Berkowitz and Popovsky - Contraception

Contraception
Rabbis Miriam Berkowitz and Mark Popovsky

EH 5:12.2010
This responsum was unanimously approved by the CJLS on December 14, 2010.
(17-0-0) Members voting in favor: Rabbis Kassel Abelson, Pamela Barmash, Miriam
Berkowitz, Elliot Dorff, Robert Fine, Susan Grossman, Reuven Hammer, Joshua Heller,
Adam Kligfeld, Gail Labovitz, Daniel Nevins, Paul Plotkin, Avram Reisner, Elie Spitz,
Barry Starr, Jay Stein, and Steven Wernick.
‫—שאלה‬When is contraception permitted within Jewish law and what classical teachings
should guide the decision to employ it? When contraception is permitted, does Jewish
law determine which contraceptive method is preferable? Does Jewish law distinguish
between contraceptive methods initiated prior to intercourse and ―emergency‖ or other
contraception introduced only after intercourse? What does Jewish tradition teach about
an adolescent obtaining contraception without a parent’s consent?
‫—תשובה‬
Overview:
Judaism has always promoted marriage and raising children as mitzvot in themselves, as
well as the foundation that enables the fulfillment and transmission of many other
mitzvot. The relevant sources start in the very beginning of Genesis, with all humans
being enjoined to follow the lead of Adam and Eve: ―Thus shall a man leave his father
and mother and cling to his wife, so that they become one flesh‖ (Genesis 2: 24). The
tradition recognizes the value of the marital bond, including its physical component,
separate from the issue of procreation. Additionally, rabbinic texts discuss how many
children a couple should have and when their obligation to ―be fruitful and multiply, fill
the earth and master it‖ (Genesis 1:28) had been completed. Finally, the obligation to
protect one’s physical and mental health is a cornerstone of Biblical and rabbinic law.
The sages discussed contraception explicitly, albeit in different terms and with different
understandings of the human reproductive system. In cases where having another child
would present physical or mental challenges to one of the parents, the rabbis permitted
contraception of various types. Nevertheless, the use of contraception was always
considered against a backdrop of sexuality within marriage and of a commitment to
raising children, This teshuvah will apply classical rabbinic values to today’s experience
and technology.
I. Relevant Halakhic Principles/ Concerns

The Jewish discourse on contraception has identified four possible concerns that might
incline against the unrestricted use of contraception 1) ‫ – השחתת זרע לבטלה‬the prohibition
BERKOWITZ/POPOVSKY 1
forbidding the unnecessary destruction of seed 2) ‫ – סרוס‬the prohibition against castration
3) ‫ – מניעת פרו ורבו‬avoiding the mitzvah to be fruitful and multiply and 4) the reluctance
to encourage sexual activity outside of normative Jewish bounds. A ruling permitting the
use of contraception first must show that efforts to prevent pregnancy do not raise any of
these concerns or that the concern raised is outweighed by an even greater Jewish
principle which is upheld through the use of contraception. Our discussion will begin by
exploring each of the concepts in detail. Our analysis will show that ‫ השחתת זרע לבטלה‬and
‫ סרוס‬both factor heavily in determining which particular forms of contraception are
preferable over others, but neither one can serve as a basis to prohibit the use of
contraception generally. It will further show that ‫ מניעת פרו ורבו‬and the concern about
encouraging unhealthy sexual behavior direct committed Jews to make decisions about
contraception cautiously with an eye towards fulfilling the mitzvah of ‫ ;פרו ורבו‬however,
within the bounds specified, neither one of these concerns is sufficient to prohibit the use
of contraception altogether. We will then turn our attention to the major classical
discussions of contraception. Building on what we have learned, we will evaluate the
most common contemporary contraceptive methods and discuss which most successfully
avoid any of the concerns listed above. Finally, we will turn our attention to Jewish
teachings that might inform our approach to issues of parental consent for the use of
contraception by adolescents.
1. ‫ – השחתת זרע לבטלה‬The Destruction of Generative Seed for

Naught1
The wasting of generative seed is not an absolute prohibition, The destruction of semen
for naught is forbidden by Joseph Caro in the Shulkhan Arukh with spectacularly florid
language. In contrast to the terse legal tone that characterizes most of the work, Caro
writes regarding ‫ השחתת זרע‬that ‫—עון זה חמור מכל עבירות שבתורה‬this transgression is more
serious than all of the sins in the Torah.2 He later cites Rabbi Elazar’s midrashic
interpretation of Isaiah 1:15 suggesting that one who had emitted seed into his hand is
akin to a murderer.3 There is no doubt that this prohibition holds a special status in
Jewish law. In fact, David Feldman’s comprehensive work on the topic shows that the
language in the codes appears positively restrained when compared to the hyperbolic
discussions of this prohibition in many Kabbalistic texts.4
Caro’s primary definition of the specific act forbidden borrows from the Tannaitic
euphemism ‫—דש מבפנים וזורה מבחוץ‬threshing on the inside and winnowing on the
outside.5 However, it is clear that he reads the prohibition more broadly than coitus
interuptus to include, at least, both masturbation and marrying a prepubescent girl. The
1
The term ‫ השחתת זרע‬is used interchangeably in rabbinic texts with ‫ הוצאת זרע לבטל‬and ‫שכבת זרע לבטלה‬.
2
‫א‬:‫אבן העזר כג‬.
3
‫ב‬:‫ אבן העזר כג‬citing ‫נדה יג ע' ב‬.
4
David Feldman, Marital Relations, Birth Control and Abortion in Jewish Law (Schocken, New York:
1975), pp. 114–119. The research in this work is impeccable. Our arguments here are greatly indebted to
Rabbi Feldman.
5
‫ו‬:‫ תוספתא נדה ב‬and ‫יבמות לד ע' ב‬.
latter conclusion is of most relevance to this discussion because if intercourse with a
woman biologically unable to conceive is considered ‫השחתת זרע‬, then it is possible that
intercourse with a fertile woman in a situation where conception is prevented through the
use of a contraceptive device or other means may also constitute a violation of the
prohibition. However, Jewish legal decisors, including Caro himself, are unanimously
and unambiguously clear that a couple not only may but must engage in sexual relations
while the wife is pregnant, after menopause and in other situations when she is unable to
conceive.6 Consequently, Caro’s concern cannot be that normal intercourse with a
woman at a time when she is unable to conceive by itself violates the prohibition against
‫השחתת זרע‬. Observing this point, Rabbi Shmuel ben Uri Shraga Faivish, the author of the
Beit Shmuel, (17th Century, Poland) rules that marrying a prepubescent girl does not
violate ‫ ;השחתת זרע‬rather, Caro forbids it because it causes the man to delay his
fulfillment of ‫—פרו ורבו‬the mitzvah to be fruitful and multiply.7 The interpretation of the
Beit Shmuel offers a reading of Caro that avoids any internal inconsistency and is
therefore normative. Postponing ‫ פרו ורבו‬will be addressed in the next section. We can
proceed here confident that nothing in the Shulkhan Arukh indicates that intercourse
where conception is prevented violates the prohibition of ‫השחתת זרע‬.
To understand the full scope of the prohibition and its relationship to contemporary
contraceptive methods, we must examine its source. Identifying that source, however, is
not a straightforward matter. Most knowledgeable Jews assume that the prohibition
against ‫ השחתת זרע‬derives from the story or Er and Onan in Genesis 38:6–10.
‫שמָּה תָ מָר‬ ְ ‫ַוי ִּ ַקח י ְהּודָ ה ִּאשָה ְלעֵר בְכֹורֹו ּו‬

‫ַויְהִּי עֵר בְכֹור י ְהּודָ ה ַרע ְבעֵינֵי י ְקֹוָק ַויְמִּתֵ הּו י ְקֹוָק‬
‫וַי ֹאמֶר י ְהּודָ ה לְאֹונָן ב ֹא אֶל ֵאשֶת ָאחִּיָך ְויַבֵם א ֹתָ ּה ְו ָה ֵקם ז ֶַרע לְָאחִּיָך‬
‫ַארצָה ְל ִּבלְתִּ י נְתָ ן ז ֶַרע‬
ְ ‫שחֵת‬
ִּ ‫לְָאחִּיו ַוי ֵדַ ע אֹונָן כִּי ֹּלא לֹו י ִּ ְהי ֶה ַהז ַָרע ְו ָהי ָה ִּאם בָא אֶל ֵאשֶת ָאחִּיו ְו‬
.ֹ‫ ַוי ֵַרע ְבעֵינֵי י ְקֹוָק ֲאשֶר ָעשָה ַויָמֶת גַם א ֹתו‬:
Judah took a wife for Er his first-born; her name was Tamar. But Er, Judah’s
first-born, was displeasing to the Lord, and the Lord took his life. Then Judah
said to Onan, ―Join with your brother’s wife and do your duty by her as a
brother-in-law, and provide offspring for your brother.‖ But Onan, knowing
that the seed would not count as his, let it go to waste whenever he joined with
his brother’s wife, so as not to provide offspring for his brother. What he did
was displeasing to the Lord, and He took his life also.
Er’s sin is not specified but it is widely accepted in the classical interpretive tradition that
he was punished for the same act as his brother Onan. While the biblical language seems
to indicate that Onan committed an act of coitus interruptus and this reading is confirmed
by several midrashic sources, the interpretation offered by the Talmud is that the
prohibited act was one of ‫—תשמיש שלא כדרכה‬non-vaginal intercourse.8 Regardless of
6
‫ה‬:‫ אבן העזר כג‬drawing from many earlier sources including ‫תוספות יבמות יב ע' ב ד"ה שלש‬, ‫ מרדכי יבמות פ' ב‬and
‫נימוקי יוסף פ' ה‬.
7
‫א‬:‫בית שמואל אבן העזר כג‬.
8
‫יבמות לד ע' ב‬.
which reading one prefers, in both, the two men were punished following a sexual act in
which conception was impossible. Neither the motives of the characters nor the specific
rationale behind the severe punishments are made clear.
A broader reading would focus on the latter part of the verse, the motive rather than the
specific means: beyond wasting his seed, Onan is also circumventing the Levirite system
by which he is obliged to father children with his older brother’s widow, thereby
maintaining his lineage. It is easy to imagine Onan’s disinterest in fathering a child that
will be considered his brother’s. The Torah may be primarily concerned with Onan’s
selfish refusal to build up his brother’s household. The severity of his punishment may
well be due to combination of his transgressions. The motive behind Er’s sin is much
harder to understand. The Talmud speculates that he may have wished to avoid risking
Tamar’s beauty with the physical challenges of a pregnancy.9 The biblical commentary
of Rabbi Yoseif Bekhor Shor (Yosef ben Yitzhak, France, 12th century) suggests ‫שמא לא‬
‫―—היה רוצה בצער גידול בנים שיש בני אדם שאינן חוששין רק להנאתם‬that he did not want the
trouble of raising children; for there are people who only worry about what is best for
themselves.‖10
The Talmudic interpretation and that in the Bekhor Shor both share readings of the text
where the reasons for avoiding pregnancy are quite shallow. While we have been
referring to the prohibition for convenience sake as ‫השחתת זרע‬, the full term is ‫השחתת זרע‬
‫—לבטלה‬the destruction of generative seed for naught. There is a redundancy in the term
itself suggesting that violation of the prohibition requires not only ―destruction‖ of the
seed but also ―destruction‖ for no purpose whatsoever. Certainly the particular reasons
for Er’s behavior suggested by the Talmud and the Bekhor Shor qualify as ―for naught.‖
However, these readings do not preclude other situations in which seed might be emitted
outside of procreative intercourse for a halakhically valid purpose. Such cases would fall
outside the bounds of the prohibition
For example, one such halakhically valid purpose is proposed by the tanna Rabbi Eliezer
who suggests to the husband of a nursing mother that the couple engage in coitus
interruptus lest a second pregnancy diminish the mother’s milk and harm the suckling
infant.11 While Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling in this specific case was rejected by his
contemporaries, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (20th Century, U.S.) concludes from the
discussion that cases must exist in which seminal emissions outside of procreative
intercourse are not considered to be ‫השחתת זרע לבטלה‬. After noting that in other
discussions Rabbi Eliezer rules even more strictly than his contemporaries in true cases
of ‫השחתת זרע לבטלה‬, Feinstein writes,
‫דזרע לבטלה שאסור אין פירושו לבטלה מהולדה שהוא בכל אופן שאי אפשר להוליד בהוצאה‬
‫כזו אלא פירושו לבטלה ממש בלא צורך אבל ביש צורך כגון למצות עונה אף שא"א להוליד‬
12
.‫בהוצאה כזו לא הוי זה לבטלה ומותר‬
9
Id.
10
‫בכור שור ברא' לח' ז‬.
11
‫יבמות לד ע' ב‬.
12
‫סג‬:‫אגרות משה א"ה א‬.
…with respect to [the destruction of] seed for naught, which is forbidden,
the definition of ―for naught‖ is not ―nullified from the possibility of
procreation such that it is impossible to procreate through such an
emission;‖ rather, the definition of ―for naught‖ is literal—for no need at all.
However, when there is a valid need, for example to fulfill the mitzvah of
pleasure [within marriage], even in a case when it would be impossible to
procreate through such an emission, it is not considered ―for naught‖ and,
thus, is permissible.
Feinstein here cites the mitzvah of ‫—עונה‬the injunction to engage in regular martial
marital relations—as one halakhically valid basis for a seminal emission to take place
outside of procreative potential without violating the prohibition against wasting
generative seed for naught. It is important to remember that this narrowing the scope of
what is included in the prohibition comes in the context of a case of coitus interruptus—
the exact act of Er and Onan, following a plain reading of the text. Presumably, in cases
where there is no ‫ דש מבפנים וזורה מבחוץ‬but rather the act is indistinguishable from
procreative sexual activity, one might find even more room for leniency.
Rabbi Asher ben Yehiel, the fourteenth-century decisor also known alternatively as the
Rosh and Asheri (France, Germany, then Spain), was asked about a case in which a
married woman has an anatomical obstruction—‫—אוטם‬preventing normal intercourse.
Though the details are unclear, one infers from Asheri’s restatement of the question that
the obstruction permits the husband to penetrate the wife’s labia temporarily; however,
the semen consistently spills out after the completion of the sexual act. He ruled,
‫ ושחת ארצה; ואע"פ שלפעמים‬:‫ קרינן ביה‬,‫יראה שהוא אסור; כיון דלעולם הוא זורה בחוץ‬
13
.‫ אסור‬,‫ כיון שלעולם הוא זורה מבחוץ‬,‫ מכל מקום‬,‫הוא דש מבפנים‬.
It appears that [sexual activity in this case] is forbidden. Since he always

winnows on the outside, the verse ―he would cast his seed on the ground‖
applies to him. Even though sometimes he may thresh on the inside,
nevertheless, because he always winnows on the outside, it is forbidden.
Interestingly, Asheri goes on to contrast the case before him with that of a woman
employing a ‫—מוך‬an absorbent device inserted internally which will be discussed in
greater detail further on. Asheri would permit intercourse in the latter case, writing,
‫ מידי דהוה אעקרה וזקנה‬,‫ אע"פ שאין זרעו ראוי להזריע‬,‫דהתם היא משמשת כדרך כל הארץ‬
.‫וקטנה‬
[such a woman] engages in sexual activity in the same way as everyone

else; even though his seed will not implant, it is analogous to [intercourse
with] a barren woman, a post-menopausal woman or a woman too young to
become pregnant [all of which are permitted].
13
‫שו"ת הרא"ש כלל לג ס' ג‬.
This responsum highlights an important distinction that is maintained in many later legal
rulings.14 When the seminal emission occurs outside of the vagina, the verse from the
story of Er and Onan—―he would cast his seed upon the ground‖—applies and ‫השחתת זרע‬
is at issue.15 When the seminal emission is internal, even though procreation may be
impossible for other reasons, ‫ השחתת זרע‬does not apply. Asheiri explicitly refers to
intercourse which the introduction of a contraceptive method has rendered non-
procreative as ‫―—היא משמשת כדרך כל הארץ‬normal intercourse.‖ Of course, when we
discuss modern contraceptive methods, we will see that some specific means of
preventing pregnancy today–namely barrier methods—may be analogous to an external
seminal emission and therefore much closer to ‫השחתת זרע‬. The key point at this stage of
our argument is that intercourse with the use of contraception does not by definition fall
within the bounds of the prohibition as long as the emission is internal.
Asheri explicates this point in his commentary on the Talmud. He writes,
‫ אבל לאחר‬. . . ‫דלא מיקרי השחתת זרע אלא במי שגורם ע"י חימום שמוציא זרע לבטלה‬
16
.‫שנעקר הזרע מן הגוף לא שייך ביה השחתתה‬
[The prohibition against] the wasting of seed for naught only applies when
one causes an emission by masturbation or arousal, which is in itself
causing the seed to go for naught… but after the semen has been emitted
from the body, the prohibition against its destruction does not apply.
The laws of ‫ השחתת זרע‬govern the way in which semen is emitted. Acts that inhibit the
reproductive capacity of semen following emission may invite concerns about
forestalling fulfillment of the mitzvah to be fruitful and multiply (to be discussed below),
but they do not cause an emission of semen to become a violation of ‫השחתת זרע‬. This
conclusion is supported by a distinction made in a responsum of Rabbi Hayim Sofer
which was later confirmed by Rabbi Avrohom Yeshaya Karelitz, (1878–1953), known as
the Hazon Ish.17 Sofer distinguishes between the improper emission of seed and the
destruction of seed following emission. While the former constitutes a clear violation of
‫השחתת זרע‬, the latter stands outside of the prohibition.
14
See, e.g., ‫ה‬:‫רמ"א אבן העזר כג‬.
15
The interpretative trend has become increasingly lenient even with respect to situations where completion
of sexual activity without withdrawal is not always possible. For example, Rabbi Eliezer Deutsch (early
20th Century, Germany) permits marital relations in a case similar to that before the Rosh because, in the
case before Deutsch, expulsion of the penis was not guaranteed every time, ‫עז‬:‫שו"ת פרי הסדה א‬. Similarly,
Rabbi Avraham Sofer (19th Century, Pressburg) permitted marital relations in a case even more similar to
that before the Rosh on the grounds that medical technology might someday make normal intercourse
possible between the couple, ‫שו"ת כתב סופר א"ה כו‬.
Note also that the CJLS and other halakhic authorities have not applied the prohibition of ‫ השחתת זרע‬to
external emissions of semen during the process of infertility treatment. See Ellior Dorff, Artificial
Insemination, Egg Donation and Adoption, CJLS Responsa EH 1:3.1994; Aaron Mackler, In Vitro
Fertilization, CJLS Responsa EH 1:3.1995 and sources cited therein.
16
‫תוספות הרא"ש יבמות יב ע' ב‬.
17
‫שו"ת מחנה חיים ס' נג‬. See also ‫ג‬-‫ב‬:‫חזון איש אבן העזר לו‬.
So far, we have assumed that ‫ השחתת זרע‬constitutes a biblical prohibition and we have
concluded that an internal seminal emission does not fall under the prohibition of ‫השחתת‬
‫ זרע‬simply because there is no possibility of procreation. We will now explore whether
that prohibition is indeed biblical and if it is possible that even when a particular form of
contraception appears on its face to involve ‫ השחתת זרע‬whether one might still find a way
to permit it in some instances when other halakhic concerns take precedent.
The biblical basis for the prohibition of ‫השחתת זרע‬, something we have assumed up until
this point, is far from clear. The term itself borrows language from Genesis 38:9 lending
credence to Rabbi Vidal of Tolosa’s claim that the root of the prohibition lies in the story
of Er and Onan.18 However, this a narrative section of the Torah from which few mitzvot
are generally derived. Further, as we noted above and as Rabbi David Feldman explains
in greater detail, the exact sins for which Er and Onan were punished are not obvious.19
Rabbi Jacob Emden concludes that the story of Er and Onan, at best, serves as a ―hint‖ to
the prohibition. He write, ‫[―—לא נזכר בפירוש בתורה רק ברמז‬the prohibition] is not
mentioned explicitly in the Torah; rather only through a hint.‖20
Given this uncertainty, a host of alternate biblical sources have been proposed as the
basis of the prohibition. One common claim begins with the observation that adultery is
forbidden several times in the Torah. Employing a hermeneutic of economy, some
rabbinic exegetes view the repeated injunctions as broadly prohibiting immoral behavior
not specified elsewhere in the Torah.21 Maimonides represents one of many who view
‫ השחתת זרע‬as forbidden on these grounds.22 Still others point to a form of the root '‫ש'ח'ת‬
employed in Genesis 6:12—―for all flesh had corrupted its ways on earth‖—as
suggesting that one of the sins for which God decided to flood the world in the time of
Noah was the direct spilling of seed onto the earth.23 A comment in the Tosafot proposes
that the prohibition is included within the positive command to be fruitful and multiply. 24
Ibn Ezra finds it in Leviticus 18:6’s injunction against coming ―near anyone of his own
flesh to uncover nakedness.‖25 Rabbi Jacob Ettlinger (19th century, Germany and
Denmark) wonders if it might lie in the command at Deuteronomy 20:19 prohibiting
wanton destruction.26 Each of these claims, despite their various exegetical merits, has
occasioned significant objections. The reader here need not determine which single basis
for the prohibition he or she finds most compelling. It is sufficient for the reader to
acknowledge that biblical exegetes and legal decisors share no consensus as to the origins
of the prohibition. The various biblical grounds proposed for the prohibition seem to
18
‫ט‬:‫מגיד משנה יד ה' איסורי ביאה כא‬.
19
Feldman, supra note 4, pp. 144–165.
20
‫כ‬:‫ ;משפט ספרים א‬see also ‫שו"ת משיבת נפש ס' יח‬.
21
‫נדה יג ע' א‬.
22
‫ד‬:‫ פירוש למשנה סנהדרין ז‬and ‫ספר מצות קטן ס' רפב‬.
23
‫ סנהדרין קח ע' ב‬and ‫ראש השנה יב ע' א‬. See also ‫ רש"י נדה יג ע' א‬and ‫יד‬:‫מגן אברהם א"ח ג‬. Many authorities
object to this proposal because it implies that one might be punished without having received prior explicit
warning. See, e.g., ‫ז‬:‫ משנה למלך מלכים י‬and ‫ערוך לנר נדה יג ע' א‬.
24
‫תוספות סנהדרין נט ע' ב ד"ה והא‬.
25
‫ו‬:‫אבן עזרה ויקרא יח‬.
26
‫בנין ציון ס' קלז‬.
serve more as ‫–אסמכתות‬biblical supports for rabbinic enactments—than as explicit
biblical commands.27
Recognizing the uncertain etiology of the prohibition, Maimonides states that there is no
punishment for a violation of ‫ השחתת זרע‬since there is no explicit biblical injunction.28
Rabbi Moshe Trani (16th Century, Italy) equivocates when ruling if the prohibition is
biblical or rabbinic, and the clearest reading of his statement suggests that he leaves the
matter unsettled.29 Perhaps the strongest argument for the non-biblical nature of the
prohibition is made by Rabbi Yehoshua Heschel ben Yoseif of Krakow (19th Century,
Poland), who astutely notes Rav’s statement in the Talmud that the transgressor of ‫השחתת‬
‫ זרע‬is subject to a rabbinic ban—‫נידוי‬. Since such bans can apply only to the violation of
rabbinic enactments and not biblical law, he argues that ‫ השחתת זרע‬must be understood as
rabbinic in nature.30
We argued above that the use of contraception by itself during intercourse does not
constitute a violation of ‫ השחתת זרע‬even if the prohibition is understood to be biblical.
Here we have shown that ‫ השחתת זרע‬need not necessarily be understood as a biblical
prohibition at all. Considering the prohibition a rabbinic enactment certainly does not
permit one concerned with Jewish law to ignore it. In the vast majority of instances this
distinction between biblical and rabbinic prohibitions can rightly be viewed as purely
academic. However, rabbinic enactments can be temporarily set aside or outweighed
when they come into conflict with biblical obligations, pressing needs or risks to health.31
Thus, should we determine that a particular form of contraception causes a seminal
emission to become ‫השחתת זרע‬, we still may not find that the prohibition of ‫השחתת זרע‬
constitutes an obstacle to permitting that particular contraceptive when it facilitates the
mitzvah of ‫ עונה‬or serves a health benefit. Further on, we will apply this principle to
various contemporary contraceptive means.
2. ‫ – סרוס‬Castration
Though the Bible does not offer a clear rule explicitly forbidding the castration of a
human being, twice it prohibits men with damaged or maimed genitalia from entering
into ―the assembly of the Lord‖ - a statement understood to forbid marriage. The
rabbinic discussions of these verses uncover two separate prohibitions.32 One prevents a
man—‫—פצוע דכא‬from marrying if his genitalia have been seriously injured, wounded, cut
or crushed by the direct act of another man. The second forbids the permanent
sterilization of either a man—‫—סריס‬or an animal by chemical or surgical means such as a
vasectomy.
27
This point is made more forcefully in ‫מד‬:‫ שו"ת פני יהושוע א"ה ב‬and ‫ערוך לנר נדה יג ע' א‬.
28
‫ד‬:‫פירוש למשנה סנהדרין ז‬.
29
‫ט‬:‫ קריאת ספר ליד איסורי ביאה כא‬as understood in ‫כב‬:‫מנחת יחיאל ב‬.
30
‫מד‬:‫ שו"ת פני יהושוע א"ה ב‬citing ‫נדה יג ע' ב‬.
31
See Joel Roth, The Halakhic Process (Moreshet, New York: 1986), pp. 153–204.
32
‫יג‬-‫א‬:‫אבן העזר ה‬.
There is some debate about whether the extension of the prohibition against ‫ סרוס‬to
include women is biblical or rabbinic in nature.33 Regardless, most decisors who have
considered the issue agree that a hysterectomy, oophorectomy (removal of the ovaries) or
tubal ligation for purposes of preventing pregnancy alone, without other medical
indications, would generally be included in the prohibition.34 However, both Rabbis
Moshe Feinstein and Eliezer Waldenberg have permitted such operations for women
when no other contraceptive means are safe.35
Caro applies the prohibition to men even when the sterilization is effected by medical or
chemical means instead of surgery. However, he permits women to drink a sterilizing
potion—called here a ―cup of roots‖—so that they will not give birth.
‫ ואין‬,‫ הרי זה אסור‬,‫המשקה כוס של עיקרין לאדם או לשאר בעלי חיים כדי לסרסו‬
36
.‫ ואשה מותרת לשתות עיקרין כדי לסרסה עד שלא תלד‬.‫לוקין עליו‬
One who gives a man or any other animals a ―cup of roots‖ to drink in
order to sterilize him, this is forbidden but the man is not flogged.
However, a woman is permitted to drink a ―cup of roots‖ in order to
sterilize her so that she will not give birth.
The ―cup of roots‖ and its capacity to serve as an analogue for contemporary
contraception will be discussed below. For our purposes here, it is sufficient to note that
the ―cup of roots‖ was understood to be a permanent sterilization technique. The
prohibition of ‫ סרוס‬is not concerned with temporary contraceptive methods that could be
33
Arguments that the prohibition is biblical include ‫כה‬:‫ ביאור הגר"א א"ה ה‬and ‫לד‬:‫ ד‬,‫יג‬:‫אגרות משה א"ה א‬.
Arguments that it is rabbinic include ‫יא עם מגיד משנה‬:‫יד איסורי ביאה טז‬, ‫יא‬:‫ טור ושולחן ערוך אבן העזר ה‬and ‫חתם‬
‫כ‬:‫סופר א"ה א‬.
34
‫לו‬-‫לג‬:‫ ד‬,‫יג‬:‫אגרות משה א"ה א‬.
35
‫לד‬:‫ אגרות משה א"ה ד‬and ‫צו‬:‫ציץ אליעזר יד‬. In ‫ ח"ט סימן נ"א‬Waldenberg sets out his general guidelines for
contraception and offers the order of priority. Tubal ligation is low on the order of priorities but permitted
in cases where no other method is effective or safe. Waldenberg says it is not a matter of ‫ פיקוח נפש‬per se
because the options of celibacy or divorce are available, but that these options would cause such severe
hardship and possibly financial hardship that the operation would be preferable. He says the majority of
poskim consider ‫ סרוס‬for women to be a rabbinic prohibition and that the actual source is the prohibition on
harming oneself (habalah), so that if the procedure is done in a medically safe and painless way, with the
woman’s consent, it does not fall under this category. Furthermore, it is possible to reverse the procedure
and reinstate fertility, unlike the Biblical concept of sterility or ‫ סרוס‬and finally, the women is a passive
participant, under anaesthetic-so is not really party to the action even if it were forbidden, but that it is
preferable for a gentile doctor to perform the operation just in case the Jewish one would be liable. See
also infra note 97.
Feinstein gives more weight to the Gra (Vilna Gaon) who considers ‫ סרוס‬even for women to be a biblical
prohibition, and he says even if it is a rabbinic prohibition, not every rabbinic prohibition can be superseded
just for the reasons of discomfort (tzaar), however in the end he concludes that in the specific case of a
woman who can not use other methods, celibacy or divorce would be a great discomfort (tzaar gadol) and
leave her like an agunah (an anchored woman) so that he calls this case an unusual circumstance (shaat
hadhak) in which the decisors are almost forced into a corner to permit it. He harmonized the Gra’s view
by saying that the other rishonim were also teachers of the Gra and that we can follow the majority,
especially since some like the Rashba consider there to be no prohibition at all.
36
‫יב‬:‫שולחן ערוך אבן העזר ה‬.
discontinued at any time.37 With respect to men, both surgical and chemical methods are
equally problematic. For women, the prohibition has not traditionally been understood to
include chemical methods. Even surgical methods may be permitted for women in some
instances.
3. ‫—מניעת פרו ורבו‬Avoiding the Mitzvah To Be Fruitful and

Multiply
The first couple, Adam and Eve, was charged with the command to ―be fruitful and
multiply‖ shortly after land and sea animals received the same imperative.38
Interestingly, rabbinic exegetes often locate the source of the mitzvah to procreate
elsewhere in the Bible. Rashi, for example, follows the Talmud in arguing that the
mitzvah stems from the command given to the children of Noah after the flood.39 In the
same comment, Rashi also echoes a rabbinic tradition that one who fails to observe this
mitzvah is to be considered as one who has shed blood. The importance of this mitzvah
cannot be overlooked. A Talmudic passage indicates that ―Have you fulfilled the
mitzvah to be fruitful and multiply?‖ is one of the first three questions a man is asked
during divine judgment.40
Hillel and Shammai debate the bounds of the biblical command. 41 Shammai rules that a
man has not discharged his obligation until he has fathered two sons. Hillel, whom the
halakhah follows, is satisfied if a man has fathered a son and a daughter. The Talmud
testifies that this is a minimal standard and that there is an additional rabbinic obligation
to continue having more children after the requisite two. Two separate non-Pentateuchal
verses are referred to in order to describe this non-biblical obligation. The first, ‫לשבת‬--to
populate, derives from Isaiah 45:18, ‫שבֶת יְצ ָָרּה‬
ֶ ‫[―—ֹלא ת ֹהּו ב ְָר ָאּה ָל‬God] did not create [the
world] a waste; rather to populate He formed it.‖ Since some offspring will die before
reproducing, the rabbinic argument follows, sufficiently ―populating‖ the world—that is,
maintaining population stability—requires that couples have more than two offspring.42
A man cannot be said to have fulfilled the commandment until he has fathered two
children who themselves have reproduced. ‫ לשבת‬can best be understood as a rabbinic
expansion of the biblical command to ensure that the biblical command is fulfilled.
The second rabbinic injunction further expands the biblical imperative. ‫—לערב‬into the
evening, derives from Ecclesiastes 11:6, ‫―— בַבֹקֶר ז ְַרע אֶת ז ְַרעֶָך ְו ָלע ֶֶרב ַאל תַ נַח י ָדֶ ָך‬Sow your
seed in the morning and do not hold back your hand into the evening.‖ The verse is
understood midrashically as demanding that a man continue to produce offspring ―into
37
‫סב‬:‫אגרות משה א‬, ‫קכו‬:‫ מנחת יצחק ה‬and ‫סב‬:‫חלקת יעקוב ג‬.
38
Genesis 1:22 and 1:28.
39
‫ רש"י‬to Genesis 9:7 referencing ‫כתובות ה ע' א‬. See also ‫תוספות יבמות סה ע' ב ד"ה ולא‬.
40
‫שבת לא ע' א‬.
41
‫ו‬:‫משנה יבמות ו‬.
42
See ‫יג‬:‫ משנה עדויות א‬and ‫יבמות נב ע' א‬.
the evening‖ of his life; that is, a man should never stop fathering children.43 While this
rabbinic injunction was not universally accepted in its day, the Talmud cites the
affirmation of Rav Mattena that the later halakhah holds it to be valid. Post-Talmudic
commentators debate the strength of ‫– לערב‬the obligation to father children indefinitely.
Rabbi Yitzhak Alfasi views it as a standard rabbinic commandment. 44 Rabbis Zerahia
ben Yitzhak HaLevi Gerondi and Asher ben Yehiel both rule that this commandment is
easily superseded when it conflicts with other commandments.45 Nahmanides sets the
level of obligation even lower calling it ‫—דרך ארץ‬a general custom that one should
attempt follow but not a strict rabbinic regulation.46 According to this view, there is no
punishment for the transgressor. Codifying Nahmanides’ interpretation into law, Rabbi
Yehiel Michael Epstein writes in his Arukh HaShulkhan,
.‫דזהו כעין הידור מצוה ומנהג דרך ארץ כמ"ש ואם יש איזה עיכוב בדבר אין כופין אותו לכך‬
This is a type of embellishment to the commandment, a general custom, and

if there is any impediment, we do not compel a man to fulfill it.47
With respect to ‫לערב‬, we see that fathering as many children as possible may be viewed
as the ideal way to fulfill the mitzvah in the classical texts but that it is not necessary.
When legitimate obstacles make such life choices difficult, one may fulfill the mitzvah of
‫ פרו ורבו‬with the rabbinic minimum.
The Talmud recounts a debate as to whether the mitzvah of ‫ פרו ורבו‬applies to both men
and women or just men.48 Though the debate is not settled in the text itself, the later
halakhic tradition has almost unanimously viewed the obligation as applying only to men.
Rabbis Kassel Abelson and Elliot Dorff describe this interpretation as ―counterintuitive‖
given the Mishnah’s clear indication that it understands the biblical text, on its face, to
mean that both Adam and Eve were told simultaneously to ―be fruitful and multiply.‖49
Jewish tradition views the obligation to have children as responsibility shared among
parents. A comment in the Tosafot clearly indicates that the author believes women to be
obligated to the rabbinic extension of ‫ לשבת‬even if she is not bound to the biblical
command.50 Later responsa and codes temper this sentiment somewhat, but they retain a
sense that a woman is actively involved in the fulfillment of the mitzvah at least, even if
she is not directly commanded herself.51 Rabbeinu Nissim sees the woman as assisting
her husband in the fulfillment of his mitzvah.52 Though it might not be a direct violation
of the mitzvah of ‫ פרו ורבו‬for her to intentionally avoid becoming pregnant, a woman
43
‫סב ע' ב‬-‫יבמות סא ע' ב‬.
44
‫רי"ף יבמות סב ע' ב‬.
45
‫ המאור הגדול‬id. ad loc., and )‫רא"ש יבמות סב ע' ב(פ' ו ס' ט‬.
46
‫ מלחמת השם‬to ‫רי"ף יבמות סב ע' ב‬.
47
‫ח‬:‫ אבן העזר א‬,‫ערוך השולחן‬.
48
‫סו ע' א‬-‫יבמות סה ע' ב‬.
49
Kassel Abelson and Elliot Dorff, ―Mitzvah Children,‖ CJLS Responsa, EH 1:5.2007.
50
‫ ;תוספות גטין מא ע' ב ד"ה לא תהו‬see also ‫תוספות בבא בתרא יג ע' א‬.
51
See, e.g., ‫יא‬:‫ בית משה אבן העזר ה‬and ‫ד‬:‫ערוך השולחן אבן העזר א‬.
52
‫חידושי ר"ן קידושין מא ע' א‬.
behaving in such a way as to inhibit procreation would minimally represent a missed
opportunity to participate in a central mitzvah.53
Some responsa cite the exemption of women from the mitzvah of ‫ פרו ורבו‬as a ‫—צד היתר‬
ground for a lenient ruling.54 The argument follows that only the man can be obligated
unreservedly since pregnancy and childbirth were dangerous to a woman’s health in the
ancient world and remain so today. Thus, they permit a form of contraception employed
exclusively by the woman—e.g. hormonal contraception—that does not involve the man
engaging in any direct action causing him to undermine the prohibition against spilling
seed while also protecting the women’s health and autonomy.55 Though we have not
presented a full argument here that the mitzvah should be reconsidered as applying to
both men and women equally, our commitment to an egalitarian halakhic method
prevents us from relying on this arbitrary distinction in our final conclusion.56 In a
modern Jewish relationship, both parties should be equally involved in the decision to
employ contraception. Whatever responsibility falls on one should be shared equally
with the other. We are aware that hormonal contraception, the method that this teshuvah
will conclude is most preferable, currently places the burden of use solely on the woman.
Should similarly safe and effective hormonal contraception become available for men, we
find no reason that the burden should remain on the woman.
Having explored the bounds of the commandment as set in the halakhic discourse, it is
necessary to consider the nature of the obligation. ‫ פרו ורבו‬is not a ‫—מצוה עשה שהזמן גרמא‬
a mitzvah that must be fulfilled at a specific time, such as the waving of the lulav and
etrog on the morning of Sukkot. Neither is it a positive mitzvah that one must actively
fulfill at all times, such as the command in Exodus 23:7 to ―stay far away from
falsehood.‖ Rather, ‫ פרו ורבו‬is most accurately understood as a mitzvah demanding a
particular lifestyle—a lifestyle that includes parenthood.57 A Jew who is able to become
a parent is required to become a parent. Active decisions that prevent one from becoming
a parent (e.g., commitments to celibacy, surgical sterilization absent health reasons, a
refusal to have children) should rightly be considered acts of ‫—מניעת פרו ורבו‬avoiding the
mitzvah to be fruitful and multiple.58 However, decisions to delay pregnancy for a time,
if they fit into a larger life plan that includes a desire to fulfill the mitzvah in the future
53
But cf. ‫( נדה כ ע' ב‬suggesting that women have a biblical obligation to serve their husbands’ sexual needs).
54
See, e.g, ‫ אגרות משה ח' א א"ה ח' א ס' סב‬,‫מנחת יצחק א"ה ח' ב ס' טז‬. Because pregnancy and childbirth were
frequently dangerous to a woman’s health in the ancient world, it could not be commanded for a woman to
fulfill.
55
Even if women were clearly obligated to the mitzvah of pru u’rvu, this would not preclude the leniencies
allowing contraception and abortion in cases where women’s physical and mental health are concerned;
these leniencies are based on Biblical values of taking care of one’s body and health and would be weighed
against the value of pru u’rvu. Similarly, this does not change the calculus for halakhic arguments
permiting the use of infertility treatments.
56
See Abelson and Dorff, supra note 49, for one articulation of this argument in more detail.
57
It has been called ‫—מצוה שאין לה זמן מוגדר‬a mitzvah that has no fixed time for its fulfillment. See ‫שו"ת‬
)‫אבני נזר י"ד ס' שצה(ו‬.
58
Simultaneously, we reaffirm the notion that Jewish tradition views with no moral judgment infertility, an
inability to find a mate and other situations of ‫ אונס‬where people who wish to become parents are unable to
procreate.
are not necessarily acts of ‫מניעת פרו ורבו‬. In the language of Rabbi Ya’akov Ariel (20th
Century, Israel),
.‫ מותר לדחות‬,‫ לכן אם קיימת סיבה מוצדקת‬.‫ אין זו חובה מיידית‬59
The mitzvah to be fruitful and multiply should not be considered an

―immediate‖ obligation which one must always hasten to fulfill. When
valid reasons exist to postpone it, it may be postponed.
Our argument here should not be read as carte blanche permission for couples to
procreate only at their own convenience. We already saw the comment of Rabbi Yoseif
Bekhor Shor above that the sin for which Er was killed was his decision to prioritize his
own expediency and shallow needs over the burden of raising children. Similarly, Rabbi
Meir Meiri writes that the commandment of ‫ פרו ורבו‬needed to be given to human beings
in the first place because, without the explicit imperative, we might prefer to avoid many
responsibilities of childrearing—a decision that is wholly unacceptable in Jewish
tradition.60
Classic sources have identified a range of situations when delaying fulfillment of the
mitzvah is appropriate. As with any positive mitzvah, fulfillment may be delayed when it
poses a risk to one’s health or well-being. This permission to employ contraceptive
means for reasons of the mother’s health has been widely adopted across the spectrum of
rabbinic opinions.61 The debate only surrounds what level of health risk triggers
permission to postpone fulfillment of the mitzvah. We urge a broad interpretation that
includes emotional and psychological factors affecting the well-being of any of the
parties involved as well as physical ones. Such an approach fits well within the classical
halakhic discourse. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Rabbi Shimon Pollack
advised a woman to use a spermicidal agent in order to delay birth of a second child at
least one year after the birth of the first when it was clear that she might suffer fatigue
and weakness bearing two children closely together.62 Rabbi Yehudah Henkin reports
that he follows the ruling of his grandfather who would permit a woman to employ
contraception for several years after the birth of a child, even if the husband had not yet
fulfilled ‫פרו ורבו‬, whenever the mother thought that the prevention of pregnancy was
necessary for her to provide appropriate care to her child.63 That is, not only is delaying
‫ פרו ורבו‬acceptable to protect the health of the mother, but even the well-being of the child
or another child already born is sufficient weight to temporarily postpone fulfillment of
the mitzvah.
59
)‫שו"ת באהלה של תורה ח' א א"ה סו(ד‬.
60
‫ האדם שהוא באמת מקבל עליו‬. . .‫" בשאר היצורים יש בהם נטיית המין אבל אין בהם הרגשת אחריות בעד זוגו ויוצאי חלציו‬
".‫אחריות זו בעדם וגם יודע מראש את האחריות יש לחוש שיתחנם על הנטייה הזו ולא יעסוק בפרייה ורבייה לכן הוצרך לברכה‬
‫כח‬:‫תורה מאירה לבראשית א‬.
61
A representative selection of responsa which arrive at this conclusion include: ‫ אחיעזר‬,‫חמדת שלמה א"ה מו‬
‫סג‬-‫סב‬:‫ אגרות משה ח' א א"ה א‬,‫ מנחה חיים א"ה נג‬,‫ מלמד להועיל א"ה יח‬,‫ שו"ת מהרש"ם ח' א ס' נח‬,‫א"ה כג‬.
62
‫שו"ת שם משמעון ס' ז‬.
63
‫ל‬:‫שו"ת בני בנים א‬.
Closely related to such considerations of emotional well-being is the concept of ‫שלום‬
‫—בית‬promoting domestic harmony. A full analysis of the concept is well-beyond the
scope of this responsum. It should be sufficient here to note that the halakhic tradition
has exempted individuals even from a range of biblical obligations when the absence of
an exemption might cause significant discord within a family. In his work Terumat
HaDeshen, Rabbi Israel Isserlin (15th century Germany) permits a widowed man to
remarry a barren woman in a situation when failing to do so might otherwise lead to the
man’s entering into a quarrelsome marriage with another woman. Isserlin’s ruling cites
the dictum ‫―—דדחינן בשביל קטטה מיבום לחליצה‬for the sake of avoiding strife, a levir may be
absolved of his obligation to marry his sister-in-law.‖64 Though in this case Isserlin
employs ‫ שלום בית‬to exempt a man who has already fulfilled ‫ פרו ורבו‬from the rabbinic
extension of ‫לערב‬, the basis for his rule in the Talmud is a case when a man is exempted
from levirate marriage—a biblical obligation. Consequently, ‫ שלום בית‬might serve as a
‫ צד התר‬to permit temporary delay even when the biblical mitzvah of ‫ פרו ורבו‬has not yet
been fulfilled.
We advise rabbis applying this ruling to the cases before them not to distort the concept
of ‫ שלום בית‬by employing it as a miscellaneous ―catch-all‖ to permit any behavior.
Nevertheless, with respect to the use of contraception, ‫ שלום בית‬should direct rabbis to
incline towards permissive rulings for newly-married couples who need additional time
to strengthen their emotional bonds prior to facing the challenges of parenthood; for
couples who have recently had a child and the introduction of another child soon
afterwards might cause discord; for couples who have determined that spacing children is
more conducive to a functional marriage and positive parenting; for couples very heavily
burdened by the economic hardships of having a child; and for all similar situations when
the well-being of the family or the marital relationship is threatened. 65 Considerations of
‫ שלום בית‬may also influence the choice of contraceptive method; it needs to be one that
both people agree on and does not negatively impact the frequency and quality of their
physical relations. We refer the reader back to our discussion of ‫ פרו ורבו‬as a mitzvah
demanding that one who is able adopt a lifestyle that includes parenthood. When a
couple is committed to a realistic plan to raise children, temporary delays in having
children to better enable a couple to fulfill their own overall plan to procreate should not
be considered acts of ‫מניעת פרו ורבו‬. However, marrying and having children ought not be
delayed intentionally beyond a time of reasonable fertility and the best chances to obtain
healthy outcomes for parents and child.66
64
‫רסג‬:‫ תרומת הדשן א‬citing ‫יבמות מד ע' א‬.
65
Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg explicitly prohibits rabbis from weighing economic considerations when
deciding whether a particular couple is permitted to use contraception. See )‫נא(ב‬:‫ציץ אליעזר ט‬. Issues of
finances and livelihood should only play a determining factor in our analysis when they are so great that
ignoring them would introduce a significant threat to ‫שלום בית‬. We expect such occasions to be both rare
and temporary. Poverty alone does not warrant an exemption from the mitzvah of ‫פרו ורבו‬. See ‫שו"ת בני‬
‫בנים ח' ב ס' לח‬.
66
Abelson and Dorff, supra note 49. Further, this discussion should not be misinterpreted to imply that
today a man should hesitate to marry, or remain married, to a woman who cannot birth a child, or that a
woman should hesitate to marry or remain married to a man who is infertile, regardless whether either
partner has biological children. In our day, the obligation to have children can be fulfilled through artificial
means and adoption.
Further, all of the ‫ צדי היתר‬and reasons not to view temporary postponement of the
mitzvah as problematic that have been discussed above are applicable even before the
minimum rabbinic requirement of one boy and one girl have been met. Certainly, a
couple who already has two children could employ contraception in all of these situations
plus others as well. While ‫—לערב‬having as many children as possible—may be
considered in the classical tradition as the ideal way to fulfill the mitzvah and while
Rabbis Dorff and Abelson have offered a cogent argument encouraging Jews to have
three or more children, we understand that contraception can play a very helpful role in
allowing couples to maintain good marital relations, in ensuring the well-being of the
family, and in creating situations conducive to additional childbirth later on.67
4. Healthy Sexual Decision-making
Some voices in the contemporary discourse on contraception worry that increased

information regarding and access to contraception might encourage unhealthy sexual
decision-making, promiscuous behavior, and sex outside of marriage. Strikingly, this
concern is absent in most of the major halakhic discussions of contraception to date,
playing only a peripheral role in a few scattered responsa.68 Dr. Avraham Steinberg
summarizes the Jewish fear to the degree that it exists as ―the concern that a casual
attitude to contraceptive use may contribute to a lower level of sexual morality.‖ 69 When
shades of this theme emerge in teshuvot, generally it is mentioned in passing as a
potential concern but not as a reason by itself to forbid a particular form of contraception
in a given case absent other restrictive factors.
To properly assess the weight that this concern should hold in the discussion, one must
first evaluate the evidence confirming or denying its validity. Such an endeavor is
difficult. Because dozens of factors coincide when an individual makes a decision about
sexual behavior, isolating the role of any one factor is all but impossible. Scientific data
do not exist suggesting that access to effective birth-control together with accurate
information about its use increases an individual’s number of sexual partners. To the
contrary, solid evidence shows that restricting access to effective birth control and
information about it has no impact on the number of partners per individual or the
frequency of risky sexual behavior across a population. At the same time, such
restrictions have been shown to increase unwanted pregnancies and abortions.70 One
recent study followed a large cohort of adolescent girls and observed the impact that
access to emergency contraception—the form of contraception currently most feared as
enabling promiscuity—had on behavior. The study confirmed that those girls who had
67
See ‫ח‬:‫ אבן העזר א‬,‫ ערוך השולחן‬and Abelson and Dorff, supra note 49.
68
Admittedly, this may because most rabbis who have been asked to rule on the use of contraception in a
particular case are asked by married couples.
69
Avraham Steinberg, Encyclopedia of Jewish Medical Ethics, Vol. I, trans. Fred Rosner, Feldheim, New
York: 2003, pg. 249.
70
See, e,g., C. Trenholm, B. Devaney, K. Fortson et al., ―Impacts of Abstinence Education on Teen Sexual
Activity, Risk of Pregnancy and Risk of Sexually Transmitted Diseases,” Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management, Spring, 2008, 27(2):255–276.
easy access to emergency contraception engaged in risky sexual behavior in exactly the
same proportion and frequency as those who did not have easy access.71
Encouraging the use of good judgment in sexual decision-making is a value that we hold
dearly. We strongly encourage individuals to pursue sexual relationships within the
guidelines set by the Rabbinical Assembly’s Rabbinic Letter on Human Intimacy, which
affirms that sexual relations within marriage represent the highest ideal in Jewish
tradition.72 It reads, ―Only marriages can attain the holiness and communal sanction of
kiddushin because it is the marital context which holds out the most promise that people
can live by those views and values in their intimate relationships.‖ 73 Therefore, our
argument that permission to use contraception does not encourage unhealthy sexual
decision-making should not be misinterpreted by the reader as an endorsement of non-
marital sex.
We believe that the mechanism for limiting unhealthy sexual activity should be a
communal effort that includes encouraging good judgment in personal and sexual
decision-making: providing effective sexual education, modeling healthy relationships,
and helping parents, teachers, rabbis, youth group leaders, and other role models to
discuss these matters with their children at appropriate occasions. Attempting to reduce
promiscuity by creating a situation in which people who choose to have sex outside of
normative sexual relationships face disincentives or obstacles to obtaining appropriate
contraception is profoundly ineffective. Further, it is harmful to those who become
pregnant as a result and will only increase the number of abortions—a far more
significant halakhic concern than the use of contraception.
II. Permissibility of Contraception

Our discussion to this point has shown that the prohibitions of ‫ השחתת זרע‬and ‫ סרוס‬do not
forbid the use of contraception altogether. Instead, they favor some contraceptive means
over others—a point to be explored further below. The concern that contraception will
encourage unhealthy sexual decision-making or risky sexual behavior is not supported by
scientific evidence and cannot serve as the basis for a Jewish prohibition against
contraception. The most significant halakhic obstacle to the use of contraception is the
delay and possible evasion of the mitzvah to procreate. Therefore, within marriage,
contraception can only be permitted when necessary for the physical or emotional well-
71
Cynthia Harper, Monica Cheong, Corinne Rocca et al., ―The Effect of Increased Access to Emergency
Contraception Among Young Adolescents,‖ Obstetrics & Gynecology (Sep. 2005) 106(3):483–491. For a
popular treatment of this subject, see Margaret Talbot, ―Red Sex Blue Sex,‖ The New Yorker, (Nov. 3,
2008), available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/11/03/081103fa_fact_talbot.
72
Elliot Dorff, “This Is My Beloved, This Is My Friend”: A Rabbinic Letter on Human Intimacy (New
York: Rabbinical Assembly, 1996); reprinted in Elliot Dorff, Love Your Neighbor and Yourself: A Jewish
Approach to Modern Personal Ethics (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2003).
73
Id., pg. 31.
being of a family member or when it represents one temporary element of a larger life
plan to have children in a way that respects the other needs of the family members. Since
the well-being of both the parents and the child could be compromised following an
undesired pregnancy outside of marriage, this outcome should be avoided. While the
rabbinic preference remains to achieve this through abstinence, contraception is
permissible.
III. Preferred Means of Contraception
Once the decision to use contraception is made, careful consideration must be given to
the particular contraceptive means. Our discussions of ‫ השחתת זרע‬and ‫ סרוס‬have
suggested that some modern means of contraception may introduce various halakhic
challenges. Before our direct consideration of which particular forms of contraception
are preferable, we will turn to the classical rabbinic discussions of contraception for
guidance.
1. ‫—מוך‬An Absorbent
The Talmudic sages knew of several methods for preventing pregnancy. The mitzvah of
‫ עונה‬made abstinence within marriage halakhically unviable. The laws of niddah made
timing intercourse to periods of reduced fertility difficult. At one point, the Talmud
refers to a series of post-coital exercises designed to inhibit fertilization.74 The method
appears to have obtained rabbinic acceptance, but no evidence suggests that it was widely
practiced or particularly effective. It was not suggested in the other places where rabbis
discuss prevention of pregnancy.
The most common contraceptive method discussed in rabbinic literature is a ‫—מוך‬a tuft
of wool inserted into the vagina either prior to intercourse in order to block sperm from
entering the cervix or following intercourse in order to absorb recently deposited sperm.
One source reports that it was common for prostitutes to use a ‫מוך‬.75 On its face, the
passage offers neither approbation nor condemnation for the practice. It is simply
descriptive.
The most direct discussion of the permissibility of the ‫ מוך‬is found in a baraita,
- ‫ ומניקה; קטנה‬,‫ מעוברת‬,‫ קטנה‬:‫ שלש נשים משמשות במוך‬,‫תני רב ביבי קמיה דרב נחמן‬
‫ שמא תגמול בנה‬- ‫ מניקה‬,‫ שמא תעשה עוברה סנדל‬- ‫ מעוברת‬,‫שמא תתעבר ושמא תמות‬
‫ ומן השמים‬,‫ משמשת כדרכה והולכת‬- ‫ אחת זו ואחת זו‬:‫ דברי ר"מ; וחכ"א‬. . . ‫וימות‬
76
.'‫ משום שנאמר שומר פתאים ה‬,‫ירחמו‬
74
‫כתובות עב ע' א‬.
75
‫ב‬-‫נדה ג ע' א‬.
76
‫יבמות יב ע' ב‬.
Rav Bibi taught before Rav Nahman: Three women use an absorbent—a
child, a pregnant woman and a nursing mother. A child—lest she become
pregnant and die. A pregnant woman—lest her fetus become a sandal. A
nursing mother—lest she wean her child prematurely and he dies…these
are the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say, both [women in these three
categories] and [women not in these three categories] have intercourse in
the usual way; mercy will come from the heavens as it is said, ―God
protects the innocent.‖
There are two debates among commentators: one on the meaning of the Hebrew (may or
must) and the other on whether the ‫ מוך‬may be used before or after intercourse. The
Hebrew term ‫משמשות‬, translated here as ―use,‖ is ambiguous in its context. It could
correctly be understood either as ―may use‖ or ―must use.‖ Both readings were proposed
by early interpreters of the text. Rashi preferred ―may use.‖ Following this reading, both
Rabbi Meir and the sages agree that women outside of these three categories are
prohibited from using a ‫ מוך‬during intercourse. Rabbi Meir, fearing the tragic outcomes
specified, permits an exception to the general prohibition for women in the three
categories listed. The sages believe that the prohibition against using a ‫ מוך‬during sex is
so strong that no exception can be made even for women in these three categories.
Underlying this reading is an assumption that the ‫—מוך‬at least when inserted prior to
intercourse—renders the seminal emission ‫ השחתת זרע‬as the semen is inhibited by a
foreign object.
Rabbeinu Tam, alternatively, preferred ―must use.‖ Following his reading, the debate is
entirely different. Both Rabbi Meir and the sages agree that all women may use a ‫מוך‬.
The sages view women in these three categories as no different from other women;
consequently, they too may or may not use a ‫ מוך‬as they wish. Rabbi Meir, on the other
hand, views these women as especially vulnerable; consequently, he mandates that they
must use a ‫ מוך‬to prevent harm. He concurs with the sage that women not in such danger
may use a ‫ מוך‬at their own discretion. According to Rabbeinu Tam, the debate here is not
about how far a prohibition against the ‫ מוך‬extends. In fact, there is no prohibition
against the ‫ מוך‬at all. Rabbi Meir and sages disagree instead about whether Jewish law
should mandate the ‫ מוך‬when there is a possible health risk to pregnancy.
Interestingly, Rabbeinu Tam agrees with Rashi, his grandfather, that a ‫ מוך‬inserted prior
to intercourse would cause the emission to be a violation of ‫השחתת זרע‬. He describes it as
‫—כמטיל זרע על העצים ועל האבנים‬as if one spilled his seed on wood and stones. Therefore,
Rabbeinu Tam believes that the ‫ מוך‬described here must be a post-coital absorbent that
allows the emission to take place without any interference. Intercourse proceeds as
normal, without the interference of a foreign object, and the semen is later rendered non-
procreative. He makes the comparison to intercourse with a barren woman which is
definitely non-procreative and yet undeniably permissible.
Readers of the text following Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam have had to determine which
interpretation they find most plausible. Strong arguments have been made either way and
need not be rehearsed at length here. We favor the reading of Rabbeinu Tam for the
reasons given by many Rishonim: Rashi’s reading has the Sages actively forbidding a
woman from taking precautions to prevent endangering herself or her child; this seems
highly implausible.77 It is much more consistent with related rabbinic teachings to adopt
a reading in which the Sages would permit such precautions even if they are unwilling to
mandate them.78
As to the second debate, the halakhically-oriented commentary of Rabbi Morechai ben

Hillel cites Rashi’s son-in-law, Rabbi Yehudah bar Natan—Rivan—in favoring the
reading of Rabbeinu Tam. 79 He permits the use of a ‫ מוך‬after intercourse but is silent on
the use of a ‫ מוך‬inserted prior to intercourse. In the responsum cited above, Asheiri
permits even a pre-coital ‫ מוך‬describing intercourse with a ‫ מוך‬in place as ―intercourse in
the normal manner‖-‫משמשת כדרך כל הארץ היא‬. 80 Rabbi Solomon Luria reaffirms Asheiri’s
permission for all women to use a pre-coital ‫מוך‬, rejecting the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam
that intercourse with a ‫ מוך‬already in place would constitute ‫השחתת זרע‬.81 He interprets
the baraita in light of other rabbinic texts where a ‫ מוך‬is clearly used prior to intercourse
and does not meet with rabbinic disapproval in the Talmud.82. Luria asserts that
Rabbeinu Tam has no basis to argue that the ‫ מוך‬here would be any different. His ruling
is affirmed in several later responsa. Rabbi Isaiah Karelitz, author of Hazon Ish, labels
Luria’s insight on this point ‫—רוח הקודש‬divinely inspired.83 Consequently, this
interpretive tradition holds that intercourse with a ‫ מוך‬does not violate ‫השחתת זרע‬.
However, this reading of the baraita is not universally accepted. Rabbi Meir Posner does
not voice a preference for either the reading of Rashi or Rabbeinu Tam, but he asserts
that it is best to rule strictly and to forbid the use of a ‫ מוך‬even after intercourse.84
Similarly restrictive rulings were reached by Rabbi Akiva Eger, his son-in-law, Rabbi
Moses Sofer, and Rabbi Jacob Ettlinger, who goes so far as to forbid the use of a ‫ מוך‬even
in situations where there is a risk of physical harm.85 Despite this restrictive tradition, we
find the approaches of Asheiri and Luria to follow from more plausible readings of the
baraita and ultimately we concur with their more permissive halakhic rulings.
77
See, e.g., ‫ חידושי ריתב"א יבמות יב ע' א‬and ‫שיטה מקובצת כתובות לט ע' א‬.
78
The counterargument claims that if the risk were significant at all, the sages would certainly have
permitted use of the ‫ מוך‬but since the danger to the women in these categories is so extremely remote, the
sages did not feel compelled to grant an exception to the prohibition. See ‫ שו"ת חמדת שלמה ס' מו‬and ‫שו"ת אור‬
‫גדול ח' א ס' לא‬.
79
‫מרדכי יבמות פ' א‬.
80
‫שו"ת הרא"ש כלל לג ס' ג‬. A comment made by Asheiri in ‫ תוספי הרא"ש נדה ג ע' ב‬suggests that he has reached
a conclusion contrary to that cited here. This comment is discredited, however, by most contemporary
decisors. See, for example, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein who writes of the seemingly inconsistent comment,
‫―—שאינו מלשון הרא"ש וגם הם דברי טעות שתלמיד טועה כתב זה‬this is not the writing of the Rosh, but the words of
a mistaken student who erred by writing this.‖ ‫סג‬:‫אגרות משה ח' א א"ה א‬.
81
‫ח‬:‫ים של שלמה יבמות א‬.
82
Later commentators vary in how limited a use they assume was accepted for the ‫מוך‬. See Feldman, supra
note 5, pp. 172–173.
83
‫ב‬:‫חזון איש א"ה לח‬.
84
‫בית מאיר א"ה כג‬
85
‫ בנין ציון קלז‬,‫ שו"ת רקע"א עא‬,‫בית מאיר א"ה כג‬. Twentieth-century rulings which follow in this tradition
include ‫ דברי יששכר קלח‬,‫ ישמח לב י"ד ד‬,‫חמדת שלמה מו‬.
The authority that Luria commanded might have been sufficient to dictate a more lenient
trend in subsequent legislation. Instead, his writings were insufficiently available, and
other commanding authorities were unaware of their existence. Without his permissive
lead to guide them, luminaries such as Rabbi Akiva Eiger and the Hatam Sofer, and
others, analyzed the matter on their own and came to cautious conclusions because ―I
have seen no precedent authority that permits.‖ Their own influence and prestige being
so substantial in Hungary, in the rest of Europe, and in the Jewish world generally, a non-
permissive school arose that inspired such statements as ―How can I permit, seeing that
Eger and Sofer have forbidden?‖ With the discovery of Luria’s bold analysis, based as it
was on both precedent and logic, such statements began to give way to others, as ―Had
Eger and Sofer seen what Luria wrote, they never would have forbidden.‖86
Having traced considerations of the ‫ מוך‬through rabbinic and halakhic texts, we must now
wonder what the implications of this discussion are for contemporary contraceptive
methods. Consistent with our conclusions above, the discussion of the ‫ מוך‬teaches that
intercourse with no possibility of procreation does not necessarily violate the prohibition
of ‫השחתת זרע‬. Nevertheless, it does suggest that intercourse in the context of some
particular forms of contraception may constitute ‫השחתת זרע‬. Though Asheiri and Luria
rule more permissively and do not view the use of a ‫ מוך‬inserted prior to intercourse to be
‫ השחתת זרע‬at all, we have observed that many authorities read the baraita as teaching that
a foreign object that physically prevents sperm from entry past the cervix is comparable
to ‫—כמטיל זרע על העצים ועל האבנים‬as if one spilled his seed on wood and stones. Such a
reading would then strongly favor contraceptive methods that permit natural unobstructed
intercourse and inhibit the reproductive capacity of the sperm through other means—e.g.,
hormonal contraception. Though we accept Asheiri’s and Luria’s rulings, the plausibility
of the reading offered by Eger and his followers together with the weight such a reading
has been given in subsequent halakhic discussions should incline us towards preferring
forms of contraception other than barrier protection when all issues of safety and efficacy
are equal, despite our confidence that barrier protection is not, by law, prohibited.
Regardless of Posner’s claim to the contrary, we see no coherent way to read the baraita
that would prohibit the use of a ‫ מוך‬following intercourse—the modern analogue being a
post-coital douche.
2. ‫ – כוס של עקרין‬The ―Cup of Roots‖
Despite the profound implications that the above baraita holds for contemporary
discussions of contraception, it is virtually ignored in most classical halakhic compendia.
Discussions of contraception in the codes focus exclusively on another contraceptive
means discussed in rabbinic literature, ‫—כוס של עקרין‬the ―cup of roots‖—a sterilizing
potion also sometimes called ‫—כסא דעקרתא‬the ―cup of infertility.‖ The Tosefta states
clearly,
86
Feldman, supra note 4, pg. 300.
87
.‫האיש אין רשאי לשתות עיקרין שלא יוליד והאשה רשאה לשתות עיקרין שלא תלד‬
A man is forbidden to drink the cup of roots in order to sterilize himself

but a woman may drink the cup of roots in order to sterilize herself.
The basis of the prohibition against men employing this contraceptive method is the
rabbinic concern to avoid ‫סרוס‬, discussed above. Because the biblical prohibition against
‫ סרוס‬falls only on men, the rabbinic prohibition of an act short of ‫— סרוס‬the ingestion of
sterilizing chemicals—should only fall on men as well.88
The Talmud recounts the story of Rabbi Hiyya’s wife, who had difficulty in previous
childbirth, disguising herself to ask for a halakhic ruling from her husband. When he
ruled that the mitzvah of ‫ פרו ורבו‬did not apply to women, she drank ‫ כוס של עקרין‬in order
to permanently sterilize herself. When Rabbi Hiyya realized her deception, he expressed
disappointment that he would not have an additional children, but he did not suggest that
her actions had violated any prohibition.89 We saw above that the Tosefta’s ruling
permitting ‫ כוס של עקרין‬to women is codified without qualification.90
What is striking about the rabbinic ‫ כוס של עקרין‬and its prominence in later halakhic
sources is that it invites no discussion at all about a possible violation of ‫השחתת זרע‬.
Through this unanimous opinion of the poskim we see an additional confirmation of our
conclusion that intercourse with a woman even when there is no possibility of
reproduction does not represent an act of ‫השחתת זרע‬. This is true even when the
sterilizing agent is permanent; certainly then there would be no concern of ‫השחתת זרע‬
with the introduction of a chemical that renders a woman temporarily infertile, such as
the hormonal contraceptive methods to be discussed below. The only concern with a ‫כוס‬
‫ של עקרין‬is one of ‫סרוס‬. Currently, no male hormonal contraception is approved for use in
the United States. The agents in development have serious drawbacks and are far from
market. Should a male hormonal contraceptive become available that, like hormonal
contraception for women, can be stopped easily with a quick resumption of fertility, we
would likely permit its use as the prohibition discussed here is specific to permanent
chemical sterilization—the only form known to the Sages and later codifiers.
87
‫ב‬:‫תוספתא יבמות ח‬.
88
This argument interprets the version of the statement commonly printed today. But see the textual
variant: ‫האיש אין רשאי לשתות עיקרין שלא יוליד והאשה לא רשאה לשתות עיקרין שלא תלד‬. ―A man is forbidden to
drink the cup of roots in order to sterilize himself and a woman may not drink the cup of roots in order to
sterilize herself.‖ This variant reading then challenges validity of halakhic conclusions drawn from the
story of Rabbi Hiyya and his wife infra. The version cited above is the version accepted by later
authorities. See infra note 90.
89
‫יבמות סה ע' ב‬.
90
‫יב‬:‫ ;שולחן ערוך אבן העזר ה‬see also ‫יב‬:‫ סמ"ג ל"ת קכ ויד איסורי ביאה טז‬,‫טור שם‬.
Contemporary Contraception
Having analyzed the relevant halakhic principles underlying the rabbinic considerations
of the ‫ מוך‬and the ‫כוס של עקרין‬, we are now ready to apply those principles directly to the
forms of contraception available today. Some forms of contraception are halakhically
prohibited in all cases unless there is a medical necessity beyond the prevention of
pregnancy. Abstinence within marriage is prohibited because it violates the mitzvah of
‫עונה‬. Surgeries such as a vasectomy, tubal ligation or tubal obstruction are prohibited
because, unless done for reasons of health, they constitute an act of ‫סרוס‬.91 Fertility
awareness strategies, commonly referred to as ―the Rhythm Method,‖ are not by
definition prohibited, but because the implementation of such methods makes
simultaneous observance of ‫ עונה‬and ‫ טהרת משפחה‬so difficult, they are unlikely to serve as
a viable option for most religious Jewish couples.92
The choice of which method to employ should be made in conversation with a physician
who can help the individual evaluate specific health risks that may influence the decision
and determine which methods may prove most effective given an individual’s lifestyle,
personality, age, goals and family situation. We take seriously the principle underlying
the rabbinic dictum ‫—חמירא סכנתא מאיסורא‬avoiding harm is a more serious concern than
violating a prohibition. The primary factors in deciding among these options must be
safety and efficacy.93
The following methods of contraception will be discussed in order of their preferability

within Jewish tradition from most preferable to least preferable; however, this ranking
holds only in a situation when all the methods are presumed to be equally safe and
effective for a given individual. If a woman elects to employ a method of contraception
farther down the list for reasons of safety or efficacy specific to her circumstances, she
may rest assured that such a choice represents a halakhically valid decision, fully justified
within normative Jewish practice. The following list should not be misunderstood as a
moral ranking of contraceptive methods but rather it serves as a set of guidelines to help a
woman or a couple to use traditional Jewish values when selecting among options that are
determined to be equally safe and effective for her.
Hormonal Contraception
91
Rabbi Yitzhak Ya’akov Weiss rules that a vasectomy, even when the spermatic cords are tied and not
cut, violates both the prohibition of ‫ סרוס‬and ‫פצוע דכא‬, ‫יג‬-‫יב‬:‫מנחת יצחק ה‬.
92
The scientific community puts the failure rate of the rhythm method at 25% compared to the
―withdrawal‖ method’s failure of 17%. ―Estimates of contraceptive failure from the 2002 National Survey
of Family Growth.‖ Contraception, Jan. 2008; 77(1):10–21.
93
As rabbis, it would neither be prudent nor proper for us to give medical advice. The determination of
what means of contraception will offer the best risk/benefit profile for a given individual should be made in
consultation with a qualified healthcare professional in consideration of the best available medical
evidence.
Hormones designed to inhibit ovulation may be ingested orally, injected into the muscles,
or slowly released into the blood stream via implanted rods, a transdermal patch or a
removable vaginal insert. Regardless of the method of administration, hormonal
contraception is most analogous to the ‫— כוס של עקרין‬the significant difference is that the
‫ כוס של עקרין‬caused permanent sterilization while hormonal contraception can be stopped
at any time with a speedy resumption of fertility afterward.94 Because the ‫כוס של עקרין‬
presented no concern of ‫ השחתת זרע‬as it allows intercourse to proceed unimpeded by a
foreign object, hormonal contraception represents the most preferable halakhic method of
birth control at present when it is at least as equally safe and effective for a particular
woman as other means of birth control would be given her unique health and behavioral
profile.
The different methods of administration allow for varying doses of slightly different
hormones. The most important factors in deciding on a method of administration should
be limiting the health risks that each option might pose for a specific individual and the
ability of a woman to comply with the delivery protocols—that is, a woman likely to
forget to take a pill daily might find a weekly patch to be more effective, etc. However,
in the event that all methods of administration present an equal safety profile and efficacy
rate for a particular woman, Jewish tradition would incline towards preferring a pill, a
patch or an insert. Each of these methods can be stopped easily, and baseline fertility can
be resumed with minimal delay. Intramuscular injections (in the US, depot
medroxyprogesterone acetate, sold under the brand name Depo-Provera) require a
slightly longer delay before fertility returns. Implants (currently sold under the brand
names Implanon and Jadelle) can always be removed with a quick resumption of fertility
afterwards, but because a physician is necessary for their removal, delays are likely.
However, since the possible delays in returning to full reproductive ability are not
extensive following the decision to discontinue implants or injections, the halakhic
preference against them is slight and could easily be outweighed by other factors for a
particular individual.95
94
The reader might wonder if hormonal contraception delivered via a vaginal insert (currently sold in the
United States under the brand name NuvaRing) should be considered more analogous to the ‫ מוך‬since a
foreign object remains in the vagina during intercourse. This analogy however is false as the ring neither
blocks entry of sperm past the cervix nor does it absorb semen. Intercourse with a similarly constructed
insert without the hormones would result in pregnancy rates equivalent to intercourse with no contraception
at all.
95
Hormonal contraception can also be used to regulate, delay or altogether eliminate menstrual cycles. The
most common protocols include 21 days of active agent followed by 7 days without, allowing for monthly
cycles; 84 days of active agent followed by 7 days without, allowing for one cycle every three months; or
active agent without interruption, allowing for the indefinite suppression of menstruation. Couples will
likely wish to consider how the various cycle options would affect the dynamics and rhythms of their
sexual relationship, from the perspective of the framework of ‫ טהרת המשפחה‬and other physical
psychological, emotional and esthetic considerations. For discussions of the terminology, background,
meaning, and evolving practices of ‫ טהרת המשפחה‬see recent responsa of the CJLS, "Mikveh and the Sanctity
of Family Relations, An Introduction‖ by Rabbi Miriam Berkowitz, "Mikveh and the Sanctity of Being
Created Human" by Rabbi Susan Grossman, "Observing Niddah in Our Day" by Rabbi Avram Reisner, and
"Reshaping the Laws of Family Purity for the Modern World" by Rabbi Miriam Berkowitz, available at
http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/law/new_teshuvot.html.
Intrauterine Devices (IUDs)
An intrauterine device (IUD) is small T-shaped object inserted into the uterus by a
healthcare professional. The exact mechanism by which IUD s prevent pregnancy is not
well-understood. It is widely believed that the exposure of the uterus to a foreign body
initiates an inflammatory reaction that is toxic to sperm. Should fertilization nevertheless
occur, the mucus developed in response to the inflammation inhibits implantation.
Despite the concerns of some prior halakhic authorities who feared that the device might
actively destroy implanted embryos, current scientific evidence strongly supports than an
IUD does not function as an abortifacient,96
At present, un-medicated or inert IUD s are not approved for use in the United States
though they are common worldwide. The only IUD s available for use by women in the
United States release copper ions (sold under brand name Paragard) or progestin (sold
under the brand name Minera). Though the specific mechanisms of action vary
depending on the specific device implanted, all can be considered equivalent from a
halakhic standpoint since no solid evidence suggests that any IUD interferes with live
pregnancy after implantation.
Though an IUD is a foreign object, it cannot properly be considered analogous to the ‫מוך‬
since it does not prevent entry of the sperm past the cervix. Sperm transverse the cervix
in exactly the same manner as they would without the implantation of the device.
Consequently, no violation of ‫ השחתת זרע‬exists even according to the opinion of those
who hold more strictly than we do and view intercourse with a ‫ מוך‬in place as a possible
violation of the prohibition. Rabbi Immanuel Jakobowitz expressed hesitance about
permitting an IUD, not because it violates ‫ השחתת זרע‬but because he feared that it might
effect an abortion.97 As noted above, the scientific evidence today does not support this
concern, and it is not echoed in the later opinions of such contemporary Orthodox
decisors such as Rabbis Eliashiv, Auerbach and Neuwirth.98 Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg
initially ruled that a diaphragm should be preferred over an IUD since the diaphragm
does not actively lead to the destruction of sperm.99 However, he later reversed his
earlier ruling, favoring the use of an IUD over both a diaphragm and even oral
contraception because of its safety and efficacy.100
96
Roberto Rivera, Irene Yacobson and David Grimes, ―The mechanism of action of hormonal
contraceptives and intrauterine contraceptive devices.‖ American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology,
Nov. 1999; 181:1263–1269 and Joseph Stanford and Raphael Mikolajczyk, ―Mechanisms of action of
intrauterine devices: Update and estimation of postfertilization effects.‖ American Journal of Obstetrics
and Gynecology 2002; 187:1699–1708.
F. Alvarez, V. Brache, E. Fernandezet al., ―New insights on the mode of action of intrauterine
contraceptive devices in women.‖ Fertility and Sterility, 1988; 49:768–773.
97
‫רעב‬:‫" נועם תשכ"ג ו‬,‫ "שאלות והערות בעינינים רפואיים שונים‬,‫ישראל יאקאבאוויטש‬.
98
)‫ ז‬,‫יב(ג‬:‫נשמת אברהם אבן העזר ה‬.
99
‫ציץ אליעזר ח' ט ס' נא‬.
100
)‫ציץ אליעזר ח' י ס' כה(י‬.
Rabbi Moshe Feinstein prohibited the use of an IUD altogether.101 While he did note the
above concerns, the primary basis for his ruling was the irregular bleeding caused by
early IUDs and the difficulty that such bleeding would impose on women observing the
laws of tohorat mishpahah. Such bleeding is much less common with contemporary
IUDs than was the case when Feinstein offered his ruling. Nevertheless, it still occurs,
especially within the first several months of use; since it is uterine bleeding, it still
requires separation and immersion, unless one follows the recommendation of Rabbi
Susan Grossman to disregard the status of zavah (irregular bleeding) altogether.102
Diaphragms & Cervical Caps
A diaphragm is an individually fitted rubber device inserted prior to intercourse which

blocks the cervix. The term ―cervical cap‖ could refer to a number of similar barrier
devices including the Prentif cap, FemCap and Lea’s Contraceptive. Cervical caps do not
require individual fitting by a trained clinician, but because their mechanism of action is
so similar to that of the diaphragm, they can be considered as equivalent for halakhic
analysis. At first, the diaphragm appears to represent a much closer analogue to the ‫מוך‬
than an IUD because its primary means of function is to prevent entry of sperm past the
cervix. However, most early authorities considering the diaphragm and its predecessors
reject this analogy and find the diaphragm to be much less halakhically problematic than
the ‫מוך‬. Many decisors who view the ‫ מוך‬as generally forbidden to women nevertheless
permit the diaphragm on the grounds that it does not absorb the sperm and destroy it;
rather, a diaphragm simply prevents live sperm from entering the uterus. Rabbi Shalom
Schwardon likened use of the diaphragm to intercourse with a pregnant woman which, of
course, is permissible—in both cases, ‫סגור פי המקור‬--the entryway to the uterus is
closed.103 Rabbi David Hoffman leaves no room for doubt in his ruling,
‫שיסתום הרופא או חכמה את פי הרחם בסתימה ראויה ובזה אין אני רואה שום צד ונדנוד‬
104
.‫איסור הואיל ואין משחיתין את הזרע אלא שמונעין את הזרע מליכנס לרחם‬
That a physician or midwife seals the entrance to the womb with an

appropriate covering, in this I see no basis for or suggestion of a
prohibition since it does not destroy the seed but rather it prevents the seed
from entering the womb.
Rabbis Feinstein and Isaac Weisz are the two twentieth century decisors who expressed
the greatest reservations about the use of a diaphragm.105 Both reject Schwardon’s
assessment and view a diaphragm as closely analogous to the ‫מוך‬. Since both of these
101
‫אגרות משה א"ה ח' ג ס' כא וח' ד ס' סט‬.
102
Susan Grossman, "Mikveh and the Sanctity of Being Created Human," CJLS Responsa, YD 183.2006b;
see also Nishmat Avraham YD 187:4 (discussing whether extensive uterine bleeding with a non-hormonal
etiology, such as polyps in the uterine, requires immersion).
103
‫שו"ת מהרש"ם ח' א ס' נח‬.
104
‫מלמד להועיל ח' ג ס' יח‬.
105
‫אגרות משה ח' א ס' סג‬. ‫מנחת יצחק ח' א ס' קטו‬.
authorities, in contrast to us, view the ‫ מוך‬as forbidden to women not at an elevated health
risk, they permit the use of a diaphragm only in limited instances of medical necessity.
Though we are neither convinced that a diaphragm should be viewed as an analogue to a
‫ מוך‬nor that the use of the ‫ מוך‬is to be permitted only in as narrow a range of
circumstances as they prescribe, we take Feinstein’s and Weisz’s opinions into account
when we rule that there is a slight halakhic preference for the IUD over the diaphragm
assuming all issues of safety and efficacy are equal for a particular woman. Since even
the concerns of Feinstein and Weisz can be addressed adequately through the use of
hormonal contraception or an IUD, such means of contraception should be preferred
when possible.
Of note, current medical guidelines do not recommend use of a diaphragm or cervical cap
without the simultaneous use of a spermicide.106 Our understanding of ‫השחתת זרע‬,
outlined above, limits the prohibition to the improper emission of seed and not the
destruction of seed following emission; so, we do not consider the use of a spermicide to
violate ‫השחתת זרע‬. Nevertheless, another reason that we find a halakhic preference for
hormonal contraception and IUDs is that neither of those two methods involves the active
destruction of sperm which, even if not a technical violation of the prohibition, remains
sub-optimal.
Sponges
The contraceptive sponge is a small circular disk moistened with tap water prior to
insertion permitting a proper fit. The only sponge sold in the US at present, the Today
sponge, contains spermicide as a secondary means of contraception. An untreated sponge
would have exactly the same halakhic status as a ‫מוך‬. That is, according to our analysis
of the sources above, it would be permitted to all women. The addition of the spermicide
invites the concerns noted in our discussion of the diaphragm and causes the
contemporary sponge to be less halakhically preferable even though it is permissible.107
Condoms
The term condom describes a membrane made of latex or a similar substance used to
create a barrier between the penis and vagina during intercourse. The term ―female
condom‖ refers to a plastic cup inserted into the vagina and anchored by an external ring.
Though used differently, both will be considered as equivalent for halakhic purposes
since both serve as a complete barrier preventing semen from entering the vagina. A
condom does not simply prevent sperm from passing the cervix, but it keeps sperm
outside of the vagina altogether. For this reason, most decisors worry that the use of a
106
L. Cook, K. Nanda, and D. Grimes, ―The Diaphragm with and without Spermicide for Contraception: A
Cochrane Review,‖ Human Reproduction, Apr. 2002, 17:4, 867–869.
107
Another drawback of diaphragm or contraceptive sponge is that they must be inserted prior to
intercourse, thus adding a certain amount of inconvenience and reducing spontaneity. Since this affects
onah, the marital pleasure aspect of the relationship, a couple may weigh them as relevant factors.
condom may violate the prohibition of ‫השחתת זרע‬. The emission of semen directly onto
the membrane, following this view, constitutes a contemporary version of Rabbeinu
Tam’s articulation ‫—כמטיל זרע על העצים ועל האבנים‬as if one spilled his seed on wood and
stones.
Definitive rulings regarding the use of a condom vary significantly, but unqualified
permission to use a condom cannot be found in the responsa literature. Rabbis Moshe
Feinstein and Dov Weidenfeld prohibit the use of a condom even to prevent a physical
danger to the woman.108 A broader group of decisors permit it only in limited
circumstances to prevent danger, i.e., if the woman would be at a health risk were she to
become pregnant, or when no other contraceptive means would be safe and effective.109
Many others who permit the use of a condom, do so only when the minimum requirement
of ‫( פרו ורבו‬a boy and a girl) has already been fulfilled and a transgression of ‫השחתת זרע‬
would be at most rabbinic.110
Even though we accept that intercourse with a ‫ מוך‬does not violate ‫השחתת זרע‬, we do not
consider a condom as analogous to a ‫ מוך‬because, with a condom, the emission is
interrupted. However, our analysis above that the prohibition of ‫ השחתת זרע‬seems to be
rabbinic in nature allows us to permit the use of a condom when it is the best means
available for one to fulfill a biblical obligation such as the mitzvah of ‫עונה‬. Even in such
cases however, the above contraceptive methods should be preferred whenever possible.
One advantage to the condom is that it has almost no side effects—a benefit not shared to
the same degree by other effective contraceptive methods.111 It is also cheap and easily
available. However, it can fail even when used properly. 112 The condom may be used by
anyone for whom no other contraceptive means are safe and available.
Also of note, the above discussion has focused exclusively on preventing pregnancy. The
condom has a second important function: to reduce the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases—a benefit that no other contraceptive method provides to the same degree.
While a full discussion about healthy sexual decision-making is far beyond the scope of
this responsum, it is clear that anyone engaging in sexual activity carries a responsibility
to themselves and their partner to take all appropriate precautions necessary for avoiding
sexually transmitted diseases. When a condom represents the best way to meet this
obligation, there is no doubt that the possible violation of a rabbinic prohibition— ‫השחתת‬
‫— זרע‬is far outweighed by the much more serious consequences of contracting or
transmitting a life-altering disease. The prohibition, while serious, is not so immutable
that a person’s health should be jeopardized in order to observe the strictest interpretation
of it. However, for monogamous relationships in which both partners are tested and
found to be disease-free prior to having sex, this benefit of the condom is less relevant.
108
‫ אגרות משה א"ה ח' ג ס' כא וח' ד ס' סז‬and ‫דובב משרים ח' א ס' כ‬.
109
See, e.g., )‫ג‬-‫ ציץ אליעזר ח' ט ס' נא(ב‬,‫ חלקת יעקב ח' ב ס' יג‬,‫סד‬:‫ הר צבי י"ד א‬,‫טז‬:‫היכל יצחק א"ה ב‬.
110
)‫ שו"ת אחיעזר ח' ג ס' כד(ה‬and ‫צא‬:‫בית יצחק א"ה א‬.
111
For some, the use of a condom will inhibit ‫עונה‬. This certainly represents a halakhic concern of
significant magnitude to factor into a couple’s decision-making.
112
M.J. Rosenberg and M.S. Waugh, ―Latex Condom Breakage and Slippage in a Controlled Clinical
Trial.‖ Contraception. Jul. 1997; 56(1):17–21.
Postcoital (Emergency) Contraception
The term postcoital contraception—commonly called ―emergency contraception‖—refers

to any drug or device employed after intercourse to prevent pregnancy. One effective
method is to insert an IUD within 72 hours of intercourse. However, because of the
expense and necessary involvement of a trained clinician to place the device, it is rarely
used for this purpose. Far more common today is the administration of hormonal agents
that prevent pregnancy in a variety of different ways. Though several hormonal agents
may be used, clinical guidelines currently recommend a high dose of levonorgestrel (sold
in the US under the brand name, Plan B) taken as quickly as possible following
intercourse or two smaller doses taken twelve hours apart by women for whom the higher
dose is contraindicated.113
Levonorgestrel and other postcoital contraceptive agents function almost identically to

hormonal contraception administered prior to intercourse inhibiting fertilisation of any
eggs released by any sperm that is still active and by causing changes to the endometrium
to prevent implantation of the fertilised egg. Were both contraceptive means equally safe
and effective, we would see no significant basis for a halakhic distinction between them,
and we would permit postcoital hormonal contraceptive in all cases when precoital
hormonal contraception is permitted. Ironically, the former is closer to what the stricter
interpreters of the braita of the three women would permit, though the latter is intuitively
more palatable to many today because it avoids the unfounded concerns about the
proximity to abortion. However, the efficacy of levonorgestrel as emergency
contraception is difficult to assess and is widely presumed to be less effective than
precoital hormonal contraception.114 Further, though no confirming data is available at
present, some physicians have expressed concerns about possible health risks were a
woman to use it repeatedly over time.115 Consequently, postcoital hormonal contraception
should never be a couple’s preferred method for preventing pregnancy, but when another
contraceptive has failed, was used improperly or not used at all, emergency hormonal
contraception constitutes an acceptable halakhic measure.
It is important to clarify the mechanism of post-coital hormonal treatment. The exact

mechanism of action varies from person to person depending on a range of factors,
including when in the cycle the hormone is administered. Levonorgestrel may delay
ovulation, interfere with fertilization, interrupt tubal transport, prevent implantation by
altering endometrial receptivity, or cause regression of the corpus luteum—a remnant of
the follicle following ovulation necessary to maintain pregnancy. Regardless of how the
agent works for a particular individual, the pregnancy preventing action always takes
113
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. ―Clinical Management Guidelines for
Obstetrician-Gynecologists,‖ ACOG Practice Bulletin. 69, Dec 2005.
114
Liang Cheng, A. Metin Gulmezoglu, Gilda Piaggioet al., ―Interventions for Emergency Contraception.‖
Cochrane Database Systems Review, April 16, 2008, CD001324.
115
United Nations Development Programme; United Nations Population Fund; World Health Organization;
World Bank Special Programme of Research, Development and Research Training in Human
Reproduction, Task Force on Post-Ovulatory Methods of Fertility Regulation. ―Efficacy and Side Effects of
Immediate Postcoital Levonorgestrel Used Repeatedly for Contraception,‖ Contraception 2000;61:303–
308.
place prior to implantation. Peer-reviewed data shows that emergency contraception is
completely ineffective once a conceptus has implanted and pregnancy has begun; it
functions through a variety of means to prevent the implantation of a fertilized embryo.116
Therefore, although emergency contraception can interfere with the implantation of a
zygote, it should not be confused with the ―abortion pill‖ or any other abortifacient which
terminates a pregnancy after it has begun.
Abortions are sometimes induced medically, but not with levonorgestrel. The only FDA-
approved protocol for a medical abortion at present calls for an oral dose of
mifespristone—a synthetic steroid sold in the US under the brand name Mifeprex and
commonly referred to as RU-486—followed two days later by a dose of prostaglandin to
induce contractions. The FDA has approved the use of mifespristone as an abortifacient
until the 49th day from the start of the woman’s last period. Mifespristone terminates a
pregnancy after the embryo has implanted by blocking progesterone, a hormone
necessary to maintain pregnancy. Confusion between medically induced abortions and
emergency contraception is common.117 Since full-dose mifespristone is intended to
terminate a developing pregnancy, it should be viewed as an abortifacent.118
Our broad permission for emergency contraception rests on a premise that pregnancy
begins with the implantation of the fertilized egg in the wall of the uterus—usually about
five days after fertilization, which itself may occur up to 72 hours after intercourse. Acts
preventing implantation are thus viewed as contraceptive, and acts terminating pregnancy
after implantation are viewed as abortive. Since setting the start of pregnancy at
implantation may not be intuitive, we must support our claims above by explaining why
we view implantation as the proper starting point for pregnancy from a halakhic
perspective.
Lending credence to the counterclaim that pregnancy might begin prior to implantation,
the rabbinic counting of the length of a pregnancy begins from the time of intercourse,
not implantation.119 However, it is important to note that prior to Leeuwenhoek’s
invention of the microscope, very little was known about the specific mechanism of
pregnancy. Most historians believe that the female ovum was not even identified until
116
Anna Glasier, ―Emergency Postcoital Contraception,‖ New England Journal of Medicine, 1997
337:1058–1064.
117
Complicating matters further is the fact that some physicians administer a small dose of mifespristone
shortly after intercourse to function as emergency contraception instead of levonorgestrel. This limited use
of low-dose mifespristone within the first five days of intercourse should be halakhically equivalent to the
use of levonorgestrel as emergency contraception and permissible. However, the more common use of full-
dose mifespristone to induce an abortion following implantation should be distinguished from the use of
mifespristone as an emergency contraceptive.
118
No CJLS teshuvah has yet addressed this question directly. There are times when abortion is permitted
in Jewish law, particularly during the first 40 days which is when full-dose mifespristone is administered.
The following CJLS responsa discuss abortion generally: David M. Feldman, "Abortion: The Jewish View"
HM 425:2.1983a; Robert Gordis, "Abortion: Major Wrong or Basic Right? " HM 425:2.1983b; Ben Zion
Bokser, Kassel Abelson, "Statement on the Permissibility of Abortion " HM 425:2.1983c; Kassel Abelson,
"Prenatal Testing and Abortion " HM 425:2.1983d; Isaac Klein, "A Teshuvah on Abortion " HM
425:2.1983e.
119
‫ב‬-‫נדה לח ע' א‬.
1828.120 Consequently, the wisdom of our Sages was limited by the incomplete scientific
understanding of their day. Further, as implantation can only be detected with the
assistance of modern testing equipment, the rabbinic direction to count from the time of
intercourse may have been nothing more than a very practical suggestion for a time when
no other starting point could have been contemplated. New scientific or medical
information need not always trump halakhic precedent, but it must be addressed directly
by halakhic authorities lest the tradition sever itself from the world which it governs.121
David Feldman offers several compelling examples of how rabbis have adjusted the
halakhic discourse surrounding pregnancy as new technologies allowed for a more
accurate understanding of the process.122 For us not to follow in this path would
represent an abdication of our responsibility to employ all of our faculties for the sake of
making proper halakhic judgments.
Today, implantation is accepted with broad consensus throughout the medical community
as the starting point of pregnancy. The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists declares, ―Conception is the implantation of the blastocyst . . . A
pregnancy is considered to be established only after implantation is complete.‖123
Definitions used by the National Institute of Health and the Food and Drug
Administration are similar. It is with implantation that a woman’s hormonal system
begins to respond to the embryo, initiating the cascade of physiological changes
associated with pregnancy. Even the most sensitive pregnancy test will display a
negative result prior to implantation. Further, it is estimated that between one-third to
one-half of all fertilized embryos fail to implant.124 From the woman’s perspective, this
is indistinguishable from menstruation. Certainly, such a woman is not generally
considered as having lost a pregnancy.
The CJLS has already adopted several responsa holding that an embryo in a laboratory
does not have the status of a fetus because implantation represents a necessary condition
for pregnancy.125 We find no significant halakhic difference between a fertilized egg in a
Petri dish and one in a fallopian tube. Neither can properly be considered as on a
trajectory towards life until implantation has occurred—an outcome that is far from
certain and depends on other factors in both cases.126
120
See, e.g., Joseph Needham, A History of Embryology (Cambridge: University Press, 1934).
121
See Roth, pp. 234–35 cited in Miriam Berkowitz, Reshaping the Laws of Family Purity for the Modern
World, CJLS Responsa, p. 22. See also Daniel Rosenak, Infertility and its Ethical and National
Repercussions: Studies in the Laws of Family Purity in the Light of Changing Realities (publication
forthcoming) pp. 47–48 (describing ―nishtanu ha- tiv’im”).
122
Feldman, supra note 4, pp. 140–143.
123
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, ―Terms Used in Reference to the Fetus,‖
Terminology Bulletin. 1, Sept. 1965.
124
I.D. Cooke, ―Failure of implantation and its relevance to subfertility,‖ Journal of
Reproduction and Fertility, Supplement I (1988) 36:155–159.
125
Elliot Dorff, ―Stem Cell Research,‖ CJLS Responsa, YD 336.2002 and Mark Popovsky ―Choosing Our
Children’s Genes:The Use of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis,‖ CJLS Responsa, EH 1:5.2008.
126
Several prominent Catholic scholars have similarly argued that emergency contraception is not abortion.
Austriaco, Nicanor Pier Giorgio, ―Is Plan B an abortifacient? A critical look at the scientific evidence,‖
National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, 2007 Winter; 7(4): 703–707; Daniel P. Sulmasy, ―Emergency
Consequently, we view emergency contraception—which prevents implantation—as
halakhically equivalent to hormonal contraception administered prior to intercourse.127
The halakhic preference for precoital use of hormonal contraception rests primarily on
the presumed safety and efficacy benefits for most women.
Parental Consent or Notification for Adolescent Use of

Contraception
The Rabbinic Letter on Intimate Relations, incorporated by this teshuvah, affirms that the
Jewish values governing permissible sexual relationships are inconsistent with sexual
activity during adolescence; other decisors of Jewish law have affirmatively prohibited
non-marital sex altogether. 128 Consequently, in an ideal Jewish setting, the use of
contraception would be a moot issue for minors. We encourage all those involved to help
teens ―recognize that sexual intercourse is not an isolated act with little or no effect on the
rest of our lives. . . . Sex should be seen . . . as one important part of our human existence
which is tied to all the other parts and which therefore affects, and is affected by, the
totality of our lives.‖129 When a teen engages in sex because of peer pressure, a series of
harmful consequences may result. However, Jewish adolescents do have sexual
relationships, and an honest halakhic consideration of the issues must not ignore this
fact.130
A full acknowledgement of this insight should lead the adolescent to discuss his or her
sexual behavior with parents and other trusted adults. We encourage the adults involved
in those conversations to provide accurate information about contraception and the
prevention of sexually transmitted diseases. Were these conversations to occur in all
situations, we would hope that a child’s seeking access to contraception without a
parent’s knowledge would prove to be rare. However, we further recognize that these
conversations do not always happen and that some adolescents will seek to obtain
contraception without the consent or knowledge of a parent.
At first, it might appear that Jewish tradition holds a bright-line standard for the capacity
to consent for oneself—the age of bar/bat mitzvah. Those who have not yet become
bar/bat mitzvah are halakhically considered minors and would need parental approval.
contraception for women who have been raped: must Catholics test for ovulation, or is testing for
pregnancy morally sufficient?,‖ Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, Dec. 2006; 16(4): 305–331.
127
Even though Rabbis Shlomo Auerbach and Yehoshua Neuwirth both rule much more restrictively than
we do with respect to contraception generally, they both concede that emergency contraception does not
function as an abortifacient and may be employed following coerced sex. )‫ב(כג‬:‫נשמת אברהם חושן משפט תכה‬.
128
See, e.g., ‫ו‬:‫ יח‬,‫ אסורי ביאה‬,‫ משנה תורה‬,‫א ;רמב"ם‬:‫שולחן ערוך אבן העזר נה‬.
129
Dorff, Rabbinic Letter, supra note 72.
130
See, e.g., Institute for Informal Jewish Education, Brandeis University, ―The Jewish Adolescent Study‖
(2005), available at http://www.brandeis.edu/ije/resources/research.html.
Those who have become bar/bat mitzvah are considered adults and, though parental
assent would be greatly preferred, it would not be absolutely required. However, in
practice, Jewish law has not applied this standard in all cases, preferring instead
definitions of majority narrowly-tailored for a specific purpose; for many situations,
adulthood does not begin until a later chronological age.131 In others, the beginning of
adulthood varies depending on the person’s intellectual, emotional, financial or other
status.132
Previous halakhic sources have not addressed the question of parental consent for
contraception, and there is little precedent for which particular standard should be applied
here. One discussion in the Talmud proposes setting the age of consent for a woman at
the age when she is able to bear children,
133
.‫ בנים עדיפי מסימנים‬:‫ ואית דאמרי‬.‫ בנים הרי הם כסימנים‬:‫אמר רב ספרא‬
[Bearing] children serves as a sufficient determinant of adulthood [even in

the absence of classic markers or chronological age]. Some say that
[bearing] children represents a better determinant of adulthood [than
classic markers or chronological age].
Though the ability to bear children would make a poor test for adulthood across the
board, we argue here that it constitutes the best halakhic test for majority with respect to
questions of consent for contraception because it is consistent with the best scientific data
available at present. That is, laws requiring parental consent or notification for access to
contraception up until the age of 16 or 18 have repeatedly been shown to increase the
number of abortions, teen pregnancies, and sexually transmitted diseases without
decreasing the frequency of adolescent sexual activity.134 Those who argue for
mandating parental involvement in the decision-making process do so because they
believe that mandating such involvement will foster an environment in which adolescents
make safer decisions. Unfortunately, the best evidence available does not support this
belief and, in fact, shows that such mandates lead to less healthy decision-making across
131
For example, a person’s right to sell his father’s land and a man’s obligation to engage in military or
Temple service begin at the age of twenty. See ‫טו‬:‫ יד כלי המקדש ה‬,‫יד‬:‫ רש"י שמות ל‬,‫גטין סה ע' א‬.
132
A son still supported by his father financially is considered a minor for many purposes even after the age
of thirteen. See ‫ טור ושולחן ערוך חושן משפט ס' רע‬,‫בבא בתרא יב ע' א‬.
133
‫יבמות יב ע' ב‬.
134
Diane Reddy, Raymond Fleming, Carolyne Swain, ―Effect of Mandatory Parental Notification on
Adolescent Girls' Use of Sexual Health Care Services,‖ Journal of the American Medical Association. Aug
14, 2002;288(6):710–714; Madeline Zavodny, ―Fertility and Parental Consent for Minors to Receive
Contraceptives,‖ American Journal of Public Health, Aug 2004;94(8):1347–1351; Rachel Jones, Heather
Boonstra, ―Confidential Reproductive Health Care for Adolescents,‖ Current Opinion in Obstetrics and
Gynecology. 2005;17:456–460; Rachel Jones, Alison Purcell, Susheela Singh, Lawrence Finer,
―Adolescents’ Reports of Parental Knowledge of Adolescents’ Use of Sexual Health Services and Their
Reactions to Mandated Parental Notification for Prescription Contraception,‖ Journal of the American
Medical Association, Jan. 19, 2005; 293(3):340–348.
a population. Further, the evidence suggests that such mandates can increase the
likelihood of acts of domestic violence.135
The reader is strongly cautioned against misunderstanding our adoption of this standard
as a statement that parents need not be involved in the sexual or medical decision-making
of their adolescent children. To the contrary, Jewish tradition places great value on
consistent, direct communication between parents and children and argues that parents
should be actively involved in the major life decisions made by adolescents. Further, it
demands that clergy, teachers and other adults behave in ways that facilitate and model
this communication. The adolescent who elects not to involve his or her parents in such
an important decision clearly acts against the intent of these deep-seated Jewish values.
Our point here is simply that Jewish law does not directly mandate parental consent or
notification for access to contraception. Instead, the tradition seeks to involve parents in
the lives of their children by creating environments and establishing relationships that are
conducive to robust parent-child communication.
Summary/ Psak:
Jewish law enjoins those who are physically and mentally able to procreate and raise
children to have a minimum of two offspring. A recent opinion of the CJLS has
increased this to three whenever possible.136
Contraception may be used before, after, and in between pregnancies if there is a

compelling physical or emotional well-being justification. However financial concerns
that go beyond obtaining basic necessities and other issues of convenience are not
generally considered sufficient reasons.
Safety and efficacy are the primary criteria for determining the most halakhically
preferable means of contraception. Because the medical and behavioral issues affecting
safety and efficacy will vary for each couple, it is a decision that should be made with a
healthcare professional and blanket halakhic generalizations should be eschewed.
Assuming that all aspects of safety and efficacy with respect to more than one
contraceptive method are equal for a particular couple, the couple is advised to follow the
order set out in this teshuvah for most to least preferable means:
* Hormonal contraception (the pill, implants, vaginal insertion, transdermal patch).

* Intrauterine device- copper or hormonal (IUD)
* Diaphragm, Cervical cap
* Sponge, including spermicidal gel; spermicidal gel in combination with another
method.
135
Reddy, Fleming, Swain, supra note 134. See also Carol Ford & Abigail English, ―Limiting
Confidentiality of Adolescent Health Services: What Are the Risks?‖ Journal of the American Medical
Association, 2002; 288:752–753.
136
Dorff and Abelson, supra note 49.
* Condoms
* Emergency contraception (―the morning after pill‖) –only after the fact and not for
regular use.
If a woman elects to employ a method of contraception farther down the list for reasons
of health, safety or efficacy specific to her circumstances, she may rest assured that such
a choice represents a halakhically valid decision, fully justified within normative Jewish
practice.
Birth control of any means is far preferable to abortion. Every effort should be made to
ensure access to and accurate information about contraception for all who might engage
in sexual intercourse. The concern that such measures will encourage risky sexual
activity or promiscuity is unsupported by scientific evidence and insufficient to warrant
the increased health risks born by those in communities where access to contraception is
limited.
This teshuvah views full-dose mifespristone intended to terminate a developing

pregnancy as an abortifacent. As such, a determination of its halakhic permissibility
should be considered in light of the Jewish laws on abortion and not the laws of
contraception discussed in this Teshuvah.
Jewish tradition places great value on consistent, direct communication between parents
and children. Parents should be actively involved in the major life decisions made by
adolescents. However, Jewish law does not mandate parental consent or notification for
access to contraception. Where there is concern for the safety of the adolescent or the
threat of domestic abuse, care should be taken to be particularly lenient in this area.

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Contraception

Rabbis Miriam Berkowitz and Mark Popovsky

I. Relevant Halakhic Principles/ Concerns

1. ‫ – השחתת זרע לבטלה‬The Destruction of Generative Seed for

‫שמָּה תָ מָר‬ ְ ‫ַוי ִּ ַקח י ְהּודָ ה ִּאשָה ְלעֵר בְכֹורֹו ּו‬

It appears that [sexual activity in this case] is forbidden. Since he always

[such a woman] engages in sexual activity in the same way as everyone

Asheri explicates this point in his commentary on the Talmud. He writes,

3. ‫—מניעת פרו ורבו‬Avoiding the Mitzvah To Be Fruitful and

This is a type of embellishment to the commandment, a general custom, and

.‫ מותר לדחות‬,‫ לכן אם קיימת סיבה מוצדקת‬.‫ אין זו חובה מיידית‬59

The mitzvah to be fruitful and multiply should not be considered an

4. Healthy Sexual Decision-making

Some voices in the contemporary discourse on contraception worry that increased

II. Permissibility of Contraception

III. Preferred Means of Contraception

As to the second debate, the halakhically-oriented commentary of Rabbi Morechai ben

2. ‫ – כוס של עקרין‬The ―Cup of Roots‖

A man is forbidden to drink the cup of roots in order to sterilize himself

The following methods of contraception will be discussed in order of their preferability

Diaphragms & Cervical Caps

A diaphragm is an individually fitted rubber device inserted prior to intercourse which

That a physician or midwife seals the entrance to the womb with an

The term postcoital contraception—commonly called ―emergency contraception‖—refers

Levonorgestrel and other postcoital contraceptive agents function almost identically to

It is important to clarify the mechanism of post-coital hormonal treatment. The exact

Parental Consent or Notification for Adolescent Use of

[Bearing] children serves as a sufficient determinant of adulthood [even in

Contraception may be used before, after, and in between pregnancies if there is a

* Hormonal contraception (the pill, implants, vaginal insertion, transdermal patch).

This teshuvah views full-dose mifespristone intended to terminate a developing

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