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TOPIC: Application of The Principle of Separation of Powers Doctrine/S

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147. Baguilat, Jr. v.

Speaker Alvarez
Jul. 25, 2017 | GR 227757  | J. Perlas-Bernabe

TOPIC: Application of the Principle of Separation of Powers

DOCTRINE/s:
 While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of
selecting the other officers. All that the Charter says is that each House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary. As such, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise
of the prerogative conferred by the constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the HoR
itself, not by the Court. 
 As a general rule, the Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without
violating the constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold. Constitutional respect and a becoming
regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the Court from prying into the internal workings of the
HoR.  Except: When there is grave abuse of discretion and if there was violation of the constitution. Then the court
may interfere by virtue of its expanded concept of judicial power.
 Such deviation from the rules is NOT adverse to the constitution under Art. VI, Section 16. The provision states that
the Speaker shall be elected by a majority vote of its entire membership. Also, the HoR may decide to have officers
other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is something within its
sole control. 

FACTS:
Prior to the opening of the 17th congress in 2016, there were news articles about Suarez saying that he was seeking an
appointment from Duterte as Minority Leader. Allegedly, to secure this, the supermajority coalition in the house “lent”
Suarez its members to feign membership in the minority to vote for him as minority leader.

July 25, 2017: Before the Speakership Election, then acting floor leader, Farinas, responded to a parliamentary inquiry from
Atienza as to who would elect the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives. Rep. Farinas then answered that: (a) all
those who vote for the winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for other candidates shall belong
to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of the Minority; and (c) the Minority
Leader shall be elected by the members of the Minority

After this announcement, the election proceeded. 252 Members voting for Alvarez, 8 voting for Baguilat, 7 voting for
Suarez, 21 abstaining and 1 registering a no vote, resulting in Alvarez being the Speaker.

Baguilat hoped that the “long standing tradition” of the House - where the candidate who garnered the 2nd highest
number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader will be done. But he never got recognized.

Abayon (one of those who abstained) told the Plenary that those who didn’t vote for Alvarez convened and elected Suarez
as Minority Leader. This was recognized. 

Lagman opposed this because of the irregularities in the election of Suarez namely: (1) Suarez was a member of the
Majority because he voted for Alvarez, (2) his transfer to the minority was irregular, (3) the abstentionists who were the
bulk of those who voted for Suarez were supposed to be independent members of the house, therefore, irregularly
deemed as part of the minority. This was overruled and Suarez was officially recognized as Minority leader.

The Petitioners filed a case for mandamus, insisting that Buguilat should be minority leader because of the long standing
tradition and the irregularities of Suarez’s election.

ISSUES:
W/N the court can compel the respondents via mandamus to recognize Baguilat as Minority Leader - NO
W/N those who abstained are members of the minority - YES

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioners have no clear legal right to the relief sought. 

Records based on the journal show that when Farinas gave his statement (FACT #2), the election proceeded without any
objection from any member of Congress, including herein petitioners. 

After Speaker Alvarez took his oath and administered the oath of office to all Members of the House, one the same day, the
Deputy Speakers, and other officers of the House (among others, the Majority Leader) were elected and all took their
respective oaths of office.

On July 26,  a full day after everyone took their oaths, Lagman delivered his privilege speech questioning Fariñas'
interpretation of the Rules. Aside from this belated questioning, no motion was made, seconded and carried to correct the
entry in the journal entry for July 25 regarding any error that may have been made, as to indicate that in fact, a protest or
objection was raised.

Logically, the HoR effectively adopted Farinas’ proposal regarding the new rules for the membership and process of
election of the minority. This demonstrates the HoR’s deviation from the petitioner’s claims of long standing tradition and
that because of the independence of those who abstained, they couldn’t have voted for a minority leader, as they were not
members thereof.

Such deviation from the rules is NOT adverse to the constitution under Art. VI, Section 16. The provision states that the
Speaker shall be elected by a majority vote of its entire membership. Also, the HoR may decide to have officers other than
the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is something within its sole control.

Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona:  while the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Speaker, it is, however, dead
silent on the manner of selecting the other officers. All that the Charter says is that each House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary. As such, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of
the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by
the HoR itself, not by the Court. 

Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the HoR the sole authority to "determine the rules of its proceedings."
These "legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their
effectivity. In fact, they 'are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them . Being
merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority

Hence, as a general rule, the Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without
violating the constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard
for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the Court from prying into the internal workings of the HoR.

Exception: Grave abuse of discretion. This stems from the expanded concept of judicial power. Also, if there was a
violation of the Constitution. 

In this case the court cannot find any evidence of grave abuse of power. This case concerns an internal matter of a coequal,
political branch of government which, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with.
To rule otherwise would not only embroil this Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the
separation of powers doctrine.

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