give which it has offices and transacts business. This is the rule in our jurisdiction and apropos thereto, it may be
such jurisdiction as to authorize a personal judgment against him. necessery to quote what we stated in State Investment House, Inc, vs. Citibank, N.A., 26 to wit:

It further availed of the ruling in Magdalena Estate, Inc. vs. Nieto 19 and Dial Corp. vs. Soriano, 20 as well as the The issue is whether these Philippine branches or units may be considered "residents of the Philippine Islands" as
principle laid down by the Iowa Supreme Court in the 1911 case of Raher vs. Raher. 21 that term is used in Section 20 of the Insolvency Law . . . or residents of the state under the laws of which they were
respectively incorporated. The answer cannot be found in the Insolvency Law itself, which contains no definition of
The first three cases are, however, inapplicable. Boudard involved the enforcement of a judgment of the civil the term, resident, or any clear indication of its meaning. There are however other statutes, albeit of subsequent
division of the Court of First Instance of Hanoi, French Indo-China. The trial court dismissed the case because the enactment and effectivity, from which enlightening notions of the term may be derived.
Hanoi court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant considering that "[t]he, evidence adduced
at the trial conclusively proves that neither the appellee [the defendant] nor his agent or employees were ever in The National Internal Revenue Code declares that the term "'resident foreign corporation' applies to a foreign
Hanoi, French Indo-China; and that the deceased Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard had never, at any time, been corporation engaged in trade or business within the Philippines," as distinguished from a "'non-resident foreign
his employee." In Magdalena Estate, what was declared invalid resulting in the failure of the court to acquire corporation' . . . (which is one) not engaged in trade or bussiness within the Philippines." [Sec. 20, pars. (h) and (i)].
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants in an action in personam was the service of summons through
publication against non-appearing resident defendants. It was claimed that the latter concealed themselves to avoid The Offshore Banking Law, Presidential Decree No. 1034, states "that branches, subsidiaries, affiliation, extension
personal service of summons upon them. In Dial, the defendants were foreign corporations which were not, offices or any other units of corporation or juridical person organized under the laws of any foreign country operating
domiciled and licensed to engage in business in the Philippines and which did not have officers or agents, places of in the Philippines shall be considered residents of the Philippines. [Sec. 1(e)].
business, or properties here. On the other hand, in the instant case, SHARP was doing business in Japan and was
maintaining four branches therein. The General Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, places "branches and agencies in the Philippines of foreign
banks . . . (which are) called Philippine branches," in the same category as "commercial banks, savings
Insofar as to the Philippines is concerned, Raher is a thing of the past. In that case, a divided Supreme Court of associations, mortgage banks, development banks, rural banks, stock savings and loan associations" (which have
Iowa declared that the principle that there can be no jurisdiction in a court of a territory to render a personal been formed and organized under Philippine laws), making no distinction between the former and the latter in so far
judgment against anyone upon service made outside its limits was applicable alike to cases of residents and non- as the terms "banking institutions" and "bank" are used in the Act [Sec. 2], declaring on the contrary that in "all
residents. The principle was put at rest by the United States Supreme Court when it ruled in the 1940 case of matters not specifically covered by special provisions applicable only to foreign banks, or their branches and
Milliken vs. Meyer 22 that domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of agencies in the Philippines, said foreign banks or their branches and agencies lawfully doing business in the
the state's jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service or personal Philippines "shall be bound by all laws, rules, and regulations applicable to domestic banking corporations of the
service without the state. This principle is embodied in section 18, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which allows same class, except such laws, rules and regulations as provided for the creation, formation, organization, or
service of summons on residents temporarily out of the Philippines to be made out of the country. The rationale for dissolution of corporations or as fix the relation, liabilities, responsibilities, or duties of members, stockholders or
this rule was explained in Milliken as follows: officers of corporation. [Sec. 18].

[T]he authority of a state over one of its citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state. This court itself has already had occasion to hold [Claude Neon Lights, Fed. Inc. vs. Philippine Advertising Corp., 57
The state which accords him privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile may Phil. 607] that a foreign corporation licitly doing business in the Philippines, which is a defendant in a civil suit, may
also exact reciprocal duties. "Enjoyment of the privileges of residence within the state, and the attendant right to not be considered a non-resident within the scope of the legal provision authorizing attachment against a defendant
invoke the protection of its laws, are inseparable" from the various incidences of state citizenship. The not residing in the Philippine Islands; [Sec. 424, in relation to Sec. 412 of Act No. 190, the Code of Civil Procedure;
responsibilities of that citizenship arise out of the relationship to the state which domicile creates. That relationship Sec. 1(f), Rule 59 of the Rules of 1940, Sec. 1(f), Rule 57, Rules of 1964] in other words, a preliminary attachment
is not dissolved by mere absence from the state. The attendant duties, like the rights and privileges incident to may not be applied for and granted solely on the asserted fact that the defendant is a foreign corporation authorized
domicile, are not dependent on continuous presence in the state. One such incident of domicile is amenability to to do business in the Philippines — and is consequently and necessarily, "a party who resides out of the
suit within the state even during sojourns without the state, where the state has provided and employed a Philippines." Parenthetically, if it may not be considered as a party not residing in the Philippines, or as a party who
reasonable method for apprising such an absent party of the proceedings against him. 23 resides out of the country, then, logically, it must be considered a party who does reside in the Philippines, who is a
resident of the country. Be this as it may, this Court pointed out that:
The domicile of a corporation belongs to the state where it was incorporated. 24 In a strict technical sense, such
domicile as a corporation may have is single in its essence and a corporation can have only one domicile which is . . . Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign corporations, duly licensed to do business
the state of its creation. 25 here, to the status of domestic corporations. (Cf. Section 73, Act No. 1459, and Marshall Wells Co. vs. Henry W.
Elser & Co., 46 Phil. 70, 76; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 411) We think it would be entirely out of line
with this policy should we make a discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the petitioner, and subject its
property to the harsh writ of seizure by attachment when it has complied not only with every requirement of law
32
made specially of foreign corporations, but in addition with every requirement of law made of domestic corporations. This case hinges on the proper interpretation and application of the rules on the admissibility of documentary
... evidence and the viability. of a civil action for damages arising from the same acts imputed to the defendant in a
criminal action where he has been acquitted.
Obviously, the assimilation of foreign corporations authorized to do business in the Philippines "to the status of
domestic corporations, subsumes their being found and operating as corporations, hence, residing, in the country. In the information filed against Rufo and Josephine Aviles, the private respondents herein, it was alleged that being
then sub-agents of Interpacific Transit, Inc. and as such enjoying its trust and confidence, they collected from its
The same principle is recognized in American law: that the residence of a corporation, if it can be said to have a various clients payments for airway bills in the amount of P204,030.66 which, instead of remitting it to their principal,
residence, is necessarily where it exercises corporate functions . . .;" that it is considered as dwelling "in the place they unlawfully converted to their own personal use and benefit. 1
where its business is done . . .," as being "located where its franchises are exercised . . .," and as being "present
where it is engaged in the prosecution of the corporate enterprise;" that a "foreign corporation licensed to do At the trial, the prosecution introduced photocopies of the airway bills supposedly received by the accused for which
business in a state is a resident of any country where it maintains an office or agent for transaction of its usual and they had not rendered proper accounting. This was done in, the course of the direct examination of one of the
customary business for venue purposes;" and that the "necessary element in its signification is locality of prosecution witnesses. 2 The defense objected to their presentation, invoking the best evidence rule. The
existence." [Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., vol. 37, pp. 394, 412, 493]. prosecution said it would submit the original airway bills in due time. Upon such undertaking, the trial court allowed
the marking of the said documents a s Exhibits "B" to "OO." The e prosecution n did submit the original airway bills
In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly registered branches at the time nor did it prove their loss to justify their substitution with secondary evidence. Nevertheless, when the certified
the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a photocopies of the said bills formally were offered, 3 in evidence, the defense interposed no objection.
resident of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have
assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving process. 27 In acquitting the accused, Judge Herminio I. Benito of the Regional Trial Court of Makati rejected the agency theory
of the prosecution and held that the relationship between the petitioner and Rufo Aviles was that of creditor and
Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only under the debtor only. "Under such relationship,' it declared, "the outstanding account, if any, of the accused in favor of ITI
processual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. would be in the nature of an indebtedness, the non- payment of which does not Constitute estafa." 4

We find NORTHWEST's claim for attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages to be without merit. The court' also held that the certified photocopies of the airway by were not admissible under the rule that "there
We find no evidence that would justify an award for attorney's fees and litigation expenses under Article 2208 of the can be no evidence of a writing the content of which is the subject of inquiry other' than the writing itself." Loss of
Civil Code of the Philippines. Nor is an award for exemplary damages warranted. Under Article 2234 of the Civil the originals had not been proved to justify the exception to the rule as one of the prosecution witness had testified
Code, before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded, the that they were still in the ITI bodega. Neither had it been shown that the originals had been "recorded in an existing
plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damaged. There being no such proof record a certified copy of which is made evidence by law."
presented by NORTHWEST, no exemplary damages may be adjudged in its favor.
In its order denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court declared that it "had resolved the issue of whether
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED insofar as it the accused has civil obligation to ITI on the basis of the admissibility in evidence of the xerox copies of the airway
denied NORTHWEST's claims for attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages but REVERSED bills." 5
insofar as in sustained the trial court's dismissal of NORTHWEST's complaint in Civil Case No. 83-17637 of Branch
54 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and another in its stead is hereby rendered ORDERING private respondent Right or wrong, the acquittal on the merits of the accused can no longer be the subject of an appeal under the
C.F. SHARP L COMPANY, INC. to pay to NORTHWEST the amounts adjudged in the foreign judgment subject of double jeopardy rule. However, the petitioner seeks to press the civil liability of the private respondents, on the
said case, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint therein until the said foreign ground that the dismissal of the criminal action did not abate the civil claim for the recovery of the amount. More to
judgment is fully satisfied. the point, ITI argues that the evidence of the airways bills should not have been rejected and that it had sufficiently
established the indebtedness of the private respondents to it.
Costs against the private respondent. SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals 6 affirmed, the decision of the trial court in toto, adding that the existing record spoken of in
Section 2 (e) and (d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court must be in the custody, of a public officer only. It also
declared that:

G.R. No. 86062 June 6, 1990 Since no evidence of civil liability was presented, no necessity existed on the part of the private respondents to
present evidence of payment of an obligation which was not shown to exist.
INTERPACIFIC TRANSIT, INC , vs.RUFO AVILES and JOSEPHINE AVILES,

33
The petitioner now asks this Court to annul that judgment as contrary to law and the facts established at the As in The time for objecting the evidence is when the same is offered. (Emphasis supplied).
the courts below, it is insisting on the admissibility of its evidence to prove the civil liability of the private
respondents. The objection of the defense to the photocopies of the airway bins while they were being Identified and marked as
exhibits did not constitute the objection it should have made when the exhibits were formally offered in evidence by
We agree with the petitioner. The certified photocopies of the airway bills should have been considered. the prosecution. No valid and timely objection was made at that time. And it is no argument to say that the earlier
objection should be considered a continuing objection under Sec. 37 of Rule 132, for that provision obviously refers
In assessing this evidence, the lower courts confined themselves to the best evidence rule and the nature of the to a single objection to a class of evidence (testimonial or documentary) which when first offered is considered to
documents being presented, which they held did not come under any of the exceptions to the rule. There is no encompass the rest of the evidence. The presumption is, of course, that there was an offer and a seasonable
question that the photocopies were secondary evidence and as such were not admissible unless there was ample objection thereto. But, to repeat, no objection was really made in the case before us because it was not made at the
proof of the loss of the originals; and neither were the other exceptions allowed by the Rules applicable. The trouble proper time.
is that in rejecting these copies under Rule 130, Section 2, the respondent court disregarded an equally important
principle long observed in our trial courts and amply supported by jurisprudence. It would have been so simple for the defense to reiterate its former objection, this time seasonably, when the formal
offer of exhibits was made. It is curious that it did not, especially so since the objections to the formal offer of
This is the rule that objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered. as an exhibit exhibits was made in writing. In fact, the defense filed no objection at all not only to the photocopies but to all the
and not before. Objection prior to that time is premature. other exhibits of the prosecution.

It is instructive at this paint to make a distinction between Identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer The effect of such omission is obvious. The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be
as an exhibit. The first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence an an validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. 9 This is true even if by its nature the evidence is
exhibit. The second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. The mere fact that a particular inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.
document is Identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean it will be or has been offered as part of the evidence
of the party. The party may decide to formally offer it if it believes this will advance its cause, and then again it may The records certainly would have been the, beet proof of such former conviction. The certificate was not the best
decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, the trial court is, under Rule 132, Section 35, not authorized to consider proof. There seems to be no justification for the presentation of proof of a character. ... Under an objection upon the
it. ground that the said certificate was not the best proof, it should have been rejected. Once admitted, however,
without objection, even though not admissible under an objection, we are not inclined now to reject it. If the
Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier. The Identification defendant had opportunely presented an objection to the admissibility of said certificate, no doubt the prosecution
of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence would have presented the best proof upon the questions to which said certificate relates. 10
for the party presenting it. Objection to the Identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection
to the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at the (It) is universally accepted that when secondary or incompetent evidence is presented and accepted without any
time it is formally offered as an exhibit. objection on the part of the other party, the latter is bound thereby and the court is obliged to grant it the probatory
value it deserves. 11
In the case at bar, the photocopies of the airway bills were objected to by the private respondents as secondary
evidence only when they, were being Identified for marking by the prosecution. They were nevertheless marked as We hold therefore that it was erroneous for the lower courts to reject the photocopies of the airway bills to prove the
exhibits upon the promise that the original airway bills would be submitted later. it is true that the originals were liability of the private respondents to the petitioner. While we may agree that there was really no criminal liability that
never produced. Yet, notwithstanding this omission, the defense did not object when the exhibits as previously could attach to them because they had no fiduciary relationship with ITI, the rejected evidence sufficiently
marked were formally offered in evidence. And these were subsequently admitted by the trial court. 7 established their indebtedness to the petitioner. Hence, we must reverse the ruling below that "on account of the
inadmissibility of the prosecution's Exhibits 'B' and 'OO', coupled with the denial made by the accused, there
In People v. Teodoro, 8 a document being Identified by a prosecution witness was objected to as merely secondary, appears to be no concrete proof of such accountability."
whereupon the trial judge ordered the testimony stricken out. This Court, in holding the objection to be premature,
said: Accoording to Rule 120, Section 2, of the Rules of Court:

It must be noted that the Fiscal was only Identifying the official records of service of the defendant preparatory to In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist,
introducing them as evidence. ... The time for the presentation of the records had not yet come; presentation was to the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party.
be made after their Identification. For what purpose and to what end the Fiscal would introduce them as evidence
was not yet stated or disclosed. ... The objection of counsel for the defendant was, therefore, premature, especially With the admission of such exhibits pursuant to the ruling above made, we find that there is concrete proof of the
as the Fiscal had not yet stated for what purpose he would introduce the said records. ... defendant's accountability. More than this, we also disbelieve the evidence of the private respondents that the said

34
airway bills had been paid for. The evidence consists only of check stubs corresponding to payments allegedly the without his first producing competent and documentary that there had been judicial proceedings for his by the
made by the accused to the ITI, and we find this insufficient. said spouses which resulted in the final judgment of a competent court decreeing his adoption.

As it is Aviles who has alleged payment, it is for him to prove that allegation. He did not produce any receipt of such On January 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin diamond intestate in Pasay City, survived by his wife, Margarita de
payment. He said that the cancelled payment checks had been lost and relied merely on the check stubs, which are Asis, and his adopted twin daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon, married to respondent Bernardo de Leon, and
self-serving. The prosecution correctly stressed in its motion for reconsideration that the accused could have easily respondent Irma Lazatin, married to Francisco Veloso.
secured a certification from the bank that the checks allegedly issued to ITI had been honored. No such certification
was presented. In short, the private respondents failed to establish their allegation that payment for the airway bills One month after Mariano's death, his widow, Margarita de Asis, commenced an intestate proceeding before the
delivered to them had been duly remitted to ITI. Court of First Instance of Pasay, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P. Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne, claiming
to be admitted illegitimate (not natural) children of Dr. Lazatin with one Helen Munoz, intervened. Subsequently, one
In Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 12 we held: Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be another admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.

There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to Two months after or on April 11, 1974, the widow, Margarita de Asis, also died, leaving a & holographic will
be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was executed on May 29, 1970, providing, among others, for a legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene
acquitted. He was, in fact, exonerated of the charge. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of
vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.
the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of
applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was I acquitted During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the People's Bank and Trust Company, Roxas
would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of Boulevard branch, which either she or respondent Nora L. de Leon could open. Five days after Margarita's death,
time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned. respondent Nora L. de Leon, accompanied by her husband, respondent Bernardo de Leon, opened the safety
deposit box and removed its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers and those of her sister,
By the same token, we find that remand of this case to, the trial court for further hearings would be a needless respondent Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to her mother. Respondent Nora L. de Leon claims
waste of time and effort to the prejudice of the speedy administration of justice. Applying the above ruling, we that she opened the safety deposit box in good faith, believing that it was held jointly by her and her deceased
hereby declare therefore, on the basis of the evidence submitted at the trial as reflected in the records before us, mother. Her sole reason for opening the box was to get her stock certificates and other small items deposited
that the private respondents are liable to the petitioner in the sum of P204,030.66, representing the cost of the therein. When she was to close the deposit box, the bank personnel informed her that she needed an authority from
airway bills. the court to do so, in view of her mother's death and so, she removed everything from the box.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and a On June 3, 1974, private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of the late Margarita de Asis, before
new one is rendered ORDERING the private respondents to. pay to the petitioner the sum of P204,030.66, with 6% docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P of respondent Court, Days after having learned that respondent Nora L. de Leon
interest from November 16, 1981, plus the costs of this suit. had opened this safety deposit box, petitioner's son, Ramon Sta. Clara, filed a motion in the probate court, claiming
that the deceased had executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate and demanding its production. He
SO ORDERED. likewise prayed for the opening of the safety deposit box. Respondent Nora L. de Leon admitted that she opened
the box but there was no will or any document resembling a will therein.

G.R. No. L-43955-56 July 30, 1979 Upon the order of the probate court, presided over by Judge Arsenio B. Alcantara, the safety deposit box was
opened on November 6, 1974, at which time it was found to be empty, because prior thereto respondent Nora L. de
RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., Leon had already removed its contents.

The Court dismisses the petition which seeks to overrule respondent judge's orders declaring that petitioner has On November 22, 1974, or seven months after, the death of Margarita de Asis, petitioner intervened for the first
failed to establish by competent evidence his alleged status as an adopted child of the deceased Lazatin spouses time in the proceedings to settle the estate of the late Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326- P), as an
and prays for judgment of this Court "declaring as established the fact of (his) adoption as a son of the deceased admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.
spouses entitling him to succeed in their estates as such." Respondent judge correctly ruled that he could not allow
petitioner (who had filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings to probate the will of the late Margarita de Asis Under the same date of November 22, 1974, petitioner's son, Ramon, filed a petition in the estate proceedings of
Vda. de Lazatin and to settle her estate as her adopted son, after having earlier filed a motion to intervene in the Margarita de Asis to examine private respondents on the contents of the safety deposit box, Whereupon, on
intestate proceedings of her pre-deceased husband as his admitted illegitimate [not natural] son), over the January 31, 1975, the probate court ordered respondent Nora L. de Leon to deliver the properties taken from the
opposition of private respondents, to introduce evidence that he had "enjoyed ... the status of an adopted child of
35
safety deposit box to the Clerk of Court. Subsequently, however, the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano this proceedings. In view thereof, and taking into consideration the evidence heretofore presented by the
Lazatin, and 2341-P, Margarita de Asis) were transferred to the sala of respondent Judge Jose C. Campos, Jr. petitioners, any further introduction of similar evidence, documentary or oral, would not prove or tend to prove the
fact of their adoption but rather of a recognized natural child.
On May 29, 1975, Judge Campos issued an order requiring counsel for respondents Nora L. de Leon and Bernardo
de Leon to produce all those papers and items removed from the safety deposit box and to deliver the same to the Petitioner then filed on March 16, 1976, in both cases, a motion to declare as established the fact of adoption in
custody of the court within one week. Within the period ordered, respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with the view of respondent Nora L. de Leon's refusal to comply with the orders of respondent court to deposit the items she
Clerk of Court, not the items themselves, but two keys to a new safety deposit box which could only be opened had removed from the safety deposit box of Margarita de Asis. As authority therefor, petitioner invokes the sanction
upon order of the court. of Rule 29, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, since according to him, the order of the court for the production of the
items in the safety deposit box can be considered as an order for production and inspection of documents under
On August 20, 1975, petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Rule 27.
Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin
Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, the petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and Private respondents opposed the motion, and on March 26, 1976, respondent court denied petitioner's motion. On
was later adopted by him. This affidavit was later modified on August 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted April 26, 1976, respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with respondent court the items she had removed from the
by both Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis. safety deposit box. An inventory was conducted by respondent court, with notice to the parties, and the items
surrendered consisted only of pieces of jewelry and stock certificates.
On September 29, 1975, Judge Campos found respondent' Nora L. de Leon guilty of contempt of court for not
complying with the orders of January 31, 1975 and May 29, 1975, requiring her to produce and deliver to the court On June 3,1976, respondent court, ruling on petitioners motion for definite resolution on his previous n declare as
an the papers and items removed from the safety deposit box. Her former counsel was also found guilty of established the fact of adoption, issued the f order: têñ.£îhqwâ£
contempt, sentenced to pay a fine of P00.00 and suspended from appearing in the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-
P, Mariano M. Lazatin, and Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, Margarita de Asis), on her testimony that she, Nora L. de Leon, As far as the case of Renato Sta. Clara is his Petition to establish his status as an adopted child, The Court has
acted upon his advice. ruled that he has failed to establish such status. The any motion for reconsideration unless based on some
documentary proof.
Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp.
Proc. No. 2341-P, at which hearings petitioner presented no decree of adoption in his, favor. Instead, petitioner Hence, the petition at bar.
attempted to prove, over private respondents' objections, that he had recognized the deceased spouses as his
parents; he had been supported by them until their death; formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" but was We find the ruling of the respondent court to be in conformity with law and jurisprudence.
compelled to change his surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased spouses refused to give consent to his
marriage to his present wife; that at first, he and his wife stayed at the residence of Engracio de Asis, father of 1. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem 2 which creates between two persons a relationship similar
Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred to the Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by the to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. 3 Only an adoption made through the court, or in
deceased spouses, where they continuously resided up to the present. Photographs were also intended to be pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. 4 It is not of
presented by petitioner, e.g., photograph of Irma Veloso where she addressed herself as sister of petitioner; natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. 5 To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be
photograph of deceased Margarita de Asis and petitioner when he was a boy; document showing that petitioners strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. 6 The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must
real name is "Renato Lazatin." 1 be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. The destruction by fire of a public building in which the
adoption papers would have been filed if existent does not give rise to a presumption of adoption nor is the
Respondent court first reserved its ruling on private respondents' objections to the admission of petitioner's destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to be presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a record of
evidence, but on November 14, 1975, when petitioner could not present evidence on the issue of his alleged legal adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its non-existence. 7 Where, under the provisions of the statute,
adoption, respondent court discontinued the hearing and gave the parties time to file memoranda on the question of an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court constitute the evidence by which such adoption
the admissibility of the evidence sought to be introduced by petitioner. may be established. 8

On March 4, 1976, respondent court barred the introduction of petitioner's evidence because: têñ.£îhqw⣠2. Petitioner's flow of evidence in the case below does not lead us to any proof of judicial adoption. We can
not pluck from his chain of evidence any link to the real existence of a court decree of adoption in his favor.
All the evidence submitted by Renato and Ramon Sta. Clara through their counsel do not prove or have no Petitioner's proofs do not show or tend to show that at one time or another a specific court of competent jurisdiction
tendency to prove the existence of any judicial proceeding where the adoption of the parties above named were rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated by the late spouses an order approving his adoption as a child of the
taken up by any court. Neither do the evidence tend to establish the presence of any record of a proceeding in court latter. No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof are presented or attempted to be presented. Petitioner
where the adoption of the above named persons was held. The evidence, however, tends to prove a status of a merely proceeds from a nebulous assumption that he was judicially adopted between the years 1928 and 1932. By
recognized natural child which, however, is not the legal basis for which Renato and Ramon seek to intervene in what particular court was the adoption decreed or by whom was the petition heard, petitioner does not even
36
manifest, much less show. There are no witnesses cited to that adoption proceeding or to the adoption decree. controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such actor
Apparently on the assumption that the adoption was commenced in Manila, petitioner's counsel secured a declaration ..."
certification from the Court of first Instance of Manila which, however, negatively reported "(T)hat among the
salvaged records now available in this Office, there has not been found, after a diligent search, any record 4. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were actually
regarding the adoption of Mr. Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara allegedly filed sometime in the years 1928 to lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former
1931 by the spouses Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin and Margarita de Asis Lazatin." The certification of the Local Civil existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents; although
Registrar of Manila "(T)hat our pre-war records relative to decisions of the Court of First Instance were either this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. 16 The sufficiency of the proof offered as a
destroyed or burned during the Liberation of the City of Manila," does not furnish any legal basis for a presumption predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the
of adoption in favor of petitioner. This is because there was no proof that petitioner was really adopted in Manila or circumstances of the particular case.17 As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to establish the former existence of
that an adoption petition was filed in the Court of first Instance of Manila by the deceased spouses, where, after the adoption paper and its subsequent loss or destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first
hearing, a judgment of approval was rendered by said court. Moreover, if there was really such adoption, petitioner beer. established that such adoption paper really existed and was lost. This is indispensable. 18 Petitioner's
could have conveniently secured a copy of the newpaper publication of the adoption as required under Section 4, supposed adoption was only testified to by him and is allegedly to be testified to a brother of the deceased Mariano
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court (formerly Section 4, Rule 100) or a certification of the publishing house to that effect. M. Lazatin or others who have witnessed that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child. If adoption
Petitioner's failure on this point is anotherer strong indication of the non-existence of the one who gave the written was really made, the records thereof should have existed and the same presented at the hearing or subsequent
consent of the non-existence of the adoption paper. We also observed to the adoption (Section 3, Rule 99, Rules of thereto or a reasonable explanation of loss or destruction thereof, if that be the case, adduced. 19
Court), whether the parents or orphanage, does not appear on this point is not so difficult and such proof must be
presented if only to prove the real existence of the adoption. And of course, if the war, the clear right and duty of Assuming the mere fact that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child does not justify the conclusion
petitioner was to duly reconstitute the records as provided by law. that petitioner had been in fact judicially adopted by the spouses nor does it constitute admissible proof of adoption.

3. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be We cannot entertain the plea of petitioner that the sanction of Rule 29 should be applied to consider as established
substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to the fact of his adoption due to the refusal of respondent Nora L. de Leon to produce the document of adoption,
establish such adoption. 9 Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime, that he intended to because first, the fact or real existence of petitioner's adoption had not been established; second, there is no proof
adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a that such document of adoption is in the possession of respondent Nora L. de Leon; third, the motu proprio order of
member of his family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption.10 the court for Nora de Leon to produce the items retrieved from the safety deposit box cannot be treated as a mode
Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and referred to one like petitioner of discovery of production and inspection of documents under Rule 27; and fourth, the items deposited in the safety
as an adopted child, recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily establish deposit box have already been surrendered by respondent Nora L. de Leon on April 26; 1976 and no document of
adoption of the child. 11 Withal, the attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of the adoption in favor of petitioner was listed as found in the safety deposit box.
deceased do not discharge the mandatory presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of petitioner's
evidence is rather to establish his status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an adopted child which status of an 5. As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot properly intervene
admitted illegitimate child was — the very basis of his petitioner for intervention in the estate proceedings of the late in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P as an adopted child because of lack of
Dr. Lazatin, as above stated. (Supra, at page 3 hereof) proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate,
either as one who would be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. 20 A child
We do not discount though that declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on the principle by adoption cannot inherit from the parent creditor. by adoption unless the act of adoption has been done in strict
that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the truth. 12 Pedigree testimony is admitted because it accord with the statue. Until this is done, no rights are acquired by the child and neither the supposed adopting
is the best that the nature of the case admits and because greater evil might arise from the rejection of such proof parent or adopted child could be bound thereby. 21 The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person
than from its admission. 13 But, in proving an adoption, there is a better proof available and it should be produced. claiming such relationship. He must prove compliance with the statutes relating to adoption in the jurisdiction where
The whereabouts of the child's family and circulation of the jurisdiction in which they resided and investigation in the adoption occurred. 22 A fortiori if no hereditary interest in the estate can be gained by a claimant who failed to
those courts where adoption are usually granted would surely produce an adoption order, if indeed there was an submit proof thereof, whether the will is probated or not, intervention should be denied as it would merely result in
order. 14 Besides, since the point in favor of receiving hearsay evidence upon matters of family history or pedigree unnecessary complication. 23 To succeed, a child must be ligitimate, legitimated, adopted, acknowledged
is its reliability, it has been set forth as a condition upon which such evidence is received that it emanate from a illegitimate natural child or natural child by legal fiction or recognized spurious child. 24
source within the family. Pursuant to this view, before a declaration of a deceased person can be admitted to prove
pedigree, or ancestry, the relationship of the declarant, by either of blood or affinity to the family in question, or a In the face of the verified pleadings of record (constituting judicial admissions) which show that petitioner sought to
branch thereof, must ordinarily be established by competent evidence. 15 Section 33 of Rule 130 states: "The act or intervene on November 22, 1974 in the estate proceedings of his alleged adoptive father Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin
declaration of a person deceased, or outside of the Philippines, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P) as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child, 25 while his intervention on August 20, 1975 in
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the the estate of Margarita de Asis, widow of the deceased Dr. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P) was as her adopted child
on the basis of the affidavit of a brother of the deceased Dr. Lazatin, Benjamin Lazatin, executed August 19, 1975
37
(which affidavit modified a first affidavit executed on May 31, 1975, which failed to estate by "oversight" petitioner, Margarita de Asis (unless, as reserved to him by the court below, he can show some documentary proof),and
but stated that affiant knew petitioner to be "an illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin who later "legally adopted (him) as a whose intervention in the estate of the deceased Dr. Mariano Lazatin is as an admitted illegitimate child, win have to
son before the Court of First Instance of Manila sometime between the years 1928 and 1921") and prescinding from decide whether he will pursue his first theory of having the of such admitted illegitimate child of said deceased.
the question of whether a natural or spurious child may be legally adopted by the putative father, we hold that no Whatever be his theory and his course of action and whether or not he may be duly snowed to intervene in the
grave abuse of discretion nor error of law as committed by respondent judge in issuing the questioned orders of proceedings below as such alleged admitted illegitimate child, his recourse in the event of an adverse ruling against
March 4, 1976, March 26, 1976 and June 3, 1976 denying petitioner's petition "to declare as established in this him is to make a formal offer of proof and of his excluded evidence, oral and documentary, and seek a reversal on
proceeding the fact of adoption" and denying "any motion for reconsideration unless based on some documentary an appeal in due course.
proof." The Court finds no basis to grant the affirmative relief sought in this proceeding by petitioner for a rendition
of judgment "declaring as established the fact of your petitioner's adoption as a son of the deceased spouses ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed and the questioned orders denying petitioner's petition below "to declare
entitling him to succeed in their estates as such in accordance with the applicable law on succession as to his as established in this proceeding the fact of [his] adoption" are hereby affirmed. The temporary restraining order
inheritance." issued on June 16, 1976 and amended on July 21, 1976 is ordered lifted, effective immediately. Without costs.

Upon the filing of the petition, the Court issued on June 16, 1976 a temporary restraining order; which as amended SO ORDERED
on July 21, 1976, restrained respondent judge "from proceeding with the hearing scheduled on June 17, 1976 at
8:30 a.m., requiring the submission of evidence to establish heirship in Special Proceedings No. 2326-P entitled
'Intestate Estate of the Late Mariano M. Lazatin' and Special Proceedings No. 2341-P, entitled 'Testate Estate of the G.R. No. L-28297 March 30, 1970 ELPIDIO JAVELLANA vs D. O. PLAZA ENTERPRISES, INC.,
late Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin,' and from proceeding with the probate of the alleged holographic will of the
deceased Doñ;a Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin scheduled on June 29, 1976, August 10 and 12, 1976 and on Direct appeal, on points of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 46762,
any other dates." With the Court's determination of the issues as herein set forth, there is no longer any need for modifying an earlier decision for the plaintiff by reducing the rate of interest on the sum adjudged, and also the
restraining the proceedings below and the said restraining order shall be immediately lifted. attorney's fees; and by ordering the plaintiff to pay damages to the defendant on account of a preliminary
attachment obtained by the former upon the latter's counterclaim.
On January 24, 1977, the Court upon petitioner's motion resolved to conditionally allow respondent judge "to take
the deposition of petitioner's witnesses to perpetuate their testimonies pursuant to Rule 134, Section 7 of the Rules The complaint in the aforesaid civil case was for collection of the sum of P43,017.32 representing balance due on
of Court, subject to the Court's ruling in due course on the admissibility of such testimonies." The Court thereby purchases of wire ropes, tractors and diesel parts made by the defendant-appellee, D. O. Plaza Enterprises, Inc.,
permitted in effect the advance testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, principally among them Rafael Lazatin and from the plaintiff-appellant, Elpidio Javellana. The complaint prayed that the defendant be ordered to pay the said
Esteban L. Lazatin, both brothers of the deceased Dr. Mariano L. Lazatin and as stated in petitioner's motion of sum of P43,017.32, with legal interest, plus attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00; it also prayed for a writ of
January 11, 1977: têñ.£îhqw⣠preliminary attachment.

Substantially, the testimony of the above-named witnesses will be on the fact that they had been informed by the Upon plaintiff's putting up a bond, the trial court, on 15 April 1961, issued a writ of attachment. On 20 May 1961, the
deceased spouses, Mariano and Margarita Lazatin that your petitioner was their [Mariano's and Margarita's] defendant moved to discharge the attachment on the ground that it was improperly issued. The motion was denied.
judicially adopted son and to elicit further from them the fact that your petitioner enjoys the reputation of being their
judicially adopted son in the Lazatin family. On 7 November 1961, the defendant filed its answer and counter-claimed for damages arising from the attachment.
The plaintiff answered and interposed a counterclaim to the counterclaim.
The Court's resolution allowing the advance testimonies of petitioner's witnesses was but in application of the
Court's long standing admonition to trial courts is reaffirmed in Lamagan vs. De la Cruz, 26, "to be liberal in After some years, or on 27 April 1966, the defendant moved for the dissolution of the preliminary attachment. Upon
accepting proferred evidence since even if they were to refuse to accept the evidence, the affected party will its filing a counterbond, the court, on 7 May 1966, dissolved the attachment.
nevertheless be allowed to spread the excluded evidence on the record, for review on appeal." The Court therein
once again stressed the established rule that "it is beyond question that rulings of the trial court on procedural On 3 November 1966, the plaintiff filed a motion to admit his amended complaint, which the court granted on 12
questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of the trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be November 1966. In this amended complaint, the plaintiff averred that of the sum of P43,017.32 alleged in the
the subject of separate appeal or review on certiorari, but are to be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal original complaint, the defendant has paid P3,900.00, thereby leaving a balance of P39,117.32 unpaid, but that, as
properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case," 27 and that a party's recourse indicated by invoices, defendant's purchases were payable within thirty (30) days and were to bear interest of 12%
when proferred evidence is rejected by the trial court is to make a offer stating on the record what a party or witness per annum plus 25% attorney's fees. The amended complaint accordingly prayed for the increased amounts.
would have testified to were his testimony not excluded, as well as to attach to the record any rejected exhibits. Defendant did not answer this amended complaint.

At the continuation of the proceedings below for declaration of heirship and for probate of the alleged holographic After trial, the court, on 15 June 1967, rendered judgment. It found the following facts:
the deceased Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin, pet who has failed to establish his status as an alleged ;m child of
38
.... During the period from 23 July 1959 to 30 July 1960, defendant, in a series of transactions, purchased from Plaintiff-appellant assigns the following errors: the reduction of the attorney's fees, the reduction of the interest, and
plaintiff wire ropes, tractors and diesel spare parts, (in) payment for which he issued several checks amounting to the grant to the defendant of damages arising from the attachment.
P43,017.32, which, when presented to the bank, were dishonored for lack of funds. Defendant substituted these
checks with another set of checks for the same amount, but again, the same were dishonored for lack of funds, as The first two assigned errors are well taken. The court a quo reduced the interest stated in its previous decision
evidenced by Exhibits A to M, except for one check in the amount of P3,900.00 as evidenced by Exhibit C. Thus, from 12% to mere legal interest and the attorney's fees from 25% to P5,000.00 on the basis of estoppel, the ground
the principal obligation was reduced to P39,117.32. At the time of the issuance of the said checks, the defendant therefor being that the reduced amounts were those alleged, hence admitted, by the plaintiff in his original
never informed plaintiff that it had funds to back them up. Plaintiff made demands to defendant for payment, but complaint. This was error. The original complaint was not formally offered in evidence. Having been amended, the
defendant pleaded for time and liberalization of payment, which was rejected by the plaintiff. The transactions in original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and became
question were covered by invoices listed in Exhibit P, a sample of which is evidenced by Exhibit C, wherein said merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, requires its formal offer.
transactions were for 30-day term, 12% interest per annum to be charged from date of invoice, and 25% attorney's
fees in case of litigation. Pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record as judicial admissions. However, any statement
contained therein may be considered as an extrajudicial admission, and as such, in order that the court may take it
The defendant claims that there were other transactions between plaintiff and defendant involving the amount of into consideration, it should be offered formality in evidence. (5 Moran 58, citing Lucido v. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 148;
P196,828.58; that it had no intention not to pay the checks it issued upon presentment; and that it suffered Bastida v. Menzi, 58 Phil. 188.)
damages in the amount of P14,800.00 by reason of the attachment.
Where amended pleadings have been filed, allegations in the original pleadings can have no effect, unless formally
xxx xxx xxx offered in evidence. (Jones on Evidence, Sec. 273.)

The counterclaim for damages arising from the attachment is without merit. The defendant was manifestly in bad Since the record does not show that the complaint (marked as Exhibit 115) was admitted in evidence, there is no
faith when it issued two sets of bouncing checks. Hence, the attachment was not improper, contrary to defendant's proof of estoppel on the part of the plaintiff on his allegations in the complaint. Not only this, but since the stipulation
claim. for 12% interest on balance due and the 25% counsel fees appear on the invoices themselves, appellee Plaza
Enterprises cannot fairly claim that it was deceived or misled by the pleadings of appellant. Even more, the original
The dispositive portion of the decision decreed: plea for P5,000.00 as attorney's fees is only contained in the prayer of the original complaint, and it is a well
established rule that the prayer for relief, although part of the complaint, is no part of the cause of action and does
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter to pay the not give character, the plaintiff being entitled to as much relief as the facts warrant (Rosales vs. Reyes, 25 Phil. 495;
former the sum of P39,117.32 with interest at 12% per annum from 14 April 1961, the date of the filing of the Aguilar vs. Rubiato, 40 Phil. 470).
original complaint, until final payment, plus 25% of the principal indebtedness as attorney's fees and costs of suit.
But the appellant's last assigned error is without merit. Although the defendant was found to be in bad faith in
The counterclaim as well as the counterclaim to the counter claim are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. issuing two (2) sets of bouncing checks in payment for its indebtedness, such bad faith was not related to his having
incurred the obligation in favor of the plaintiff but to defendant's failure to perform said obligation. There was,
On 28 June 1967, the defendant moved to reconsider. Over the objection of the plaintiff, the court issued an order therefore, no ground for the plaintiff to attach the defendant's properties on the ground of fraud. That the plaintiff
dated 10 August 1967, now the subject of the present appeal, modifying the previous decision, in the manner acted in good faith in securing attachment does not relieve him from the damages that the defendant sustained by
following: reason of the attachment because he, the plaintiff, was, in the first place, not entitled to attachments, the element of
malice was unnecessary (3 Moran, Rules of Court, 19).
WHEREFORE, the dispositive part of the decision rendered in this case is hereby modified as follows:
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby reversed insofar as it reduced the amount of
(a) By ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P39,117.20 plus the legal interest therein from the attorney's fees and the interest on the principal sum adjudged in the original decision dated 15 June 1967; but the
filing of the complaint until the amount is fully paid. order is affirmed in all other respects. No costs.

(b) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant the sum of P16,190.00, the amount of damages suffered by the Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
defendant on account of the preliminary attachment of the defendant; and

(c) By ordering the defendant to pay P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. G.R. No. L-11889 January 10, 1918

Without pronouncement as to costs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, applicant-appllee, vs. CARMEN MARTINEZ and DOLORES
MARTINEZ,
39
In the cadastral proceedings instituted in the Court of Land Registration for the settlement of titles to lands in the Juan Madrenas Soler, attorney in fact of Julio Salvador, who was away in Spain during the trial, testified: That Julio
municipality of Iloilo, Province of Iloilo, Dolores and Carmen Martinez on May 11, 1914, appeared claiming to be the Salvador gave him certain papers referring to the land in question and that he looked among them for the document
owners of lots Nos. 873 and 450. They alleged in effect, after describing said lots, that they were in possession of the sale executed by the Martinez sisters in favor of Antonio Domenech but did not find it; that the made
thereof for about twenty-five years, having acquired them by donation from Maria Sarlabus, and that their investigations concerning said document, having interviewed My. Yulo, because he remembered that when
predecessors in interest had had possession of the same for at least three years prior to said Salvador left for Spain he told the witness that the documents concerning the case had been in Yulo's possession,
donation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library who informed him that the Martinez sisters had been looking for the same documents having asked him about
them, to which he answered that he remembered having returned those papers to Domenech and that he did not
When the case came up for trial, Julio Salvador, through his attorney, entered his appearance and claimed title to have them, not having found them, when he had looked for them, but that, according to Mr. Yulo himself, a copy of
said lots, alleging that he was in actual possession thereof, and that his predecessors in interest had been in them was in some archive in Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
possession before him for at least fourteen years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As the claimants Martinez denied having sold the aforesaid two lots to Antonio Domenech,, as stated by the witness
Trial having been held and the parties having adduced their evidence, judgment was rendered by the Court of First Saez, and having executed a document of sale of said lots in favor of Domenech, the attorney for Julio Salvador,
Instance of Iloilo, which took the place of the Court of Land Registration, denying the claim of Carmen and Dolores besides the document of sale of said lots executed by Antonio Domenech in favor of Julio Salvador on March 14,
Martinez and adjudicating said lots to Julio Salvador, on the ground that, in the opinion of the court, it was proved 1912 (Exhibit 1), presented also a certified copy issued by the acting registrar of deeds of Iloilo and dated May 13,
that the Martinez sisters had sold said land to one named Domenech and that the latter, in return, sold it to Julio 1914 (Exhibit 2). In referring to the registration of the property consisting of the two lots in question, after mentioning
Salvador, who could, therefore, be considered owner of the disputed lots.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles the acquisition of said lots by Carmen and Dolores Martinez by virtue of a donation inter vivos made to them of one
virtual law library of said lots by Maria Sarlabus and of a grant of the other in their favor by Anastasio Montes, respectively, on
September 19, 1889, and April 24, 1893, said certified copy stated that said Martinez sold the same lots, that is, the
Dolores and Carmen Martinez excepted to said judgment and filed a bill of exceptions after their motion for new trial property in the city, to Antonio Domenech de Toldra for the sum of one hundred fifty pesos, and that the vendors
had been overruled, and they had excepted to the order overruling said motion. they now allege that the trial court acknowledged having received the price from the purchaser before the execution of the contract. Said copy also
erred:chanrobles virtual law library contained all that was stated in the document of sale executed on January 9, 1900, before the notary public, Don
Gregorio Yulo y Regalado, and presented in that registry at 9:30 a. m. on April 23, 1900, according to entry No. 2,
1. In admitting the copy of the record of a supposed document of sale presented by the oppositor Julio Salvador, in vol. 1 of the daybook. It further stated that in the same entry there was a marginal note which read: "This property
support of his claim of title without the disappearance or loss of the original document having been previously was sold too Mr. Julio Salvador y Miralles, as appears from record No. 2 of this property No. . . . page . . . of vol. 6
proved;chanrobles virtual law library of this book." And said acting registrar, Roman Lacson, having appeared at the trial, indicated said registration in
the book mentioned in said certificate, and also stated that Exhibit 2 was a true and exact copy
2. In not considering the evidence of the appellants as to his acts of possession and ownership on the lot in thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
question; and,chanrobles virtual law library
Said entry, that is, the certified copy already referred to (Exhibit 2), having been presented as evidence, as already
3. In adjudicating and decreeing the registration of said lot in favor of said oppositor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary stated, the attorney of the Martinez claimants objected, alleging that it has not been satisfactorily proved that the
chanrobles virtual law library document of sale said to have been executed by them in favor of Antonio Domenech was lots; that Julio Salvador
did not say, nor was there any statement, made by him or his attorney in fact, that the document was in his
According to the testimony of Tiburcio Saez, witness of Julio Salvador, he was acquainted with the latter for about possession, and, finally, that the previous existence of such document has not been proved nor had anybody seen
twelve or fourteen years; Julio Salvador acquired said lots from Antonio Domenech, as appeared in the document it before its supposed loss. The court, however, on the ground that Julio Salvador's counsel did all he could possibly
exhibited to him at the trial, dated March 14, 1912, and signed by him (the witness) in the name, and at the request, do when he found himself obliged to present said document, admitted said certified copy (Exhibit 2), the attorney for
of the vendor Domenech because the latter had a trembling hand and a poor eyesight; the notary and two the appellants having excepted to this ruling.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
witnesses were present at the time of signing; said lots, according to the document, consisted of three pieces, to
wit, one acquired by Domenech from Anastasio Montes and the other two from Dolores and Carmen Martinez who, The oppositor or claimant Julio Salvador was under the obligation to present, as evidence of his supposed title to
because of certain difficulties he had been in, sold them in a document acknowledged before the notary public, Mr. the lots in question, the document of sale of the said two lots, which, accordingly to the witness Saez, was executed
Yulo; he was not presented when the transaction was effected, having only learned of it from the plaintiffs; he did by the Martinez sisters in favor of Antonio Domenech; for to prove said title it was not sufficient for them to present,
not know of any other possessor of said land but Domenech, during his lifetime, and Julio Salvador; after as they did, the document of sale of said lots executed by said Domenech on March 14, 1912, in favor of Julio
Domenech's death Dolores Martinez told him that the lands did not belong to the former but to them, and finally, Salvador, in the execution of which, according to the declaration of the same witness, Saez, he took part, signing in
Julio Salvador took possession of said lands at the time of the sale, a fact which he afterwards knew from Salvador the name, and at the request, of the vendor Domenech; but said certified copy of the record in the registry, Exhibit
himself, for he was not personally present when the possession was taken.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles 2, in which mention is made of the document, was presented by said oppositor, in view of the fact that he did not
virtual law library have said document in his possession. Nevertheless Julio Salvador ought first to have proved the loss of said
40
original document and that the same was duly signed and only then could he have proved the contents-thereof by
means of the certified copy of the record, Exhibit 2, or by the statement therein contained of that sale, according to Section 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "The written acts of record of the acts of the sovereign
the provisions of section 321 of the Code of Civil Procedure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library authority, of official bodies and tribunals and of public officers, legislative, judicial, and executive of the Philippine
Islands, or of the United States, or of any States of the United States or of a foreign country, and public records kept
The knowledge of the witness Juan Madrenas Soler attorney in fact of Salvador, concerning said document of sale in the Philippine Islands of private writings are public writings. A copy of a public writing, duly certified to be a true
was obtained from Mr. Yulo who, according to said witness, had told him that the documents referring to the land in copy thereof, is admissible evidence in like cases and in like effect as the original writing." The appellee
question were again delivered by him to Mr. Domenech. Said witness also testified that before the search for said understands that as the copy of a public writing duly certified to be a true copy has the same effects as the original,
document, he had no occasion to see it as he was not interested; that he did not attempt to look for it after making according to section 299, such a copy, as a public writing, is included in the exception of section 321 of the same
the declaration he made in the municipal building; that Julio Salvador himself, before leaving for Spain had not Code, which provides that secondary evidence of the contents of a document cannot be admitted without the
instructed him to look for said papers; and finally, that when Salvador gave him power to represent him in all his requirement of said section having been complied with, as already explained in the preceding
business he only recommended that the name of Antonio Domenech be changed with that of his paragraphs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
own.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The first observation that may be made against said argument, is that the certified copy issued by the acting
As already stated, Tiburcio Saez only said that he knew that due to certain informations, Dolores and Carmen registrar of deeds of Iloilo, Exhibit 2, is not a true copy of the document of sale which is said to have been executed
Martinez had executed a document of sale in favor of Domenech before the notary public Mr. Yulo, but that he did by the Martinez sisters in favor of Antonio Domenech, but of the recital appearing in the books of said registry with
not see its execution, learning thereof only through statements made by the Martinez sisters, which the latter denied respect to the urban property, consisting of those two lots, which recital is to the effect that there was presented in
while testifying at the trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library the office of the registrar at 9:30 a. m. on April 23, 1900, a document of sale, executed on January 9 of said year by
Carmen and Dolores Martinez before the notary, D. Gregorio Yulo y Regalado, in favor of Antonio Domenech, of
The oppositor Julio Salvador did not present as a witness the notary public, Mr. Yulo, before whom, according to the said property or lot composed of two parts, one acquired by said Martinez from Doña Maria Victoria Sarlabus by
witness Saez, Domenech executed said document of sale, in order that he might testify on this point and donation inter vivos, according to the document of September 19, 1889, ratified before a notary of that province, D.
corroborate the references made to him by the witnesses Madrenas and Saez and especially by the first, with Andres Pastor Santana, and the other by a grant from D. Anastasio Montes, as evidenced by a private document
respect to the whereabouts of the document. No attempt appears to have been made to present as witnesses said executed on April 24, 1893. On the margin of said entry it is stated that said lot was sold to Julio Salvador. In short,
notary and those persons who must have seen the signing of the document, nor was it shown that said document the effect of the certified copy as evidence is that said document, in which the facts already stated appear, was
had been lost. Finally, it does not appear that Julio Salvador or his lawyer or his attorney in fact, Madrenas, had presented to the registrar of deeds on April 23, 1900. So that all that was certified to by the registrar of deeds in the
made any effort to obtain a copy of said document from the general archives in the City of Manila, where, according document, Exhibit 2, is that said recital, referring to the document appears in the books of the registry. For this
to the lawyer himself, it could be secured. He, however, promised, after the introduction of evidence, to present it reason it is evident that as said certified copy was not a copy of the original document it could not, unlike the original
after looking for it in the archives, which promise was made good, although the court said that he wound limit writing, be properly admitted as evidence in the present case on the ground that it was a public document according
himself to the evidence therefore introduced, for the trial having terminated on May 15, 1914, and the court having to section 299. Neither could said copy produce the same legal effect as the original. Such certification has the
rendered judgment on December 15, 1915, that is, one and one-half years afterwards, he had had sufficient time character of a public document and is such indeed, according to said section 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
within which to look for said document and ask for the admission thereof, in case it should be found, before the final but is only effect is to show that said document was presented at the office of the registrar of deeds of Iloilo, where
judgment appealed from was rendered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library the aforesaid statements appear. It does not, however, prove that said lots had in fact been sold by the Martinez
sisters to Antonio Domenech, or that the document presented was true, duly executed or ratified before the notary,
The loss of said document of sale which, it is said, had been executed by the Martinez sisters in favor of Domenech D. Gregorio Yulo, for the simple reason that said document presented to the registrar might have been false and
not having been proved and no proof having been offered that said document was duly executed and signed, all of simulated, and the signatures appearing thereon might not have been the authentic and legitimate signatures of the
this being due to an obvious lack of diligence on the part of the oppositor himself, his lawyer and attorney in fact, the vendors, or of the notary before whom it was ratified, or of the witnesses who appear in said document as
presentation of the certified copy of the registration, Exhibit 2, and its admission by the court as secondary and eyewitnesses to the signing thereof by the vendors.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
supplementary evidence of said document, was improper and cannot serve as a basis for us to hold it proven, as
the lower court did hold, that the Martinez sisters had sold the land in question to Antonio Domenech and that It is true that section 299 already cited includes among public documents the public records of private writings
having acquired it from the latter, Julio Salvador, the oppositor, could be adjudged to be the owner of said disputed existing in the Philippine Islands; and this may very well give rise to the interpretation , which the appellee seems to
lots.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library give it, that the entry in the books of the registry of Iloilo as to the presentation of said document of conveyance
executed by the Martinez sisters in favor of Domenech is a public record of the same writing, and therefore the
The appellee, however, invoking section 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure, maintains that said certified copy, recital of said entry is a public writing. But in the first place it must be taken into account that the entry made in the
Exhibit 2, issued by the acting registrar of deeds of Iloilo, was properly admitted as evidence in the same manner registry and mentioned in Exhibit 2 refers only to the presentation of the writing at the office of the registrar; and as
that the original deed of sale of said lots said to have been executed by the Martinez sister in favor of Antonio the Martinez sisters denied at the trial having executed said document in favor of Domenech and sold the property
Domenech, which, copy being a public document, had the same effect as the original.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary therein described, and the document itself not being literally transcribed in said entry or registry, and as it is neither
chanrobles virtual law library proved that in the filing of said document with the registrar the Martinez sisters took any part, said certified copy
41
cannot have the effect of proving the said sale took place, even considering said document as a public writing. It obtained from the same source, no ground can be laid for resorting to evidence of an inferior or secondary
was therefore necessary for the claimant Julio Salvador, in order to fully and sufficiently prove his alleged title to character. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, p. 912, par. 68, and cases therein cited.) chanrobles virtual law library
that real property, to present the original document of said to have been executed by the Martinez sisters in favor of
Domenech, or a literal copy of the same, or a recital thereof appearing in some authentic document. If he could not Preliminary to the introduction of secondary evidence under the principle herein referred to, the proponent must
do so he should have proved its contents by means of the recollection that a witness might have had establish the former existence of the primary evidence, and its loss or destruction as the case may be. . . . It has
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library been held that the existence of a deed is sufficiently proved where there is a preponderance of proof in its favor.
(Ruling Case Law, vol, 10, p. 917, par. 75, and cases therein cited.) chanrobles virtual law library
The recital in the entry in the registry, a certified copy of which has been presented as Exhibit 2, by counsel of Julio
Salvador, cannot be held to have the effect of proving the contents of the documents referred to, for the reason that The contents of a lost instrument cannot be proved unless it appears that reasonable search has been made in the
the Martinez claimants have questioned and denied the authenticity of said document which, according to the entry place where the paper was last know to have been, and if not found there, that inquiry has been made of the person
in the registry, was presented to the registrar on April 23, 1900. And, as already stated with respect to the last known to have had its custody. (Ruling Case Law, vol, 10, p. 917, par. 76, and cases therein cited.) chanrobles
recollection that a witness may have of said document, none of the witnesses who testified for the oppositor, virtual law library
Salvador, affirmed having seen such document, said witnesses having learned of it only by reference, as he himself
stated, from the Martinez claimants themselves, who denied even this fact.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles In accordance with the rule set forth in the next preceding paragraph parol evidence of the contents of a will is
virtual law library inadmissible, unless it is first shown that diligent and unavailing search has been made for the original, by or at the
request of the party interested, and in the place where it is most likely to be found. . . . But to justify admission of
But whether said entry in the registry be considered as a recital of said document in an authentic writing, or whether secondary evidence of a deed, it is not necessary to prove its loss beyond all possibility of mistake. A reasonable
it be held that some witness had some recollection of said document, this secondary evidence of said document probability of its loss is sufficient; and this may be shown by a bona fide and diligent search, fruitless made for it in
should not have been admitted by the court for the reason that the oppositor, Julio Salvador, had not first complied places where it is likely to be found. (Ruling Case Law, vol, 10, p. 918, par. 77, and cases therein cited.)
with the provisions of section 321 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
As the failure of the oppositor to present the original document in question was not accounted for; as it is not proper
The best obtainable evidence should be adduced to prove every disputed fact, and a failure to produce it, but an to suppose that the original could not have been presented within a reasonable time if he had exercised due
attempt instead to sustain the issue by inferior evidence, will authorize the inference that the party does not furnish diligence for he or his counsel had the means, opportunity and time to find the original if it really existed; as no proof
the best evidence because it would tend to defeat, instead of sustaining, the issue of his part. In requiring the was adduced that said document had been lost, or destroyed, or that proper search therefor was made in the
production of the best evidence applicable to each particular fact, it is meant that no evidence shall be received general files of notarial documents in the City of Manila, or that an attempt was made to secure a copy thereof if it
which is merely substitutionary in its nature, so long as the original evidence can be had. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, existed in said files; as the notary, Gregorio Yulo, a person well known in Iloilo, was not asked directly and clearly
p. 903, par. 54, and cases therein cited.) chanrobles virtual law library as to the whereabouts of said document or some particular or data it in order to obtain from him some conclusive
and categorical answer; as said notary has not been presented at the trial to be examined on these points; and,
Undoubtedly the best evidence of the contents of a written instrument consists in the actual production of the lastly, as it was not shown that the party interested in the presentation of said document who is Julio Salvador, had
instrument itself, and the general rule is that secondary evidence of its contents cannot be admitted until the made a diligent and proper, but fruitless, search for said document in any place where it could probably be found -
nonproduction of the original has been satisfactory accounted for. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, p. 903, par. 55, and therefore the secondary evidence presented by the oppositor, consisting of the testimony of the witnesses, Saez
cases therein cited.) chanrobles virtual law library and Madrenas, and the certified copy issued by the registrar of deeds of Iloilo, Exhibit 2, is of no value for the
purpose intended and such evidence was improperly considered by the court in reaching the conclusion that said
Secondary evidence of the contents of writings if admitted on the theory that the original cannot be produced by the Julio Salvador was the owner of the lots in question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
party by whom the evidence is offered, within a reasonable time by the exercise of reasonable diligence. And
ordinarily secondary evidence is not admissible until the nonproduction of the primary evidence has been But not only this - as stated in said certified copy of the registry, Exhibit 2, Carmen and Dolores Martinez acquired
sufficiently accounted for. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, p. 911, par. 66, and cases therein cited.) chanrobles virtual said lots, one by donation inter vivos from Maria Sarlabus, made in a public document, and the other by grant fro
law library Anastasio Montes, evidenced by a private document. These documents being a part of the title deeds of the lots,
they ought to have been delivered by the Martinez sisters to Domenech; and when the registration of said sale in
Under the earlier English decisions no degrees of secondary evidence are recognized. The American courts, the registry was asked, these documents should have been presented by the latter, together with the deed of sale
however, have asserted that secondary evidence, to be admissible, must be the best evidence obtainable under the which is said to have been the notary Yulo on January 9, 1900; and when they were returned to Domenech or to
circumstances. . . . It is a rule of evidence, too ancient and too well understood to require proof of its existence, that any other, the registrar ought to have made at the foot of said documents, a note stating the fact of their
the original instrument is better evidence than a copy. Again, whenever a copy of a record or document is itself presentation, together with the document of April 23, 1900, as well as of the fact that they were properly noted in the
made original or primary evidence, the rule is clear and well settled that it must be a copy made directly from or registry; and, finally, said documents ought to be in the possession of Domenech, and afterwards, when the lots
compared with the original. If the first copy be lost, or in the hands of the opposite party, so long as another may be were sold to Julio Salvador, those documents should have been delivered by Domenech to the
latter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
42
 The attorney for the Bishop of Jaro, Jose Maria Arroyo, witness for the claimants, Martinez, stated that the bishop,
Yet said documents were not in the possession of Julio Salvador, or his attorney in fact, but of Dolores and Carmen having attempted to acquire the lot in question, as it adjoins a lot of his, Domenech took him to the land, stating that
Martinez, who presented them at the trial and were there marked as Exhibit A and B, for the purpose of proving he wanted to sell it, but that the bishop did not put the sale through, because he suspected that it belonged to the
their title to said lots, and there appears no note whatever of the registrar to the effect that they had been presented Martinez sisters; that he could not tell whose property it was; that he did not know whether Domenech possessed it;
in the registry and that they had been noted in said office. This is evident proof that really they were not presented that he did not know who collected the fruits of the land, but he had information that it belonged to the Martinez
to the registrar when the document of sale alleged to have been executed on January 9, 1900, by the Martinez sisters, although he had not seen the title deeds, documents, or anything. He furthermore insisted that the purchase
sisters in favor of Domenech, and ratified before the notary public, Mr. Yulo, was presented by Domenech or his was not effected because of the doubts that existed about the ownership of the land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
representative. Said document of donation, Exhibit B, and that of grant, Exhibit A, being among the title deeds of chanrobles virtual law library
said lots, it is strange that in registering said sale the should have presented the said document only, the existence
and execution of which were denied by the Martinez sisters. There are therefore sufficient grounds to hold it not Lastly, according to Dolores Martinez, a woman who like her sister Carmen, was already in the sixties, Antonio
proved that the latter sold said lots to Antonio Domenech, and, consequently, they could not have transferred any Domenech lived in their house before the bombardment of the city (which must have taken place in 1898) until
title thereto to Julio Salvador.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 1912, when he died; that although Domenech had been a supervisor of laborers, he no longer had that occupation
when he came to live in their house; that during the first years he paid the corresponding rent, but after the
On the other hand, the title of Carmen and Dolores Martinez to said lots, Nos. 873 and 450, which constitute the bombardment he ceased to pay rent and for his subsistence, which was given him by them. Dolores Martinez and
property described in their claim and that of Julio Salvador, respectively, is recognized by the latter, when he her sister also denied having sold the two lots of land in question to Domenech or that they had received any sum
attempted to prove that they were sold by the former to Antonio Domenech, as well as by the witnesses of said from him in payment of said lot, or that they had executed the document already reffered to. The former further
oppositor, Tiburcio Saez, when he stated that they were sold by said two sister to Domenech; and this title has been stated that she did not make any statement whatever to the witness Saez on the occasions referred to by him to the
confirmed by the documents already mentioned, Exhibits A and B. The first of said documents states that on April effect that they had sold said lot to Domenech. She also declared that she had not received any sum of money from
24, 1893, Anastasio Montes gratuitously ceded a lot 9:20 meters wide and 11.80 meters long, bordering on Calle him for, on the contrary, they had to support him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
San Rafael, and bounded on the north by the lot of Don Leon Yorac, while the document, Exhibit B, which is a
public document executed on September 29, 1869, and ratified before the notary public of Iloilo, Don Andres Pastor As the title of the claimants Dolores and Carmen Martinez to the lots in question was proved, as it was not proved
Santana, states that Maria Victoria Sarlabus, in order to show affection to her intimate friends Carmen and Dolores that they had sold them to Antonio Domenech, and as Julio Salvador could not have acquired said property from
Martinez, gave them by way of a perfect and irrevocable donation inter vivos a lot belonging to her, situated on said Antonio Domenech, these lots still belong to the Martinez sisters; and, on the other hand, as it was established that
Calle San Rafael, Iloilo, being 6 brazas wide and 7 brazas long, and bounded on the right by the lot of Mateo they had been in possession of said lots since the acquisition thereof; and as the possession which Julio Salvador
Catalva, on the left by that of Nicolas Batingui, and on the rear by that of Anastasio Montes. These lots are might have exercised during the last years (admitting the statements in the record to this effect) is not based upon
numbered as 450 and 873 in the cadastral plans of the municipality of Iloilo and constitute the lot now in any valid or legitimate title, it is evident that the two sister are entitled to have their rights to the lots in question
question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library confirmed and to have them registered in their name. It is, therefore, clear that the trial court erred in not so holding
in the judgment appealed from.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It appears from the evidence that the lot in question was not fenced and there was no building at all on it, the
witness Tiburcio Saez having declared that he knew that Domenech was in possession thereof and after him Julio The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and the claims of Julio Salvador is denied; and we declare that
Salvador, which statement was contradicted by Dolores Martinez and her witness Manuel Zerrudo. Dolores the two lots Nos. 873 and 450 should be adjudicated to the appellants Carmen and Dolores Martinez and be
Martinez stated that during all the time that were in possession of the land, Julio Salvador never laid any claim to registered in their name. No special pronouncement is made as to costs. So ordered.
them until lately, that is, about two or three years ago; that during the lifetime of Domenech they paid the real estate
taxes of the land, giving the sum of P6 to him every year, and that they had no receipts because Domenech had a G.R. No. 174659       July 28, 2008 PEOPLE vs vs. RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK and LIKAD SARAPIDA
lot adjacent to theirs and he included it in the receipt of the lot in question for they look their receipts at the same TAURAK, 
time; and that even after Domenech's death, Julio Salvador paid for the taxes, and they did not attempt to pay for
them because Domenech had already talked to Mr. Campos, who told him that he paid for said taxes; that it There are people who are simply incapable of feeling pity or compassion for others.
seemed that lately Salvador was in possession of the land; that during the lifetime of Domenech they had filled it
and that it was not true that Campos or Salvador had paid for the filling of the land. The witness Manuel Zerrudo
declared that he knew the land for about twenty years; that since he knew it, it has been in the possession of Ma. Teresa Basario must have felt a dagger deep in her heart when she lost her two-year old son, Christopher, two
Carmen and Dolores Martinez and at the date of the trial was still in their possession; that Julio Salvador at no time weeks before Christmas on December 13, 1999. And again upon being reunited with him some 16 months later
possessed it; that he did not see Salvador fence it; and that he knew of the possession of the Martinez sisters for he when he could neither recognize her nor remember who he was.
lived on Calle Del Rosario and the lot was next to that of his teacher, Mr. Anastasio Montes; and, finally, he
indicated, as an act of possession of the claimants, the fact that they had put it in their Justice demands that those responsible for this cruel and agonizing separation of mother and child be punished to
name.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library the full extent of the law.

43
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to a Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that her niece had it
McDonald’s outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney which was parked outside,
table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat, Christopher followed Zenaida under Taurak’s watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the ransom money to Mamantak. At this
to the counter. Barely had Christopher gone from his mother’s sight when she realized that he had disappeared. juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak
She and her sister frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises of the fastfood outlet, to no avail. As and Taurak.
their continued search for the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment.
Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the incident. On the other hand, Teresa
The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of Christopher and almost lost her sanity. At the time Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her third child. The child, born
to appeal for help and information. Despite the publicity, however, Teresa received no word about Christopher’s very sickly, eventually died.
whereabouts. Worse, pranksters were gleefully having a field day aggravating her misery.
The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom under the following Information:
On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a muslim. The caller claimed to have
custody of Christopher and asked for ₱30,000 in exchange for the boy. That on December 13, 1999 in Binondo, Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did
On March 27, 2001, the same muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent photo of her then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive Christopher Basario, a two-year old
son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa went there, minor of his liberty against his will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as
someone gave her a recent picture of Christopher. She then contacted the mysterious woman through the a condition for his release amounting to THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱30,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of
cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the woman instructed her to immediately board a ship Christopher Basario in said amount and such other amount as maybe awarded to him under the provisions of the
for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the Civil Code.
pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was formed and
Police Officer (PO)31 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresa’s niece. Mamantak and Taurak pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After pre-trial, trial ensued and the parties presented their
respective evidence.
Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan
City and proceeded to the designated meeting place. 1awphi1 In defense, Mamantak and Taurak denied the charges against them. Taurak testified that at the time and date of the
alleged kidnapping, she was peddling wares in Divisoria market, Manila. When she saw Christopher wandering
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitang’s Carinderia, two women came. They about aimlessly, she talked to him but he did not seem to understand her. She took the boy under her care and
were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and waited for someone to come for him. No one did. As it was already 7:00 p.m., she brought the boy home with her to
asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a certain Rocma Bato, the name written the Muslim Center in Quiapo.
at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who
stated that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already The next day, she and her husband took the boy to the nearest police outpost but no one was there so they just
in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 brought the boy to their stall. They opted to keep the boy until his parents could claim him.
Palafox and informed them that she had Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but
they refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher. On February 17, 2001, Taurak brought the child to Maganding, Sultan Kumander, Lanao del Sur. Sometime later,
Teresa contacted her and asked for Christopher’s picture for confirmation. It was at this point that Taurak arranged
Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher was in a a meeting at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April 7, 2001. She did not bring the boy at first
nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed as a precautionary measure. Only after confirming that Teresa was the boy’s mother did she relinquish custody to
over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several minutes with Christopher. her. However, she was shocked when members of the PAOCTF suddenly arrested her. She protested because she
was innocent. There were no charges against her nor was there a warrant for her arrest.
Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no longer recognized
nor understood her for he could only speak in the muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the boy gave a muslim Mamantak corroborated her sister Taurak’s testimony. She claimed that she was at Nunungan, Lanao del Norte on
name with "Taurak" as surname. December 13, 1999. At that time, she did not know the exact whereabouts of Taurak who was in Manila and whom
she had not seen for some time. They met again on April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia but only by chance. She
44
happened to be there when Taurak came. When Teresa arrived later, Taurak talked to her and then left, returning The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom
after a few hours with Christopher whom Mamantak saw for the first time. Taurak told her that she had found the from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the
boy and was returning him to his mother. Mamantak stayed in the carinderia all the while, waiting for her ride home commission of the offense.
at 4:00 p.m. She was stunned when PAOCTF members suddenly arrested her and her sister as she had not
committed any crime and there was no warrant for her arrest. When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision 2 on November 30, 2004
finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and accused RAGA The crime has the following elements:
SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as amended
by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of  RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused (1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim 7 or a public officer who has a
are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the Christopher Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa duty under the law to detain a person;8
Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
against the accused. (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or
Both accused are given credit for the preventive imprisonment undergone by them during the pendency of this detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious
case. physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made or (d)
the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official.
SO ORDERED.3
If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally
Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision 4 dated March 31, 2006, the appellate court detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential. The crime is
ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the demand for ₱30,000 as a demand for ransom. Such qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of
circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present.9
Taurak and Mamantak with modification amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.5 Pursuant to
Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent of the
this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records. 6 accused to effect it.10 It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in
whatever form and for whatever length of time. 11 And liberty is not limited to mere physical restraint but embraces
We affirm the Court of Appeals, with a modification of penalty. one’s right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare. 12

Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act The two-year-old Christopher suddenly disappeared in Binondo, Manila and was recovered only after almost 16
(RA) 7659: months from Taurak and Mamantak (both of them private individuals) in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. During the
entire time the boy was kept away from his mother, he was certainly deprived or restrained of his liberty. He had no
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or means, opportunity or capacity to leave appellants’ custody and return to his family on his own. He had no choice
in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. but to stay with total strangers, go with them to a far away place and learn a culture and dialect alien to him. At such
a very tender age, he was deprived of the liberty to enjoy the company and care of his family, specially his mother.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control and custody and even brought him to Lanao del Norte. She
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if demanded ₱30,000 in exchange for his return to his mother. On the other hand, Mamantak’s actions (e.g., her
threats to kill him shall have been made. presence in the carinderia and her acceptance of the ransom) showed without doubt that she was aiding her sister
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, and was acting in concert with her. These were the identical factual findings of both the trial and appellate courts.
female or a public officer. There is no reason to disturb them as they are sufficiently supported by evidence.

45
Taurak’s story that she merely gave Christopher refuge was incredible. It was like the apocryphal tale of a man WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The March 31, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
accused of theft of large cattle; his excuse was that he saw a piece of rope and brought it home not knowing that H.C. No. 00729 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida
there was a cow tied to the other end. She never even tried to bring the boy to the proper authorities or surrender Taurak are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom for which they are
him to the Department of Social Welfare and Development’s social workers in her barangay or in the city hall at any sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. They are further ordered to pay,
time during the 16 months he was with her. And how could Teresa have initiated her phone conversations with jointly and severally, ₱50,000 civil indemnity, ₱200,000 moral damages and ₱100,000 exemplary damages to their
Taurak when they were total strangers to each other? young victim Christopher Basario.

Similarly, Mamantak’s account that she was at Pitang’s Carinderia only by coincidence and that it was only there Costs against appellants.
that she first saw Christopher invites nothing but disbelief. The unequivocal testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses on her role in arranging for the payment of ransom and the release of the kidnap victim ( e.g., confirming G.R. No. 186529               August 3, 2010 PEOPLE vs. JACK RACHO y RAQUERO,
the identity of Teresa and demanding and receiving the ransom money) showed otherwise. The evidence clearly
established that Mamantak was a principal in the kidnapping of Christopher. On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 affirming the
Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) Joint Decision3 dated July 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
itself.13 The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the statements of Taurak and Mamantak did not deserve
credence. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses The case stemmed from the following facts:
and the probative weight thereof, are accorded great, if not conclusive, value when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.14
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the
purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a
The Court of Appeals considered the demand for ₱30,000 as a qualifying circumstance which necessitated the team composed of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the
imposition of the death penalty. On the other hand, the trial court deemed the amount as too measly, compared to Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the appellant. 4 The agent gave the police appellant’s name,
what must have been actually spent for the care and subsistence of Christopher for almost two years. It therefore together with his physical description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the
treated the amount not as ransom but as a reimbursement of expenses incurred for taking care of the child. following day.
(Kidnappers in Mindanao today call it reimbursement for "board-and-lodging.")
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis
Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that will bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team
release him from captivity. 15 No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for members then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same
ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim’s freedom. 16 The amount day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as
of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial. the person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for
a tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team
In this case, the payment of ₱30,000 was demanded as a condition for the release of Christopher to his mother. approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly considered it as a demand for ransom. the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which,
when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. 5
One final point of law. While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any
other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code 17 is death, RA 934618 has banned the death penalty and The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated specimen was turned over
reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Pursuant to this law, we reduce the to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his initials and with appellant’s name. The field test
penalty imposed on appellants from death to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole. and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.6
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of ₱50,000 civil indemnity19 was proper. Pursuant to People
v. Garalde,20 the award of ₱50,00021 moral damages is increased to ₱200,000 considering the minority of Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or
Christopher. Moreover, since the crime was attended by a demand for ransom, and by way of example or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions
correction, Christopher is entitled to ₱100,000 exemplary damages.22 of which read:

46
"That at about 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this briefly discussed by the RTC, the validity of the arrest and search and the admissibility of the evidence against
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in his possession appellant were not squarely raised by the latter and thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and appellate courts.
five point zero one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "Shabu", a
regulated drug without any permit or license from the proper authorities to possess the same. It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review. 1avvphi1 This Court is clothed
with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in arriving at a
CONTRARY TO LAW."7 just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with
the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond
"That at about 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora, the said accused did then and reasonable doubt.14
there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully transporting or delivering dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of shabu
without any permit or license from the proper authorities to transport the same. After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed below, we find that
appellant can no longer question the validity of his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the
CONTRARY TO LAW."8 warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against him.

During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges. The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, this is
the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the trial of the
case, we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction
At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his brother to inform him
of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect
about their ailing father. He maintained that the charges against him were false and that no shabu was taken from
may have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
him. As to the circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the police officers, through their van, blocked the
Appellant’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal. 15
tricycle he was riding in; forced him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear;
then brought him to the police station for investigation. 9
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain whether or not the search
10 which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.16
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment  convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A.
9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00; but acquitted
him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. 11 The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.17 Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
Hence, the present appeal.

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

In his brief,12 appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He likewise avers that the
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of the team’s failure to mark the
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief, appellant assails, for the first time, the legality of his
4. Consented warrantless search;
arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He questions the admissibility of the confiscated
5. Customs search;
sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18
The appeal is meritorious.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
We have repeatedly held that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or searched, and the character of the articles procured. 19
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the case. 13
The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was caught in the act of
Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of the sachet of shabu and, actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the apprehending officers as he
consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It is noteworthy that although the circumstances of his arrest were arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet of shabu. 20 Consequently, the warrantless search was
considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the lawful arrest.
47
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; surveillance. For five days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. On
generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest August 1, 1999, the civilian asset informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later
can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. 21 Thus, that day with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of police officers posted
given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest themselves to await Tudtud’s arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a
appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground carton. The police officers approached the suspects and asked if they could see the contents of the box which
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that yielded marijuana leaves.29
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 22
In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male person, more or less 5’4" in height,
The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination of the established 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants,
facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. While conducting stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug
purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to trafficking, they saw the accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag. The police accosted the accused
apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent with the information that he and informed him that they were police officers. Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the accused, the bag
was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid to escape charges, the accused
T-shirt. The team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. disclosed where two other male persons would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male
of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent persons, later identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police approached them, introduced
pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team themselves as police officers, then inspected the bag they were carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag
approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out turned out to be marijuana leaves.30
his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug.23 The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there was no adequate
confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the probable cause. We required the showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal design.
contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip given by the did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed,
informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance gives rise to another was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini
question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest. bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a
reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no
arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. 24 We find no cogent reason to depart from
this well-established doctrine. We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable information" sufficient to justify a search
incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. As cited in People v. Tudtud, these include People v.
The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,25 People v. Tudtud,26 and People v. Nuevas.27
Maspil, Jr.,31 People v. Bagista,32 People v. Balingan,33 People v. Lising,34 People v. Montilla,35 People v.
In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Valdez,36 and People v. Gonzales.37 In these cases, the Court sustained the validity of the warrantless searches
Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the police assembled a team and notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the accused had
deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. While thus positioned, a Victory committed, was actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court, except in
Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building where two females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches. 38
the team members the woman, "Aling Rosa," who was then carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the team
approached her and introduced themselves. When asked about the contents of her bag, she handed it to the Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite
apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves. 28 warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the
"tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellant’s physical
The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City, received a description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19),
report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was there was an assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample
responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in the area. Reacting to the report, the Intelligence Section conducted opportunity to apply for a warrant.39

48
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the confiscated item is perpetua imposed by the same court upon Tranquilino Pacala, Jr., for the death of Jose Bacsal, in Criminal Case
inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in No. 6897, for Robbery with Homicide.
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
During the pendency of this appeal, appellants Cipriano Saberon and Patricio Pacala died in the New Bilibid
Without the confiscated shabu, appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, the former as an aftermath of a riot committed in prison and the latter as a consequence
an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering of sickness, and the cases against them were dismissed on February 13, 1969 and October 15, 1972, respectively.
a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry This decision is, therefore, confined to the appeal of Aquilino Pacala and Tranquilino Pacala, Jr., the only two
with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. 40 remaining appellants in the case.

One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas, 41 It is undisputed that on the evening of November 17, 1964, Jose Bacsal was killed by a group of armed men near
his hut in Sitio Binotong, of Barrio Guintarcan, of the town of Villareal, Province of Samar. Binotong is adjacent to
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law- Sitio Burabod, and both are situated along the coast, and are accessible either by sea or land. The deceased was a
abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend farmer of some substance who had just had his old house demolished for the purpose of building on the same site a
to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime bigger one of stronger materials. In the meantime a small hut with roof and with the floor a meter above the ground,
regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of without walls, was constructed nearby where the deceased and his son stayed to guard the construction materials
law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual piled near the place and to supervise the construction of the house. The hut was about 130 meters from the
denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law seashore.
and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and
within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means. 42 Roque Bacsal, 25 years of age, fisherman, son of the deceased, recounting the incident, testified that at about 7:30
o'clock on the evening of November 17, 1964, he and his father were in the aforesaid hut listening over the radio,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. when they noticed the presence of five men who immediately surrounded the hut. As the moon was very bright, he
00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. was able to recognize the five men as the brothers Patricio Pacala, Aquilino Pacala, Francisco Pacala and
Tranquilino Pacala, Jr., who were his former classmates, and their uncle, Cipriano Saberon. When Cipriano
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant, unless the latter Saberon fired his pistol, he and his father immediately jumped from the hut into the ground and ran. He himself ran
is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons for his to the trail leading to Burabod and hid behind some tall grasses and bushes about sixty meters from the hut. When
confinement, within ten (10) days from notice. No costs. he heard his father shouting for help, he made his way through the bushes and saw, a few meters away, his father,
Jose Bacsal, being held by Cipriano Saberon. As he was thus being held, Patricio Pacala stabbed Jose Bacsal on
the right side below his armpit. After Bacsal was wounded, Cipriano Saberon released his hold. When the victim
started to run, however, Francisco Pacala went after him and slashed him on the back with his bolo. At this juncture,
the accused, including the two appellants, surrounded the wounded Jose Bacsal. Appellant Aquilino Pacala was
holding a firearm pointed forward. Appellant Tranquilino Pacala, Jr., who is also known by the name of Ambrosio
alias Chacoy, was holding a bolo. Although the deceased was already prostrate on the ground, Tranquilino Pacala,
Jr., apparently in response to the orders of Cipriano Saberon, who told his companions, "Finish him so he won't
speak," repeatedly boloed the victim on the forehead. Afterwards, the five men left the victim and proceeded in the
direction of the hut. When he was certain that the assailants had already left the place, Roque Bacsal approached
his father and tried to assist him. The victim was groaning with pain. In the meantime, in response to shouts for
help, the barrio captain, Victoriano Fortaleza, arrived at the scene of the incident. As the barrio captain attended to
the needs of the wounded man, Roque proceeded to their hut. According to him, that was the time he discovered
that his transistor radio, worth P130.00, which he had left on the floor, and the wooden trunk, where their clothing
G.R. No. L-26647 August 15, 1974 THE PEOPLE vs AQUILINO PACALA and TRANQUILINO PACALA, JR.
and cash in the amount of P1,700.00 were kept, were already missing.
alias CHACOY, 
Teresa Ocenar Bacsal, wife of the deceased and mother of Roque, also testified that they counted the money
Automatic Review of the Death Penalty imposed by the Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch I, 13th Judicial
earlier that day, with the intention of using it for the purchase of galvanized iron sheets for the roofing of their house;
District, upon Cipriano Saberon, Patricio Pacala and Aquilino Pacala, and appeal of the sentence of reclusion
and that she and Roque had intended to take the bus for Catbalogan the next day to buy iron sheets.
49
Victoriano Fortaleza, barrio captain of Burabod, Villareal, Samar, confirmed the fact that he went to the aid of the After the accused had waived their right to the second stage of the preliminary investigation, the case was elevated
Bacsal s when he heard their shouts for help. Thus, he declared, on the evening of November 17, 1964, while he to the Court of First Instance for trial.
was relaxing in the balcony of his house to enjoy the bright moonlight, he heard shouts for help emanating from the
direction of the hut of the Bacsals. But before he could reach the hut, he found on the way Jose Bacsal, seriously In the meantime, Francisco Pacala died. Consequently, only Patricio Pacala, Aquilino Pacala, Ambrosio Pacala
wounded and lying on the ground about twenty (20) brazas from the schoolhouse. Upon hearing Jose Bacsal faintly alias Tranquilino, and Cipriano Saberon were charged for the crime by the Provincial Fiscal.
utter, "I'll die," he asked him who wounded him. The latter could only say "Patricio and Francisco" before he died.
Fortaleza then proceeded to the town of Villareal to report the incident to the municipal authorities. In view of this Patricio Pacala admitted having killed the deceased with the assistance of his brother Francisco Pacala, now also
information, the police of Villareal got the body of the deceased and brought it to the poblacion for autopsy. deceased. He testified that during the evening in question, there was a heavy rain with strong winds, consequently,
he and his brother Francisco were constrained to seek shelter inside the hut of the deceased. When the deceased
Modesto Leyson, a 49-year old farmer living in Sitio Burabod, confirmed the presence of the Pacala brothers and arrived, however, he became angry upon seeing them inside his hut, drew his bolo and chased Patricio and his
Cipriano Saberon at the scene of the incident during the night in question. He declared that he knows Aquilino brother away from the hut. He pursued the two until they reached their banca and, upon overtaking Patricio, the
Pacala, Patricio Pacala and Tranquilino Pacala, who is also known as Ambrosio Pacala, since their childhood days, deceased Jose Bacsal stabbed Patricio on the back. In response to his shouts for help, his elder brother Francisco
and that Tranquilino, Aquilino, Patricio and Francisco Pacala are all brothers of the full blood, while Cipriano Pacala got hold of a paddle and hit Jose Bacsal with it, causing the latter to fall on top of a stone. After Bacsal had
Saberon is their uncle. On the evening of November 17, 1964, while he was fishing in the sea near Nabu-an Point fallen, he (Patricio) got the bolo of the victim and used it to stab the victim. He claimed that the wounds on the head
of Barrio Burabod, of the town of Villareal, he saw Tranquilino Pacala, Aquilino Pacala, Patricio Pacala, Cipriano of Jose Bacsal might have been caused by the sharp rocks when Bacsal fell. He denied that his brothers Aquilino
Saberon and Francisco Pacala aboard a banca pass by. He saw the Pacalas land on the shore and observed them and Tranquilino and his uncle Cipriano Saberon participated in the commission of the crime. Patricio Pacala further
moving towards the direction of the hut of Jose Bacsal. After a while, he heard two (2) gun reports. Upon hearing declared that as a result of the incident, he and his brother Francisco did not continue anymore to Guintarcan to
these, he decided to go home and report the matter to the barrio captain. The barrio captain then borrowed his visit their mother as they had originally intended to do.
motorboat and fetched the chief of police to investigate the incident. He explained that he was able to recognize the
Pacalas and Cipriano Saberon because it was bright moonlight and they were only four (4) brazas from the Both Aquilino and Tranquilino Pacala denied involvement in the crime in question and interposed the defense of
outrigger of his boat when they passed him. alibi. According to Aquilino Pacala, he could not have been in Sitio Binotong of Barrio Guintarcan, Villareal, Samar,
on the evening of November 17, 1964 because he was then residing with his wife at Barrio Bagakay, San Miguel,
The post-mortem  findings indicated that the cause of death was profuse internal hemorrhage as a result of several Leyte, his wife being a native of the place. After sawing logs in the concession of Diosdado Asoy, at 4:00 o'clock in
wounds inflicted upon the deceased Jose Bacsal, to wit: the afternoon of that day, he remained in his house until the following morning. He stated that on December 17,
1964, he was arrested by the constabulary and detained, but he was not investigated. He admitted that Patricio
HEAD: Face; conjunctiva and tongue pale. — Stab wound — 1 inch wide, bony deep located at Pacala, Francisco Pacala and Tranquilino Pacala are his brothers.
the right parietal region.
— Stab wound — 1 inch wide, bony deep located at the temporal region, right. Tranquilino Pacala, 18 years of age, also testified that on the night of November 17, 1964 he was in Catbalogan, as
— Contusion with Abrasion — ½ inch at the back. he had been living there since the month of October, 1964 up to December, 1964, when he was arrested by the
THORAX: Stab wound (front) exit 1 inch left chest 4 inches below the nipple; (back) right constabulary authorities. On that date (November 17, 1964), he was in the house of Didang Villanueva in
scapular region 1-½ inches 5 inches deep. Catbalogan, Samar. He claimed that he had to leave Villareal, Samar, because he could not find any work there.
LUMBAR REGION: Stab wound — 5 inches directed upward anteriorly and to the left. Upon his arrival in Catbalogan sometime in October, 1964, he was allegedly employed as a pedicab driver.
EXTREMITIES: No sign of Physical Injuries.
Julita Solayco also testified in support of the alibi of Cipriano Saberon.
INTERNAL FINDINGS: Abdominal cavity filled with blood (about 3 cups). The stomach was
wounded through and through. Wounding of the abdominal aorta, lower portion of the left lung Cipriano Saberon, however, did not take the witness stand.
was wounded. (Exhibit "A".)
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the trial court convicted the appellants for the crime of robbery with
As a result of the investigation conducted by the chief of police of Villareal, a criminal complaint was filed by him in homicide and imposed upon them the penalties aforestated. .
the Justice of the Peace Court of the said municipality on December 5, 1964 against Aquilino Pacala, Patricio
Pacala, Francisco Pacala, Cipriano Saberon y Pacala and Ambrosio Pacala alias "Chacoy" for robbery with
homicide. Appellants contend in this appeal that (1) the commission of the crime of robbery was not sufficiently proven; (2) the
testimonies of Roque Bacsal and Modesto Leyson are not entitled to credence because they are either
contradictory, uncorroborated or improbable; and (3) the proceedings before the trial court are null and void in view

50
of the absence of any certification in the information that a preliminary investigation was conducted by the Provincial No improper motive has been shown why either of these two prosecution witnesses would falsely implicate any of
Fiscal. the appellants in the commission of the crime. In fact, appellant Pacala candidly admitted on the witness stand that
he does not know whether or not Modesto Leyson and Roque Bacsal had entertained any ill-will against him.
1. In connection with the robbery aspect of the crime charged, two things must be borne in mind:  first, that there
were no eyewitnesses to the alleged robbery; and second, that none of the things allegedly stolen, namely, the Appellants attempt to impugn the credibility of Roque Bacsal by citing certain alleged inconsistencies in his
transistor radio and the trunk purportedly containing the sum of P1,700.00 was ever recovered. If there was, testimony. Those inconsistencies refer to minor details, and the rule is that inconsistencies in the testimony of
therefore, any evidence to support the charge of robbery, the same was entirely circumstantial in character. prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their
declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimony.
Roque Bacsal testified that the five accused surrounded the hut, and after Saberon fired his pistol, he and his father
jumped from the hut into the ground and ran to a place about sixty meters away where his father was overtaken and On the alleged contradictions between the affidavit of Roque Bacsal (Exh. "1") executed before the Municipal Judge
attacked by said accused, and, afterwards, the latter left and proceeded towards the direction of the hut. Roque of Villareal, Samar, on December 5, 1964, and his testimony in court, it must be noted that the alleged
then went to the succor of his father and tried to assist him until Victoriano Fortaleza, the barrio captain, arrived. It contradictions are more apparent than real. It is true that in the aforementioned affidavit Roque Bacsal declared,
was only after the arrival of the barrio captain that Roque was able to return to their hut, and discovered that the among others, as follows: " ... I notice ( sic) that some of this(sic) five person (sic) run (sic) after my father and when
radio and the trunk where the money was kept were missing. my father was over taken they stab ( sic) my father. My father shouted for help calling me but because I was afraid
of being killed I did not show up. When I notice ( sic) that this (sic) persons were gone I tried to look for my father
It is evident from the foregoing that no iota of evidence had been presented showing that appellants and their and I found him laying ( sic) down wounded. I cried and a few minutes the barrio captain Victoriano Portalisa ( sic)
companions knew of the existence of the money in the amount of P1,700.00, or of the place where it was allegedly arrived and my father was investigated. ..." The aforementioned statement is not in any way inconsistent with his
kept, much less is there any positive proof that when they went to the place of the victim their intention was to rob testimony that he and his father jumped from the hut, hid at a place 30 meters from the hut, and upon hearing the
the latter. It would seem, therefore, that the trial court's conclusion that it has been "established beyond voice of his father shouting for help, he looked through the tall grasses and saw Cipriano Saberon and Patricio
peradventure of doubt that, taking advantage of the night, five men decided to rob the deceased whom they knew to Pacala holding his father from behind while the other accused were stabbing him. It is a matter of judicial
have some money in the trunk. ...," is based on a mere inference, or conjecture and not upon positive evidence. It is experience that an affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is often incomplete. An affidavit, "being taken ex-parte  is almost
well-settled that in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes from the want of
robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any other essential element of a crime. In order for the crime of robbery suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral
with homicide to exist, it is necessary that it be clearly established that a robbery has actually taken place, and that, circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestions of his memory, and for his accurate recollection
as a consequence or on the occasion of such robbery, a homicide be committed. Where the evidence does not of all that belongs to the subject.2
conclusively prove the robbery, the killing of the victim would, therefore, be classified either as a simple homicide or
murder, depending upon the absence or presence of any qualifying circumstance, and not the complex offense of As against their positive identification, appellants interpose the defense of alibi.
robbery with homicide.1
We have declared in an earlier case3 that whether or not the defense of alibi has been established is a question of
2. In contrast to the paucity of proof on the commission of the robbery is the clear and positive identification of fact. By its very nature, alibi is established by the testimony of witnesses who confirm the presence of the accused
appellants as among the group of five men who attacked the deceased Jose Bacsal. at some place so far removed from the scene of the crime as to cast reasonable doubt on his actual participation in
the offense charged. "As a consequence, the credibility of an alibi depends so much on, and may very well be
Modesto Leyson had known the five accused for a long time because they were from Guintarcan, while he was from equated with, the credibility of the witnesses who seek to establish it. On that account, therefore, and in that
Burabod, which are separated by a distance of only about one kilometer. It is not disputed that on the night of respect, the relative weight which the trial magistrate assigns to the testimony of said witnesses must, unless
November 17, 1964, he was fishing in his boat at Point Nabu-an, Burabod, Villareal, Samar, about 100 meters away patently and clearly inconsistent with the evidence on record, be accepted." The trial court flatly rejected the
from Jose Bacsal's hut. He testified that the five accused, who were aboard another boat, passed by his boat, and it defense of alibi put up by the appellants and gave sound reasons in support of its action.
was from a distance of about four (4) brazas that he was able to recognize them as the moon was then bright at that
time. He also declared that he saw the five disembark from the boat and head in the direction of the hut of Jose Appellant Aquilino Pacala's testimony to the effect that on the date in question, November 17, 1964, he was in
Bacsal; and, shortly thereafter, he heard two gun reports coming from that direction. Bagakay, San Miguel, Leyte, sawing logs in the forest, and not in Guintarcan, Villareal, Samar, stands
uncorroborated. According to him, his mother-in-law and his wife were then living with him in Bagakay. They had
The other witness, Roque Bacsal, had known four of the accused — the Pacala brothers — for a long time, for they neighbors. He had a partner in the log-sawing undertaking. Every now and then he delivered sawn lumber to his
were once his classmates. He positively identified the appellants as among those who attacked his father. employer in Barugo, Leyte. Consequently, as aptly observed by the court below, this appellant's testimony could
easily have been corroborated by any of these persons were it true; yet none of them was called in court although it
would have been of the greatest import to the appellant.

51
On his part, appellant Tranquilino Pacala declared that at the time of the incident he was at Patag District, In the case at bar, the accused not only expressly waived their right to preliminary investigation but they also never
Catbalogan, Samar, in the house of Jaime and Didang Villanueva. He was driving a tricycle belonging to one Clara raised the issue of lack of certification by the fiscal at any stage of the proceedings before the trial court, except in
de la Peña. He stated that Didang's cousin, Tony Nacionales, had informed him that the Villanuevas left Catbalogan this appeal. There is no question that the right to preliminary investigation is a personal right conferred by law and
for Manila sometime ago, and he, the appellant, did not know where to reach them. Assuming this to be true, may be waived. Where appellant had waived the preliminary investigation in the trial court and failed to raise in
appellant could have asked someone in Catbalogan to attest to his presence therein on the day in question. There issue the alleged absence of a valid preliminary investigation at any stage of the proceedings before the said court,
was the tricycle owner. There could be neighbors and acquaintances who might remember. According to this the said question may not be raised on appeal for the first time. 9
appellant, the Villanueva spouses were still in Catbalogan when he was arrested in connection with the case; yet,
knowing how vitally important to him were these spouses if it were true that he was staying in their house on the WHEREFORE, the two appellants are declared guilty of murder, and the judgment of the lower court is accordingly
night in question, he did not even exert any effort to contact them, much less did he request that they be modified. Aquilino Pacala is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua; and Tranquilino Pacala, Jr. is sentenced to
subpoenaed to testify in his behalf. suffer the penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The appellants are ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased, jointly and
Added to the utter absence of corroboration of the appellants' testimony on alibi is, of course, the more important severally, the sum of P12,000.00 as civil indemnity, and the costs.
consideration that, as already stated above, these appellants, together with the other accused, were clearly and
positively identified by two witnesses of the prosecution. Well-settled is the rule that defense of alibi cannot prevail G.R. No. 126586           February 2, 2000 ALEXANDER VINOYA vs NLRC ,RFC
over the positive identification by witnesses.
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeks to annul and set aside the decision, 1 promulgated on 21 June 1996,
The killing of Jose Bacsal is murder in view of the qualifying circumstance of aid of armed men. Appellant of the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") which reversed the decision 2 of the, Labor Arbiter, rendered
Tranquilino Pacala, however, must be credited with one mitigating circumstance, i.e., that he was less than eighteen on 15 June 1994, ordering Regent Food Corporation ("RFC") to reinstate Alexander Vinoya to his former position
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. 4 and pay him backwages.

In passing, it must be said that motive is unessential to conviction in murder cases when, as in the instant case, Private respondent Regent Food Corporation is a domestic corporation principally engaged in the manufacture and
there is no doubt as the identity of the culprits. 5 Despite the absence of proof of motive, the accused may be found sale of various food products. Private respondent Ricky See, on the other hand, is the president of RFC and is
guilty of murder.6 being sued in that capacity.

3. The appellants' contention that the proceedings in the court below, as well as the judgment Petitioner Alexander Vinoya, the complainant, worked with RFC as sales representative until his services were
rendered by it, are null and void by reason of the absence in the information of a certification by terminated on 25 November 1991.
the provincial fiscal that a preliminary investigation was conducted by him, is untenable.
The parties presented conflicting versions of facts.
It appears from the record that the criminal complaint against the accused was filed with the Justice of the Peace
Court of Villareal, Samar, on December 5, 1964, and it was only after the aforesaid court had conducted the Petitioner Alexander Vinoya claims that he applied and was accepted by RFC as sales representative on 26 May
requisite preliminary examination that it issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. On January 14, 1965, after the 1990. On the same date, a company identification card 3 was issued to him by RFC. Petitioner alleges that he
herein appellants were arrested and delivered to the court, they expressly waived their right to the second stage of reported daily to the office of RFC, in Pasig City, to take the latter's van for the delivery of its products. According to
the preliminary investigation.7 petitioner, during his employ, he was assigned to various supermarkets and grocery stores where he booked sales
orders and collected payments for RFC. For this task, he was required by RFC to put up a monthly bond of P200.00
As We held in People v. Marquez,8 what is not allowed under Section 14 of Rule 112, Revised Rules of Court, is the as security deposit to guarantee the performance of his obligation as sales representative. Petitioner contends that
"filing of the information without a preliminary investigation having been previously conducted, and the injunction he was under the direct control and supervision of Mr. Dante So and Mr. Sadi Lim, plant manager and senior
that there should be a certification is only a consequence of the requirement that a preliminary investigation should salesman of RFC, respectively. He avers that on 1 July 1991, he was transferred by RFC to Peninsula Manpower
first be conducted. Logically, therefore, inasmuch as the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction is that the right to the Company, Inc. ("PMCI"), an agency which provides RFC with additional contractual workers pursuant to a contract
preliminary investigation itself must be asserted or invoked before the plea, otherwise, it is deemed waived, it for the supply of manpower services (hereinafter referred to as the "Contract of Service"). 4 After his transfer to
stands to reason that the absence of the certification is nothing but evidence of a fact, and if the omission of the fact PMCI, petitioner was allegedly reassigned to RFC as sales representative. Subsequently, on 25 November 1991,
itself to be certified is waived, if not properly raised before the accused enters his plea, why should the omission he was informed by Ms. Susan Chua, personnel manager of RFC, that his services were terminated and he was
merely of the certification be given more importance than the absence of the fact itself to be certified to?" asked to surrender his ID card. Petitioner was told that his dismissal was due to the expiration of the Contract of
Service between RFC and PMCI. Petitioner claims that he was dismissed from employment despite the absence of

52
any notice or investigation. Consequently, on 3 December 1991, petitioner filed a case against RFC before the SO ORDERED.11
Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal and non-payment of 13th month pay. 5
Separate motions for reconsideration of the NLRC decision were filed by petitioner and PMCI. In a
Private respondent Regent Food Corporation, on the other hand, maintains that no employer-employee relationship resolution,12 dated 20 August 1996, the NLRC denied both motions. However, it was only petitioner who elevated
existed between petitioner and itself. It insists that petitioner is actually an employee of PMCI, allegedly an the case before this Court.
independent contractor, which had a Contract of Service 6 with RFC. To prove this fact, RFC presents an
Employment Contract7 signed by petitioner on 1 July 1991, wherein PMCI appears as his employer. RFC denies In his petition for certiorari, petitioner submits that respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
that petitioner was ever employed by it prior to 1 July 1991. It avers that petitioner was issued an ID card so that its reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter, and asks for the reinstatement of the latter's decision.
clients and customers would recognize him as a duly authorized representative of RFC. With regard to the P200.00
pesos monthly bond posted by petitioner, RFC asserts that it was required in order to guarantee the turnover of his Principally, this petition presents the following issues:
collection since he handled funds of RFC. While RFC admits that it had control and supervision over petitioner, it
argues that such was exercised in coordination with PMCI. Finally, RFC contends that the termination of its
relationship with petitioner was brought about by the expiration of the Contract of Service between itself and PMCI 1. Whether petitioner was an employee of RFC or PMCI.
and not because petitioner was dismissed from employment. 2. Whether petitioner was lawfully dismissed.

On 3 December 1991, when petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter, PMCI was The resolution of the first issue initially boils down to a determination of the true status of PMCI, whether it is a
initially impleaded as one of the respondents. However, petitioner thereafter withdrew his charge against PMCI and labor-only contractor or an independent contractor.
pursued his claim solely against RFC. Subsequently, RFC filed a third party complaint against PMCI. After
considering both versions of the parties, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, 8 dated 15 June 1994, in favor of In the case at bar, RFC alleges that PMCI is an independent contractor on the sole ground that the latter is a highly
petitioner. The Labor Arbiter concluded that RFC was the true employer of petitioner for the following reasons: (1) capitalized venture. To buttress this allegation, RFC presents a copy of the Articles of Incorporation and the
Petitioner was originally with RFC and was merely transferred to PMCI to be deployed as an agency worker and Treasurer's Affidavit13 submitted by PMCI to the Securities and Exchange Commission showing that it has an
then subsequently reassigned to RFC as sales representative; (2) RFC had direct control and supervision over authorized capital stock of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), of which Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
petitioner; (3) RFC actually paid for the wages of petitioner although coursed through PMCI; and, (4) Petitioner was (P300,000.00) is subscribed and Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) is paid-in. According to RFC, PMCI is
terminated per instruction of RFC. Thus, the Labor Arbiter decreed, as follows: a duly organized corporation engaged in the business of creating and hiring a pool of temporary personnel and,
thereafter, assigning them to its clients from time to time for such duration as said clients may require. RFC further
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered respondent RFC is hereby declared guilty of illegal dismissal and contends that PMCI has a separate office, permit and license and its own organization.
ordered to immediately reinstate complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights and
other benefits and pay him backwages in the amount of P103,974.00. Labor-only contracting, a prohibited act, is an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits,
The claim for 13th month pay is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal. 14 In labor-only contracting, the following
This case, insofar as respondent PMCI [is concerned] is DISMISSED, for lack of merit. elements are present:

SO ORDERED.9 (a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment to actually perform the
job, work or service under its own account and responsibility;
RFC appealed the adverse decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. In a decision, 10 dated 21 June 1996, the (b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing
NLRC reversed the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC opined that PMCI is an independent contractor activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal. 15
because it has substantial capital and, as such, is the true employer of petitioner. The NLRC, thus, held PMCI liable
for the dismissal of petitioner. The dispositive portion of the NLRC decision states: On the other hand, permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal
agrees to put out or farm out with a contractor or subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job,
work or service within a definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be
performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal. 16 A person is considered engaged in
legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the following conditions concur:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is modified as follows:
1. Peninsula Manpower Company Inc. is declared as employer of the complainant;
2. Peninsula is ordered to pay complainant his separation pay of P3,354.00 and his proportionate 13th (a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to
month pay for 1991 in the amount of P2,795.00 or the total amount of P6,149.00. perform the job, work or service on its own account and under its own responsibility according to its own

53
 manner and method, and free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters connected with BCC was paid in lump sum for the services it rendered. These features of that case make it
the performance of the work except as to the results thereof; distinguishable from the present one.25
(b) The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and
(c) The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual Not having shown the above circumstances present in Neri, the Court declared Skillpower, Inc. to be engaged in
employees entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right labor-only contracting and was considered as a mere agent of the employer.
to self-organization, security of tenure, and social and welfare benefits. 17
From the two aforementioned decisions, it may be inferred that it is not enough to show substantial capitalization or
Previously, in the case of Neri vs. NLRC,18 we held that in order to be considered as a job contractor it is enough investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries and work premises, among others, to be considered as an
that a contractor has substantial capital. In other words, once substantial capital established it is no longer independent contractor. In fact, jurisprudential holdings are to the effect that in determining the existence of an
necessary for the contractor to show evidence that it has investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, independent contractor relationship, several factors might be considered such as, but not necessarily confined to,
work premises, among others. The rational for this is that Article 106 of the Labor Code does not require that the whether the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill required;
contractor possess both substantial capital and investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of specified pieces of work; the control
premises, among others.19 The decision of the Court in Neri, thus, states: and supervision of the workers; the power of the employer with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the
workers of the contractor; the control of the premises; the duty to supply premises, tools, appliances, materials and
Respondent BCC need not prove that it made investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, labor; and the mode, manner and terms of payment. 26
work premises, among others, because it has established that it has sufficient capitalization. The Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC both determined that BCC had a capital stock of P1 million fully subscribed and Given the above standards and the factual milieu of the case, the Court has to agree with the conclusion of the
paid for. BCC is therefore a highly capitalized venture and cannot be deemed engaged in "labor-only" Labor Arbiter that PMCI is engaged in labor-only contracting.
contracting.20
First of all, PMCI does not have substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment,
However, in declaring that Building Care Corporation ("BCC") was an independent contractor, the Court considered machineries, work premises, among others, to qualify as an independent contractor. While it has an authorized
not only the fact that it had substantial capitalization. The Court noted that BCC carried on an independent business capital stock of P1,000,000.00, only P75,000.00 is actually paid-in, which, to our mind, cannot be considered as
and undertook the performance of its contract according to its own manner and method, free from the control and substantial capitalization. In the case of Neri, which was promulgated in 1993, BCC had a capital stock of
supervision of its principal in all matters except as to the results thereof. 21 The Court likewise mentioned that the P1,000,000.00 which was fully subscribed and paid-for. Moreover, when the Neri case was decided in 1993, the
employees of BCC were engaged to perform specific special services for its principal. 22 Thus, the Court ruled that rate of exchange between the dollar and the peso was only P27.30 to $1 27 while presently it is at P40.390 to
BCC was an independent contractor. $1.28 The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that in 1993, the economic situation in the country was not as
adverse as the present, as shown by the devaluation of our peso. With the current economic atmosphere in the
The Court further clarified the import of the Neri  decision in the subsequent case of Philippine Fuji Xerox country, the paid-in capitalization of PMCI amounting to P75,000,00 cannot be considered as substantial capital
Corporation vs. NLRC.23 In the said case, petitioner Fuji Xerox implored the Court to apply the Neri doctrine to its and, as such, PMCI cannot qualify as an independent contractor.
alleged job-contractor, Skillpower, Inc., and declare the same as an independent contractor. Fuji Xerox alleged that
Skillpower, Inc. was a highly capitalized venture registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Second, PMCI did not carry on an independent business nor did it undertake the performance of its contract
Department of Labor and Employment, and the Social Security System with assets exceeding P5,000,000.00 according to its own manner and method, free from the control and supervision of its principal, RFC. The evidence
possessing at least 29 typewriters, office equipment and service vehicles, and its own pool of employees with 25 at hand shows that the workers assigned by PMCI to RFC were under the control and supervision of the latter. The
clerks assigned to its clients on a temporary basis. 24 Despite the evidence presented by Fuji Xerox the Court Contract of Service itself provides that RFC can require the workers assigned by PMCI to render services even
refused to apply the Neri  case and explained: beyond the regular eight hour working day when deemed necessary. 29 Furthermore, RFC undertook to assist PMCI
in making sure that the daily time records of its alleged employees faithfully reflect the actual working hours. 30 With
Petitioners cite the case of Neri v. NLRC, in which it was held that the Building Care Corporation (BCC) regard to petitioner, RFC admitted that it exercised control and supervision over him. 31 These are telltale indications
was an independent contractor on the basis of finding that it had substantial capital, although there was that PMCI was not left alone to supervise and control its alleged employees. Consequently, it can be, concluded
no evidence that it had investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries and work premises. But that PMCI was not an independent contractor since it did not carry a distinct business free from the control and
the Court in that case considered not only the capitalization of the BCC but also the fact that BCC was supervision of RFC.
providing specific special services (radio/telex operator and janitor) to the employer; that in another case,
the Court had already found that BCC was an independent contractor; that BCC retained control over the Third, PMCI was not engaged to perform a specific and special job or service, which is one of the strong indicators
employees and the employer was actually just concerned with the end-result; that BCC had the power to that an entity is an independent contractor as explained by the Court in the cases of Neri  and Fuji. As stated in the
reassign the employees and their deployment was not subject to the approval of the employer; and that Contract of Service, the sole undertaking of PMCI was to provide RFC with a temporary workforce able to carry out

54
whatever service may be required by it. 32 Such venture was complied with by PMCI when the required personnel It should be pointed out that no particular form of proof is required to prove the existence of an employer-employee
were actually assigned to RFC. Apart from that, no other particular job, work or service was required from PMCI. relationship.36 Any competent and relevant evidence may show the relationship. 37 If only documentary evidence
Obviously, with such an arrangement, PMCI merely acted as a recruitment agency for RFC. Since the undertaking would be required to demonstrate that relationship, no scheming employer would ever be brought before bar of
of PMCI did not involve the performance of a specific job, but rather the supply of manpower only, PMCI clearly justice.38 In the case at bar, petitioner presented the identification card issue to him on 26 May 1990 by RFC as
conducted itself as labor-only contractor. proof that it was the latter who engaged his services. To our mind, the ID card is enough proof that petitioner was
previously hired by RFC prior to his transfer as agency worker to PMCI. It must be noted that the Employment
Lastly, in labor-only contracting, the employees recruited, supplied or placed by the contractor perform activities Contract between petitioner and PMCI was dated 1 July 1991. On the other hand, the ID card issued by RFC to
which are directly related to the main business of its principal. In this case, the work of petitioner as sales petitioner was dated 26 May 1990, or more than one year before the Employment Contract was signed by petitioner
representative is directly related to the business of RFC. Being in the business of food manufacturing and sales, it is in favor of PMCI. It makes one wonder why, if petitioner was indeed recruited by PMCI as its own employee on 1
necessary for RFC to hire a sales representative like petitioner to take charge of booking its sales orders and July 1991, how come he had already been issued an ID card by RFC a year earlier? While the Employment
collecting payments for such. Thus, the work of petitioner as sales representative in RFC can only be categorized Contract indicates the word "renewal," presumably an attempt to show that petitioner had previously signed a
as clearly related to, and in the pursuit of the latter's business. Logically, when petitioner was assigned by PMCI to similar contract with PMCI, no evidence of a prior contract entered into petitioner and PMCI was ever presented by
RFC, PMCI acted merely as a labor-only contractor. RFC. In fact, despite the demand made by the counsel of petitioner for production of the contract which purportedly
shows that prior to 1 July 1991 petitioner was already connected with PMCI, RFC never made a move to furnish the
counsel of petitioner a copy of the alleged original Employment Contract. The only logical conclusion which may be
Based on the foregoing, PMCI can only be classified as a labor-only contractor and, as such, cannot be considered
derived from such inaction is that there was no such contract end that the only Employment Contract entered into
as the employer of petitioner.
between PMCI and petitioner was the 1 July 1991 contract and no other. Since, as shown by the ID card, petitioner
was already with RFC on 26 May 1990, prior to the time any Employment Contract was agreed upon between PMCI
However, even granting that PMCI is an independent contractor, as RFC adamantly suggests, still, a finding of the and petitioner, it follows that it was RFC who actually hired and engaged petitioner to be its employee.
same will not save the day for RFC. A perusal of the Contract of Service entered into between RFC and PMCI
reveals that petitioner is actually not included in the enumeration of the workers to be assigned to RFC. The
With respect to the payment of wages, RFC disputes the argument of petitioner that it paid his wages on the ground
following are the workers enumerated in the contract:
that petitioner did not submit any evidence to prove that his salary was paid by it, or that he was issued payslip by
the company. On the contrary, RFC asserts that the invoices 39 presented by it, show that it was PMCI who paid
1. Merchandiser petitioner his wages through its regular monthly billings charged to RFC.
2. Promo Girl
3. Factory Worker
The Court takes judicial notice of the practice of employers who, in order to evade the liabilities under the Labor
4. Driver33
Code, do not issue payslips directly to their employees. 40 Under the current practice, a third person, usually the
purported contractor (service or manpower placement agency), assumes the act of paying the wage. 41 For this
Obviously, the above enumeration does not include the position of petitioner as sales representative. This only reason, the lowly worker is unable to show proof that it was directly paid by the true employer. Nevertheless, for the
shows that petitioner was never intended to be a part of those to be contracted out. However, RFC insists that workers, it is enough that they actually receive their pay, oblivious of the need for payslips, unaware of its legal
despite the absence of his position in the enumeration, petitioner is deemed included because this has been agreed implications.42 Applying this principle to the case at bar, even though the wages were coursed through PMCI, we
upon between itself and PMCI. Such contention deserves scant consideration. Had it really been the intention of note that the funds actually came from the pockets of RFC. Thus, in the end, RFC is still the one who paid the
both parties to include the position of petitioner they should have clearly indicated the same in the contract. wages of petitioner albeit indirectly.
However, the contract is totally silent on this point which can only mean that petitioner was never really intended to
be covered by it.
As to the third element, the power to dismiss, RFC avers that it was PMCI who terminated the employment of
petitioner. The facts on record, however, disprove the allegation of RFC. First of all, the Contract of Service gave
Even if we use the "four-fold test" to ascertain whether RFC is the true employer of petitioner that same result would RFC the right to terminate the workers assigned to it by PMCI without the latter's approval. Quoted hereunder is the
be achieved. In determining the existence of employer-employee relationship the following elements of the "four-fold portion of the contract stating the power of RFC to dismiss, to wit:
test" are generally considered, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee or the power to hire; (2)
the payment of wages; (3) the power to dismiss; and (4) the power to control the employee. 34 Of these four, the
7. The First party ("RFC") reserves the right to terminate the services of any worker found to be
"control test" is the most important. 35 A careful study of the evidence at hand shows that RFC possesses the
unsatisfactory without the prior approval of the second party ("PMCI"). 43
earmarks of being the employer of petitioner.

In furtherance of the above provision, RFC requested PMCI to terminate petitioner from his employment with the
With regard to the first element, the power to hire, RFC denies any involvement in the recruitment and selection of
company. In response to the request of RFC, PMCI terminated petitioner from service. As found by the Labor
petitioner and asserts that petitioner did not present any proof that he was actually hired and employed by RFC.
Arbiter, to which we agree, the dismissal of petitioner was indeed made under the instruction of RFC to PMCI.
55
The fourth and most important requirement in ascertaining the presence of employer-employee relationship is the G.R. Nos. 118441-42           January 18, 2000
power of control. The power of control refers to the authority of the employer to control the employee not only with
regard to the result of work to be done but also to the means and methods by which the work is to be ARMANDO JOSE y PAZ and MANILA CENTRAL BUS LINES (MCL), represented by its General Manager MR.
accomplished.44 It should be borne in mind, that the "control test" calls merely for the existence of the right to control DANILO T. DE DIOS,  vs COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL ABRAHAM, represented by his father FELIXBERTO
the manner of doing the work, and not necessarily to the actual exercise of the right. 45 In the case at bar, we need ABRAHAM, JOSE MACARUBO and MERCEDES MACARUBO, 
not belabor ourselves in discussing whether the power of control exists. RFC already admitted that it exercised
control and supervision over petitioner. 46 RFC, however, raises the defense that the power of control was jointly This is a petition for review on certiorari  of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the
exercised with PMCI. The Labor Arbiter, on the other hand, found that petitioner was under the direct control and Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and ordering petitioners to pay damages for injuries to
supervision of the personnel of RFC and not PMCI. We are inclined to believe the findings of the Labor Arbiter persons and damage to property as a result of a vehicular accident.
which is supported not only by the admission of RFC but also by the evidence on record. Besides, to our mind, the
admission of RFC that it exercised control and supervision over petitioner, the same being a declaration against
interest, is sufficient enough to prove that the power of control truly exists. The facts are as follows:

We, therefore, hold that an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner and RFC. Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL) is the operator-lessee of a public utility bus
(hereafter referred to as Bus 203) with plate number NVR-III-TB-PIL and body number 203. Bus 203 is
owned by the Metro Manila Transit Corporation and is insured with the Government Service Insurance
Having determined the real employer of petitioner, we now proceed to ascertain the legality of his dismissal from System.1âwphi1.nêt
employment.
On February 22, 1985, at around six o'clock in the morning, Bus 203, then driven by petitioner Armando Jose,
Since petitioner, due to his length of service, already attained the status of a regular employee, 47 he is entitled to the collided with a red Ford Escort driven by John Macarubo on MacArthur Highway, in Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro
security of tenure provided under the labor laws. Hence, he may only be validly terminated from service upon Manila. Bus 203 was bound for Muntinlupa, Rizal, while the Ford Escort was headed towards Malanday, Valenzuela
compliance with the legal requisites for dismissal. Under the Labor Code, the requirements for the lawful dismissal on the opposite lane. As a result of the collision, the left side of the Ford Escort's hood was severely damaged while
of an employee are two-fold, the substantive and the procedural aspects. Not only must the dismissal be for a valid its driver, John Macarubo, and its lone passenger, private respondent Rommel Abraham, were seriously injured.
or authorized cause,48 the rudimentary requirements of due process — notice and hearing 49 — must, likewise, be The driver and conductress of Bus 203 rushed Macarubo and Abraham to the nearby Fatima Hospital where
observed before an employee may be dismissed. Without the concurrence of the two, the termination would, in the Macarubo lapsed into a coma. Despite surgery, Macarubo failed to recover and died five days later. Abraham
eyes of the law, be illegal.50 survived, but he became blind on the left eye which had to be removed. In addition, he sustained a fracture on the
forehead and multiple lacerations on the face, which caused him to be hospitalized for a week.
As the employer, RFC has the burden of proving that the dismissal of petitioner was for a cause allowed under the
law and that petitioner was afforded procedural due process. Sad to say, RFC failed to discharge this burden. On March 26, 1985, Rommel Abraham, represented by his father, Felixberto, instituted Civil Case No. 2206-V-85
Indeed, RFC never pointed to any valid or authorized cause under the Labor Code which allowed it to terminate the for damages against petitioners MCL and Armando Jose in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela.
services of petitioner. Its lone allegation that the dismissal was due to the expiration or completion of contract is not
even one of the grounds for termination allowed by law. Neither did RFC show that petitioner was given ample
opportunity to contest the legality of his dismissal. In fact, no notice of such impending termination was ever given On July 17, 1986, the spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of the deceased John Macarubo, filed their
him. Petitioner was, thus, surprised that he was already terminated from employment without any inkling as to how own suit for damages in the same trial court, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 2428-V-86, against MCL
and why it came about. Petitioner was definitely denied due process. Having failed to establish compliance with the alone. On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, registered owner of the Ford
requirements on termination of employment under the Labor Code, the dismissal of petitioner is tainted with Escort on the theory that John Macarubo was negligent and that he was the "authorized driver" of Juanita
illegality. Macarubo. The latter, in turn, filed a counterclaim for damages against MCL for the damage to her car. Civil Case
No. 2206-V-85 and Civil Case No. 2428-V-86 were consolidated and later tried jointly. The facts, as found by the
trial court, are as follows:
An employee who has been illegally dismissed is entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of
seniority rights and to payment of full backwages corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual
reinstatement.51 Petitioner is entitled to no less. In Civil Case No. 2206-V-85, the Court heard the testimonies that during the night previous to the accident
of February 22, 1985 at 6:15 a.m., Rommel Abraham and John Macarubo were at a party. There was
therefore, no sleep for them, notwithstanding testimony to the contrary and the service of drinks cannot be
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the NLRC, dated 21 June 1996, as well as its resolution, totally discounted. After the party at 11 p.m., while both Rommel and John were enroute home to
promulgated on 20 August 1996, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter, rendered on Valenzuela from La Loma, the car encountered mechanical trouble and had to be repaired as its cross-
15 June 1994, is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. joint was detached. The defect of a cross-joint is not minor and repair thereof would as testified to by
56
 Rommel lasted up to early dawn and the car started to run only after five o'clock in the morning. With lack (e) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
of sleep, the strains of a party still on their bodies, and the attention to the repair coupled with the wait
until the car was ready to run, are potentials in a driver for possible accident. The accident happened at 2. The heirs of John Macarubo:
6:15 a.m. when the physical and mental condition of the driver John Macarubo was as expected not too fit
for the driving as he could not anymore control the car. The desire to be home quick for the much needed (a) P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death;
sleep could have prompted him to overtake the preceding vehicle. (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
Indeed the pictures taken of the two vehicles (Exh. 1, 2 and 3) will clearly show that the MCL bus was at (d) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
its proper lane and not in an overtaking position while the car driven by John Macarubo was positioned in
a diagonal manner and crossed the line of the MCL, which is an indication of an overtaking act. If it were Costs against the appellees. SO ORDERED.
the bus that was overtaking at the time, the car would have been thrown farther away from the point of the
impact.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners MCL and Armando Jose raise four issues which boil down to
the question whether it was the driver of Bus 203 or that of the Ford Escort who was at fault for the collision of the
The court is convinced of the close supervision and control of MCL over their drivers, and its exercise of two vehicles.
due diligence in seeing to it that no recklessness is committed by its employees, drivers especially, from
the unrebutted testimonies of Cesar Cainglet.
It is well-settled that a question of fact is to be determined by the evidence offered to support the particular
contention.3 In the proceedings below, petitioners relied mainly on photographs, identified in evidence as Exhibits 1
The Court noted the respective damages of the two vehicles especially the point of the impact. From to 3, showing the position of the two vehicles after the collision. On the other hand, private respondents offered the
these damages as shown by the picture, it can be clearly deduced which vehicle did the bumping. It was testimony of Rommel Abraham to the effect that the collision took place because Bus 203 invaded their lane. 4
the car driven by John Macarubo that hit the MCL which was on its right and correct lane. 2
The trial court was justified in relying on the photographs rather than on Rommel Abraham's testimony which was
Based on the foregoing facts, the trial court rendered judgment on September 28, 1989, dismissing both civil cases obviously biased and unsupported by any other evidence. Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent
against MCL and ruling favorably on its third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, ordering the latter to pay manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. 5 In criminal cases such as murder
MCL P54,232.12 as actual damages, P24,000.00 for lost income, and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. or rape where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many occasions, relied
principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. In People v. Vasquez,6 where the physical evidence on
Rommel Abraham, the Macarubo spouses, and third-party defendant Juanita Macarubo then appealed to the Court record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we ruled that the physical evidence
of Appeals which, on December 21, 1994, rendered a decision reversing the decision of the trial court. It held (1) should prevail.7
that the trial court erred in disregarding Rommel Abraham's uncontroverted testimony that the collision was due to
the fault of the driver of Bus 203; (2) that the trial court erred in relying on photographs (Exhs. 1-3) which had been In this case, the positions of the two vehicles, as shown in the photographs (Exhs. 1 to 3) taken by MCL line
taken an hour after the collision as within that span of time, the positions of the vehicles could have been changed; inspector Jesus Custodio about an hour and fifteen minutes after the collision, disputes Abraham's self-serving
(3) that the photographs do not show that the Ford Escort was overtaking another vehicle when the accident testimony that the two vehicles collided because Bus 203 invaded the lane of the Ford Escort and clearly shows
happened and that John Macarubo, its driver, was negligent; and (4) that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing that the case is exactly the opposite of what he claimed happened. Contrary to Abraham's testimony, the
that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver Armando Jose. The dispositive portion of photographs show quite clearly that Bus 203 was in its proper lane and that it was the Ford Escort which usurped a
the decision reads: portion of the opposite lane. The three photographs show the Ford Escort positioned diagonally on the highway,
with its two front wheels occupying Bus 203's lane. As shown by the photograph marked Exhibit 3, the portion of
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and the defendants-appellees MCL and Armando MacArthur Highway where the collision took place is marked by a groove which serves as the center line separating
Jose are adjudged to pay jointly and severally: the right from the left lanes. The photograph shows that the left side of Bus 203 is about a few feet from the center
line and that the bus is positioned parallel thereto. This negates the claim that Bus 203 was overtaking another
1. Rommel Abraham, represented by his father Felixberto Abraham: vehicle and, in so doing, encroached on the opposite lane occupied by the Ford Escort.

(a) P37,576.47 as actual damages; Indeed, Bus 203 could not have been overtaking another vehicle when the collision happened. It was filled with
(b) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages; passengers,8 and it was considerably heavier and larger than the Ford Escort. If it was overtaking another vehicle, it
(c) P15,000.00 as moral damages; necessarily had to accelerate. The acceleration of its speed and its heavy load would have greatly increased its
(d) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and momentum so that the impact of the collision would have thrown the smaller and lighter Ford Escort to a
57
considerable distance from the point of impact. Exhibit 1, however, shows that the Ford Escort's smashed hood was Q: Why were you able to reach this place at 6:00 o'clock?
only about one or two meters from Bus 203's damaged left front. If there had been a great impact, such as would be A: We went home and look for the spare parts in their house, ma'am.
the case if Bus 203 had been running at a high speed, the two vehicles should have ended up far from each other. Q: House of Macarubo?
A: Yes, ma'am.
In discrediting the physical evidence, the appellate court made following observations: Q: So you were able to repair the car?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: What time were you able to repair the car?
We cannot believe that it the car which overtook another vehicle and proceeded to the lane occupied by
A: Around 5:00 o'clock in the morning, sir.
the bus. There was a traffic jam on the "bus lane" while traffic was light on the "car lane." Indeed, we find
Q: You were able to replace the cross-joint or what?
it inconceivable that the car, occupying the lane without any traffic , would overtake and traverse a heavy
A: Ginawaan ng paraan, ma'am.
traffic lane.9 (Emphasis supplied.)
Q: How?
A: The cross-joint were welded in order to enable us to go home , ma'am.
This is correct. However, the fact remains that when the Ford Escort finally came to a stop, it encroached on the Q: No spare parts was replaced?
opposite lane occupied by Bus 203. A: No, ma'am.

Significantly, Rommel Abraham testified that on February 21, 1985, the night before the accident, he and John Thus, as Rommel Abraham himself admitted, the Ford Escort's rear cross-joint was cut/detached. This mechanism
Macarubo went to a friend's house in La Loma where they stayed until 11 p.m. 10 Abraham's explanation as to why controls the movement of the rear tires. Since trouble in the cross-joint affects a car's maneuverability, the matter
they did not reach Valenzuela until six o'clock in the morning of the next day when the accident happened indicates should have been treated as a serious mechanical problem. In this case, when asked if they were able to repair the
that the Ford Escort careened and slammed against Bus 203 because of a mechanical defect. Abraham told the cross-joint, Abraham said "Ginawaan ng paraan, ma'am," by simply welding them just so they could reach home.
court.11 His testimony indicates that the rear cross-joint was hastily repaired and that, at most, the kind of repairs made
thereon were merely temporary; just enough to enable Abraham and Macarubo to reach home. Given such fact, the
ATTY. RESPICIO: likelihood is that while the Ford Escort might not have been overtaking another vehicle, it actually strayed into the
bus' lane because of the defective cross-joint, causing its driver to lose control of the vehicle.
Q: I am sorry, Your honor. After leaving Arnel's place where did you go?
ROMMEL ABRAHAM The appellate court refused to give credence to the physical evidence on the ground that the photographs were
A: We proceeded in going home, sir. taken an hour after the collision and that within such span of time the bus could have been moved because there
Q: You were on your way home? was no showing that the driver left the scene of the accident. This is not correct. Constancia Gerolada, Bus 203's
A: Yes, sir. conductress, testified that, immediately after the collision, she and bus driver, petitioner Armando Jose, took the
Q: What time did you . . . I will reform the question. You met the accident at about 6:00 o'clock the next injured driver and passenger of the Ford Escort to the Fatima Hospital. 12 This fact is not disputed by private
day, 6:00 o'clock in the morning the next day, did it take you long to reach BBB? respondents.
A: Our car had a mechanical trouble somewhere at 2nd Avenue, sir.
Q: What kind of trouble? Rommel Abraham mentioned in his appellant's brief in the appellate court a sketch of the scene of the accident
A: The cross-joint were detached, sir. allegedly prepared by one Patrolman Kalale, which shows Bus 203 to be occupying the Ford Escort's lane.
Q: Are you familiar with cars? However, the records of this case do not show that such a sketch was ever presented in evidence in the trial court
A: A little, sir. or that Patrolman Kalale was ever presented as a witness to testify on the sketch allegedly prepared by him. Under
Rule 132, §3 of the Rules on Evidence, courts cannot consider any evidence unless formally offered by a party.
COURT:
Finally, the appellate court also ruled that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing that it exercised the diligence
Q: What time was that when you have this cross-joint problem? of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver, Armando Jose. 13 Under the
A: About 12:00 o'clock perhaps, sir. circumstances of this case, we hold that proof of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not
Q: What happened to the cross joint? required.
A: It was cut, ma'am.
Q: You were able to repair that cross-joint 12:00 o'clock and you were able to run and reached this place The Civil Code provides in pertinent parts:
of accident at 6:00 o'clock?
A: No, we we're not able to get spare parts, ma'am.
58
 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is Art. 2180 of the Civil Code makes the persons specified therein responsible for the  quasi-delicts of others. The
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual burden is upon MCL to prove that Juanita Macarubo is one of those specified persons who are vicariously liable for
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter. the negligence of the deceased John Macarubo.

Art. 2180 The obligation imposed in Art. 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but In its third-party complaint, MCL alleged that Juanita Macarubo was the registered owner of the Ford Escort car and
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. that John Macarubo was the "authorized driver" of the car. 16 Nowhere was it alleged that John Macarubo was the
son, ward, employee or pupil of private respondent Juanita Macarubo so as to make the latter vicariously liable for
xxx     xxx     xxx the negligence of John Macarubo. The allegation that John Macarubo was "the authorized driver" of the Ford Escort
is not equivalent to an allegation that he was an employee of Juanita Macarubo. That John Macarubo was the
"authorized driver" of the car simply means that he drove the Ford Escort with the permission of Juanita Macarubo.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry. Nor did MCL present any evidence to prove that Juanita Macarubo was the employer of John Macarubo or that she
is in any way liable for John Macarubo's negligence under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. For failure to discharge its
burden, MCL's third-party complaint should be dismissed.
xxx     xxx     xxx

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the complaints filed in Civil Cases Nos.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
2206-V-85 and 24428-V-86 against Manila Central Bus Lines and Armando Jose, as well as the third-party
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
complaint filed in Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 against Juanita Macarubo, are hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.
Thus, the responsibility of employers is premised upon the presumption of negligence of their employees. As held
G.R. No. 174466               July 14, 2008 ACI PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. EDITHA C. COQUIA, DOING BUSINESS IN
in Poblete v. Fabros:14
THE NAME OF E. CARDOZO COQUIA ENTERPRISE, 
[I]t is such a firmly established principle, as to have virtually formed part of the law itself, that the
Petitioner ACI Philippines, Inc. 1 is engaged in the business of manufacturing fiberglass, which is used in both
negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. This
commercial and industrial equipment for thermal and acoustic insulation. In 1993, it ceased from using silica sand in
is the presumed negligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The theory of presumed
the manufacture of fiberglass and started using instead recycled broken glass or flint cullets to save on
negligence, in contrast with the American doctrine of respondent superior, where the negligence of the
manufacturing costs.2
employee is conclusively presumed to be the negligence of the employer, is clearly deducible from the
last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides that the responsibility therein mentioned
shall cease if the employers prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to Petitioner contracted with respondent Editha C. Coquia for the purchase of one (1) lot of flint cullets, consisting of
prevent damages (12 Manresa, 657; Balica vs. Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624; Cangco vs. Manila 2,500 to 3,000 metric tons, at a price of ₱4.20 per kilo under Purchase Order No. 106211 3 dated 6 October 1994.
Railroad Co., 30 Phil. 768), as observed in the same cases just cited. Several deliveries made by respondent were accepted and paid for by petitioner at the unit price of ₱4.20 per kilo
as indicated in Purchase Order No. 106211.4
Therefore, before the presumption of the employer's negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees
can arise, the negligence of the employee must first be established. While the allegations of negligence against the However, on 28 October 1994, petitioner demanded the reduction of the purchase price from ₱4.20 per kilo to
employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict ₱3.65 per kilo to which respondent acceded, albeit allegedly under duress. Petitioner accordingly issued Purchase
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the failure to prove the employee's negligence during the trial is fatal to proving Order No. 1063735 explicitly superseding Purchase Order No. 106211. Deliveries were again made by respondent
the employer's vicarious liability. In this case, private respondents failed to prove their allegation of negligence on 5, 8 and 12 November 1994 under Delivery Receipt Nos. 901, 719 and 735, 6 respectively. Petitioner accepted
against driver Armando Jose who, in fact, was acquitted in the case for criminal negligence arising from the same the deliveries but refused to pay for them even at the reduced price of ₱3.65 per kilo, demanding instead that the
incident.15 unit price be further reduced to ₱3.10 per kilo.7

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellate court erred in holding petitioners liable to private respondents. Respondent then filed a Complaint 8 for specific performance and damages against petitioner seeking payment for
The next question then is whether, as the trial court held, private respondent Juanita Macarubo is liable to the deliveries made under Delivery Receipt Nos. 901, 719 and 735, amounting to 46,390 kilos at the renegotiated
petitioners. price of ₱3.65 per kilo. Respondent further demanded that petitioner be directed to accept and pay for the
remaining deliveries to complete the one (1) lot of flint cullets originally contracted for.

59
On 26 November 1994, three (3) days after the complaint against it was filed, petitioner paid for the flint cullets Petitioner also maintains that it entered into a contract with respondent upon the latter’s assurance that she could
under Delivery Receipt Nos. 901, 719 and 735 at the unit price of ₱3.65 per kilo. promptly deliver the 2,500-3,000 metric tons of flint cullets required by petitioner. However, it believes that the trial
court and the appellate court erroneously refused to receive evidence aliunde  to prove that time was an important
Ruling in favor of the respondent, the trial court ordered petitioner to accept deliveries of the flint cullets contracted element of the agreement.
for under Purchase Order No. 106211 and to pay for the said deliveries within ten (10) days from each delivery at
the unit price of ₱4.20 per kilo. It further directed petitioner to pay ₱2,540,300.00 in damages plus interest at the The Court of Appeals identified the three issues for resolution: (1) whether petitioner may be bound to accept the
legal rate from the time of the filing of the complaint on 23 November 1994 until fully paid. The trial court also deliveries of washed cullets from respondent; (2) what is the unit price applicable; and (3) who is entitled to
awarded respondent attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱200,000.00, litigation expenses in the amount of ₱20,000.00 damages. Central to these issues is the soundness of the appellate court’s pronouncement that the purchase
and costs of suit. orders in question are contracts of adhesion whose terms must be strictly construed against petitioner.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but deleted the award of attorney’s fees, litigation A contract of adhesion is one wherein a party, usually a corporation, prepares the stipulations in the contract, and
expenses and costs of suit. In its Decision 9 dated 15 September 2005, the appellate court held that Purchase Order the other party merely affixes his signature or his "adhesion" thereto. Through the years, the courts have held that in
No. 106211 is a contract of adhesion whose terms must be strictly construed against petitioner. It also deemed as this type of contract, the parties do not bargain on equal footing, the weaker party's participation being reduced to
contrary to the original agreement, which pegged the unit price of flint cullets at ₱4.20 per kilo, petitioner’s willful the alternative to take it or leave it. Thus, adhesion contracts are viewed as traps for the weaker party whom the
refusal to pay for the deliveries unless the price is reduced, for which petitioner should be held liable. courts of justice must protect. However, we have also been steadfast in reminding courts to be careful in their
evaluation of allegations of blind adherence to contracts. 15
The appellate court denied petitioner’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration, 10 as well as respondent’s Urgent Ex
Parte  Application for Attachment,11 in its Resolution12 dated 30 August 2006. There is every indication in this case that respondent, a presumably astute businesswoman who has dealings with
big corporations such as La Tondeña as the latter’s sole buyer of cullets and has the financial savvy to obtain a loan
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Purchase Order No. 106211 is a contract of adhesion from a bank,16 gave her assent to Purchase Order No. 106211 with full knowledge. She was, in fact, the one who
despite the fact that respondent is an established businesswoman who has the freedom to negotiate the terms and sought a contract with petitioner upon learning of the latter’s need for a supply of flint cullets. Respondent testified:
conditions of any contract she enters into. It stresses that Purchase Order No. 106211 was superseded by
Purchase Order No. 106373 and that in both contracts, it was made clear to respondent that her assurance of Q: Could you tell the Court how you were able to get this PO?
prompt delivery of the flint cullets motivated the transaction. A: I went to ACI, sir.
Q: You went to ACI because you have knowledge that they were in need of flint cullets?
Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s decision which compelled it to accept A: Yes, sir.
and pay for the deliveries at the price of ₱4.20 per kilo and at the same required it to pay damages representing Q: And who told you that ACI is in need of flint cullets?
respondent’s alleged unrealized profits. It also alleges that the appellate court erroneously applied Article 21 of the A: With information, I learned that ACI is in need of cullets, so I went to ACI.
Civil Code despite the existence of purchase orders which should govern the contractual obligations of the parties. Q: You went to ACI to see a person, who is that person?
A: I went to see ACI that I will deliver cullets, and then I was ordered to go to the purchasing department, sir.
Q: When you went to ACI, you said to deliver cullets?
Apart from stating that petitioner appears to have shut down its operations, respondent’s Comment 13 dated 12
A: To sell cullets, sir.17
January 2007 merely reiterates her position that Purchase Order No. 106373 was a product of intimidation practiced
upon her by petitioner.
We cannot, therefore, apply the rule on contracts of adhesion in construing the provisions of the purchase orders in
this case. Even the conditions of purchase enumerated at the reverse side of the purchase orders, which uniformly
In its Reply14 dated 22 April 2007, petitioner asserts that its juridical personality continues to subsist despite the
provide —
change of its corporate name from ACI Philippines, Inc. to Asia Pacific Insulation Corporation. It emphasizes that
Purchase Order No. 106211 is not a contract of adhesion and should be considered valid and binding considering
that the parties voluntarily executed the same and that, furthermore, Purchase Order No. 106211 had already been 1. Acknowledgement by the Vendor to the Purchaser or any delivery made by the Vendor pursuant to this
superseded by Purchase Order No. 106373. order shall constitute acceptance by the Vendor of this order and a contract between the Vendor and the
Purchaser in terms of this order to the exclusion of all other terms and conditions between them.
Petitioner maintains that it did not exercise any intimidation on respondent to force the latter to acquiesce to the new
purchase order and that assuming that it did, the resultant voidable contract was ratified by respondent’s delivery of 2. The Vendor guarantees the goods ordered to be of merchantable quality and condition and this
the flint cullets and the fact that the Statement of Account dated 28 October and 16 November 1994 sent by condition shall apply notwithstanding any examination of the goods by or on behalf of the Purchaser. Any
respondent to petitioner already reflected the reduced unit price of ₱3.65 per kilo. stipulation as to the quality of goods is also a condition of any contract arising from this order. If a sample

60
of the goods has been made available to the Purchaser then contract arising from this order shall have using any goods or products of Purchaser for any alleged infringement or claim of infringement of any
contract for sale by sample as well as a contract for sale by descriptions. patent, [trademark], [copyright], industrial design, or process of manufacture by reason of the sale or use
of the goods by the Purchaser and will pay all costs[,] damages and expenses which Purchaser may
3. The prices stated in this order are firm prices save that any reduction in price resulting from a reduction sustain by reason of any such claim and/or suit [or] action.
in customs duties or sales tax from those in force at the date hereof is to be allowed to the Purchase in
reduction of the price agreed hereunder. 10. Invoices quoting this Order number and Vendor’s packing slip numbers are required for each
individual order and shipment, and shall be mailed to the Purchaser not later than the day of despatch of
4. Delivery of the goods must be made at the Purchaser’s address shown on the face of this order or as the goods. All products shall be accompanied by original packing slips. Overseas Vendors must render an
otherwise directed, on a working day between the hours of 8:00 and 3:30 p.m. Until delivery the goods additional certified invoice for Philippines Customs purposes. Negotiable bills of lading or consignment
shall be at the Vendor’s risk. Any delivery date shown on this order shall be of the essence of any contract notes properly signed by the Carrier must be attached to the Vendor’s invoices.
arising. Delivery must be made in strict accordance with the order or delivery schedule and any quantities
delivered in excess of that specified on the order may be returned by the Purchaser at the Vendor’s risk 11. Waiver by the Purchaser of any specific defaults by the Vendor, or failure of the Purchaser to cancel
and expense. this order or any part thereof when such a right arises shall not constitute a waiver by the Purchaser of
any of the conditions of this order except such defaults as are specifically waived and then only in respect
5. All goods must be suitably packed or otherwise prepared for delivery to the satisfaction of the carrier. of the actual defaults.18
No charges are to be made for wrapping packing cartons boxes or crating unless authorized by this order.
— do not reveal any hint of one-sidedness in favor of petitioner.
6. The Purchaser may without prejudice to any other rights at any time after delivery of the good reject
them if on inspection the Purchaser considers them not to be in conformity with any contract arising from If anything, in fact, Condition 4 above seems to have worked to petitioner’s disadvantage as it underpins the refusal
this order. Goods rejected will be held at the vendor’s risk and are returnable at the Vendor’s risk and of the trial court to accept evidence aliunde  to show that time was of the essence in the transaction. The said
expense. condition specifically mentions that the "delivery date shown on (the purchase order) shall be of the essence of any
contract arising" and that "delivery must be made in strict accordance with the order or delivery schedule…"
7. All drawings, blueprints, tools or patterns furnished in connection with this order at any time, are Purchase Order No. 106211, however, is unusually silent as to the date the flint cullets are needed.
confidential to the Vendor and Purchaser and shall be used solely to complete this contract or any other
contract relating to the products between the Vendor and the Purchaser, and for no other purpose, except Petitioner remedied this seeming inadvertence by squarely raising the failure of the purchase order to express the
with the prior consent in writing of the Purchaser, and shall remain the property of the Purchaser and be true intent of the parties, i.e.,  that petitioner entered into a contract with respondent conditioned upon the latter’s
returned to the Purchaser on demand. The Vendor shall not without the written prior approval of the prompt delivery of flint cullets, as an issue in its Answer with Counterclaims. 19 Unfortunately, the trial court sustained
Purchaser furnish to any third party any goods for the manufacture of which drawings, blueprints, tools, respondent’s objection based on the parol evidence rule.
patterns, specifications or samples have been supplied to the Vendor by the Purchaser, or manufacture
such articles except for the Purchaser. This restriction shall continue notwithstanding termination of this It is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance, that the written document is the best
order. evidence of its own contents. It is also a matter of both principle and policy that when the written contract is
established as the repository of the parties’ stipulations, any other evidence is excluded and the same cannot be
8. The Purchaser reserves the right to cancel or suspend this order or any part thereof, if the goods are used as a substitute for such contract, nor even to alter or contradict them. 20 This rule, however, is not without
not delivered according to deliveries as specified, or if the Purchaser is unable to accept delivery for any exception. Section. 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that a party may present evidence to modify, explain or
cause beyond the Purchaser’s control. add to the terms of the agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written agreement to express
the true intent and agreement of the parties. Since an exception to the parol evidence rule was squarely raised as
The Purchaser further reserves the right to cancel this order if the goods are not in accordance with an issue in the answer, the trial court should not have been so inflexible as to completely disregard petitioner’s
drawings, blueprints, approved samples or specifications, or are defective in workmanship or material or evidence.
are not otherwise satisfactory to the Purchaser.
Sifting through the testimony of respondent, we find that although she was not given definite days during which she
9. Vendor warrants that the sale to the Purchaser and the use by the Purchaser of the goods in any way should deliver the flint cullets, she was indeed apprised of petitioner’s urgent need for large quantities
will not infringe any patent, [trademark], [copyright], industrial design or process of manufacture, and thereof.21 Furthermore, petitioner presented the unrebutted testimony of Ermilinda Batalon, its materials control
covenants that Vendor will, at Vendor’s own expense, upon demand of Purchaser, investigate and deal manager, to prove that it agreed to the ₱4.20 per kilo purchase price only because respondent assured it of prompt
with every claim and/or suit or action, which may be brought against Purchaser or against those selling or deliveries sufficient for petitioner’s production requirements.22 These testimonies give us a more complete picture of

61
the transaction between the parties and allow for a more reasoned resolution of the issues, without over-reliance on By acquiescing to the new purchase order which no longer indicated a specific quantity of flint cullets to be
the tenuous application of the rule on contracts of adhesion. delivered, respondent knew or should be presumed to have known that deliveries made thereafter were no longer
meant to complete the original quantity contracted for under Purchase Order No. 106211. 1avvphi1
Coming now to the second purchase order, we find that Purchase Order No. 106211 had indeed been superseded
by Purchase Order No. 106373 as the latter plainly states. Respondent testified that the deliveries of flint cullets on The foregoing leads us to resolve the first and second issues framed by the Court of Appeals in favor of petitioner.
28 October 1994 and on subsequent dates were already covered by the new purchase order which did indicate the Petitioner accepted deliveries under Purchase Order No. 106211 on 8, 12, 15, 18, 20 and 22 October 1994 and
reduced unit price but did not mention the quantity to be delivered. She said: paid for these deliveries in accordance with the terms of the purchase order, i.e.,  at the contract price of ₱4.20 per
kilo. However, the original contract between the parties evidenced by Purchase Order No. 106211 was
Q: And of course you were told by Mrs. Batalon that the PO that will be issued to you is an open PO? unequivocally novated by Purchase Order No. 106373, thereby extinguishing the original obligation of petitioner to
Atty. Tanopo: accept deliveries from respondent until the 2,500-3,000 metric tons of flint cullets originally contracted for is
What do you mean by open PO? filled.24 Petitioner, therefore, cannot be compelled to accept more deliveries of flint cullets from respondent to
Atty. Buyco: complete the quantity originally contracted for.
It does not indicate the quantity that will deliver.
Q: There is no quantity mentioned as to how much you are going to deliver, you deliver as they come. [I]n By the same token, petitioner cannot be tied down to the ₱4.20 per kilo unit price under Purchase Order No.
other words at ₱3.65? 106211, nor even to the ₱3.65 per kilo indicated in Purchase Order No. 106373, the latter contract not having
A: Yes, sir. stated the quantity petitioner is willing to accept delivery of and pay for under that price.
Q: So much so that your subsequent deliveries after October 28 is already on the basis of this PO?
A: Yes, sir. As regards damages, we find the award thereof to respondent to be without factual basis. Respondent sought to
Q: Exhibit D? prove the actual damages she incurred merely through her own testimony, without adducing any documentary
A: Yes, sir. evidence to substantiate her alleged losses. While she claims that she obtained a bank loan at an interest rate of
Q: Now, your counsel earlier manifested that he filed this complaint on November 24, 1994, it was after 21%, respondent did not present any document to prove the said loan or the use thereof to purchase flint cullets for
November 23, 1994 Mrs. Coquia [ sic] that there were developments that substantially affected the delivery to petitioner. Neither did respondent present documents to prove her alleged stock of 1,000 metric tons of
allegations in this complaint, like substantial payments made by you by ACI, Philippines? flint cullets for which she allegedly invested ₱2,500,000.00.

Atty. Tanopo: The claim for actual damages in this case should be admitted with extreme caution since it is based only on bare
assertions without support from independent evidence. In determining actual damages, the Court cannot rely on
Counsel may show us, your Honor. mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable regarding the actual amount of loss. 25
Court:
Finally, we find the appellate court’s citation of Article 21 of the Civil Code misplaced not only because of the pre-
Counsel may stipulate. existing contractual relation between the parties which bars the application of this provision, but more importantly
because we do not deem petitioner to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith. 26
Q: Did the deliveries of invoices no. [901, 719] and 735[,] Exhibits F, F1 and F2 has already been paid by
the plaintiff? WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57678 dated 15 September 2005, and its
Resolution dated 30 August 2006 are REVERSED. The complaint dated 23 November 1994 filed by Editha C.
Atty. Tanopo: Coquia against ACI Philippines, Inc. is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Admitted, paid at the rate of ₱3.65.23 G.R. No. 170633             October 17, 2007 MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION,  vs. SSANGYONG
CORPORATION
Clearly, respondent knew, at the time she made the deliveries on 28 October 1994 and thereafter, that Purchase
Order No. 106373 would already govern the transaction. Significantly, payments on these deliveries were made by Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
petitioner on 26 November and 8 December 1994, after the complaint for specific performance was filed and without 82983 and its Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
respondent making as much as a whimper of protest against the terms of the new purchase order or the reduced
purchase price indicated therein.
62
Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo, Manila, is engaged in the The following day, June 29, 2000, Ssangyong received, by fax, a letter signed by Chan, requesting an extension of
business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. 3 One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation time to open the L/C because MCC's credit line with the bank had been fully availed of in connection with another
(Ssangyong),4 an international trading company5 with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters transaction, and MCC was waiting for an additional credit line. 26 On the same date, Ssangyong replied, requesting
in Makati City, Philippines.6 The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or that it be informed of the date when the L/C would be opened, preferably at the earliest possible time, since its Steel
telecopy transmissions.7 Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product Team 2 in Korea was having problems and Ssangyong was incurring warehousing costs. 27 To maintain their good
order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it business relationship and to support MCC in its financial predicament, Ssangyong offered to negotiate with its steel
back to Ssangyong, again by fax.8 manufacturer, POSCO, another US$20/MT discount on the price of the stainless steel ordered. This was intimated
in Ssangyong's June 30, 2000 letter to MCC. 28 On July 6, 2000, another follow-up letter 29 for the opening of the L/C
On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a letter 9 addressed to Gregory Chan, MCC Manager [also was sent by Ssangyong to MCC.
the President10 of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation], to confirm MCC's and Sanyo Seiki's order of  220 metric
tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel under a preferential rate of US$1,860.00 per MT. Chan, on behalf of the However, despite Ssangyong's letters, MCC failed to open a letter of credit. 30 Consequently, on August 15, 2000,
corporations, assented and affixed his signature on the conforme portion of the letter.11 Ssangyong, through counsel, wrote Sanyo Seiki that if the L/C's were not opened, Ssangyong would be compelled
to cancel the contract and hold MCC liable for damages for breach thereof amounting to US$96,132.18, inclusive of
On April 17, 2000, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTSO40112 containing the terms warehouse expenses, related interests and charges. 31
and conditions of the transaction. MCC sent back by fax to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity
signature13 of Chan. As stated in the pro forma invoice, payment for the ordered steel products would be made Later, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-132 and ST2-POSTS080-233 dated August 16, 2000 were issued by
through an irrevocable letter of credit (L/C) at sight in favor of Ssangyong. 14 Following their usual practice, delivery Ssangyong and sent via fax to MCC. The invoices slightly varied the terms of the earlier  pro forma invoices (ST2-
of the goods was to be made after the L/C had been opened. POSTSO401, ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2), in that the quantity was now officially 100MT per
invoice and the price was reduced to US$1,700.00 per MT. As can be gleaned from the photocopies of the said
In the meantime, because of its confirmed transaction with MCC, Ssangyong placed the order with its steel August 16, 2000 invoices submitted to the court, they both bear the conformity signature of MCC Manager Chan.
manufacturer, Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation (POSCO), in South Korea 15 and paid the same in full.
On August 17, 2000, MCC finally opened an L/C with PCIBank for US$170,000.00 covering payment for 100MT of
Because MCC could open only a partial letter of credit, the order for 220MT of steel was split into two, 16 one stainless steel coil under Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2.34 The goods covered by the said invoice were
for 110MT covered by Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS0401-117 and another for 110MT covered by ST2- then shipped to and received by MCC.35
POSTS0401-2,18 both dated April 17, 2000.
MCC then faxed to Ssangyong a letter dated August 22, 2000 signed by Chan, requesting for a price adjustment of
On June 20, 2000, Ssangyong, through its Manila Office, informed Sanyo Seiki and Chan, by way of a fax the order stated in Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-1, considering that the prevailing price of steel at that
transmittal, that it was ready to ship 193.597MT of stainless steel from Korea to the Philippines. It requested that the time was US$1,500.00/MT, and that MCC lost a lot of money due to a recent strike. 36
opening of the L/C be facilitated. 19 Chan affixed his signature on the fax transmittal and returned the same, by fax,
to Ssangyong.20 Ssangyong rejected the request, and, on August 23, 2000, sent a demand letter 37 to Chan for the opening of the
second and last L/C of US$170,000.00 with a warning that, if the said L/C was not opened by MCC on August 26,
Two days later, on June 22, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office informed Sanyo Seiki, thru Chan, that it was able to 2000, Ssangyong would be constrained to cancel the contract and hold MCC liable for US$64,066.99 (representing
secure a US$30/MT price adjustment on the contracted price of US$1,860.00/MT for the 200MT stainless steel, and cost difference, warehousing expenses, interests and charges as of August 15, 2000) and other damages for
that the goods were to be shipped in two tranches, the first 100MT on that day and the second 100MT not later than breach. Chan failed to reply.
June 27, 2000. Ssangyong reiterated its request for the facilitation of the L/C's opening. 21
Exasperated, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on September 11, 2000, canceling the sales
Ssangyong later, through its Manila Office, sent a letter, on June 26, 2000, to the Treasury Group of Sanyo Seiki contract under ST2-POSTS0401-1 /ST2-POSTS0401-2, and demanding payment of US$97,317.37 representing
that it was looking forward to receiving the L/C details and a cable copy thereof that day. 22 Ssangyong sent a losses, warehousing expenses, interests and charges.38
separate letter of the same date to Sanyo Seiki requesting for the opening of the L/C covering payment of the first
100MT not later than June 28, 2000. 23 Similar letters were transmitted by Ssangyong Manila Office on June 27, Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against
2000.24 On June 28, 2000, Ssangyong sent another facsimile letter to MCC stating that its principal in Korea was defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its
already in a difficult situation25 because of the failure of Sanyo Seiki and MCC to open the L/C's. complaint,39 Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their contract when they refused to open the L/C in the
amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-
1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.

63
After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence 40 alleging that Ssangyong failed to A. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS
present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. In an Order dated April 24, AGREED TO PURCHASE 200 METRIC TONS OF STEEL PRODUCTS FROM APPELLEE,
2003, the court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence presented had already been admitted in INSTEAD OF ONLY 100 METRIC TONS.
the December 16, 2002 Order 41 and their admissibility finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. Considering that both testimonial and documentary evidence 1. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN
tended to substantiate the material allegations in the complaint, Ssangyong's evidence sufficed for purposes of a EVIDENCE THE PRO FORMA INVOICES WITH REFERENCE NOS. ST2-
prima facie case.42 POSTS0401-1 AND ST2-POSTS0401-2.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision 43 on March 24, 2004, in favor of Ssangyong. The trial court II. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN AWARDING ACTUAL DAMAGES TO
ruled that when plaintiff agreed to sell and defendants agreed to buy the 220MT of steel products for the price of APPELLEE.
US$1,860 per MT, the contract was perfected. The subject transaction was evidenced by  Pro Forma Invoice
Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2, which were later amended only in terms of reduction of volume III. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO
as well as the price per MT, following Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-2. The RTC, APPELLEE.
however, excluded Sanyo Seiki from liability for lack of competent evidence. The fallo of the decision reads:
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GREGORY CHAN
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants MCC Industrial JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH APPELLANT MCC. 47
Sales Corporation and Gregory Chan, to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally the following:
On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision 48 affirming the ruling of the trial court, but absolving Chan of any
1) Actual damages of US$93,493.87 representing the outstanding principal claim plus interest at the rate liability. The appellate court ruled, among others, that Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-
of 6% per annum from March 30, 2001. POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F") were admissible in evidence, although they were mere facsimile
printouts of MCC's steel orders.49 The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
2) Attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 plus P2,000.00 per counsel's appearance in court, the same
being deemed just and equitable considering that by reason of defendants' breach of their obligation WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court holds:
under the subject contract, plaintiff was constrained to litigate to enforce its rights and recover for the
damages it sustained, and therefore had to engage the services of a lawyer.
(1) The award of actual damages, with interest, attorney's fees and costs ordered by the lower court is
hereby AFFIRMED.
3) Costs of suit.
(2) Appellant Gregory Chan is hereby ABSOLVED from any liability.
No award of exemplary damages for lack of sufficient basis.
SO ORDERED.50
SO ORDERED.44
A copy of the said Decision was received by MCC's and Chan's principal counsel, Atty. Eladio B. Samson, on
On April 22, 2004, MCC and Chan, through their counsel of record, Atty. Eladio B. Samson, filed their Notice of September 14, 2005.51 Their collaborating counsel, Castillo Zamora & Poblador, 52 likewise, received a copy of the
Appeal.45 On June 8, 2004, the law office of Castillo Zamora & Poblador entered its appearance as their CA decision on September 19, 2005.53
collaborating counsel.
On October 4, 2005, Castillo Zamora & Poblador, on behalf of MCC, filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
In their Appeal Brief filed on March 9, 2005,46 MCC and Chan raised before the CA the following errors of the RTC: decision.54 Ssangyong opposed the motion contending that the decision of the CA had become final and executory
on account of the failure of MCC to file the said motion within the reglementary period. The appellate court resolved,
I. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS VIOLATED on November 22, 2005, to deny the motion on its merits, 55 without, however, ruling on the procedural issue raised.
THEIR CONTRACT WITH APPELLEE
Aggrieved, MCC filed a petition for review on certiorari56 before this Court, imputing the following errors to the Court
of Appeals:

64
 THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A LEGAL QUESTION NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH counsel has not yet received a copy of the decision. In this case, when Atty. Samson received a copy of the CA
JURISPRUDENCE AND SANCTIONED A DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL AND ACCEPTED COURSE decision on September 14, 2005, MCC had only fifteen (15) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration
OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BY REVERSING THE COURT A QUO'S DISMISSAL OF THE conformably with Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, or to file a petition for review on certiorari in accordance
COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 02-124 CONSIDERING THAT: with Section 2, Rule 45. The period should not be reckoned from September 29, 2005 (when Castillo Zamora &
Poblador received their copy of the decision) because notice to Atty. Samson is deemed notice to collaborating
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE counsel.
OF THE PRO-FORMA INVOICES WITH REFERENCE NOS. ST2-POSTSO401-1 AND ST2-
POSTSO401-2, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WERE MERE PHOTOCOPIES OF We note, however, from the records of the CA, that it was Castillo Zamora & Poblador, not Atty. Samson, which
FACSIMILE PRINTOUTS. filed both MCC's and Chan's Brief and Reply Brief. Apparently, the arrangement between the two counsels was for
the collaborating, not the principal, counsel to file the appeal brief and subsequent pleadings in the CA. This
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT, EVEN explains why it was Castillo Zamora & Poblador which filed the motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision,
ASSUMING PETITIONER BREACHED THE SUPPOSED CONTRACT, THE FACT IS THAT and they did so on October 5, 2005, well within the 15-day period from September 29, 2005, when they received
PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT IT SUFFERED ANY DAMAGES AND THE AMOUNT their copy of the CA decision. This could also be the reason why the CA did not find it necessary to resolve the
THEREOF. question of the timeliness of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, even as the CA denied the same.

III. THE AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF US$93,493.87 IS SIMPLY Independent of this consideration though, this Court assiduously reviewed the records and found that strong
UNCONSCIONABLE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT LEAST REDUCED, IF NOT DELETED concerns of substantial justice warrant the relaxation of this rule.
BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.57
In Philippine Ports Authority v. Sargasso Construction and Development Corporation ,59 we ruled that:
In its Comment, Ssangyong sought the dismissal of the petition, raising the following arguments: that the CA
decision dated 15 August 2005 is already final and executory, because MCC's motion for reconsideration was filed In Orata v. Intermediate Appellate Court , we held that where strong considerations of substantive justice
beyond the reglementary period of 15 days from receipt of a copy thereof, and that, in any case, it was a pro are manifest in the petition, this Court may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the
forma motion; that MCC breached the contract for the purchase of the steel products when it failed to open the exercise of its legal jurisdiction. In addition to the basic merits of the main case, such a petition usually
required letter of credit; that the printout copies and/or photocopies of facsimile or telecopy transmissions were embodies justifying circumstance which warrants our heeding to the petitioner's cry for justice in spite of
properly admitted by the trial court because they are considered original documents under R.A. No. 8792; and that the earlier negligence of counsel. As we held in Obut v. Court of Appeals:
MCC is liable for actual damages and attorney's fees because of its breach, thus, compelling Ssangyong to litigate.
[W]e cannot look with favor on a course of action which would place the administration of justice
The principal issues that this Court is called upon to resolve are the following: in a straight jacket for then the result would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at
all. Verily, judicial orders, such as the one subject of this petition, are issued to be obeyed,
I – Whether the CA decision dated 15 August 2005 is already final and executory; nonetheless a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the circumstances attending the case may
warrant. What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose
II – Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as
life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities.
such;

The rules of procedure are used only to secure and not override or frustrate justice. A six-day delay in the
III – Whether there was a perfected contract of sale between MCC and Ssangyong, and, if in the affirmative,
perfection of the appeal, as in this case, does not warrant the outright dismissal of the appeal.
whether MCC breached the said contract; and
In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals , we gave due course to the petitioner's
appeal despite the late filing of its brief in the appellate court because such appeal involved public
IV – Whether the award of actual damages and attorney's fees in favor of Ssangyong is proper and justified. interest. We stated in the said case that the Court may exempt a particular case from a strict application
of the rules of procedure where the appellant failed to perfect its appeal within the reglementary period,
-I- resulting in the appellate court's failure to obtain jurisdiction over the case. In Republic vs. Imperial, Jr., we
also held that there is more leeway to exempt a case from the strictness of procedural rules when the
It cannot be gainsaid that in Albano v. Court of Appeals,58 we held that receipt of a copy of the decision by one of appellate court has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case. We emphasize that:
several counsels on record is notice to all, and the period to appeal commences on such date even if the other

65
 [T]he rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the
than frustrate it. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the original fax transmittals.
would subvert the rule's primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting justice.
Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every In resolving this issue, the appellate court ruled as follows:
party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. 60 Admissibility of Pro Forma
Invoices; Breach of Contract
Moreover, it should be remembered that the Rules were promulgated to set guidelines in the orderly administration by Appellants
of justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts would be consigned to being mere slaves
to technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion. Technicalities must take a backseat to substantive rights. Turning first to the appellants' argument against the admissibility of the Pro Forma Invoices with
After all, it is circumspect leniency in this respect that will give the parties the fullest opportunity to ventilate the Reference Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F", pp. 215-218,
merits of their respective causes, rather than have them lose life, liberty, honor or property on sheer technicalities. 61 Records), appellants argue that the said documents are inadmissible (sic) being violative of the best
evidence rule.
The other technical issue posed by respondent is the alleged pro forma nature of MCC's motion for reconsideration,
ostensibly because it merely restated the arguments previously raised and passed upon by the CA. The argument is untenable.

In this connection, suffice it to say that the mere restatement of arguments in a motion for reconsideration does not The copies of the said pro-forma invoices submitted by the appellee are admissible in evidence, although
per se result in a pro forma motion. In Security Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. Cuenca ,62 we held that a motion for they are mere electronic facsimile printouts of appellant's orders. Such facsimile printouts are considered
reconsideration may not be necessarily pro forma even if it reiterates the arguments earlier passed upon and Electronic Documents under the New Rules on Electronic Evidence, which came into effect on August 1,
rejected by the appellate court. A movant may raise the same arguments precisely to convince the court that its 2001. (Rule 2, Section 1 [h], A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).
ruling was erroneous. Furthermore, the pro forma rule will not apply if the arguments were not sufficiently passed
upon and answered in the decision sought to be reconsidered.
"(h) 'Electronic document' refers to information or the representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by
- II - which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and
affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
The second issue poses a novel question that the Court welcomes. It provides the occasion for this Court to electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout or output, readable by
pronounce a definitive interpretation of the equally innovative provisions of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic
(R.A. No. 8792) vis-à-vis the Rules on Electronic Evidence. document. For purposes of these Rules, the term 'electronic document' may be used
interchangeably with 'electronic data message'.
Although the parties did not raise the question whether the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data
messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act (the petitioner merely An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best
assails as inadmissible evidence the photocopies of the said facsimile transmissions), we deem it appropriate to Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect
determine first whether the said fax transmissions are indeed within the coverage of R.A. No. 8792 before ruling on the data accurately. (Rule 4, Section 1, A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC)
whether the photocopies thereof are covered by the law. In any case, this Court has ample authority to go beyond
the pleadings when, in the interest of justice or for the promotion of public policy, there is a need to make its own The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No. 8792, 64 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of
findings in order to support its conclusions.63 2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document for evidentiary purposes.65 The Rules on Electronic Evidence66 regards an electronic document as
Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove the admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related
perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. 67 An electronic document is also the
8792, because the law merely admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand, equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or
respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile other means, shown to reflect the data accurately. 68
transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the
best evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals

66
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent the IRR reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is significant and pivotal, as discussed
of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" hereunder.
or an "electronic document."
The clause on the interchangeability of the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document" was the
The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 defines electronic data message and electronic document as follows: result of the Senate of the Philippines' adoption, in Senate Bill 1902, of the phrase "electronic data message" and
the House of Representative's employment, in House Bill 9971, of the term "electronic document." 72 In order to
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act, the following terms are defined, as follows: expedite the reconciliation of the two versions, the technical working group of the Bicameral Conference Committee
adopted both terms and intended them to be the equivalent of each one. 73 Be that as it may, there is a slight
difference between the two terms. While "data message" has reference to information electronically sent, stored or
c. "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means. transmitted, it does not necessarily mean that it will give rise to a right or extinguish an obligation ,74 unlike an
electronic document. Evident from the law, however, is the legislative intent to give the two terms the same
construction.
f. "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols
or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established
The Rules on Electronic Evidence promulgated by this Court defines the said terms in the following manner:
or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of these Rules, the following terms are defined, as
69 follows:
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792,  which was signed on July 13, 2000 by the then
Secretaries of the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Budget and Management, and then
Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, defines the terms as: (g) "Electronic data message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means.

(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols
or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established
or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents
Sec. 6. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act and these Rules, the following terms are defined, and print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data
as follows: message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be
used interchangeably with "electronic data message."
(e) "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, Given these definitions, we go back to the original question: Is an original printout of a facsimile transmission an
telex or telecopy. Throughout these Rules, the term "electronic data message" shall be equivalent to and electronic data message or electronic document?
be used interchangeably with "electronic document."
The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, its IRR and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, at first
(h) "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, glance, convey the impression that facsimile transmissions are electronic data messages or electronic documents
symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is because they are sent by electronic means. The expanded definition of an "electronic data message" under the
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is IRR, consistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law, further supports this theory considering that the enumeration "xxx
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. Throughout [is] not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." And to telecopy
these Rules, the term "electronic document" shall be equivalent to and be used interchangeably with is to send a document from one place to another via a fax machine .75
"electronic data message."
As further guide for the Court in its task of statutory construction, Section 37 of the Electronic Commerce Act of
The phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy " in the 2000 provides that
IRR's definition of "electronic data message" is copied from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 70 from which majority of the provisions of R.A.
Unless otherwise expressly provided for, the interpretation of this Act shall give due regard to its
No. 8792 were taken.71 While Congress deleted this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of
international origin and the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith
67
 in international trade relations. The generally accepted principles of international law and convention on Senator Santiago. We are in Part 1, short title on the Declaration of Policy, Section 5, Definition of Terms.
electronic commerce shall likewise be considered.
At the appropriate places in the listing of these terms that have to be defined since these are arranged
Obviously, the "international origin" mentioned in this section can only refer to the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the alphabetically, Mr. President, I would like to insert the term DATA and its definition. So, the amendment
UNCITRAL's definition of "data message": will read: "DATA" MEANS REPRESENTATION, IN ANY FORM, OF INFORMATION OR CONCEPTS.

"Data message" means information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar The explanation is this: This definition of "data" or "data" as it is now fashionably pronounced in America -
means including, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or - the definition of "data" ensures that our bill applies to any form of information in an electronic record,
telecopy.76 whether these are figures, facts or ideas.

is substantially the same as the IRR's characterization of an "electronic data message." So again, the proposed amendment is this: "DATA" MEANS REPRESENTATIONS, IN ANY FORM, OF
INFORMATION OR CONCEPTS.
However, Congress deleted the phrase, "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail,
telegram, telex or telecopy," and replaced the term "data message" (as found in the UNCITRAL Model Law ) with Senator Magsaysay. May I know how will this affect the definition of "Data Message" which encompasses
"electronic data message." This legislative divergence from what is assumed as the term's "international origin" has electronic records, electronic writings and electronic documents?
bred uncertainty and now impels the Court to make an inquiry into the true intent of the framers of the law. Indeed,
in the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the Senator Santiago. These are completely congruent with each other. These are compatible. When we
intent and spirit of the law. 77 A construction should be rejected that gives to the language used in a statute a define "data," we are simply reinforcing the definition of what is a data message.
meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that tends to defeat the ends
which are sought to be attained by the enactment. 78 Senator Magsaysay. It is accepted, Mr. President.

Interestingly, when Senator Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr., the principal author of Senate Bill 1902 (the predecessor of Senator Santiago. Thank you. The next term is "ELECTRONIC RECORD." The proposed amendment is
R.A. No. 8792), sponsored the bill on second reading, he proposed to adopt the term "data message" as formulated as follows:
and defined in the UNCITRAL Model Law. 79 During the period of amendments, however, the term evolved into
"electronic data message," and the phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail,
telegram, telex or telecopy" in the UNCITRAL Model Law was deleted. Furthermore, the term "electronic data "ELECTRONIC RECORD" MEANS DATA THAT IS RECORDED OR STORED ON ANY MEDIUM IN OR
message," though maintaining its description under the UNCITRAL Model Law, except for the aforesaid deleted BY A COMPUTER SYSTEM OR OTHER SIMILAR DEVICE, THAT CAN BE READ OR PERCEIVED BY
phrase, conveyed a different meaning, as revealed in the following proceedings: A PERSON OR A COMPUTER SYSTEM OR OTHER SIMILAR DEVICE. IT INCLUDES A DISPLAY,
PRINTOUT OR OTHER OUTPUT OF THAT DATA.
xxxx
The explanation for this term and its definition is as follows: The term "ELECTRONIC RECORD" fixes the
scope of our bill. The record is the data. The record may be on any medium. It is electronic because it is
Senator Santiago. Yes, Mr. President. I will furnish a copy together with the explanation of this proposed recorded or stored in or by a computer system or a similar device.
amendment.
The amendment is intended to apply, for example, to data on magnetic strips on cards or in Smart
And then finally, before I leave the Floor, may I please be allowed to go back to Section 5; the Definition cards. As drafted, it would not apply to telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, unlike the
of Terms. In light of the acceptance by the good Senator of my proposed amendments, it will then United Nations model law on electronic commerce. It would also not apply to regular digital telephone
become necessary to add certain terms in our list of terms to be defined. I would like to add a definition on conversations since the information is not recorded. It would apply to voice mail since the information has
what is "data," what is "electronic record" and what is an "electronic record system." been recorded in or by a device similar to a computer. Likewise, video records are not covered. Though
when the video is transferred to a website, it would be covered because of the involvement of the
If the gentleman will give me permission, I will proceed with the proposed amendment on Definition of computer. Music recorded by a computer system on a compact disc would be covered .
Terms, Section 5.
In short, not all data recorded or stored in digital form is covered. A computer or a similar device has to be
Senator Magsaysay. Please go ahead, Senator Santiago. involved in its creation or storage. The term "similar device" does not extend to all devices that create or

68
 store data in digital form. Although things that are not recorded or preserved by or in a computer system "electronic data message." This term then, while maintaining part of the UNCITRAL Model Law's terminology of
are omitted from this bill, these may well be admissible under other rules of law. This provision focuses on "data message," has assumed a different context, this time, consonant with the term "electronic record" in the law of
replacing the search for originality proving the reliability of systems instead of that of individual records Canada. It accounts for the addition of the word "electronic" and the deletion of the phrase " but not limited to,
and using standards to show systems reliability . electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy ." Noteworthy is that the Uniform Law
Conference of Canada, explains the term "electronic record," as drafted in the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act, in a
Paper records that are produced directly by a computer system such as printouts are themselves manner strikingly similar to Sen. Santiago's explanation during the Senate deliberations:
electronic records being just the means of intelligible display of the contents of the record. Photocopies of
the printout would be paper record subject to the usual rules about copies, but the original printout would "Electronic record" fixes the scope of the Act. The record is the data. The record may be any medium. It is
be subject to the rules of admissibility of this bill. "electronic" because it is recorded or stored in or by a computer system or similar device. The Act is
intended to apply, for example, to data on magnetic strips on cards, or in smart cards. As drafted,  it would
However, printouts that are used only as paper records and whose computer origin is never again called not apply to telexes or faxes (except computer-generated faxes), unlike the United Nations Model Law on
on are treated as paper records. In that case, the reliability of the computer system that produces the Electronic Commerce. It would also not apply to regular digital telephone conversations, since the
record is irrelevant to its reliability. information is not recorded. It would apply to voice mail, since the information has been recorded in or by
a device similar to a computer. Likewise video records are not covered, though when the video is
transferred to a Web site it would be, because of the involvement of the computer. Music recorded by a
Senator Magsaysay. Mr. President, if my memory does not fail me, earlier, the lady Senator accepted that
computer system on a compact disk would be covered.
we use the term "Data Message" rather than "ELECTRONIC RECORD" in being consistent with the
UNCITRAL term of "Data Message." So with the new amendment of defining "ELECTRONIC RECORD,"
will this affect her accepting of the use of "Data Message" instead of "ELECTRONIC RECORD" ? In short, not all data recorded or stored in "digital" form is covered. A computer or similar device has to be
involved in its creation or storage. The term "similar device" does not extend to all devices that create or
store data in digital form. Although things that are not recorded or preserved by or in a computer system
Senator Santiago. No, it will not. Thank you for reminding me. The term I would like to insert is
are omitted from this Act, they may well be admissible under other rules of law. This Act focuses on
ELECTRONIC DATA MESSAGE in lieu of "ELECTRONIC RECORD."
replacing the search for originality, proving the reliability of systems instead of that of individual records,
and using standards to show systems reliability.
Senator Magsaysay. Then we are, in effect, amending the term of the definition of "Data Message" on
page 2A, line 31, to which we have no objection.
Paper records that are produced directly by a computer system, such as printouts, are themselves
electronic records, being just the means of intelligible display of the contents of the record. Photocopies of
Senator Santiago. Thank you, Mr. President. the printout would be paper records subject to the usual rules about copies, but the "original" printout
would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this Act.
xxxx
However, printouts that are used only as paper records, and whose computer origin is never again called
Senator Santiago. Mr. President, I have proposed all the amendments that I desire to, including the on, are treated as paper records. See subsection 4(2). In this case the reliability of the computer system
amendment on the effect of error or change. I will provide the language of the amendment together with that produced the record is relevant to its reliability. 81
the explanation supporting that amendment to the distinguished sponsor and then he can feel free to take
it up in any session without any further intervention. There is no question then that when Congress formulated the term "electronic data message," it intended the same
meaning as the term "electronic record" in the Canada law. This construction of the term "electronic data message,"
Senator Magsaysay. Before we end, Mr. President, I understand from the proponent of these which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes , is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce
amendments that these are based on the Canadian E-commerce Law of 1998. Is that not right? Law's focus on "paperless" communications and the "functional equivalent approach" 82 that it espouses. In fact, the
deliberations of the Legislature are replete with discussions on paperless and digital transactions.
Senator Santiago. That is correct.80
Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but verily are paper-based.
Thus, when the Senate consequently voted to adopt the term "electronic data message," it was consonant with the
explanation of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago that it would not apply " to telexes or faxes, except computer- A facsimile machine, which was first patented in 1843 by Alexander Bain, 83 is a device that can send or receive
generated faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on electronic commerce ." In explaining the term "electronic pictures and text over a telephone line. It works by digitizing an image—dividing it into a grid of dots. Each dot is
record" patterned after the E-Commerce Law of Canada, Senator Defensor-Santiago had in mind the term either on or off, depending on whether it is black or white. Electronically, each dot is represented by a bit that has a

69
value of either 0 (off) or 1 (on). In this way, the fax machine translates a picture into a series of zeros and ones Incidentally, the National Statistical Coordination Board Task Force on the Measurement of E-Commerce, 93 on
(called a bit map) that can be transmitted like normal computer data. On the receiving side, a fax machine reads the November 22, 2006, recommended a working definition of "electronic commerce," as "[a]ny commercial transaction
incoming data, translates the zeros and ones back into dots, and reprints the picture. 84 A fax machine is essentially conducted through electronic, optical and similar medium, mode, instrumentality and technology. The transaction
an image scanner, a modem and a computer printer combined into a highly specialized package. The scanner includes the sale or purchase of goods and services, between individuals, households, businesses and
converts the content of a physical document into a digital image, the modem sends the image data over a phone governments conducted over computer-mediated networks through the Internet, mobile phones, electronic data
line, and the printer at the other end makes a duplicate of the original document. 85 Thus, in Garvida v. Sales, interchange (EDI) and other channels through open and closed networks." The Task Force's proposed definition is
Jr.,86 where we explained the unacceptability of filing pleadings through fax machines, we ruled that: similar to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) broad definition as it covers
transactions made over any network, and, in addition, it adopted the following provisions of the OECD definition: (1)
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and for transactions, it covers sale or purchase of goods and services; (2) for channel/network, it considers any
graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or computer-mediated network and NOT limited to Internet alone; (3) it excludes transactions received/placed using
tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over fax, telephone or non-interactive mail; (4) it considers payments done online or offline; and (5) it considers delivery
regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the made online (like downloading of purchased books, music or software programs) or offline (deliveries of goods). 94
elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or
other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. We, therefore, conclude that the terms " electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission . Accordingly, a facsimile
x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the
marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact,
be a sham pleading.87 Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be
considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not
Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-
scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.
the same legal function as paper-based documents.88 Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically,
there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are - III -
considered as originals.89 Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is
interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have Nevertheless, despite the pro forma invoices not being electronic evidence, this Court finds that respondent has
an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct proven by preponderance of evidence the existence of a perfected contract of sale.
from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in
communications and computer technology90 when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like In an action for damages due to a breach of a contract, it is essential that the claimant proves (1) the existence of a
telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the perfected contract, (2) the breach thereof by the other contracting party and (3) the damages which he/she
ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term "electronic data message." sustained due to such breach. Actori incumbit onus probandi. The burden of proof rests on the party who advances
a proposition affirmatively.95 In other words, a plaintiff in a civil action must establish his case by a preponderance of
Clearly then, the IRR went beyond the parameters of the law when it adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law's evidence, that is, evidence that has greater weight, or is more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to
definition of "data message," without considering the intention of Congress when the latter deleted the phrase " but it.96
not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy ." The inclusion of this
phrase in the IRR offends a basic tenet in the exercise of the rule-making power of administrative agencies. After In general, contracts are perfected by mere consent, 97 which is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the
to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend acceptance absolute.98 They are, moreover, obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided
the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. 91 Thus, if a all the essential requisites for their validity are present. 99 Sale, being a consensual contract, follows the general rule
discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, that it is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract
because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance—an administrative agency certainly and upon the price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions
cannot amend an act of Congress.92 Had the Legislature really wanted ordinary fax transmissions to be covered by of the law governing the form of contracts.100
the mantle of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, it could have easily lifted without a bit of tatter the entire
wordings of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
70
The essential elements of a contract of sale are (1) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, to transfer ownership in J Letter to defendants dated 26 June Credit, defendants' failure and refusal to com
exchange for the price, (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract, and (3) cause of the obligation 2000, original with their obligations and the problems of plainti
which is established.101 K Letter to defendants dated 27 June incurring by reason of defendants' failure
2000, original refusal to open the L/Cs.
In this case, to establish the existence of a perfected contract of sale between the parties, respondent Ssangyong L Facsimile message to defendants dated
formally offered in evidence the testimonies of its witnesses and the following exhibits: 28 June 2000, photocopy
M Letter from defendants dated 29 June To prove that defendants admit of their liabilitie
Exhibit Description Purpose 2000, contained in facsimile/thermal plaintiff, that they requested for "more extension
E Pro forma Invoice dated 17 April 2000 To show that defendants contracted with plaintiff for paper faxed by defendants to plaintiff time for the opening of the Letter of Credit,
with Contract No. ST2-POSTS0401- the delivery of 110 MT of stainless steel from Korea showing the printed transmission details begging for favorable understanding
1, photocopy payable by way of an irrevocable letter of credit in on the upper portion of said paper as consideration.
favor of plaintiff, among other conditions. coming from defendant MCC on 29 June
E-1 Pro forma Invoice dated 17 April 2000 To show that defendants sent their confirmation of 00 11:12 AM
with Contract No. ST2- the (i) delivery to it of the specified stainless steel M-1 Signature of defendant Gregory  
POSTS0401, contained in products, (ii) defendants' payment thereof by way of Chan, contained in facsimile/thermal
facsimile/thermal paper faxed by an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of plaintiff, paper faxed by defendants to plaintiff
defendants to plaintiff showing the among other conditions. showing the printed transmission details
printed transmission details on the upper on the upper portion of said paper as
portion of said paper as coming from coming from defendant MCC on June 00
defendant MCC on 26 Apr 00 08:41AM 11:12 AM
E-2 Conforme signature of Mr. Gregory To show that defendants sent their confirmation of N Letter to defendants dated 29 June  
Chan, contained in facsimile/thermal the (i) delivery to it of the total of 220MT specified 2000, original
paper faxed by defendants to plaintiff stainless steel products, (ii) defendants' payment O Letter to defendants dated 30 June To prove that plaintiff reiterated its request
showing the printed transmission details thereof by way of an irrevocable letter of credit in 2000, photocopy defendants to L/C opening after the latter's requ
on the upper portion of said paper as favor of plaintiff, among other conditions. for extension of time was granted, defenda
coming from defendant MCC on 26 Apr failure and refusal to comply therewith extensio
00 08:41AM time notwithstanding.
F Pro forma Invoice dated 17 April 2000 To show that defendants contracted with plaintiff for P Letter to defendants dated 06 July  
with Contract No. ST2-POSTSO401- delivery of another 110 MT of stainless steel from 2000, original
2, photocopy Korea payable by way of an irrevocable letter of
credit in favor of plaintiff, among other conditions. Q Demand letter to defendants dated 15 To prove that plaintiff was constrained to enga
Aug 2000, original services of a lawyer for collection efforts.
G Letter to defendant SANYO SEIKE dated To prove that defendants were informed of the date
20 June 2000, contained in of L/C opening and defendant's conforme/approval R Demand letter to defendants dated 23 To prove that defendants opened the first L/C
facsimile/thermal paper thereof. Aug 2000, original favor of plaintiff, requested for fur
postponement of the final L/C and for mini
G-1 Signature of defendant Gregory amounts, were urged to open the final L/C on ti
Chan, contained in facsimile/thermal and were informed that failure to comply will can
paper. the contract.
H Letter to defendants dated 22 June To prove that defendants were informed of the S Demand letter to defendants dated 11 To show defendants' refusal and failure to open
2000, original successful price adjustments secured by plaintiff in Sept 2000, original final L/C on time, the cancellation of the contrac
favor of former and were advised of the schedules a consequence thereof, and final demand u
of its L/C opening. defendants to remit its obligations.
I Letter to defendants dated 26 June To prove that plaintiff repeatedly requested W Letter from plaintiff SSANGYONG to To prove that there was a perfected sale
2000, original defendants for the agreed opening of the Letters of defendant SANYO SEIKI dated 13 April purchase agreement between the parties for
71
 2000, with fax back from defendants metric tons of steel products at the price of back-up photocopy the balance of 100 metric tons, apart from the o
SANYO SEIKI/MCC to plaintiff US$1,860/ton. order and shipment of 100 metric tons which w
SSANGYONG, contained in delivered by plaintiff Ssangyong and paid for
facsimile/thermal paper with back-up defendant MCC.102
photocopy
W-1 Conforme signature of defendant To prove that defendants, acting through GregorySignificantly, among these documentary evidence presented by respondent, MCC, in its petition before this Court,
Gregory Chan, contained in Chan, agreed to the sale and purchase of 220assails the admissibility only of Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E"
facsimile/thermal paper with back-up metric tons of steel products at the price ofand "F"). After sifting through the records, the Court found that these invoices are  mere photocopies of their original
photocopy US$1,860/ton. fax transmittals. Ssangyong avers that these documents were prepared after MCC asked for the splitting of the
W-2 Name of sender MCC Industrial Sales To prove that defendants sent their conformity tooriginal order into two, so that the latter can apply for an L/C with greater facility. It, however, failed to explain why
Corporation the sale and purchase agreement by facsimilethe originals of these documents were not presented.
transmission.
X Pro forma Invoice dated 16 August To prove that defendant MCC agreed to adjust andTo determine whether these documents are admissible in evidence, we apply the ordinary Rules on Evidence, for
2000, photocopy split the confirmed purchase order into 2 shipmentsas discussed above we cannot apply the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 and the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
at 100 metric tons each at the discounted price of
US$1,700/ton. Because these documents are mere photocopies, they are simply secondary evidence, admissible only upon
X-1 Notation "1/2", photocopy To prove that the present Pro forma Invoice wascompliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states, "[w]hen the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
the first of 2 pro forma invoices. cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
X-2 Ref. No. ST2-POSTS080-1, photocopy To prove that the present Pro forma Invoice was
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated." Furthermore, the offeror of secondary evidence
the first of 2 pro forma invoices.
must prove the predicates thereof, namely: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of
X-3 Conforme signature of defendant To prove that defendant MCC, acting throughthe proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of
Gregory Chan, photocopy Gregory Chan, agreed to the sale and purchase ofdocuments; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of
the balance of 100 metric tons at the discountedthe loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and  bona fide but unsuccessful
price of US$1,700/ton, apart from the other ordersearch has been made for the document in the proper place or places. It has been held that where the missing
and shipment of 100 metric tons which wasdocument is the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than where the document is only
delivered by plaintiff SSANGYONG and paid for bycollaterally involved.103
defendant MCC.
DD Letter from defendant MCC to plaintiff To prove that there was a perfected sale andGiven these norms, we find that respondent failed to prove the existence of the original fax transmissions of Exhibits
SSANGYONG dated 22 August purchase agreement between plaintiffE and F, and likewise did not sufficiently prove the loss or destruction of the originals. Thus, Exhibits E and F cannot
2000, contained in facsimile/thermal SSANGYONG and defendant MCC for the balancebe admitted in evidence and accorded probative weight.
paper with back-up photocopy of 100 metric tons, apart from the other order and
shipment of 100 metric tons which was delivered byIt is observed, however, that respondent Ssangyong did not rely merely on Exhibits E and F to prove the perfected
plaintiff SSANGYONG and paid for by defendantcontract. It also introduced in evidence a variety of other documents, as enumerated above, together with the
MCC. testimonies of its witnesses. Notable among them are Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-
DD-1 Ref. No. ST2-POSTS080-1, contained in To prove that there was a perfected sale andPOSTS080-2 which were issued by Ssangyong and sent via fax to MCC. As already mentioned, these invoices
facsimile/thermal paper with back-up purchase agreement between plaintiffslightly varied the terms of the earlier invoices such that the quantity was now officially 100MT per invoice and the
photocopy SSANGYONG and defendant MCC for the balanceprice reduced to US$1,700.00 per MT. The copies of the said August 16, 2000 invoices submitted to the court bear
of 100 metric tons, apart from the other order andthe conformity signature of MCC Manager Chan.
shipment of 100 metric tons which was delivered by
plaintiff SSANGYONG and paid for by defendantPro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-1 (Exhibit "X"), however, is a mere photocopy of its original. But then again,
MCC. petitioner MCC does not assail the admissibility of this document in the instant petition. Verily, evidence not
DD-2 Signature of defendant Gregory Chan, To prove that defendant MCC, acting throughobjected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. 104 Issues not
contained in facsimile/thermal paper with Gregory Chan, agreed to the sale and purchase ofraised on appeal are deemed abandoned.

72
As to Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2 (Exhibits "1-A" and "2-C"), which was certified by PCIBank as a true This Court, however, finds that the award of actual damages is not in accord with the evidence on record. It is
copy of its original,105 it was, in fact, petitioner MCC which introduced this document in evidence. Petitioner MCC axiomatic that actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proven with a reasonable degree
paid for the order stated in this invoice. Its admissibility, therefore, is not open to question. of certainty.110 In Villafuerte v. Court of Appeals,111 we explained that:

These invoices (ST2-POSTS0401, ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-2), along with the other unchallenged Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or loss
documentary evidence of respondent Ssangyong, preponderate in favor of the claim that a contract of sale was he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice and are aimed at repairing the wrong done.
perfected by the parties. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss as he has duly proven. It is hornbook doctrine that to be able to recover actual damages,
This Court also finds merit in the following observations of the trial court: the claimant bears the onus of presenting before the court actual proof of the damages alleged to have
been suffered, thus:
Defendants presented Letter of Credit (Exhibits "1", "1-A" to "1-R") referring to Pro Forma Invoice for
Contract No. ST2POSTS080-2, in the amount of US$170,000.00, and which bears the signature of A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him
Gregory Chan, General Manager of MCC. Plaintiff, on the other hand, presented Pro Forma Invoice as he has duly proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof,
referring to Contract No. ST2-POSTS080-1, in the amount of US$170,000.00, which likewise bears the but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. We have emphasized that
signature of Gregory Chan, MCC. Plaintiff accounted for the notation "1/2" on the right upper portion of these damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific
the Invoice, that is, that it was the first of two (2) pro forma invoices covering the subject contract between facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are
plaintiff and the defendants. Defendants, on the other hand, failed to account for the notation "2/2" in its borne.112
Pro Forma Invoice (Exhibit "1-A"). Observably further, both Pro Forma Invoices bear the same date and
details, which logically mean that they both apply to one and the same transaction. 106 In the instant case, the trial court awarded to respondent Ssangyong US$93,493.87 as actual damages. On appeal,
the same was affirmed by the appellate court. Noticeably, however, the trial and the appellate courts, in making the
Indeed, why would petitioner open an L/C for the second half of the transaction if there was no first half to speak of? said award, relied on the following documents submitted in evidence by the respondent: (1) Exhibit "U," the
Statement of Account dated March 30, 2001; (2) Exhibit "U-1," the details of the said Statement of Account); (3)
Exhibit "V," the contract of the alleged resale of the goods to a Korean corporation; and (4) Exhibit "V-1," the
The logical chain of events, as gleaned from the evidence of both parties, started with the petitioner and the
authentication of the resale contract from the Korean Embassy and certification from the Philippine Consular Office.
respondent agreeing on the sale and purchase of 220MT of stainless steel at US$1,860.00 per MT. This initial
contract was perfected. Later, as petitioner asked for several extensions to pay, adjustments in the delivery dates,
and discounts in the price as originally agreed, the parties slightly varied the terms of their contract, without The statement of account and the details of the losses sustained by respondent due to the said breach are, at best,
necessarily novating it, to the effect that the original order was reduced to 200MT, split into two deliveries, and the self-serving. It was respondent Ssangyong itself which prepared the said documents. The items therein are not
price discounted to US$1,700 per MT. Petitioner, however, paid only half of its obligation and failed to open an L/C even substantiated by official receipts. In the absence of corroborative evidence, the said statement of account is
for the other 100MT. Notably, the conduct of both parties sufficiently established the existence of a contract of sale, not sufficient basis to award actual damages. The court cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork
even if the writings of the parties, because of their contested admissibility, were not as explicit in establishing a as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend on competent proof that the claimant had suffered, and on
contract.107 Appropriate conduct by the parties may be sufficient to establish an agreement, and while there may be evidence of, the actual amount thereof.113
instances where the exchange of correspondence does not disclose the exact point at which the deal was closed,
the actions of the parties may indicate that a binding obligation has been undertaken. 108 Furthermore, the sales contract and its authentication certificates, Exhibits "V" and "V-1," allegedly evidencing the
resale at a loss of the stainless steel subject of the parties' breached contract, fail to convince this Court of the
With our finding that there is a valid contract, it is crystal-clear that when petitioner did not open the L/C for the first veracity of its contents. The steel items indicated in the sales contract 114 with a Korean corporation are different in all
half of the transaction (100MT), despite numerous demands from respondent Ssangyong, petitioner breached its respects from the items ordered by petitioner MCC, even in size and quantity. We observed the following
contractual obligation. It is a well-entrenched rule that the failure of a buyer to furnish an agreed letter of credit is a discrepancies:
breach of the contract between buyer and seller. Indeed, where the buyer fails to open a letter of credit as
stipulated, the seller or exporter is entitled to claim damages for such breach. Damages for failure to open a List of commodities as stated in Exhibit "V":
commercial credit may, in appropriate cases, include the loss of profit which the seller would reasonably have made
had the transaction been carried out.109 COMMODITY: Stainless Steel HR Sheet in Coil, Slit Edge
SPEC: SUS304 NO. 1
- IV - SIZE/Q'TY:

73
 2.8MM X 1,219MM X C 8.193MT As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well settled that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate and not
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.736MT every winning party is entitled to an automatic grant of attorney's fees. The party must show that he falls under one
of the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. 118 In the instant case, however, the Court finds the
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.885MT award of attorney's fees proper, considering that petitioner MCC's unjustified refusal to pay has compelled
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C 8.629MT respondent Ssangyong to litigate and to incur expenses to protect its rights.
4.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.307MT
4.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.247MT WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82983 is MODIFIED in that the award of actual damages is DELETED. However,
4.5MM X 1,219MM X C 8.450MT
petitioner is ORDERED to pay respondent NOMINAL DAMAGES in the amount of P200,000.00, and
4.5MM X 1,219MM X C 8.870MT the ATTORNEY'S FEES as awarded by the trial court. SO ORDERED.
5.0MM X 1,219MM X C 8.391MT
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C 6.589MT G.R. No. L-5791 December 17, 1910 THE UNITED STATES, vs. BERNARDO GREGORIO and EUSTAQUIO
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.878MT BALISTOY, 
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C 8.397MT
Appeals were interposed by the defendants Bernardo Gregorio and Eustaquio Balistoy from the judgment rendered
TOTAL: 95.562MT115 in the two causes prosecuted, No. 1574, against Bernardo Gregorio, and No. 1575, against Eustaquio Balistoy,
which were consolidated and in which but one judgment was rendered, and forwarded to this court and registered
List of commodities as stated in Exhibit "X" (the invoice that was not paid): under No. 5791.

DESCRIPTION: Hot Rolled Stainless Steel Coil SUS 304 In the suit instituted by Pedro Salazar, as a creditor, against Eustaquio Balistoy, in the justice of the peace court of
SIZE AND QUANTITY: Libog, for the payment of a certain sum of money, judgment was rendered, on April 4, 1908, wherein the debtor was
sentenced to pay to the plaintiff P275.92, with interest thereon, and the costs. For the execution of the said
2.6 MM X 4' X C 10.0MT judgment, two rural properties belonging to the debtor were attached and the 27th of May, 1908, was set as the
3.0 MM X 4' X C 25.0MT date for the sale and adjudication of the said attached properties to the highest bidder. On the 18th of the same
4.0 MM X 4' X C 15.0MT month, Bernardo Gregorio requested the deputy sheriff to exclude the said realty from the attachment, alleging that
4.5 MM X 4' X C 15.0MT he was the owner of the land situated in Tambogon, one of the properties levied upon, 400  brazas in circumference,
situate in the pueblo of Bacacay, the location and boundaries of which are expressed in his petition, for the reason
5.0 MM X 4' X C 10.0MT that he had acquired it by purchase from the judgment debtor, Balistoy, in 1905, prior to the filing of the complaint.
6.0 MM X 4' X C 25.0MT By reason of this claim and petition the judgment creditor, Salazar, had to give a bond, in view of which the sheriff
TOTAL: 100MT116 proceeded with the sale of the said property, and of another, also attached for the sum of P300, and both were
adjudicated to the judgment creditor, according to the certificate, Exhibit C. lawphil.net
From the foregoing, we find merit in the contention of MCC that Ssangyong did not adequately prove that the items
resold at a loss were the same items ordered by the petitioner. Therefore, as the claim for actual damages was not In order that the claim of intervention presented to the sheriff might prosper, Bernardo Gregorio attached thereto the
proven, the Court cannot sanction the award. document Exhibit D, at the end of which and among other particulars appears the memorandum dated in Libog as
of February 22, 1905, and signed by Eustaquio Balistoy, Lorenzo Gregorio, and Cirilo Valla, and in which Balistoy
states that he bought the land referred to in the said document from Luis Balistoy and sold it to Bernardo Gregorio
Nonetheless, the Court finds that petitioner knowingly breached its contractual obligation and obstinately refused to
for P300, wherefore he signed as such vendor.
pay despite repeated demands from respondent. Petitioner even asked for several extensions of time for it to make
good its obligation. But in spite of respondent's continuous accommodation, petitioner completely reneged on its
contractual duty. For such inattention and insensitivity, MCC must be held liable for nominal damages. "Nominal The charge consists in that Balistoy, with intent to injure his creditor, Pedro Salazar, and for the purpose of avoiding
damages are 'recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that the attachment and sale of one of the properties belonging to him, to secure the payment of the judgment obtained
has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial by his creditor in the aforementioned suit, did, with disregard of the truth in the narration of the facts, execute or
injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.'" 117 Accordingly, the Court awards nominal write the said memorandum whereby, on February 25, 1905, he made or simulated a conveyance of one of the
damages of P200,000.00 to respondent Ssangyong. attached properties in favor of the said Bernardo Gregorio, according to the aforesaid copy, when in fact the said
memorandum was written in April, 1908.

74
For the foregoing reasons a complaint was filed in each of the two aforesaid causes in the Court of First Instance of improper to hold, with only a copy of the said original in view, that the crime prosecuted was committed; and
Albay, charging each of the defendants with the crime of the falsification of a private document, and proceedings although, judging from the testimony of the witnesses who were examined in the two consolidated causes, there is
having been instituted in both causes, which were afterwards, by agreement of the parties thereto, consolidated, the reason to entertain much doubt as to the defendants' innocence, yet, withal, this case does not furnish decisive and
court, on November 6, 1909, pronounced in both of them the judgment appealed from, written in duplicate, whereby conclusive proof of their respective guilt as coprincipals of the crime charged. Defendants in a criminal cause are
Balistoy was sentenced to the penalty of one year eight months and twenty-one days of presidio correccional, to the always presumed to be innocent until their guilt be fully proven, and, in case of reasonable doubt and when their
accessory penalties, to pay a fine of 1,501 pesetas, and, in case of nonpayment thereof through insolvency, to guilt is not satisfactorily shown, they are entitled to a judgment of acquittal. In view of the evidence produced in both
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, provided it should not exceed one-third of the principal sentence, of the aforesaid criminal causes, said causes can only be terminated by such a finding.
and to pay the costs incurred in cause No. 1575; and likewise, Bernardo Gregorio was sentenced to the penalty of
three months and eleven days of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of 1,980 pesetas, and, in case of insolvency, to the For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, to acquit, and
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, with the provision that it should not exceed one-third of the principal we hereby do acquit Eustaquio Balistoy and Bernardo Gregorio, with the costs of both instances  de oficio. So
penalty, to the accessory punishments, and to pay the costs occasioned by cause No. 1574. From these sentences ordered.
the defendants, respectively, appealed.
G.R. No. 117609 December 29, 1998 HEIRS OF SEVERA P. GREGORIO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO
This case concerns the falsity of a document alleged to have been written on a date prior to the one when it actually SANTOS, ROSALINA PALOMO, SPOUSES WILSON TAN and BENITA LUI TAN, 
was prepared, which instrument simulates the sale of a parcel of land by its owner to a third party, with the intent to
defraud the creditor who, through proper judicial process, solicited and obtained the attachment and sale of the said At bar is an appeal by way of petition for review on certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals which
property in order, with the proceeds of such sale, to recover the amount which the owner of the land owed him. reversed the holding of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79, in Civil Case No. Q-49254,
entitled Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio, et al., vs. Rosalina Palomo, vs. spouses Wilson and Benita Lui Tan , nullified
The sale was recorded in a memorandum, made upon a private document, according to the alleged copy of the the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale, dated July 14, 1971, as falsified, fictitious and forged, and adjudged the
latter presented at trial which belonged to the owner of land; and, notwithstanding the fact that the sheriff, who defendant spouses. Wilson Tan and Benita Lui Tan, as purchasers/holders in bad faith.
carried out the proceedings of attachment and sale, testified to his having seen the original of the said document, or
at least the original memorandum of the conveyance, the only record that could be of use to the intervener, who As culled by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the case are, as follows:
claimed a lien on the land which was to be sold at public auction; certainly the mere exhibition of a copy of an
unauthenticated private document could not legally produce the effect of suspending the sale of the said land,
inasmuch as such copy is not sufficient proof of the right of the intervener and opponent, being e mere copy of a Spouses Wilson Tan and Benita Lui Tan are the registered owners of a 1,381.1 square meter
private document whose legality has not been proven. lot located along Quezon Blvd., Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 349788 issued by the
register of Deeds of Quezon City.
In the charge filed in this cause against the vendor and the vendee of the land in question, it is stated that these
parties, the defendants, simulated the said memorandum of sale or conveyance of the land with the intent to injure The lot was previously owned by Severa Gregorio as evidenced by TCT No. 8787 issued to her
the creditor, Pedro Salazar; but as the original document, setting forth the said memorandum, was not presented, on January 4, 1949.
but merely a copy thereof, and furthermore, as it could not be ascertained who had the original of the document
containing the memorandum in question, nor the exact date when the latter was written; the said memorandum, Sometime in 1965, Shell company leased the lot from Severa for a period of twenty (20) years.
presumed to be simulated and false, was not literally compared by the sheriff who testified that he had seen its
original for but a few moments, nor by any officer authorized by law to certify to documents and proceedings such On September 20, 1976, Severa died intestate leaving behind three (3) legitimate children —
as are recorded in notarial instruments, nor even by two witnesses who might afterwards have been able to testify Buenconsejo Vivar, Jesusa aGalang and Cecilio Pineda. On March 9, 1982, Cecilio died.
before the court that the copy exhibited was in exact agreement with its original; therefore, on account of these
deficiencies, doubt arises as to whether the original of the document, Exhibit D, really existed at all, and whether the In late September or October, 1986, after the lease with Shell Company expired, Buenconsejo
memorandum at the foot of the said exhibit is an exact copy of that alleged to have been written at the end of the Vivar tried to sell the lot to one Federico Ng. So she asked her son Oliver to get certified true
said original document. lawphil.net copies of the pertinent documents from the Quezon City Registry of Deeds. Oliver was able to
secure certified true copies of (1) deed of absolute sale dated July 18, 1971 executed by Severa
In criminal proceedings for the falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the judges and courts have before Gregorio in favor of Ricardo Santos; (2) deed of absolute sale dated September 17, 1986
them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited, or falsified, in order that they may find, pursuant executed by Ricardo Santos in favor of spouses Wilson and Benita Tan; and (3) deed of
to the evidence produced in the cause, whether or not the crime of falsification was committed, and also, at the assignment executed by spouses Felicisimo and Rosalina Palomo in favor of spouses Wilson
same time, to enable them to determine the degree of each defendant's liability in the falsification under and Benita Tan.
prosecution. Through the lack of the original document containing the memorandum alleged to be false, it is
75
Buenconsejo was shocked to find that her brother's title, TCT No. 8787, was canceled and that Summons on defendant Ricardo Santos was effected through publication on May 28, June 4,
in lieu thereof, TCT No. 349787 was issued to spouses Tan. and June 11, 1990. However, Santos did not file any answer. He was accordingly declared in
default on September 13, 1990.
Records show that Severa Gregorio sold to Ricardo Santos 2/3 portion of the lot. Santos, in
turn, sold the same 2/3 portion to spouses Wilson and Benita Tan for P1,400,000.00. During the trial, the heirs of Gregorio presented as their witnesses Bienvenido Albacea, a
Questioned Document Examiner of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); Dr. Wilhelmina
With respect to the remaining 1/3 portion, it appears that in 1978, spouses Felicisimo and Vibar, daughter of Buenconsejo Vibar; and Viterbo Cahilig, Records Officer, Quezon City
Rosalina Palomo filed with the then Court of First Instance of Caloocan City an action for a sum Register of Deeds. Spouses Tan presented appellant Wilson Tan; Atty. Jose Ramos Sunga,
of money against Jesusa Galang (Severa's daughter) and her husband Victoriano Galang. The counsel of spouses Tan; Records Officer Viterbo Cahilig; and June Pangilinan, OIC of the
court decided the case in favor of the Palomos. On December 20, 1978, the 1/3 undivided share Records Section of the Regional Trial Court in Kalookan.
of Jesusa in the lot was sold on execution to the Palomos, being the highest bidders. The
Galang failed to redeem the property within one year. Hence, a final deed of sale in favor of the Defendants Palomo did not present any evidence but adopted all the testimonial and
Palomos was confirmed by the court and recorded in the Quezon City Registry of Deeds. documentary evidence adduced by spouses Tan.

On September 18, 1986, the Palomos assigned to spouses Wilson and Benita Tan that 1/3 On December 29, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
portion of the lot for P800,000.00. reads:

On the same day, September 18, 1986, at the instance of spouses Tan, (1) the deed of sale WHEREFORE, a decision is hereby rendered in this case as follows:
between Severa Gregorio and Ricardo Santos, (2) the subsequent deed of sale between
Ricardo Santos and spouses Tan and (3) the deed of assignment between spouses Palomo 1. Declaring the forged Deed of Sale purportedly signed and executed by Severa P. Gregorio in
and spouses Tan were registered in the Quezon City Registry of Deeds. Consequently, TCT favor of defendant Ricardo G. Santos dated July 18, 1971 conveying the subject property
No. 8787 in the name of Severa Gregorio was canceled and TCT No. 349788 was issued in the covered by TCT No. 8787 null and void ab initio;
name of spouses Tan covering the entire lot.
2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Ricardo G. Santos in favor of spouses
On October 30, 1986, the heirs of Severa Gregorio filed with the trial court the instant complaint Wilson C. Tan and Benita Lui Tan dated September 17, 1986 conveying 2/3 undivided portion
against spouses Tan for cancellation of title and/or reconveyance with damages alleging that of the subject property covered by TCT No. 8787 null and void ab initio;
the deeds of conveyance were forged and are therefore void.
3. Declaring and maintaining the validity of the Deed of Assignment executed by Spouses
Thereafter, or on June 11, 1988, a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall Building. The entire records Felicisimo Palomo and Rosalina Palomo infavor of spouses Wilson C. Tan and Benito Lui Tan
of this case were destroyed. The key documents, such as the original copy of the deed of sale dated September 18, 1986 regarding 1/3 undivided portion of the subject property covered by
between Severa Gregorio and Ricardo Santos dated July 14, 1971 covering 2/3 portion of the TCT No. 8787;
lot; the original copy of the deed of sale between Ricardo Santos and spouses Tan covering the
same portion dated September 17, 1986; the original copy of the deed of assignment from 4. Declaring null and void and ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 349788, Quezon City
spouses Palomo to spouses Tan covering 1/3 portion of the same lot dated September 18, Registry, in the name of spouses Wilson C. Tan and Benita Lui Tan;
1986; and the original copy of TCT No. 349788 in the names of spouses Tan were all burned.
5. Declaring null and void and ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 349789, Quezon City
On July 10, 1989, the trial court issued an order for the reconstitution of the records. The parties Registry, in the name of Ricardo G. Santos;
had hardly started the reconstitution when, on September 29, 1989, the heirs of Gregorio filed
an amended and/or supplemental complaint which was admitted by the court. The supplemental
matters revolved around the signature of Severa Gregorio affixed to the July 14, 1971 deed of 6. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to reinstate TCT No. 8787, Quezon City
sale between her and Ricardo Santos. On February 12, 1990, spouses Tan filed an answer to Registry, in the name of the registered owner Severa P. Gregorio including all the entries in the
the amended complaint alleging that the deed of sale was genuine and that they purchased the memorandum of encumbrances;
property in good faith.

76
 7. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to annotate the memorandum of B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
encumbrance of TCT No. 8787, the Deed of Assignment of 1/3 undivided share of spouses DEFENDANT SPOUSES TAN ARE INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR
Felicisimo Palomo and Rosalina Palomo in favor of spouses Wilson C. Tan and Benita Lui Tan VALUE AND IN GOOD FAITH WITH RESPECT TO THE 2/3 PORTION OF
dated September 18, 1986; THE SUBJECT LOT CONVEYED TO THEM BY RICARDO SANTOS.

8. Ordering defendant Ricardo G. Santos to pay plaintiffs' attorney's fees in the sum of The assignment of rights by the spouses Palomo to respondent spouses Tan over a 1/3 portion of subject property
P50,000.00; sold on execution to the Palomos in satisfaction of a final judgment is not raised as an issue in this appeal.

9. Ordering defendant Ricardo G. Santos to pay and return to spouses Wilson C. Tan and Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for not giving credence to the testimony of NBI handwriting expert Bienvenido
Benita Lui Tan the purchase price of 2/3 portion of the subject property in the sum of Albacea, who examined the deed of sale in question and concluded that the signature thereon purporting to be that
P1,400,000.00 with legal rate of interest to be computed from the date of the filing of this case of the late Severa Gregorio, is forged. They contend that, as borne out by the records, (1) on September 10, 1987,
until it is fully paid; Albacea conducted an examination of the original copy of subject deed of sale dated July 14, 1971 at the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City; (2) on the basis of such examination, he arrived at the conclusion that the
10. Ordering defendant Ricardo G. Santos to pay spouses Wilson C. Tan and Benita Lui Tan signature appearing thereon was forged; (3) unfortunately, as a result of the fire of June 11, 1988, which destroyed
P100,000.00 moral damages and P50,000.00 attorney's fees; the Quezon City Hall, the records of the case were all burned including the original copy of the aforesaid deed of
sale; and (4) the said original copy of the deed of sale could not be produced in court thereby necessitating the
presentation of a certified true xerox copy thereof. 4
11. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay spouses Wilson C. Tan and Benita Lui Tan the sum of
P69,946.41 by way of reimbursement of the taxes paid for the subject property by spouses
Tan. 1 Following the ruling in U.S. vs. Gregorio 5 and Borje vs. Sandiganbayan, 6 the Court of Appeals reversed the
findings by the trial court and ruled out the testimony of the NBI handwriting expert, holding that "when the
genuineness of signatures on a document is sought to be proved or disproved through comparison of standard
From the aforesaid Decision, both the plaintiffs and defendant spouses Tan appealed to the Court of Appeals — the
signatures with the questioned signatures, a xerox copy or photo copy cannot be used by the expert witness in lieu
plaintiffs with respect to the ruling below, (a) ordering them to reimburse the spouses Tan the sum of P69,946.41
of the original." It disregarded the expert testimony of the said witness who presented during his testimony in court
representing unpaid realty taxes allegedly paid by the latter for the property, (b) declaring as valid the deed of
only a mere photostat (xerox) copy of the subject deed of sale.
assignment between the spouses Palomo and defendant spouses Tan over the 1/3 undivided portion of subject lot,
and (c) disallowing the removal and/or demolition of whatever improvements plaintiffs may have introduced on the
property. Defendants appealed with respect to the finding by the trial court that they were not innocent purchasers The petition is not impressed with merit.
for value of the 2/3 undivided portion or interest in the property and that the notarized Deed of Sale dated July 14,
1971 was falsified and forged. Basic is the rule of evidence that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is
admissible other than the original document itself except in the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the
On April 29, 1994, the Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals came out with a decision  2 reversing the Revised Rules of Court. Mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule.  7 This
aforementioned findings of the trial court, and disposing, thus: is especially true when the issue is that of forgery.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence 8 and the
ASIDE. The ownership and title of spouses Wilson Tan and Benita Lui Tan over the entire burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in an instrument is the
disputed lot are declared valid. Costs against the plaintiffs-appellants heirs of Severa Gregorio. instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison
between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is
theorized upon to have been forged. Without the original document containing the alleged forged signature, one
SO ORDERED. 3
cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish forgery. A comparison based on a mere xerox copy or
reproduction of the document under controversy cannot produce reliable results.
Hence, the appeal by the heirs of Severa Gregorio assigning as errors, that:
Petitioners claim that what was actually examined by the NBI expert on September 10, 1987 at the Office of the
A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE Register of Deeds of Quezon City was the original copy of the deed of sale dated July 14, 1971 but a fire accident
WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE NBI HANDWRITING EXPERT supervened preventing its introduction during trial.
FOR THE REASON THAT WHAT HE TESTIFIED ON IN COURT WAS A
MERE XEROX COPY OF THE QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE, AND
77
This contention of petitioners is untenable. Due to the technicality of the procedure involved in the examination of It bears stressing, however, that the indefeasibility of the torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetuate
forged documents, the expertise of questioned document examiners is usually helpful. However, resort to fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Mere registration of sale is not good enough. Good faith must
questioned document examiners is not mandatory and while probably useful, they are not indispensable in concur with registration because otherwise registration becomes an exercise in futility. 15
examining or comparing handwriting. 9 A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting
experts. Although such testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right
authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny. The judge cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert. to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price at the time of purchase or before he has notice of the
In the case of Gamido vs. Court of Appeals 10 (citing  the case of Alcon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA claim or interest of some other person in the property. 16 As good faith primarily refers to a state of mind and is
833), the Court held that the authenticity of signatures. always a question of intention, evidence as to conduct and outward acts are usually resorted to in order to arrive at
a reasonable determination of the inward motive or intention. 17
. . . is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning , e.g., quantum
physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. In this case, when the spouses Tan purchased the subject property from defendant Santos, the title was clean and
The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly free from any lien and encumbrance except for the claim of the spouses Palomos by virtue of a final judgment in
much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly court awarding 1/3 undivided portion of the lot to the latter. As a matter of fact, the trial court and the Court of
technical issue. Appeals were in agreement with the following factual findings, to wit:

A judge must therefore conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a Wilson Tan testified that . . . they did not know or meet Severa P. Gregorio but they came
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity and this cannot be done without the original copy being across her name in 1986 when the property was offered to them by Zapata Realty. . . . They
produced in court. asked for a xerox copy of the title and they were given a xerox copy of the title in the name of
Severa Gregorio and a Deed of Sale between Severa Gregorio and Ricardo Santos. He verified
Neither can we discern any sustainable basis for the second assigned error relied upon by petitioners. the title in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and found the title clean except for
that portion belonging to the Palomos. So he agreed to purchase the lot at the offered price of
The Court of Appeals found that the petitioners were not able to overcome the presumption of good faith which P2,000.00 per sq.m. . . . (RTC Decision, p. 13).
benefits defendant spouses Tan and that.
The Court of Appeals likewise found as follows:
At any rate, the heirs of Gregorio failed to present evidence of any dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity on the part of the spouses Tan. In fact, no bad judgment or negligence can be . . . Tan did not know the Gregorio family before he purchased the lot. He learned about the lot
attributed to them because they took the necessary steps to protect their investment. 11 being offered for sale through Zapata Realty, a professional real estate broker. Ricardo Santos
showed Tan the original 1971 deed of sale from Severa Gregorio to him (Santos) and the
It is axiomatic that good faith is always presumed unless convincing evidence to the contrary is adduced. It is duplicate original copy of her TCT No. 8787. Tan went to the Office of the Register of Deeds of
incumbent upon the party alleging bad faith to sufficiently prove such allegation. Absent enough proof thereof, the Quezon City and satisfied himself with the authenticity of the documents shown by Santos. With
presumption of good faith prevails. In the case under examination, the burden of proving bad faith therefore lies with respect to the 1/3 portion, Tan had the title cleaned of all adverse claims before he purchased
petitioners (plaintiffs below) but they failed to discharge such onus probandi. Without a clear and persuasive the share of the Palomos. Also, before buying the lot, he visited it to check its condition. ( Rollo,
substantiation of bad faith, the presumption of good faith in favor of respondents stands. p. 35).

In view of the indefeasibility of a torrens title, every person dealing on registered lands may safely rely on the Good faith is the opposite of fraud and consists of the honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable
correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go beyond the certificate and and unscrupulous advantage of
inquire into the circumstances culminating in the vendor's acquisition of the property. 12 The rights of innocent third another. 18 From the evidence on record, it can be gleaned that respondent spouses Tan were not personally
persons who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title and acquired rights over the property covered thereby acquainted with Santos prior to the sale. They bought the property through a real estate broker, Zapata Realty, and
cannot be disregarded and the courts cannot order the cancellation of such certificate for that would impair or erode not from Santos himself. But they satisfied themselves that subject certificate of title was clean, and of the
public confidence in the torrens system of land registration. 13 genuineness and authenticity of the deed of sale of Santos, by personally verifying the same with the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. Such verification, in fact, disclosed that subject certificate of title was free from any adverse
claim except that of the Palomos. Respondent spouses Tan even consulted a lawyer before proceeding with the
When a portion of registered property was sold and the sale was duly registered (and annotated in the certificate of
sale. Verily, the latter were not amiss in their duty to ascertain their vendor's capacity to sell the property.
title of the vendor), the vendee technically becomes the owner of the sold portion as of the registration of the sale
although the title to said property is still in the name of the vendor. 14
78
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision appealed from AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as On March 26, 1981, petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
to costs. SO ORDERED. 1356(M).

G.R. No. 83377 February 9, 1993 BASILIO DE VERA, LUIS DE VERA, FELIPE DE VERA, HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIA On July 31, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision *** the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
DE VERA-PAPA vs SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR and LEONA V. AGUILAR, 
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants:
This is a petition for review on certiorari  of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 1987 in CA-
GR CV No. 07448 entitled, "Basilio de Vera, Luis de Vera, Felipe de Vera, Heirs of Eustaquia de Vera-Papa, 1. To reconvey the property in question to the plaintiffs;
represented by Gliceria Papa-Francisco, and Heirs of Maria de Vera-Torres, represented by Luis V. Torres, 2. To pay plaintiffs P10,000.00 as litigation expenses;
plaintiffs-appellees versus Spouses Mariano Aguilar and Leona V. Aguilar, defendants-appellants", which reversed 3. To pay plaintiffs P5,000.00 as exemplary damages;
the decision ** of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Third Judicial Region, Branch 14, for failure of petitioners to 4. To pay P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
prove the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale and of all its duplicate original copies.
SO ORDERED.1
The undisputed facts are as follows:
In ruling in favor of the petitioners, the trial court admitted, over the objection of the respondents, Exhibit A
Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria, all surnamed de Vera and respondent Leona, married to purporting to be a xeroxed copy of an alleged deed of sale executed on April 28, 1959 by the respondents selling,
respondent Mariano Aguilar, are the children and heirs of the late Marcosa Bernabe who died on May 10, 1960. In transferring and conveying unto Marcosa Bernabe the disputed parcel of land for and in consideration of P1,500.00.
her lifetime, Marcosa Bernabe owned the disputed parcel of land situated in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, with
an area of 4,195 square meters, designated as Cadastral Lot No. 3621, Cad. 337, Case No. 4, Meycauayan Not contented with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that they never sold
Cadastre. back to Marcosa Bernabe the disputed parcel of land. Furthermore, respondents contended that since the
petitioners have failed to produce the original of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959, the same was not the
The disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and Felipe de Vera to a certain Atty. Leonardo best evidence of the alleged sale hence it should have been excluded and should not have been accorded any
Bordador. When the mortgage had matured, the respondents redeemed the property from Atty. Leonardo Bordador evidentiary value. On the other hand, the petitioners claimed that the existence of the document of sale dated April
and in turn Marcosa Bernabe sold the same to them as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated February 11, 28, 1959 had been duly established by the testimony of the notary public before whom it was acknowledged and by
1956. Luis de Vera who was present during its execution and that the loss of the original document had been proven by
the testimony of the representatives of the offices of the National Archives and the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan.
On February 13, 1956, the respondents registered the deed with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan resulting in the
cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Marcosa Bernabe and the issuance of another in the name of the On November 29, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the trial court's decision. It found that
Aguilars. Since then and up to the present, the Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land. the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale has not been duly proven by the petitioners. Hence, secondary
evidence, i.e., presentation of the xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of sale is inadmissible.
On July 20, 1977, respondent Mariano Aguilar was issued a free patent to the land on the basis of which Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M) was issued in his name. Hence this petition.

On September 1, 1980, the petitioners wrote to the respondents claiming that as children of Marcosa Bernabe, they The crux of this case is whether or not the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of sale
were co-owners of the property and demanded partition thereof on threats that the respondents would be charged so as to allow the presentation of the xeroxed copy of the same.
with perjury and/or falsification. The petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the property to
Marcosa Bernabe on April 28, 1959. We rule in the negative.

On September 27, 1980, the respondents wrote in reply to the petitioners that they were the sole owners of the Section 4 of Rule 130 (now Section 5, Rule 130) of the Rules of Court on Secondary Evidence states:
disputed parcel of land and denied that the land was resold to Marcosa Bernabe.
Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. — When the original writing has
True to petitioners' threat, they filed a falsification case against the respondents. However, on March 31, 1981, been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Arsenio N. Mercado of Bulacan recommended dismissal of the charge of falsification of
public document against the respondents for lack of a  prima facie  case.
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 destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents evidence can be given of any one. This petitioners failed to do. Records show that petitioners merely accounted for
in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses. three out of four or five original copies.

Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the In reversing the trial court, the respondent Court of Appeals considered the following points:
introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The
correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents  although this order may be changed if Asked on the witness stand where the original of the document (Exhibit A) was, plaintiff-
necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an appellee Luis de Vera answered that it was with the Provincial Assessor in Malolos, Bulacan,
alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular whereupon the appellees reserved its (sic) right to present it in evidence (p. 11, tsn., August 11,
case.2 1981, Steno, Tecson). The same question propounded to the same witness at the next hearing,
he replied that in the early part of 1976 his sister Maria borrowed from him the original
A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely ruled on the existence and due execution of the document and a certified true copy thereof and brought them to the Office of the Register of
alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959. It failed to look into the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss or Deeds in Malolos "for the purpose of having it registered;" and that when she returned she told
destruction of the original copies of the alleged deed of sale. him that the original copy of the document was submitted to that office "and it (the property) was
transferred in the name of Marcosa Bernabe instead of Mariano Aguilar" (p. 8, tsn., December
In the case at bar, the existence  of an alleged sale of a parcel of land was proved by the presentation of a xeroxed 10, 1981, Steno, Crisostomo; p. 9, tsn., Mar. 16, 1982, Steno, Vallarta).
copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale.
Indeed, upon the appellees' own evidence the original of the deed of sale in question, a
In establishing the execution  of a document the same may be established by the person or persons who executed purported xerox copy and certified true copy of which are marked as Exhibits A and B, has not
it, by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw it been lost or destroyed. It was submitted to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Malolos for
executed or who, after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the registration. The appellees, therefore, should have asked the office to produce it in court and if it
instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof. 3 could not be produced for one reason or another should have called the Register of Deeds or
his representative to explain why. That they failed to do. The loss or destruction of the original of
the document in question has not, therefore, been established. Hence, secondary evidence of it
We agree with the trial court's findings that petitioners have sufficiently established the due execution of the alleged
is inadmissible . . . .
deed of sale through the testimony of the notary public to wit:

Neither did the testimony of notary public Ibasco, Jr. to the effect that he did not have a copy of
Preponderance of evidence clearly disclosed the facts that Atty. Ismael Estela prepared Exhibit
the deed of sale in question because his files were burned when his office at Ronquillo Street,
A. Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr. positively identified the signatures appearing therein to be that ( sic)
Manila was gutted by fire in 1971 and 1972 (p. 4, tsn., November 10, 1981, Steno, Crisostomo)
of the spouses and witnesses Luis de Vera and Ismael Estela, in his capacity as Notary Public
establish the loss or destruction of the original document in question. What was lost or
who ratified the document.4
destroyed in the custody of Atty. Ibasco, Jr. was but one of the duplicate original copies on file
with him. Nor did the testimony of Hipolito Timoteo, representative of the Assessor's Office of
After the due execution of the document has been established, it must next be proved that said document has been Bulacan, to the effect that he failed to see the deed of absolute sale annotated on the simple
lost or destroyed. The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may copy of tax declaration No. 15412 (p. 7, tsn., Aug. 12, 1982, Steno, Vallarta) and of David
be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by any one who had made, in the judgment of the court, a Montenegro, Jr. of the National Archives to the effect that his office had no copy of the
sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by document in question because the notary public might not have submitted a copy thereof; or
the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other that it was lost or destroyed during the transmittal; and that most of the record before 1960 were
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost. 5 destroyed by termites (pp. 8-12, tsn., Oct. 5, 1982, Steno, Tecson), prove loss or destruction of
the original and of all the duplicate original copies of the document in question. 8
However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using copies. For, since all the duplicates or
multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be We find no cogent reason to rule otherwise.
regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable ( i.e. lost, retained by the opponent or by
a third person or the like).6
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED.
In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who notarized the document testified that the alleged
SO ORDERED.
deed of sale has about four or five original copies. 7 Hence, all originals must be accounted for before secondary
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G.R. No. 180643             September 4, 2008 Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by requiring him to
appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
ROMULO L. NERI, vs SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON of executive privilege.7 The letter of Executive Secretary Ermita pertinently stated:
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, 
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations and
Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the President. It exists to protect correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered executive privilege
public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the nation will (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002). Maintaining
receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of information between the the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of her executive and
President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise policy decision making process. The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of her conversations
of the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution. The confidentiality of the President’s conversations and and correspondences, like the value which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens, is the
correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in
as the right to privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally Presidential decision-making. Disclosure of conversations of the President will have a chilling effect on the
ordained separation of governmental powers. President, and will hamper her in the effective discharge of her duties and responsibilities, if she is not
protected by the confidentiality of her conversations.
In these proceedings, this Court has been called upon to exercise its power of review and arbitrate a hotly, even
acrimoniously, debated dispute between the Court’s co-equal branches of government. In this task, this Court The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed
should neither curb the legitimate powers of any of the co-equal and coordinate branches of government nor allow might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given the
any of them to overstep the boundaries set for it by our Constitution. The competing interests in the case at bar are confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the
the claim of executive privilege by the President, on the one hand, and the respondent Senate Committees’ Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is
assertion of their power to conduct legislative inquiries, on the other. The particular facts and circumstances of the designed to protect.
present case, stripped of the politically and emotionally charged rhetoric from both sides and viewed in the light of
settled constitutional and legal doctrines, plainly lead to the conclusion that the claim of executive privilege must be In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive
upheld. privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.

Assailed in this motion for reconsideration is our Decision dated March 25, 2008 (the "Decision"), granting the Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in an unprecedented 11-hour
petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Romulo L. Neri against the respondent Senate Committees on Accountability hearing, wherein he has answered all questions propounded to him except the foregoing questions
of Public Officers and Investigations, 1 Trade and Commerce,2 and National Defense and Security (collectively the involving executive privilege, we therefore request that his testimony on 20 November 2007 on the ZTE /
"respondent Committees").3 NBN project be dispensed with.

A brief review of the facts is imperative. On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President
invoking executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the show-cause letter
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. On November 29, 2007, in petitioner’s reply to
hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by the respondent Committees, he manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he
Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He also
("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered manifested his willingness to appear and testify should there be new matters to be taken up. He just requested that
him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President he be furnished "in advance as to what else" he "needs to clarify."
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for
petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30, 2008; In Re: P.S.
on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, 4 (b) whether or not she directed him to Res. Nos. 127,129,136 & 144; and privilege speeches of Senator Lacson and Santiago (all on the ZTE-NBN
prioritize it,5 and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it. 6 Project), citing petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office
of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

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On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. 8 He insisted that he had not shown A. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE MATTERS FOR WHICH EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IS CLAIMED
"any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest." He emphasized his willingness to testify on new matters, CONSTITUTE STATE SECRETS.
but respondent Committees did not respond to his request for advance notice of questions. He also mentioned the
petition for certiorari he previously filed with this Court on December 7, 2007. According to him, this should restrain B. EVEN IF THE TESTS ADOPTED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE DECISION IS APPLIED,
respondent Committees from enforcing the order dated January 30, 2008 which declared him in contempt and THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE
directed his arrest and detention. ARE PRESENT.

Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction) C. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE IS ADEQUATE SHOWING OF A COMPELLING NEED TO JUSTIFY
on February 1, 2008. In the Court’s Resolution dated February 4, 2008, the parties were required to observe the THE DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION SOUGHT.
status quo prevailing prior to the Order dated January 30, 2008.
D. TO UPHOLD THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE INSTANT CASE WOULD
On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds: first, the communications elicited by SERIOUSLY IMPAIR THE RESPONDENTS’ PERFORMANCE OF THEIR PRIMARY FUNCTION TO
the three (3) questions were covered by executive privilege; and second, respondent Committees committed grave ENACT LAWS.
abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. Anent the first ground, we considered the subject communications
as falling under the presidential communications privilege because (a) they related to a quintessential and non- E. FINALLY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION, AND THE
delegable power of the President, (b) they were received by a close advisor of the President, and (c) respondent CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY OUTWEIGH
Committees failed to adequately show a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and the THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE.
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. As to the second ground, we
found that respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order because (a)
there was a valid claim of executive privilege, (b) their invitations to petitioner did not contain the questions relevant IV
to the inquiry, (c) there was a cloud of doubt as to the regularity of the proceeding that led to their issuance of the
contempt order, (d) they violated Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution because their inquiry was not in CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, RESPONDENTS DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE
accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure," and (e) they issued the contempt order arbitrarily and ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED CONTEMPT ORDER, CONSIDERING THAT:
precipitately.
A. THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
On April 8, 2008, respondent Committees filed the present motion for reconsideration, anchored on the following
grounds: B. RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE SUPPOSED REQUIREMENTS LAID DOWN IN SENATE
V. ERMITA.
I
C. RESPONDENTS DULY ISSUED THE CONTEMPT ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE INTERNAL RULES.
ASSAILED ORDERS WERE ISSUED BY RESPONDENT COMMITTEES PURSUANT TO THE
EXERCISE OF THEIR LEGISLATIVE POWER, AND NOT MERELY THEIR OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS. D. RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE VI, SECTION 21 OF
THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRING THAT ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE BE DULY PUBLISHED, AND
II WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE COURT CONSIDERED THE OSG’S INTERVENTION ON
THIS ISSUE WITHOUT GIVING RESPONDENTS THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT.
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, THERE CAN BE NO PRESUMPTION THAT
THE INFORMATION WITHHELD IN THE INSTANT CASE IS PRIVILEGED. E. RESPONDENTS’ ISSUANCE OF THE CONTEMPT ORDER IS NOT ARBITRARY OR PRECIPITATE.

III In his Comment, petitioner charges respondent Committees with exaggerating and distorting the Decision of this
Court. He avers that there is nothing in it that prohibits respondent Committees from investigating the NBN Project
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, THERE IS NO FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS or asking him additional questions. According to petitioner, the Court merely applied the rule on executive privilege
TO HOLD THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS ELICITED BY THE SUBJECT THREE (3) QUESTIONS ARE to the facts of the case. He further submits the following contentions: first, the assailed Decision did not reverse the
COVERED BY EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, CONSIDERING THAT: presumption against executive secrecy laid down in Senate v. Ermita; second, respondent Committees failed to
82
overcome the presumption of executive privilege because it appears that they could legislate even without the Respondent Committees ardently argue that the Court’s declaration that presidential communications are
communications elicited by the three (3) questions, and they admitted that they could dispense with petitioner’s presumptively privileged reverses the "presumption" laid down in Senate v. Ermita11 that "inclines heavily against
testimony if certain NEDA documents would be given to them; third, the requirement of specificity applies only to the executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure." Respondent Committees then claim that the Court erred in relying on
privilege for State, military and diplomatic secrets, not to the necessarily broad and all-encompassing presidential the doctrine in Nixon.
communications privilege; fourth, there is no right to pry into the President’s thought processes or exploratory
exchanges; fifth, petitioner is not covering up or hiding anything illegal; sixth, the Court has the power and duty to Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential
annul the Senate Rules; seventh, the Senate is not a continuing body, thus the failure of the present Senate to communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the truth. The Court, in the
publish its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation  (Rules) has a vitiating effect on them; eighth, earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez,12 affirmed that the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the
the requirement for a witness to be furnished advance copy of questions comports with due process and the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v.
constitutional mandate that the rights of witnesses be respected; and ninth, neither petitioner nor respondent has Ermita,13 the case relied upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the
the final say on the matter of executive privilege, only the Court. cases in which the claim of executive privilege was recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) ,14 and Chavez v. PEA.15 The Court articulated in these
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that: (1) there is no categorical pronouncement from the cases that "there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public, 16" that there is
Court that the assailed Orders were issued by respondent Committees pursuant to their oversight function; hence, a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and
there is no reason for them "to make much" of the distinction between Sections 21 and 22, Article VI of the other national security matters";17 and that "the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as
Constitution; (2) presidential communications enjoy a presumptive privilege against disclosure as earlier held ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations,
in Almonte v. Vasquez9 and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (PEA)10; (3) the communications elicited by the three correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings."18
(3) questions are covered by executive privilege, because all the elements of the presidential communications
privilege are present; (4) the subpoena ad testificandum issued by respondent Committees to petitioner is fatally Respondent Committees’ observation that this Court’s Decision reversed the "presumption that inclines heavily
defective under existing law and jurisprudence; (5) the failure of the present Senate to publish its Rules renders the against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure" arises from a piecemeal interpretation of the said Decision.
same void; and (6) respondent Committees arbitrarily issued the contempt order. The Court has repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion
thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety. 19
Incidentally, respondent Committees’ objection to the Resolution dated March 18, 2008 (granting the Office of the
Solicitor General’s Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Memorandum) only after the promulgation Note that the aforesaid presumption is made in the context of the circumstances obtaining in Senate v. Ermita,
of the Decision in this case is foreclosed by its untimeliness. which declared void Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464, Series of 2005. The pertinent portion of
the decision in the said case reads:
The core issues that arise from the foregoing respective contentions of the opposing parties are as follows:
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States
(1) whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal and in this jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against
system; Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a
(2) whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the three (3) sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or
questions are covered by executive privilege; not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is
(3) whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the three (3) any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact
questions are critical to the exercise of their functions; and of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the
(4) whether or not respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and
order. underscoring supplied)

We shall discuss these issues seriatim. Obviously, the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the "exemption" being
claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, solely by virtue of their positions in the
I Executive Branch. This means that when an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b)
of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke
executive privilege given by the President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this situation
There Is a Recognized Presumptive
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Presidential Communications Privilege

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Senate v. Ermita 20 expounds on the premise of the foregoing ruling in this wise: Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the
public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the
certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has public." x x x In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in
the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express Almonte v. Vasquez. Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted
pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege:
allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences , like the
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, he has all the values to which we accord
privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the
is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making.  A
instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies
responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain information and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately . These
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is
definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and italics supplied)
particular case.
Clearly, therefore, even Senate v. Ermita adverts to "a presumptive privilege for Presidential communication," which
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President was recognized early on in Almonte v. Vasquez. To construe the passage in Senate v. Ermita adverted to in the
the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Committees, referring to the non-existence of a "presumptive
privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of authorization" of an executive official, to mean that the "presumption" in favor of executive privilege "inclines heavily
the President", which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure" is to distort the ruling in the  Senate v. Ermita and make the
power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the same engage in self-contradiction.
President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to
uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Senate v. Ermita22 expounds on the constitutional underpinning of the relationship between the Executive
Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score. Department and the Legislative Department to explain why there should be no implied authorization or presumptive
authorization to invoke executive privilege by the President’s subordinate officials, as follows:
The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke executive privilege granted by the President
to executive officials in Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464 does not obtain in this case. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power - the President on whom executive
specific matter involving an executive agreement between the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is
three (3) questions propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees’ investigation. Thus, the based on he being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-
factual setting of this case markedly differs from that passed upon in Senate v. Ermita. equal branch of governments which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. (Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, contrary to the claim of respondents, the Decision in this present case hews closely to the ruling Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the President
in Senate v. Ermita,21 to wit: on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same be recognized
and be given preference or priority, in the absence of proof of a compelling or critical need for disclosure by the one
assailing such presumption. Any construction to the contrary will render meaningless the presumption accorded by
Executive privilege
settled jurisprudence in favor of executive privilege. In fact, Senate v. Ermita reiterates jurisprudence citing "the
considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications." 23
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the
promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has
II
been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.

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There Are Factual and Legal Bases to privilege to communications between those who are ‘operationally proximate’ to the President but who may have
Hold that the Communications Elicited by the "no direct communications with her."
Three (3) Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege
It must be stressed that the doctrine of "operational proximity" was laid down in In re: Sealed Case27precisely to limit
Respondent Committees claim that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are not covered by the scope of the presidential communications privilege. The U.S. court was aware of the dangers that a limitless
executive privilege because the elements of the presidential communications privilege are not present. extension of the privilege risks and, therefore, carefully cabined its reach by explicitly confining it to White House
staff, and not to staffs of the agencies, and then only to White House staff that has "operational proximity" to direct
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power ." presidential decision-making, thus:

First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a "quintessential We are aware that such an extension, unless carefully circumscribed to accomplish the purposes of the
and non-delegable presidential power," because the Constitution does not vest it in the President alone, but also in privilege, could pose a significant risk of expanding to a large swath of the executive branch a privilege
the Monetary Board which is required to give its prior concurrence and to report to Congress. that is bottomed on a recognition of the unique role of the President. In order to limit this risk, the
presidential communications privilege should be construed as narrowly as is consistent with ensuring that
the confidentiality of the President’s decision-making process is adequately protected. Not every person
This argument is unpersuasive.
who plays a role in the development of presidential advice, no matter how remote and removed from the
President, can qualify for the privilege. In particular, the privilege should not extend to staff outside the
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive. White House in executive branch agencies. Instead, the privilege should apply only to communications
"Quintessential" is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of authored or solicited and received by those members of an immediate White House advisor’s staff who
substance.24 On the other hand, "non-delegable" means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, have broad and significant responsibility for investigation and formulating the advice to be given the
even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor. 25 The power to enter into an executive agreement is in President on the particular matter to which the communications relate. Only communications at that level
essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the are close enough to the President to be revelatory of his deliberations or to pose a risk to the candor of
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. 26 Now, the fact that the his advisers. See  AAPS, 997 F.2d at 910 (it is "operational proximity" to the President that matters in
President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete determining whether "[t]he President’s confidentiality interests" is implicated). (Emphasis supplied)
report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the
power.
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch" (a fear
apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet,
The inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government thus, properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family.
by no means prescribes absolute autonomy in the discharge by each branch of that part of the governmental power Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the official involved is far too remote, this Court also mentioned in the
assigned to it by the sovereign people. There is the corollary doctrine of checks and balances, which has been Decision the organizational test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice .28 This goes to show that
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches. Thus, by analogy, the operational proximity test used in the Decision is not considered conclusive in every case. In determining which
the fact that certain legislative acts require action from the President for their validity does not render such acts less test to use, the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand
legislative in nature. A good example is the power to pass a law. Article VI, Section 27 of the Constitution mandates proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the
that every bill passed by Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President who shall approve Executive’s organizational structure. Thus, respondent Committees’ fear that the scope of the privilege would be
or veto the same. The fact that the approval or vetoing of the bill is lodged with the President does not render the unnecessarily expanded with the use of the operational proximity test is unfounded.
power to pass law executive in nature. This is because the power to pass law is generally a quintessential and non-
delegable power of the Legislature. In the same vein, the executive power to enter or not to enter into a contract to
secure foreign loans does not become less executive in nature because of conditions laid down in the Constitution. C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized interest; and in balancing
The final decision in the exercise of the said executive power is still lodged in the Office of the President. respondent Committees’ and the President’s clashing interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987 Constitutional
provisions on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information.
B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive. Third, respondent Committees claim that the Court erred in upholding the President’s invocation, through the
Executive Secretary, of executive privilege because (a) between respondent Committees’ specific and
demonstrated need and the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality, there is a need to strike the balance
Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the application of the "doctrine of operational in favor of the former; and (b) in the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded the provisions of the 1987
proximity" for the reason that "it maybe misconstrued to expand the scope of the presidential communications Philippine Constitution on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information, specifically,

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Article III, Section 7;29 Article II, Sections 2430 and 28;31 Article XI, Section 1;32 Article XVI, Section 10;33 Article VII, The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing
Section 20;34 and Article XII, Sections 9,35 21,36 and 22.37 valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that "information on inter-
government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to
It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her generalized reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest." Even earlier, the same privilege was upheld
interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified  presidential in People’s Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v. Manglapus  wherein the Court discussed the reasons
communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign nation as the for the privilege in more precise terms.
bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter stated:
In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking information from the President’s
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given the The Court denied the petition, stressing that "secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not
confidential nature in which this information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access
Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is to information." The Resolution went on to state, thus:
designed to protect. (emphasis supplied)
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are
Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This nature. Although much has been said about "open" and "secret" diplomacy, with disparagement
is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal department. of the latter, Secretaries of State Hughes and Stimson have clearly analyzed and justified the
practice. In the words of Mr. Stimson:
It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the President’s communication with her advisor. The
NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was actually a product of the meeting of "A complicated negotiation …cannot be carried through without many, many private
minds between officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever the President says about the agreement - talks and discussion, man to man; many tentative suggestions and
particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China will surely view with particular interest. proposals. Delegates from other countries come and tell you in confidence of their
There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could adversely affect our diplomatic as well as economic relations with troubles at home and of their differences with other countries and with other
the People’s Republic of China. We reiterate the importance of secrecy in matters involving foreign negotiations as delegates; they tell you of what they would do under certain circumstances and would
stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 38 thus: not do under other circumstances… If these reports… should become public… who
would ever trust American Delegations in another conference? (United States
Department of State, Press Releases, June 7, 1930, pp. 282-284)
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy, and
even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual
concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic, for this might xxxx
have a pernicious influence on future negotiations or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger
and mischief, in relation to other powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent There is frequent criticism of the secrecy in which negotiation with foreign powers on nearly all
reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the subjects is concerned. This, it is claimed, is incompatible with the substance of democracy. As
Senate, the principle on which the body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit, expressed by one writer, "It can be said that there is no more rigid system of silence anywhere
then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers in the world." (E.J. Young, Looking Behind the Censorship, J. B. Lipincott Co., 1938) President
respecting a negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish a dangerous precedent. Wilson in starting his efforts for the conclusion of the World War declared that we must have
"open covenants, openly arrived at." He quickly abandoned his thought.
US jurisprudence clearly guards against the dangers of allowing Congress access to all papers relating to a
negotiation with a foreign power. In this jurisdiction, the recent case of Akbayan Citizens Action Party, et al. v. No one who has studied the question believes that such a method of publicity is possible. In the
Thomas G. Aquino, et al.39 upheld the privileged character of diplomatic negotiations. In Akbayan, the Court stated: moment that negotiations are started, pressure groups attempt to "muscle in." An ill-timed
speech by one of the parties or a frank declaration of the concession which are exacted  or
offered on both sides would quickly lead to a widespread propaganda to block the
negotiations. After a treaty has been drafted and its terms are fully published, there is ample
opportunity for discussion before it is approved. (The New American Government and Its
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
Works, James T. Young, 4th Edition, p. 194) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

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 Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. that the Indeed, the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not espouse an absolute right to
President is the sole organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries, viz: information. By their wording, the intention of the Framers to subject such right to the regulation of the law is
unmistakable. The highlighted portions of the following provisions show the obvious limitations on the right to
"x x x In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold information, thus:
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Article III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official records, and to documents,
invade it. As Marshall said in his great arguments of March 7, 1800, in the House of and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
Representatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
sole representative with foreign nations." Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613… (Emphasis supplied; provided by law.
underscoring in the original)
Article II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that Congress
may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government ,40 it was stated that there are no specific laws
informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need. prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be
Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted consequences of subjecting a Chief obliged. Nonetheless, it enumerated the recognized restrictions to such rights, among them: (1) national security
Executive to unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased frequency and great publicity. No Executive matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.
can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face of intense and unchecked legislative incursion into the National security matters include state secrets regarding military and diplomatic matters, as well as information on
core of the President’s decision-making process, which inevitably would involve her conversations with a member of inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements. It was further held that
her Cabinet. even where there is no need to protect such state secrets, they must be "examined in strict confidence and given
scrupulous protection."
With respect to respondent Committees’ invocation of constitutional prescriptions regarding the right of the people
to information and public accountability and transparency, the Court finds nothing in these arguments to support Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain information allegedly in
respondent Committees’ case. aid of legislation, not the people’s right to public information. This is the reason why we stressed in the assailed
Decision the distinction between these two rights. As laid down in Senate v. Ermita, "the demand of a citizen for the
There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of the people to information and the constitutional production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as
policies on public accountability and transparency. These are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress" and "neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to
a democratic government. The citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power exact testimony from government officials." As pointed out, these rights belong to Congress, not to the individual
has been delegated if they are denied access to information. And the policies on public accountability and citizen. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the parties here are respondent Committees and petitioner Neri
democratic government would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is and that there was no prior request for information on the part of any individual citizen. This Court will not be
denied. swayed by attempts to blur the distinctions between the Legislature's right to information in a legitimate legislative
inquiry and the public's right to information.
In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in
any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and transparency. For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did not enjoin respondent Committees from inquiring
into the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect matters that are covered by executive privilege.
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is
nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They III.
could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed
his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes from the scope of respondents’ investigation the three (3) Respondent Committees Failed to Show That
questions that elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear the Communications Elicited by the Three Questions
before respondents to answer the said questions. We have discussed the reasons why these answers are covered Are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions
by executive privilege. That there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information is a
recognized principle in other democratic States. To put it simply, the right to information is not an absolute right.

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In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees devote an unusually lengthy discussion on the The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has constitutional dimensions. The
purported legislative nature of their entire inquiry, as opposed to an oversight inquiry. Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right 'to be confronted with
the witness against him' and 'to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.' Moreover,
At the outset, it must be clarified that the Decision did not pass upon the nature of respondent Committees’ inquiry the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of
into the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent Committees’ power to investigate the NBN law. It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to accomplish that it is
Project in aid of legislation. However, this Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be produced.
privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of
respondent Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential
pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may have relevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court communications in performance of the President's responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege
in past decisions on executive privilege is that the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by  a showing of on the fair administration of criminal justice. (emphasis supplied)
compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.
xxx xxx xxx
In the Decision, the majority held that "there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating ...the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would
authority." In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees argue that the information elicited by the three cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the
(3) questions are necessary in the discharge of their legislative functions, among them, (a) to consider the three (3) courts. A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of his office
pending Senate Bills, and (b) to curb graft and corruption. is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal
proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration
We remain unpersuaded by respondents’ assertions. of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President's
broad interest in confidentiality of communication will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of
In U.S. v. Nixon, the U.S. Court held that executive privilege is subject to balancing against other interests and it is conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases.
necessary to resolve the competing interests in a manner that would preserve the essential functions of each
branch. There, the Court weighed between presidential privilege and the legitimate claims of the judicial process. In We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a
giving more weight to the latter, the Court ruled that the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized
assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal
The Nixon Court ruled that an absolute and unqualified privilege would stand in the way of the primary constitutional trial. (emphasis supplied)
duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions. The said Court further ratiocinated, through its
ruling extensively quoted in the Honorable Chief Justice Puno's dissenting opinion, as follows: In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a court’s need for facts in order to adjudge liability in a criminal case
but rather with the Senate’s need for information in relation to its legislative functions. This leads us to consider
"... this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of our historic commitment to the rule of law. once again just how critical is the subject information in the discharge of respondent Committees’ functions. The
This is nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that 'the twofold aim (of criminal justice) is that burden to show this is on the respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude into the sphere of competence of
guild shall not escape or innocence suffer.' Berger v. United States, 295 U.S., at 88, 55 S.Ct., at 633. We the President in order to gather information which, according to said respondents, would "aid" them in crafting
have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues legislation.
before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental
and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon 41 expounded on the nature of a legislative
partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public inquiry in aid of legislation in this wise:
confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of
evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore, entirely on whether
be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense. the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its legislative functions. There is a clear
difference between Congress' legislative tasks and the responsibility of a grand jury, or any institution
xxx xxx xxx engaged in like functions. While fact-finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its task,
legislative judgments normally depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed legislative
actions and their political acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of past events; Congress frequently

88
 legislates on the basis of conflicting information provided in its hearings. In contrast, the responsibility of CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
the grand jury turns entirely on its ability to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that
certain named individuals did or did not commit specific crimes. If, for example, as in Nixon v. Sirica, one So can you tell the Court how critical are these questions to the lawmaking function of the
of those crimes is perjury concerning the content of certain conversations, the grand jury's need for the Senate. For instance, question Number 1 whether the President followed up the NBN project.
most precise evidence, the exact text of oral statements recorded in their original form, is undeniable.  We According to the other counsel this question has already been asked, is that correct?
see no comparable need in the legislative process, at least not in the circumstances of this case. Indeed,
whatever force there might once have been in the Committee's argument that the subpoenaed materials ATTY. AGABIN
are necessary to its legislative judgments has been substantially undermined by subsequent events.
(Emphasis supplied)
Well, the question has been asked but it was not answered, Your Honor.
Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or demonstratively
critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to adjudicate actual controversies. Also, CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
the bare standard of "pertinency" set in Arnault cannot be lightly applied to the instant case, which
unlike Arnault involves a conflict between two (2) separate, co-equal and coordinate Branches of the Government. Yes. But my question is how critical is this to the lawmaking function of the Senate?

Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the conflicting claims between the Executive and the ATTY. AGABIN
Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive presidential communications privilege. This is
conceded even in the Dissenting Opinion of the Honorable Chief Justice Puno, which states: I believe it is critical, Your Honor.

A hard look at Senate v. Ermita ought to yield the conclusion that it bestowed a qualified presumption in CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
favor of the Presidential communications privilege. As shown in the previous discussion, U.S. v. Nixon, as
well as the other related Nixon cases Sirica and Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Why?
Activities, et al., v. Nixon in the D.C. Court of Appeals, as well as subsequent cases all recognize that
there is a presumptive privilege in favor of Presidential communications. The Almonte case quoted U.S. v.
ATTY. AGABIN
Nixon and recognized a presumption in favor of confidentiality of Presidential communications.

For instance, with respect to the proposed Bill of Senator Miriam Santiago, she would like to
The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent Senate Committees to
indorse a Bill to include Executive Agreements had been used as a device to the circumventing
overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the information to be elicited by the answers to
the Procurement Law.
the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft legislation. Here, there is simply
a generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and
non-specific reference to pending Senate bills. It is not clear what matters relating to these bills could not be CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
determined without the said information sought by the three (3) questions. As correctly pointed out by the Honorable
Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Separate Concurring Opinion: But the question is just following it up.

…If respondents are operating under the premise that the president and/or her executive officials have ATTY. AGABIN
committed wrongdoings that need to be corrected or prevented from recurring by remedial legislation, the
answer to those three questions will not necessarily bolster or inhibit respondents from proceeding with I believe that may be the initial question, Your Honor, because if we look at this problem in its
such legislation. They could easily presume the worst of the president in enacting such legislation. factual setting as counsel for petitioner has observed, there are intimations of a bribery scandal
involving high government officials.
For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before legislatives bodies can come
up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law. Interestingly, during the Oral CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
Argument before this Court, the counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted that the Senate could still
come up with legislations even without petitioner answering the three (3) questions. In other words, the information
being elicited is not so critical after all. Thus:

89
 Again, about the second question, were you dictated to prioritize this ZTE, is that critical to the actions and their political acceptability than on a precise reconstruction of past events. It added that, normally,
lawmaking function of the Senate? Will it result to the failure of the Senate to cobble a Bill Congress legislates on the basis of conflicting information provided in its hearings. We cannot subscribe to the
without this question? respondent Committees’ self-defeating proposition that without the answers to the three (3) questions objected to as
privileged, the distinguished members of the respondent Committees cannot intelligently craft legislation.
ATTY. AGABIN
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need for
I think it is critical to lay the factual foundations for a proposed amendment to the Procurement information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is
Law, Your Honor, because the petitioner had already testified that he was offered a P200 Million legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress. 44 And
bribe, so if he was offered a P200 Million bribe it is possible that other government officials who if this is the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3) questions covered by privilege, it
had something to do with the approval of the contract would be offered the same amount of may even contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or
bribes. not investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or oversight function of Congress, respondent Committees’
investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,45 this Court ruled:
Again, that is speculative.
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution.
Moreover, as held in a recent case, "the political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to
ATTY. AGABIN
judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been
given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said
That is why they want to continue with the investigation, Your Honor. provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases. 46 (Emphasis
supplied)
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
There, the Court further ratiocinated that "the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really ‘in aid of
How about the third question, whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project legislation’ because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
after being told about the alleged bribe. How critical is that to the lawmaking function of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of
Senate? And the question is may they craft a Bill a remedial law without forcing petitioner Neri R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the
to answer this question? courts rather than of the Legislature."47 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

ATTY. AGABIN The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the
President.48 While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of high government officials,
Well, they can craft it, Your Honor, based on mere speculation. And sound legislation requires including the President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform. The role
that a proposed Bill should have some basis in fact. 42 of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has
not bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature
The failure of the counsel for respondent Committees to pinpoint the specific need for the information sought or how adjudicate or prosecute.
the withholding of the information sought will hinder the accomplishment of their legislative purpose is very evident
in the above oral exchanges. Due to the failure of the respondent Committees to successfully discharge this burden, Respondent Committees claim that they are conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation and a "search for truth,"
the presumption in favor of confidentiality of presidential communication stands. The implication of the said which in respondent Committees’ view appears to be equated with the search for persons responsible for
presumption, like any other, is to dispense with the burden of proof as to whether the disclosure will significantly "anomalies" in government contracts.
impair the President’s performance of her function. Needless to state this is assumed, by virtue of the presumption.
No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they cannot assume the power reposed upon
Anent respondent Committees’ bewailing that they would have to "speculate" regarding the questions covered by our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of who is/are liable for a crime or illegal activity, the
the privilege, this does not evince a compelling need for the information sought. Indeed, Senate Select Committee investigation of the role played by each official, the determination of who should be haled to court for prosecution
on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon43 held that while fact-finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a and the task of coming up with conclusions and finding of facts regarding anomalies, especially the determination of
part of its task, legislative judgments normally depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed legislative criminal guilt, are not functions of the Senate. Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it

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bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting standards of evidence essential to
Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence and "punish" those arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law. Hence, Section 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
investigated are indefensible. There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure. 49 In this regard, Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that "technical rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings
the pronouncement in Barenblatt v. United States50 is instructive, thus: which do not affect substantive rights need not be observed by the Committee." Court rules which prohibit leading,
hypothetical, or repetitive questions or questions calling for a hearsay answer, to name a few, do not apply to a
Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since Congress may only investigate into the legislative inquiry. Every person, from the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right to be
areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings by a competent court or body.
exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the
Judiciary, it cannot inquire into matters that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it IV
supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent Committees Committed Grave
At this juncture, it is important to stress that complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been filed against Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order
President Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman. Under our Constitution, it is the
Ombudsman who has the duty "to investigate any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency Respondent Committees insist that they did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."51 The Office of the Ombudsman is because (1) there is no legitimate claim of executive privilege; (2) they did not violate the requirements laid down
the body properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not the in Senate v. Ermita; (3) they issued the contempt order in accordance with their internal Rules; (4) they did not
allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor. The same holds true for our courts upon which the violate the requirement under Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution requiring the publication of their Rules; and
Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with finality. Indeed, the rules of procedure in the Office of (5) their issuance of the contempt order is not arbitrary or precipitate.
the Ombudsman and the courts are well-defined and ensure that the constitutionally guaranteed rights of all
persons, parties and witnesses alike, are protected and safeguarded. We reaffirm our earlier ruling.

Should respondent Committees uncover information related to a possible crime in the course of their investigation, The legitimacy of the claim of executive privilege having been fully discussed in the preceding pages, we see no
they have the constitutional duty to refer the matter to the appropriate agency or branch of government. Thus, the reason to discuss it once again.
Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of graft and corruption cannot be deemed compelling enough
to pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by executive privilege. As discussed above, the
Legislature can still legislate on graft and corruption even without the information covered by the three (3) questions Respondent Committees’ second argument rests on the view that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, requiring invitations
subject of the petition. or subpoenas to contain the "possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry" along with the "usual
indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof" is not provided for by the
Constitution and is merely an obiter dictum.
Corollarily, respondent Committees justify their rejection of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege on the ground
that there is no privilege when the information sought might involve a crime or illegal activity,  despite the absence of
an administrative or judicial determination to that effect. Significantly, however, in Nixon v. Sirica,52 the showing On the contrary, the Court sees the rationale and necessity of compliance with these requirements.
required to overcome the presumption favoring confidentiality turned, not on the nature of the presidential conduct
that the subpoenaed material might reveal, but, instead, on the nature and appropriateness of the function in the An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates its own abuses.
performance of which the material was sought, and the degree to which the material was necessary to its fulfillment. Consequently, claims that the investigative power of Congress has been abused (or has the potential for abuse)
have been raised many times. 53 Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the
Respondent Committees assert that Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon  does Executive to function effectively. The requirements set forth in Senate v. Ermita are modest mechanisms that would
not apply to the case at bar because, unlike in the said case, no impeachment proceeding has been initiated at not unduly limit Congress’ power. The legislative inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus, prevent
present. The Court is not persuaded. While it is true that no impeachment proceeding has been initiated, however, the "roving commissions" referred to in the U.S. case, Kilbourn v. Thompson.54 Likewise, witnesses have their
complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been filed against President Arroyo and other personalities constitutional right to due process. They should be adequately informed what matters are to be covered by the
before the Office of the Ombudsman. As the Court has said earlier, the prosecutorial and judicial arms of inquiry. It will also allow them to prepare the pertinent information and documents. To our mind, these requirements
government are the bodies equipped and mandated by the Constitution and our laws to determine whether or not concede too little political costs or burdens on the part of Congress when viewed vis-à-vis the immensity of its
the allegations of anomaly in the NBN Project are true and, if so, who should be prosecuted and penalized for power of inquiry. The logic of these requirements is well articulated in the study conducted by William P.
criminal conduct. Marshall,55 to wit:

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 A second concern that might be addressed is that the current system allows committees to continually "The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any witness before it
investigate the Executive without constraint. One process solution addressing this concern is to require who disobey any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper questions
each investigation be tied to a clearly stated purpose. At present, the charters of some congressional by the Committee or any of its members." (Emphasis supplied)
committees are so broad that virtually any matter involving the Executive can be construed to fall within
their province. Accordingly, investigations can proceed without articulation of specific need or purpose. A In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt order because
requirement for a more precise charge in order to begin an inquiry should immediately work to limit the during the deliberation of the three (3) respondent Committees, only seven (7) Senators were present. This number
initial scope of the investigation and should also serve to contain the investigation once it is could hardly fulfill the majority requirement needed by respondent Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
instituted. Additionally, to the extent clear statements of rules cause legislatures to pause and seriously and Investigations which has a membership of seventeen (17) Senators and respondent Committee on National
consider the constitutional implications of proposed courses of action in other areas, they would serve that Defense and Security which has a membership of eighteen (18) Senators. With respect to respondent Committee
goal in the context of congressional investigations as well. on Trade and Commerce which has a membership of nine (9) Senators, only three (3) members were
present.57 These facts prompted us to quote in the Decision the exchanges between Senators Alan Peter Cayetano
The key to this reform is in its details. A system that allows a standing committee to simply articulate its and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. whereby the former raised the issue of lack of the required majority to deliberate and vote
reasons to investigate pro forma does no more than imposes minimal drafting burdens. Rather, the on the contempt order.
system must be designed in a manner that imposes actual burdens on the committee to articulate its need
for investigation and allows for meaningful debate about the merits of proceeding with the When asked about such voting during the March 4, 2008 hearing before this Court, Senator Francis Pangilinan
investigation. (Emphasis supplied) stated that any defect in the committee voting had been cured because two-thirds of the Senators effectively signed
for the Senate in plenary session.58
Clearly, petitioner’s request to be furnished an advance copy of questions is a reasonable demand that should have
been granted by respondent Committees. Obviously the deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the issuance of the contempt order is flawed.
Instead of being submitted to a full debate by all the members of the respondent Committees, the contempt order
Unfortunately, the Subpoena Ad Testificandum dated November 13, 2007 made no specific reference to any was prepared and thereafter presented to the other members for signing. As a result, the contempt order which was
pending Senate bill. It did not also inform petitioner of the questions to be asked. As it were, the subpoena merely issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful representation of the proceedings that took place on said date.
commanded him to "testify on what he knows relative to the subject matter under inquiry." Records clearly show that not all of those who signed the contempt order were present during the January 30, 2008
deliberation when the matter was taken up.
Anent the third argument, respondent Committees contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation (the "Rules") are beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true that this Court must refrain from Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:
reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, however, when a constitutional
requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith. We cannot turn a blind eye The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
to possible violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy. In this regard, the pronouncement in  Arroyo v. De aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of person appearing
Venecia56 is enlightening, thus: in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied)

"Cases both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form part of the witness’ settled expectation. If the limitations
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the are not observed, the witness’ settled expectation is shattered. Here, how could there be a majority vote when the
absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private members in attendance are not enough to arrive at such majority? Petitioner has the right to expect that he can be
individuals. cited in contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding in which the matter has been fully deliberated upon.
There is a greater measure of protection for the witness when the concerns and objections of the members are fully
United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,  the rule was stated thus: ‘The Constitution empowers each House articulated in such proceeding. We do not believe that respondent Committees have the discretion to set aside their
to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate rules anytime they wish. This is especially true here where what is involved is the contempt power. It must be
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding stressed that the Rules are not promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it is the witness who has the
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained." highest stake in the proper observance of the Rules.

In the present case, the Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review is warranted because there appears to be a Having touched the subject of the Rules, we now proceed to respondent Committees’ fourth argument. Respondent
clear abuse of the power of contempt on the part of respondent Committees. Section 18 of the Rules provides that: Committees argue that the Senate does not have to publish its Rules because the same was published in 1995 and

92
in 2006. Further, they claim that the Senate is a continuing body; thus, it is not required to republish the Rules, SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until they
unless the same is repealed or amended. are amended or repealed. (emphasis supplied)

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after an
debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly
or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each elected Senators shall begin their term.
Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself
confirms this when it states: However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the date of
their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the  Rules.
RULE XLIV The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
UNFINISHED BUSINESS general circulation."59 The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are
amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next
status. Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished
business.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be
taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time. (emphasis supplied) The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with
the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its
legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even legislative
effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished
matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next
readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of
which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted
pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should
continue into the next Congress with the same status. be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as
expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its valid and effective.
business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure) states:
Respondent Committees’ last argument is that their issuance of the contempt order is not precipitate or arbitrary.
RULE LI Taking into account the totality of circumstances, we find no merit in their argument.
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
As we have stressed before, petitioner is not an unwilling witness, and contrary to the assertion of respondent
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall Committees, petitioner did not assume that they no longer had any other questions for him. He repeatedly
begin their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for manifested his willingness to attend subsequent hearings and respond to new matters. His only request was that he
amendment or revision. be furnished a copy of the new questions in advance to enable him to adequately prepare as a resource person. He
did not attend the November 20, 2007 hearing because Executive Secretary Ermita requested respondent
Committees to dispense with his testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Note that petitioner is an executive
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one day
official under the direct control and supervision of the Chief Executive. Why punish petitioner for contempt when he
before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be
required for its approval. (emphasis supplied) was merely directed by his superior? Besides, save for the three (3) questions, he was very cooperative during the
September 26, 2007 hearing.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
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On the part of respondent Committees, this Court observes their haste and impatience. Instead of ruling on EMMA K. LEE,  vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE,
Executive Secretary Ermita’s claim of executive privilege, they curtly dismissed it as unsatisfactory and ordered the MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL,
arrest of petitioner. They could have informed petitioner of their ruling and given him time to decide whether to VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE,
accede or file a motion for reconsideration. After all, he is not just an ordinary witness; he is a high- ranking official
in a co-equal branch of government. He is an alter ego of the President. The same haste and impatience marked This case is about the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad testificandum and a parent’s right not to testify in a case
the issuance of the contempt order, despite the absence of the majority of the members of the respondent against his children.
Committees, and their subsequent disregard of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration alleging the pendency of his
petition for certiorari before this Court. The Facts and the Case

On a concluding note, we are not unmindful of the fact that the Executive and the Legislature are political branches Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from
of government. In a free and democratic society, the interests of these branches inevitably clash, but each must China. They had 11 children, namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee,
treat the other with official courtesy and respect. This Court wholeheartedly concurs with the proposition that it is Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee
imperative for the continued health of our democratic institutions that we preserve the constitutionally mandated (collectively, the Lee-Keh children).
checks and balances among the different branches of government.
In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The
In the present case, it is respondent Committees’ contention that their determination on the validity of executive respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee
privilege should be binding on the Executive and the Courts. It is their assertion that their internal procedures and nearby, and had a relation with him.
deliberations cannot be inquired into by this Court supposedly in accordance with the principle of respect between
co-equal branches of government. Interestingly, it is a courtesy that they appear to be unwilling to extend to the
Executive (on the matter of executive privilege) or this Court (on the matter of judicial review). It moves this Court to Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children with Lee (collectively, the Lee’s
wonder: In respondent Committees’ paradigm of checks and balances, what are the checks to the Legislature’s all- other children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request
encompassing, awesome power of investigation? It is a power, like any other, that is susceptible to grave abuse. the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. After conducting such an investigation, the NBI
concluded in its report:
While this Court finds laudable the respondent Committees’ well-intentioned efforts to ferret out corruption, even in
the highest echelons of government, such lofty intentions do not validate or accord to Congress powers denied to it [I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger
by the Constitution and granted instead to the other branches of government. woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in
a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8
children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his second family and secure their
There is no question that any story of government malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its veracity. As respondent future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary had not the father and his second
Committees contend, this is founded on the constitutional command of transparency and public accountability. The family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG. 1
recent clamor for a "search for truth" by the general public, the religious community and the academe is an
indication of a concerned citizenry, a nation that demands an accounting of an entrusted power. However, the best
venue for this noble undertaking is not in the political branches of government. The customary partisanship and the The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the Lee’s other children, Marcelo Lee (who
absence of generally accepted rules on evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at the truth or achieving was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38 years
justice that meets the test of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. We believe the people deserve a old at the time. Another of the Lee’s other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was
more exacting "search for truth" than the process here in question, if that is its objective. then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other words, by the hospital records of the Lee’s other children,
Keh’s declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave birth to such other children,
numbering eight.
WHEREFORE, respondent Committees’ Motion for Rec
On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of them before the
G.R. No. 177861               July 13, 2010 Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City 2 in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the certificate of
live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the
IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH, name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name.

In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion but
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Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court of Appeals6 that the Lee-Keh children have
Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s stepmother. 3 On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the the right to file the action for correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lee’s other children, Emma Lee
subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and that the included. The Court recognized that the ultimate object of the suit was to establish the fact that Lee’s other children
obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lee’s mother. were not children of Keh. Thus:

Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh children’s motion for reconsideration, they filed a special civil action of It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the CA rendered a Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.  The petitions filed by private respondents for the
decision,4 setting aside the RTC’s August 5, 2005 Order. The CA ruled that only a subpoena  duces tecum, not a correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological
subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in
Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that Tiu’s advanced age alone does not render her incapable of their birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions
testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that she would be unable to to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok
withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner Emma Lee failed to do. Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood
relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners. 7 (Underscoring supplied)
Since the CA denied Emma Lee’s motion for reconsideration by resolution of May 8, 2007, 5 she filed the present
petition with this Court. Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh children’s action, obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or
admit that she is the mother of Lee’s other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not
give testimony that Lee’s other children were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for
seeking Tiu’s testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to compel the attendance of such
a material witness.

But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify: a) considering her
The Question Presented
advance age, testifying in court would subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it would violate
her parental right not to be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter.
The only question presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu
to testify in the correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the certificate of
1. Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were compelled
birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Keh’s daughter.
at her age and condition to come to court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to the
satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have passed from the time the Lee-Keh children sought the
The Ruling of the Court issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial court. The RTC would have to update itself and
determine if Tiu’s current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of coming to court and
Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on being questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued to her.
the ground that it was unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on oral
examination concerning the Lee-Keh children’s theory that she had illicit relation with Lee and gave birth to the Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to badgering by adverse counsel.
other Lee children. The trial court’s duty is to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is
especially true where the witness is of advanced age.8
But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds cited—unreasonable and oppressive—are proper for subpoena ad
duces tecum or for the production of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that has a 2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee,
tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads:
provides:
SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. — The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion promptly made ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
and, in any event, at or before the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the
books, documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to
The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal
advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof.
cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions,
whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or descendants.
95
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege 3. Later that day, at around four o'clock in the afternoon, Barangay Captain Aristeo Allarey of Barangay
cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected Ilayang Tayuman was visited in his house by Mila de la Cruz, Dyesebel's mother, who reported that her
by a common ancestry.1avvphi1 A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus daughter was missing. Allarey sought the assistance of his constituents and organized a search party
provides: composed of the members of the Sangguniang Barangay, a Barangay Tanod, Dyesebel's father Gonzalo
dela Cruz, and other residents of the barangay. Prosecution witnesses Bayani Samadan, a Kagawad of
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who the Sangguniang Barangay and Reynaldo Merle, a "barangay tanod," were among the searchers (pp. 10-
descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends. 13, tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991; p. 24, tsn, De la Cruz, February 5, 1991; pp. 6-7, tsn, Merle, July 18,
1991; pp. 4-7, tsn, Samadan, September 17, 1991).
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.
4. Barangay Captain Allarey learned from Gonzalo de la Cruz that, earlier, Dyesebel was in the company
of accused-appellant Vicente Valla, and that both of them were tasked to watch the ricefield. They went to
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in
the ricefield but appellant was not there. Allarey learned from a barangay tanod that appellant was
CA-G.R. SP 92555.
drinking liquor in the house of a friend within the same barangay. He summoned appellant but the latter
failed to immediately report to him. (pp. 14-15, and 20, tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991). 1âwphi1.nêt

5. That afternoon, Allarey and his party started their search but they had to stop at around 6:30 in the
G.R. No. 111285           January 24, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs VICENTE VALLA1  evening since it was already dark. The following day, they continued their search for Dyesebel, (p. 12, tsn,
Allarey, February 5, 1991; pp. 7-8, tsn, Merle, July 18, 1991).
On appeal is the decision dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62,
convicting appellant of the crime of rape with homicide, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and 6. While Allarey, De la Cruz and the rest of their companions were searching for Dyesebel, they were
ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P30,000.00 as actual and joined by appellant who trailed behind them. Earlier, appellant spoke to Allarey and told him that he knew
moral damages. nothing about Dyesebel's whereabouts. (pp. 15-16, tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991; p. 24, tsn, De la Cruz,
February 5, 1991; p. 13, tsn, Merle, July 18, 1991; pp. 8-9, tsn, Samadan, September 17, 1991).
Appellant was 28 years old, married, cousin of the victim, and resident of Barangay Tayuman, San Francisco,
Quezon, at the time of incident. The victim was an eight (8) year-old girl, Dyesebel "Gigi" de la Cruz, who was 7. At around 11:00 o'clock in the morning of that day, they finally found Dyesebel. Her body was found
reported missing and the following day found raped and strangled to death near the riverbank of the Tayuman river near the river with her neck blackened and her vagina bloodied. She was still wearing her dress but her
in Quezon province. panty had been pulled down to her mid-thigh. (pp. 13-14, tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991; p. 23, tsn, De la
Cruz, February 5, 1991; pp. 8-9, tsn, Merle, July 18, 1991; pp. 7-8, tsn, Samadan, September 17, 1991).
The facts, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, which we find to be supported by the records, are
as follows: 8. Allarey and his companions immediately confronted appellant who, out of remorse, admitted that he
raped and killed Dyesebel. Thereafter, he addressed Dyesebel's father, in the presence of Allarey and
1. On April 14, 1991, at around nine o'clock in the morning, Myra Pines, a twelve-year old girl, was company, offering his own daughter in payment of Dyesebel's life which he took and begged for
passing by the ricefield near the road located at Barangay Ilayang Tayuman in the Municipality of San forgiveness. De la Cruz told appellant that he cannot accept appellant's daughter and, thereafter, tried to
Francisco, Quezon Province. She was carrying bananas on her way to the crossing in said municipality. unsheath his bolo. But before De la Cruz could attack appellant, he was held back by the people around
(pp. 3-6, Pines, February 5, 1991). him. Appellant was ordered arrested by Allarey. (pp. 16-17 and 21, tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991; pp. 24-
26 and 28, tsn, De la Cruz, February 5, 1991; pp. 11 and 18, tsn, Merle, July 18, 1991; pp. 9-11 and 13-
2. As she passed by the ricefield, she heard a voice coming from the direction of the forested area of the 14, tsn, Samadan, September 17, 1991).
place and it seemed to her that someone was being strangled. Listening closely, she recognized the voice
as belonging to her friend and playmate, Dyesebel de la Cruz, an eight-year old girl. Frightened at the 9. That same day, at around one o'clock in the afternoon, Allarey, accompanied by Samadan, Merle, De
thought that Dyesebel was being strangled, Myra scampered and proceeded to the crossing where she la Cruz, and one Abelardo Rego, brought appellant to the police headquarters in San Francisco, Quezon.
was originally headed for. After discharging her bananas at the crossing, she went home. (pp. 5-6, tsn, (pp. 5-6, tsn, Rosales, November 6, 1991; p. 17, tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991).
Pines, February 5, 1991).
10. Dyesebel's body was brought to the Bondoc Peninsula District Hospital in Catanauan, Quezon, where
an autopsy was performed. Dyesebel's skull bore a depression on the left temporal area which resulted

96
 from being struck with a hard object. Her pubic area bore blisters brought about by a contact with a lighted On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses (1) appellant himself who bluntly denied any participation
cigarette. Her hymen bore several lacerations indicative of repeated rape before and possibly, after she in the rape/killing of the victim, or that he made any confessions to the barangay captain; he interposed the defense
was killed. (pp. 4-6, tsn, Madatu, January 14, 1992). 2 of alibi that at the time of the alleged rape/killing, he was at his house in Barangay Ilayang Tayuman, San
Francisco, Quezon together with his wife, their child and his brother, caring for his sick child, 6 and (2) his father
On August 14, 1990, appellant was charged with the crime of "rape with murder" under the following Information: 3 Emilio Valla, who corroborated his story. 7 The defense offered no documentary evidence.

The undersigned upon complaint originally filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco- On March 29, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision 8 finding appellant guilty of the crime of "rape with homicide,"
San Andres, by Gonzalo de la Cruz, father of the offended party Dyesebel de la Cruz, accuses Vicente the dispositive portion of which reads:
Valla (prisoner, (sic) of the crime of rape with murder, committed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the fact that the government has proved beyond an iota of a doubt
That on or about the 14th day of April 1990, at Barangay Ilayang Tayuman, in the Municipality of San that the accused is guilty, sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Francisco, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused with lewd design, by means of force and violence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully Further the accused is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Dyesebel de la Cruz the sum of
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Dyesebel de la Cruz, a minor, 8 years of age, against her P50,000.00 for her death and P30,000.00 for actual and moral damages.
will; that by reason, and on the occasion of said rape, the said accused with intent to kill and with
treachery and taking advantage of his superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and SO ORDERED.
feloniously attack, assault and employ violence against said Dyesebel de la Cruz, thereby inflicting upon
the latter injuries on vital parts of her body, which directly caused her death. Hence, the present appeal. Appellant assigns the following errors: 9

Contrary to law. I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE CONFLICTING
AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio Atty. Ronaldo Salamillas, entered a plea of not
guilty to the crime charged.4 Trial on the merits ensued. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Myra Pines, the victim's 12 year-old playmate, who heard
the victim's cries as she was being strangled, but became afraid and went home instead; (2) Aristeo Allarey, the In his brief, appellant claims that the testimony of prosecution witness Allarey was inconsistent since on direct
Barangay Captain of Ilayang, Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon, who organized a search party upon report of the examination, Allarey narrated that when he summoned appellant, the latter did not immediately appear, 10 but on
mother that her daughter was missing, and before whom, appellant admitted that he raped and killed the victim, and cross-examination, he said that appellant immediately reported to him. 11 Appellant also contends that Merle's
even offered his (appellant's) daughter in return; (3) Gonzalo de la Cruz, father of the victim, who took part in the testimony that appellant was "tulala" at the time he confessed to the commission of the crime 12 was inconsistent with
search party, and who witnessed appellant's confession to the commission of the crime; (4) Reynaldo Merle, appellant's alleged begging for forgiveness far the crime. 13 Further, appellant adds that his statement offering to
Barangay Tanod of Barangay Ilayang, Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon, another member of the search party; (5) exchange his own daughter for the victim was made because of compulsion from the crowd. Appellant further
Bayani Samadan, Kagawad of the Barangay, also a member of the search party; (6) Rodolfo Rosales, police insists that his alibi should be given due consideration since the prosecution failed to overturn his alibi which was
investigator of San Francisco, Quezon, Philippine National Police; (7) Dr. Araceli R. Madatu, Senior Resident duly corroborated by the testimony of his father.
Physician of Bondoc Peninsula District Hospital, Catanauan, Quezon, who testified that when the cadaver was
brought for examination, it was in cadaveric rigidity, the legs were spread like a woman about to give birth ("parang
nanganganak"), the tongue sticking out ("nakalawit"), the skull crushed ("basag"), and the pubic area had blisters The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, recommends affirmance of the judgment in toto. The OSG
resulting from cigarette burns, ("pinagpapaso ng sigarilyo"), and the vagina had a laceration up to the anus, contends that the alleged inconsistencies, assuming them to be so, are too minor and insignificant to destroy the
evidencing that the child was raped.5 credibility of said prosecution witnesses, particularly where the testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses are
consistent and compatible with each other on material points. Anent the defense of alibi, the OSG points out that
appellant's house is located within the same barangay where the incident took place, therefore there is no physical
In addition to the oral evidence, the prosecution offered as documentary evidence the sworn statements of impossibility regarding his commission of the crime.
Barangay Captain Aristeo Allarey and Gonzalo de la Cruz, the Criminal Complaints filed with the Municipal Trial
Court of San Francisco, San Andres, Quezon, and the Medico-legal Certificate signed by Dr. Madatu.
In sum, the crucial issue centers on the assessment of credibility of the witnesses. In this case, the trial court gave
full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We find no reason to disturb this finding. As
consistently held by the Court, the trial judge's evaluation of the testimony of a witness is generally accorded not
97
only the highest aspect, but also finality, unless some weighty circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood but As to the crime committed, the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the special complex crime of "rape with
which could change the result. Having had the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand, the trial judge homicide," and not "rape with murder" as designated in the Information, since "homicide" is herein taken in its
was in a vantage position to assess his demeanor, and determine if he was telling the truth or generic sense.
not.14
The aggravating circumstance of ignominy under Article 14, No. 17 of the Revised Penal Code should be
The alleged inconsistency in the testimony of Allarey as to whether appellant immediately reported to him after appreciated considering that the medico-legal officer testified that the pubic area of the victim bore blisters brought
being summoned, and in the testimony of Merle that appellant was "tulala" at the time he admitted responsibility for about by a contact with a lighted cigarette. This circumstance added disgrace and obloquy to the material injury
the crime, merely refer to minor details which do not in actuality touch upon the "whys" and "wherefores" of the inflicted upon the victim of the crime.23
crime committed.15 Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when referring only to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Although At the time of the commission of the crime, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code imposed the penalty of death when
there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. However, the 1987 Constitution suspended the
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants. 16 In fact, some minor imposition of death penalty, and therefore, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
inconsistencies could show that the witness was not previously coached so as to tailor his testimony, and thus they
serve as badges of credibility. As to the amount of damages, however, the trial court erred in awarding P50,000.00 only as indemnity and
P30,000.00 for actual and moral damages. Hence, correction is called for. This being a case of rape with homicide,
Further, the prosecution witnesses, particularly the barangay officials, had no motive to falsely testify against civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00 should be awarded, pursuant to current jurisprudence. 24 Moral
appellant, who is their townmate, nor did they have any reason to impute such a heinous crime against appellant if it damages in the amount of P50,000.00 should also be awarded to the heirs of the victim, without need of further
were not true. Appellant's claim that he was implicated in the crime "because he did not immediately accomplish the proof.25 In view of the attendance of one aggravating circumstance, exemplary damages in the amount of
cutting of the grass in the ricefield"17 is too preposterous to even merit consideration. P20,000.00 should likewise be awarded, pursuant to Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. But the award of actual
damages cannot be allowed for lack of supporting evidence.
More importantly, the declaration of appellant acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence
against him under Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Note that his extrajudicial confession is WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62 is AFFIRMED with
corroborated by the corpus delicti as required by Section 3 of Rule 133. The Rules do not require that all the MODIFICATIONS. Appellant VICENTE VALLA is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the
elements of the crime must be clearly established by evidence independent of the confession.  Corpus delicti only heirs of the victim the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as
means that there should be some concrete evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the exemplary damages. Costs against appellant.1âwphi1.nêt
confession. In this case, the fact of the crime was sufficiently proven through the testimonies by witnesses such as
Myra Pines, who heard the cries of the victim, and the other members of the search party who found the body of the SO ORDERED.
victim, and witnessed the confession of the appellant, as well as documentary evidence presented during trial such
as the medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "D") attesting that the victim had been raped and killed.
G.R. No. 132745             March 9, 2000 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ROMEO UGIABAN
LUMANDONG, 
The statement of the accused asking for forgiveness and even offering his own daughter in exchange for his
crime18 may also be regarded as part of the res gestae under Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Res
gestae means "things done".19 There are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae: (1) that the Before us on automatic review is the Decision 1 in Criminal Case No. 96-106 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence, in this case the discovery of the body of the victim; (2) the Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, dated February 2, 1998 finding Romeo Lumandong y Ugiaban guilty of murder for
statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood, in this case, appellant the killing of Analou Eduave and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
had begged for forgiveness immediately after the body was found; and (3) that the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances, in this case, appellant had admitted to raping The lifeless and naked body of eight (8) year old Analou Eduave was found by the local residents of Sitio Bolihon,
and killing the victim, and even "offered" his daughter in exchange for the victim. 20 Taglimao, Cagayan de Oro City in the isolated and grassy portion of the Iponan River on December 1, 1995, at
about 8:00 o'clock in the morning. She sustained multiple stab and hack wounds on different parts of her body. Her
Appellant's defense of denial and alibi is likewise riddled with glaring inconsistencies. During his testimony, he neck was slashed. There was no witness to the gruesome murder. However, the relentless efforts of the barangay
claimed that on the night of the incident, he was at home with his wife and brother, taking care of his sick child, and officials of Taglimao resulted in the arrest of appellant Romeo Lumandong who allegedly confessed to the killing.
emphatically declared that nobody else was with them. 21 However, appellant's father testified that he was also with
appellant at the time of the incident, creating a doubt regarding his alibi. Although appellant's father initially denied The Information 2 dated January 12, 1996 charging appellant Romeo Lumandong with the crime of Murder defined
knowing the victim, he later admitted that he knew her as the daughter of Gonzalo de la Cruz. 22 Evidently, and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, reads:
appellant's defense was fabricated in a desperate attempt to exculpate him.
98
 The undersigned Prosecutor accuses Romeo Ugiaban Lumandong of the crime of Murder, committed as STAB WOUNDS, non-penetrating: five (5) in number; elliptical in shapes; measuring 0.7 cm., 1 cm., 0.5
follows: cm., 1.5 cms., and 1.4 cms. long; located at the right shoulder joint region, right infrascapular region, right
subcostal region, left thigh, and left lumbar region; edges, clean cut; one (1) extremity is sharp, the other,
That on or about November 30, 1995, at more or less 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at ( sic) Bolihon, blunt; involving the skin and underlying tissues and muscles; with approximate depths of 0.8 cm., 2.6
Taglimao, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the cms., 0.6 cm., 2.4 cms., and 1.5 cms., respectively.
above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with a bladed knife which he was then conveniently
provided, with treachery, and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and STAB WOUNDS, non-penetrating: two (2) in number; elliptical in shapes; measuring 2.5 cms. and 3.5
feloniously kill one Analou L. Eduave, an 8 year old child/girl, by then and there attacking her, stabbing cms. long; located at the left lateral infrascapular region and antero-lateral aspect of the left thigh; edges,
and hitting her chest and different vital parts of her body several times with said bladed knife, seriously clean- cut; one (1) extremity is sharp, the other is blunt; involving the skin and underlying soft tissues and
injuring the said victim, resulting to her sudden death. muscles, with approximate depths of 3.4 cms. and 4 cms.

That the commission of the above offense is attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, and STAB WOUNDS, four (4) in number; elliptical in shapes; one (1) extremity is sharp, the other is blunt;
abuse of superior strength. edges, clean-cut:

Contrary to Article 248 in relation to R.A. 7659 which took effect on January 1, 1994 and Article 14 of the — measuring 2.6 cms., 3.4 cms., 2.5 cms., and 1.1 cms. long.
Revised Penal Code. — located at the left side of the chest, lower inner quadrant; right side of the chest,
inferior aspect; left upper quadrant of the abdomen; and left lower thoracic region of
The evidence of the prosecution shows that Rebecca Eduave and her four (4) children were in their house in Sitio the back.
Bolihon, Taglimao, Cagayan de Oro City in the evening of November 30, 1995. Her husband, Cruz Eduave, was not — involving, among others, the skin and underlying soft tissues and muscles.
around as he stayed in the house of his elder brother in Bubao, Iponan. After studying her school assignment, the — completely cutting the fifth left rib, piercing the left ventricle of the heart, the
victim, Analou Eduave, then a grade two (2) student and second to the eldest, went to sleep. At about 8:30 in the diaphragm, and the right lobe of the liver; with an approximate depth of 8.2 cms.
evening, Rebecca retired beside her children. 3 — partially cutting the upper border of the 7th right rib and piercing the lower lobe of
the right lung; with an approximate depth of 9.5 cms.
— piercing the full thickness of the abdominal wall and perforating portions of the
At about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, Rebecca was awakened by the cry of her youngest child. She lit the lamp
small intestines with intestinal evisceration; with an approximate depth of 5.5 cms.
inside the house and noticed that Analou was missing. 4
— through the 6th left intercostal space and piercing the lower lobe of the left lung;
with an approximate depth of 6.5 cms.
Rebecca immediately went to the house of her parents-in-law which was just fifteen (15) meters away from her
house to inquire about her daughter but she was told that Analou was not there. Initial search for Analou in the
neighborhood, led by the barangay captain, proved futile. It was already 8:00 o'clock in the morning when the HACK WOUND, neck, gaping; 14.5 cms. long; running from the right side to the left side of the
neck; edges, clean-cut; the right extremity is 10 cms. below and 1.5 cms. in front of the right
lifeless and naked body of Analou was found by a couple in the grassy portion of the village near the Iponan River. 5
external auditory meatus, while the left extremity is 4 cms. below and 2 cms. behind the left
external auditory meatus; directed backward; involving among others, the skin and underlying
The body of the victim was brought by a combined team of the police and NBI authorities to the funeral parlor where soft tissues and muscles, the blood vessels of the neck, including the left internal jugular vein
a post mortem examination thereon was conducted by Dr. Tammy Cruz, M.D., of the NBI medico-legal office in and left internal carotid artery, completely cutting the thyroid cartilage, partially cutting the 4th
Cagayan de Oro City. The Autopsy Report 6 which is signed by Dr. Tammy Cruz and noted by Atty. Sancho K. cervical vertebra and the underlying spinal cord; with an approximate depth of 4.3 cms.
Chan, Jr., NBI Regional Director, Cagayan de Oro City, contains the following findings:
HEMOTHORAX, right, about 100 cc.; left, about 50 cc.
Pallor, marked, generalized. Rigor mortis, lower legs and knee joints. HEMOPERICARDIUM, about 50 cc. of dark fluid and clotted blood.
HEMOPERITONEUM, about 200 cc. of dark fluid and clotted blood.
ABRASIONS, with fresh scabs, confluent: 2x1.2 cms. And 2.2x1 cms. mid-aspect of the forehead; 3x1.1 Stomach, about 3/4 filled with semidigested corn grits and other food particles.
cms., right temple region. Heart chambers, empty of blood.
Brain and other visceral organs, pale.
INCISED WOUND, with clean-cut edges: 3.8. cms. long; located at the middle third of the left forearm,
lateral aspect; with an approximate depth of 0.8 cm.; involving the skin and underlying soft tissues and
muscles.
99
 CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to multiple stab wounds, and hack wound According to Atty. Paasa, the appellant accepted him to act as his counsel during the custodial
of the neck. investigation. After having been informed by Atty. Paasa of his rights under the Constitution, the appellant
agreed to give a statement 12 wherein he admitted stabbing Analou Eduave with a double bladed knife at
Dr. Uy explained that the victim suffered abrasion on her forehead which could have been caused by a around midnight of November 30, 1995 in the grassy portion of the Iponan river in Sitio Bolihon inasmuch
violent contact against a hard surface. An incised wound which measures 3.8 centimeters was inflicted on as he harbored a grudge against her parents. Also in the presence of Atty. Paasa during the same
the mid-section of her left forearm. Moreover, the body of the victim bore eleven (11) stab wounds mostly investigation, the appellant executed a waiver 13 for his continued detention. Both documents were
on the chest and abdomen. Four (4) of the stab wounds located on the chest and abdominal regions acknowledged by the appellant before Atty. Anabel Carmen S. Casino, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC,
penetrated the vital organs and were, therefore, fatal. The gaping wound on the neck which completely Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 17.
cut through the left artery and the cartilage of the airway was also fatal. The weapon used by the assailant
was a sharp object such as a knife or a bolo. 7 Appellant Lumandong testified that he attended the birthday party of a certain Boni Daang in the
afternoon of November 30, 1995. Among those who attended the birthday party were Homer Paduga,
The prosecution presented in evidence a list 8 of expenses, certified by Ruben P. Obsioma, Barangay Isagani Pabilona, Wilfredo Eduave, Zaldy Eduave and Rubio Paduga. After eating and drinking Red
Captain of Taglimao, Cagayan de Oro City, which were incurred due to the death of Analou Eduave. Horse beer, appellant left the party at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening and proceeded to sleep in the
house of Homer Paduga where he had been staying for eight (8) months. 14
Ruben Obsioma, Barangay Captain of Sitio Bolihon, Taglimao, Cagayan de Oro City instructed Kagawad
Osias Pabilona to prepare a list of the persons who attended the birthday party of a certain Bonifacio Appellant vehemently denied in court that he killed Analou Eduave and claimed that he confessed to the
Daang which was held in the same evening when Analou Eduave was killed. Appellant Romeo crime before the barangay captain and the police for fear of his life. He stated that he and Homer Paduga
Lumandong was among the persons included in the list that was subsequently forwarded to the police. were fetched on December 17, 1995 from the latter's house by a barangay tanod upon order of the
The investigation by the police of the said suspects yielded negative result. Later, however, Barangay barangay captain. Upon reaching the house of the barangay captain, the appellant was led to the back
Captain Obsioma received information that appellant Lumandong had knowledge about the crime. 9 portion of the house while Homer Paduga was instructed to remain at the terrace in front of the house. In
the presence of six (6) barangay tanods, the barangay captain asked the appellant three (3) times if he
had anything to do with the killing of Analou Eduave on November 30, 1995, to which he replied in the
Consequently, Barangay Captain Obsioma wrote a letter to Homer Paduga requesting the latter to bring
negative each time. Apparently losing his patience, the barangay captain hit the appellant on the left side
the appellant to his house in the afternoon of December 17, 1995. At the appointed time and date, Homer
of his body with the butt of his shotgun. The barangay tanods kicked and mauled the appellant on the
Paduga and appellant Lumandong appeared before Barangay Captain Obsioma in his house. Homer
different parts of his body. Thereafter, appellant was handcuffed by the barangay captain and the same
Paduga remained at the terrace while the appellant proceeded to the backyard with the barangay captain.
was attached to a live electric wire which caused the appellant to feel numb and loss consciousness.
Obsioma asked the appellant what he knew about the killing of Analou Eduave. The appellant initially
Upon recovering his consciousness and while still feeling the pain, appellant pleaded for his life as he
gave no answer and merely bowed his head. After having been asked for the third time, appellant
acceded to admit killing Analou Eduave. That evening, appellant stayed in the house of the barangay
admitted the killing of Analou Eduave allegedly because her parents withheld his past earnings in the
captain inasmuch as he was not permitted to return home. 15
farm. In addition, appellant revealed that it was actually Analou's father whom he intended to kill, but he
was not in the house that fateful evening and that he stabbed Analou with a double bladed knife only five
(5) times, the other wounds being mere exit wounds. He also said that he did not rape Analou and In the early morning of the following day, the appellant was brought by the barangay captain and the chief
undressed her only to confuse the investigators about the motive for the killing. 10 of the tanods to the police headquarters in Cagayan de Oro City. It was PO3 Agbalog who interrogated
him about the killing of Analou Eduave in the presence of the barangay captain and the chief of the
tanods. He recalled having confessed his guilt before Agbalog due to fear arising from the threat of the
In view of the admissions of the appellant, Barangay Captain Obsioma did not allow him anymore to leave
barangay captain that he will be killed by the police if he would not admit to the crime. Atty. Emelgar
his house that evening. On the following day, Obsioma accompanied the appellant to the Homicide and
Paasa arrived only after the interrogation and informed him that he was going to be his counsel. Appellant
Arson Division of the Cagayan de Oro police for formal investigation.
denied that he admitted killing the victim before Atty. Paasa and Atty. Casino, who appeared to have
administered the oath to him, inasmuch as they did not talk to him anymore. 16
At the police headquarters, SPO1 Agbalog apprised the appellant of his constitutional rights. Since the
appellant had no lawyer, Agbalog suggested that he would be given a lawyer who could provide him legal
Homer Paduga was presented by the prosecution as a rebuttal witness. He testified that appellant
services for free to which the appellant agreed. Thus, the legal services of Atty. Emelgar Paasa of the
Lumandong had been residing in his house for almost eight (8) months before the killing happened on
Public Attorney's Office (PAO) was engaged by the police to assist the appellant during the
November 30, 1995 and that a barangay tanod went to his house on December 17, 1995 upon order of
investigation. 11
the barangay captain to fetch him and the appellant. Appellant went with the barangay captain inside his
house while Paduga remained outside. About thirty (30) minutes later, the barangay captain went out and
told Paduga that appellant admitted killing Analou Eduave. Thereafter, the appellant narrated to the
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barangay captain and Homer Paduga how he killed the victim and the reason for killing his said victim. He 1. The fact that Analou was an 8 year old girl thus making her death a crime of murder
denied that appellant was mauled while the said appellant was inside the house of the barangay captain. qualified by treachery.
He emphasized that only the appellant and the barangay captain talked during the occasion. In addition, 2. Nighttime.
Paduga disclosed that he was the one who turned over to the barangay captain the knife 17 which was 3. Abuse of superior strength.
allegedly used by the appellant in killing the victim. 18 4. Uninhabited place (despoblado).
5. Cruelty.
After analyzing the evidence, the trial court adjudged the appellant guilty of the crime of murder as
charged in the Information. It stated, thus: Nighttime and superior strength are absorbed by treachery which is the qualifying circumstance.
Uninhabited place and cruelty are generic aggravating circumstances. 19
Accused first made his admission of culpability in the presence of the Barangay Captain Ruben
Obsioma and his roommate Homer Paduga in Taglimao, Cagayan de Oro City, which Therefore, the appellant was meted out the following penalty:
admission became confession when he agreed to set this down as affidavit before PO3 Vladimir
Agbalog on December 18, 1995 in the presence of counsel Emelgar Paasa, and swore to the WHEREFORE, the court finds accused guilty of the crime of murder for killing Analou Eduave.
truth thereof before Atty. Anabel Carmen Casino. All these lady and gentlemen testified in court He is hereby sentenced to death, and imposed the accessory penalties provided by law. He is
— in a straightforward, clear and convincing manner without any sign of bias and prejudice ordered to indemnify the heirs of his victim the following: P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
against the accused. P10,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P5,000.00 as actual
damages. He is also ordered to pay the costs of this case. 20
x x x           x x x          x x x
In the instant appeal, appellant raised the following assignment of errors, to wit:
The court is convinced that accused voluntarily and freely executed his confession, and that his
denial of the contents therein is an afterthought. There are so many matters in the confession I
that are corroborated by the rest of the prosecution evidence and which he himself knew and
which had never been testified on by any other witness. Take motive. For not having been paid THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING (sic) CONVICTION OF (sic) THE ACCUSED-
the money due him from the parents of Analou Eduave, and for so long a time before he started APPELLANT DESPITE HAVING BEEN SHOWN THAT HIS CONFESSION WAS TAKEN
to stay for 8 months with Homer Paduga, despite his repeated plea for payment to the Eduave THROUGH THREAT, TORTURE AND VIOLENCE.
spouses, he could not help himself from harboring ill-will against said spouses. Then came
November 30th (1995), Bonnie Daang's birthday where he and others ate and drank Red Horse
beer. There is no testimony about the amount of Red Horse beer that he drank, nor that he was II
drunk, but having drunk could easily relate to becoming bold and aggressive, outbalanced and
reckless. It is not improbable that being influenced by Red Horse, he remembered the Eduaves' THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
unjustness and inequity to him. Hence, as he stated in his confession, Exh. "E", he proceeded PERSONS WHO ALLEGEDLY ASSISTED IN EXTRACTING THE CONFESSION OF THE
to the Eduaves' house with practically open doors as there was no door shutter even of ( sic) the ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO WERE FOUND TO HAVE FUMBLED IN THEIR
sleeping room or space. His object was Mr. Eduave, but he was not there, in the alternative, TESTIMONIES. 21
Mrs. Eduave, but he waxed fearful that she might shout upon his assailing her. So he settled
with the presumably meek 8 year old Analou who he deemed he could carry away in silence It is clear from the records of this case that the minority status of appellant Lumandong at the time of the
even should she wake up, and brought her 200 meters away from the Eduave house, near commission of the crime was not disputed by the prosecution. The appellant stated during the trial that he was born
Iponan River and on a grassy spot struck her and stabbed her 7 times with his double blade on March 15, 1981 22 . A verification with the Civil Registrar's Office in Cagayan de Oro City proved futile
knife but inflicting 11 wounds, 4 of which being fatal, and 7 being contributory to the victim's considering that all records of birth prior to 1986, according to the head of the said office, were burned by fire  23 .
demise. Nevertheless, it is doctrinal that the claim of minority by an accused will be upheld by the court even without any
proof to corroborate his testimony until the same is disproved by the prosecution  24 . Consequently, the trial court
x x x           x x x          x x x erred when it failed to consider that appellant was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime. Minority being
a privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 13(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, appellant
There are 5 aggravating and no mitigating circumstances in the case, namely: Lumandong should have automatically been spared the supreme penalty of death.

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Anent the issue of admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of the appellant, this Court is guided by four At the police headquarters, Atty. Paasa talked to the appellant alone for about one (1) hour inside a room away from
fundamental requirements, namely: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the the police and the barangay officials. 28 During the occasion, Atty. Paasa asked the appellant if the latter was willing
assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must to accept him as his counsel to which the appellant agreed. Atty. Paasa proceeded to explain to the appellant his
be in writing. 25 constitutional rights before inquiring about the incident. The appellant revealed that he harbored a grudge against
the parents of Analou Eduave inasmuch as they maltreated him. Consequently, on November 30, 1995 at almost
Appellant Lumandong denied during the trial that he killed Analou Eduave. He alleged that he was maltreated by midnight, the appellant carried Analou from her house toward the Iponan River where he continuously stabbed her
the barangay officials in the house of Barangay Captain Obsioma in Sitio Bolihon, Taglimao, Cagayan de Oro City until she died. The appellant decided to surrender to the police for the reason that he was bothered by his
in the evening of December 17, 1995. He also alleged that he confessed before PO3 Agbalog due to fear arising conscience and that he was also willing to execute a written statement before the police.
from the threat from Obsioma that the police would kill him should he refuse to admit the crime.
The written statement of appellant Lumandong was taken by PO3 Agbalog in the presence of Atty. Paasa. PO3
An extrajudicial confession will be struck for being involuntary if it had been obtained with the use of coercion, Agbalog simultaneously typed the questions and the corresponding answers of the appellant which were both made
intimidation, inducement or false promises. 26 The evidence, however, fails to support the allegation of the appellant in the Visayan dialect inasmuch as the same was comprehensible to the appellant. The truth of the contents of the
that he was maltreated by the barangay officials in the house of Barangay Captain Obsioma. It appears that the written statement was affirmed by the appellant before Atty. Annabel Carmen S. Casino, Branch Clerk of Court,
appellant was accompanied by his friend, Homer Paduga, when he went to the house of Barangay Captain RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 17, after the latter also informed the appellant of the consequences of his
Obsioma in Sitio Bolihon, Taglimao, Cagayan de Oro City in the afternoon of December 17, 1995. Paduga waited statement. Specifically, Atty. Casino warned the appellant that he might be convicted for life and that appellant
for the appellant at the terrace while the latter was conversing with the barangay captain at the backyard. After could still retract his statements if the same were not true. However, the appellant stated that he was bothered by
about thirty (30) minutes, the barangay captain informed Paduga that the appellant admitted to him that he killed his conscience and then proceeded to sign his written statement. 29 Thereafter, Atty. Emelgar Paasa signed the
Analou Eduave. He then inquired from the appellant himself and the latter confirmed that he was the one who killed written statement as the assisting counsel of the appellant before Atty. Casino who likewise signed the same in her
Analou Eduave on November 30, 1995. capacity as administering officer.

Homer Paduga categorically denied the allegation of the appellant that he was maltreated by the barangay officials The foregoing facts clearly do not show that the appellant was coerced, intimidated nor induced to admit the killing
while he was in the house of Barangay Captain Obsioma. Paduga disclosed that he even remained in the house of of Analou Eduave. The appellant failed to substantiate his allegations that he was maltreated and intimidated by the
Barangay Captain Obsioma the entire evening of December 17, 1995 to be with the appellant.  27 Besides, the barangay officials. Likewise, he never complained to the police or to Atty. Paasa or Atty. Casino about the alleged
credibility of the appellant is seriously put to doubt when he failed to divulge during the trial the names of the maltreatment and intimidation which he allegedly suffered at the hands of the barangay officials when he had all the
barangay tanods who allegedly mauled and kicked him despite the fact that he was also a resident of the same opportunity to do so. The failure of the appellant to present evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on his
village. person and to complain to the officers who administered the oath are clear indications of the voluntariness of his
confession. 30 In addition, the presence of Atty. Paasa, who is an officer of the PAO, effectively insured that no force,
threat or intimidation was employed to obtain a confession from the appellant. 31
Significantly, the appellant did not assail the regularity of the custodial investigation that was conducted by the
police at the police headquarters in Cagayan de Oro City on December 18, 1995. His bare allegation of threats from
the barangay captain is certainly not convincing in view of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Barangay We agree with the lower court that the killing of Analou Eduave by appellant Lumandong was attended by treachery
Captain Obsioma and the chief of the barangay tanods merely accompanied the appellant to the police in view of the age of the victim who was only eight (8) years 32 old at the time of her death on November 30,
headquarters in view of the latter's previous admission to the killing of Analou Eduave. Upon arrival thereat, 1995. 33 Likewise, the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place under Article 14(6) was correctly appreciated
Barangay Captain Obsioma immediately turned over the appellant to the police and informed PO3 Vladimir against the appellant. It appears from the evidence that the appellant deliberately carried his victim to the isolated
Agbalog, who is the police officer assigned to the case, that the appellant wanted to surrender for killing Analou and grassy portion of the Iponan River which is about two hundred (200) meters away from her house  34 before
Eduave. Before formally starting with the investigation, PO3 Agbalog apprised the appellant of his rights under killing his said victim thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. The aggravating circumstances of nighttime
Section 12 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution namely: 1) the right to remain silent; 2) the right to have counsel of and abuse of superior strength are absorbed in treachery. The aggravating circumstance of cruelty may not be
his own choice; and 3) the right to be informed of said rights. The appellant indicated that he had no counsel. PO3 appreciated against the appellant absent any showing that the other wounds found on the body of the victim were
Agbalog then suggested that he would be given a lawyer who could provide him legal assistance for free. The inflicted to prolong her suffering before the fatal wound was delivered. 35
appellant agreed.
On the other hand, it appearing that the appellant was only fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and fifteen (15)
PO3 Agbalog contacted the Public Attorney's Office in Cagayan de Oro City to request legal assistance for the days old at the time of the commission of the crime, he is entitled to a reduced penalty due to the privileged
appellant. Accordingly, the head of the said office, Atty. Sofia Bacal, designated Atty. Emelgar Paasa to assist the mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 13(2) in relation to Article 68(1) of the Revised Penal Code which
appellant during the custodial investigation. provides at least two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for the crime of murder under Article 248 of the same
code. Consequently, there being one (1) aggravating circumstance, the imposable penalty on the appellant

102
is prision mayor in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be within the appellant poured kerosene on the bed (papag) and lighted it with cigarette lighter ( Ibid., p. 10). The fire
range of the penalty next lower in degree that is prision correccional. was easily put off by appellant's wife who arrived at the place. ( Ibid., p. 10).

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, convicting Romeo At around 1:00 o'clock in the morning of February 28, 1996, prosecution witness Lina Videña, likewise a
Lumandong y Ugiaban of the crime of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that the penalty resident of Mountain Heights Subdivision, was roused from her sleep by the barking of their dogs at the
to be imposed on him is the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of  prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) back portion of her house. (TSN, May 20, 1996, pp. 3-4). When she went out of her house, she saw
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. The appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim complainant's house situated at the adjacent lot near the back portion of her garage burning. ( Ibid., p. 4).
the sum of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50.000.00 as When she peeped through the holes of the GI sheets separating her lot from the adjacent lot, she noticed
exemplary damages and P5,000.00 as actual damages. 1âwphi1.nêt the presence of appellant standing alone in front of the burning house. ( Ibid., p. 5) Appellant was just
watching the blaze and not doing anything to contain it. ( Ibid.)
SO ORDERED.
Witness Videña immediately rushed back to her house and informed her husband about the fire at the
G.R. No. 126351           February 18, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs RAUL ACOSTA Y LAYGO,  nearby lot. (Ibid., p. 5). They called up the police detachment and alerted other members of her family to
be ready for any contingency. ( Ibid., p. 6). The fire truck arrived at around 2:00 o'clock in the morning,
when the house was already razed to the ground. (TSN, May 20, 1996, p. 6; TSN, May 22, 1996, p. 11).
This is an appeal from the decision1 dated August 25, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch
127, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Arson, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify private complainant the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages without subsidiary An on-the-spot investigation was conducted by Fire Investigator Raymundo Savare of the Kalookan Fire
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Department (TSN, May 27, 1996, p. 2). After the conduct of the investigation, the investigator did not find
any incendiary device; hence, the cause of fire remained undetermined. (TSN, May 27, 1996, p. 5). In his
Report, the investigator did not rule out the possibility of intentional burning, since there is no other source
Appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a resident of Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan
of ignition, unless otherwise somebody lighted an illuminating object and left it unattended. (TSN, May 17,
City, at the time of the offense charged. He used to be a good friend of Almanzor "Elmer" Montesclaros, the
1996, p. 8).
grandson of private complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen. 2 On February 27, 1996, a few hours before the fire,
Montesclaros, in the belief that appellant and his wife were the ones hiding his live-in partner from him, stormed the
house of appellant and burned their clothes, furniture, and appliances. 3 Montesclaros lived in the house owned by x x x           x x x           x x x4
said complainant and located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights Subdivision, Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City. It was
this house allegedly set on fire by appellant. On March 11, 1996, appellant was charged with the crime of Arson under the following Information:

The pertinent facts in this case, as summarized by the Solicitor General, which we find supported by the records, That on or about the 28th day of February, 1996 in Kal. City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
are as follows: Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully
(sic), unlawfully and feloniously burn the house of one, FILOMENA MONTESCLAROS VDA. DE
At about 4:00 to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, the nephew of prosecution witness MARIGOMEN, located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights Subdivision., Bo. Makatipo, this city, said
Mona Aquino called the latter, simultaneously shouting that appellant Raul Acosta, their neighbor, was accused knowing the same to be prohibited, by then and there setting fire to the said house thereby
carrying a stove and a kitchen knife (TSN, May 22, 1996, pp. 3-4, 7). She went out of her house and causing the same to be totally burned, to the damage and prejudice of herein complainant in the
approached appellant who, when asked why he was carrying a stove and a knife, replied that he would estimated amount of P100,000.00.
burn the house of complainant Filomena M. Marigomen. ( Ibid., pp. 3-4).
Contrary to Law.5
Complainant's house is situated at Banahaw Street, Mountain Heights Subdivision, Kalookan City and
adjacent to the house of prosecution witness Aquino. ( Ibid., pp. 2, 18). Only a wall fence divides her On April 22, 1996, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio Atty. Juanito Crisostomo, was arraigned and
property from that of the complainant. ( Ibid., p. 18). entered a plea of not guilty.

Owing to the fearsome answer of appellant to witness Aquino's query, she returned immediately to her During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses (1) Mrs. Lina Videña, (2) Mrs. Mona Aquino, both
house (Ibid., p. 7). A few minutes after closing the door, she heard the sound of broken bottles and the neighbors of appellant; and (3) Fire Investigator Raymundo Savare. When the defense agreed to the proposed
throwing of chair inside the house of complainant ( Ibid., p. 8). When she peeped through her kitchen door, stipulation that the value of the burned property was P100,000.00, the State Prosecutor dispensed with the
she saw appellant inside complainant's house, which was unoccupied at that time. ( Ibid., p. 8). Thereafter, testimony of private complainant,6 the owner of the house.
103
The defense presented the appellant himself, Ernesto Riolloraza and Marieta Acosta as witnesses. Appellant not see appellant at the locus criminis could be explained by a reading of her entire testimony. She saw appellant
claimed that at the time of the alleged arson he was sleeping at his mother's home, some five houses away from the inside the yard of the burning house during the fire, not after the fire. Further, the Solicitor General stressed that the
burned house.7 Ernesto Riolloraza testified he lived in the house behind the home of appellant's mother; that at determination of credibility of witnesses remains within the province of the trial court, whose finding is accorded due
around 9:00 in the evening, he saw appellant and his family transferring their belongings to the house of appellant's respect on appeal, absent any substantial circumstance which could have been overlooked in the decision.
mother; that at around 11:00 in the evening, he saw appellant watching TV; and that at around 1:00 AM, he was
awakened by the sound of fire sirens; and that he and appellant stood by the roadside and watched the Arson is defined as the malicious destruction of property by fire. 12 In this case, the alleged crime was committed on
fire.8 Marieta Acosta, common-law wife of appellant, corroborated appellant's testimony that they were sleeping in February 28, 1996, after R.A. 7659 already took effect. The trial court found appellant herein liable under Article
the home of appellant's mother at the time of the incident. 320, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 10 of R.A. No. 7659, which provides as follows:

Art. 320. Destructive Arson. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any
person who shall burn:

On August 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, 10 disposing as follows: 1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of
simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or different occasions.
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused with moral certainty, this Court
hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to xxx     xxx     xxx
indemnify the offended party the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Appellant's conviction rests on circumstantial evidence. Pertinently, Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
provides:
The period of the Accused's preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of his sentence if
qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code. Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

SO ORDERED. (a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
Appellant seasonably interposed the present appeal assigning the following errors: (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BASED MERELY ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to
leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused. 13 But no greater degree of
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND ALIBI OF certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. 14
THE ACCUSED.
In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following circumstances taken together constitute an
Appellant centers his appeal on the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence against him. He maintains that the unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair and logical conclusion, that accused started the fire which gutted the
fact that Montesclaros lived in the house which was razed to the ground was not duly proved by the Prosecutor, and house of private complainant. Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we agree with the
that even the Fire Investigator could not determine the true cause of the fire. Appellant further assails the credibility trial court holding him guilty thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved and on record:
of the prosecution witnesses Mona Aquino and Lina Videña since their respective testimonies as to his presence in
the locus criminis before and after the incident remain uncorroborated, and therefore, wholly unreliable and First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it is frequently impossible for
insufficient to sustain his conviction. the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for the commission of the crime charged, nevertheless in a case
of arson like the present, the existence or non-existence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the
For the State, the Solicitor General rebutted the factual submissions of appellant. First, appellant himself testified witnesses.15 It was duly proved that at around 4:30 in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, private complainant's
that he knew that Elmer Montesclaros lived in the house of private complainant. 11 Second, the testimony of grandson, Elmer Montesclaros, stormed the house of appellant and his wife and burned their clothes, household
prosecution witness Mona Aquino though uncorroborated does not impair her credibility since no ill-motive was furniture and appliances, like TV and karaoke. 16 When appellant arrived home at around 5:00 in the afternoon and
ascribed to her to testify falsely against appellant. Third, any inconsistency in Lina Videña's testimony that she did was informed of the incident, he got mad, and as his common-law wife testified, appellant threw a tantrum

104
("nagdadabog").17 Appellant had every reason to feel aggrieved about the incident and to retaliate in kind against were about to leave when appellant arrived. Private complainant asked him why he burned her house and appellant
Montesclaros and his grandmother. answered, "So what if I burned your house?" Then appellant stared meanly at private complainant, who got nervous
and had to take medications.24 The following day, appellant threatened prosecution witness Mona Aquino, saying
Second, appellant's intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to set on fire a bed that if she would testify against him, he would also bum her house. 25
("papag") inside the same house (private complainant's) which was burned later in the night. Prosecution witness
Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the same day, she saw appellant carrying a gas stove All the foregoing circumstances were duly established by the evidence on record. Inseparably linked with one
and knife. When she asked him what he was going to do with the stove, he answered that he was going to burn the another, they point to no other conclusion than appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While nobody actually
house of private complainant.18 Later, she heard the sound of somebody throwing a chair and breaking bottles next saw appellant light the match which set the house on fire, the facts and circumstances proved make a complete
door. When she peeped in the kitchen, she saw that appellant entered the house of private complainant and started chain strongly leading, to the conclusion that it was the appellant who perpetrated the crime. 26
pouring gas on a bed ("papag") and then lighted a fire with a disposable lighter. Appellant's wife rushed in and
extinguished the fire with a broomstick. The two later left the house at around 6:00 in the evening. 19 In prosecutions for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes (1) the  corpus
delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendants as the one responsible for the
While it is true that "evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he crime.27 Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime, it is the fact that a crime has actually been committed. In
did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time," it may be received "to prove a specific intent or arson, the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and of its having been
knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like." In  People v. Dadles, 278 SCRA intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if credible, may be enough to prove
393 (1947), we held that: the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.28

In the early case of United States v. Evangelista, [24 Phil. 453 (1913)] the accused was convicted of Appellant interposes the defense of all in his bid for acquittal. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is axiomatic that
arson after the trial court admitted evidence that he had earlier attempted to set fire to the same premises. the appellant must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed, but that it
Ruling on the admissibility of the said evidence, we said that: was likewise physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime. 29 In this case,
appellant himself testified that the house of his mother where he was staying on that fateful night was merely five (5)
. . . While it was not the fire charged in the information, and does not by any means amount to direct houses away from the locus criminis, hence considering the distance, it was not physically impossible for him to
evidence against the accused, it was competent to prove the intent of the accused in setting the fire which have perpetrated the crime and then gone home to his mother's home, appearing as innocent as a lamb.
was charged in the information.
Lastly, it would not be amiss here to point out that "[i]n the crime of arson, the enormity of the offense is not
xxx     xxx     xxx measured by the value of the property that may be destroyed but rather by the human lives exposed to
destruction."30 It is indeed a heinous crime that the law wisely seeks to suppress with the most serious penalty
because of its grave anti-social character.
. . . Where a person is charged with the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received of
other similar acts, committed about the same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent
of the accused. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify private
complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen, in the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages, without subsidiary
Shortly thereafter, at around 9:00 in the evening, defense witness Ernesto Riolloraza who lived behind the house of
imprisonment, is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED.
appellant's mother, saw appellant and his family transferring their belongings to said house of appellant's mother. 20

G.R. No. 209039, December 09, 2015 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. MIRAFLOR UGANIEL LERIO, 
Third, appellant was not only present at the locus criminis before the incident, he was seen inside the yard of the
burning house during  the height of the fire. At around 1:00 in the morning of February 28, 1996, prosecution witness
Lina Videña was awakened by the barking of their dog, so she went to the back of their house to Before us for review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC. No. 01392 dated 20
investigate.21 Through the holes of the GI sheets, she saw appellant standing alone inside private complainant's June 2013 which affirmed with modification the Judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch
yard watching the house burning. 22 Appellant even looked happy with a canine smile and crazy-looking expression. 24, in Criminal Case No. CBU-74501, finding accused-appellant Miraflor Uganiel Lerio guilty beyond reasonable
("Siya para bang ang mukha niya ay natutuwa na hindi naman humahalakhak, . . . para bang ngiting aso at doubt of the crime of kidnapping of a minor.
mukhang nakakaluko, your honor").23
Accused-appellant, together with co-accused Relly Ronquillo Arellano (Arellano), were charged with Kidnapping of
a Minor in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
Fourth, appellant's actions subsequent to the incident further point to his culpability. At around 12:00 noon of the
same day, private complainant went with prosecution witness Lina Videña to the place of Kagawad Tecson. They
105
That on or about the 10th day of September, 2005, at about 10:00 a.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within Accused-appellant testified in her defense and interposed the defense of denial. 10
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping with each other, with deliberate intent, being then private individuals, did then and there kidnap, carry away Accused-appellant claimed that she and Anniban used to be neighbors. She did confirm that on 10 September
and deprive one JUSTIN CLYDE D. ANN [BAN, a baby boy, one (1) month) and eighteen (18) days old, of his 2005, she had gone to Anniban's house and chatted with her. While Anniban was busy doing her chores, she told
liberty, without authority of law and against his will and consent. 3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary her that she would take the child outside but was uncertain whether she had been heard by Anniban. Accused-
Accused-appellant was arrested on 10 September 2005 and detained on 12 September 2005. appellant did take the child outdoors and proceeded to the pier as she had gotten a call from her boyfriend
requesting her to meet with him on the vessel M/V Asia Philippines. Accused-appellant brought the child with her as
On 19 September 2005, private complainant Aileen Anniban (Anniban) filed an Affidavit of Desistance 4 in favor of her boyfriend allegedly wanted to see the child.
Arellano declaring her belief that the latter was innocent of the crime charged. The police officers, however, insisted
on impleading Arellano in the Information. Upon reinvestigation, as ordered by the trial court, Public Prosecutor Atty. On the vessel, accused-appellant averred that she had received a call from Anniban asking for her child's
Ma. Luisa Ratilla-Buenaventura recommended the dismissal of the case against Arellano. Accordingly, the trial whereabouts. Accused-appellant allegedly replied that they were just meeting with her boyfriend and that she would
court dropped the name of Arellano from the Information. 5 return the child that same afternoon. In response, Anniban purportedly threatened to file a case for kidnapping
against accused-appellant if she did not return her son. Accused-appellant and her boyfriend were indeed arrested
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial ensued. and charged with kidnapping of a minor by the maritime police officers.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Anniban, Senior Police Officer 4 Virgilio Paragas (SPO4 Paragas) and On cross-examination, accused-appellant revealed that she had conceived a child around the same time as
Police Officer 3 Florito Homecilla Banilad (PO3 Banilad) whose testimonies sought to establish the following Anniban but that her child died during labor. She did not disclose this to her boyfriend and the latter's mother fearing
facts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary their condemnation.11

Anniban is a housewife, and a resident of Sitio San Miguel, Purok I Apas, Cebu City. She had come to know of On 09 August 2011,12 accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping of a minor. The
accused-appellant a week before the incident as the latter had been staying at her neighbour's house. RTC ruled that accused-appellant's act of taking of the one-month old infant, without the knowledge or consent of
his mother, constituted the crime. It rejected accused-appellant's denial and gave credence to the testimonies for
On 10 September 2005, around 5:30 in the morning, Anniban was in her kitchen preparing milk for her infant child, the prosecution. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
Justin Clyde, when accused-appellant entered the house and lay down on the bed beside the child and began WHEREFORE, finding accused MIRAFLOR UGANIEL LERIO GUILTY of the crime charged beyond reasonable
chatting with her. doubt, hereby sentences her to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, as provided for in Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code as the victim is a minor, one-month old. She shall suffer the accessory penalty inherent in law.
Accused-appellant then told her that she would take the infant outside to bask him under the morning sun. Anniban
refused this as the child had not yet been bathed. A few minutes later, Anniban realized that accused-appellant and She is adjudged liable to pay the following measures of damages;
her child were no longer in the house. A tenant of Anniban's informed her that she had seen accused-appellant a) the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by reason of the crime;
quietly slip out of the house. When Anniban left the house to search for accused-appellant, she met her neighbor
Yvonne on the way who told her that she had seen accused-appellant carrying her son and that accused-appellant b) the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
was en route to Toledo City.6
c) the sum of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
Anniban sought the help of her neighbor Virginia Baldoza (Baldoza) who had known accused-appellant. Baldoza
and her daughter thereafter accompanied Anniban to the South Bus Terminal. Thereat, a dispatcher informed them No pronouncement as to costs.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
that accused-appellant had been fetched by a tattoed man on board a taxicab and that both headed for the pier to Accused-appellant seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal 14 before the CA.
get on the M/V Asia Philippines.7
On 20 June 2013, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC but modified the amount of exemplary damages, raising
Around three o'clock in the afternoon, Anniban reported the incident to the Maritime Police and requested it to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) in line with the case of People v. Valerio.15
assistance. SPO4 Paragas, PO3 Banilad and PO1 Ricky Yeban accompanied Anniban to the vessel. 8
The CA rejected accused-appellant's contention that there had been no actual confinement or restraint imposed by
Inside the ship, Anniban saw Arellano rocking her child in a cradle. Certain that it was Justin Clyde, she took the her on the one-month old baby and that there had been no intention on her part to deprive him of liberty. The CA
child and told Arellano that the child is hers. Both grappled for the baby. considered the age of the baby and ruled that since he had been placed in the physical custody and complete
control of accused-appellant, whom he could not fight nor escape from, such constituted deprivation of liberty. The
Shortly, accused-appellant, who had been standing a few meters away, joined Arellano and both were arrested. 9 CA also noted accused-appellant's admission that she took the child away from her mother even when uncertain
whether the latter had heard her request to take him; and that accused-appellant curiously had quietly left the house
106
with the child and did not inform Anniban of her plans to head for the pier and show the baby to her boyfriend. 16 Court of Cebu City, Branch 24, for Kidnapping of a Minor and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and pay damages as follows: a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto; b) P50,000.00 as moral
Accused-appellant appealed her conviction before this Court. In. a Resolution 17 dated 20 November 2013, accused- damages; and c) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. All damages
appellant and the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) were notified that they may file their respective briefs if they awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
so desired. Both parties manifested that they were adopting their briefs filed before the appellate court as their SO ORDERED
respective supplemental briefs.18
G.R. No. L-75390 March 25, 1988 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  vs. DANILO VALDEZ and SINIPLICIO
The Court finds no reason to reverse the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. The prosecution has ORODIO alias "Kamlon
established the elements of kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: (1) the
offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his or This case is before us on automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch
her liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, 26, San Fernando, La Union, convicting the accused-appellants Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio of the crime of
female or a public officer.19 murder and sentencing each of them to death.
The prosecution has adequately and satisfactorily proven that accused-appellant is a private individual; that
accused-appellant took one-month old baby Justin Clyde from his residence, without the knowledge or consent of, The accused Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio were charged in an information which read as follows:
and against the will of his mother; and that the victim was a minor, one-month old at the time of the incident, the fact
of which accused-appellant herself admitted.20 That on or about the 7th day of June, 1977, in the Municipality of Santol, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
To reiterate the time-honored maxim, unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, armed with a fire arm, with treachery
or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight that would have affected the result of the case, the Court will not and evident premeditation and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
disturb factual findings of the lower court. Having had the opportunity of observing the demeanor and behavior of and feloniously, shoot Eleno Maquiling inflicting upon him a gunshot wound which caused the
witnesses while testifying, the trial court more than this Court is in a better position to gauge their credibility and victim's instantaneous death.
properly appreciate the relative weight of the conflicting evidence for both parties. When the issue is one of
credibility, the trial court's findings are given great weight on appeal. 21 That the aggravating circumstance of nighttime was present in the commission of the crime.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, accused-appellant's defense of denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, is impotent. It
constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of After arraignment and trial, the trial court rendered in due course, on 27 June 1986, a decision finding both of the
credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. 22 accused guilty of murder. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
The prescribed penalty for kidnapping a minor under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused Danilo Valdez and
Republic Act No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death, to wit:
Simplicio Orodio alias 'Kamlon' guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in
judgment is hereby rendered imposing upon each of them the Capital penalty of death; to
any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
indemnify the heirs of Eleno Maquiling the sum of P30,000.00; to reimburse the expenses in the
sum of P3,000.00 to said heirs, and to pay the costs.
xxxx

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female, or a The bail bonds posted by the accused for their provisional liberty are hereby cancelled and their
public officer. immediate arrest ordered.
Since neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the felony, the RTC properly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, together with the accessory penalty provided by law. The Court of The accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in the following respects:
Appeals also correctly modified the amount of the award of exemplary damages in conformity with prevailing
jurisprudence.23 Finally, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of 1) That the evidence of the prosecution does not establish the guilt of the accused beyond
this judgment until fully paid.24 reasonable doubt; and

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 20 June 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC. No. 01392 2) That the evidence of the prosecution is based simply on suspicion.
affirming the judgment of conviction of accused-appellant Miraflor Uganiel Lerio rendered by the Regional Trial
107
We will address these arguments together. 4. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia 1 inch above armpit, back, right, pellet plowed slightly
upwards and to left. Pellet was not recovered.
From the record, the facts of the case may be collated as follows:
5. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia 8th intercostal space, back, right, 1 inch lateral to the
The house of the Maquiling family stands on the slope of a mountain in Barangay Ambagat, Santol, La Union. At vertebral column, pellet penetrated check cavity hitting lower lobe of lungs, right. Pellet was not
about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of 7 June 1977, the victim Eleno Maquiling, his sisters Leticia and Thelma, his recovered.
mother Esmenia, and his father Juanito were an in the yard of their house. Esmenia and Juanito were under the
awning of their house facing north, engaged in stringing together tobacco leaves. The victim's brother Dionisio was 6. Wound, gunshot ½ inch longest dia medial, back, left, level of 8th intercostal space, hitting
eating his dinner in the wall-less kitchen located on the ground floor of the house. The victim Eleno was seated with the lower lobe, lung, left. Pellet was not recovered.
his back toward the north and plucking a guitar. The place and its surroundings were lighted by a 300 candle power
petromax lamp hanging under the northern end of the awning of the house. 1 7. Wound, gunshot. ½ inch longest dia chest, back medial, left, (Level of 9th interspace),
penetrating chest cavity hitting lower lobe, lung, left. Pellet was not recovered.
While the Maquilings were thus seated in their yard, a relative of the family, one Carolina, arrived and asked
Esmenia to accompany her to a prayer meeting. Esmenia demurred and instead asked Eleno to accompany 8. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia postero-lateral, back, I inch below lowest rib of chest,
Carolina. The victim was then just about two (2) meters away from his parents and about to stand up when right. Pellet was recovered at the abdominal wall, hypochondic region, front, right. Two (2)
suddenly a very loud gun shot rang out from the northern side of the yard and Eleno fell to the ground, crying out to pellets were given to Chief of Police, Segundo Tuvera. 3
his father for help. Juanita rushed to his fallen son and carried him into their house; Eleno, however, died
immediately thereafter. The morning after the shooting, on 8 June 1977, Sgt. Segundo Tuvera of the Integrated National Police, Santol, La
Union, went to the house of the Maquilings to investigate the death of Eleno. 4 He saw a petromax lamp hanging
The victim's mother Esmenia was about to succour Eleno when she instinctively looked toward the direction from from the awning of the northern end of the house, as well as footprints near the bamboo groves near the northern
whence the gunshot came and saw the two (2) accused, Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio, running down the hill side of the house. During his investigation, neither Esmenia nor Dionisio informed Sgt. Tuvera of what they had
away from the bamboo groves on the northern side of the house. According to Esmenia, the accused Danilo was seen.
wearing a blue shirt and dark pants and carrying a long firearm, while the other accused Simplicio was running
along side the former. Dionisio Maquiling, brother of the victim, also testified that he too had seen Danilo with a gun On 10 June 1977, Juanito Maquiling, the victim's father, executed a sworn statement before the police in the Santol
and Simplicio both running away in a westernly direction. Danilo stated that he was then about seven (7) meters Police Substation. Juanita admitted in his statement that he had not seen the accused-appellants on the night of the
away from the accused-appellants. 2 Danilo Valdez was a neighbor and a relative of the Maquilings, while Simplicio shooting. He did relate, however, that three (3) days prior to the shooting of Eleno, Eleno had informed him that in
Orodio was their old accquaintance residing in Sitio Village, Barangay Corooy of the same town; thus, both were case something untoward happened to him (Eleno), the accused-appellants Danio Valdez and Simplicio Orodio
well-known to Esmenia and Dionisio Maquiling. should be held responsible, since he (Eleno) had quarrelled with them concerning their stealing and
robbing. 5 Juanita further, stated that the accused Danilo has had a personal grudge against Eleno; Danilo had
On 8 June 1977, the Municipal Health Officer of Balaoan, Dr. Monico O. Morales, conducted an autopsy which mortgaged to Eleno's brother a stolen spading fork, a circumstance that Eleno discovered when the real owner of
showed that the victim Eleno had sustained eight (8) gunshot (pellet) wounds on his back: the spading fork came to talk to him. Esmenia, Eleno's mother, gave no sworn statement on that day. Ten (10) days
later, on 20 June 1977, however, she made a sworn statement to the Philippine Constabulary in San Fernando, La
1. Wound, gunshot, ½; inch longest dia., 1 cm. below base of neck, medial, pellet plowed Union. Shortly thereafter, on 23 June 1977, Dionisio Maquiling, Eleno's brother, gave his own separate sworn
slightly upward and found its exist at the lower 3rd of neck, left, measuring 3/4 inch longest statement also to the Philippine Constabulary. Both Esmenia and Dionisio Identified Danilo Orodio as Eleno's
diameter. (Thru and thru). killers. 6

2. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia medial, 1 inch lateral to vertebral column, right, pellet At the trial, Esmenia Maquiling was firm and categorical in Identifying the appellants as the men she saw running
plowed upward and found its exit at the base of neck, left, measuring ¾ longest diameter. (Thru from the bamboo groves immediately after the shooting —
and thru).
Q. When you heard that gunshot, what did you do?
3. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia level of 4th intercostal space, back, right, penetrating the A. We immediately rushed to his side and we found him on the ground, sir.
chest cavity, pellet was recovered at the upper lobe of right lung. Q. From what direction did you hear the gunshot?
A. North of our yard, sir.
Q. When you went to the succour of your son, what else did you do?
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A. When I went, to give succour to my son, I turned and I saw these two, sir, Esmenia's testimony was corroborated by the equally definite testimony of
Q. Where did you see the two accused? Dionisio Maquiling, who declared that:
A. North of our yard, sir. Q. Where were you at the time your brother was shot to death?
Q. How far were they from you when you saw them? A. I was in our kitchen eating.
A. Witness indicating a distance of more or less five meters. Q. Where was your brother then at the time he was shot in relation to your
Q. When you saw the two accused, did you see anything in their house?
possession? A. He was west of our kitchen.
A. They have, sir, (Witness indicating a length of about a foot), and it was Q. In what particular part of your house, inside or outside?
Danilo Valdez who was holding that object. A. Outside of our house.
Q. Were you able to recognize that object which Danilo Valdez was then Q. What time was your brother shot to death?
holding? A. More or less 8 o'clock in the evening.
A. It was a gun, sir. Q. You said you were in the kitchen of your house eating and you Pointed to
Q. When you saw Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio north of your yard, Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio alias "Kamlon" as the persons who shot
what were they doing? your brother. How were you able to see Simplicio Orodio and Danilo Valdez
A. I saw Danilo Valdez holding the gun while Simplicio Orodio ran downhill shoot your brother?
and then Danilo Valdez followed, sir. A. I saw them.
Q. You Id that you saw Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio north of your Q. Will you relate how were you able to see Danilo Valdez and Simplicio
yard. In relation to the place where you heard the gunshot, where were Orodio alias Kamlon shoot your brother Eleno Maquiling?
they? A. When I was eating facing westward I heard a gunshot and when I looked
A. Near the bamboo grove which is located north of our house, sir? through the north I saw Danilo Valdez running being followed by Simplicio
Q. In relation to that bamboo grove where you heard the gunshot, where Orodio.
were Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio at the time you saw them? Q. When you looked northward and you saw Danilo Valdez and Simplicio
A. They were east of the bamboo grove, sir. Orodio running, did you see anything in their possession?
Q. How far were they from that bamboo grove? A. A gun. (Witness showing a length of about half a meter).
A. Witness referring to a distance of about 6 to 6-½ meters away. Q. Who of the two, Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio was hiding the gun?
COURT: A. Danilo Valdez. 8
Q. How far were you from the accused when you recognized them?
A. Less than a meter away when I recognized them, sir. The trial court found the testimony of witnesses Esmenia and Dionisio as positive, credible and reliable. We find no
FISCAL: reason to disagree with the finding of the trial court. It is commonplace that "the findings of the trial court as to the
Q. You Id that the distance between you and the two accused at the time credibility of the witnesses are to be given great weight and a high degree of respect by the appellate court".  9 There
you saw them was five meters more or less. Upon questioning of the court, is nothing in the record to show that the prosecution witnesses were moved by any improper motive to accuse
you Id that the distance is less than a meter. Which is true? falsely the accused-appellant — one a relative and the other an old acquaintance — of so grave a crime as murder.
A. Witness pointing to a distance of more or less five meters.
Q. How were you able to recognize the two accused at that distance of five The circumstance that Esmenia waited for thirteen (13) days after her son's assassination before reporting the
meters from you considering that it was nighttime? Identities of the accused to the authorities, was not unnatural in itself. She explained the delay by saying that she
A. There was a light from the petromax lamp which was hanging [from] the was afraid to talk about the killing and that she had seen the accused loitering frequently around the Maquilings'
awning of our house, sir. house, carrying a gun, after the burial of her son. 10 The trial court observed that Esmenia's fear —
Q. That part of the house where this awning is located, is there a wall
surrounding the awning?
A. None, sir.
Q. That petromax lamp which you said was hanging under the awning of
your house, how high is the petromax light from the ground level? was not imaginary because the night that she reported the Identities of the accused their house
A. The height is 12 feet, sir. was stoned by unidentified persons. The delay was satisfactorily explained. In People vs.
Q. How big was the petromax light? Martinez, 127 SCRA 260, it was held that delay of witness for several months, because of fear,
A. About two feet, sir. 7 in reporting the incident to the police does not affect credibility. "Fear of likely retaliation by the
several accused who were still at large has been considered as a justified reason for the
109
 witnesses' delay in coming forward with their testimony' (People vs. Sampang, 16 SCRA 531; In his brief, the Solicitor General took the position that accused-appellant Simplicio Orodio should be acquitted for
People vs. Equal, 14 SCRA 89). 11 lack of sufficient evidence to sustain this conviction either as a principal or an accomplice. The Solicitor General
said:
This explanation does not appear incredible in itself and certainly such a delay of thirteen(13)days, under the
circumstances of this case, does not warrant a conclusion that her testimony as to the Identities of the killers of her In the case at bar, the information charged Orodio as having allegedly conspired with Valdez in
son was false. In People v. Martinez,  12 the Court held that the failure of a witness to reveal immediately the killing Eleno. The prosecution did not however adduce any evidence establishing the aforesaid
Identities of the accused does not militate against his credibility. alleged conspiracy between Valdez and Orodio to commit the crime charged. The only fact that
the prosecution was able to successfully prove was the presence of Orodio at the crime scene
Both Esmenia Maquiling and Dionisio Maquiling did not testify that they had actually seen either Danilo Valdez or when he was seen running together with Valdez by Dionisio and Esmenia after Eleno was
Simplicio Orodio shooting at the deceased victim.  The principal evidence against the accused is, therefore, gunned down and that he was a barkada  of Eleno. It is submitted that in the light of the
circumstantial in character. The trial court recognized this and was careful to analyze the chain of circumstantial aforecited ruling in the Madera case, there exist no factual and legal basis to sustain the
evidence on the basis of which the trial court concluded that the two (2) accused had killed Eleno Maquiling: conviction of Orodio either as a principal or accomplice in this case. 15

While the prosecution failed to present an eye witness to the actual shooting by the accused of We are unable to agree with the Solicitor General, whose view appears to be too drastic a simplification of the
deceased Eleno, the chain of circumstances, prior and subsequent to the killing, leaves no evidence that was in fact before the trial court. Orodio was present with Valdez at the time Eleno Maquiling was
room for doubt that accused are the guilty persons . The rule is that before conviction upon killed by a shotgun blast at his back. He was in the company of a man running with a shotgun, at approximately
circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which 8:00 o'clock in the evening, immediately after the fatal shooting, just outside the Maquilings house where he had no
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as the authors of the crime. business being if he were not acting in concert with Danilo Valdez, the accused-appellant who carried the shotgun.
(People vs. Pamintuan, 127 SCRA 820). In this case, this requisite has been fully met. He was a close friend (barkada) of the accused Danilo Valdez, both of whom the deceased victim had Identified as
probably responsible should any untoward event befall the victim. Simplicio Orodio completely failed to explain what
he was doing with Danilo Valdez the night of the killing, on the one hand. Upon the other, both Danilo Valdez and
Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Simplicio Orodio pleaded the same alibi. Valdez and Orodio both testified that they were in Cervantes, Ilocos Sur,
when Eleno was shot to death. Their common alibi remained uncorroborated for both failed to present either the
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, WHEN SUFFICIENT. — Circumstantial mother of accused Danilo Valdez who was supposed to have come to Cervantes Ilocos Sur, to inform them that
evidence is sufficient for conviction if: Eleno Maquiling had been shot to death, or any other witness for that matter. The trial court found the accused
(a) There is more than one circumstances; common defense of alibi as non-credible "as it was not impossible for the accused to be present at the scene of the
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and crime. 16
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
We hold that the prosecution's evidence was more than adequate to sustain the finding of the trial court of a
conspiracy between Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio. Conspiracy being present, it does not matter that the
Tested by the rule stated above, and considering that Eleno was killed by a shot in the back and prosecution had failed to show who as between the two actually pulled the trigger of the shotgun that killed Eleno
suffered eight (8) pellet wounds from one gunshot only; that the accused were immediately Maquiling. 17 Both Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio are liable as co-conspirators since any act of a co-
seen running down-hill away from the scene after the gunshot report with accused Danilo v. conspirator becomes the act of the other regardless of the precise degree of participation in the act. 18
Valdez  carrying a long firearm; that three (3) days before the incident there was already bad
blood between the victim and accused Danilo Valdez as the victim confided to his father Juanito
The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of treachery and evident premeditation. The accused had
Maquiling that if ever he would be shot accused Danilo Valdez is the one to be blamed; 13 that
purposely sought nocturnity and hid themselves behind the bamboo groves located close by the victim's house and
when the place where the clime was committed is an isolated place and it is highly probable that
had fired at Eleno Maquiling suddenly, without any warning, from behind obviously to ensure the success of their
some other malefactors could have been present; and that footprints were seen by the police
deadly purpose without any risk to themselves and without any possibility of retaliation. Three (3) days before his
investigators behind the bamboo grove where the accused were seen to come from
assassination, Eleno was already apprehensive for his life when he disclosed to his father, Juanito Maquiling, his
immediately after the shooting that Esmenia Maquiling even described the clothing of accused
quarrel with Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio over the latter's thievery and robbery. Clearly, the accused had
Danilo Valdez; that the two accused are well known to the victim's family thereby precluding the
planned to kill Eleno some days before the fateful night of 7 June 1977; the shotgun blast at the back of Eleno was
possibility of mistaken Identity; all these proven facts afford sufficient or a reasonable inference
not the result of a spur of the moment decision.
that the two accused were indeed the killers of the victim . 14
Since both treachery and evident premeditation were present, and only one (1) qualifying circumstance is
necessary to constitute homicide into murder, evident premeditation may be considered as a generic aggravating
110
circumstance. 19 The circumstance of nighttime is, however, absorbed by treachery. 20 A second aggravating properties by (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 613494, 363123, 236236 and 263236 are excluded
circumstance — that the victim who had given no provocation was slain in his dwelling — was also found by the trial from these proceedings.
court. 21
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the trial court finding Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED. In view of the abolition of capital punishment Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition 9 which contained the following averments:
under the 1987 Constitution, and in view of the presence of two (2) aggravating circumstances not offset by any
mitigating circumstance, the applicable penalty is reclusion perpetua. SO ORDERED. 3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the following business entities, to wit:

G.R. No. 124715           January 24, 2000 RUFINA LUY LIM, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA
CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING Business Entity Address:
CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC.  xxx     xxx     xxx

May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the estate of a Alliance Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF Homes,
deceased person? Marketing, Inc. Parañaque, Metro Manila.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review on certiorari, the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on 18 April 1996, in CA-GR SP No. 38617, which nullified and set aside the orders dated 04 Speed 910 Barrio Niog, Aguinaldo Highway,
July 19952 , 12 September 19953 and 15 September 19954 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, Distributing Inc. Bacoor, Cavite.
sitting as a probate court.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of probate Auto Truck TBA
2251 Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City.
proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, Corp.
represented by George Luy, Petitioner". 1âwphi1.nêt
xxx     xxx     xxx
Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Active Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF Homes,
Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are corporations formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and Distributors, Inc. Parañaque, Metro Manila.
which owned real properties covered under the Torrens system.
xxx     xxx     xxx
On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented by her Action 100 20th Avenue Murphy, Quezon
nephew George Luy, fried on 17 March 1995, a joint petition 5 for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim Company City or 92-D Mc-Arthur Highway
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Valenzuela Bulacan.

Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim,
3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged in business with the public as
then filed a motion6 for the lifting of lis pendens and motion7 for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the
corporations, all their capital, assets and equity were however, personally owned by the late
decedent.
Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders and officers appearing in the respective articles
of incorporation of the above business entities were mere dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they
In an order8 dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court, were listed therein only for purposes of registration with the Securities and Exchange
granted the private respondents' twin motions, in this wise: Commission.

Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to lift, expunge or delete the 4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with the following banks: (a) Metrobank,
annotation of lis pendens on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and Grace Park, Caloocan City and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City Branches and (b) First Intestate Bank
5182 and it is hereby further ordered that the properties covered by the same titles as well as those

111
 (formerly Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and in other banks whose identities In an order12 dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew private respondents' motion for exclusion, in
are yet to be determined. this wise:

5. That the following real properties, although registered in the name of the above entities, were actually The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether the corporations are the mere alter
acquired by Pastor Y. Lim during his marriage with petitioner, to wit: egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim, Otherwise ( sic) stated, the issue involves the piercing of the
corporate veil, a matter that is clearly within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and not the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Thus, in the case of Cease vs. Court of Appeals , 93 SCRA 483, the crucial
Corporation Title Location
issue decided by the regular court was whether the corporation involved therein was the mere extension
xxx     xxx     xxx of the decedent. After finding in the affirmative, the Court ruled that the assets of the corporation are also
assets of the estate.
k. Auto Truck TCT No. 617726 Sto. Domingo TBA
Corporation Cainta, Rizal A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, shows that the SEC's exclusive ( sic) applies only
q. Alliance Marketing TCT No. 27896 Prance, Metro Manila to intra-corporate controversy. It is simply a suit to settle the intestate estate of a deceased person who,
during his lifetime, acquired several properties and put up corporations as his instrumentalities.

Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title and/or Tax Declarations are hereto attached SO ORDERED.
as Annexes "C" to "W".
On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed by petitioner, issued an order 13 the
xxx     xxx     xxx dispositive portion of which reads:

7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late Pastor Y. Lim, are all conjugal in Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein under enumerated are hereby ordered
nature, having been acquired by him during the existence of his marriage with petitioner. to comply strictly with this order and to produce and submit to the special administrators, through this
Honorable Court within (5) five days from receipt of this order their respective records of the
8. There are other real and personal properties owned by Pastor Y. Lim which petitioner could not as yet savings/current accounts/time deposits and other deposits in the names of Pastor Lim and/or corporations
identify. Petitioner, however will submit to this Honorable Court the identities thereof and the necessary above-mentioned, showing all the transactions made or done concerning savings/current accounts from
documents covering the same as soon as possible. January 1994 up to their receipt of this court order.

On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioner's motion issued an order 10 , thus: xxx     xxx     xxx

Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City is SO ORDERED.
hereby directed to reinstate the annotation of lis pendens in case said annotation had already been
deleted and/or cancelled said TCT Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 51282. Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari14 , with an urgent prayer for a restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a
Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123, 236256 and 236237 by virtue probate court.
of the petitioner are included in the instant petition.
On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private respondents, rendered the assailed
SO ORDERED. decision15 , the decretal portion of which declares:

On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special administrator 11 and Miguel Lim and Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil action for certiorari is hereby granted, The
Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of administration impugned orders issued by respondent court on July 4, 1995 and September 12, 1995 are hereby nullified
were accordingly issued. and set aside. The impugned order issued by respondent on September 15, 1995 is nullified insofar as
petitioner corporations" bank accounts and records are concerned.

112
 SO ORDERED. 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and
intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner Rufina Luy Lim now comes before us personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed One Hundred Thousand
with a lone assignment of Pesos (P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate or amount of the
error16 : demand does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs, the amount of which
must be specifically alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's,
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the lower court which merely allowed
litigation expenses and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees, Provided
the preliminary or provisional inclusion of the private respondents as part of the estate of the late
deceased (sic) Pastor Y. Lim with the respondent Court of Appeals arrogating unto itself the power to further, that where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
repeal, to disobey or to ignore the clear and explicit provisions of Rules 81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of
claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the
Court and thereby preventing the petitioner, from performing her duty as special administrator of the
same or different transactions;
estate as expressly provided in the said Rules.

xxx     xxx     xxx
Petitioner's contentions tread on perilous grounds.

Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon the gross
In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders issued by the probate court which were
value of the estate of the decedent.
subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeals.

As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily on the principle that a probate court may
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on jurisdiction over probate proceedings is
pass upon title to certain properties, albeit provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
indeed in order.
should or should not be included in the inventory.
The provisions of Republic Act 769117 , which introduced amendments to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, are pertinent:
In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may extend its probing arms in the determination
of the question of title in probate proceedings.
Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:
This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,18 held:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
. . . As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve
with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
xxx     xxx     xxx included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds One resolve title.
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value
exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS19 :

xxx     xxx     xxx . . . The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate
Sec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows: court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE20 citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE21 , We made an exposition on the
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: probate court's limited jurisdiction:

113
 It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly,
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. . . .
claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was ever presented by petitioner to
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D. 1529,
administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree", proscribes collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence:
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO22 , We had occasion to elucidate, through Mr. Justice Andres Narvasa 23 :
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack . — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as a probate court, attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of
title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the property subject of the controversy was duly
parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the registered under the Torrens system, We categorically stated:
question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced,
the reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be
resolved by the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court . . . Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties
(e.g. probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the
involving a mode of practice which may be waived. . . . respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the
property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such
third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. . . .
. . . . These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title is not in the
decedent's name but in others, a situation on which this Court has already had occasion to rule . . . .
(emphasis Ours) Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the Late Pastor Y. Lim are in the
possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, which under the law possess a
personality separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of
Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under the Torrens system and registered in corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand
the name of private respondent corporations should be included in the inventory of the estate of the decedent undisturbed.
Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the determination by the probate court of whether these properties should be
included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not conclusive and subject to a final determination in a separate
action brought for the purpose of adjudging once and for all the issue of title. Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents' motion for exclusion. While it may be true
that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is
competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are registered in the name of private respondent decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over properties, it is no less true that such
corporations, the jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY vs., ALCID  24 is of great essence and finds applicability, authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with due regard
thus: and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case.

It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens system in the name of private
ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is respondents, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate court obviously
endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded to issue the impugned orders.
which of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. . . .
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter disregard of the presumption of
conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents. Certainly, the probate court through such brazen act
. . . . In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens title transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on this matter.
is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence
of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent corporations are properly part of the
decedent's estate but also the private respondent corporations themselves. To rivet such flimsy contention,
114
petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime, organized and wholly-owned the five corporations, Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrong-doing must be clearly and
which are the private respondents in the instant case. 25 Petitioner thus attached as Annexes "F" 26 and "G"27 of the convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.34
petition for review affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao which among others, contained
averments that the incorporators of Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included on the list had no actual and participation in Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate
the organization and incorporation of the said corporation. The affiants added that the persons whose names court, petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the
appeared on the articles of incorporation of Uniwide Distributing, Inc., as incorporators thereof, are mere dummies veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner on the affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani
since they have not actually contributed any amount to the capital stock of the corporation and have been merely Wenceslao is unavailing considering that the aforementioned documents possess no weighty probative value
asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix their respective signatures thereon. pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits are inadmissible in
evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not at all presented during the course of the proceedings in the lower court.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it. To put it differently, for this Court to uphold the admissibility of said documents would be to relegate from Our duty
It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal to apply such basic rule of evidence in a manner consistent with the law and jurisprudence.
indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it. 28
Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. LEONIDAS35 finds pertinence:
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and separate from its
stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by
protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it. another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statements, which may thus be either omitted
or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the
vs. COURT OF APPEALS29 , We enunciated: affiant themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.

. . . When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the As to the order36 of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that the
evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted without jurisdiction in issuing said order; The probate court had no authority
monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with which the law covers and isolates to demand the production of bank accounts in the name of the private respondent corporations.
the corporation from the members or stockholders who compose it will be lifted to allow for its
consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals. . . . WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the decision of the Court of Appeals which nullified and set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the protective shroud which exempts its Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12 September 1995 is AFFIRMED. 1âwphi1.nêt
stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a
seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction. 30 SO ORDERED.

The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just but the alter ego G.R. No. 173608             November 20, 2008 JESUS GERALDO and AMADO ARIATE, vs PEOPLE OF THE
of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated; where a PHILIPPINES, 
wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity should come to naught. 31
Petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were, by Information dated December 23, 2002 filed on December 27,
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as follows: 2002 before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao del Sur, charged with Homicide allegedly committed as follows:
1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy
and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at x x x [O]n the 1st day of July, 2002 at about 3:00 o'clock early morning, more or less, at Sitio Tinago,
the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to Barangay Bunga, municipality of Lanuza, province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the
commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one
act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause another, armed with xxx handguns and with intent to kill, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
the injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the corporate veil". 32 feloniously sho[o]t one ARTHUR U. 1 RONQUILLO, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter wounds
described hereunder:
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a
corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities. 33 POINT OF ENTRY:
115
 1. Right lumbar area
A = Jesus Geraldo Jr. alias Bajing
2. Right iliac area
B = Amado Ariate
POINT OF EXIT

1. Left lateral area of abdomen /x/x/x/ /x/x/x/

2. Right hypogastric area
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION
which wounds have caused the instantaneous death of said ARTHUR U. RONQUILLO, to the damage
and prejudice of his heirs in the following amount: To determine the presence of gunpowder residue, Nitrates. /x/x/x/

FINDINGS:
P50,000.00 - as life indemnity of the victim;

10,000.00 - as moral damages; Qualitative examination conducted on specimens A and B gave NEGATIVE results for powder
residue, Nitrates. /x/x/x/
10,000.00 - as exemplary damages; and
CONCLUSION:
40,000.00 - as actual damages.
Specimens A and B do not reveal the presence of gunpowder residue, Nitrates. /x/x/x/
2
CONTRARY TO LAW.
REMARKS:
At 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002, his wife, daughter Mirasol, and son Arnel, among other persons, on being informed of
the shooting of Arthur Ronquillo (the victim), repaired to where he was, not far from his residence, and found him The original copy of this report is retained in this laboratory for future reference.
lying on his side and wounded. Although gasping for breath, he was able to utter to Mirasol, within the hearing
distance of Arnel, that he was shot by Badjing 3 and Amado. TIME AND DATE COMPLETED:

Petitioners who were suspected to be the "Badjing" and "Amado" responsible for the shooting of the victim were 1700H 03 July 2002
subjected to paraffin tests at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Butuan City. In the PNP
Chemistry Report No. C-002-2002-SDS,4 the following data are reflected: x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

xxxx In a document dated July 1, 2002 and denominated as "Affidavit" 5 which was subscribed and sworn to before Clerk
of Court II Manuel A. Balasa, Sr. on July 26, 2002, the victim's son Arnel gave a statement in a question and answer
TIME AND DATE RECEIVED : 1105H 03 July 2002 style that herein petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were the ones who shot his father.

REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT : Chief of Police In another document dated July 4, 2002 also denominated as "Affidavit" 6 which was subscribed and sworn to also
Lanuza Police Station before the same Clerk of Court II Balasa on July 26, 2002, Mirasol also gave a statement in a question and answer
Lanuza, Surigao del Sur style that her father uttered that herein petitioners shot him.

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED : At the witness stand, Mirasol echoed her father's declaration that "Badjing" and "Amado" shot him. Arnel
substantially corroborated Mirasol's statement.7
Paraffin casts taken from the left and the right hands of the following named living persons:
Upon the other hand, petitioners gave their side of the case as follows:

116
Petitioner Ariate, a barangay tanod of Bunga, declared that Barangay Kagawad Omboy Roz (Roz) woke him up at As shown from the above-quoted transcript of the proceedings, the trial court restrained the presentation of the
3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002 and informed him that the victim was shot. He and Roz thus borrowed a tricycle, result of the paraffin tests because the same was not covered in the Pre-trial Order. In the Pre-trial Order, 11 the trial
proceeded to the crime scene and, along with others, brought the victim to the hospital where he was pronounced court noted the parties' agreement "that witnesses not listed in this Pre-trial Order shall not be allowed to testify as
dead on arrival. Ariate submitted himself to a paraffin test and tested negative for gunpowder residue/nitrates. 8 additional witnesses." Significantly, there was no agreement to disallow the presentation of documents which were
not reflected in the Pre-trial Orders. At all events, oddly, the trial court allowed the marking of the PNP Chemistry
Petitioner Geraldo declared that he slept in his house located also in Barangay Bunga, Lanuza at 9:30 p.m. of June Report as Exhibit "3."12
30, 2002 and woke up at 4:00 a.m. the following day. At 6:30 a.m., on seeing many people in the vicinity of the 45-
meter away house of one Josita Bongabong where the victim's body was found, he inquired and learned that the When petitioner Geraldo's turn to present the same PNP Chemistry Report came, the trial court ruled:
victim was shot. Policemen subsequently went to his house and advised him to take a paraffin test. He obliged and
was tested at the PNP Crime Laboratory and was found negative for gunpowder residue/nitrates. 9 COURT

In the course of the testimony of Ariate, his counsel presented the PNP Chemistry Report reflecting the negative That is the problem in the Pre-Trial Brief if the exhibits are not stated. I will set aside that Order
results of the paraffin test on him and Geraldo. The trial court restrained the presentation of the document, however, and in the interest of justice I will allow the accused to submit, next time I will not any more
as reflected in the following transcript of stenographic notes taken on March 21, 2003: consider exhibits not listed in the Pre-trial Order. 13 (Underscoring supplied)

xxxx The version of the defense was in part corroborated by witnesses.

Q I am showing to you [Ariate] a copy of the result of the paraffin test attached to the record of this case. The trial court, passing on the demeanor of prosecution witness-the victim's eight-year old daughter Mirasol,
observed:
COURT
. . . She talks straightforward, coherent and clear, very intelligent, with child mannerism[s]. While testifying
Is it covered in the Pre-trial Order? You cannot do that. That is why I told you; lay your cards on she was criss-crossing her hands, touching anything within her reach, innocent and simple, pressing of[f]
the table. and on her stomach but she talks with correct grammar. No doubt, this Court was convinced of her
testimony which was corroborated by her brother Arnel Ronquillo. 14
ATTY. AUZA
On the nature and weight of the dying declaration of the victim, the trial court observed:
May I ask for the court's reconsideration.
A dying declaration may be xxx oral or in writing. As a general rule, a dying declaration to be admissible
COURT must be made by the declarant while he is conscious of his impending death. However, even if a
declarant did not make a statement that he was on the brink of death, the degree and seriousness of the
wound and the fact that death supervened shortly afterwards may be considered as substantial evidence
Denied. I am warning you, all of you.
that the declaration was made by the victim with full realization that he was in a dying condition; People
vs. Ebrada, 296 SCRA 353.
ATTY. AUZA
Even assuming that the declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of
With the denial of our motion for reconsideration, I move to tender exclusive evidence. He would the res gestae since it was made shortly after the startling occurrence and under the influence thereof,
have identified this result. The paraffin test, which [forms] part of the affidavit of this witness hence, under the circumstances, the victim evidently had no opportunity to contrive. 15 (Underscoring
attached to the record of this case on page 29. May I ask that this will be marked as Exhibit "3" supplied)
for the defense.
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court convicted petitioners, disposing as follows:
COURT
WHEREFORE, finding the accused JESUS GERALDO y CUBERO and AMADO ARIATE y DIONALDO
Mark it. (Marked).10 (Underscoring supplied) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal

117
 Code and with the presence of one (1) aggravating circumstance of night time and applying the moral certainty that indeed the persons they identified as the as the assailant of Arthur O. Ronquillo were
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of which could be properly imposed under the rules of really the ones who perpetrated the crime.
said code and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribe[d]
by the code for the offense, hereby sentences each to suffer the penalty of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) Admittedly, prosecution witnesses were able to identify positively herein petitioners as the alleged
DAY of Prision Mayor minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY assailant[s] of Arthur O. Ronquillo. But said identification is based on the assumption that they were the
of Reclusion Temporal maximum as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law. To very same "BADJING AMADO" and/or "BADJING AND AMADO" referred to by their deceased father in
pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as life indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages his dying declaration.
and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. The claim for actual damages is denied, there being no evidence
to support the same. What the Honorable Court of Appeals failed to consider is that, just because the victim declared that it
was "BADJING AMADO" and/or "BADJING AND AMADO" who shot him does not necessarily follow that
The bail bond put up by the accused Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate are ordered cancelled and to pay herein petitioners were really the perpetrators in the absence of proof that the "BADJING" referred to by
the cost. him is Jesus Geraldo and that the "AMADO" is Amado Ariate. It would have been a different story had the
prosecution witnesses [been] eyewitnesses because proof that the "BADJING AMADO" and/or "BADJING
SO ORDERED.16 (Underscoring supplied) AND AMADO" referred to by the victim and the persons identified by the prosecution witnesses are the
same is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals, by Decision of June 30, 2006, 17 affirmed with modification the trial court's decision. It found
that the trial court erred in appreciating nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance. And it reduced the award of Herein petitioners believe, that even assuming that there are no other "BADJING" or "AMADO" in the
moral damages18 to P50,000, and deleted the award of exemplary damages. Thus the Court of Appeals disposed: barangay, still it does not follow that the person[s] referred to by the dying declarant as his assailant were
Jesus Geraldo alias "BADJING" and Amado Ariate alias "AMADO". Although, it is inconceivable how the
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED save for the Honorable Court of Appeals arrived at the said conclusion that there are no other "BADJING AMADO"
modification of the penalty imposed. Accordingly, accused-appellants are each hereby sentenced to suffer and/or "BADJING AND AMADO" in the barangay absent any proof to that effect from the
an indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years, Five (5) Months and One (1) Day of prision mayor medium as prosecution.22 (Underscoring in the original)
minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of reclusion temporal medium as maximum, with
all accessory penalties provided by law, and to jointly and solidarily pay the heirs of the victim the amount The petition is impressed with merit.
of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The trial court relied on the dying declaration of the victim as recounted by his daughter Mirasol and corroborated by
SO ORDERED.19 (Italics in the original) his son Arnel.

Hence, the present Petition20 raising the following issues: A dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are present: (a) it concerns the cause
and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and
I the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify
WHETHER OR NOT THE IDENTIT[IES] OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AS THE ALLEGED had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the
ASSAILANT HAS BEEN ADEQUATELY ESTABLISHED AS PER EVIDENCE ON RECORD? declarant's death.23
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE IDENTIT[IES] OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED There is no dispute that the victim's utterance to his children related to the identities of his assailants. As for the
BY PROOF BEYOND victim's consciousness of impending death, it is not necessary to prove that he stated that he was at the brink of
REASONABLE DOUBT?21 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) death; it suffices that, judging from the nature and extent of his injuries, the seriousness of his condition was so
apparent to him that it may safely be inferred that such ante mortem declaration was made under consciousness of
Petitioners argue: an impending death.24 The location of the victim's two gunshot wounds, his gasping for breath, and his eventual
death before arriving at the hospital meet this requirement. 25
With due respect, herein petitioners disagree with the holding of the Honorable Court of Appeals that "It is
not necessary that the victim further identify that "Badjing" was in fact Jesus Geraldo or that "Amado" was It has not been established, however, that the victim would have been competent to testify had he survived the
Amado Ariate" because, [so petitioners contend], it is the obligation of the prosecution to establish with attack. There is no showing that he had the opportunity to see his assailant. Among other things, there is no
indication whether he was shot in front, the post-mortem examination report having merely stated that the points of
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entry of the wounds were at the "right lumbar area" and the "right iliac area." 26 "Lumbar" may refer to "the loins" or SO ORDERED.
"the group of vertebrae lying between the thoracic vertebrae and the sacrum," 27 or to "the region of the abdomen
lying on either side of the umbilical region and above the corresponding iguinal." 28 "Iliac" relates to the "ilium," which G.R. No. 133579 May 31, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ROGELIO CONTEGA Y FLORENDO, 
is "one of the three bones composing either lateral half of the pelvis being in man broad and expanded above and
narrower below where it joins with the ischium and pubis to form part of the actabulum." 29 ROGELIO CONTEGA Y FLORENDO was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City with robbery with
homicide committed on 27 April 1994 against one Isauro Barba after the accused in conspiracy with another
At all events, even if the victim's dying declaration were admissible in evidence, it must identify the unlawfully took away from his victim P1,500.00 and on the same occasion inflicted upon him serious physical
assailant with certainty; otherwise it loses its significance.30 injuries which caused his death.1

In convicting petitioners, the trial court, as stated earlier, relied on the testimony of the victim's daughter Mirasol, On 12 December 1997 the trial court found Rogelio Contega guilty as charged and sentenced him to reclusion
which was corroborated by her brother Arnel, that the "Badjing" and "Amado" mentioned by the victim as his perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law. In addition, it ordered him to pay the heirs of Isauro Barba
assailants are herein petitioners whom they claimed to know because they live in the same barangay. 31 The Court civil indemnity of P50,000.00, unearned income of P132,000.00, actual and compensatory damages of P30,000.00,
of Appeals believed too the siblings' testimonies, holding that and to pay the costs.2

It is not necessary that the victim further identify that "Badjing" was in fact Jesus Geraldo or that "Amado" Isauro, Alberto and Alex, all surnamed Barba, owned the Los Pescadores Restaurant  located at the second floor of
was Amado Ariate. There was never an issue as to the identity of the accused. There was no other a two (2)-storey building in A. Reyes Avenue, Estancia, Iloilo. Isauro occupied the mezzanine floor. At around 9:00
person known as "Badjing" or "Amado" in their neighborhood or in their barangay. Accused-appellants in the evening of 27 April 1994 Jose Navarro, a waiter at the restaurant, noticed that Isauro Barba did not show up
never presented any proof that a person in their locality had the same aliases or names as they. It is not for his dinner. It was his routine to be there at about 7:00 in the evening. Finding his absence a little strange, Jose
uncommon that even an eight-year-old child can identify that Jesus Geraldo was known as "Badjing" and went to Isauro's room which was lighted but did not find him there so Jose returned to the restaurant, took a
that Amado Ariate was "Amado."32 (Underscoring supplied) flashlight and went to the bodega  at the ground floor managed by Isauro. The bodega  was dark. Before he could
reach the switches near the door his flashlight illumined the figure of Isauro lying face down on the cement floor. He
Contrary, however, to the immediately-quoted ruling of the appellate court, it is the prosecution, not petitioners, immediately turned on the lights, shook Isauro's shoulders and asked him what happened. Isauro could only mutter
which had the burden of proving that petitioners were, at the material time, the only ones in the barangay who bore that he was "bumped" by two (2) men.
such nicknames or aliases. This, the prosecution failed to discharge.
At that juncture, Jose noted that Isauro's neck was covered with blood which dripped to the floor. He asked Isauro
When there is doubt on the identity of the malefactors, motive is essential for their conviction. 33 The Court notes that who his assailant was, and Isauro answered, it was "Rogelio," former  pakyaw (piece-meal worker) in the
in their affidavits supporting the criminal complaint, the victim's wife and children Mirasol and Arnel proffered not bodega/restaurant. Then Jose recalled a certain Rogelio Contega who was fired a month before on suspicion of
knowing any possible motive for petitioners to shoot the victim. 34 At the trial, no evidence of any motive was having stolen rice from the warehouse.
presented by the prosecution. Petitioners' defense of denial and alibi thus assumes importance.
Forthwith, Jose went back to the restaurant and informed Chief Cook Rolly, Assistant Cook Jose Patwigas and
Specifically with respect to petitioner Ariate, the victim's wife admitted that Ariate accompanied her family in bringing Secretary Melody Duran of the misfortune of Isauro. Jose requested Melody to make the necessary phone
the victim to the hospital.35 While non-flight does not necessarily indicate innocence, under the circumstances calls, i.e., to the Barba family, to the police and to the doctor. Together with the Chief and Assistant Cooks, Jose
obtaining in the present case, Ariate's spontaneous gesture of immediately extending assistance to the victim after went down to the bodega. They tried to bring Isauro to the main gate of the bodega but they could not find the keys
he was advised by the Barangay Kagawad of the victim's fate raises reasonable doubt as to his guilt of the crime to the gate which Isauro always brought with him. Aside from the keys, they noticed that Isauro's wallet was also
charged.36 missing.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2006 affirming with In the meantime, at around 10:30 in the evening, PO3 Armando Robles received a telephone call concerning the
modification the Decision of Branch 41 of the Surigao del Sur Regional Trial Court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. incident at the Los Pescadores Restaurant. Accompanied by SPO3 Leopoldo Soldevilla, PO3 Robles hurried to the
Petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate are ACQUITTED of the charge of Homicide for failure of the site. Informed that Isauro was in the warehouse, they proceeded there and met Jose, the Chief Cook, the Assistant
prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Cook and the Secretary. They were all on their way up carrying the body of Isauro. PO3 Robles observed that
Isauro's physical condition was critical so they brought him inside the eatery and placed him on top of a table.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City who is directed to
cause the immediate release of petitioners unless they are being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this A certain Dr. Arellano rushed to the restaurant. He cleaned Isauro's neck that was full of blood, examined the
Court of action taken within ten (10) days from notice hereof. gushing wounds thereof and gave him emergency medical treatment. PO3 Robles asked Isauro about the identity
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of his assailant and he simply replied it was "Rogelio," a former piece-meal worker in the place. Thereafter, Isauro Meanwhile, at around 5:00 in the morning of 28 April 1994, Rogelio Contega was apprehended at his residence in
was brought to the Jesus Colmenares District Hospital in Iloilo where he died at about 2:35 in the afternoon of 28 Barangay Pa-on, Estancia, Iloilo, about three (3) kilometers from the Los Pescadores Restaurant.
April
1994.3 Eventually his keys were found but not his wallet. Eduardo Barba, Isauro's nephew, stated that Isauro was receiving a salary of P3,000.00 per month. He also stated
that the Barba family incurred hospitalization expenses of P10,000.00, expenses for embalming services of
The post-mortem examination of the body of Isauro however was conducted by Dr. Ricardo Jaboneta of the P15,000.00 as borne by a receipt; 5 expenses for the wake for ten (10) days of P7,000.00; and, expenses for labor
National Bureau of Investigation. His autopsy yielded the following findings: and materials for the gravestone of P5,000.00.

. . . Abrasions, linear, 5.3 cms. Oriented medially downwards, subcostal arch, left side along Rogelio's alibi was that at around 5:30 in the afternoon of 27 April 1994 he was in his house with his wife Norma,
parasternal line. children and his wife's sister-in-law Silma Dominguez. He was melting lead to be used in catching squid. At 7:00
they had dinner; afterwards, he slept. At 5:00 the following morning, two (2) members of the Estancia police force
Contused abrasion; (1) 1.3 x 0.7 cms., right temple; (2) 8.5 x. 3.5 cms., right zygomatic area; (3) arrived in his house and told him that the Chief of Police wanted to see him. He went with them thinking, according
1.3 x 1.0 cms., elbow, right side, medial aspect; (4) 2.0 x 1.5 cms., knee, right side. to him, that there was a job waiting for him. At the police station, he learned that he was a suspect in the killing of
Isauro Barba. Afterwards, he was locked up in jail. His defense was corroborated by Dominguez.
Hematoma; (1) 9.0 x. 7.0 cms., left mandibular area; (2) 7.0 x 2.7 cms., upper eyelid, left side;
(3) 5.0 x 8.0 cms., penna., left ear. The trial court convicted Rogelio based on Isauro's dying declaration that his assailant was "Rogelio," a
former pakyaw in the bodega/restaurant, as told to Jose Navarro and PO3 Armando Robles. The trial court was not
impressed with his alibi because his residence was only approximately three (3) kilometers away from the Los
Wound, punctured; (1) 0.5 cm., forehead, left side, just above lateral end of left eyebrow,
directed backwards medially downwards, penetrating subcutaneous tissues and make an Pescadores Restaurant and could be negotiated by foot at a slow pace in thirty (30) minutes. In addition, it found
that he had the motive because he was dismissed from employment for reportedly stealing rice from the bodega.
approximate depth of 1.0 cm., (2) 0.3 x 0.4 cm., tempore-parietal area, left side, involving third
layer of the scalp; (3) 0.2 x 0.2 cm., left pre-auricular area, left side, involving soft tissues only;
(4) 0.3 x 0.2 cm., thru and thru, left penna; (5) Triangular, 0.3 x 0.5 cm., left upper lip involving, Accused-appellant now disputes the sufficiency of the dying declaration of Isauro on the ground that he merely
soft tissues and make an approximate depth of 1.0 cm., (6) multiple, sixteen (16) in number, mentioned the name "Rogelio" without further details on the identity of the suspect.
sizes vary from 0.3 x 0.5 to 0.4 x 0.4 cm., nape, over an area of 13.0 x 9.0 cms., the average
depth is 1.0 cm., (7) Triangular in shape, 0.4 x 0.4 x 0.4 cm., subcostal arch, left side, 19.0 cm., Accused-appellant has a point and it is valid. His conviction indeed rests on quicksand. While factual findings of the
from anterior midline, directed upwards, medially backwards, penetrating abdominal wall thru trial court are entitled to great weight and respect, this case calls for a departure from the general rule. Easily, it can
9th intercostal space into abdominal cavity, grazing spleen; (8) Triangular in shape, 0.3 x 0.3 x be said that the trial court has overlooked certain facts of substance and value that if considered would have altered
0.3 cm., back left side along posterior axillary line, 13.0 cms. From posterior midline, level of the result of the case.6
10th rib, penetrating abdominal wall thru 20th intercostal space into abdominal cavity,
perforating left kidney and left renal artery; (9) Triangular in shape, 0.4 x 0.4 x 0.4 cm. Lumber A dying declaration, made in extremis when the party is at the point of death and the mind is induced by the most
region along midline, bone depth; (10) Thru and thru, triangular in shape, 1.0 x 1.5 cms., powerful considerations to speak the truth, occasioned by a situation so solemn and awful, is considered by the law
forearm, right side, dorso-ulnar aspect, 13.0 cms. Below elbow penetrating soft tissues and as creating an obligation equal to that which is created by a positive oath administered in a court of justice. The idea
make an EXIT, triangular in shape 0.3 x 0.2 cm., forearm, right-side, antero-lunar aspect, 5.0 more succinctly expressed is that "truth sits on the lips of dying men." 7 As an exception to the hearsay rule, it is
cm., below elbow' (11) 0.3 x 0.5 cm., forearm, left side, antero-ulnar aspect, 6.5 crms., below defined in Sec. 37, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court as one made by a dying person under the consciousness of an
elbow, penetrating soft tissues and make an EXIT, 0.5 cm., forearm, left side, anterior aspect, impending death with respect to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. It may be received in any
3.0 cms., below elbow; (12) triangular in shape, 0.3 x 0.3 cm., forearm, left side, antero-ulnar case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry and requires the concurrence of the following: (a) the statement or
aspect, 13.5 cms. Below elbow, penetrating soft tissues and make an approximate depth of 3.0 declaration must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) at the time it
cms. . . . . was made the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a
witness; and, (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the decedent
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple punctured wounds. 4 is the victim.8

According to Dr. Jaboneta, among the twelve (12) punctured wounds suffered by Isauro, wounds 7 and 8 which Isauro declared that his attacker was "Rogelio," a former  pakyaw  (piece-meal worker) in the bodega/restaurant
were caused by a triangular pointed instrument were the most fatal having penetrated the vital organs of the victim. of Los Pescadores. On this aspect, Jose Navarro testified —

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 Q: After you switch(ed) all the lights and you held the shoulder of Isauro A: We often see (sic) each other because he catch-up ( sic) to eat his
Barba, did you notice his appearance . . . . breakfast . . . . 12
A: His neck was bloodied and there was also blood on the cement. Q: As far as you know, how many months did he work as "pakyaw" worker
Q: And when you saw this, what did you do? of Isauro Barba?
A: When I put on the light and I saw him in this situation I asked him what A: Since I work (sic) in the Los Pescadores, in December of 1993 up to the
happened to him and he answered me that it ( sic) was bumped by two men, time when the incident happened, this Rogelio Contega was no longer
and when I asked him who the men are ( sic), he answered me that it working, and a month before the incident (emphasis supplied).
was Rogelio one of his piece-meal workers (pakyaw)  in a local dialect Q: Why did he no longer work at (sic) Isauro Barba? What happened?
(emphasis supplied).9 A: Because according to what I heard, and what the late Isauro Barba told
us, while he was still alive and in fact contained in the police blotter, this
Navarro continued his narration by stating that he did not know any other person by the name of "Rogelio" who also Rogelio Contega was involved in the stealing of palay . . . . (emphasis
worked there as pakyaw  except accused-appellant whom he identified in court — supplied).
Q: Is it possible because Rogelio Contega was involved in the stealing of
palay, this prompted Isauro Barba to dismiss Rogelio Contega from his
Q: You said that on April 27, 1994 you were already working as a waiter at
work?
the Los Pescadores Restaurant. Since when have you been working there?
A: Probably that is one of the reasons.
A: December of 1993.
Q: Is it possible also that this Rogelio Contega harboured ill feeling against
Q: Do you know a person by the name of Rogelio who was previously
Isauro Barba?
working as pakyaw?
A: It is possible. 1
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you know where this Rogelio was residing?
A: At Brgy Pa-on, Estancia, Iloilo . . . . Isauro also gave the same name and description of his assailant to PO3 Armando Robles —
Q: Now, if (sic) this Rogelio whom you said was working before as a
pakyaw at the Los Pescadores Restaurant, is he inside the Courtroom? Can A: When we asked him what happened to him and who made this thing to
you point him? him, he answered, it was a certain "Rogelio."
INTERPRETER: Witness goes to a person inside the Courtroom and points Q: And when he mentioned that it was a certain "Rogelio," what else did you
to a person who upon being asked identified himself as Rogelio ask from him?
Contega . . . . 10 A: When we asked him further about this "Rogelio" and his description, he
Q: Aside from Rogelio Contega who is still working as a pakyaw in the answered that this Rogelio was a former worker of the place.
bodega, do you know if there were any other person(s) by the name of Q: As a policeman, do you know if there was such a worker before at  Los
Rogelio who was also working there as pakyaw? Pescadores  warehouse named Rogelio?
A: No more (emphasis supplied). 11 A: Before I know (sic) of a certain Rogelio who works (sic) there as a
"pakyaw" in the place but "Tay Isauro" is definite in his description that this
Aside from having known accused-appellant as a former piece-meal worker in the bodega/restaurant, Navarro also "Rogelio" was once a "pakyaw" in the place and already left it  (emphasis
knew why his employment was terminated, thus providing the motive for the crime — supplied) . . . . 14

Q: At the time you found Isauro Barba at the bodega on April 27, 1994 was Likewise, PO3 Robles identified accused-appellant in court 15 which Navarro corroborated when he confirmed that
this Rogelio Contega still working at the bodega? Isauro did inform PO3 Robles about the identity of his assailant —
A: No more.
Q: Do you know the reason why Rogelio Contega was not working there? Q: Mr. Navarro, you said that while Doctor Arellano was cleaning the wound
A: As far as I know among ( sic) before the incident, this Rogelio Contega of Isauro Barba he was asked question who bumped him. Please tell us
was a suspect in the stealing of rice from the bodega. who was asking this question?
Q: Do you personally know this Rogelio Contega? A: Robles.
A: Yes, sir. Q: Is this the same Robles the policeman who arrived?
Q: During the time that you were there at the Los Pescadores Restaurant, A: Yes, sir.
how often will (sic) you see him? COURT: Was that particular question addressed to the Doctor?
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 A: While the Doctor was cleaning the injuries, Robles was asking question records do not reveal, much less imply, that the restaurant opened only in December 1993 or thereabouts. It is thus
on why and who bumped him because he sustained a swelling on the right quite possible that there could be another "Rogelio" who used to work there as a  pakyaw but whom Navarro could
temple. not have known before his employment thereat. Another competent witness should have been presented by the
COURT: The Court was asking you to whom was the question addressed? prosecution on this significant detail.
Was the question addressed by the Police Officer to the Doctor or to the
victim? With respect to the testimony of PO3 Robles, he said that he knew of a certain "Rogelio" who worked as
A: The victim . . . . a pakyaw in the place. However, he failed to mention that that "Rogelio" was the only former piece-meal worker in
ATTY. SALAS: What did Isauro Barba answered ( sic)? the bodega/restaurant. At any rate, even if he did so testify, he was not equipped with the required competence to
A: His answer was, Rogelio his piece-meal worker (emphasis supplied).16 shed light on the subject.

Judging from the nature and extent of Isauro's injuries, the seriousness of his condition was so apparent to him that Moreover, Navarro stated that the person he pinpointed to as the attacker of Isauro was dismissed a month before
it could safely be inferred that such ante-mortem declaration was made under the consciousness of an impending the incident. However, his statement was contradicted by PO3 Robles in his affidavit 20 when he said that Isauro had
death. That his demise came swiftly or only a few hours after arrival at the hospital further emphasized his told him that his assailant "was already separated for quite a long time." Certainly, "quite a long time" cannot be
realization of the hopelessness of his recovery. 17 The records do not disclose that he was incompetent as a equated with "a month."
witness. Apparently his declaration was offered to prove the crime of robbery with homicide where his death was
the subject of inquiry. However, the Court finds that his dying declaration did not sufficiently identify accused- While we hesitate to ignore the findings of the trial court we cannot remove the nagging uncertainty about the
appellant as the person responsible for his imminent death . identity of the accused Rogelio Contega y Florendo as the very same  pakyaw referred to by Isauro as narrated by
witness Jose Navarro. For, there could be other Rogelios or  pakyaws who could have been employed earlier at Los
It is axiomatic that the prosecution bears not only the onus to show distinctly that a crime has been committed but, Pescadores than accused-appellant. In other words, the prosecution has not eliminated the possibility that another
just as importantly, to likewise establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the person or persons who should piece-meal worker with the name "Rogelio" was employed by the Barbas without the prosecution witnesses
be held responsible therefor. The latter, i.e., the identification of the accused to be the perpetrator of the crime, is knowing about it, in which case and in view of such possibility, the conclusion that accused-appellant Rogelio
concededly not an easy task. 18 It has thus once been observed that — Contega y Florendo was the same person referred to by the prosecution has not been established beyond
reasonable doubt.

Not even the supposed motive of accused-appellant to commit the crime merits weight. Navarro's knowledge of the
matter was hearsay as it was merely supplied by Isauro and other people. Moreover, the prosecution did not bother
to present the police blotter Navarro referred to as containing the charge of stealing made by Isauro against
accused-appellant.

. . . . There are few more difficult subjects with which the administration of justice has to deal. But we agree with the trial court that accused-appellant's defense of alibi does not convince. He failed to show that
The carelessness or superficiality of observers, the rarity of powers of graphic description, and it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at the time it happened.  21 He admitted that his
the different force with which peculiarities of form or color or expression strike different persons, residence was only three (3) kilometers away, which can be negotiated in just thirty (30) minutes by walking and
make recognition or identification one of the least reliable of facts testified to even by actual perhaps a little more than ten (10) minutes by running. And there is the tricycle that is usually available as the
witnesses who have seen the parties in question. 19 means of transportation. 22 On these accounts, the corroboration provided by Silma Dominguez does not assume
importance. Alibi is a weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and concoct between relatives, friends and even
those not related to the offender. 2 Yet, while the alibi of accused-appellant may be weak, the rule that "alibi must be
Navarro and PO3 Robles may have been in unison in their testimonies on the declaration of Isauro regarding the
satisfactorily proved was never intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases; otherwise, we will see the
identity of his assailant, i.e., "Rogelio, former pakyaw  worker." By themselves the declarations are not enough to
absurdity of an accused being put in a more difficult position where the prosecution's evidence is vague and weak
identify with certainty the person responsible for the crime. "Rogelio" is a common name and the description
than where it is strong." 24 The prosecution cannot profit from the weakness of the alibi of the accused. It must rely
"former pakyaw  worker" provides little help. It is thus necessary to ascertain whether the "Rogelio" whom Navarro
on the strength of its own evidence and establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It failed to do so in this case. 25
and PO3 Robles knew as a former pakyaw  in the bodega/restaurant was the only such worker in the place.

As in all criminal cases, speculation and probabilities cannot take the place of proof required to establish guilt
While Navarro testified that accused-appellant was the only former  pakyaw in the bodega/restaurant he knew, the
beyond reasonable doubt. 26 We conclude that the evidence presented by the prosecution did not pass the test of
problem with his statement is that it was confined to a limited span of only four (4) months. According to him he
moral certainty to warrant the conviction of accused-appellant for the death of Isauro.
started his employment in the restaurant in December 1993 whereas the incident took place on 27 April 1994. The
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Neither can we uphold accused-appellant's conviction for robbery based on the finding of the trial court that "the feloniously attack and shoot DEOGRACIAS RENDAL, a barangay police, with the use of a firearm, thereby inflicting
accused by means of violence or intimidation took away the wallet of the victim containing the amount of P1,500.00 upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his death shortly thereafter. 3
according to Jose Barba, brother of the deceased." 27 Jose Barba did not testify but merely executed an affidavit
which was not even submitted in evidence. More importantly, although there was evidence that Isauro's wallet was It appeared from the same set of facts Edgar was also separately charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of
missing, there was no proof that Isauro had his wallet with him prior to the incident. 28 In order to sustain a conviction Firearms and Ammunitions. Since the homicide and the illegal possession cases arose from the same alleged
for robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be established as conclusively as any other incident, the RTC ordered the consolidation of these two cases.
essential element of the crime. 29
During the arraignment on 28 July 1981, Edgar, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty.4 A joint
In sum, we reiterate that the dying declaration of the victim Isauro Barba failed to categorically identify accused- trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
appellant as his assailant, and the prosecution did not conclusively establish that robbery was committed upon the
person of Isauro. In the absence of other evidence showing accused-appellant's guilt for the crime charged, it is not Six witnesses for the prosecution took the witness stand, namely: (1) Alberto Loquez (Alberto), brother-in-law of the
only his right to be set free; it is even more his constitutional right to be acquitted. victim Deogracias Rendal (Deogracias), who allegedly witnessed the shooting incident involving the purported
assailant Edgar and the victim; (2) Teresita Rendal (Teresita), the wife of the late Deogracias, who also testified that
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from finding accused-appellant Rogelio Contega y Florendo guilty as she saw the victim fire at by Edgar who was by the window of his house pointing a gun at Deogracias on the road
charged is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence and on reasonable doubt; consequently, he is below; (3) Modesto Reyes (Modesto), who testified that he heard a gunshot that prompted him to look out of the
ACQUITTED of the crime charged and ordered immediately released from custody unless held for some other window; (4) Patrolman Isidro Duterte (Patrolman Duterte), one of the responding police officers; (5) Patrolman
lawful cause. Adriano Empacis (Patrolman Empacis), the other responding officer; and (6) Dr. Arturo Llenes (Dr. Llenes), a
physician of Southern Island Hospital, Cebu City, who conducted the autopsy on the corpse of the victim.
The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED forthwith to implement this Decision immediately and to inform this Court
within five (5) days from receipt hereof of the date accused-appellant shall have actually been released from The following exhibits were formally offered by the prosecution: (1) Exhibit "A" - Affidavit of Alberto dated 19 March
confinement. Costs de oficio. 1980; (2) Exhibit "B" - Order issued by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal for the conduct of the Preliminary
Investigation; (3) Exhibit "C" - Joint Affidavit of Patrolmen Duterte and Empacis; (4) Exhibit "D" - the revolver
SO ORDERED. allegedly used in killing the victim; (5) Exhibit "E" - Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Llenes; (6) Exhibit "F" - Death
Certificate of Deogracias; (6) Exhibit "G" - a photograph of the crime scene; (7) Exhibit "H" - another photograph of
the vicinity of the crime scene; (8) Exhibit "I" - three live bullets taken from the revolver; (9) Exhibit "J" - Sketch of
the staircase of the house of Edgar drawn by patrolman Duterte, in which the victim was found by the responding
police officers; and (10) Exhibit "K" - a copy of the Police Blotter of the incident.

Taken together, the evidence offered by the prosecution shows that at around 6:30 in the evening of 9 March 1980,
Alberto, brother-in-law of Deogracias, was in the sala of his house when he heard a gunshot. 5 The same sound was
heard by Teresita, who was standing beside the road facing the house of Edgar and Modesto, at a nearby store
[G.R. NO. 176981 : December 24, 2008] EDGAR GERASTA Y LAPUS,  v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  buying cigarettes.6 After hearing the shot, Alberto immediately went to the window of his house and saw Edgar
across the road, by the window of his house pointing a gun at Deogracias, who was lying beside the road. With the
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision 1 dated 9 November gun pointed at Deogracias, Edgar fired for the second time. 7 Simultaneously, Teresita looked at the direction of the
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21549 which affirmed in toto the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial gunshot and saw Edgar aiming his gun at Deogracias and shooting the latter. 8 For his part, Modesto went out of the
Court (RTC) of Cebu, Branch 11, finding petitioner Edgar L. Gerasta (Edgar) guilty of the crime of homicide. store following the second shot, and saw Deogracias's body lying face down. 9 Both Alberto and Modesto spotted
Quirino Gerasta (Quirino), Edgar's brother, emerge from the dark and approach the victim. Edgar asked his brother,
On 31 March 1981, Edgar was charged before the RTC with the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised "Brod, unsa buhi pa na?" (Brother, is he still alive?) to which Qurino answered in the affirmative. 10 Edgar went down
Penal Code, as amended. The accusatory portion of the Information reads: towards the victim. As the gunshots attracted several people from the neighborhood, Edgar, with his gun in his
hands, shouted at them: "Who will complain, I will shoot him next." 11 Then, the two brothers brought the body to the
That on the 9th day of March 1980 at 6:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, in the Municipality of San Fernando, balcony of Edgar's house and dropped the same at the stairs. 12 The body fell at the foot of the staircase.13
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and Having received a report of the incident, Patrolman Duterte and Patrolman Empacis hastily proceeded to the house
of Edgar where they saw the wounded victim at the foot of the staircase, still breathing but unable to talk. 14 Edgar

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approached Patrolman Duterte and surrendered his gun saying, "This is the gun I used in shooting Deogracias went up the stairs and reached the porch, where the two battled for the control of the revolver. He heard
[Deogracias]."15 The policemen also observed bloodstain on the road near the house of Edgar. 16 two bursts of gunfire and saw Deogracias fall on the stairs.

The victim was brought to Southern Islands Hospital in Cebu City where he succumbed to the gunshot wounds he Quirino testified that on the evening in question, someone informed him that Deogracias was daring his brother
sustained. Edgar to a fight. Upon hearing this, he allegedly ran the 150-meter distance that separated his house from that of
Edgar. As he was nearing, he saw his brother and Deogracias wrestling at the porch. Two gunshots were fired.
The following day, Dr. Llenes conducted an autopsy on the corpse of Deogracias, in which she found two gunshot Deogracias fell down the stairs. He asked his brother why Deogracias was shot. Edgar answered he shot
wounds, one in the left thigh and the other in the head. 17 He observed that the wound in the head was fatal, as it Deogracias because he came upstairs with a gun.23
severed the brain tissues.18 He then concluded that the ultimate cause of the victim's death was the destruction of
the brain secondary to a gunshot wound.19 The certificate of death prepared and signed by Dr. Llenes states: On the witness stand, Dr. Thomas Refe gave his opinion on the result of the autopsy on the victim made by Dr.
Llenes. He opined that the gunshot wounds could be inflicted within the span of two seconds if the contesting
CAUSE OF DEATH x x x. parties would be grappling for the possession of the gun. As to the relative position of the victim and the assailant,
he also said that the gunshot wound in the head could have been inflicted by an assailant firing the gun at the right
side and at the back of Deogracias.
Cardio pulmonary arrest due to

Dr. Llenes was again presented by the prosecution on rebuttal. He testified that from the trajectory of the bullet as
Intracranial Injury due to Gunshot Wound, Head, penetrating, perforating. 20
shown by the gunshot wound in the head, it was possible that the assailant could have been on an elevated place
with the victim below when fired at.24
The defense, on the other hand, advanced the theory that the death of Deogracias was not through the fault of
Edgar, since the former pointed a gun at the latter, and the two grappled for possession of the gun when it
In a decision dated 8 November 1996, the RTC found Edgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
accidentally fired, hitting the victim in the process. The defense put up self-defense. To buttress this theory, the
homicide. He was, however, acquitted of the charge of illegal possession.
defense presented Edgar, Quirino and the following witnesses: (1) Miriam Gerasta, the wife of the alleged assailant,
who corroborated her husband's testimony that the death of the victim was purely an accident; (2) Ismael Barredo,
an alleged eyewitness to the incident; (3) Dr. Tomas Refe, senior medico-legal officer, National Bureau of The dispositive portion of the RTC decision convicting Edgar reads:
Investigation, Visayas Regional Office, Cebu City. He testified that based on the trajectory of the wounds of the
victim, the assailant was at the right side and obliquely in front of the victim. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by the Court x x x finding the
accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and, taking into account the rules on mitigating
On the witness stand, Edgar testified that at around 6:30 p.m. of 9 March 1980, while he was in the sala of his and aggravating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer the
house, together with his wife, he heard Deogracias by the roadside challenging him to a fight. 21 Initially, Edgar did indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum of it, to
not mind it. But when Deogracias got near his house and was about to go up, Edgar allegedly approached him. fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as the maximum thereof. The accused is hereby
There, Deogracias purportedly pointed a gun at Edgar. Edgar parried Deogracias' hand which held the gun. The two given full credit for the preventive imprisonment that he may have suffered. The accused is also hereby ordered by
wrestled for possession of the gun. In the course thereof, the gun fired twice. Following the second burst of gunfire, the Court to indemnify the heirs of Deogracias Rendal in the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos ( P50,000.00) as death
Deogracias fell on the stairs. Edgar ran inside the house. At once, his brother Quirino arrived. Quirino asked Edgar indemnity and the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as reimbursement of the funeral expenses
why Deogracias challenged him to a fight. Edgar answered he did not know the reason for Deogracias's actuations. defrayed by them.25
He also asked Quirino to call the police authorities. Patrolmen Duterte and Empacis arrived. Edgar handed over the
gun to patrolman Duterte and told him it was the gun which he had taken from Deogracias, and that the same fired Edgar appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. In a decision dated 9 November 2005, the Court of
when they wrestled for its control. 22 Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The judgment provides:

Witness Miriam Gerasta confirmed what Edgar testified to. She added that at one point, Edgar embraced WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
Deogracias to gain control of the gun. City, Branch 11, in Criminal Case No. CU-9248 is AFFIRMED in toto.26

On his part, Ismael Barredo (Ismael) testified that while he was on his way home from the cockpit, he met Hence, the instant case.
Deogracias who was drunk and challenging everybody to a fight. Ismael allegedly advised Deogracias to go home
but the latter, instead of heeding his advice, threatened the former with a revolver. As Deogracias was walking, Edgar assails the RTC's and the Court of Appeal's findings which gave weight and credence to the accounts of the
Ismael kept an eye on him. When Deogracias reached the place of Edgar, he challenged the latter to a duel. incident given by prosecution witnesses Alberto and Teresita. Edgar contends that said prosecution witnesses
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never made unequivocal declarations that they actually witnessed him hitting the victim with a revolver. He points Teresita unmistakably perceived the incident as it was unfolding, because it happened within her view, unimpeded
out that the same witnesses did not categorically state what happened prior to the first burst of gunfire, thereby by any obstruction. Her house was just across the road from that of the assailant. The electric light from the electric
creating doubt on his involvement in the slaughter of Deogracias. He also insists that the lower courts should not post located so close to the crime scene adequately lit up the place. Thus, the incident could not have escaped her
have accorded belief to the testimonies of Alberto and Teresita, since they were closely related to the victim. attention, because she was just a few meters away from the assailant.
Furthermore, Edgar questions Alberto's belated act of coming forward as a witness.
Alberto, who was more or less 10 meters away from where the assailant was, recalled the incident in this manner:
The elemental question in this case is the credibility of the parties and their witnesses.
Q:     How far is that house of Edgar Gerasta from your house?cra lawlibrary
Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most A:     About 10 or 15 meters.
competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the xxx
declarant's demeanor, conduct and position to discriminate between truth and falsehood. 27 This is especially true Q:     On March 9, 1980, at about 6:30 in the evening, where were you if you can recall?cra lawlibrary
when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, because said findings are generally A:     I was in the sala of my house.
conclusive and binding upon this Court, unless it be manifestly shown that the latter court had overlooked or Q:     At about such time and on such date, could you recall if there was an unusual incident that happened?cra
disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in the case. 28 The RTC and the Court of Appeals lawlibrary
did not overlook any significant facts in the case. A:     At that precise moment, 6:30 in the evening, I heard an explosion which prompted me to look out of the
window and I saw Edgar Gerasta by the window of his house pointing a gun to the body of Deogracias Rendal lying
In no uncertain terms, the prosecution's eyewitnesses, Alberto and Teresita, were in unison in pointing to Edgar as down on the ground and he fired for the second time.
the person who gunned down the victim. They were able to identify Edgar as the perpetrator, since the crime scene xxx
was illuminated by an electric bulb perched on an electric post. Teresita testified as follows: Q:     Will you explain to this Honorable Court how come you were able to see Edgar Gerasta by his window when it
was already dark at that time?cra lawlibrary
A:     I was able to see Edgar Gerasta holding his gun pointing at the same time to the body of Deogracias Rendal
Q:     And you remember that your attention was focused on the residence of the accused in this case?cra lawlibrary
already lying on the ground because the electric post that was lighted is near the house of Edgar Gerasta and my
A:     At first I did not give attention to the house of the accused because my purpose of going out was to get the
house is only a few meters away from his house.
scattered firewood, but upon hearing the explosion that was the time I focused my attention to the house of the
Q:     After [Qurino] Gerasta, as you said, answered his brother Edgar Gerasta, "already dead" (patay na), what
accused
transpired next?cra lawlibrary
Q:     When your attention was invited by the sudden explosion that you heard at that time, who was the first person
A:     After that Edgar Gerasta went down, got out of his house and went to the body of Deogracias Rendal still
you have seen in the direction where the explosion was?cra lawlibrary
carrying with him his firearm and when he was near the body of Deogracias Rendal he made announcement,
A:     After hearing the explosion, I look back toward the house of the accused and I saw Edgar Gerasta holding a
saying: "Whoever is aggrieved, I will shoot him." Then he carried the dead body of Deogracias Rendal to his house.
gun pointing the said gun to my husband who was wounded in front of his house, that was after the first explosion.
xxx
Q:     You therefore agree with me that you have witnessed the particular moment that the accused of theses cases
Q:     Mr. Witness, could you tell use what happened after that?cra lawlibrary
had shot your husband. I am referring to the first explosion that you made mention?cra lawlibrary
A:     Not long after that the policemen arrived so I went down and I saw Edgar Gerasta surrendering his firearm to
A:     I saw the accused fired the gun to my husband because the accused was in the window of his house, because
the policemen x x x.
upon hearing the explosion, I look back to the house of the accused, so I saw the accused holding and pointing the
Q:     You said "policemen", how many policemen were there?cra lawlibrary
gun to my husband.
A:     Two policemen.
Q     After hearing the explosion, how many seconds did you turn your head to the place where the explosion was?
Q:     What are their names?cra lawlibrary
cra lawlibrary
A:     Pat. Empacis and Pat. Isidro Duterte.30
A:     More or less five seconds.
Q:     And at that right moment, you have also seen the accused standing at the side of the window of his
residence?cra lawlibrary Although Teresita and Alberto may not have witnessed Edgar pull the trigger for the first time, they were able to see
A:     Yes, I saw the accused standing by the window of his house still holding the gun and pointing the said gun to him pointing the gun at the victim just a second or two following the first gunfire. This fact alone would have
my husband. undoubtedly pinned Edgar as the assailant. But there is more. The two witnesses actually saw him fire the second
Q:     At the time you were standing beside the road fronting the house of the accused?cra lawlibrary shot aimed at the victim. Taking pride in his violent feat, he even challenged and threatened to kill anyone who
Q:     Yes, I was standing at the place fronting the house of the accused because I wanted to see what Edgar might disapprove of what he just did. Moments later when the policemen arrived, Edgar surrendered to the police
Gerasta would do to my husband. officers the gun which he admitted he used in shooting the victim.
Q:     Are you familiar with the residence of Edgar Gerasta?cra lawlibrary
A:     Yes, sir, because the house of the accused to my house is only more or less two meters away. 29
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What further militates against Edgar's claim is that by raising self-defense, he admitted he shot the victim and minimum period pursuant to Article 64(2) of the Revised Penal Code, which ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 14
inflicted on him the two gunshot wounds. Unfortunately for him, from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, it years and 8 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the imposable penalty shall be
is readily clear that the first requisite of self-defense is wanting. The victim was standing by the road in front of taken from the full range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e, prision mayor or from 6 years and one day to 12
Edgar's house. Edgar was by the window and fired at the victim. Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was years.
totally absent. Granting arguendo that the victim shouted and challenged Edgar to a fight, such act would not have
constituted unlawful aggression so as to justify Edgar's taking away the victim's life. First, the victim was unarmed. The RTC imposed on Edgar the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of  prision mayor, as
How could he possibly inflict any harm on Edgar who was armed with a gun?cra lawlibrary minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The penalty imposed by
the trial court was within the prescribed range; hence, we sustain it.
The version of the defense detailing the manner in which he supposedly defended himself from the assault of the
victim is hard to believe. He claims that he and the victim, whom he claimed to be drunk, struggled for possession of The RTC also awarded P50,000.00 as death indemnity and the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos P20,000.00 for
the gun allegedly owned by the latter. According to him, in the course of the struggle, the victim who was noticeably funeral expenses.
of smaller build than Edgar was accidentally hit by the gunshot and fell from the stairs. What is odd is that if the first
shot hit the victim and caused him to fall down, why did the victim sustain another gunshot wound from a different The RTC awarded P20,000.00 for funeral expenses incurred by the victim's heirs. However, in People v. Dela
bullet? The nature and number of injuries likewise make Edgar's defense highly suspect. If indeed they were Cruz,36 it was held that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, as
wresting control of the gun, it defies logic why the victim suffered one gunshot wound in the head and another in the in the present case, the award of temperate damages for P25,000.00 is justified, in lieu of actual damages for a
thigh. lesser amount. This Court ratiocinated that it would be anomalous and unfair that the heirs of a victim who tried and
succeeded in proving actual damages amounting to less than P25,000.00 would be in a worse situation than
With this frail evidence adduced by Edgar to support self-defense, juxtaposed with the strong and convincing another who might have presented no receipts at all but would be entitled to P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
evidence of the prosecution, his conviction is ineluctably forthcoming. Hence, in lieu of the actual damages, the heirs of the victim are entitled to P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

Edgar is clutching at straws in making an issue out of the delay on the part of Alberto to report that he witnessed the In addition, the heirs of the victim are also entitled to P50,000.00 as moral damages in line with recent
incident. There is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, frightful jurisprudence.37
or traumatic experience - - some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into
insensibility.31 Different people react differently to a given stimulus or type of situation. 32 Edgar had sufficiently WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 9 November 2005, which affirmed the 8 November 1996
explained his delay in reporting the crime: that he was shocked, as it was his first time to witness an actual killing. 33 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 11, finding Edgar L. Gerasta GUILTY of the crime of
Homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that Edgar L. Gerasta is also ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of the award of funeral
expenses.
The relationship of witnesses Alberto and Teresita to the victim did not impair the credibility of their testimonies,
absent any showing that they had improper motives. On the contrary, since they were closely related to the victim, SO ORDERED.
their natural instinct would be to help bring the real culprit to justice. Hence, it would make them more believable, as
it would be unnatural for them, who are interested in vindicating the crime to impute it to somebody other than the G.R. No. 130601               December 4, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN, 
real culprit.34 To blame an innocent man for the killing of the victim would serve them no purpose. 35
RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN appeals from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City finding him
In fine, this Court defers to the findings of the trial court, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, there being guilty of Robbery with Rape, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the
no cogent reason to veer away from such findings. victim, Dominga Pikit-pikit, ₱8,500.00 for actual damages and ₱50,000.00 for moral damages.1

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered in Edgar's favor. The evidence shows that Culled principally from the testimonies of Dominga Pikit-pikit and PO3 Steve dela Cruz, the inculpatory facts follow:
Edgar surrendered to a person in authority on the day of the incident. This fact was not contested by the At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of 16 April 1995 complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit, 24 years old, was
prosecution. walking towards Emiville Subdivision, Diversion Road, Sasa, Davao City, on her way home from work. Suddenly, a
man appeared from behind, looped his arm around her neck and warned her not to shout or else she would
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. Taking into account the die.2 The man then dragged her through the banana plantation towards the cornfields where the plants were a meter
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and the fact that no aggravating circumstance attended the high and far apart.3 When Dominga shouted for help, the man pushed her to the ground and punched her on the
commission of the crime, the maximum penalty of the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be imposed in its stomach saying, "Leche ka, why are you shouting? What do you want me to do, make you unconscious?" 4
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Dominga Pikit-pikit got a good look at the man, who turned out to be accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y Guzman, Eulalio and Juan corroborated his alibi and testified on his good moral character as a ministerial servant of their
as he sat on her thighs and proceeded to divest her of her belongings - ladies watch, bracelet, ring with russian faith.
diamonds, wedding ring and ₱1,000.00 cash. With the full moon shining on his face, the victim clearly saw Diopita
place the items on the right pocket of his shorts. 5 On 18 June 1997, the trial court formally rejected his defense of alibi and convicted him of the crime charged;
consequently, accused-appellant is now before us on appeal. The trial court ruled -
Thereafter, accused-appellant Diopita announced his desire to have carnal knowledge of Dominga. Forthwith, he
pulled up her t-shirt and unfastened her brassiere. He also loosened her belt, unzipped her pants and struggled to Alibi is a weak defense because it can easily be fabricated that it is so easy for witnesses to get confused as to
pull it down, nearly ripping her zipper. Annoyed at the tightness of her pants, Diopita hit her and ordered her to help dates and time. The precision with which the witnesses for the defense, who are his co-members in the Jehovah’s
him pull them down.6 Dominga, fearing for her life and thinking of Diopita’s punches, obeyed. She pulled her pants Witnesses, quoted the respective hours when the participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at
to her hips. Then accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down further and got irritated in fact when he was told that best, self-serving and deserves scant consideration because of the facility with which it may be concocted and
she was wearing a girdle and panty. In frustration, he punched her repeatedly and kept on muttering, "Why is this fabricated.
very tight? What kind of panty is this?" Finally, he succeeded in pulling the girdle and panty down. 7
On the other hand, private complainant Dominga Pikit-Pikit positively identified Rafael Diopita as the person who
Accused-appellant Diopita then took off his shorts. He kissed the victim, lasciviously caressed her breasts, bit her robbed and raped her on April 16, 1995. She testified in a clear, straightforward and convincing manner and no ill-
nipples, and fornicated with her. As he was sexually assaulting her, Dominga made desperate struggles and frantic motive on her part had been shown to have prompted her to testify falsely. The failure of the defense to attribute
calls for help but her efforts proved futile until he finally satiated his lust. He then warned Dominga not to tell anyone any ill-motive on the part of Pikit-Pikit to pin responsibility on Diopita adds more credence to complainant’s
and that should he hear that she told anybody about the incident he would shoot her to death. Then he dressed up testimony.
and left, walking casually to the opposite direction of the subdivision before disappearing in the darkness. 8
In a long line of cases, it has been held that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
Exhausted, Dominga slowly stood up, put on her clothes and walked away in the direction of her house. Finding it accused by the victim. Pikit-Pikit testified that she was able to see the face of her attacker because the moon was
locked, she asked help from her neighbors who called the police. Thereafter, Dominga was brought to Precinct No. shining brightly that evening. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that in the month of April 1995 the full moon
4 of Sasa, Davao City, where SPO1 Stephen Batacan entered her complaint in the police blotter. Later, she was came out on April 15, 1995, a day before the date of the crime.
examined by Dr. Floranne Lam-Vergara at the Davao Medical Center who found her "positive for spermatocytes." 9
We affirm his conviction; the guilt of accused-appellant has been established by the evidence beyond reasonable
PO3 Steve dela Cruz, who was on duty at the Intelligence and Investigation Section, made a follow-up on the case. doubt.
He went to the victim’s house and interviewed her between the hours of 1:00 o’clock and 3:00 o’clock in the
morning of the following day, 17 April 1995. Dominga gave a description of the suspect and his possible First. Complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit positively and categorically identified accused-appellant as her
whereabouts.10 Acting on that information, PO3 dela Cruz went to the scene of the crime to investigate and there he assailant, first during the police line-up where she singled him out from among the four (4) suspects and, later
recovered a colored white/yellow, size ten (10) slipper. Since the victim earlier disclosed that the suspect headed during the trial where she pointed at accused-appellant as the one who robbed and sexually molested her -
north after committing the crime, he proceeded to that direction where he came upon four (4) houses about fifteen
(15) to fifty (50) meters away from the scene of the crime. A back-up team was called and they rounded up all the
residents therein. Afterwards, four (4) men who fitted the description of the suspect were invited to the police station Q: Where did you go?
for questioning. They were Placido Laput, William Silvano, Vicente Silvano and accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y A: To the Police Station, there were four persons who lined up for identification.
Guzman.11 Q: And then?
A: First, when I arrived, I peeped behind the place where there were four persons lining up. After that I went to the
place where they were receiving visitors and I saw the four persons who were there already and lined up.
At about 6:00 o’clock in the morning of 17 April 1995, the police invited Dominga to identify the suspect at the police Q: And then?
station. Thereat, Dominga saw the four (4) men in a police line-up and readily pointed at accused-appellant. 12 The A: After that the police told me to identify the person who molested me, and I pointed to that person there (witness
police then had him try on the recovered slipper; it easily fitted him. 13 Thus, Diopita was detained while the others pointing to the accused whom she previously identified). 15
were released.
From the circumstances of this case, it cannot be denied that complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit had a good
The defense denied the charge and invoked alibi. Accused-appellant claimed that between 8:30 to 12:00 o’clock in look at the face and physical features of accused-appellant during the commission of the crime. While the robbery
the evening of 16 April 1995 he was with his wife Flora, son Ryan and fellow Jehovah’s Witnesses Roger Custorio was in progress, the moonlight sufficiently illumined his face and clothes, thus making it possible for private
and Ruben Suarez at the house of Eulalio Nisnisan for an informal Bible session upon the invitation of Juan complainant to identify him.16 During the rape, private complainant was as close to accused-appellant as was
Nisnisan.14 Accused-appellant also claimed that during those hours, he never left the place. Flora, Roger, Ruben, physically possible, for a man and a woman cannot be more physically close to each other than during a sexual
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act.17 Victims of criminal violence naturally strive to know the identity of their assailants and observe the manner the based on this defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (a) he was in another
crime was perpetrated, creating a lasting impression which may not be erased easily in their memory. 18 There is place at the time of the commission of the offense; and, (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
therefore no reason to doubt the accuracy of private complainant’s visual perception of accused-appellant as the the crime at the time it was committed.21 This, accused-appellant miserably failed to do.
criminal. Nor is there any reason to doubt her honesty of intention for there is no showing that she implicated
accused-appellant due to an evil or corrupt motive. Accused-appellant admitted that at the time in question he was with his wife, son and fellow members of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses at the house of one Eulalio Nisnisan supposedly attending Bible studies, which is merely
We do not subscribe to accused-appellant’s contentions that the complaining witness hesitated to point at him fifteen (15) to fifty (50) meters away from the crime scene. Considering the short and insignificant distance, it was
during the police line-up, and that she was just forced by the police to choose him from among the four (4) not impossible for accused-appellant to surreptitiously slip away from the house of Nisnisan, commit the crime and
suspects. The identification was made with such certainty by the complaining witness that even accused-appellant then return without arousing the suspicion of his companions who were then busy with their Bible session. This is
had to comment on it - obviously the situation in this case and, taken together with the preceding considerations, we likewise reject this
poor and discredited defense as did the trial court. Verily, even if the defense of alibi is corroborated by the
Atty. Galicia: What made you say she was hesitant to point at you? x x x x testimony of the friends of accused-appellant, it deserves the barest consideration and will not be given weight if it
would not preclude any doubt that he could have been physically present at the locus criminis or its
immediate vecino at the time of its commission.22
Rafael Diopita: Because during that time, sir, when we confronted each other in the police station, she was looking
at me when there were four of us there. So, I asked why x x x x 19
Third. Perhaps aware of the crushing impact of complainant’s positive identification of accused-appellant, the
defense attacked the supposed inconsistencies and discrepancies in her testimony in a vain attempt to make it
The foregoing testimony belied the allegation of hesitancy on the part of Dominga Pikit-pikit to pinpoint accused-
completely unreliable, claiming that: (a) the victim declared that the culprit wore short pants with a zipper, and he
appellant during the line-up. His very own words project his guilt as well. Only the guilty experiences neurotic fear in
had no short pants with zipper; (b) the yellow slipper retrieved by the police did not belong to him as his slippers
the face of imminent discovery of his malefaction. His paranoia colors his interpretation of the events during the line-
were colored blue, with his initials inscribed thereon; and, (c) the description given by complainant in the police
up. Consider accused-appellant’s assertion that Dominga Pikit-pikit was forced by the police to point at him, and
blotter did not fit the physical appearance of accused-appellant.
Prosecutor Esparagoza's objection thereto –

We are not persuaded. Suffice it to say that these are mere trifles which do not detract from complainant’s
straightforward and consistent identification of accused-appellant as the one who robbed and raped her. Trivial
inconsistencies do not shake the pedestal upon which the complainant’s credibility rests. On the contrary, they are
Sur-rebuttal of Atty. Galicia: Mr. Diopita, according to private complainant Dominga Pikit-pikit during her rebuttal taken as badges of truth rather than as indicia of falsehood for they manifest spontaneity and erase any suspicion of
testimony that she was not forced by the police to point at you when you were in the police station. What can you a rehearsed testimony.23 Furthermore, entries in police blotters should not be given undue significance or probative
say to that? value for they are normally incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestion or want of
suggestion or inquiry.24
Rafael Diopita: That woman hesitated to point at me but the police said you point at him.
Fourth. We now deal with the more substantial arguments raised by accused-appellant in his brief. He tenaciously
Q: What made you say she was hesitant to point at you? maintains that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime charged since he is a person of good moral
character, holding as he does the position of "Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and
Prosecutor Esparagoza: The witness said "ITUDLO! ITUDLO!" (YOU POINT! YOU POINT!). He did not say he was that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the word
the one pointed to, your Honor.20 of God.

Gleaned from the aforequoted testimony was the absence of suggestiveness in the identification process. There We are not impressed. The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the
were four (4) men in the line-up and the police did not specifically suggest to Dominga to point particularly at conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of "Ministerial
accused-appellant. Not even the shodding of the slipper recovered from the scene of the crime could provide any Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed,
suggestiveness to the line-up as it came after accused-appellant was already identified by Dominga Pikit-pikit. religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the
impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral
Second. In light of this positive and direct evidence of accused-appellant’s culpability, the trial court correctly character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue
discarded his defense of alibi. It is an elementary rule that alibi cannot prevail over the clear and positive of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the
identification of the accused as the very person who committed the crime. Moreover, in order to justify an acquittal evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of
accused-appellant is unavailing.
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Accused-appellant likewise bewails and assigns as reversible error the failure of the trial court to give credence to On 3 December 1993, Dominga Anib filed a complaint for rape 2 against MARIO and RICARDO on behalf of her
the testimonies of the defense witnesses. He argues that these are Jehovah’s Witnesses, and as such, they are mentally retarded daughter ANACURITA before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tagana-an-Sison,
God-fearing people who would never lie as to his whereabouts at the time in question. This argument is as puerile Surigao del Norte. The complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. 993, alleged that ANACURITA is a "retardate"
as the first. We quote once more, and with approval, the pertinent portion of the trial court’s ruling on this point - and the crime was committed at midnight of 2 December 1993. Submitted in support of the complaint was a medical
certificate3 issued by the Surigao Provincial Hospital and the affidavits 4 of Dominga Anib, Eduardo Diaz and Anita
x x x x it is so easy for witnesses to get confused as to dates and time. 1âwphi1 The precision with which the Lisondra.
witnesses for the defense, who are his co-members in the Jehovah’s Witnesses, quoted the respective hours when
the participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at best, self-serving and deserves scant After conducting a preliminary examination, the MCTC found a prima facie case for rape, confirmed the arrest and
consideration because of the facility with which it may be concocted and fabricated ( underscoring supplied). detention of MARIO and RICARDO without bail, and required them to submit their counter-affidavits. Instead of
filing their counter-affidavits, MARIO and RICARDO filed a joint motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that the
The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is best and most competently performed by the trial crime of rape cannot be prosecuted de oficio and the complaint was not signed by the offended party, there being
court who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying, and to assess no proof that the latter was incapacitated.
their credibility using various indicia available but not reflected in the records. 25 Hence, the court a quo's appraisal
on the matter is entitled to the highest respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing In its resolution5 of 10 January 1994, the MCTC ruled that the complaint was properly filed by the mother of
that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would ANACURITA since the latter is a retarded woman and stated that "by merely looking upon the victim, the Court finds
affect the result of the case.26 There is no compelling reason in the present case to depart from this rule. that indeed Anacurita Anib is a retarded woman." It also found probable cause that MARIO and RICARDO
committed the crime charged and forwarded the case to the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of the information.
In sum, we find that all the elements of robbery with rape are present in this case. There was asportation of the
jewelry and cash of the victim by means of force and violence on her person, showing the initial animus lucrandi of On 24 January 1994, the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of Surigao del Norte filed with the Regional Trial Court of
accused-appellant,27 and then his lecherous intent when he raped his victim. Accordingly, we hold that the court Surigao del Norte a complaint 6 for rape, bearing the thumb mark of ANACURITA and approved by the Provincial
below did not commit any reversible error in ruling that the requisite quantum of evidence for a finding of guilt has Prosecutor. The complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4247 and assigned to Branch 30 thereof, alleges as
been sufficiently met by the prosecution as to call for our affirmance of the judgment of the court a quo.28 follows:

However, in addition to the actual and moral damages awarded by the trial court in the amounts of ₱8,500.00 and That on or about the 2nd day of December 1993, at 12:00 o’clock [ sic] midnight, more or less, at Barangay Aurora,
₱50,000.00, respectively, another amount of ₱50,000.00 should have also been awarded to the victim Dominga Tagana-an, Surigao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused with full
Pikit-pikit for civil indemnity, as it is mandatory upon a conviction of rape. Such indemnity is distinct from moral freedom and intelligence did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of violence and
damages and based on different jural foundations. 29 intimidation, and taking advantage of nighttime drag MISS ANACURITA ANIB y DUMANACAL inside the vacant
house of Jaime Batac and have carnal knowledge of herein complainant against her will.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, convicting accused-appellant
RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN of ROBBERY WITH RAPE, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and in an uninhabited place.
to pay DOMINGA PIKIT-PIKIT the sums of ₱8,500.00 for actual damages and ₱50,000.00 for moral damages, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that, in addition, civil indemnity of another ₱50,000.00 is further awarded to MARIO and RICARDO sought for a reinvestigation of the case. They questioned the unsigned complaint for rape
her. Costs against accused-appellant. SO ORDERED. and alleged that ANACURITA’s filing of the complaint belied her mental incapacity. Moreover, she never gave a
categorical statement that she was raped. The defense further asserted as hearsay the statement of Dominga Anib
G.R. No. 123096               December 18, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, , vs. MARIO DUMANON y and Anita Lisondra in their affidavits that ANACURITA confessed to them that she was raped. They also assailed
DUMANACAL and RICARDO LABRADOR y SUACILLO, alias "RIC-RIC,"  the prosecution for its failure to present any eyewitness. Finally, they maintained that they were deprived of their
right to submit their counter-affidavits.
Accused-appellants Mario Dumanon y Dumanacal (hereafter MARIO) and Ricardo Labrador y Suacillo (hereafter
RICARDO) appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30, in Criminal Case No. The prosecution opposed the motion for reinvestigation. It claimed that MARIO and RICARDO were actually
4247, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing them to suffer the penalty required but failed to submit their counter-affidavits. Moreover, since it was already resolved that ANACURITA is a
of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the complainant Anacurita Anib (hereafter ANACURITA) the amount of ₱20,000 retardate, thus mentally incapacitated, the law recognizes the right of her mother to file the complaint on her behalf.
as moral damages and the costs of the suit. However, as stated in the decision of the trial court, MARIO and RICARDO abandoned the motion and instead
proceeded with the arraignment wherein they separately entered a plea of not guilty. 7

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Trial on the merits started only on 2 June 1994 and was completed on 22 November 1994. In its decision the trial The laceration could have been caused by an erect male penis while the hematoma was probably inflicted by a fist
court attributed the delay "to postponements at the instance of both the prosecution and the defense, especially that blow. She also found a vaginal discharge of yellowish and whitish substance. She had the specimen brought to the
the parties, being related, manifested for a possible settlement of the case." The prosecution presented as laboratory for examination for the presence of sperms. However, she was not informed of the results of the
witnesses ANACURITA, Dominga Anib, Eduardo Dizon and Dr. Gregoria Beberino-Comelon. examination.12

ANACURITA testified in court seven months after she was raped. She was then thirty-eight years old. According to Only MARIO testified for the defense while RICARDO opted not to take the witness stand.
her she knew MARIO and RICARDO as they were her friends and townmates. In the early evening of 2 December
1993, she was in the municipal gymnasium of Tagana-an, Surigao del Norte, watching a parade of gays. At about MARIO claimed that he and ANACURITA, his distant cousin, were lovers. On the evening of 2 December 1993 he
11:00 p.m. she left and headed for her home in barangay Aurora, Tagana-an. As she was walking, she passed by was also at the municipal gymnasium to watch a coronation event. At about 10:15 p.m. he decided to go home and
RICARDO who was then sitting on a bench, apparently drunk. Suddenly, RICARDO blocked her way. She tried to along the way, he saw ANACURITA and they talked by the fence of Jaime Batac’s house. He confessed his love for
break free but he continued to obstruct her way. Then he pulled her and brought her to the deserted house of Jaime her and he suggested if it was possible for them to have sexual intercourse. ANACURITA nodded her head in
Batac, which was just about nine meters away from her home. Inside the house, RICARDO stripped off his clothes consent and replied that she had yearned to bear a child at her age. They talked for ten minutes. ANACURITA
and immediately removed her underwear. He then placed his penis inside her vagina. After satisfying his lust, invited him inside the abandoned house of Jaime so that they would not be seen by her mother. Inside Jaime’s
RICARDO ran away. Then she put on her underwear. After a few minutes, MARIO, who was likewise drunk, house, he asked her again if he could have sexual intercourse with her. She consented. ANACURITA had no
entered Jaime’s house, pulled her down and undressed her. Mario inserted his penis inside her vagina and just like reaction at all during their sexual intimacy. After they were done, he escorted her to her house and then he walked
RICARDO ran away after the sexual intercourse. ANACURITA went home and told her mother what had toward his house. He immediately heard Dominga Anib scold ANACURITA. Dominga demanded to know where she
happened.8 came from and why she arrived late. In the early morning of the following day the police arrested and detained
him.13
Dominga Anib testified that MARIO and RICARDO are her neighbors and that the former is even her relative. In the
evening of 2 December 1993, ANACURITA was out watching a show at the municipal gymnasium. At about After the defense rested its case the trial court required both parties to submit their respective memoranda. The
midnight she was awakened by her husband who told her that ANACURITA had not yet arrived. When she turned parties waived the submission thereof.
on the light, she heard the protesting voice of her daughter coming from the house of Jaime Batac. She went to the
house and dragged ANACURITA home. ANACURITA was holding her underwear and her hair and dress were The trial court rendered its decision of 21 June 1995. It specifically noted therein the trial judge’s personal
soiled. She asked ANACURITA if any man did anything to her. ANACURITA told her that she had just been raped impression which he entered in his personal notes that ANACURITA is "a mongoloid (physically) and mentally
by RICARDO and MARIO inside Jaime’s house. Accompanied by Eduardo Diaz, Dominga immediately reported the deficient who has difficulty in understanding the questions." While conceding that ANACURITA’s narration of how
incident to the barangay captain and then later, to the police. On 4 December 1993, Dominga brought ANACURITA she was sexually abused by the accused-appellants was not "detailed," it nevertheless concluded that it was
to the Provincial Hospital of Surigao del Norte for examination. The turn of events caused Dominga to suffer shame "candidly told by one who is mentally deficient." She was "able to show and convince the Court that she, in fact, was
and embarrassment.9 taken advantage of by the two drunken neighbors." It gave full credence to her testimony, which was supported by
the medical findings. It held that MARIO and RICARDO, especially the former, who is her cousin, knew of
According to Eduardo Diaz, he knew MARIO and RICARDO. MARIO is a close friend and relative. He, MARIO and ANACURITA’s mental condition. It ruled that "(e)vidently, … Anacurita Anib, in her retarded understanding, was
RICARDO and the Anibs reside along the same street. On 2 December 1993, Eduardo was in the municipal overcome with shock, fear and, otherwise, intimidated by her two drunken neighbors, who accosted her."
gymnasium to watch a show. He left for home at 10:00 p.m. Along the way he saw MARIO and RICARDO. When
he arrived home, he learned that there was no more kerosene for the lamps. He went out to buy kerosene and a The trial court characterized MARIO’s version as "simply out of this world," and "even assuming that it was what has
cigarette at the store next door. He saw MARIO at the store who asked a cigarette from him. He obliged and then happened, it only manifests that the victim is, in fact, abnormal, not capacitated to give a valid consent."
went back home. He wanted to eat; but when he found out that there was no more food, he decided to request
some viand from MARIO. On the road he saw MARIO going inside the house of Jaime Batac. So, he returned
home. Later, he heard the voice of Dominga Anib from her house berating her weeping daughter ANACURITA. He The trial court also considered RICARDO’s silence as an admission of the charge against him. The trial court then
overheard that ANACURITA came from the house of Jaime Batac, which was near the house of the Anibs. decreed:
Dominga ordered ANACURITA to stay upstairs while she went out of their house. It was about midnight.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, MARIO DUMANON Y DUMANACAL and RICARDO LABRADOR Y
Dominga saw Eduardo and sought his help. Eduardo accompanied Dominga to the barangay captain, Mr. Jaime SUACILLO, alias "Ric-Ric", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized in Article
Pelarco.10 The latter looked for RICARDO and MARIO, who were eventually arrested and detained. 355, of the Revised Penal Code, and metes out the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify complainant-victim
Anacurita Anib the sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos moral damages, jointly and severally, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer the accessory penalties, provided for by law; and, to pay
Dr. Gregoria Beberino-Comelon physically examined ANACURITA on 4 December 1993 and issued the the costs.
corresponding medical certificate.11 She noted a fresh hymenal laceration at 6 o’clock and a hematoma on the thigh.
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On 13 July 1995, MARIO and RICARDO seasonably appealed from the decision, which the Court accepted on 23 The OSG further asseverates that rape committed against a feeble-minded victim does not require the use of
September 1995. However, there was an undue delay in the filing of the Appellants’ Brief, and counsel for accused- physical force since the commission of the sexual act constitutes the force itself. There was thus no need to
appellants had to be fined before he finally filed the Appellant’s Brief on 19 July 1999. establish that ANACURITA is a mental retardate since her rape was attendant with force and intimidation. It also
points out that the attempt of MARIO and RICARDO to settle the case was an implied admission of their guilt.
In their Appellants’ Brief, MARIO and RICARDO allege that:
Finally, the OSG seeks an award of civil indemnity to ANACURITA in the amount of ₱50,000 and an increase of the
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF RAPE award of moral damages from ₱20,000 to ₱50,000.
COMMITTED ON A MENTAL RETARDATE WHEN THE INFORMATION ACCUSES THEM OF RAPE
COMMITTED ON A WOMAN WITH THE USE OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION. We sustain the conviction of MARIO and RICARDO.

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINANT IS A MENTAL RETARDATE IN THE On the issue of whether or not ANACURITA is a retardate, as correctly pointed out by the defense, no expert
ABSENCE OF CLEAR MEDICAL OR EXPERT EVIDENCE SHOWING SUCH ABNORMAL PHYSICAL AND testimony was offered to prove that, indeed ANACURITA is a retardate. But, this matter gains importance if, in fact,
MENTAL CONDITION. the trial court’s conviction for rape was based on a finding that her retardation was of such an extent that she was
deprived of reason or that she had mental age of a child of less than 12 years old. As will be shown later, such is
3. NO FORCE OR INTIMIDATION ATTENDED THE SEX ACT BETWEEN THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AND not the situation obtaining in the case at bar, for we agree with the trial court’s finding that MARIO and RICARDO
THE COMPLAINANT. are guilty of rape by the use of force and intimidation.

MARIO and RICARDO underscore the fact that the complaint filed with the court below alleges that the rape was It has been held that mental retardation can be proved by evidence other than medical evidence. 14 Thus, it is our
committed with the use of force and intimidation and hence they cannot be held guilty of rape committed on a considered opinion that for purposes of determining whether ANACURITA is mentally normal or does not have the
mental retardate since this circumstance was never alleged in the Complaint. Neither can they be liable for rape mental capacity of a normal person, the personal observation of the trial judge would suffice as a measure of
committed with the use of force and intimidation since the same was not sufficiently proven by the evidence for the determining the impact on her of the force and intimidation foisted by MARIO and RICARDO vis-a-vis the legal
prosecution. requirement to prove the commission of the crime of rape.

MARIO and RICARDO emphasize that their conviction was based on the trial court’s conclusion that ANACURITA The original complaint,15 filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte by
is a mental retardate. Such a conclusion has no basis since no medical or expert opinion categorically affirming Dominga Anib on behalf of ANACURITA, alleged that ANACURITA is a retardate. The translation of the affidavit 16 of
such condition was offered by the prosecution. Accordingly, they pray for their acquittal for failure of the prosecution Dominga Anib, which was submitted in support of the original complaint, alleged that ANACURITA is "not mentally
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. normal." During the preliminary examination Dominga testified that ANACURITA is mentally retarded. 17 The
Resolution18 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte categorically declared that
In the Appellee’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) refutes the errors raised by MARIO and RICARDO. "by merely looking upon the victim," ANACURITA is indeed a "retarded woman."
It counters that the trial court did not convict MARIO and RICARDO of rape of a mental retardate deprived of
reason, but of simple rape through force and intimidation, although not necessarily employed with immense The transcript of stenographic notes is also replete with particulars on ANACURITA’s mental condition. When she
measure but one that was sufficient for the victim not to resist. The force contemplated by law in the commission of first testified, the trial court ordered to "make it on record the physical appearance of the witness [ANACURITA]
rape is relative, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties. The only requirement is that force or having [a] hard time in understanding the question of the interpreter," and that she is "mentally deficient." As she
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Intimidation must be viewed in continued with her testimony, it further observed that she had difficulty answering the questions and, under the
light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast circumstances, it allowed leading questions during her direct examination. 19
rule.
The appealed decision likewise bears the trial court’s personal impression that ANACURITA "appears to be
The OSG asserts that in this case the trial court found that ANACURITA was mentally deficient, as revealed by its mongoloid (physically) and mentally deficient who has difficulty in understanding the questions." 20 We often call a
personal notes quoted in its decision, its forbearance in allowing the prosecution to proceed with leading questions person who is suffering from mongolism as a mongoloid. Mongolism is a condition characterized by a small,
during her direct examination due to her difficulty in comprehending and responsively answering the questions, and anteroposteriorly flattened skull, short, flat-bridged nose, epicanthus, short-phalanges, and widened space between
in acknowledging the observation of the MCTC judge in his Resolution that ANACURITA was different from or less the first and second digits of hands and feet, with moderate to severe mental retardation and associated with a
than those of a fully functioning adult. Hence, the degree of force needed to overwhelm her is less. The force which chromosomal abnormality.21 It is known as mongolism because its physiognomic features are suggestive of those
may not be sufficient for the rape of a normal person, may be more than enough when employed in the rape of a normally exhibited by the Mongolian race.22 It is also known as Down’s Syndrome.23 Hence, the courts can take
mentally deficient person, like ANACURITA.
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judicial notice of the appearance and features of those suffering from mongolism and based thereon, conclude that Q And when Mario Dumanon arrived, did he say anything to you?
a victim, like ANACURITA, is a mongoloid. A None.
Q Without talking to you Mario Dumanon removed his pants?
Having established that ANACURITA is a retardate even in the absence of an expert opinion thereon, we shall now A Yes, sir.
determine if MARIO and RICARDO were properly charged with rape by means of force and intimidation. A thorough xxx
review of the assailed decision supports the findings and conclusion of the trial court that ANACURITA was indeed Q As a matter of fact when he removed your pantie [ sic] you did not resist by telling him "not to do that to me"?
raped by means of force and intimidation. ANACURITA in her testimony declared that while she was on her way A He was also drunk.
home, RICARDO, then drunk, blocked her way, pulled her toward the uninhabited house of Jaime Batac and once Q And when he pulled you to lie down with him because he was already lying down, you did not pushed [ sic] him
inside the house he undressed her and took off her panty and inserted his penis into her vagina. 24 After he was away?
through, RICARDO ran away. Then later MARIO arrived. MARIO pulled ANACURITA and also inserted his penis A He was drunk.
into her vagina.25 Q You could have run away by pushing his hands but you did not, is it not a fact of the situation?
A Yes, sir.
Q Although you knew that you could have run away yet you did not run away?
The blocking, the holding of the hand, the pulling towards an uninhabited house, the removal of the panty and the
A The door is too small.
fact that both MARIO and RICARDO were in a state of drunkenness, were enough force and intimidation
Q Whether the door is small or not yet there is [ sic] no attempt on your part to run away?
considering the mental state of ANACURITA.
A No, sir.
Q You did not even shout for help?
The use of force or intimidation was further shown in the cross-examination of ANACURITA by defense counsel, A No, sir.26
Atty. Medina, thus:
Furthermore, the hematoma found on the victim’s left thigh as shown by the medical certificate issued by the
xxx examining physician27 is physical evidence of the use of force in the consummation of the beastly act.
Q Let’s go to that testimony of yours that Ricardo Labrador grab [ sic] you to the house of Jaime Batac, how did
Ricardo Labrador grab you?
It is a settled rule that force in rape is relative, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties. In the same
A He pulled me.
manner, intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the
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commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. When the victim is a retardate the force required to
Q So you went [sic] to tell the Court that Ric-Ric was just leading you towards the house of Jaime and not dragging
overcome her is of a lesser degree than that used against a normal adult. 28 Thus, the degree of force which may not
you with the used [sic] of one hand?
suffice when the victim is a normal person, may be more than enough when employed against an imbecile. 29
A He pulled me, sir.
Q You did not shout when Ric-Ric Labrador was pulling you towards the house of Jaime?
A No, sir. With the foregoing disquisition, MARIO and RICARDO were correctly convicted of rape under the first circumstance
Q You did not also pulled [sic] back your hand to free it from the hand of Ricardo Labrador? of Article 335, i.e. by the use of force or intimidation. Once the elements of force and intimidation were properly
A No, also sir. alleged in the Information and duly proven during the trial, as in this case, the conviction becomes a matter of
Q There was not even an attempt on your part to free your hand? course. As correctly assessed by the OSG, the conviction for rape decreed by the trial court was not based on the
A I struggle [sic], sir. fact that ANACURITA is a mental retardate, but on the use of force and intimidation. The mental retardation of
Q How did you attempt to free your hand? ANACURITA was only a circumstance which the trial court considered in evaluating the degree and extent of the
A (Witness indicating her answer by pulling her hand towards the right side of her body reaching as far as his palm force and intimidation.1âwphi1
as her palm towards her right side).
Q But you were not able to free your hand? We also take note of the trial court’s pronouncement 30 that accused-appellants manifested a possible settlement of
A I was able to free my hand. the case. The offer of compromise is an implied admission of guilt pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 27,
Q So when you succeeded in freeing your hand from the grabs [ sic] of Ricardo Labrador you did not make an Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.31
attempt to run away?
A I was not able to run, it did not occur to my mind. Finally, as regards the civil aspects in this case, in accordance with current jurisprudence 32 we grant the award of
Q Even if you were able to free your hand from the grab of Ric-Ric still you went with Ric-Ric towards the house of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity for the rape of ANACURITA, and the increase of moral damages from ₱20,000 to
Jaime? ₱50,000 even without proof thereof.33
A I try [sic] to run away but he blocked my way.
xxx
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WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Surigao City, Branch 30, finding accused-appellants from the accused at the aforesaid billiard hall; (pp. 5, tsn, Jan. 22, 1982 A.M. Exhibits " H " and "
MARIO DUMANON y DUMANCAL and RICARDO LABRADOR y SUACILLO, alias "RIC-RIC," guilty beyond I ".)
reasonable doubt of rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that they are further That on July 24, 1981, at around 11:00 PM, the aforesaid officers, Patrolmen Joves and
ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000 to the complainant ANACURITA ANIB, and the amount of Federes and Sgt. Guitan were at the aforesaid billiard hall together with the confidential
moral damages awarded to the latter is increased from ₱20,000 to ₱50,000. Costs against accused-appellants. informant and the latter approached the herein accused to buy marijuana, and the accused
received the four (4) P5.00 bills, all previously marked by the police officers, and accused gave
G.R. No. L-66875 June 19, 1986 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs FELICIANO RUBIO y ALCOBENDAS,  one (1) small plastic bag of marijuana to the buyer (confidential informant) and after said
informant had left the billiard hall, Patrolman Federes apprehended herein accused and frisked
In an information filed on July 27, 1981 with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, FELICIANO RUBIO y him and recovered from his possession four (4) P5.00 bills, which were previously
ALCOBENDAS was accused of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, in the following manner: marked,together with two more plastic bags of marijuana leaves from the right side pocket of his
(accused's) pants; (pp. 5-6, 12-13, tsn, Jan. 18, 1982 A.M.; pp. 4-5, tsn, Jan. 22,1982 PM;
Exhibits "H" and "I".)
That on or about July 24, 1981, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then
and there wilfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale one (1) small plastic bag containing That the confidential informant relinquished the small plastic bag of marijuana leaves which he
marijuana leaves to an unidentified confidential informant for a consideration of P20.00 and the bought and received from the accused and this small plastic bag together with the other two (2)
said marijuana is a prohibited drug. (Expediente, p. 1.) plastic bags of marijuana leaves were submitted to the Forensic Division of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) for examination; (pp. 8, 13, 15-16, tsn, Jan. 18, 1982 A.M.; p. 4, tsn, Jan.
22, 1982 A.M.; Exhibits "H " and "I "; see also Exhibits "B " and "C".)

That witness Nieva G. Gamosa, Forensic Chemist of the NBI conducted microscopic and
chemical examinations on the specimen (3) small plastic bags containing marijuana leaves with
several pieces of rolling papers (Exhs. A, A-1, A-2 and A- 3), submitted by Patrolman Federes,
The accused pleaded "not guilty" to the charge and after trial he was sentenced as follows: and the result of the microscopic examination on the said specimen which gave a positive result
for marijuana (Exh. "C"), and that witness Gamosa conducted the three examinations, it being
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Feliciano Rubio y Alcobendas, guilty beyond the standard procedure to test the presence of marijuana; (pp. 2-5, tsn, Nov. 4, 1981; Exhibits
reasonable doubt of the crime as charged and hereby sentences him to serve the penalty of life "B" and "C"; also Exhibits "H" and " I ".)
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and to pay the costs. ( Id., p. 71.)
That the three aforesaid police officers affixed their signatures and/or initials on the four (4) P
Rubio filed a notice of appeal which is the reason for this decision. 5.00 bills and took down the serial number of each and that Patrolman Joves was the one who
investigated the accused on July 24, 1981 inside the Investigation Room of Police Station No. 5,
People's counsel has adopted the narration of facts in the appealed decision as follows: and after informing the accused about the nature of the charges against him and about his
constitutional rights, accused verbally admitted that he sold the one small plastic bag of
...it appears that a report from a concerned citizen was received by the police station No. 5, marijuana leaves but he refused to reduce in writing his verbal admission. (pp. 8-11, 12, tsn,
Western Police District, [Metro Manila], to the effect that there was an illegal act being Jna. 28, 1982 A.M.; Exhibits "H" and I ".) (Brief,  pp. 3-5.)
committed by the suspect, by selling marijuana at the billiard hall of the Boulevard Executive
Building, Ermita, Manila; that upon receipt of said confidential information, the aforesaid Upon the other hand, the appellant's version is as follows:
Patrolman Joves and Sgt.Guitan conducted a week long surveillance of the quarry and they
were able to ascertain the Identity and name of the suspect-alias Tarras-who is the herein ... that on July 24, 1981 at around 10:00 P.M., while he was inside the billiard hall of the
accused, Feliciano Rubio y Alcobendas; (pp. 3-4, tsn, Feb. 22, 1982 A.M. pp. 3-5, tsn, Jan. 22, Executive Building, Ermita, Manila, being a bystander, and while there, all of a sudden
1982 A.M. Exhibits "H " and "I".) somebody came close to him; that he does not know these persons who approached him who
were in civilian clothes and they said they were policemen and told him not to run that he asked
That after one week of surveillance, the aforesaid police officers gave the confidential informant why he was told not to run and they answered 'we are law enforcements and further said they
P 20.00 in four (4) P5.00 bill denominations (Exhs. D, E, F & G) with which to buy marijuana were informed that he (accused) is selling marijuana; that he answered he is not and at this time

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 he was being searched and nothing was taken from his possession; that at the time he had no about 11:00 P.M. they were inside the billiard hall of the Boulevard Executive Building in Ermita, Manila. There they
money in his possession and afterwards he was brought to the Police Precinct 5; that at the saw, from a distance of about 5 meters, the accused deliver to their informant a plastic bag in exchange for P20.00
Police Precinct, he explained to the police but they never paid attention to him; that the three (3) in four 5-peso bills which had been previously marked. Immediately thereafter Patrolman Federes apprehended the
plastic bags of marijuana and the money were not taken from him; that his investigation at the accused, frisked him and confiscated the marked money together with two more plastic bags similar to the one
Police Precinct was nor reduced in writing; that after his investigation he was brought to the City which had been delivered to the informer. In the light of this testimonial evidence, the Identity of the plastic bag
Jail; that he told the police that he was innocent of the crime for which he was arrested; and that mentioned in the information appears to be indubitable. It should be stated in this connection that during the trial of
he has not filed any complaint against these police investigators since July 27, 1981. the case the accused never for a moment questioned the Identity of the plastic bag which constitutes the corpus
(Expediente, pp. 68-69.) delicti.

It should be stated that the above version is based solely on the testimony of the appellant for there was no other Anent the second proposition, the appellant states:
witness for the defense.
Since Miss Nieva Gamosa was being presented as an expert witness, the prosecution had the
The appellant claims that the trial court erred in convicting him because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt and burden of proving that she is indeed an expert witness and must prove that she possesses the
in support thereof he advances the following propositions: necessary learning, knowledge, skill and experience to give an opinion as an expert witness.
(Carbone vs. Warburton 94 A2d 680, 683; Fully vs. Mahoming Exp. Co., 119 NE2d 831, 833;
1. There is absolutely nothing to show that the alleged bag of marijuana leaves allegedly turned Dark vs. Fitzer 149 NW2d 222, 229; International Security Life Insurance Co. vs. Beauchamp,
over by the alleged informer of the Western Police District is the very same bag which 464 SW2d 679, 681.)
defendant-appellant allegedly sold to him. " (Brief, p. 7.)
xxx xxx xxx
2. The NBI forensic chemist, Nieva Gamosa, was not qualified as an expert witness to testify
that the contents of the bag in question are marijuana leaves. ( Id, p. 10.) The statement of Miss Nieva Gamosa that she is a forensic chemist is not sufficient to establish
that she is an expert witness. The prosecution should have proven her learning, knowledge, skill
In support of the first proposition, the appellant points to the fact that the alleged informer was never presented as a and experience. (Brief,  pp. 8-9.)
witness to prove the fact that the bag he received from the appellant was the very same bag which he delivered to
the police. The People's counsel has, in our opinion, sufficiently rebutted the appellant's proposition in the
following words:
Rebutting this argument, the Solicitor General states:
Even at the start of her testimony as a prosecution witness, Miss Nieva Gamosa declared that
Even if these three plastic bags containing marijuana leaves were not 'authenticated', as she is a forensic chemist of the NBI and that some of her duties were to conduct biological
appellant insists that they should be, their Identification during the trial of this criminal case in chemical and physical analysis of dangerous drugs (p. 2, tsn, Nov. 4, 1981). Thereafter, the
the court below was clearly established. The records of this criminal case will show that counsel prosecuting fiscal proceeded to ask questions on her having conducted the examinations of the
for the appellant never questioned or opposed the presentation and Identification of the specimen or contents of the three plastic bags containing marijuana leaves forwarded to the
aforesaid three plastic bags containing marijuana leaves during the trial on the merits before the NBI (Exhibit "B "), which were confiscated from the appellant by the police officers (Exhibits "A",
lower court. There was no need, therefore, to present the confidential informant for secrecy and "A-1 ", "A-2" and "A-3"), as well as the results of her examinations thereof (Exhibit "C ") (pp. 3-4,
security reasons, since the Identities of the said plastic bags containing marijuana leaves tsn, Id).
(Exhibits "A ", "A-1", "A-2 " and "A-3 ") were impliedly admitted by the appellant. ( Brief, p. 7.)
Counsel for the appellant did not object to the questions propounded by the prosecuting fiscal
The first proposition is not impressed with merit. which elicited answers coming from an expert. Even during the cross-examination of said NBI
forensic chemist, counsel for the appellant did not question her competence, qualification,
expertise and experience on the subject matter of marijuana. Instead, counsel for the appellant
There can be no doubt that the plastic bag which the appellant delivered to the informer was the very same object
tried to test the NBI forensic chemist on her knowledge and experience with other elements, but
which the latter in turn delivered to the police.
the said witness demonstrated her competence and expertise by stating that only marijuana
contains constituent traceable to manibonol (p. 5, tsn, Id). Appellant is now estopped from
We have examined the testimony of Romeo Joves, Salvador Guitan and Proceso Federes of the Drugs
Enforcement Unit, Police Station No. 5, Western Police District. They were united in saying that on July 24, 1981 at
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 raising for the first time on appeal the issue of the competence of said witness as an expert on strongly tend to sustain the conclusion that no such improper or evil motive existed and so the
the subject of marijuana. Court finds their testimonies as being trustworthy and reliable.

Be that as it may, NBI forensic chemist Gamosa testified competently and reliably on the The Court finds that. with the mere denial of the accused, same can not prevail over the
subject of her examinations of the specimen or contents of the three plastic bags containing probative weight and value of the testimonies of the police officers, as confirmed and supported
marijuana leaves, confiscated from the appellant by the police officers. Thus, on the same day, by the findings of the N.B.I. Forensic Chemist, which testimonies are deserving of belief and
July 24, 1981, she conducted three examinations on the said specimen, namely: microscopic merit the Court's full faith and credit. (Expediente,  pp. 70-71.)
examination, chemical examination, and chromatographic examination. The first examination is
visual through the use of large magnified lens. With her experience in examining marijuana WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error to have been committed by the court a quo, the appealed decision is
leaves, Miss Gamosa readily Identified the specimen as marijuana. The second examination hereby affirmed in toto. Costs against the appellant.
involved the application of a solvent on an extraction of the resin of said specimen, which
resulted in the appearance of a purple color therein, which meant it was positive for marijuana. SO ORDERED.
In the case of chromatographic examination, the extraction of the resin was spotted on a thin
layer of the chromatographic plate, which was 'run' on a solvent system for about 45 minutes,
and then sprayed with allocating senior agent, resulting in the appearance of purple, scarlet and
orange colors, which also meant that it was positive for marijuana. Hence, NBI forensic chemist
Gamosa submitted her findings, as follows:

Microscopic, chemical and chromatographic examinations made on The above specimen gave
POSITIVE RESULTS for MARIJUANA. (Exhibit "C".)

An expert is one possessing in regard to a particular object or department of human activity,

knowledge not usually acquired by other persons (U.S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil. 530). Scientific study
and training are not always essential to the competency of a witness as an expert.

A witness may be competent to testify as an expert although his knowledge was acquired
through the medium of practical experience rather than scientific study and research. Generally
speaking, any person who by study or experience has acquired particular knowledge or
experience may be allowed to give in evidence his opinion upon matters of technical knowledge
relating to such business or employment (Dilag & Co. Inc. vs. Merced, et al., (CA) 45 O.G.
5536). (Brief, pp. 9-11.)

The appellant also faults the trial court for "admitting in evidence the alleged oral admission of defendant-appellant."
(Brief, p. 10.) He disclaims having made an oral admission to the police and, assuming that he made one, he
questions its admissibility on constitutional grounds principally on the basis of the rule in Miranda. We have read the
trial court's decision very closely and nowhere do we find that it admitted or relied upon the alleged oral admission
of the accused in order to find him guilty. The accused was convicted solely on the oral testimony of the prosecution
witnesses who were found by the court to be more credible in these words:

The clear and straight-forward manner with which the aforenamed police officers, as
prosecution witnesses, testified on the stand merits the Court's belief in their testimonies giving
the same full weight and credit. There is no evidence to show that the three (3) police officers
were actuated by evil or bad motive to testify and, as has been held in a case, in the absence of
evidence as to an improper or evil motive actuating them to testify in the manner they did

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