People vs. Mendoza, 59 Phil. 163, No. 39275 December 20, 1933
People vs. Mendoza, 59 Phil. 163, No. 39275 December 20, 1933
People vs. Mendoza, 59 Phil. 163, No. 39275 December 20, 1933
In criminal case No. 4851 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, the provincial
fiscal thereof filed an information against the herein appellee, which reads as
follows:
"The undersigned provincial fiscal accuses Ricardo Mendoza of the crime of assault
upon a person in authority committed as follows:
"That on or about September 30, 1932, in the municipality of San Fernando,
Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, the said accused, Ricardo Mendoza, being
a pupil of the teacher Iluminada Tinio, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally attack and lay hands upon her person, to wit: slapped said Iluminada
Tinio on one of her cheeks, while she was engaged in the performance of her duties
as such teacher and while she was within the premises of the high school building
exercising the functions inherent in such capacity."
Upon motion of the appellee, as accused in the aforesaid case, the trial court
dismissed the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not
constitute a crime but simply a misdemeanor or light felony. / The present appeal
was taken by the fiscal for the purpose of setting aside the order of dismissal in
question.
The question to decide, therefore, is whether or not the facts as alleged in the said
information really constitute the crime of assault upon a person in authority or at
least an assault upon an agent of authority, or any other grave or light felony.
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PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Mendoza
The fiscal bases his appeal on the findings of this court in the cases of People vs.
Villacenda (G. R. No. 32596, promulgated April 26, 1930, not reported); People vs.
Lagrimas (G. R. No. 33529, promulgated April 8, 1931, not reported); and People vs.
Tacud (56 Phil., 800) wherein a question similar to the one under consideration was
discussed and decided, claiming that the facts as alleged in the information
constitute an assault upon a public officer and agent of authority at the same time.
In the three cases above-cited, this court, in modifying one and affirming two of the
judgments rendered by the courts a, quo, really held that the acts committed by the
defendants therein constituted the crime of assault upon a public officer and, theref
ore, they should be sentenced to the penalty prescribed in article 251 of the old
Penal Code. The reason for such doctrine is based on the fact that the said article,
as explained in the case of People vs. Mijares (44 Phil., 684), provided as follows:
"The maximum degree of the penalty prescribed in the last paragraph of the
preceding article shall be imposed upon those who shall have employed the force or
the intimidation mentioned in No. 1 of article 249 for the object indicated in No. 1 of
article 229 or who shall have placed hands upon persons coming to the assistance
of authority or upon its agents or upon public officers."
Inasmuch as the afore-cited article was in force at the time the decisions in the
three cases were promulgated and the acts complained of therein had been
committed long before the present Revised Penal Code went into effect, it was
necessary that the defendants and appellants in the aforesaid cases be convicted of
the crimes with which they had been charged and sentenced later to the penalty
prescribed in the afore-cited article. The reason is obvious because said acts
constituted a violation of the article in question, as held by this court.
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PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Mendoza
public officers was penalized likewise in the said article 264 of the Spanish Penal
Code.
A teacher is not a person in authority on the ground that he does not possess the
necessary requisite therefor prescribed by law. Article 152 of the Revised Penal
Code defines a person in authority as follows:
"In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any
person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of
some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a
person in authority."
The word "authority" has been given a restricted meaning in the case of United
States vs. Smith (39 Phil., 533), so as to include only persons who perform some of
the functions of the Government of the Philippine Islands and who, according to the
aforesaid article, are directly vested with jurisdiction. By "directly vested
jurisdiction" is meant "the power or authority to govern and execute the laws,
particularly the authority vested in the judges to administer justice, that is, to try
civil or criminal cases or both, and to render judgment thereon in accordance with
the law" (Escriche, Rational Dictionary of Legislation and Jurisprudence, p. 1154);
and "authority" as well as "directly vested jurisdiction" are two things which should
be conferred by law.
The Administrative Code, which creates the Executive Department and the bureaus
and offices dependent on it, for the purpose of exercising the executive functions of
the Government of the Philippine Islands, is silent with regard to powers had or
which may be had by high school teachers, in defining those vested in functionaries
of the aforesaid offices. The Code in question only defines the duties and powers of
the Director of Education and of the division superintendents. Nothing is said about
principals, except that their authority should be determined by the Director of
Education, and much less about high school teachers. The powers granted to the
said Director of Education and
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PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Mendoza,
not included in article 263 which describes and defines said crime? And if they
should be so, in the case stated in the last paragraph of article 264, shall it be
understood that may also be, In all the cases relative to persons in authority and
their agents as stated in article 263? ? To decide these questions, it is necessary to
know beforehand who are public officers. Article 416 defines them as: those who, by
direct provision of law, popular election, or appointment by competent authority,
take part in the performance of public functions. From the above-cited provision, it
follows that every agent of authority is a public officer but not every public officer is
an agent of authority. The officers of a ministry and those of provincial governments
are public officers inasmuch as they perform functions intended for the preservation
and government of the State, yet in spite of it, they are not persons in authority nor
agents thereof. They are not persons in authority on the ground that they are not
directly vested with jurisdiction either individually or as members of some court or
public corporation. They are not agents of authority because, as? subordinate
officers, they are not charged with the task of executing the orders of any such
person. This important difference should be borne in mind so as not to mistake
offices for functions,
"The same Code, speaking of the laying of hands upon agents of authority or upon
public officers defines the difference between one and the other. Therefore, an
agent of authority cannot be conf used with a public officer when the legislator
himself speaks of them separately.
"Therefore, inasmuch as public officers are not agents of authority, it seems that,
generally speaking, they cannot be the subject of the crime of assault, as defined in
article 263, on the ground that said article considers assault as only those acts
committed upon persons in authority and their agents, it being silent with regard to
public officers.
"It is true that there is a manifest contradiction between the generic doctrine of
article 263 and the specific statement
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PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Mendoza
(Slander by Deed), or of article 266 (Maltreatment) of the Revised Penal Code.
However, inasmuch as the complaint does not allege the motive of the defendant in
maltreating the aforesaid teacher, in the manner he had so done, nor the fact that
the act was committed publicly, it is more proper and more in accordance with the
law to consider the aforesaid acts as merely constituting light felony as defined and
penalized in the said article 266, with the third aggravating circumstance. In such
case, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to try the case by reason of the penalty
therefor as prescribed by law.
Let it not be said that we did not take into consideration the doctrine laid down in
the case of Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga vs. Rosauro (G. R. No. 39289)1, for we
had it before us in considering the case at bar. The truth is that there is no similarity
between the former and the present case on the ground that although the crime
alleged therein was "direct assault upon a person in authority" and the offended
party therein was a public elementary school teacher acting in the performance of
his duties as such, nevertheless, it was clearly alleged in the body of the complaint
that the defendant therein gravely intimidated and threatened said teacher. There is
no question that, in accordance with the provisions of article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code, the jurisdiction to try cases of grave threats belongs to Courts of First
Instance by reason of the penalty prescribed therein. Prescinding from the title of
the offense stated in the information under consideration, it is observed from the
allegations contained in the body of said pleading that the crime committed is slight
in nature, the trial of which falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
court.
Wherefore, we are of the opinion and so hold that the order of dismissal appealed
from is in accordance with the law and should therefore be sustained.
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