Alalayan V. NPC
Alalayan V. NPC
Alalayan V. NPC
NPC Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company assails the power vested in NAPOCOR that "in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder," receiving at least 50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such franchise holder "shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses." Also it could renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy,". This is all in pursuant to RA 3043 and the amendments it offered to RA 2641. Alalayan and PPDC are contractors with NAPOCOR. They are re-suppliers of power produced by NAPOCOR. They aver that the provision of the said RA is a rider in only meant to increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3043 is constitutional. HELD: No bill "which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in [its] title . . ." This provision is similar to those found in many American State Constitutions. It is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills as log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious or unconsidered enactments. Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill. Alalayan asserts that the provision objected to is such a rider. To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or impede proper legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable and not unduly technical, it must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for its accomplishment. Thus, mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. More specifically, if the law amends a section or part of a statute, it suffices if reference be made to the legislation to be amended, there being no need to state the precise nature of the amendment. "Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators." ** RA. 3043, approved June 17, 1961, entitled "An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty-One." "SEC. 3 The National Power Corporation is hereby authorized to represent and transact for the benefit and in behalf of the public consumers, and it shall in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder require as a condition that the franchise holder, if it receives at least fifty percent of its electric power and energy from the National Power Corporation, shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses. The National Power Corporation shall renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy, in order to give effect to the provisions hereof. In the event that the net profit as verified by the Public Service Commission should exceed the said twelve percent, the Public Service Commission shall order such excess to be returned pro rata to the customers either in cash or as credit for future electric bills." Alalayan v. National Power Corporation Case No. 8G.R. No. L-24396 (July 29, 1968)Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46 FACTS: Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled An Act to Further Amend CommonwealthAct No. 121. In Section 3 of the same act, Respondent is empowered, in anyfranchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of the electricpower and energy of that franchisee, to realize a net profit of not more than 12%annually of its investments plus 2-month operating expenses; and NPC is allowed torenew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could be giveneffect. ISSUE: W/N Section 3 is a subject which the bill title An Act to Further AmendCommonwealth Act No. 121 does not embrace, thus making it a rider because it isviolative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill, which may be enactedinto law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in itstitle. HELD: Section 3 is constitutional.Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act. It is sufficient that the title makesreference to the legislation to be amended (in this case Commonwealth Act 121).Constitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to include thegeneral object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and everyends and means necessary for its accomplishment. Title doesnt need to be acomplete index of the contents of the act
Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary ofa Energy Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate theseinnovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crudeoil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineriesand other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his ownrequirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails theconstitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates onimported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause.Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries anddiscriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxedon unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional. HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which iscontrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated andcontrolled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the onlymajor league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As thedominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. Thetariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of thetariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects ahigh barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos.Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument thatthe 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest inrefineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot beattracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to theleague of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new playersinsofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies byrequiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.
TITLE: Tanada v Tuvera FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter of instructions,general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it would be granted to a private individualonly in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "itis for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved.The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition for thereason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by noless than the fundamental law of the land. ISSUE: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause inArticle 2 unless otherwise provided. HELD: Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not with the publicationrequirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for the law to becomeeffective. The necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished presidentialissuances which are of general application, was affirmed by the court on April 24, 1985. This isnecessary to provide the general public adequate notice of the various laws which regulate actionsand conduct as citizens. Without this, there would be no basis for Art 3 of the Civil CodeIgnorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette allunpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, theyshall have no binding force and effect.
Taada v. TuveraCase No. 287G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986) FACTS:Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. Thegovernment argued that while publication was necessary as arule, it was not so when it wasotherwise provided as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effectiveimmediately upon their approval. ISSUE:W/N the clause otherwise provided in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to thenecessity of publication.HELD: No, the clause otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted.Publication in full should beindispensable. Without such notice or publication, there would be no basis for theapplication of the maxim ignorantia Legis non excusat. The court, therefore,declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not been publishedshall have no force and effect, and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette immediately.
Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union vs Vega In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of thePhilippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB employeesunion herein petitioner filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits.On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was signed into law byPres. Corazon Aquino and which was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.In May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite thelate mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, respondent Judge Vega continued with theliquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992. HELD: The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days followingcompletion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation inthe Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clauseunless otherwise provided. Citing Tanada vs Tuvera, this clause refers to the date of effectivityand not to the requirement of publication, which cannot in any event be omitted. The reason is thatsuch omission would affect due process in so far as it would deny the public knowledge of the lawsthat are supposed to govern it In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB employees union herein petitioner filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits. On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was signed into law by Pres. Corazon Aquino and which was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank. In May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, respondent Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992. HELD: The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause unless otherwise provided. Citing Tanada vs Tuvera, this clause refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication, which cannot in any event be omitted. The reason is that such omission would affect due process in so far as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.