Case Digest 157-172
Case Digest 157-172
Case Digest 157-172
161658, 11/3/08
Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it
mandatory for candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers
and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office
with certain offenses, among other personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator
Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the 2004 synchronized elections, challenged Section
36(g) of the said law.
Issue: is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an unconstitutional imposition
of additional qualification on candidates for Senator?
Held: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office whether
appointed or elected both in the national or local government undergo a mandatory drug test is
UNCONSITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the Constitution, an aspiring candidate for
Senator needs only to meet 5 qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4)
age, and (5) residency. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional
mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In the
discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to
yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.
161. Freedom of Speech and Debate (Osmena vs. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863; Jimenez vs.
Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 & People vs. 324 SCRA 689; Chavez vs. JBC, GR No. 202242,
4/16/13; Pobre vs. Santiago, A.C. 7399, 8/25/09)
OSMENA V. PENDATUN (109 PHIL. 863)
FACTS: In a privilege speech entitled: A message to Garcia, Osmena made allegations of
bribery against the Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 59 followed the creation of a
special committee to investigate the allegedly groundless charges made by Osmena against the
Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious disorderly
behavior and thereby suspending him for 15 months.
ISSUES: WON his suspension was constitutional
HELD: Court has no Jurisdiction. Dismissed
RATIO: Osmena contends that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity in
his privilege speech. Although the purpose of parliamentary immunity is to guarantee the
legislator complete freedom of expression without being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions, it does NOT protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his
words or conducts are disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof. The question of whether
Osmena’s speech constitutes disorderly conduct is for the House to judge. The matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the house knows best. On the question of jurisdiction,
the case should be dismissed for being moot or academic. Because no preliminary injunction was
issued, the special committee performed its task, reported to the house and the latter approved
the suspension order
FACTS: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the
JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase “a representative of congress” refers that both
houses of congress should have one representative each, and that these two houses are permanent
and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both
houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one
representative from congress.
ISSUE: Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art
VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.
HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of
congress” should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either
house, not both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be
allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function
in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction
of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said
in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
FALLO: The motion was denied.
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its
report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by
the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed
to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to
a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented
is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private
rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead
of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as
the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the
business of the House.
disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days – is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a
preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.”
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days – is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a
preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.”
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The issues in this habeas corpus case are: (1) whether the arrest and detention of the petitioner
after a preliminary investigation that was conducted by the Tanodbayan without notice to him,
are valid, and (2) whether the crime charged against him has already prescribed.
On January 21, 1976, Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., then the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur,
applied for a free patent for Lot No. 3097-A, PLS-67, with an area of 1,391 square meters,
located beside the Washington Highway in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. His application was
favorably acted upon by the Land Inspector, Armando Luison. On May 11, 1976, OCT No. P-
8379 was issued to him (p. 19, Rollo).
Eight (8) years later, on June 27, 1984, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San
Francisco passed Resolution No. 40, requesting the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del
Sur to assist it in recovering Lot No. 3097 from Attorney Paredes because the land had been
designated and reserved as a school site. The Sangguniang Bayan requested the provincial fiscal
to file a perjury charge against Attorney Paredes, Jr. (p. 15, Rollo). The resolution was approved
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (p. 16, Rollo). On March 28,1985, Civil Case No. 512, for
annulment of Attorney Paredes' title, was filed by the Republic in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 6, Agusan del Sur (p. 17, Rollo).
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 512, Teofilo Gelacio, former vice-mayor of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, filed with the Tanodbayan on October 28, 1986, a criminal complaint
charging Attorney Paredes with having violated Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. 3019) because he allegedly used his office as Provincial Attorney to
influence, persuade, and induce Armando Luison, Land Inspector of the District Land Office in
Agusan del Sur, to favorably indorse his free patent application. Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft
Law provides:
On February 23, 1987, the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman) referred the case to Fiscal Ernesto
Brocoy of Butuan City (TBP Case No. 86-03368) for preliminary investigation.
Fiscal Brocoy issued summons to Attorney Paredes, Jr. to appear at the preliminary investigation
of the case on August 29, 1987. However, the summons was served on November 19, 1987 upon
the INP Station Commander of San Francisco, instead of Atty. Paredes. The summons did not
reach Attorney Paredes. Nevertheless, without waiting for proof of service of the summons on
the accused, Fiscal Brocoy proceeded to conduct the preliminary examination of the complainant
and his witnesses. On August 29, 1988, the fiscal issued a resolution finding a prima facie case
of violation of Section 3(a) of R.A. 3019 committed by the accused. The Fiscal's resolution was
approved by Tanodbayan Prosecutor Josephine Fernandez on June 26, 1989 (p. 22, Rollo).
Attorney Paredes filed a motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan's resolution. He assailed
the validity of the preliminary investigation that was conducted by Fiscal Brocoy without notice
to him (pp. 23-25, Rollo). His motion for reconsideration was denied.
In the local elections on January 18, 1988, Attorney Paredes was elected governor of Agusan del
Sur.
On May 20, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Sur rendered a decision in Civil Case
No. 512, annulling Governor Paredes' Free Patent No. (X-8) 1253 and his OCT No. P-8379 and
restoring the land "to the mass of public domain" (pp. 85-98, Rollo).
On August 28,1988, an information was filed against Governor Paredes in the Sandiganbayan
(Crim. Case No. 13800) and a warrant for his arrest, fixing bail of P20,000 for his provisional
liberty, was issued on August 30, 1989 and served upon him (p. 12, Rollo). He refused to post
bail in "protest against the injustice to him as Governor," (p. 68, Rollo). Consequently, he was
detained in the municipal jail of San Francisco.
On September 20, 1989, this petition for habeas corpus was filed by his wife, Mrs. Eden
Paredes, against the Sandiganbayan. She alleged that the warrant for her husband's arrest was
void because the preliminary investigation was void, and, that the crime charged in the
information against him had already prescribed.
In his return of the Writ, the Solicitor General, as counsel for the Sandiganbayan, agreed that
lack of notice to Governor Paredes of the preliminary investigation was "a fatal defect"
invalidating not only the preliminary investigation, but also the information prepared by the
Tanodbayan, and the warrant of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan (p. 54, Rollo). The Solicitor
General agreed with the petitioner's contention that the ten-year prescriptive period of the offense
under Section 11 of R.A. 3019, assuming it was committed on January 21, 1976, expired on
January 21, 1986. Although the prescriptive period was increased to fifteen (15) years under
Section 4, B.P. Blg. 195 of March 16, 1982, the Solicitor General opined that the new law may
not be applied retroactively to Paredes.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman argued that the Sandiganbayan was improperly made
respondent in this case because it does not have custody of Governor Paredes; that the lack of
preliminary investigation did not affect the validity of the information nor the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan; and, that the crime has not yet prescribed because the period of prescription
commences to run not on the day the crime was committed but on the day it was discovered by
the offended party, the authorities, or their agents (Art. 91, Revised Penal Code).
At the hearing of the petition of September 27, 1989, the Court directed the petitioner to implead
the Tanodbayan, through the Special Prosecutor, as well as the Ombudsman, as respondents. The
Clerk of Court was instructed to furnish them with copies of the petition and to require them to
answer within ten (10) days. The hearing of this case was reset on October 18, 1989 at 9:30
o'clock in the morning and provisional liberty was granted Governor Ceferino Paredes, Jr. on his
own recognizance pending the determination of the petition.
On October 6, 1989, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed its comment on the petition
for habeas corpus. The Special Prosecutor argued that since Paredes was charged in the
Sandiganbayan for violation of Republic Act 3019, and as the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over that offense, it is authorized to issue a warrant for his arrest and a writ of habeas
corpus may not issue to free him from the custody of the law.
After careful deliberation over the petition and the comments thereon of the Solicitor General,
the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman/Tanodbayan, the Court finds insufficient merit in the
petition. The settled rule is that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which
has jurisdiction to do so (Luna vs. Plaza, 26 SCRA 310; Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391;
Canary vs. Director of Prisons, 36 SCRA 39; Ventura vs. People, L-46576, November 6, 1978).
The petitioner alleges that the information against Governor Paredes is invalid because the
preliminary investigation was invalid and the offense charged has already prescribed. Those
circumstances do not constitute valid grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The
absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case nor
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective (People vs. Casiano, L-
15309, February 16, 1961; People vs. Figueroa, L-24273, April 30, 1969). The remedy of the
accused in such a case is to call the attention of the court to the lack of a preliminary
investigation and demand, as a matter of right, that one be conducted. The court, instead of
dismissing the information, should merely suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a
preliminary investigation. Thus, did we rule in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 139 SCRA 349.
If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no
preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest,
and/or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules, or to ask for an investigation /
reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of
commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the
accused. So it is explicitly provided for by Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Ilagan was a reiteration of this Court's ruling in People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 (1961) that:
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the
case. Nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. If
there was no preliminary investigation and the defendant, before entering his plea, calls
the attention of the court to the absence of a preliminary investigation, the court, instead
of dismissing the information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to
conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation
may be conducted.
The same rule was reiterated in the decision of this court in Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 85468, September 7, 1989.
The defense of prescription of the offense charged in the information should be pleaded in the
criminal action otherwise it would be deemed waived (U.S. vs. Serapio, 23 Phil. 584,
598 citing Aldeguer vs. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. 500; Domingo vs. Osorio, 7 Phil. 405; Maxilom vs.
Tabotabo, 9 Phil. 390; Harty vs. Luna, 13 Phil. 31; Sunico vs. Ramirez, 14 Phil. 500). It is a
proper ground for a motion to quash which should be filed before the arraignment of the accused
(Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 117, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; People vs. Castro, L-6407, July 29,
1954) for whether the crime may still be prosecuted and penalized should be determined in the
criminal case not in a special proceeding of habeas corpus.
All questions which may arise in the orderly course of a criminal prosecution are to be
determined by the court to whose jurisdiction the defendant has been subjected by the
law, and the fact that a defendant has a good and sufficient defense to a criminal charge
on which he is held will not entitle him to his discharge on habeas corpus. (12 R.C.L.
1206.) (Emphasis ours)
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition, the same is hereby denied. The accused,
Ceferino Paredes, Jr. should file a bail bond of P20,000, fixed by the Sandiganbayan for his
provisional liberty. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the
House making serious imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of
this, a Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special House Committee to investigate
the truth of the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner to substantiate his
charges, and in case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause why he should
not be punished by the House.
Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground
that it infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the
House. Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving
petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A
House resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months.
Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain
the petition, and defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.
Issue:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress,
the Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other
place.” This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the
United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of
Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be
questioned in any other place” than Congress.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is
the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has
conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white
for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
XIII. Vacancies
172. Lozada vs. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337 173. RA 6645, December 28, 1987
FACTS: Petition for mandamus to review the decision of the Commission on Elections
Petitioners Eulalio and Igot filed this petition as a representative suit for and on behalf of those
who wish to participate in the election, to compel COMELEC to call a special election to fill up
12 existing vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
The petition is based on Sec. 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which reads: “In case a
vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa 18 months or more before a regular election, the
[COMELEC] shall call a special election to be held within 60 days after the vacancy occurs to
elect the Member to serve the
unexpired term.”
Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bonafide elector of Cebu City, and a transient voter
of Quezon City. He wants to run for the position in the Batasan. Igot alleges that as a taxpayer,
he has standing to petition by mandamus the calling of a special election as mandated by the
Constitution.
They allege that they are deeply concerned about their duties as citizens and they want to uphold
the Constitutional mandate; and that they filed the petition since the subject matters are of
profound and general interest.
COMELEC opposes the petition alleging that petitioners lack standing to file the petition
because they are not the proper parties to institute the action, the SC has no jurisdiction to
entertain the same, and that the Constitutional provision above cited does not apply to the Interim
Batasang Pambansa.
NO.
RULING: The Court held that petitioners may not file the instant petition as taxpayers, because
there is no allegation that tax money is being illegally spent. The act complained of is the
inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election, which is allegedly its duty under Sec 5(2),
Art. VIII of the Constitution, and therefore, there is actually no expenditure of public funds
involved in the act complained of.
It is only when an act complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or statute,
involves the illegal expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed.
What the instant case seeks is one that entails expenditure of public funds which may be illegal,
because it would be spent for a purpose that has no authority in the Constitution or a statute.
Petitioners also do not have standing to sue as voters, because they do not have the requisite
personal and substantial interest in the case such that they have or would sustain direct injury as
a result of the assailed act.
The alleged inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election to fill the vacant seats in the
Batasang Pambansa would adversely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens.
The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC, as provided in the Constitution, is only to review by
certiorari the latter’s decision, orders, or rulings. In this case, there is no such decision, order or
ruling of the COMELEC that is brought to the Court for review. It is not alleged that petitioners
asked COMELEC to perform its alleged duty, and that it had issued an order/resolution denying
such petition.
Further, the writ of mandamus cannot issue because there is no showing that COMELEC has
unlawfully refused or neglected to perform a ministerial duty.
The holding of special elections would entail huge expenditures of money that have to be
financed by the necessary appropriations, which is an act only the Batasang Pambansa can do.
The Court held that the provision cited by the petitioners applies only to the regular Batasang
Pambansa, and not the Interim one.
This is because of the Interim Batasang Pambansa’s composition, which is the members of the
Constitutional Convention, Congressmen, Senators, and the President and Vice-President. Thus,
even if there were vacancies therein, no province or legislative district would ever be without
representation, unlike in the Regular Batasang Pambansa.
Further, said provision is in the main body of the Constitution, and not in the Transitory
Provisions.