Republic of the Philippines 

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

GR No. L-46892 June 28, 1940

ANTAMOK GOLDFIELDS MINING COMPANY, appellant, 

Messrs. DeWitt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile on behalf of the appellant. 

IMPERIAL, J .:

This is an appeal by certiorari filed by the appellant against the order issued by the Industrial Relations Court on
May 6, 1939, which obliged her to replace her previous work or other substantially equivalent to the 45 workers
listed in the petition of the March 31, 1939 and the 10 workers headed by A. Haber who were excluded
indefinitely, within 10 days of receiving a copy of the order; to pay these 55 workers the wages they should have
received from the date of their suspension or separation until their replacement; and pending resolution of the
other issues that the parties have submitted, the appellant refrains, under penalty of contempt, of dismissing or
excluding, without prior permission of the court, to any worker or employee who was under his service at the
time when the dispute that is currently working in the mines or that is replaced in his work in accordance with the
order arose; and against the resolution of the same court of August 17, 1939 that denied the motion for
reconsideration of the appellant filed on May 26, 1939.

On December 12, 1938, the National Labor union, Inc., in representation of the workers and employees of the
Complainant who were members of the workers' union, addressed a letter to the Complainant requesting 21
claims in favor of its affiliates. The letter was received by the appellant's office in Manila in an envelope stamped
by the Baguio post office on the same month. The appellant's officials called a meetingto its employees on
January 2, 1939 and in it they informed all their workers that some of the demands had been accepted and had
already been put into practice, others would be considered and the rest would be rejected because they were
unreasonable, and they were I advise that they not resort to violence and observe legal methods in the
settlement of their differences with the appellants. On the night of the same day the workers and employees of
the appellant went on strike and abandoned their jobs. The complainant immediately reported this strike to the
Department of Labor and requested her intervention in order to resolve it. The Secretary of Labor appointed
Adolfo Umengan, Special Investigator of the Department, and Eladio C. Leaño, Public Defender of the Mountain
Province, to intervene and see how to solve the strike.

FRIENDLY SETTLEMENT

In order to have the present strike of the contractors and laborers of the respondent company who
staged a walkout on January 3, 1939, amicably settled, the parties hereby mutually agree to end the said
strike under the condition that all laborers will be readmitted upon the execution of this
agreement; provided, that all laborers whose services should be dispensed with due to lack of work in
those tunnels where they are no longer needed will be given not less than fifteen days employment from
the date of this settlement or resumption of work, and provided, further, that as soon as the stopes in
1360 and 1460 levels are opened and the services of men are needed,

In witness hereof, the laborers represented by a committee composed of Messrs. Luis Lardizabal,

The agreement was signed by the parties on January 4, 1939, but the workers did not show up until 9 in the
morning of the 6th of the same month. The management of the appellant did not, however, allow any worker to
enter the underground section known as the "830 level" for the reason that the air had become vitiated due to
the strike and it was necessary to renew it with pure air with the In order to avoid personal misfortunes.  This
precaution was taken by the workers as a refusal of the appellant for them to work again, so they went on strike
again. The strikers joined by sympathy the workers who worked in the mine called "680 division," which is
another separate mine and located 3 kilometers from the factory. Again the Department of Labor and through
the mediation of Eladio C.

On January 9, 1939 the Department of Labor endorsed the dispute to the Industrial Relations Court in
accordance with Article 4 of Commonwealth Law No. 103 and said Court held the first hearing of the matter on
the 13th of the same month in the City of Baguio In this hearing, the 21 claims of the National Labor Union, Inc.
were disputed one by one, and an agreement was reached by the parties on some of them, others were
submitted to the decision of the Triunal and the others were left pending for be seen and resolved later.

On March 31, 1939, the majority of the aforementioned claims still pending, the National Labor Union, Inc.
appealed, filed a motion alleging that the foreman A. Haber and 9 other workers of the appellant had been
indefinitely suspended on the 29th of the same month; that these workers had previously been transferred to
outside jobs in order to provide the appellant with an excuse to later separate them from service; that another
group of about 30 workers were dismissed by the company for no reason and without authorization from the
court; and that the suspensions and separations that were made were acts of revenge and discriminatory for the
workers, for which reason it was requested that the officials of the appellant responsible for such acts be
punished for contempt and that the appellant be forced to replace the workers in their primitive jobs within the
mines and pay their salaries corresponding to the period in which they were separated from the sevice  The
appellant answered the motion denying the alleged facts and alleges that Haber and his 9 companions were
suspended for their continuous laziness during working hours and for having constantly refused to work, and that
the 45 workers headed by the foreman Victorian Madayag were dismissed for having refused to indicate to those
responsible for the mistreatment of foreman Juan Moldero on the morning of March 30, 1939. The motion was
seen on April 3, 1939 and at the hearing the parties presented their witnesses. The court appointed one of its
special agents to be constituted in the appellant's mines and will conduct an investigation in order to supplement
the facts that were proven during the hearing. After considering the evidence presented to him and the facts
found by the appointed commissioner, the court in its order of May 6, 1939 declared the following facts proven:

1. The discharges and indefinite suspensions alleged in the motion were made by the respondent
without first securing the consent of the Court in violation of the order of this Court of January 23, 1939.

2. The discharges and indefinite suspensions were made by the respondent without just cause.

In the same order, the Industrial Relations Court makes the following considerations that support the conclusions
reached:

In the order of January 23, 1939, the respondent was enjoined to refrain from discharging any laborer
involved in the dispute without just cause and without previous authority of the Court. It appears and no
denial of the fact is made by the respondent that the dismissal is one case and alleged suspension for an
indefinite time in the other, which has all the effects of a discharge, were made without seeking the
authority of the Court.

The charge that Haber and the group of nine laborers were indefinitely suspended of continuous loafing
and refusal to work was not established. The real motive behind the lay was the completion of their work
"outside." Under the circumstances, the provision of the order of March 21, to the effect that these men
should be returned to their work underground after the completion of their work "outside" should have
been observed. The respondent instead of complying with the order laid off the men.

The discharge of Victorian Madayag and his forty-four companions as a result of the Moldero incident
also lacks justification. In the case of Madayag, although he was present with Haber when Moldero was
attacked, neither one is accused of the aggression. The two of them were conversing with Moldero with
the latter was stoned from behind without anybody apparently being able to point out the
aggressor. Less justification can be found for the discharge of the forty-four men as a result of the
incident. The investigation disclosed that at the time of the assault, they were at the Creek busy with
their work. Both the distance and the topographical situation of the place where the men were working,
which is far and well below the bank of the place of the incident, precluded their hearing of seeing clearly
what transpired above them in the place where Moldero was assaulted. An ocular inspection of the
premises made by the investigator confirmed this view. So far as is known, despite the investigations
conducted by the officials of the company and the policeman of the camp and by the constabulary
authorities in Baguio, the person or persons responsible for the stoning has not been determined.  The
precipitate and unwarranted dismissal of the forty-five men after the incident seems to have been
spurred by an over anxious desire on the part of the company to get rid of these men.  despite the
investigations conducted by the officials of the company and the policeman of the camp and by the
constabulary authorities in Baguio, the person or persons responsible for the stoning has not been
determined. The precipitate and unwarranted dismissal of the forty-five men after the incident seems to
have been spurred by an over anxious desire on the part of the company to get rid of these men. despite
the investigations conducted by the officials of the company and the policeman of the camp and by the
constabulary authorities in Baguio, the person or persons responsible for the stoning has not been
determined. The precipitate and unwarranted dismissal of the forty-five men after the incident seems to
have been spurred by an over anxious desire on the part of the company to get rid of these men.

As previously found, in the order of this Court of March 21, 1939, about 134 underground laborers of the
respondent were transferred and made to work 'outside of the mines' or surface work. The majority of
these men were muckers, miners, timbermen, trammers, and mine helpers and had to their favor from 6
months to 5 years service in the mines of the company and not a few of them have done underground
work in several capacities and in different tunnels and divisions of the mine. Among them are found
leaders of the movement of the laborers for higher pay and better working conditions which culminated in
the strike called on January 3, 1939. These leaders have been prominent in the formation of the union its
activities and in connection with the strike. The temporary transfer of these men to "outside" work was
authorized by the Court in said order on the strength of the assurance of the respondent that no more
work suited for them inside the mines existed. It was directed, however, in the aforesaid order that as
soon as their outside was completed the laborers should be immediately returned to their respective
work inside the mines. Subsequent events and acts of the officials of the respondent in charge of the
mines have convinced the Court work existed and exists for the men inside the tunnels and their
transfers were made to provide an opportunity to the company to dispense with their services as soon as
the work is completed. The unwarranted discharges of Haber and nine others and those of Victoriano
Madayag and his forty-four companions amply demonstrated this conclusion. Upon the company's own
admission, as shown in its reports in the records and upon the findings of the investigator of the Court,
more than four hundred (400) workers of different classes among them, muckers, miners, timbermen,
trammers and foremen coming from different mines in the region have been employed by the respondent
as fresh laborers. Almost all, if not all, of these men are not members of the petitioner, the National
Laborer Union, Inc.

At the same time the work in different tunnels and division in the mines are allegedly being completed,
the old workers are being laid off. Although a small number of the men found transfer to other divisions
being operated, the majority are being left without work. Instead of laying hands on the old men laid off
and making them work in the tunnels needing hands and reinstating in the tunnel work those laborers
transferred to the 'outside' department, the respondent preferred to take in and hire other workers
coming from different places because evidently they are not members of the union.

There is no doubt in the mind of the Court that a good number of the position given of the men who were
employed after the strike numbering more than four hundred to date could have been offered to the
strikes who are now doing work "outside" and other who have been laid off on the allegation that the
underground work in which they were engaged had been completed. To believe that not a single man or
say a few among the latter could have met the requirements set by the technical men of the company to
perform the different classes of work for which the fresh men were engaged because they lack the
required efficiency, experience, physique intelligence and skill of the four hundred fresh laborers would
be shutting the eyes of the court to realities. These men prior to the occurence of the dispute, had
worked for months and many for years in the mines of the respondent and it can not be easily accepted
that their experience gained in their particular lines in the very property of the respondent would be
inferior to that attained by the other workmen in other mines in the district for an equal period of
time. Their inefficiency as a whole group can not be successfully sustained now because they were not
transferred to surface work for this reason but because of the alleged lack of work or completion of their
work underground. Had any of them been inefficient in the past, it can not be explained why the
company laborer continued in the service as the records of the company abound with instance of
discharges made in the past of laborers who were found either inefficient or incompetent or whose
services They were unsatisfactory.

The company asserts ignorance of the union affiliations of the men in the mine but the evidence stands
uncontradicted that before the strike was called a petition was presented by the men to the management
carrying the signatures of about eight hundred (800) worker demanding higher pay and better working
conditions. When the men struck, the operation of the mine was completely paralyzed and there is a
strong indication that a great majority of the workers joined openly the strike. It would not have been
difficult for the respondent, with the means at its command, to find for itself the employees and laborers
 who remained loyal to the company and to consider those who struck as either members of the union or
its sympathizer.

The respondent's claim as to the motive for the suspension and discharges lacks substance and support
in the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it. From all what appears, it is inferred that the
respondent desire to discourage membership in the union and to rout it if possible.  The wholesale
discharges were the expression of such desire. The acts in the mind of the Court, are calculated to have
two effects. They will not only immediately affect the discharged laborers but would also discourage
other laborers from joining or remaining members of the union.

The allegation that it has always been policy to consider the laborer's connection with the company
terminated upon termination of the working place in which he is employed is not supported by the
facts. It has been shown that as a general rule when work in a place is completed, workers are
transferred to another working place in one level or to another level, although in some instances days
may elapse before all the men in a bunch can be absorbed in different levels.

It is alleged that mining operations in the property vary and involve several types, and that a miner, for
example, may be good in one type, but that it does not necessarily follow that he can do good work in
another type. And that the employment of men in particular jobs not suitable for them increased the cost
of production as a result of lower output. Consequently, the respondent vehemently insists in its right of
selecting the men that it should employ and that in the exercise of this right it should not be restrained or
interfered with by the Court. It contends that as to fitness of a laborer to do a particular type of work the
opinion of the management or its technical men should be respected. But all these arguments are
meaningless in the face of the finding of the Court that the underground laborers transferred to the
'outside' work are not wanting in experience, efficiency and other conditions alleged to be found among
the fresh laborers. The special qualifications to do particular work can not rightly be invoked in favor of
the employment of new laborers most specially in those cases of common or unskilled labor like
muckers, trammers, helpers, etc.

Under normal circumstances, the exercise of judgment of the employer in selecting men he is to employ
should not be interfered with. But when such judgment is arbitrarily exercised to the prejudice of
members of a labor union whose rights should be safeguarded in consonance with the policies of the
law, the Court not only feels it justified but rightly its duty to interfere to afford protection to the laborers
affected .

The appellant filed an extensive motion for reconsideration of the said order, a motion that was denied by the
resolution of August 17, 1939. The order of May 6, 1939 and the resolution of August 17 of the same year are
those that gave rise to the appeal filed by the appellant.

The appellant maintains that Commonwealth Law No. 103, as amended by laws Nos. 254 and 355, is
unconstitutional (1) because it violates the principle of separation of powers; (2) because the National Assembly
abdicated its legislative power by violating the doctrine on delegation of powers; (3) because the judicial powers
conferred by law to the Industrial Relations Court, considered separately, are arbitrary and unreasonable and
allow the deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law; and (4) because assuming that the law
is valid and constitutional in its entirety, the portion, at least, of article 20 that provides that the Industrial
Relations Court "adopt its procedural regulations" It must be declared null and void because it violates Article 13
of Title VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines that obliges the Industrial Relations Tribunal to observe the
general rules of procedure applicable to the courts of justice. The appellant alleges in this respect that since she
has been subjected to an arbitrary procedure and different from that applied to the other litigants in the Philippine
courts, she has been denied due process of law and the principle of equal protection before laws.

Commonwealth Law No. 103 which, as its title indicates, provides for the protection of the worker, creating an
Industrial Relations Court empowered to set a minimum wage for workers and the maximum rent to be paid by
tenants; to enforce the mandatory arbitration between employers or landlords and employees or tenants,
respectively, and prescribes penalties for the violation of its decrees, it has been promulgated by the National
Assembly under the precepts contained in article 5, Title II; Article 6, Title XIII; and articles 1 and 2, Title VIII, of
the Constitution of the Philippines that provide:

ART. 5. The State shall take care to promote social justice in order to ensure the well-being and
economic stability of all the people.
 ART. 6. The State shall protect all workers, especially women and minors, and shall regulate the
relations between landlords and tenants, and between labor and capital in industry and agriculture. The
State may establish mandatory arbitration.

ART. 1. The Judiciary shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in other lower courts established by law.

ART. 2. The National Assembly shall have the power to define, prescribe and distribute the jurisdiction of
the various courts,. . .

In compliance with the transcribed constitutional precepts, the National Assembly enacted Commonwealth Law
No. 103 that creates the Industrial Relations Court which is a special court with judicial powers (Pambusco
Employees Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., GR No 46727; Ang Tibay et al. Vs. Court of Industrial
Relations et al., GR No. 46496, concurrent opinion of Judge Jose P. Laurel). Article 1 of said law provides that
the Industrial Relations Court shall exercise jurisdiction to consider, investigate, decide and settle any issue,
issue, conflict or dispute that affects or arises between employers and employees or workers, and between
owners and tenants or sharecroppers, and to regulate the relations between them, in accordance with and
subject to the provisions of the law. And Article 20 prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and resolution of
any issue or conflict, and in the exercise of any of its duties and powers, the court shall act in accordance with
justice and fairness and the substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities and legal formulations,
and will not be subject to any technical rules of legal evidence, but will form judgment in the manner it believes
fair and equitable. Law No. 103 confers on the Industrial Relations Court full discretionary power to resolve and
decide agricultural and industrial disputes in the manner it creates fair and equitable, regardless of legal
technicalities and formulations, and the power thus granted is judicial and non-legislative , so it does not violate
the principle of separation of powers, the prohibition on delegation of legislative powers nor equal protection
before the law. As stated in the Cincinnati, W. & ZR Co. casevs . Comm'rs, of Clinton County '1852), 1 Ohio St.,
88, cited in the Rubi et al. against The Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Jur. Fil., 675, "There is a real difference
between delegating the power to enact laws, which necessarily implies discretion as to what they should be, and
conferring attribution or discretion to do them. to comply, discretion that must be executed in accordance with
the law. The first cannot be done in any way; no objection can be filed against the second. "

To reinforce the arguments in favor of the unconstitutionality of Law No. 103, the appellant emphasizes what has
been resolved in the Schechter case. United States (1935), 295 US, 496, 79 Law. ed. 270, in which the
Supreme Court of the United States declared the National Recovery Act unconstitutional. There is, however, a
marked difference between that matter and that considered because the National Recovery Act instead of
creating a court of justice, I believe together with legislative powers and I authorize the President of the United
States to promulgate codes prescribing the precedent rules in order to carry out the purposes of the law.

The last basis that is alleged against the validity of Law No. 103 is that the judicial powers granted to the
Industrial Relations Court are so unlawful and unreasonable that they allow the deprivation of liberty and
property without due law process; and that article 20, at least, suffers from this fundamental defect because it
confers on the Industrial Relations Court the power to dictate its own rules of procedure, which contravenes
article 13, Title VIII, of the Constitution that prescribes that the Tribunal The Supreme Court will issue rules
concerning the writings of uniform claims, practice and procedure for all courts of the same category.

Article 20 of Law No. 103 reads as follows:

ART. 20. Regulations of the Court . - The Industrial Relations Court shall promulgate its rules of
procedure and shall have the other powers that generally correspond to a court of
justice: Understanding, however , That at the hearing, investigation and resolution of any issue or
conflict, and in the exercise of Any of its duties and faculties under this Law, the Court shall act in
accordance with justice and fairness and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal formulations, and shall not be subject to any rules, techniques of legal evidence, but that will
form judgment in the way it creates fair and equitable.

A simple reading of this article demonstrates that the law has not empowered the Industrial Relations Court to
investigate and resolve issues and conflicts between workers and employers, and tenants and landlords, in an
arbitrary and capricious manner without subjecting to a particular standard of conduct. The article clearly states
that the rules of procedure that it adopts, to which the court must comply, should be inspected in justice and
equity, and prescribes that the criterion that is formed should be based on the substantial merits of the case
without regard to technicalities or legal formulations. Law No. 103 that creates a special tribunal called the
Industrial Relations Court with the power to issue its own regulations and to resolve and decide agrarian and
industrial disputes in accordance with the dictates of justice and equity, cannot be challenged on the grounds
that it increases the deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law; nor does it conflict with the
precept of article 13, Title VIII, of the Constitution because the Industrial Relations Court is not of the same
category as the municipal courts, peace courts and courts of first instance for which the regulations of the courts
by the Supreme Court.

In relation to the validity and constitutionality of Law No. 103 and its amendments, we then insert the concurrent
opinion of Judge Lauren in the matter of Ang Tibay, supra , whose observations will serve to refute the proposed
proposition that the said law and its Amendments are valid and do not violate the Constitution.

It should be observed at the outset that our Constitution was adopted in the midst of surging unrest and
dissatisfaction resulting from economic and social distresswhich was threatening the stability of
governments theworld over. Alive to the social and economic forces atwork, the farmers of our
Constitution boldly met the problems and difficulties which faced them and endeavored to crystallize,
with more or less fidelity, the political, social; and economic proposition of their age, and this they did,
with the consciousness that the political and philosophicalaphorism of their generation will, in the
language of a great jurist, "be doubted by the next and perhaps entirely discarded by the third." (Chief
Justice Winslow in Gorgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis., 327; 133 NW, 209.) Embodying the spirit of the
present epoch,justitia communis advocated by Grotius and Leibnits many years ago to be secured
through the counterbalancing of economic and social forces and opportunities which should be
regulated, if not controlled, by the State or placed, as it were, in custodia societatis. "The promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people 'was thus inserted as vital
principle in our Constitution. (Sec. 5, Art. II, Constitution.) And in order that this declaration of principle
May not just be an empty medley of words, the Constitution in various sections thereof has provided the
means towards its realization. For instance, section 6 of Articles XIII declares that the State "shall afford
protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and shall regulated the relations between
landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. "The same section
also states that" the State may provide for compulsory arbitration. "In extraordinary cases mentioned in
section 16, Articles VI, of the Constitution, the President of the Philippines may be authorized by law, for
a limited period and subject to such restrictions as the National Assembly may prescribed, to
"promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Albeit, almost at the same time
the Congress of the United States approved the National Labor Regulations Act (49 Stat., 449) on July 5,
1935, commonly known as the Wagner Act, we were in the Philippines headway towards the adoption of
our fundamental law, pursuant to congressional authority given in the Tydings-McDuffie Independence
Act, approved March 24, 1934. In our Bill of Rights we now find the following provision "The right to form
associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. " (Par. 6, section 1, art.
III, Constitution.

By and large, these provisions in our Constitution all evince and express the need of shifting emphasis to
community interest with a view to affirmative enhancement of human values. In conformity with the
constitutional objective and cognizant of the historical fact that industrial and agricultural disputes had
given rise to disquietude, bloodshed and revolution in our country, the National Assembly enacted
Commonwealth Act No. 103, entitled "An Act to afford protection of labor by creating a Court of Industrial
Relations empowered to fix minimum wages for laborers and maximum rental to be paid tenants, and to
enforce compulsory arbitration between employers or landlords, and employees or tenants, respectively;
and by prescribing penalties for the violation of the orders "and , later, Commonwealth Act. No. 213,
entitled, "vide"finding and policy," preamble [sec. 1] of the Wagner Act [49 Sta., 449]).

Commonwealth Act No. 103, approved October 29, 1936, was originally Bill No. 700 of the National
Assembly. More light is shed by the explanatory statement of the Bill than by what transpired in the
course of the deliberation of the measure in the legislative chamber. "The present bill," thus the
explanatory statement of Bill No. 700, 'creates an Industrial Relations Board. . . and provides mandatory
arbitration. . . in accordance with Article 6, Title XIII of the Constitution, it provides that "The State may
establish mandatory arbitration." "Incorporating the conclusion reached by a committee appointed, a
year or so before it was observed that 'under the current legislation'" - evidently referring to Act No. 4055
- "there is no adequate instrument to avoid strikes. The Department of Labor plays a peaceful role
among the parties to the dispute and its decisions are not mandatory for employers or workers. The town
is close to a degree of industrial development, which makes it imperative that government intervention in
these conflicts be more effective. . . "The creation of a Court of Industrial Relations was thus proposed,
endowed" not only of the power to arbitrate but also of the duty to investigate, decide, and make
recommendations on the issues in conflict and the problems that affect Capital and Labor in the Industry
and the Farmer under the direction of the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or at the
request of the Secretary of Labor.
 xxx xxx xxx

From what has been stated, it appears that the legislation which are now called upon to construe was
enacted in pursuance of what appears to be deliberate embodiment of a new social policy, founded on
the conception of a society integrated not by independent individuals dealing at arms 'length, but by
interdependent members of a consolidated whole whose interests must be protected against mutual
aggression and warfare among and between divers and diverse units which are impelled by counter
vailing and opposite individual and group interests, and this is particularly true in the relationship
between Labor and capital. Social and industrial disturbances which fifty years ago were feudal-like and
of isolated importance may now well result in a serious strain upon the entire economic organism of the
nation. In the United States labor legislation has undergone a long process of development too long to
nature here, culminating in the enactments of what were commonly known as the Clayton Act, the
Norris-La Guardia Act, and finally, the Wagner Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The
Wagner Act created the National Labor Relations Board as an instrumentality of the Federal Government
in the settlement of labor disputes, which device is aimed at the avoidance of unnecessary friction
between labor and capital and the establishment of industrial peace. Scrutiny of legislation in that
country and of pronouncement made by its Supreme Court reveals a continuous renovation and change
made necessary by the impact of changing needs and economic pressure brought about by the
irresistible momentum of new social and economic forces developed there. In the light of changes that
have occured, it is doubted if the pronouncement made by the said Supreme Court in 1905 (Lochner v.
New York, 198, US, 45) or in 1908 (Adair v. US, 52 Law. Ed. 430, 208 US, 161, and Coppage v. Kansas,
236 US, 1) - cases which are relied upon by the petitioner in its printed memorandum - still retain their
virtuality at the present time. In the Philippines, social legislation has had a similar development although
of course to a much smaller degree and of different adaptation giving rise to several attempts at meeting
and solving our peculiar social and economic problems. (See Commonwealth to the National Assembly,
September 2,1936; Executive Order No. 49, S. 1936). The system of voluntary arbitration devised by Act
No. 4055 of the defunct Philippine Legislature has apparently been abandoned by the enactment of the
aforementioned Commonwealth Acts Nos. 103 and 213. In the midst of changes that have taken place, it
may likewise be doubted if the pronouncement made by this court in the case of People vs. Pomar (46
Phil., 440) - also relied upon by the petitioner in its printed memorandum - still retains its virtually as a
living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interests. 440) -
also relied upon by the petitioner in its printed memorandum - still retains its virtually as a living
principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way the assumption by the government of
the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interests. 440) - also relied upon
by the petitioner in its printed memorandum - still retains its virtually as a living principle. The policy of
laissez faire has to some extent given way the assumption by the government of the right of intervention
even in contractual relations affected with public interests.

xxx xxx xxx

In Commonwealth Act No. 103, and it, our Government no longer performs the role of a mere mediator
or intervenor but that of the supreme arbiter.

In his next error signal, the appellant alleges that the conduct of the investigator, the investigative investigation
and the manner in which he learned of the matter, the Court of Industrial Relations deprived him of a fair and
partial view, and constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law. In order to demonstrate the
lack of basis for the error signaling, we believe it is sufficient to reproduce below the manner in which the
investigation was carried out by the commissioner appointed by the Industrial Relations Court and the manner in
which the hearing by the court is established, as set forth in the order of the May 6, 1939.

Hearing was held on April 3, 1939, where witnessesfor both the petitioners and the respondent
testified. To supplement the facts brought out at the hearing, the Court ordered one of its Special Agents
to proceed to the premises of the mines to conduct a further investigation.

The commissioner was appointed by the Industrial Relations Court in his faculty conferred by Article 10 of
Commonwealth Law No. 103 and the inspection and hearings held by the commissioner and the court,
respectively, the parties were duly represented, heard and presented the evidence that they had available and
thought it convenient to offer such inspections and hearings had the character of an impartial and fair judicial
hearing and constitute the due process of law that guarantees the Constitution.
The appellant also maintains that the order of May 6, 1939 is arbitrary because there is no substantive or
competent evidence to support it. On this end, the factual conclusions that the Industrial Relations Tribunal has
established demonstrate that the order challenged is sustained by the result of the investigation carried out by
the commissioner and the evidence that the parties presented directly before the Court. These conclusions have
been considered and analyzed by the Industrial Relations Court all the evidence that the parties presented and
the conclusion that the order is not arbitrary and is justified and supported by the proven facts is inevitable.

The last error signaling is related to the part of the order of May 6, 1939 that the appellant orders to pay the 55
workers of the North American tastes that they ceased to perceive during their separation from service. The
appellant maintains that this part of the order is equivalent to a sentence for damages and damages that the
Industrial Relations Court cannot pronounce because it lacks jurisdiction. The claim is not meritorious. The
Industrial Relations Court, as has already been said, is a special and full court has the power to provide that the
recurring daily pay of its employees and workers have been replaced. Articles 1 and 4 of Commonwealth Law
No. 103 , as the first one has been amended by Article 1 of Law No. 254,

The appeal for certiorari is denied and the order of May 6, 1939 and the resolution of August 17 of the same
year are confused, with the appellant's costs. Asise orders.

Avanceña, Diaz, Laurel and Moran, MM., Are satisfied.