[ GR No.

L-12495, Jul 26, 1960 ]

PEOPLE v. DIONISIO LIDRES +

DECISION

BARRERA, J.:
Dionisio Lidres was charged in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
(Criminal Case No. V-4137) with the crime of usurpation of official
functions as defined and penalized in Republic Act No. 10, under the
following information:
"That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1954, in the municipality of
Balamban, province of Cebu, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and without
pretense of official position did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously perform acts pertaining to the position of the second grade class
of the Biasong Elementary School of the aforementioned municipality, a
position assigned to and occupied by Miss Josita Diutay who had been duly
appointed to said position.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty and was, thereafter tried. After
trial, he was found guilty of the crime charged and was sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of from 3 years to 5 years, and to pay the costs.
From this judgment, he appealed to us directly assigning as sole error the
trial court's finding that under the information and facts of the case, he was
guilty of the crime of usurpation of official functions.
The records disclose that Magdalena P. Echavez, a public school teacher of
Biasong Elementary School, at Balamban, Cebu, applied for and was
granted maternity leave beginning the first school day of January, 1954 and
ending on March of the same year. To fill up the vacancy expected to be
created by said leave of Echavez, Josita Diotay and defendant Lidres filed
their respective applications as substitute teachers. On December
30,1953, Diotay was recommended by the supervising teacher of the
aforementioned school, Hilario Laspiñas, to fill up the position of Echavez.
Laspiñas, however, requested Diotay to sign an agreement (Exh. 1), wherein
both Diotay and defendant agreed to take over Echavez' position on a "50-
50" basis, that is, the period from January, 1954 to March, 1954, would be
equally divided between them. Thereafter, Diotay received her appointment
(Exh. B) as substitute teacher, vice Echavez, effective January 4, 1954.
Diotay then took over the job of Echavez and began teaching the second
grade class in said school.
On February 12, 1954, apparently on the strength of the agreement (Exh. 1),
defendant appeared at Biasong, Elementary School, armed with a prepared
letter of resignation for the signature of Diotay. When defendant asked
Diotay to sign said letter of resignation, the latter refused. Subsequently,
defendant made known to Diotay that whether she liked it or not, he would
take over her class on Monday, February 22, 1954. True to his words,
defendant, on said date (February 22), went to the classroom where Diotay
was conducting her classes, and insisted to take over the same, but Diotay
tried to hold on. As a consequence, both held classes, Diotay on 2 rows of
pupils and defendant, on the remaining 2 rows. In order to assert
his authority, defendant also erased Diotay's name from the attendance
chart, and placed his own. Annoyed by defendant's actuation, Diotay left
the classroom, and reported the matter to the principal teacher, Exequiel
Tecson, at Balamban. The latter advised her to return to her post, which she
did. When she arrived at her classroom in the afternoon of the same day
(February 22), defendant was still there, holding the class until 4:00
o'clock. In view of this, Diotay went back to inform said principal about
defendant's insistence in taking over her class.
On the following day, February 23, 1954, both Diotay and defendant were
summoned by the supervising teacher (Laspiñas) for a conference in Cebu
City. At said conference, said supervising teacher told Diotay to continue
teaching, while defendant was advised not to go back to the school. Without
heeding said instruction, defendant, on February 24, 1954, without any
authority whatsoever, again took over Diotay's class, against the latter's
will.
Upon this set of facts, appellant was prosecuted and sentenced as stated at
the beginning of this opinion.
In regard to the offense of usurpation of official functions, the law, as
originally appearing in Article 177 of Act No. 3815 (Revised Penal Code),
provides:
"Art. 177. Usurpation of official functions. Any person who, under
pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person
in authority or public officer, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall
suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods." (Emphasis supplied.)
"Any person who, with or without pretense of official position, shall
perform any act pertaining to the Government, or to any person in
authority or public officer, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall be
punished with imprisonment for not less than two years nor more than ten
years." (Sec. 1; Emphasis supplied.)
Still later on, or on June 14, 1949, Republic Act 379 was adopted, amending
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code, to read as follows:
"ART. 177. Usurpation of Authority or official functions. Any person who
shall knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent, or
representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government
or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official position,
shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer
of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or any agency
thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty
of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods." (Emphasis
supplied.)
On May 31, 1954, appellant was, as already stated, prosecuted and later
tried and convicted under Republic Act No. 10. Appellant now contends in
his appeal that Republic Act No. 10 is not applicable to his case because this
law is an emergency measure and intended to apply only to members of
subversive organizations.
Examination of the discussion of House Bill No. 126, which became
Republic Act No. 10, discloses indisputably that said Act was really
intended as an emergency measure, to cope with the abnormal situation
created by the subversive activities of seditious organizations at the time of
its passage in September, 1946. Hence, the elimination of the element of
pretense of official position required under Article 177 above-quoted of the
Revised Penal Code, and the elevation of the penalty from prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods (under the latter
provision) to not less than 2 years nor more than 10 years (under Rep. Act
No. 10).
***
"Mr. Sumulong. Now, if the gentleman will allow me to add something to
that because I do not want to have any possibility of misunderstanding
when I say that this proposed measure is intended to supplant the provision
of the Penal Code, I want to make it clearly understood that this is going to
replace the Penal Code provision only so long as the situation which we
intend to correct with this measure continues to exist, and we like to believe
that this situation will not be permanent but only transient and ephemeral.
"Mr. Roy. I should like that to be made clear on the records. Do I
understand from the gentleman from Rizal that this is a sort of an
emergency measure?
"Mr. Sumulong. Exactly.
"Mr. Roy. And, if so, will, the gentleman explain the justification for the
existence of that emergency?
"Mr. Sumulong. This is an emergency measure because the situation which
we propose to correct with this bill, we believe, has its origin during the
Japanese occupation. It is a situation which was created on account of
psychology which arose during that extraordinary period in our history.
***
"Mr. Roy. Now referring to present conditions, does the gentleman have in
mind the reported activities of some organizations in the Central Plains of
Luzon to the effect that those organizations are levying or collecting taxes
and performing marriages?
"Mr. Sumulong. I think those are intended to be corrected by this measure,
if the newspaper reports and the information contained in official reports
are true, which I cannot definitely state one way or the other."
***
(Congressional Record, House of Representatives, Vol. I, No. 16, June 18,
1946, p. 309; emphasis supplied).
The explanatory note of said bill, states:
"In some provinces of the Philippines, the rule of law and order has been
impaired or replaced by force and terrorism. Using economic injustice as a
rallying cry, unscrupulous agitators have succeeded in destroying public
faith and confidence in the orderly processes of government and in
imposing extralegal rule over the inhabitants therein. That faith and
confidence must be restored and constituted authority respected. The
Government must resist with all the forces at its command any attempt to
subvert public authority. The accompanying bill seeks to remedy the
situation and approval thereof by this body is, therefore, hereby urged."
(Id., at p. 307; emphasis supplied.)
Were Republic Act No. 10 not so intended to apply only to members of
subversive organizations, it would create an absurd situation where a lesser
offense performing official functions without pretense is penalized with a
higher penalty, that of imprisonment of not less than two years nor more
than 10 years, instead of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods. And since it is neither alleged in the information aforequoted, nor
proved during the trial that defendant is a member of said seditious
organizations engaged in subversive activities, he could not be held liable or
found guilty under said provision of Republic Act No. 10.
Granting, arguendo, that Republic Act No. 10 is an amendment to Article
177 of the Revised Penal Code and not merely an implementation thereof (2
Padilla, Revised Penal Code Annotated [1958 Ed.] 267), or an emergency
measure as stated, the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 379
effective June 14, 1949, would constitute an amendment thereof by
restoring the element of pretense of official position in the offense of
usurpation of official functions, originally required by Article 177 prior to its
amendment by the latter Act. Under Republic Act No. 379 then, the law in
force at the time of the commission of the alleged offense by
defendant, pretense of official position is an essential element of the crime
of usurpation of official functions. But the information specifically charges
that defendant committed the offense "without pretense of official
position". Under the circumstances, the facts alleged in the information fail
to constitute an offense. Neither can defendant be convicted of usurpation
of authority, as distinguished from usurpation of official functions, under
the first paragraph of Article 177, as amended by said Republic Act No. 379,
namely, that of representing to be an officer, agent, or representative of any
department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign
government, inasmuch as the information does not charge the same.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed; the accused
acquitted, with costs de oficio, and the bond given for his provisional liberty
cancelled. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia,
and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., did not take part.

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