South African Journal of Philosophy

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Moral imperatives for an immanent world: an

investigation of the pragmatist, deconstructive
and ante-philosophical positions

Minka Woermann

To cite this article: Minka Woermann (2013) Moral imperatives for an immanent world: an
investigation of the pragmatist, deconstructive and ante-philosophical positions, South African
Journal of Philosophy, 32:3, 275-284, DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2013.837657

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South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(3): 275–284 Copyright © South African Journal of Philosophy
Printed in South Africa — All rights reserved SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHY
ISSN 0258-0136 EISSN 2073-4867
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2013.837657

Moral imperatives for an immanent world: an investigation of the

pragmatist, deconstructive and ante-philosophical positions

Minka Woermann
Department of Philosophy, University of Stellenbosch, Private Bag X1, Matieland 7602, South Africa
minka@sun.ac.za

In this paper, I argue that an implication of the so-called ‘death of metaphysics’

is the imbrication of the normative and descriptive understandings of morality.
This imbrication gives rise to a paradox, which amounts to the desire to refute both
a priori moral justifications, and ‘the tyranny of the real’ or the socialisation and
relativisation of our moral assertions and positions. I investigate three responses
to this paradox, namely the pragmatic response, Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive
response, and (what I term) the ante-philosophical response, which is based on
the work of Jean-Luc Nancy. The reason for focusing on these three philosophical
positions is that they all espouse an immanent (as opposed to transcendental) view
of morality. Through means of this analysis, I attempt to highlight the following
implications of an immanently-defined moral position: (1) the constitutive,
as opposed to the pedagogical or prescriptive, nature of philosophy; (2) the
increasing focus on the performative force of doing philosophy and the importance
of philosophical skill; (3) the problematic nature of the distinctions between
philosophy, moral theory, and applied ethics, and therefore also between the nature
and function of morality; and (4) the status of philosophy and moral theory as one
type of praxis amongst many, rather than the definitive voice on praxis.

Introduction
Bernard Gert (2011) argues that our understanding of the term ‘morality’ ‘plays a crucial, although
often unacknowledged, role in formulating ethical theories’. He distinguishes between descriptive
accounts of morality, which refer to the codes of conduct put forward by specific societies, groups
of people, or individuals, and normative accounts of morality, which ‘all hold that “morality”
refers to a code of conduct that applies to all who can understand it and can govern their behavior
by it.’ It follows that those working in the field of descriptive morality attempt to specify what is
the case, whereas those interested in normative accounts of morality attempt to define what ought
to be the case. The primary difference between these two conceptualisations of morality hinges on
a concern for whether moral principles are universally defensible, and since ‘the goal of ethical
theory is to identify and defend some fundamental principle that can serve as the foundation for
morality’ (DesJardins 2004: p. 96), it stands to reason that normative morality is the rightful
domain of philosophy.
Yet, despite a common interest in the subject matter, a cursory glance through the history of
philosophy reveals much disagreement between philosophers regarding both the identification of,
and justification for, fundamental moral principles. For example, whereas both Plato and Aristotle
endorse a virtue-based, eudaimonistic approach to morality, their views on eudaimonia differ. Plato
argues that eudaimonia is a state of perfection, which is based on metaphysical grounds, and that
the ‘Form of the Good’ (which is attainable only through knowledge) serves as the transcendental
principle of all goodness (Frede 2009). Aristotle, in contrast, argues that eudaimonia constitutes
a state of human flourishing or well-being that can be achieved through the proper appreciation
and application of virtues, rather than through training in the sciences and metaphysics (Kraut
South African Journal of Philosophy is co-published by Taylor & Francis and NISC (Pty) Ltd
276 Woermann

2012). Although Plato and Aristotle have very different ideas of how one can arrive at the good
life, it is clear that, for both, the function of moral theory is pedagogical, and the aim is to promote
eudemonia. On both their counts, knowledge of the good is also viewed as essentially attainable,
and this view of morality as knowable was further strengthened during the modernist epoch.
In modernism, Plato’s metaphysical view, as opposed to Aristotle’s practical view, of ethics
found traction in philosophy, and the deontological and teleological theories that characterise
modernist moral theories are premised on the assumption that universal and categorically-binding
principles are rationally defensible. During this epoch, the function of moral theories was to
provide a normative system of rules and principles, which, when followed, would ensure moral
actions. The conception of normative morality, given above at the hand of Gert, therefore finds its
full expression during modernism. Although no moral principle has conclusively been shown to be
categorically-binding, modernist accounts of morality remain influential and Kant’s deontological
theory, together with Mill’s Unitarianism, continue to inform the normative basis of the so-called
‘applied’ ethics fields.
However, in recent times, these modernist accounts of morality have also met with a strong
challenge issued by various philosophical schools, including post-modernism, post-structuralism,
pragmatism and feminism. Philosophers working within these fields take issue with the
a-historical, a-contextual, and universal descriptions of morality provided under modernism, and,
in their theories, attempt to reintroduce sensitivity for the complexities and contingencies that
define our moral experiences. In debunking the idea of categorically-binding moral principles,
these theorists also challenge the fact–value distinction, upon which the traditional accounts of
descriptive and normative morality (as defined above) rests.
The fact–value distinction, first introduced by Hume (1739), represents the view that one
cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, or a value judgement from an objective fact. Many
philosophers, however, question both the status of facts and value judgements. As regards
the status of facts, it is argued that we cannot know the world in any unmediated way, which
means that all facts are interpreted facts (or in the words of Nietzsche (1995: p. 92), ‘illusions
of which one has forgotten that they are illusions’). This means that our facts or descrip-
tions of the world are necessarily defined by a normative dimension, since our interpreta-
tions are never value-neutral. In other words, we can never objectively describe what the case
is. However, the status of these value judgements is also challenged if one rejects a priori or
transcendental justifications of the good, arguing instead for an understanding of the good that
is contingent on, and framed within, our specific lived contexts. In other words, the argument
is that our value judgements are informed by certain descriptive features of our contexts;
and, what the case ought to be, cannot – on this account – be justified on ideal or metaphys-
ical grounds. It is therefore argued that the imbrication of the normative and descriptive
dimensions introduces complexity (Woermann 2013).
This complexity manifests as a paradox: we cannot defend our moral positions on a priori
grounds, yet we simultaneously wish to avoid ‘the tyranny of the real’ or the socialisation and
relativisation of our moral assertions and positions (Woermann 2013). Arguably, the potential
value that moral theory holds for our current day practices sits in the very heart of this paradox,
and it is this paradox that will further be explored in this paper. Therefore, instead of providing an
historical account of the development of moral theory in philosophy, I rather intend to explore the
status of moral justification and moral duty from the standpoint of three philosophical positions,
namely pragmatism, Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction and (what I term) an ante-philosophical
understanding of moral duty (based on the work of Jean-Luc Nancy).
The reason for focusing on these three philosophical positions is that they all espouse an
immanent (as opposed to transcendental) view of morality. Therefore, these three positions
will only be treated in terms of the implications that they, as immanently-defined philosophical
positions, hold for our understanding of moral justification and duty. This means that a broad
overview of key elements, rather than a close reading, of the above positions will be offered.
Moreover, it should also be noted that much of the scholarly work done with respect to Derrida
and Nancy on ethics and morality has focused on the status of alterity (see, for example, May
South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(3): 275–284 277

1997, Critchley 2007, Watkin 2007). In the context of this paper, however, this topic is treated as
secondary to the questions of moral justification and duty.

The pragmatist response to postmodern conditions

As will be argued in this section, one way in which to understand morality under postmodern
conditions is to re-inscribe morality as a practical, rather than a theoretical, enterprise. Although
this view has some affinity with Aristotle’s notion of praxis, which refers to the process of
developing practical knowledge on ethics, politics, and economics, and which can also refer ‘to
the act of engaging, applying, exercising, realizing, or practicing ideas’,1 there are also important
differences between these two positions. In this regard, it is especially important to note that
whereas pragmatists attempt to develop a philosophical position, given a plurality of ends,
Aristotle’s notion of praxis is geared towards achieving eudaimonia as a final telos for all men.
The pragmatic tradition is described in more detail below.
In ‘Intimations of Postmodernity’, Zygmunt Bauman (1992) writes that the modern approach to
morality actually marginalised moral issues by trying to regulate everything in a law-like manner,
and by abandoning everything that could not be regulated in this manner, to the private sphere.
Under postmodern conditions (defined as an historical epoch, rather than a philosophical position),
moral issues take centre stage, despite the fact that not all these issues are necessarily new.
Bauman points out two important aspects of a postmodern ethics, namely the plurality of authority
and the strengthening of autonomy of the moral agent, both of which underscore the importance of
philosophical competence (as will be illustrated).
With regard to the plurality of authority, Bauman states that the absence of a single source of
authority that can regulate moral behaviour has two effects. Firstly, general rules for behaviour
do not exist. Rather rules emerge from a process of competition and negotiation. The negotia-
tion itself has an ethical and political character, and the rules emerging from this negotiation are
provisional, and therefore subject to revisions. Secondly, moral responsibility shifts back to the
moral agent. Bauman contends that moral rules are not reached by listening to the legislator’s
monologue (as was the case in modernism), but by participating as an interpreter in a dialogue.
With regards to the strengthened autonomy of the moral agent, Bauman writes that the moral
focus turns inwards as self-control, self-reflection, and self-evaluation become primary qualities of
the moral agent. However, again, the boundary line between autonomous moral agents represents
a fighting line, and questions regarding the appropriate levels and limits of tolerance abound (for
example, how far should one allow people with different, often extremely unconventional, princi-
ples to be autonomous?). Again, no fixed criteria for evaluating behaviour exist. Rather, these
criteria must be negotiated in practice.
Given Bauman’s description of postmodern morality, the focus of moral philosophy turns from
substantive, theoretical concerns about the nature of the good to developing our ability to respond
to, and engage with, the complex issues with which we are confronted on a daily basis. In other
words, philosophical skills rather than philosophical content become important in a world defined
by moral pluralism. This focus on philosophical skill and moral competence resonates well with
the pragmatist agenda, as does Bauman’s thoughts on morality under postmodern conditions.
Indeed Bauman has been described as ‘intellectually closest to the neopragmatism exemplified
by Richard Rorty’ (Decjusza 2000), and the value that the pragmatist tradition has to offer in our
current context is also affirmed by the revival that pragmatism has undergone since the 1970s
(Hookway 2008).
William James (1975: p. 28), one of the founders of pragmatism, defined pragmatism as
a ‘method for settling metaphysical disputes that may otherwise be interminable’. Pragmatism
shifts the focus of the argument from metaphysical disagreements to practical considerations;
and, according to another early and influential pragmatist, Charles Peirce (1877), ‘the sole object
of inquiry is the settlement of opinion’, which can be achieved by accepting propositions that
seem ‘“agreeable to reason”’. In other words – and according to the pragmatists – we settle on

1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Praxis_(process)
278 Woermann

propositions that are ‘validated by our methods of validation, and while truth is relative to a set of
institutional procedures and assumptions that may change, there can be no more secure founda-
tion… than the sort of truth we possess’ (Culler 1982: p. 153). Following this understanding of the
pragmatist enterprise, Christopher Hookway (2008) argues that:

pragmatist accounts of the normative standards we should follow in arriving at beliefs

about the world are cast in terms of how we can carry out inquiries in a disciplined,
self-controlled way. They provide rich accounts of the capacities we must possess in order
to inquire well and the rules, or guiding principles, that we should adopt.

Therefore, in the absence of an all-embracing framework, moral philosophy should teach us

how to respond to events and ideas, and to further find the most effective methods for communi-
cating information and principles in a world that is already saturated with information. Pragmatists
are, however, not the only philosophers who stress the importance of philosophical skill for moral
reasoning. Indeed, the post-structural philosopher Derrida (1976: p. 163), who is so often accused
of relativism for having stated that ‘there is nothing outside the text’, argues that this statement
means nothing besides the fact that ‘there is nothing outside of context’ (Derrida 1988: p. 136)
and that moral agents should therefore become competent readers of context. This point is most
closely shared by Rorty, who disputes the early pragmatists’ notion of truth (defined on the basis
of a systematic and constructive reasoning), arguing instead for a notion of belief that meets the
standards endorsed by a community at a specific point in time (Rorty 1991).

Criticisms
Despite some similarities between pragmatism and deconstruction, there are also important
differences between these positions. According to deconstructionists, the primary problem of
pragmatism regards a notion of truth or justified belief, as something that ‘is both what can be
demonstrated within an accepted framework and what simply is the case, whether or not anyone
could believe it or validate it’ (Culler 1982: p. 154). This problem leads to two further points of
critique. First, the pragmatist view rests on an ‘appeal to consensus and convention… [which]
works to treat the norm as a foundation’ (p. 153). Deconstruction aims to challenge and displace
these commonly accepted norms, because ‘norms are produced by acts of exclusion’ (p. 153).
Otherwise put, pragmatists are able to make strong claims in the absence of metaphysical justifi-
cations, but the danger is that the limited status of these claims is not sufficiently recognised. If
our perspectives and knowledge claims are necessarily limited, and if moral rules and princi-
ples are the outcome of ethical–political negotiations rather than natural givens, then it stands to
reason that not everyone’s interests can simultaneously be served. More often than not, it is the
disenfranchised (which includes women, children, the poor, etc.) whose voices are not heard, and
accounted for, by commonly accepted ‘global’ norms. Given that all perspectives are limited and
exclusionary, they are also necessarily violent, and should therefore be subjected to careful and
continual scrutiny and deconstruction (Derrida 1981), something which the pragmatist discourse
(with its emphasis on consensus) does not sufficiently allow for.
A second (but related) problem concerns the pragmatic attitude toward reflective enquiry.
Rigorous pragmatists argue ‘that we cannot by an effort of self-scrutiny or theoretical enquiry
get outside the framework of beliefs and assumptions within which we operate’ (Culler 1982:
p. 154). Deconstructionists are also sceptical about the possibility of breaking out of our concep-
tual frameworks, but actively resist the pragmatic complacency in this regard, arguing instead
that, although theoretical inquiry cannot lead to new foundations (as also affirmed by pragma-
tists), rigorous and critical reflection on these frameworks ‘does lead to changes in assumptions,
institutions, and practices’ (p. 154). In this regard, Derrida (1999: p. 67) argues that ‘political,
ethical and juridical responsibility requires a task of infinite close reading’, where reading is not
restricted to spending nights in the library with texts, but includes close readings of contexts. In
Derrida’s words (p. 67): ‘to read events, to analyse the situation, to criticize the media, to listen to
the rhetoric of demagogues, that’s close reading, and it is required more today than ever.’
South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(3): 275–284 279

Possible responses
A possible response to the above deconstructionist concerns is, why – morally speaking – should
we care about excluded interests and the status of our conceptual models, given the fact that an
all-encompassing framework (capable of reconciling everyone’s interests) is unattainable? To
this one can respond that, although moral progress in the traditional, teleological understanding
of the term is debunked in immanent philosophical positions, it is possible to still retain the notion
of moral development, as that which allows us to re-inscribe issues of power and truth ‘in more
powerful, larger, more stratified contexts’ (Derrida 1988: p. 146). In other words, although moral
development and critical enquiry never reach their end goal, we can still strive to deepen and
broaden our moral competencies, in order to lead better lives. If morality plays a constitutive role
in forming our identities and the identities of our practices (which is a view that is defended in
most immanently-defined moral theories), then moral philosophy should play a decisive role in
bringing these issues to our attention.
On this take, learning to live a morally good life entails learning to live without any fixed
reference points, and, in this regard, a position such as deconstruction constitutes a type of
meta-position that can help to sensitise us to the type of considerations that we should bear in mind
when engaging in our complex and contingent practices. This re-inscription of moral progress as
moral development necessitates that we carefully rethink the relationship between moral theory
and applied ethics. Traditionally, the moral theorist is responsible for defending moral principles,
and the applied ethicist is responsible for applying these general principles to specific situations, in
order to move us towards accepting specific conclusions regarding practical problems (DesJardins
2004). However, if moral principles are the outcome of negotiation, and are themselves defended in
practice, then the line between the moral philosopher and the applied philosopher becomes blurred.
The sceptic might reply that the above line of argumentation merely shifts the issue of moral
justification to a higher level. Although the function of moral philosophy may well be to help us to
live better lives, the question regarding the status of the morally better life still remains. Can moral
theory still perform a regulative function if one rejects both pragmatism, as well as transcendental
notions of the good? In other words, can an immanently-defined moral theory still appeal to notions
of the good and of justice that transcend particular uses of these concepts as encapsulated in conven-
tionally established norms? According to William Rasch (2000: p. 77), the answer to this question is
no, because ethics ultimately ‘serves as the unspeakable limit or condition of the world’. This same
sentiment is expressed in the ‘Tractatus’ (6.421), where Wittgenstein (2001) famously declares that
it is clear that ethics cannot be articulated (‘Es ist klar, dass sich Ethik nicht aussprechen lasst’).
Philosophical positions that view moral questions in an immanent light, but that are critical of
pragmatically-determined norms, therefore find themselves on difficult terrain. This is because
all evaluative terms (such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ or ‘right’ and ‘wrong’) have been divested of
legitimacy and hence of authority, and any appeal to these terms ultimately rings empty. Yet,
Whitehead’s (1979: p. 39) statement that ‘all of philosophy is but a footnote to Plato’ is accurate
to the extent that it seems impossible to speak of morality without referring to these evaluative
categories. At this juncture, I turn specifically to Derrida’s treatment of this problem, in order to
illustrate the way out of this impasse, but also to evaluate the success of his strategy. The reason
for focusing on Derrida’s thought is that his philosophy represents an attempt to address the
methodological complexity of thinking together the normative and the descriptive dimensions of
morality (as manifested in the paradox, referenced earlier).

Deconstruction: between immanence and transcendence

Although Derrida maintains that there is nothing but the text, this does not imply that the text
cannot be subjected to criticism. Derrida employs deconstruction, in order to break open texts,
reveal their metaphysical blind spots, and challenge that which is ‘still too homogenous, insuffi-
ciently refined or differentiated, or else egalitarian’ (Derrida 2002: p. 20). Deconstruction works
by means of a double movement, whereby we take seriously existing conceptual structures or
hierarchies, in order to reverse them, with the goal of displacing the meaning of the key concepts
within these hierarchies. Deconstruction is based on a ‘recursive modality’ (Wood 1999: p. 117),
280 Woermann

which means that we must always deconstruct anew. However, the attribute that prevents
deconstruction from becoming an endlessly pointless exercise – akin to Sisyphus pushing a rock
up a mountain, just to have it roll back down again, and repeating the same exercise for all of
eternity – is ethics. The logic of ethical testimony, argues Derrida (1999: p. 82), is the impetus
for deconstruction: ‘It is only by reference to the possibility of testimony that deconstruction can
begin to ask questions concerning meaning and knowledge.’
In raising these questions, deconstruction also draws attention to otherness, defined as that
which resists appropriation and therefore falls beyond our knowledge. In this regard, Wessel
Stoker (2012: p. 20) writes that, in Derrida’s work, ‘the relationship between transcendence and
immanence is no longer viewed as an opposition. Rather, one has learned to think beyond the
opposition, whereby the wholly other can appear in every other.’ To think beyond this opposition
is, above all, philosophy’s proper function, since as Derrida (2002: p. 10) notes:

There are other ways for philosophy than those of appropriation or exappropriation... Not
only are there other ways for philosophy, but philosophy, if there is any such thing, is the
other way.

If Derrida is correct in thinking that our moral duty should first-and-foremost be to respect
difference, and if ‘true’ philosophy represents a thinking of, and through, difference, then philos-
ophy as such becomes the most poignant expression of morality in our age.
It is specifically through recourse to his quasi-transcendental or limit concepts (of which justice,
forgiveness, hospitality, and the gift serve as examples), that Derrida attempts to think through the
notion of alterity and attempts to situate a transcendental ethics within the world. Limit concepts
are undeconstructable, because they are divested of meaning, yet are capable of finding expression
in the instant of the decision or of the event. In other words, although it is impossible to formalise
justice (for example) and give it substantive content, we can nevertheless attempt to be just when
we make decisions and take actions. However, as soon as the decision is made and the action is
taken, our intentions can be described, justified, rationalised, or criticised. Otherwise put, although
justice manifests in the event, the very openness of justice (or justice, as respect for the alterity
of the Other) is also destroyed in the event. This is because justice is drawn into the realm of the
intelligible, takes on meaning and an identity, and hence ceases to be justice.
For Derrida, it is the impossibility of ethics (as something that can be realised within the world)
that serves as the very condition for the possibility of ethics. Raffoul (2008) writes that possibility
and impossibility should not be understood as modal opposites; rather the impossible should be
viewed as that which haunts, and thus enables, the possible. In other words, it is the very impossi-
bility of ‘calculating’ or systematising morality that keeps the pulse of morality alive.
In sum, Derrida attempts to define absolute moral categories (such as justice or the moral good)
as things that can only exist in so far as they are revealed within the world, but which simulta-
neously withdraw from the world. Consequently, the good reveals itself as a type of haunting,
rather than as a revelation. Although Derrida’s view of philosophy differs vastly from Plato’s
metaphysical view, it seems that he too cannot shake the sceptre of metaphysics from his philos-
ophy. It is granted that Derrida’s quasi-transcendental or limit concepts are based on an empty
metaphysics, because the metaphysical or transcendental realm cannot exist (in his view, there
is no originary origin, which can serve as the grounding of all meaning). Yet, Derrida retains the
traditional function of metaphysics in his moral philosophy since it is only on the basis of the
appeal to a transcendental (i.e. the authority of justice or the good) that Derrida can make his first
moral injunction, which is that one must respect difference.

Ante-philosophical moral duty

From the above, it seems that the metaphysical justification for morality (which stems
from Plato’s ideal form of the Good) has survived the so-called death of metaphysics. Yet,
the question that now remains is whether there can be a non-metaphysical, non-pragmatic
understanding of morality. Moving further into the field of contemporary post-structural
South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(3): 275–284 281

philosophy, we come to the figure of Jean-Luc Nancy who, in his work, provides us with
a radical re-inscription of morality, as not only constitutive of the text (which is Derrida’s
position), but as the very grounds for the text.
For Nancy, morality comes to the fore in the duty to respond to sense, which means that
morality does not supersede the text, but is itself instantiated in, and as, the existence of the
text. Otherwise put, whereas Derrida’s focus is on deconstructing the symbolic-ideological
order (i.e. what Nancy calls ‘the operative community’), Nancy is concerned with that which
precedes this order, which is something that cannot be conceptualised, but only experienced and
expressed as ontology. In my view, Nancy thus provides an ante-philosophical understanding of
moral duty, which both strips moral duty of its traditional understanding and avoids the abstrac-
tions upon which the discipline of philosophy is based. It should also be noted that Nancy
himself would have probably resisted having his thought classified as a form of ‘moral philos-
ophy’, and as such the phrase ‘ante-philosophical moral duty’ also serves to distance Nancy
from this tradition. This discussion should therefore be read as an attempt to relate Nancy’s
project to the tradition of moral philosophy, rather than as an attempt to situate his project
within this tradition.
In order to better grasp the above points, it is necessary to briefly elaborate on two aspects
of Nancy’s oeuvre, namely his view of sense and his view of moral duty. With regard to sense,
Benjamin Hutchens (2005: p. 44) explains that, for Nancy:

the world does not “have” an exterior sense... but sense “belongs to its structure” as a
constitutive “signifyingness” or “significance” of the world itself. The “there is”, the
happening of experience to existence itself, is the “constitutive” sense itself.

Nancy thus supports an open immanence, which he views as the only viable response to the end
of philosophy or of transcendence. This open immanence prohibits the projection of an exterior
source of meaning (expressed as ideology or myth; a ‘reserve of meaning’) on which we then
reflect, thereby projecting back on our own sense of identity. Rather, Nancy’s immanence consti-
tutes the totality of infinite relationships without exeriority; relationships that cannot be general-
ised but only experienced from the vantage point of the singular other (which, because of the
relational nature of being, is also a ‘we’ or a ‘singular-plural’). Community (‘the inoperative
community’) is not constituted by a symbolic-ideological order (‘the operative community’), but
by the mitsein (that is, by being thrown into community). Community is thus the medium through
which sense circulates and is hence a necessary condition for existence (Hutchens 2005).
Yet, sense is not inevitable. In order to show why this is the case, Nancy deconstructs the notion
of freedom that informs Kant’s categorical imperative. Nancy maintains that our freedom does not
manifest in our choice for or against the imperative as Kant would have it, but precedes the very
concept of conscious choice. Freedom, in other words, is the very condition of the imperative, which,
as an imperative, constitutes the will or duty to sense (understood as the condition of existence). A
positive, radical notion of evil is a founding condition of this freedom, in that evil constitutes the
freedom to will against existence and sense, and, hence, to will against itself. Freedom, as the will
or duty to sense, confronts thinking as a certain non-thinking. In other words, freedom is that which
allows us to think by revealing the finitude and elusiveness of thought (Hutchens 2005). In Nancy’s
work, finitude should not be understood as the modal opposite of infinitude, but as the enabling
condition of thought. In other words, the limits of thought opens us up to thought (Nancy 1997),
and the limitlessness of freedom is therefore ‘felt’ in the very finitude of thinking. In ‘Concealed
Thinking’, Nancy (2003a: p. 34) describes the nature of thought as follows:

There is no thinking, no articulation of sense, that doesn’t have something of the

uncompleteable about it, that doesn’t exceed sense, like an intimation, a binding, implac-
able obligation, logical as much as ethical, to conceal itself as thinking in the very act of
thinking “in order,” if you’ll allow me to risk the phrase, to be thinking (“in order to make
sense” and “in order to free itself”…)
282 Woermann

This freedom generated by thought reveals itself in a Bataillian burst, or a surprise – the
surprise of thought, where thought surprises itself. The link in Nancy’s work between community
and freedom is that freedom itself is the incessant surprise of existence in multiplicity, and in
community with being (Hutchens 2005).
Thinking and the world do not have sense; rather they are sense, where ‘[t]he sense of sense is
one of self-concealment’ (Nancy 2003a: p. 38). Whereas for Derrida, one responds to an impera-
tive in the moment of the event; for Nancy, the event already constitutes the response. Gilbert-
Walsh (2000: p. 30) writes that Nancy ‘strives to acknowledge the imperative voice not only by
writing on it but by responding to it as that which demands a response’. This also implies that
Nancy’s imperative lies prior to all moral abstraction, and, as with Derrida, Nancy therefore views
ethics and morality as neither opposite to, nor independent from, philosophy. Likewise, he also
does not consider duty as either a philosophical or unphilosophical concept (in other words, duty
neither belongs to philosophy, nor is opposed to philosophy) (Gilbert-Walsh 2000).
On Nancy’s take, our responsibility (defined as a responsibility or duty towards sense), must
interrupt, or differ, from itself. Indeed, he writes that in the imperative ‘reason... speaks to itself,
it addresses itself to itself, but it does not hear itself there: it cannot call to account the theory
of its freedom. As a result, it separates itself from itself’ (Nancy in Gilbert-Walsh 2000: p. 41).
According to Gilbert-Walsh (p. 46), it is this interruption (the simultaneous presentation and
withdrawal of the imperative), the inadequacy of understanding, that invites the other’s reciprocal
rejoinder, which is the responsibility to respond to sense. ‘And’, he asks,

is not the possibility of such a rejoinder the very possibility of a continued accomplisse-
ment of interruption, of praxis, of ‘that echo which is not a repetition’? Perhaps this is the
force behind Nancy’s imperative: ‘[The] work... must be offered up for communication
(CD, 181/73) (Gilbert-Walsh 2000: p. 46).

Therefore, for Nancy, thinking is always an activity that is related to some form of alterity or
otherness, which can never be appropriated by a body of philosophy, but which nevertheless propels
us to communication and to doing philosophy. In his words: ‘Concealed thinking is identical to
communication, and this identity itself is the night of not-knowing’ (Nancy 2003a: p. 45).
In my interpretation, Nancy provides a radical redescription of moral duty, in that moral duty
becomes something that – like thinking – is felt and experienced, rather than actively reflected
upon. Although the appeal of his argument lies in the fact that he can proceed with a description
of duty freed from the need for metaphysical or pragmatic validation, it is also clear that the work
of moral theory in this account is very limited. This is because moral theory does not support true
thinking, which:

rejects abstraction and conceptualisation as these are recognized by understanding.

Thinking does not produce the operators of knowledge; it undergoes an experience and lets
the experience inscribe itself (Nancy 2003b: p. 247).

Rather than viewing thinking as a knowledge-producing activity, Nancy argues that ‘thinking is
love’ (2003b: p. 247), which implies a duty to remain open to alterity and multiplicity, and not to
confine one’s thoughts to the limits of (moral) theory or abstraction.
Relating Nancy’s account to moral philosophy, one can therefore argue that moral theory
is always something that supersedes moral duty, and hence ceases to be what it purports to be
(i.e. moral in nature). Yet, it is only by virtue of thinking that we – as limited and finite beings – can
experience our moral duty, which manifests as the will to sense. This will to sense, however, has
‘a failure of achievement… as its very propriety, absolutely and unconditionally’ (Nancy 2003a:
p. 32). In practical terms, our will to sense manifests as the continually renewed engagement with
thought, and with the thoughts of others, in every activity of our daily life (including the activity of
doing philosophy). Applying Nancy’s work to moral philosophy therefore offers us a perspective
that completely conflates morality’s (indeed, philosophy’s) nature and function. Morality, in other
South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(3): 275–284 283

words, becomes performative, and, in this regard, it is useful to note Nancy’s definition of praxis
as ‘the endless transformation of the subject of sense in itself: a sense that is nothing other than its
communication – and, by the same token, its concealment’ (Nancy 2003a: p. 47).

Conclusion
Three possible responses to the collapse of the fact–value distinction were investigated in this paper,
namely the pragmatic, deconstructive, and ante-philosophical responses. In the pragmatic response,
norms are generated on the basis of reason, convention, and consensus. However, it was argued that
this response does not allow for sufficient reflexive and critical inquiry, which is needed in order to
challenge the conceptual frameworks within which these norms are generated. The deconstructive
response, in contrast, is sensitive to the limits of our theoretical (and hence also our ethical) positions.
Derrida is also careful to divest moral concepts of substantive content in an attempt to avoid
metaphysics, but – as was demonstrated – the authority of his a-conceptual concepts is still grounded
in an empty metaphysics. The ante-philosophical response, based on the work of Nancy, avoids both
the shortfalls of pragmatism and deconstruction by defining moral duty as a type of thinking that
resists understanding; however, in avoiding the metaphysical trap and the problem of contextually-
generated norms, this strategy also spells the end of philosophy and ethics, construed as an enterprise
that is foremost aimed at gaining a better understanding of what it means to be human.
Despite the differences between these responses, they share three important implications, all of
which can be traced to the failure of establishing a universally-binding moral theory. Firstly, if
philosophical concepts have no final grounding then the value of philosophical argumentation lies not
in the pedagogical or prescriptive nature of philosophy, but in the constitutive nature of philosoph-
ical thought. Secondly, the attempt to divorce morality from the metaphysical project, and, instead,
to describe morality in immanent terms, means that morality is progressively viewed in terms of the
performative force of doing philosophy, rather than in terms of the locutionary force of substantive
moral statements. In other words, philosophical form, rather than content, becomes important. By
taking the first two points together, and by employing a deconstructive gesture, one could say that
all philosophy becomes a type of applied ethics (but not in the traditional understanding of the term),
which serves to problematise the distinction between the nature and function of philosophy. Thirdly,
the status of philosophy is challenged, because philosophy becomes one type of praxis amongst
many, rather than the definitive voice on praxis. Yet, as previously argued, the practice of philosophy
still remains a vital tool for sense-making. The reason for this being that philosophical competence
is needed for successfully engaging with the paradox that is brought about by the imbrication of the
normative and descriptive dimensions, or for successfully exploring positions, such as Nancy’s, that
forego this paradox in order to think philosophy differently.
Therefore, if one accepts the argument for the collapse of the fact–value distinction, one has,
according to the positions put forward in this paper, the choice: (1) to accept pragmatic norms
that will always elude final justification; (2) to continue to live within the shadow of metaphysics
in an attempt to retain the form (but no longer the content) of normative ideals; or (3) to endorse
an anti-metaphysical, but also ante-philosophical, understanding of morality, in which the
goal is no longer to write against writing, to write the last word (which is the metaphysical
desire par excellence), but merely to heed to the duty to write, which is also the duty to think
our concealed thoughts.

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