CALIBUSO, JONA CARMELI B.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP.
NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.

G.R. No. 202242 - April 16, 2013

PRINCIPLES:

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS

Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution. It reads:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.

The creation of JBC is only for the purpose to eliminate partisan politics especially at the time
there is still the confirmation from the Committee on Appointment of the President before the
latter can appoint members of the Judiciary.

NATURE OF THE CASE:

SC DECISION: Finally, while the Court finds wisdom in respondents' contention that both the
Senate and the House of Representatives should be equally represented in the JBC, the Court is
not in a position to stamp its imprimatur on such a construction at the risk of expanding the
meaning of the Constitution as currently worded. Needless to state, the remedy lies in the
amendment of this constitutional provision. The courts merely give effect to the lawgiver's
intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include
the power to correct, by reading into the law what is not written therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial
and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.

FACTS: Under Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution, viz:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector. (7 ONLY)

In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC,
designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. Perhaps
in order to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the House of
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Representatives and the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words,
Congress had only one (1) representative.

` In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only
seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives
from Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of Representatives and one
from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.7 Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc,
in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate
and the House of Representatives one full vote each.8 At present, Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition, setting forth Article VIII,
Section 8, Paragraph 1 is clear, definite and needs no interpretation in that the JBC shall have
only one representative from Congress.

The JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings as its composition is illegal and
unconstitutional

Through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondents defended their position as
members of the JBC in their Comment13 filed on July 12, 2012. According to them, the crux of
the controversy is the phrase "a representative of Congress. Reverting to the basics, they cite
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution15 to determine the meaning of the term

"Congress." It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
are permanent and mandatory components of "Congress," such that the absence of either divests
the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. In simplistic terms, the
House of Representatives, without the Senate and vice-versa, is not Congress.16 Bicameralism,
as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of "a representative from Congress," it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.

Tracing the subject provision’s history, the respondents claim that when the JBC was
established, the Framers originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating
"a representative of the National Assembly" to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified
to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism, the legislative system finally adopted by the
Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. According to respondents, if the Commissioners
were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral
one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in
the JBC.

The ambiguity having resulted from a plain case of inadvertence, the respondents urge the Court
to look beyond the letter of the disputed provision because the literal adherence to its language
would produce absurdity and incongruity to the bicameral nature of Congress.19 In other words,
placing either of the respondents in the JBC will effectively deprive a house of Congress of its
representation. In the same vein, the electorate represented by Members of Congress will lose
their only opportunity to participate in the nomination process for the members of the Judiciary,
effectively diminishing the republican nature of the governmen

ISSUE: Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the
1987 Constitution.

RULING: YES. As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter "a" preceding
"representative of Congress" is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is
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indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress
may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than
one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.32 It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.33 Verba legis non est
recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear
and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is
associated.37 This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with
other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word "Congress" used
in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion
whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to,
but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The
foregoing declaration is but sensible, since, as pointed out by an esteemed former member of the
Court and consultant of the JBC in his memorandum,40 "from the enumeration of the
membership of the JBC, it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single
individual only.

Indeed, the spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.42 Not
any of these instances, however, is present in the case at bench. Considering that the language of
the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic
aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission.

At this juncture, it is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a
practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This
underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half
(1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC
for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the
JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then
be rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself created.
While it would be unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it
is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting
deadlock.
CALIBUSO, JONA CARMELI B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1