Role Name Affiliation

Principal Investigator A. Raghuramaraju Professor, Department of

Philosophy, University of
Hyderabad
Paper Coordinator Shyam Ranganathan Assistant Professor,
Department of Philosophy and
Department of Social
Sciences, South Asian Studies,
York University, Toronto
Content Writer Shyam Ranganathan Assistant Professor,
Department of Philosophy and
Department of Social
Sciences, South Asian Studies,
York University, Toronto
Content Reviewer Vibha Chaturvedi Retired Professor, Department
of Philosophy, University of
Delhi
Language Editor

Description of Module

Subject name Philosophy

Paper Name Ethics-1
Module Name/Title The Scope of Moral Philosophy
Module Id 4.2
Prerequisites 4.1
Objectives Understand the scope of moral philosophy
Key words Ethical Theory, Analysis, Argument, Dharma
The Scope of Moral Philosophy

1. Introduction: Review of Philosophy

In this lesson, we shall explore the practice of philosophy as foundational to ethics. In the second
explication section, we shall review what was learned in the last lesson: philosophy as a discipline
proceeds by rendering its basic categories general (resulting in philosophical concepts), and its
generalizations abstract (resulting in philosophical reasons). Ethics is that application of philosophy
concerned with the question of what should be the norm or customary as such, and the question of the
relative priority of the good and the right is the way to explore this question. Indeed, the very concepts of
ETHICS, the RIGHT and the GOOD are generalized universals and any further explanation requires
philosophical reasons. We proceed beyond the last lesson by noting that philosophical reasons and
concepts can be employed to create philosophical arguments and analyses. We also take stock of the basic
requirements of philosophical writing and reading. This sets the stage for the brief third section, where I
set out the main argument. The conclusion is that Ethics is a mere extension of the philosophical project
of the mutual application of the universality and generality criteria. Moreover, three differing varieties of
ethics (Metaethics, Normative Ethics and Applied Ethics) while all addressing the question of the Right
and the Good are distinguishable by their philosophical objective. Metaethics concerns the conceptual
relations of Ethics, Normative Ethics concerns the practical resolution of the right and the good, and
Applied Ethics attempts a case-type account of the the right and the good. In the fourth section, I respond
to an objection to this account of ethics—namely that ethics is culturally peculiar. We shall see this is not
true by contemplating the basic possible ethical theories that arise out of the question of the priority of the
good and the right. Three such theories (Deontology, Consequentialism and Virtue Theory) can be found
the world over, but one seems to be popular in the Indian tradition, and not obviously represented in the
West.Call this “Bhakti Theory.” (5) These observances allow certain modest conclusions about what
moral philosophers, both East and West, are interested in.

2. The Methods of Philosophy

2.1. Categories and Generalities

Generalities are claims about what is common to cases or scenarios. Such cases are characterized by
objects, relations and categories. A case or scenario is not the same as an object: the same object can
occur in different cases. As generality is a commonality of cases, a generality isdescriptive: they tell us
about how things are.

A category is an abstraction or universal: a kind of thing. A category need not be general: it may range
over a set of objects that it functions as a name for. CAR for instance is a category and it functions as a
name for cars. The difference is that in the category of CARS, spatial or temporal factors do not define the
category; but in the case of actual cars, they do. Other categories, such as numbers, seem to be the very
object that they name. Here the object contained by the category of a number is in no sense defined by
spatial and temporal constraints. This has led some to identify numbers as abstract objects (cf. Frege).

Universals have the peculiar property of being prescriptive. The category of a CAR, when properly
analyzed, prescribes certain criteria for an object to count as a car. The claim, for instance, that the moon
is a car is false in part because the moon does not qualify to be counted as a car by virtue of the category
CAR. This has to do with the criteria that constitute the category CAR. Truths of categories are
paradigmatically prescriptive. Mathematical claims, such as 2+2=4, are excellent examples of this. To the
extent that they are true, they are not true because they were confirmed in experiments, but because
failing to count in conformity to such truths is an error.

The prescriptivity of categories constrains what we should count as evidence. The prescriptivity of the
number 2 (its essential characteristics) renders some claims about this number true and others false. This
is not settled on the basis of experimentation, but adherence to the procedures or criteria that define this
concept.

2.1.1. Generalized Categories

For a category to be general is for it to also range over cases—these are scenariosdefined by objects and
their relations—and other categories too. A generalized category is in this respect a higher order category
that ranges over categories. A philosophical category is of a high generality. Examples of such concepts
are KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, LOGIC, BEAUTY. Central to ethics are the concepts of RIGHT and GOOD, and their
corollaries WRONG and BAD.

As noted, these central concepts of philosophy divide philosophy in to principle areas:

Metaphysics — concerned with reality

Epistemology — concerned with knowledge
Logic — concerned with reason
Ethics — concerned with the right and the good, and
Aesthetics — concerned with beauty

One difference between so called Value or Normative concepts, and Non-Evaluative or Non-Normative
concepts is that in the case of the former, the prescriptive element takes priority, whereas in the Non-
Evaluative Non-Normative concepts, the generality takes priority. Examples of the former variety of
concepts are ethical concepts. Examples of the latter variety of concepts are those of metaphysics. This is
to say very little, for both Value concepts, which are prescriptive, have some descriptive content, and
Non-Value concepts, have prescriptive implications.

The concept of ETHICS (or MORALITY)is the topic of our course. Its literal meaning has to do with what is
normative or customary. However, as this concept is generalized it becomes a question of the normative
or customary as such, and not merely in specific cases. Any concept of the norm can be assessed in two
ways: procedurally, and with respect to outcome. Procedure has to do with the right; outcomes have to do
with the good. Hence, the central concepts of ethics — ETHICS/DHARMA — breaks down into an answer to
the relative priority of the RIGHT and the GOOD. This is evidence that we have two terms for the same
concept: DHARMA and ETHICS.

As we shall see, the view that a philosopher takes about the relationship between the RIGHT and the GOOD
constitutes her moral theory that she usually simply call “ethics” or “dharma.”

2.1.2. Universalized Generalizations

A generality is a commonality of scenarios. Typically they are expressed in claims (e.g. “the sun usually
rises in the morning”).Even the more basic claim “the sun rises in the morning” is a generalization that
ranges over scenarios. To universalize a generality is to rewrite it so as to remove definite descriptions of
particular things, and to replace them with abstract descriptions applicable in principle to many things.
The form a universalized generalization should take in philosophy is controversial. Some hold that that an
acceptable generalization must maintain an “other things being equal” (ceteris paribus) clause or
something like it (such a “prima facie”—‘on the face of it—or “pro tonto”—‘to that extent’) to admit of
exceptions. Philosophers who hold this are Generalists. Some Generalists hold that if the sentence
“Shyam Ranganathan is writing this lesson” is relevant to philosophical explanation, it would have to be
general in addition to being universalized: “Other things being equal, anything writing this lesson called
“The Scope of Moral Philosophy’ is also something called ‘Shyam Ranganathan.’” Non-Generalists reject
this. The famous Non-Generalists are Particularists, who hold that philosophical explanation has to be
answerable to contexts of deliberation. For them, the proper universalization would omit a generality
clause: “anything writing the lesson ‘The Scope of Moral Philosophy’ is also something called ‘Shyam
Ranganathan.’”

The difference is that the Generalist regards moral claims of the general variety as having an authority
that transcends contexts (McKeever and Ridge 2006). These context transcendent rules that are often
treated as in-and-of-themselves-true are called moral principles. However, the Non-Generalist,
Particularist in contrast, rejects the relevance of principles. For her, if a universalized claim is true, it is
true by virtue of the specific cases (Little 2000; Dancy 2004; McDowell 1998). Principles play no role in
her account of moral knowledge. Either way, the ethical claim can be universalized (Schroth 2003). The
only explanation for the belief that Particularists must reject that philosophical explanations must be
universalized is to confuse Universalization—abstraction—with generality. It is consistent with
Particularism to hold that a properly universalized ethical explanation abstract even from its latent
generality. Generalists reject this.

2.1.3. Putting the Criteria of Philosophy Together

By combining abstractions that are generalized, with generalities that are universalized, we arrive at the
prospects of analysing our philosophical concepts. When we analyze concepts, we explain their meaning,
usually with other concepts. Generalities that are universalized—philosophical reasons—can be used to
explain abstractions that are generalized—philosophical concepts.

Our central philosophical concepts, we know, not only prescribe, they describe too. But flushing out what
this prescription and description amounts to requires laying bare the categories in virtue of which our
central philosophical concepts are applicable to explanation.

Philosophical concepts as categories, are prescriptive—whatever their level of generality. A proper

analysis of the concept of REALITY, for instance, would tell us what we could count as reality, and what we
could not. Cashing this out involves an explanation of the concept, and the explanation consists in a
universalized generalization.

For instance, if, after careful inspection, a philosopher were to conclude with the following universalized
generalization—

· anything real and objective must be knowable from multiple perspectives, and what can
only be viewed from one perspective is not real and objective

— she would have reason to discount reflections in mirrors as real and objective (though the mirror itself
would thereby be counted as real and objective). This is the prescriptive import of the concept of REALITY
so explained. But because this concept is also general, and ranges over categories and scenarios, itseems
to have descriptive content that tells us how things are. Given an acceptable analysis of REALITY, we know
what kinds of things are real, and what kinds of things that are not—even (and perhaps, especially) in
cases we have not yet experienced. So, if we were ever to find ourselves in front of a mirror while being
tempted to believe the reality of our reflection, this metaphysical analysis would give reason to
descriptively discount our appearance in the mirror as objective, but to prescriptively count the mirror as
objective.

2.2. Arguments

Philosophy is concerned with universals that are general and generalities that are universal. Talking about
this involves making a case for thesesthat are abstract themselves (philosophical claims), on the basis of
universals that are general (philosophical concepts). When we rely upon the universalized generalizations
to shed light on categories that are generalized, we are engaging in analysis—the breakdown, or
description, of ideas in terms of further concepts. When we proceed the other way, to use our concepts to
make a case for generalizations, we are engaged in argument. These activities are not mutually exclusive,
and sometimes the only way to engage in the one is to engage in the other.

An argument consists of reasonsfor a conclusion. There are two types of arguments: inductive and
deductive.

2.2.1. Inductive Arguments

Inductive Arguments are the bread and butter of the sciences. Inductive arguments attempt to establish a
conclusion (thesis) on the basis of observation or evidence. An example of an inductive argument are
arguments for weather predictions, based on observation of past weather patterns. We typically consult
meteorological predictions as a way to plan our day. If it turns out that the prediction is wrong we do not
fault the reasoning that lead us to it. As long as the predication was founded on good evidence, we take it
seriously. Similarly, in a clinical trial for a vaccine, researchers will test the vaccine on several subjects. If
the sample size is large enough, researchers take the generalizations from such findings seriously. Even
in so called harder sciences, such as physics, such arguments play a role. A generalization that has been
inductively confirmed to a high degree continues to be treated with seriousness even in the face of
occasional and possible disconfirming evidence. The examples of Quantum Mechanics that governs
microcosmic events, and Relativity that pertains to large scale events are as though disconfirming cases
for each other that are not taken to disprove these two theories as the cases in which each of these theories
have been confirmed are numerous and significant.

Inductive Arguments are not philosophical in so far as the evidence that they are built on are not
generalized abstractions. The evidence that is useful are concrete and specific cases and the conclusion of
such an argument—the generalization—is strong in proportion to the frequency of observations that count
as the reasons.

2.2.2. Deductive Arguments

Any argument where the evidence or reasons are abstractions answers to a different logic. These
arguments are called Deductive Arguments. In the case of a validdeductive argument, the conclusion is
thought to follow prescriptivelyfrom the premises if they are true. Another term for this same phenomena
is “entailment.” When p entails q, it is the case that if p is true, q is true too. A valid deductive argument
need not be based on true premises. Consider the following example of a valid deductive argument:

o Premise (1): The moon is made of green cheese.

o Premise (2): All items made of green cheese are yummy.
o Conclusion: The moon is yummy.
Certainly, these premises are not true. The conclusion is certainly false. But, if the premises were true, the
conclusion would have to be true. In this case, we find the first premise is an abstraction not based on any
actual cases. The second premise seems like an inductive generalization but once again, it too is divorced
from any evidence in its favour and hence functions as an abstraction. The conclusion is inevitable, given
these claims.

Not all valid, deductive arguments need be ridiculous. Indeed, the sound ones are not. Consider the
following example of a sound, deductive argument.

o Premise (1): Humans are mammals.

o Premise (2): Healthy mammals have brains.
o Conclusion: Healthy humans have brains.

Here the argument relies on generalizations that are abstracted from actual cases. These are the premises.
If they are true, the conclusion must be true. In this case the premises are true. They are generalizations
that employ categories in a manner that conform to the actual cases. In the empirical sciences, this
conformity to actual cases is the grounds of truth.

As an example of a plausible philosophical argument that employs philosophical concepts to justify a

conclusion, consider the following that relies upon the concept WRONG to derive a conclusion:

o Premise (1): Premeditated killing without justification is wrong

o Premise (2): Murder is premeditated killing without justification
o Conclusion: Murder is wrong.

Or, consider the following argument about reality.

o Premise (1): Real objects are observable from a number of directions..

o Premise (2): Reflections are not observable from a number directions.
o Conclusion: Reflections are not real objects.

In both cases, the arguments rely upon philosophical categories that are general. The first argument relies
upon the idea of the WRONG, and the second on REALITY. The conclusions are generalizations that are
abstract. This is to say that they have a prescriptive element that prevents them from being assessed
merely on the basis of observable evidence. In the way that 2+2=4 is prescriptive and not dependent upon
testing and observation, so are philosophical conclusions.

The truth of these premises is dependent upon the facts, and the facts in many of these cases are
philosophical. Either it is correct that killing without justification is wrong, or it is permissible. Either the
real is objective, and the objective is observable from multiple perspectives, or it is not. We can’t have it
both ways so there is something factual at stake in these philosophical claims. The soundness of a
philosophical argument depends upon the truth of the premises.
 2.3. Writing and Reading in Philosophy

2.3.1. Writing

Every discipline is unique: the considerations that are deemed important for a discipline are discipline
relative: writing successful essays is thus discipline relative.This sounds obvious. But it is not. There are
many students who believe that to learn to write properly in philosophy, they must learn essay
composition from an expert in literature and writing. In short, many students treat writing essays as a
matter of linguistic competence.

In philosophy, our goal in writing is none other than the participation in the discipline of philosophy. As
philosophy involves the twin criteria of the universalized generality (philosophical claims) and the
generalized universal (philosophical concepts), with the two making a case for each other, writing in
philosophy involves analysis and argument.

Indeed, the classical sutra texts of Indian philosophy are, for the most part, replete with analysis.
Argument is there too, but making arguments explicit requires a discursive style.

Writing in philosophy that involves both of these basic processes of philosophy (analysis and argument)
usually requires certain steps.

(1) State the goal of the work (make clear what will be discussed).

This is called the Introduction. It is an essential part of any philosophical essay, but one that should be
restricted to the purpose of explaining the topic of the work.

(2) Explicate the background necessary to understand the argument. This portion might consist of
explicit analysis, but also reference to the literature.

Call this the Explication section. This is an important part of philosophical writing. We find it in
traditional latter Indian philosophical writing too where typically the views of the opponent are listed.

(3) A main argument where philosophical concepts are used to make a case for some
philosophical claim, which has the character of a universalized generalization.

This Main Argument section is an extremely important part of the philosophical essay. Here the ideas of
the author are presented in argument.

(4) Response to criticisms and objections of the main argument.

This Response to Criticisms is a part of mature philosophical writing. It displays an awareness of the
vantage of others, and when employed effectively, allows the author to respond to concerns from
differing perspectives.

(5) Conclusion.

Very little needs to be included in the Conclusion over and above a summary of what has been argued.
 2.3.2. Reading

When we read philosophy, we should be looking for these very same elements. What we want to discern
in reading a philosophical text is how it provides consistent and valid arguments for the philosophical
concepts it mentions or employs. While philosophers might disagree about whether an argument is sound,
they can agree on whether it is sound. This is because determining whether an argument is valid does not
depend upon truth. Similarly, philosophers can agree whether a thesis is consistent without agreeing
whether it is true. The reason is that consistency, like validity, does not depend upon any account of what
is true.

Learning how to read philosophy is the same practical knowledge that is involved in writing philosophy.
This knowledge is aided by an awareness of the two basic elements of philosophy: philosophical concepts
and philosophical claims. Both play a role in setting out the analysis of concepts and arguments for
conclusions. Reading philosophy consists in sensitivity to the role these two basic elements play in a text,
as they ideally constitute consistent and valid arguments.

3. Ethical Theory: Standard Presentations

(1) Ethics (answering the question of the priority of the RIGHT and the GOOD) is a Species
of Philosophy (which is itsGenus).
(2) Species inherit essential traits of the genus.
(3) An essential trait of philosophy is the mutual combination of the criteria of universality
and generality.
Conclusion: An essential trait of ethics (answering the question of the priority of the RIGHT
and the GOOD) is the mutual combination of the universality and generality criteria. 1

This first premise relies on the philosophical concepts of PHILOSOPHY and ETHICS. These concepts are
philosophical in that they are both categories that generalize over scenarios. The concept of Ethics is
analyzed further into the question of the priority of the RIGHT and the GOOD—of procedure and outcome.
This analysis is a mini argument itself. We could rephrase this mini argument as follows:

(a) If ETHICS, a generalized abstraction, is being discussed, then the priority of the RIGHT and the GOOD is
answered.

(b) Ethics is being discussed.

Therefore, the question of the priority of the RIGHT and the GOOD is being answered.

The idea that moral philosophers debate the question of the relative priority of the right and the good is
uncontroversial. Indeed, fault lines across ethical theories are drawn according to answers to this question.
But this also shows that ethics is a species of philosophy. It involves providing analyses of basic ethical
concepts, which is essential to philosophy.

The second premise, the idea that species inherit the essential traits of a genus, is uncontroversial. A
genus is merely a higher order category of which species are members. So all of its members will be
things of the same kind. This is enough for them to share the genus as their traits

1
For an argument that shares some premises, but a more controversial conclusion, see Shafer-Landau (2007).
The third premise was explored in the previous section. We spent the previous sections (and the previous
lesson) understanding what the mutual combination of the universality and generality criteria amounts to
and how it is an essential trait of philosophy. We are lead to agreeing that this is true because philosophy
is concerned with both abstraction and generality, but it is not a mere addition of the interests of
mathematics (concerned as it is with abstractions) with the interests of science (concerned as it is with
generalities). Indeed, by combining the generality and universality criteria mutually, we arrive at
philosophical concepts (categories that are generalized) and reasons (generalizations that are
universalized) that can function in analysis or argument.

The conclusion of the argument at the head of this section follows as a matter of deduction from the
premises.

This I believe is an example of a sound philosophical argument—an argument that is not only valid and
relies upon true premises, but also relies centrally on philosophical concepts and philosophical
generalizations.

When philosophers engage in ethics as described in this argument, they produce ethical theories. Ethical
theory is comprised of analyses of basic ethical concepts, and ethical generalities that are universalized
that deductively follow from the basic ethical concepts as they are analyzed. Examples of such theories
include Deontology, Consequentialism and Virtue Theory. These three are examples of Normative Ethical
Theories. Other varieties of ethical theories are Metaethical, and surprisingly Applied Theories.

3.1. Normative Ethics, Metaethics, Applied Ethics

For some time, it has been customary to distinguish activities in moral philosophy into three headings.

· Normative ethics: “first order” responses to the question of the priority of the RIGHT and
the GOOD.

Normative ethics, so understood, is about our choices, and how we should proceed with them. Normative
theory concerns a practical resolution of ethics as concerned with the priority of the RIGHT and the GOOD.
This usually involves arguments for ethical principles (or claims) that take ethical concepts (suitably
analyzed) as premises. Moral Particularists, as noted, would rather we treat theory as something that we
build based on credible context based decisions, not principles. Whereas Generalists take ethical theory to
have a higher prescriptive value, dictating and justifying correct decisions to a large degree, Particularists
treat it as descriptive at best and subject to future confirmation.

· Metaethics: questions about first order ethical questions.

Included in metaethics are questions about the definition of moral terminology, or about the scope of
ethics as an inquiry. What we have been engaged in within this lesson is metaethics. Certainly, when
basic ethical concepts are analyzed, philosophers are engaged in metaethics. We have touched upon some
very foundational ethical concepts, such as the RIGHT and the GOOD. But there are others—many others—
that arise out of the analysis of the idea of ethics itself as a resolution of the question of the priority of the
right and the good. Some of these concepts are particular to theories and not widely endorsed. For
instance, the idea of ahiṃsā,or harmlessness, is a concept that some moral theories take seriously, while
others do not. Whether this concept is given the dignity of being philosophically analyzed depends upon
the moral theory that a philosopher engages with and this in turn rests upon the theory’s position on the
relationship between the right and the good. Metaethics concerns the conceptual resolution of the
question of the RIGHT and the GOOD.
Similarly, it has been fashionable to distinguish from the previous two:

· Applied Ethics: the ethics of case-type problems.

An example of applied ethics would be Environmental Ethics, or Nursing Ethics. Applied Ethics has
become very sophisticated in recent years. The resulting analyses of case based ethical problems results in
novel theories that draw on the other aspects of moral philosophy. Applied ethics is a case-type resolution
of the priority of the RIGHT and the GOOD. Alternatively, if we like, it concerns the question of the priority
of the Right and the Good as it pertains to kinds of cases, be they of the Environment, or Nursing to name
just two. Because Applied Ethics pertains to kinds of cases, and not specific scenarios, it is amenable to
theoretical explanations that employ moral principles.

3.2. Standard Presentation in Ethics Texts

Standard presentations of ethics in leading textbooks often rely upon these distinctions in how the topic of
ethics is presented. Consider, for instance, a leading textbook on ethical theory, edited by Russ Shafer-
Landau. Ethical Theory(2012) contains numerous articles by various authors, divided into several
headings:

Part I The Status of Morality

Part II Moral Knowledge
Part III Why Be Moral?

These first three sections, each containing several articles, are metaethical. Questions about ethics the
discipline are entertained. This is followed by further sections:

Part IV Ethics and Religion

Part V Value
Part VI Moral Responsibility
Part VII Moral Standing

These sections discuss topics of relevance to applied ethics. Nevertheless, as noted, applied ethics, though
seeming to be focused on specific questions, draws its reasons and inspiration from metaethical
discussions. The result is that many of these discussions are high level and abstract, while simultaneously
focusing on concrete questions. The last section, on Moral Standing, is a paradigm case of an ethical topic
that is at once abstract and concrete. The question addressed in this section is: what kinds of things count
for the purpose of ethical deliberation. Answering this question provides decisions on questions such as
the status of non-human animals, and the permissibility of abortion.

Shafer-Landau’s textbook ends with the sections covering standard ethical theories:

Part VIII Consequentialism

Part IX Deontology
Part X Contractarianism
Part XI Virtue Ethics
Part XII Feminist Ethics
 Part XIII Prima Facie Duties and Particularism

These chapters cover topics of Normative Ethics.

Consequentialism is the view that the good(s) takes priority over the right as a justification for decisions.
Deontology takes the opposite view: the right takes priority over the good in justifying choices.
Contractarianism is a variation on Deontology that highlights the Consequentialist considerations in
favour of choosing a deontology. In other words, Contractarianism is (generally) the argument that things
work out for the good (or at least, the better), if we decide to adopt a deontological approach. Virtue
Ethics is the view that a specific good—a strength—causes right action, and that this good itself can be
cultivated. Feminist ethics is a recent development in philosophy that highlights considerations of
importance to moral theory given a commitment to Feminism—the political program geared towards
fighting injustice against women. Finally, the section on Prima Facie Duties and Particularism addresses
an important question about how to formulate ethical explanation. Specifically, this section concerns
whether the reasons of ethics may be generalizations or whether they must be detailed descriptions that
identify specific choices or outcomes as appropriate. Generalists are open to the universalization of their
ethical reasons, so long as they are not case specific. For them, ethical justification is applicable across
cases and scenarios. For Particularists, an ethical explanation, though abstract and universalizable, is case
bound.

To his credit, Shafer-Landau lists all the topics in his book as falling under the heading of ethical theory.
When philosophical argument stresses the role of basic ethical concepts in justifying universalized
generalities (abstract sentences), what one has is not only normative theory but also normative ethics.
When philosophers stress the analytic function of philosophy, to explain ethical concepts by deference to
abstract considerations, what we find is metaethics. When these same abstract considerations are
employed to decide difficult cases in ethics defined by a type of case, we find applied ethics.

Ethical theory, yet, just is the philosophical argument that either serves to analyze basic ethical concepts,
or to make a case for practical questions of the right and the good by abstract considerations.

Ethical theory is hence coextensive with moral philosophy.

It might be noteworthy that there are some in the public and the philosophical world who draw a
distinction between ethics and morality (Williams 1985). This distinction, though influential in some
circles, expresses a certain theoretical view about ethics. The distinction goes back to Hegel, who in the
Philosophy of the Right distinguished between the rules that we share in society that structure our lives
(ethics) against an introspective activity of critical reflection on choices (morality). Ethics is cultural:
morality looks a lot like Kant’s moral theory. This is itself a normative ethical theory, which divides the
answer to the question of the Right and the Good into two competing activities: one public, and the other
private. We could add this to the list of possible normative theories. The discipline of ethics or moral
philosophy does not require this distinction, and it is common practice to treat “ethics” and “morality” as
synonyms in the philosophical literature.

4. Response to Objection: Ethics is Western

One objection that one might raise against ethics as it has been described is that it is peculiar to the
Western tradition. This criticism cuts both ways. If it is only Western and not global or universal, it would
seem that not only do other Non-Western cultures fail to make notable contributions to moral philosophy,
but it would also suggest that there is something parochial about ethics, so understood. This would count
against ethics as a philosophical enterprise, which in its abstraction and generality cannot be parochial.
This is an important point. If ethics were merely a description of some culture’s values, we would have
very little reason to find it across philosophical traditions. That is not what ethics is.

The idea that Non-Western cultures have made a poor contribution to moral philosophy is an old
criticism. For instance, some have argued that in the case of Indian philosophy, the dominant concern has
been with World and Life Negation, though ethics is about a positive affirmation of life—something seen
in the West and China (Schweitzer 1936). Similarly, it has been argued that there is no moral philosophy
in the East as it is all mysticism (Danto 1972). One might forgive these noticed authors for making such
inflammatory claims: they are after all not Indologists— they do not know what they are talking about
when it comes to India as they lack disciplined training in Indology.

Yet, it has been a repetitive theme of many Indologists—famous ones too—that we don’t find ethics in
the Indian philosophical tradition (cf. Ranganathan 2007, ch. 1).

Here we find two kinds of criticisms. One is what we might call the: they (Easterners) do not do ethics
objection. The second is the: “they don’t do what we call ethics” objection.

4.1. Indian and Western Ethical Theory: Answering with the Right and the Good

The first objection, that eastern intellectuals did not participate in or contribute to ethics, is false. If ethics
is a philosophical reflection on the priority of procedures and outcomes, or the right and the good, then
these are basic philosophical concerns that are ubiquitous in South Asian and Asian philosophy. As noted,
the question of the priority of the right and the good defines differing ethical positions, such as
Deontology, Consequentialism and Virtue Theory. In the case of Indian philosophy, all three can be
found. Indeed, in the case of Indian philosophy, we find a fourth option. Let us start with a basic fact of
philosophy:

0. Ethics is the philosophical question about the relative priority of the right and
the good

This allows us to distinguish at least four kinds of theories:

1. Deontology:the right is prior to the good as a matter of justifying choices.

2. Consequentialism:the good (end) justifies the right (means).

3. Virtue Theory: a good—virtue or strength—produces right action.

4. Bhakti Theory: the rightis productive of the good.

In the case of Virtue theory, what is central is the idea that the virtues give rise to right action. So, it may
be possible for two virtuous people in the same context to act on the basis of differing virtues to give rise
to differing actions, and for both actions to be ethical (Hursthouse 1996). Virtue theory, unlike
Consequentialism, is not a theory of justifying action by deference to outcome: it is an account of how
right actions are produced by good states of character.

By Bhakti Theory I mean an ethical theory. It is possible to have a tradition of religious devotion that
votaries distinguish from their ethical theory. (The Indian theologian and philosopher Madhva seems to
take this position.) However, Bhakti Theory is the opposite: devotion is at the heart of ethics. This is
because for the Bhakti Theorist, the good is nothing but the practical realization of the regulative ideal of
the right. We find the ideas of Bhakti anywhere we embrace practice or yoga as the means of bringing
about improvement. For here, we bind ourselves to a regulative ideal (such as music) and the result is that
we act in conformity to the ideal (we practice music) and we thereby practically instantiate the ideal (as
competent musicians). The useful ethical versions identify the ideal as the free and perfect person. For
instance, as Patañjali of the Yoga Sūtra argues, if we submit to the Lord (the ideal person who is free from
the consequences of past choices and afflictions) then we bring about our own Lordliness. We are the
practical outcome of our submission to the regulative ideal—the Lord—and to this extent we are free and
perfect.

We can add to this list other ethical theories noted so far a further basic theory—

5. Moral Particularism: the question of the right is to be determined by the

good of specific contexts.

—and a theory that combines two other theories:

6. Contractarianism:there are Consequentialist reasons to prefer Deontology.

4.1.1. An Indian Example of Basic Ethical Theories

As an example of the difference between these theories, consider the case of Arjuna on the battlefield
with Krishna before the Mahābhārata war. He has been driven to this point of seeming no return for the
foes (his evil cousins) will not try to make peace or compromise in any way. His initial reaction is to
argue against war, because it results in bad outcomes. This is a Consequentialist argument. Krishna argues
instead that he should do what is right without concern for consequences because it is the right thing to
do. He calls this karma yoga (BG II.38, 47, XVIII.47). In contemporary philosophy, we call this
Deontology. Specifically, Krishna claims that the right thing to do is specified by context transcendent
rules that take into account of capacities and situate us within a reciprocal arrangement of obligations and
support (BG III.5-13, 33-35). These are moral principles. He also further argues that good things happen
when people stick to their duty (BG II.32). This is a mild version of Bhakti Ethics. Krishna further argues
that we can give up the outcomes of our duties—good or bad—for the ultimate moral ideal—Krishna,
whose duty is the preservation of diversity (BG III.24) and morality as such (BH IV.7-8). The outcome of
this devotion (bhakti) is freedom from trouble and participation in the divine (BG XXII). In the text, this
is called “Bhakti Yoga.” This is a very specific version of Bhakti Ethics: one that criticizes a hedonic
(sensory) account of outcomes, and identifies the proper outcome of right action as the agent’s own self-
improvement and freedom. Bhakti theory is an interesting and important ethical theory. If it is correct, we
do not have to sacrifice our own self-interest in performing our duties. Rather, we protect our self-interest
via the practice of our duty.

Virtue Theory and Moral Particularism appear at the end of the Gītā. Having argued for Deontology and
Bhakti theory as the way to understand Dharma through the whole Gītā, at BG XVIII.66 Krishna claims
that “relinquishing all Dharma, seek Me alone for refuge. I will release you from all faults.” This is an
expression of Virtue Theory, for it claims that some state of goodness or outcome (Krishna, defined as a
state that one can take refuge in) results in the right, without fault. Goodness (the refuge provided by
Krishna) produces the right. But this also appears to be a version of Moral Particularism, which rejects the
role of ethical principles (dharma as Krishna previously set out) in ethical reasoning. Here when Krishna
tells us to abandon all dharmas, he is not rejecting the project of ethics (right actions, and good
outcomes—he is still concerned about that) but rejecting the idea that we get there by what he was talking
about as “dharma”—general principles specific to one’s capacities.

Krishna follows this up with the claim that this doctrine should only be adopted by the austere and one
who is devoted (BG XVIII.67). Here a connection is being drawn between Bhakti and Virtue. What is it?
Being devoted to a moral ideal as a matter of practice is a principled approach to ethical choosing. This is
Bhakti theory, which is a version of Generalism. But the good that follows from devotion is not a
deductive consequence of principles (constrained by one’s capacity) but caused by one’s conformity to
the regulative ideal. To take an analogy, a musician might be concerned about the rules of music while
practicing music. But the outcome is not a deductive outcome of practice, but is rather caused by the
individual’s conformity to the ideal (music). It might seem in the end that a good musician is not
following rules or direction at all. This seems like Particularism applied to music. In this state of high
performance, the musician should put aside the rules and take refuge in the outcome: virtuosity. This
makes for a good performance. Nevertheless, it comes about via a Generalist program of binding oneself
to a regulative ideal.

By analogy, as one continues in the process of Bhakti Ethics, where one’s behavior is regulated by one’s
commitment to an ideal, one starts to instantiate the very rules of morality as a good musician instantiates
the rules of music. At this stage, it is rather correct to embrace the virtuous outcome as what protects right
action. However, this is only relevant to the practitioner of discipline. Therefore, Virtue Theory and
Moral Particularism are merely how things look as we perfect ourselves, and not in any sense the right
account of how to get there.

The BhagavadGītā is an unusual work of moral philosophy as many of the basic ethical theories are
stitched together in a narrative of personal improvement. To call upon the Gītā to illustrate differences in
basic ethical theory is useful, but ethical theory of course transcends these five options and the Gītā. In
the West, there is a long tradition of Contractarianism. This too can be found in the Indian tradition.
Specifically a version of this can be found in Nāgārjuna’s ethics.

4.2. Indian Thinkers and Moral Philosophy

One reason that the breadth and scope of ethics in Indian philosophy is misunderstood is that Indian
philosophers typically used their word for “ethics”—“dharma”—for whatever gets priority. Deontologists
call the right “dharma,” Virtue Theorists called strengths of character that lead to right action “dharma”
and Consequentialists typically call the outcomes “dharma.” Bhakti (devotional) theorists talk about
bhakti yoga as the proper practice of dharma (such as in the BhagavadGītā), or sometimes, bhāgavata
dharma. In English, we speak the same way when we are confident about our theories: we confidently
talk about the ethical or moral in terms of our moral or ethical theory. If we are not sensitive to moral
theory, we might fail to see the differences in theoretical employments of “dharma” across schools. This
renders the moral philosophy of the Indian tradition opaque.

Interestingly, the concept of ETHICS as the philosophical resolution of the question of the priority of the
right and the good gets top billing in Indian philosophy under the numerous excursions into the topic of
dharma.

With respect to the idea that Eastern thinkers were not doing what “we” call ethics in the West, this is
clearly false. All the major ethical theories of note in standard textbook presentations of ethics have had
their detractors and defenders in the Indian tradition. One must merely care to look in order to find it. We
shall throughout this course.

5. Conclusion

The scope of moral philosophy is wide, and bounded by philosophy itself. Philosophy itself is generated
by the mutual support of the abstraction and generality requirements. This results in the generation of (a)
philosophical concepts, such as ETHICS, GOOD and RIGHT that are at once abstract but also general, and
also (b) philosophical claims—generalizations that have been universalized and stripped of primitive
reference to individuals. The generalization of philosophical concepts allows them to range over many
cases, and the universalization of philosophical generalities renders clear the categories at work in a
claim. Put these together, and one can generate analyses of philosophical concepts, and arguments based
on such concepts for philosophical claims. When the concepts are ethical, and the analyses and arguments
concern the priority of the Right and the Good, we have ethical theory. Normative ethics concerns the
practical specification of this question, metaethics answers the conceptual question of relationship of the
RIGHT and the GOOD, and applied ethics seeks case-type answers to the question of the priority of the
Right and the Good.

This backdrop allows us to see that philosophers in the Western and Indian traditions address questions of
ethics. If we understand ethics as a specific theory (such as Utilitarianism, a version of Consequentialism)
or a specific activity in philosophy (such as metaethics), then all the other theories and approaches to
moral philosophy will be delisted. This has been the standard approach of researchers into Non-Western
and especially Indian thought: assume something to be essential to ethics, when it is merely a
controversial theory or approach, and judge the rest of the world on that basis. Of course, everything else
in the diverse world of philosophy gets ignored, and the representation of Non-Western and Western
thought is impoverished. But philosophy transcends such narrow-mindedness. In philosophy, we are
interested in the basic philosophical adventure, and this renders us open to theoretical and methodological
diversity. One thing that we discover when we frame the question of ethics philosophically is that
philosophers the world over seemed to agree about the range of options, but yet some differences remain.
We only note this if we decide to examine Dharma philosophically, as an account of the relative priority
of the right and the good.

h 2003; McKeever and Ridge 2006; Little 2000; Irwin 2000; Hooker and Little 2000; Holton 2002; ncy
2004; Rāmānuja 1991)

The following reading material will be of special help:

Dancy, Jonathan. 2004. Ethics Without Principles. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press.
Danto, Arthur Coleman. 1972. Mysticism and Morality: Oriental Thought and Moral Philosophy. New
York: Basic Books.
Holton, Richard. 2002. "Principles and Particularisms." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society no.
76:191-210.
Hooker, Brad, and Margaret Olivia Little. 2000. Moral Particularism. Oxford; New York: Clarendon
Press; Oxford University Press.
Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1996. Normative Virtue Ethics. In How Should One Live?, edited by Roger Crisp:
Oxford University Press.
Irwin, T.H. 2000. "Ethics as an Inexact Science: Aristotle's Ambitions for Moral Theory." In Moral
Particularism, edited by Brad Hooker and Margaret Olivia Little, 100-129. Oxford; New York:
Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press.
Little, Margaret Olivia. 2000. "Moral Generalities Revisited." In Moral Particularism, edited by Brad
Hooker and Margaret Olivia Little, 276-304. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford
University Press.
McDowell, John. 1998. "Virtue and Reason." In Mind, Value, and Reality, 50-73. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
McKeever, Sean D., and Michael R. Ridge. 2006. Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rāmānuja. 1991. Śrī Rāmānuja Gītā Bhāṣya (edition and translation). Translated by Svami Adidevanada.
Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math.
Ranganathan, Shyam. 2007. Ethics and the History of Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motlial Banarsidass.
Schroth, Jörg. 2003. "Particularism and Universalizability." The Journal of Value Inquiry
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Schweitzer, Albert. 1936. Indian Thought and its Development. Translated by Charles E. B. Russell. New
York: H. Holt and Company.
Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2007. "Ethics as Philosophy: A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism." In Ethical
Theory: An Anthology, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, 62-71. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
———. 2012. Ethical Theory: An Anthology. 2 ed: Wiley-Blackwell.
Williams, Bernard. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.