VOL.

205, JANUARY 30, 1992 625

Yap vs. Paras

*
G.R. No. 101236. January 30, 1992.

JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner, vs. MARTIN PARAS and

ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of
Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato, respondents.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prejudicial question; For a

civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action, it must
appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon
which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution
of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.·Section 5,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended
provides: Section 5. Elements of prejudicial question,·The two (2)
essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. A prejudicial
question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial
question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in
another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. We have
held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the
determination of the civil action, it must appear not only that the
civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues
raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused."
Same; Same; Same; Suspension; The order dismissing the
criminal action without a motion for suspension in accordance with
Sec. 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended and without the accused in the civil case for the annulment
of the second sale, suggests not only ignorance of the law but also
bias on the part of the respondent judge.·It is worth remarking
that not every defense raised in the civil action will raise a
prejudicial question to justify

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

626

626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Yap vs. Paras

suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve an

issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the
criminal action and its resolution should determine whether or not
the latter action may proceed. The order dismissing the criminal
action without a motion for suspension in accordance with Rule 111,
Section 6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended,
and even without the accused indicating his defense in the civil case
for the annulment of the second sale, suggests not only ignorance of
the law but also bias on the part of the respondent judge.
Judicial Ethics; Code of Judicial Conduct; A judge shall be
faith-ful to the law and maintain professional competence and
should administer justice impartially.·Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona,
Sr. is sternly reminded that under the Code of Judicial Conduct, "a
judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence" and "should administer justice impartially." He is
hereby reprimanded for his questionable conduct in the case at bar,
with the warning that commission of similar acts in the future will
be dealt with more severely.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to review the order

of the Municipal Trial Court of Glan Malapatan, South
Cotabato.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Mariano C. Alegarbes for petitioner.
 Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

This is still another dispute between brother and sister

over a piece of property they inherited from their parents.
The case is complicated by the circumstance that the
private respondent's counsel in this petition is the son of
the judge, the other respondent, whose action is being
questioned.
Petitioner Juliana P. **Yap was the sister of private
respondent Martin Paras.

_______________

** She died pendente lite on September 2, 1991, and was by resolution

of the Court dated January 13, 1991, substituted by her children,
Ruperto, Rustico, Ignacio, Rogelio, Arsenio, Jr., all surnamed Yap,
Rainilda Yap Breta, and the children of the deceased Teodora Yap
Cuaycong.

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VOL. 205, JANUARY 30, 1992 627

Yap us. Paras

On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her

his share in the intestate estate of their parents for
P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private document.
Nineteen years later, on May 2,1990, Paras sold the same
property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was
evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a
complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang with the
1
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City.
On the same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification
of the said 2sale with the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City.
After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted
a criminal complaint for estafa against Paras with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South
Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.
On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused,
the trial judge motu proprio issued an order dismissing the
criminal case on the ground that:
x x x after a careful scrutiny of the statements of complainant,
Juliana P. Yap and of the respondent Martin Paras and his
witnesses, the Court holds and maintained (sic) that there is a
prejudicial question to a civil action, which must be ventilated in
the proper civil court. In the case of Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125,
the Supreme Court had already made a pronouncement that "a
criminal action for Estafa for alleged double sale of property is a
prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged Deed
of Sale and defense of the alleged vendors of forgeries of their
3
signatures to the Deed."

The petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied

on April 30, 1991. She then came to this Court for relief in
this special civil action for certiorari.
The Court could have referred this petition to the Court
of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction under BP
129, but decided to resolve the case directly in view of the
peculiar circumstances involved.

_______________

1 Rollo, p. 8.
2 lbid., p. 13.
3 Id,pp. 30-31.

628

628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Yap vs. Paras

The petitioner's contention is that where there is a

prejudicial question in a civil case, the criminal action may
not be dismissed but only suspended. Moreover, this
suspension may not be done motu proprio by the judge
trying the criminal case but only upon petition of the
defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court. It is also
stressed that a reversal of the order of dismissal would not
bar the prosecution of the accused under the double
jeopardy rule because he has not yet been arraigned.
The Court notes that the counsel for private respondent
Paras who filed the comment in his behalf is the son and
namesake of Judge Barcelona. Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona,
Jr. is employed in the Public Attorney's Office. He has
made it of record that he was not the counsel of Paras at
the time the questioned order of dismissal was issued by
his father. He thus impliedly rejects the charge of bias
against his father.
Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona suggests
there may have been a basis for the order in view of the
alleged double sale of the property which was being
litigated in the regional trial court. He concedes, however,
that the order may have been premature and that it could
not have been issued motu proprio. Agreeing that double
jeopardy would not attach because of the lack of
arraignment, he asks that his Comment be considered a
motion for the suspension of the criminal action on the
ground of prejudicial question.
The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that
the respondent judge did indeed commit grave abuse of
discretion in motu proprio issuing the order of dismissal.
Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended by this Court on July 7, 1988,
provides as follows:

Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.·A petition

for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When
the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time
before the prosecution rests.

Judge Barcelona's precipitate action is intriguing, to say

the least, in light of the clear provision of the above-quoted
rule.
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VOL. 205, JANUARY 30, 1992 629

Yap vs. Paras

The rule is not even new, being only a rewording of the

original provision in the Rules of Court before they were
amended. It plainly says that the suspension may be made
only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge
alone, and it also says suspension, and not dismissal. One
also wonders if the person who notarized the disputed
second sale, Notary Public Alexander C. Barcelona, might
be related to the respondent judge.
But more important than the preceding considerations is
the trial judge's misapprehension of the concept of a
prejudicial question.
Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended provides:

Section 5. Elements of prejudicial question,·The two (2) essential

elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a

case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must
be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged
4
in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
5
of the accused.
We have held that "for a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension
of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil
action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves
the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is
based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
said civil action would be

_______________

4 People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357; Merced vs. Diez, 109 Phil. 155;
Zapanta vs. Montesa, 114 Phil. 428; Fortich-Celdran vs. Celdran, 19
SCRA 502.
5 De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202; Mendiola vs. Macadaeg, 1 SCRA
593.

630

630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Yap vs. Paras

necessarily6
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused."
It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the
continuation of the criminal action, not the criminal action
that is prejudicial to the civil action.
The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in his Order7
does not appear anywhere in the decision of Ras v. Rasul.
Worse, he has not only misquoted the decision but also
wrongly applied it. The facts of that case are not analogous
to those in the case at bar.
In that case, Ras allegedly sold to Pichel a parcel of land
which he later also sold to Martin. Pichel brought a civil
action for nullification of the second sale and asked that
the sale made by Ras in his favor be declared valid. Ras's
defense was that he never sold the property to Pichel and
his purported signatures appearing in the first deed of sale
were forgeries. Later, an information for estafa was filed
against Ras based on the same double sale that was the
subject of the civil action. Ras filed a "Motion for
Suspension of Action" (that is, the criminal case), claiming
that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would
necessarily be determinative of his guilt or innocence.
Through then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, this
Court ruled that a suspension of the criminal action was in
order because:

On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases
against petitioner and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a
prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial
question in the case at bar, considering that petitioner Alejandro
Ras' defense (as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and
forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Luis Pichel
(plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witnesses in the criminal
case) is based on the very same facts which would be necessarily
determinative of petitioner Ras' guilt or innocence as accused in the
criminal case. If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or
fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would
be innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case
(if it were allowed to

_______________

6 Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125; Mendiola vs. Macadaeg, supra.
7 Supra.

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VOL. 205, JANUARY 30, 1992 631

Yap vs. Paras
proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to be set
aside if it were finally decided in the civil action that indeed the
alleged prior dead of sale was a forgery and spurious.
xxx
The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the
complaint in Civil Case No. 73 that he had never sold the property
in litigation to the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his signatures in
the alleged deed of sale and that of his wife were forged by the
plaintiff. It is, therefore, necessary that the truth or falsity of such
claim be first determined because if his claim is true, then he did
not sell his property twice and no estafa was committed. The
question of nullity of the sale is distinct and separate from the
crime of estafa (alleged double sale) but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner
in the criminal action.

In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the

criminal action on the ground that the defense in the civil
case·forgery of his signature in the first deed of sale·had
to be threshed out first. Resolution of that question would
necessarily resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal case. By contrast, there was no motion for
suspension in the case at bar; and no less importantly, the
respondent judge had not been informed of the defense
Paras was raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could
not have ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil
action would determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.
It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in
the civil action will raise a prejudicial question to justify
suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve
an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue
raised in the criminal action and its resolution should
determine whether or not the latter action may proceed.
The order dismissing the criminal action without a
motion for suspension in accordance with Rule 111, Section
6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended,
and even without the accused indicating his defense in the
civil case for the annulment of the second sale, suggests not
only ignorance of the law but also bias on the part of the
respondent judge.
Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded that
under the Code of Judicial Conduct, "a judge shall be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence"
and "should ad-
 632

632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Samhwa Company Ltd. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

minister justice impartially." He is hereby reprimanded for

his questionable conduct in the case at bar, with the
warning that commission of similar acts in the future will
be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order
issued by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. dated April 17,
1991, dismissing Criminal Case No. 1902-G, and the Order
dated April 30, 1991, denying the motion for
reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 1902-G is ordered REINSTATED for
further proceedings, but to be assigned to a different judge.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (C.J.), Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,

concur.

Petition granted; order reversed and set aside.

Note.·Court finds Judge Montemayor guilty of gross

negligence and grave partiality in issuing the questioned
orders and writs. (McCormack vs. Montemayor, 187 SCRA
713.)

··o0o··

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