9

MARITIME
PIRACY
 9

MARITIME PIRACY Until recently, piracy was a phenomenon in decline.

Twenty-first century piracy was first seen in the
Unlike most of the other organized crime problems South China Sea and in the Malacca Straits. 3
discussed in this report, maritime piracy is not a Attacks peaked at roughly 350 to 450 reported
trafficking issue. No contraband is moved, no illicit attacks per year during the period 2000-2004, and
market serviced. Rather, it is a violent, acquisitive then dropped by almost half in 2005.4 This reduc-
crime.1 It is transnational because a ship is consid- tion was attributed to effective and coordinated
ered the sovereign territory of the nation whose flag international action against the pirates. But in 2008-
she flies.2 It is organized because commandeering a 2009, piracy again skyrocketed, due almost entirely
ship at sea requires considerable planning and some to the dramatic increase of piracy off the Coast of
specialized expertise. Somalia. Piracy is once again on the forefront of the
international community’s attention, as maritime
The following chapter focuses on just one piracy trade is threatened and ransom payments to Somali
problem: that found off the coast of Somalia, espe- pirates have risen to the millions of dollars.
cially in the Gulf of Aden. This area has seen the
largest share of global piracy attacks in recent years, FIG. 155: LOCATIONS OF ALL REPORTED PIRACY
and the problem appears to be growing. Somalia is ATTACKS, 2000-2009
not the only area of the world affected by maritime
500 Somalia/Gulf
piracy, however. The Gulf of Guinea in West Africa
Total number of attacks

of Aden
has long been a high risk area, as are the waters 400 Rest of world
along Bangladesh and the South China Sea. But in
2009, more than half the global piracy attacks were 300
ascribed to Somali pirates.
200
The term “piracy” encompasses two distinct sorts of
100
offences: the first is robbery or hijacking, where the
target of the attack is to steal a maritime vessel or its 0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
cargo; the second is kidnapping, where the vessel
Somalia/Gulf of Aden 22 19 17 21 10 48 22 51 111 217
and crew are threatened until a ransom is paid. The
Somali situation is unique in that almost all of the Rest of world 447 316 353 424 319 231 219 219 182 189

piracy involves kidnapping for ransom. Source: IMB-ICC annual reports, 2003-2009

FIG. 156: PIRACY ATTACKS, 2009

Each dot represents a piracy

or armed robbery incident during 2009

Total per regions

Note: The names of countries are mentioned

when the number of attacks was higher than
10 in 2009.
Pacific
Gulf Bangladesh
of Aden Ocean
India
Caribbean Sea Bay Viet
of Bengal Nam
Nigeria
South and Central
Somalia 30 South
Asia Malaysia
37 America Gulf
of Guinea
47 West Africa Indian Ocean

Peru Indonesia

Atlantic 223 Indian Ocean, 67 South-East

Asia
Red Sea and
UNODC / SCIENCES PO

Ocean Gulf of Aden

Pacific

Ocean

Sources: International Chamber of Commerce, International Maritime Bureau, Piracy Reporting Center

Case studies of transnational threats 193

 MARITIME PIRACY

FIG. 157: PIRACY ATTACKS, MAIN COUNTRIES,

1992-2009

Number of pirate attacks 350

Countries with more than 50 attacks

during the period 1992-2009.

200

150

100
1992

1995

2000

2005

50

Somalia / Red Sea /

Gulf of Aden 10

Peru
United Republic of Tanzania
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Viet Nam

Nigeria

Bangladesh

India

Malacca Straits
Singapore Straits

Malaysia

Indonesia
Ecuador
Sri Lanka
Thailand

Philippines
Source: ICC International
Brazil Maritime Bureau,
Piracy and Armed Roberry
against Ships, annual reports
from 2003 to 2009

China (including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan)

1992

1995

2000

2005

2009

194
 MARITIME PIRACY

What is the nature of this market? ment of the pirates. Drifting further and further
from the Somali coasts, the pirates are attacking
Although there have long been pirates based in
commercial freighters, pleasure craft and other ves-
Somalia, profiting off the commercial maritime
sels that have nothing to do with Somalia. Rather
flows that concentrate in the area, recent events are
than championing the cause of the Somali people,
a direct product of the social and political chaos
pirates today attack vessels bearing the food aid on
that has prevailed in the last two decades. After the
which so many Somalis depend.
22-year dictatorship of Siad Barre and 18 years of
civil war, the central government collapsed in 1991, Somalia’s pirates have had to drift further and fur-
and the country effectively split into three: ther from the coast in search of prey. In 2004, the
s the independent north-eastern state of International Maritime Board warned all vessels to
Somaliland; avoid sailing within 50 nautical miles of the Somali
s the central semi-autonomous region of coast. In 2005, it increased this distance to 100
Puntland; and nautical miles. 7 By 2006, some pirate attacks
s the south-western state of Somalia. extended as far as 350 nautical miles off the coast of
Somalia, with pirate attacks occurring in the Indian
Today, the Transitional Federal Government of
Ocean, in the Gulf of Aden and at the mouth of the
Somalia still does not retain full control of the cap-
Red Sea.8 Between 2007 and 2008, the main area of
ital, let alone the rest of its sovereign territory. Over
pirate activity shifted from southern Somalia and
three million Somalis depend on food aid, more
Mogadishu port to the Gulf of Aden. Since the
than a two-third increase from 2007. The country
beginning of 2009, there has been an increase in the
has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in
number of attacks reported off the east coast of
the world. Less than a quarter of Somalia’s children
Somalia in the western Indian Ocean, with some
go to school, and the country is about to become
attacks taking place over 1,000 nautical miles off
Africa’s least literate. There has been a continuous
that coast.
outflow of refugees and migrants to neighboring
countries, with the UN High Commissioner for The greatest victim of this piracy is undoubtedly
Refugees estimating that as many as 50,000 people, the Somalis themselves. On top of the ongoing
predominantly Somalis, crossed the Gulf of Aden to conflict, Somalia is also suffering from four years of
Yemen in 2008.5 catastrophic drought, and an estimated 3.2 million
Modern piracy off the coast of Somalia is said to Somalis, approximately 43% of the population,
have arisen from efforts of local fishermen, who were dependent on food aid in the latter part of
formed vigilante groups to protect their territorial 2008. Some 95% of international aid supplies to
waters. After the fall of the Barre regime, foreign Somalia is shipped by sea. The World Food Pro-
vessels from Europe, Asia and Africa moved into gramme (WFP) ships approximately 30,000 to
tuna-rich Somali waters en masse. Unauthorized 40,000 metric tons of food aid per month to the
fishing may have resulted in the loss of nearly 30% Horn of Africa region. As a result of the attacks on
of the annual catch. The United Kingdom Depart- aid-bearing ships, WFP has reported that it has
ment for International Development (DFID) has become more expensive and dangerous to ship food
estimated that Somalis lost US$100 million to ille- assistance to Mogadishu.9
gal tuna and shrimp fishing in 2003-2004, at a time Since late 2008, on top of having to pay higher
when the country’s GDP was perhaps US$5 bil-
insurance premiums, WFP shipments also require
lion.6 There have also been reports of toxic waste
an escort from European Union or Canadian navies.
dumping in Somali waters. Initially, vessels involved
While some Somali pirates have consented not to
in illicit fishing or dumping were attacked by these
target vessels carrying humanitarian aid and other
vigilante groups, with the end of either extracting
supporting commercial vessels,10 attacks on human-
taxes or deterring future incursions. One way of
itarian aid shipments have yet to stop. For example,
securing reparations was to hold the vessel and its
in April 2009, Somali pirates hijacked the MV
illicit cargo until compensation was paid, and over
Maersk Alabama and attacked the MV Liberty Sun,
time seizing vessels became an end in itself.
both US-flagged and -crewed cargo vessels con-
Today, in a situation similar to what has happened tracted by the WFP to deliver food assistance off the
in the Niger Delta, the political aims of the pirates south-east coast of Somalia.11 In November 2009,
have all but been forgotten. While the rhetoric the MV Maersk Alabama was attacked again,
remains, the true end of these attacks is the enrich- although the crew managed to repel the attack.12

196
 9

FIG. 158: PIRACY INCIDENTS ATTRIBUTED TO SOMALI PIRATES, 2006-2009

Om an 500 km O man 500 km

E ri tre a Yemen Er it r ea Yem en

D j i b ou ti D jib o u t i
d

d
Som Som
lan

lan
aliland aliland
nt

nt
E th io p ia Et h io p ia
Pu

Pu
Somalia Somalia

Kenya Ken y a

U n i te d Seyc helles U n it ed S ey c h elles

R e p u b lic R ep u b lic
o f Ta nza n ia o f Tan z an ia

C o mo ro s 2006 C o mo r o s 2007

Om an 500 km O man 500 km

E ri tre a Yemen Er it r ea Yem en

D j i b ou ti D jib o u t i
d

Som Som
lan

lan

aliland aliland
nt

nt

E th io p ia Et h io p ia
Pu

Pu

Somalia Somalia

Kenya Ken y a
UNODC / SCIENCES PO

U n i te d Seyc helles U n it ed S ey c h elles

R e p u b lic R ep u b lic
o f Ta nza n ia o f Tan z an ia

C o mo ro s
2008 C o mo r o s
2009
Sources: Source: ICC: International Maritime Bureau,
Piracy and armed robbery against ships, Annual Report 2009

Each dot represents an actual or Number of pirate attacks

attempted piracy attack in the area, 2006-2009 2006 2007 2008 2009

The increased shipping costs have also had a major on countries like the Seychelles, who rely on the
impact on the economy, since shipping is tradition- fishing industry for up to 40% of their income.14
ally a major source of income for the country. The
On the other hand, the inflow of ransom money
region’s fishing industry has also been affected. Tuna has had a beneficial economic effect on some local-
catches in the Indian Ocean are reported to have ities. For example, Garoowe, the capital of Punt-
fallen by 30% in 2008, in part because of fishing land, appears to be experiencing a construction
vessels’ fear of piracy.13 This has had a major impact boom, and even the price of marriage dowries is

Case studies of transnational threats 197

 MARITIME PIRACY

said to have increased.15 This ‘dirty money’ is likely could be hidden from aerial and maritime surveil-
to have a negative impact on governance in that lance while they are being renamed and repainted.
region, however, as the purchasing power and influ- Instead, Somali pirates have developed on-land
ence of the pirates exceeds that of the government. sanctuaries from which they can launch pirate
Piracy is said to be penetrating all levels of the soci- attacks and conduct ransom negotiations.22 This,
ety in Puntland, with a number of ministers being no doubt, has affected their choice to focus on hos-
suspected of involvement in piracy. 16 It is also tages rather than cargo.23 What may have been
reported to be undermining the traditional leader- considered a deficiency has resulted in a very posi-
ship influence of many clan elders in Somalia, who tive outcome for the pirates: the amounts they com-
are actively encouraging local youth not to get mand for ransoms far exceed what they could have
involved in piracy.17 There have been fears that gained through robbery.
ransom funds could affect the outcome of upcom-
Traditionally, Somali pirates have operated from
ing elections in Puntland.
small, fast skiffs, waiting up to 50 nautical miles off
Beyond Somalia, the effects are also wide ranging. the coast for a suitable vessel to attack. But as patrols
There are the direct victims: in the first half of 2009 have pushed them further out, they are increasingly
alone, 485 seafarers were taken hostage off the coast using bigger fishing trawlers as “mother ships”.
of Somalia, with six injured, four killed and one These larger vessels are usually able to carry several
missing.18 Ship-owners are victim to piracy not only skiffs, as well as weapons (typically AK-47s and
because of the ransom that they have to pay but also increasingly, rocket-propelled grenades).
because of the increase in the cost of shipping. The
The visual horizon at sea is normally about three
increased incidence of piracy has raised insurance
miles. The ability of pirates to locate target vessels
premiums for vessels plying these waters from some
in vast expanses of sea has led some to conclude that
US$20,000 in 2008 to US$150,000 at the end of
pirates are being provided with GPS coordinates by
2009.19 informants with access to ship tracking data. 24
The Gulf of Aden is one of the most important trad- Crews of some hijacked vessels have said that the
ing routes in the world. Thousands of ships pass pirates appear to know everything about the ship on
through the Gulf en route to or from the Suez Canal boarding, from the layout of the vessel to its ports
every year. The US Department of Energy estimated of call. Calls made by pirates from their satellite
that, as of 2006, as many as 3.3 million barrels of oil phones from captured ships indicate an interna-
per day were transiting the Bab el Mandab strait tional network.
between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.20 To From the time of first sighting, it generally takes the
compound the problem, there are few alternatives to pirates some 15 to 30 minutes to board the ship.25
the Gulf of Aden. The longer route to Europe and Once the vessel is targeted, the skiffs attack from a
North America around the Cape of Good Hope number of directions simultaneously, which usually
significantly increases the cost of shipping. allows one of the skiffs to approach the vessel unno-
Canal authorities have reported declines in shipping ticed. Relatively slow ships with low sides, a small
traffic and resulting revenue loss recently, due both crew and insufficient surveillance are more vulner-
to decreased economic activity and the piracy threat able to pirate attacks. Pirates do not limit their
in the Gulf of Aden.21 If international shipping attacks to one kind of ship, although bulk carriers,
continues to avoid the Gulf area’s oil and gas export- container ships and general cargo ships comprise
ing facilities, the world may see an increase in com- the majority of piracy targets.26
modity and energy prices from Asia and the Middle Most ships that are successfully captured by Somali
East. Furthermore, it is feared that if the price of pirates in the Gulf of Aden are brought to Eyl,
shipping, including insurance premiums, continues Hobyo or Haradheere.27 There are also reports that
to rise, regional trade for countries like Egypt, Bargaal and Garaad are used as anchorage sites.28 As
Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Dijbouti mentioned above, since the pirates are not con-
and Yemen will decline as well. cerned about concealing the vessel from public
How is the crime conducted? sight, negotiations are usually done with the ship
visibly anchored off the Somali coast.29
Somali piracy is unique in many regards, as Somalia
does not have a natural coastal terrain of the sort In the first part of 2009, the average time that crews
that is usually favourable to pirates. Pirates in other were held hostage was approximately two months,
parts of the world typically operate in areas with with the shortest time being six days and the long-
numerous forested inlets and islands, where ships est six months.30 Negotiations for ransom are usu-

198
 9

ally done directly between the pirates on the seized s the Puntland group operating from a small
vessel and the ship-owners or head companies, village near Bossaso, using modified fishing ves-
although sometimes third-party intermediaries in sels and seized vessels for continued attacks.35
Somalia and abroad are also used. The negotiations It also appears that a number of groups are organ-
are generally conducted via satellite telephones and ized along clan lines, with the sub-clans of Darood
the captured ship’s communication equipment. and Hawiye being particularly prominent. But most
In most instances, ransoms are paid in cash and are piracy groups appear to be equal-opportunity
employers, seeking recruits in the refugee camps
delivered to the pirates aboard the seized ship. The
housing some 40,000 internally displaced Somalis.
method of payment may be direct transportation of
They may recruit skilled fishermen since some
the money to the pirates by a representative of the
would-be pirates have little or no knowledge of the
ship-owner or even the parachuting of the ransom
sea. With the resources they command, pirates can
money. In a few cases, ransoms have been paid to a
draw whole communities into their net.36 For exam-
trusted third party representative outside Somalia.
ple, the ancient town of Eyl is said to have been
Upon receipt of the money, the pirates release the
transformed into a logistic support structure for
hostages and usually leave separately to avoid track-
piracy.
ing and capture.31
How big is the offence?
Who are the offenders?
The amount of ransom demanded by the pirate
Somali pirates are generally young men raised in a groups over the past few years has risen from tens of
desperate and disorganized society, willing to risk thousands of dollars to hundreds of thousands and
their lives for the slightest chance of something even millions. In 2008, the average ransom was
better. The groups themselves are small – perhaps estimated at between US$500,000 to US$2 mil-
six to 10 individuals – so despite the existence of a lion, and in 2009 it appears to have risen further
number of well-known groups, this would appear still. According to the Report of the Secretary-Gen-
to be an endeavour with few barriers to entry. So eral to the Security Council on the state of piracy in
long as start-up financing is available, there is likely Somalia (2009), the “Eyl Group” alone was holding
a long list of volunteers willing to sign up. Most use hostage six vessels and their crew and was expected
small arms such as AK-47s and shoulder-fired rock- to have earned approximately $30 million in ransom
et-propelled grenades, of which there is an abun- payments by the end of 2008..37 While some ship-
dant supply in their war-torn country. While clearly owners have been understandably reluctant to dis-
no match for a naval vessel, teenagers with auto- close ransom payments, recent ransom payments of
matic weapons in skiffs can easily overcome most more than US$5 million have been reported.38
commercial ships, since the crews are generally
Only a portion of this money goes to the pirates.
unarmed.
Government officials and the armed groups that
Some 1,400 Somalis are estimated to be involved in control different parts of the country - especially in
piracy.32 Two main piracy networks in Somalia have Puntland - may also be taking a share, though the
been recognized: one in the semi-autonomous north- precise amount is unknown. According to one
ern Puntland in the Eyl district and another group breakdown, the pirates involved in the actual hijack-
based in Haradheere in Central Somalia.33 Smaller ing receive only 30% of the ransom, out of which
pirate groups have been recognized operating from they must cover their expenses. The armed groups
the ports of Bosaso, Qandala, Caluula, Bargaal, who control the territory where the pirates are based
Hobyo, Mogadishu and Garad.34 Specific groups may claim perhaps 10% as a tax, and elders and
mentioned in reports from the region include: local officials command a similar share. The finan-
cier of the operation may take 20% as interest on
s the Somali Marines based in Central Somalia,
the funds advanced, with a full sponsor claiming
this group appears to have pioneered the use of
mother ships; perhaps 30%.39
s the Kismayu group (also own as National According to a convicted pirate, a single armed
Volunteer Coastguard) from Kismayu in pirate can earn anywhere from US$6,000 to
southern Somalia, focused on small boats, close US$10,000 for a $US1 million ransom.40 This is
to the shore; approximately equivalent to two to three years’
s the Marka Group operating south of Mogad- worth of salary for an armed guard at a humanitar-
ishu to Kismayo, this small group uses fishing ian agency and much higher than what a local busi-
boats with long-range fire power; and, ness would pay.

Case studies of transnational threats 199

 MARITIME PIRACY

IMPLICATIONS FOR FIG. 159: ATTEMPTED VERSUS

RESPONSE SUCCESSFUL HIJACKINGS
IN THE GULF OF ADEN,
Somali piracy is another example of a problem 2008-2009
caused more by prevailing conditions than by the
Successful hijackings in the Gulf
impetus of any particular group. If armed robbery 250 Attempts in the Gulf
in any other part of the world routinely yielded tak- Somali attacks outside Gulf
20
ings in the millions of dollars, or even the equiva- 200
lent of several years’ salary, this activity would be
extremely difficult to deter through law enforce- 150 96
ment, however harsh. But these rich pickings are
available in an environment where there are few 100 32
alternative sources of income, where war and famine
50 60 102
have hardened some to the sufferings of others, and
where the chances of being brought to justice are 0
19
slim. In this context, becoming a pirate may appear 2008 2009
to be a rational vocational choice. Source: IMB-ICC annual reports, 2008 and 2009

Halting this activity will require a change in cir-

cumstances. There have been longstanding interna- into the waters… the best way to actually fight the
tional efforts to combat hunger, promote piracy is to tackle these things from the land.”42 It is
development and bring peace to Somalia, and these certainly true that the open way the pirates cur-
remain the core of the issue. There may be scope for rently operate is only possible with substantial
reducing piracy, however, without waiting until this mainland support. The pirates are often at sea for
embattled nation is returned to normalcy. months negotiating a ransom, and need supplies
and services during this time. Once paid, the mili-
One approach is target hardening. The shipping
tants must debark and return to shore, often laden
lines themselves have experimented with a wide
with considerable volumes of cash. They would not
variety of security devices, most of which are non-
get far if they could not rely on the protection of
lethal, including water cannons and high-intensity
local potentates. If the groups that are currently
light and sound projectors. The efficacy of these
taxing the piracy trade – including community
devices remains unclear, but if they could truly repel
officials, elders and clan leaders, and militants –
a military attack, they would likely have wider
were to decide it were in their best interest to stop
application in conventional warfare. This sort of
piracy, it would very likely stop. The governments
technical solution could promote an arms race, with
of Puntland and the TFG have pledged their sup-
cargo vessels taking on increasingly heavy hardware
port, but need assistance in translating this political
to avoid being singled-out, and well-funded pirates
will into local action. Aside from the broader project
employing ever more aggressive tactics in response.
of improving national governance and the rule of
However well-funded, it is unlikely the pirates will law in the country, specific measures aimed at
ever be able to take on a naval warship. Under enhancing law enforcement effectiveness could have
Resolution 1816,41 the Security Council has created a beneficial effect.
conditions for third-party governments to conduct
Another point of vulnerability lies in the pirates’
anti-piracy operations in Somali territorial waters,
information stream. While some attacks appear to
as well as engaging in on-shore operations with
be opportunistic, some seem to be aimed at particu-
authorization from the Somali Transitional Federal
lar maritime vessels. Locating a particular ship at sea
Government (TFG). Currently, naval battleships
without inside information would be extremely dif-
from a wide range of countries patrol the Gulf of
ficult. Better securing this information for vessels
Aden. This presence seems to have had some impact:
traversing the danger zone could pay dividends in
there were more attempted hijackings in the Gulf in
reduced pirate attacks. Similarly, bundles of cur-
2009 than in 2008, but fewer successful ones.
rency are of little use if they cannot be converted
But the greatest potential lies in promoting action into the goods and services the pirates desire. Meas-
against the pirates by Somalis in Somalia. Somali ures to prevent the outflow of this money or the
Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke inflow of products (particularly arms, maritime
has argued that, “[Y]ou cannot tackle piracy from craft and parts, and vehicles) could also reduce
the sea no matter how many naval ships you put incentives for piracy.

200