Paterok Vs Customs
Paterok Vs Customs
Paterok Vs Customs
Untalan, Trinidad, Razon, Santos & Associate Law Offices for petitioner-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; POSTING OF NOTICE
OF HEARING ON BULLETIN BOARD DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PROPER SERVICE OF
NOTICE. A notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board of the public respondent
in a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of the alleged prohibited article is known
does not constitute sucient compliance with proper service of notice and
procedural due process.
2.
ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. Time and again, the Court has emphasized the
imperative necessity for administrative agencies to observe the elementary rules of
due process. And no rule is better established under the due process clause of the
Constitution than that which requires notice and opportunity to be heard before any
person can be lawfully deprived of his rights.
3.
ID.; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 73; FORFEITURE OF IMPORTED GASOLINEPOWERED CARS WITH ENGINE DISPLACEMENT OF OVER 2,800 CUBIC
CENTIMETERS. A Mercedes Benz 450 SLC, has an engine displacement of over
2,800 cubic centimeters which clearly falls within the prohibited importation
specied in the law aforequoted and as such, is liable for seizure and forfeiture by
the public respondents.
4.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; WHEN THE LAW DOES
NOT DISTINGUISH, WE MUST NOT DISTINGUISH. On the other hand, the
petitioner claims that the said prohibition involves only "direct" and not "indirect"
importation as when both the shipper and the consignee are one and the same
person which is the case at bar. Be that as it may, the law is clear and when it does
not make any distinction on the term "importation", we likewise must not
distinguish. "Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus."
5.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 73; REDEMPTION OF
FORFEITED PROPERTY, DISALLOWED. The petitioner invokes Sec. 2307 of the
TCCP, as amended by Executive Order No. 38, dated August 6, 1986, which provides
an alternative in lieu of the forfeiture of the property in question, that is, the
payment of ne or redemption of the forfeited property. But the last paragraph of
the said section, as amended, categorically states that redemption of forfeited
property shall not be allowed in any case where the importation is absolutely
prohibited or where the surrender of the property to the person oering to redeem
the same would be contrary to law. Inasmuch as it would be contrary to law, i.e.,
B.P. Blg. 73, to allow the petitioner to redeem the Mercedes Benz in question, there
is therefore no alternative, as correctly claimed by the public respondents, but to
forfeit the same.
6.
ID.; TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE; BUREAU OF CUSTOMS; COLLECTOR OF
CUSTOMS; DISPOSITION OF CONTRABANDS; SALE, NOT RELEASE OF
CONTRABAND, PREROGATIVE OF THE COLLECTOR. In the matter of disposing of
contrabands, Section 2609(c) of the Tari and Customs Code specically provides
that the prerogative of the Collector of Customs is not the release of the contraband
like the Mercedes Benz in question but its sale, which presupposes a prior custody
pursuant to forfeiture and seizure proceedings as in the case at bar.
DECISION
SARMIENTO, J :
p
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari led by Ute Paterok, the petitioner
herein, seeking the annulment of the decision 1 rendered by the public respondent,
the Bureau of Customs, through its Commissioner, the Hon. Salvador N. Mison,
approving the order 2 of forfeiture issued by the District Collector of Customs
against the shipment of one (1) unit of Mercedes Benz of the petitioner in favor of
the government.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In March 1986, the petitioner shipped from Germany to the Philippines two (2)
containers, one with used household goods and the other with two (2) used
automobiles (one Bourgetti and one Mercedes Benz 450 SLC). The rst container
was released by the Bureau of Customs and later on, the Bourgetti car, too. The
Mercedes Benz, however, remained under the custody of the said Bureau.
LibLex
In December 1987, after earnest eorts to secure the release of the said Mercedes
Benz, the petitioner received a notice 3 of hearing from the legal ocer of the
Manila International Container Port, Bureau of Customs informing the former that
seizure proceedings were being initiated against the said Mercedes Benz for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 73 in relation to Section 2530(F) of the Tari and
Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), as amended, and Central Bank Circular
(CBC) 1069.
While the said case was pending, the petitioner received only on April, 1988, a letter
4 informing her that a decision ordering the forfeiture of her Mercedes Benz had
been rendered on December 16, 1986 by the District Collector of Customs. The
petitioner had not been informed that a separate seizure case was led on the same
Mercedes Benz in question before the said District Collector, an oce likewise under
As regards the rst assignment of error, we agree with the petitioner that a notice
of hearing posted on the bulletin board of the public respondent in a forfeiture
proceeding where the owner of the alleged prohibited article is known does not
constitute sucient compliance with proper service of notice and procedural due
process.
LibLex
Time and again, the Court has emphasized the imperative necessity for
administrative agencies to observe the elementary rules of due process. 10 And no
rule is better established under the due process clause of the Constitution than that
which requires notice and opportunity to be heard before any person can be lawfully
deprived of his rights. 11
In the present case, although there was a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin
board, the said procedure is premised on the ground that the party or owner of the
property in question is unknown. This is clear from the provisions of the TCCP relied
upon by the public respondent, namely, Sections 2304 and 2306, captioned
"Notication of Unknown Owner" and "Proceedings in Case of Property Belonging to
Unknown Parties," respectively, wherein the posting of the notice of hearing on the
bulletin board is specifically allowed.
But in the case at bar, the facts evidently show that the petitioner could not have
been unknown. The petitioner had previous transactions with the Bureau of
Customs and in fact, the latter had earlier released the rst container consisting of
household goods and the Bourgetti car to the former at her address (as stated in the
Bill of Lading). Moreover, there was a similar seizure case 12 that had been
instituted by the Manila International Container Port, docketed as S.I. No. 86-224,
covering the same Mercedes Benz in question and involving the same owner, the
petitioner herein.
If only the public respondents had exercised some reasonable diligence to ascertain
from their own records the identity and address of the petitioner as the owner and
the consignee of the property in question, the necessary information could have
been easily obtained which would have assured the sending of the notice of hearing
properly and legally. Then, the petitioner would have been aorded the opportunity
to be heard and to present her defense which is the essence of procedural due
process. But the public respondent regrettably failed to perform such basic duty.
Notwithstanding the procedural inrmity aforementioned, for which the Court
expresses its rebuke, the petition nonetheless cannot be granted.
This brings us to the second and third assignments of error raised by the petitioner.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 73, a law intended to promote energy conservation, provides
that:
SEC. 3.
Towards the same end and to develop a more dynamic and
eective program for the rational use of energy, the following acts are
hereby prohibited:
(a)
The importation, manufacture or assembling of gasoline-powered
passenger motor cars with engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic
centimeters or Kerbweight exceeding 1,500 kilograms, including
accessories. 13
The petitioner does not dispute the fact that the motor car in question, a Mercedes
Benz 450 SLC, has an engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic centimeters which
clearly falls within the prohibited importation specied in the law aforequoted and
as such, is liable for seizure and forfeiture by the public respondents.
Cdpr
On the other hand, the petitioner claims that the said prohibition involves only
"direct" and not "indirect" importation as when both the shipper and the consignee
are one and the same person which is the case at bar. Be that as it may, the law is
clear and when it does not make any distinction on the term "importation", we
likewise must not distinguish. "Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus."
Finally, the petitioner invokes Sec. 2307 of the TCCP, as amended by Executive
Order No. 38, dated August 6, 1986, which provides an alternative in lieu of the
forfeiture of the property in question, that is, the payment of ne or redemption of
the forfeited property. But the last paragraph of the said section, as amended,
categorically states that:
Redemption of forfeited property shall not be allowed in any case where the
importation is absolutely prohibited or where the surrender of the property
to the person oering to redeem the same would be contrary to law.
(Emphasis ours) 14
Inasmuch as it would be contrary to law, i.e., B.P. Blg. 73, to allow the petitioner to
redeem the Mercedes Benz in question, there is therefore no alternative, as
correctly claimed by the public respondents, but to forfeit the same.
We can not agree with the proposition that the Collector of Customs is authorized to
release the motor vehicle in question to the petitioner which, in eect, would
absolve the latter from any liability.
In the matter of disposing of contrabands, Section 2609(c) of the Tari and Customs
Code specically provides that the prerogative of the Collector of Customs is not the
release of the contraband like the Mercedes Benz in question but its sale, which
presupposes a prior custody pursuant to forfeiture and seizure proceedings as in the
case at bar.
As thus worded:
SEC. 2609.
Disposition of Contraband. Article of prohibited
importation or exportation, known as contraband, shall, in the absence of
special provision, be dealt with as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)
Other contraband of commercial value and capable of legitimate use
may be sold under such restrictions as will insure its use for legitimate
purposes only . . .
There is nothing in the Code that authorizes the Collector to release the contraband
in favor of an importer. The Code, on the other hand, is clear that the thing may be
disposed of by sale alone "under such restrictions as will insure its use for legitimate
purposes." To be sure, the restrictions to be prescribed by the Collector must
coincide with the purpose underlying Batas Blg. 73, that is, to conserve energy.
Hence, he can not allow its use (after sale), in this case a Mercedes Benz with an
engine displacement of more than 2,800 cubic centimeters, that would set at
naught that purpose. He must make sure that the engine is changed before it is
allowed to ply Philippine soil.
In all cases, forfeiture is a must.
LLjur
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J ., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the, as usual, well-written decision of Mr. Justice
Sarmiento. The reasons for my dissent are as follows:
The decision states:
"The petitioner does not dispute the fact that the motor car in question, a
Mercedes Benz 450 SLC, has an engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic
centimeters which clearly falls within the prohibited importation specied in the
law aforequoted and as such, is liable for seizure and forfeiture by the public
respondents." (pp. 6-7, decision) The law relied upon is Section 3(a) of BP 73
which provides:
"SEC. 3.
Towards the same end and to develop a more dynamic and
eective program for the rational use of energy, the following acts are
hereby prohibited:
(a)
The importation, manufacture or assembling of gasoline-powered
passenger motor cars with engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic
centimeters or Kerb-weight exceeding 1,500 kilograms, including
accessories."
It would thus appear that, under the forequoted provisions of Sec. 11 of BP 73, only
passenger motor vehicles manufactured or assembled in violation of Section 3(a)
thereof shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government.
prcd
The Mercedes Benz in the case at bar, having been admittedly imported, but not
manufactured or assembled in violation of Sec. 3(a) of BP 73, is not, therefore,
subject to confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the Government.
On the other hand, Sec. 2609 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides:
"SEC. 2609.
Disposition of Contraband. Article of prohibited
importation or exportation, known as contraband, shall, in the absence of
special provision, be dealt with as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
c.
Other contraband of commercial value and capable of legitimate use
may be sold under such restrictions as will insure its use for legitimate
purposes only; but if the thing is unt for use or the Collector is of the
opinion that, if sold, it would be used for unlawful purposes, it shall be
destroyed in such manner as the Collector shall direct." (Emphasis supplied.)
2.
Rollo, 18-19.
3.
Id., 16.
4.
Id., 17.
5.
Id., 20-30.
6.
Id., 30-31.
7.
Id., 32-42.
8.
Id., 44-45.
9.
Id., 7.
10.
11.
12.
Rollo, 87.
13.
Id., 123.
14.
Id., 126.