Evidence Page 1
Evidence Page 1
Evidence Page 1
TUASON, J.:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that
court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice
of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner
might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with
their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of
the accused. The motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of
this proceeding.
RULE 128
General Provisions
Section 1. Evidence defined. Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these
rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of
fact. (1)
Section 2. Scope. The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts
and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these
rules. (2a)
EN BANC
Judicial Notice
Sections 1-3, Rule 129
RULE 129
What Need Not Be Proved
Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial
extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world
and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions. (1a)
Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable to
1. The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgement cannot be raised
in a motion to dismiss when such ground does not appear on the face of the
complaint. What immediately calls attention in the rather sketchy and in
conclusive discussion in the six-page brief of applicant is that there was no
denial as to the truth of the statement made by Judge Gorospe that there
was a previous dismissal the same plaintiff's complaint against the
predecessor-in-interest of defendants, who as expressly admitted by
appellant was the deceased husband of one of them and father of the rest.
There was no denial either of the property involved being the same and of
the finality of the decsion in the previous case which would show that
appellant's claim was devoid of any support in law. It would be therefore futile
for the court to continue with the case as there had been such a prior
judgment certainly binding on appellant. What then was there for the lower
court to do? Was there any sense in its being engaged in what was
essentially a fruitless, endeavor as the outcome was predictible?
Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of
Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its
futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances,
the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment
in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was
all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly
such an order is not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former
Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken judicial notice
of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot
one, or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under
consideration." 3
2. There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly
had recourse to a remedy which under the law then in force could be availed
of. It would have served the cause of justice better, not to mention the
avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to which
appellees were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the
valuable time of this Tribunal would not have been frittered away on a
useless find hopeless appeal. It has, ever been the guiding principle
from Alonso v. Villamor, 4 a 1910 decision, that a litigant should not be
allowed to worship at the altar of technicality. That is not to dispense justice
according to law. Parties, and much more so their counsel, should ever keep
such an imperative of our legal system in mind. 5
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is hereby
affirmed. With costs against plaintiff.
in the names of his heirs, the defendants in this case, namely Meden Jack,
Joker, Nonito and Zeferino, Jr., all surnamed Arroyo.
On March 6, 1956 said heirs filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur a petition (L.R.C. No. 144; G.L.R.O. No. 1025; Special Proceedings No.
900) in which they claimed that the technical description set forth in their
transfer certificate of title and in the original certificate of their predecessor
did not conform with that embodied in the decision of the land registration
court, and was less in area by some 157 square meters. They therefore
prayed that said description be corrected pursuant to Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act; that their certificate of title be cancelled and another one
issued to them containing the correct technical description. The petition was
filed in the registration record but was docketed as Special Proceedings No.
900.
On May 23, 1956 the court issued an order directing the Register of Deeds of
Camarines Sur to "change, upon payment of his fees, the description in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 227 of Lot 2 in Plan Psu-106730 so as to
make it conform to that embodied in the decision of the Court on March 8,
1950, and to correct therein the spelling of the name of one of the petitioners
from 'Miden Arroyo' to 'Meden Arroyo'.
On November 29, 1956 Prieto filed against the defendants in the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur (in the original registration records of the two
lots) a petition to annul the order of May 23 in Special Proceedings No. 900.
At the hearing of the petition on July 12, 1957 neither he nor his counsel
appeared. Consequently, the trial court on the same day issued an order
dismissing the petition for failure to prosecute. A motion for reconsideration of
that order was denied on September 5, 1957.
On September 2, 1958 Prieto filed against the same defendants the present
action for annulment of Special Proceedings No. 900 and the order therein
entered on May 23, 1956. He also prayed that the 157 square meters
allegedly taken from his lot by virtue of said order be reconveyed to him.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
Plaintiff opposed, and on January 15, 1959 the court granted the motion. It is
from the order of dismissal, plaintiff having failed to secure its
reconsideration, that the appeal has been taken.
Appellant maintains that the institution of Special Proceedings No. 900 was
irregular and illegal mainly because he was not notified thereof and the same
was instituted almost six years after the issuance of the decree and title
sought to be corrected, and hence the order of the court dated May 23, 1956
for the correction of the technical description in appellees' title is void ab
initio.
The issue here, however, is not the validity of said Special Proceedings No.
900 but the propriety of the dismissal of appellant's complaint on the ground
of res adjudicata. The validity of the said proceedings was the issue in the
first case he filed. But because of his failure and that of his counsel to attend
the hearing the court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Since no
appeal was taken from the order of dismissal it had the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, the court not having provided otherwise (Rule
30, Section 3).
Appellant contends that said order could not have the effect of a judgment
because the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the
respondents therein, defendants-appellees here, as they did not file any
opposition or responsive pleading in that case. Appellees, on the other hand,
allege that they had voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction after they
were served copies of the petition. This allegation finds support in the record,
particularly in the following statement of appellant in his brief:
This petition was originally set for hearing on December 8, 1956, but
was postponed to January 14, 1957, due to lack of notice to the
respondents. Upon motion for postponements of respondents, now
defendants-appellees, the hearing of January 14, 1957 was
postponed to May 16, 1957. The hearing set for May 16, 1957 was
again postponed upon motion of the respondents to July 12, 1957.
Appellant next points out that the lower court should not have dismissed his
first petition for annulment because no "parole" evidence need be taken to
support it, the matters therein alleged being parts of the records of L.R.C. No.
144, G.L.R.O. No. 1025, and L.R.C. 173, G.L.R.O. No. 1474, which were well
within the judicial notice and cognizance of the said court.
hearing, which the court correctly denied. Finally, the point raised by counsel
is now academic, as no appeal was taken from the order dismissing his first
petition, and said order had long become final when the complaint in the
present action was filed.
The contention that the causes of action in the two suits are different is
untenable.
Both are based on the alleged nullity of Special Proceedings No. 900; in both
appellant seeks that the order of correction of the title of appellees be set
aside. Of no material significance is the fact that in the complaint in the
instant case there is an express prayer for reconveyance of some 157
square meters of land, taken from appellant as a result of such correction of
title. For that area would necessarily have reverted to appellant had his first
petition prospered, the relief asked for by him being that "the Register of
Deeds of Camarines Sur be ordered to amend Certificate of Title No. 332 by
incorporating therein only and solely the description of Lot No. 2, plan Psu106730 as appearing in the Decree No. 5165 and maintaining consequently
the description limits and area of the adjoining land of the herein petitioner,
Lot No. 3, plan Psu-117522, in accordance with Decree No. 2301 of Land
Registration No. 173." The claim for damages as well as for other additional
and alternative reliefs in the present case are not materially different from his
prayer for "such other remedies, just and equitable in the premises"
contained in the former one.
There being identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between
the two cases, the order of dismissal issued in the first constitutes a bar to
the institution of the second.
The appealed order is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon,
Regala,
Bengzon,
J.P.,
and
Zaldivar,
JJ.,
concur.
Barrera, J., is on leave.
In the first place, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
tried or are actually pending before the same judge (Municipal Council of San
Pedro, Laguna, et al. v. Colegio de San Jose, et al., 65 Phil. 318). Secondly,
if appellant had really wanted the court to take judicial notice of such records,
he should have presented the proper request or manifestation to that effect
instead of sending, by counsel, a telegraphic motion for postponement of
May 6, 1991
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the
respondent court, for lack of basis. It is argued that the lower courts should
not have taken into account evidence not submitted by the private
respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about
440 square meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an
action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in the Regional Trial Court
of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein
petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the
defendant was required to vacate the disputed lot. 1
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in
1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla
returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her
son Juan's instruction, conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same
time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been
living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes
on the property, which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the
said land until her death, following which the petitioner, her son and halfbrother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed
when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he
refused, claiming it as his own.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot,
which he inherited from his parents, who acquired it even before World War II
and had been living thereon since then and until they died. Also disbelieved
was his contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla
was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three
sides by the Makato River.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its
factual findings, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A",
"B" and "C", which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally
submitted in evidence. The trial court also erred when, to resolve the
ownership of the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case
involving the same parties but a different parcel of land.
The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:
Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter
dated October 4, 1921 addressed in Makato, Capiz, Philippines; Exh.
"A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter indicating that the amount of P600.00
the first P300.00 and then another P300.00 as interest since
October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh. "B", a
Spanish document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by Tomasa
Timtiman and Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1", paragraph 4
of Exh. "C".
In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the
allegations of the appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted
in evidence as disclosed by the transcript of stenographic notes, which it
quoted at length. 2 The challenged decision also upheld the use by the trial
court of testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the
second case.
We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not
the above-described documents but Exhibits "X" and "T" and their submarkings, which were the last will and testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the
order of probate. It is not at all denied that the list of exhibits does not include
Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". In fact, the trial court categorically declared that
"Exhibits "A-1, "A-2", "B", "C" and "C-l," were not among those documents or
exhibits formally offered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix." This is a
clear contradiction of the finding of the appellate court, which seems to have
confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence
mentioned in the quoted transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.The court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not
mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It
is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case
below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. They
were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said
in Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, 3 "At the trial on the merits, the party
may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its
cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event,
such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any
evidentiary value."
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:
. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his
findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the patties at the trial. 4
We did say in People vs. Napat-a 5 that even if there be no formal offer of an
exhibit, it may still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been
duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been
incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not find that these
requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court said
the said exhibits could be validly considered because, even if they had not
been formally offered, one of the plaintiffs witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez,
testified on them at the trial and was even cross-examined by the defendant's
counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify
the documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the
contents of the exhibits.
Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:
LEGASPI: That is this Exh. "A" about ?
She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible
error in taking judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had
previously heard which was closely connected with the case before it. It
conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of
the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been heard or are actually pending b before the same
judge. 7 Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all
parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original
record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case
pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in
some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the
original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually
withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or
with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record
of the case then pending. 8
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence
of objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or
with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original
or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives"
and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These
conditions have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner
was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being
considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the
petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly
sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly
took judicial notice of the other case, striking off all reference thereto would
not be fatal to the plaintiff's cause because "the said testimony was merely
corroborative of other evidences submitted by the plaintiff." What "other
evidences"? The trouble with this justification is that the exhibits it intends to
corroborate, to wit, Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been
formally submitted.
Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent,
we feel that the complaint should have been dismissed by the trial court for
failure of the plaintiff to substantiate its allegations. It has failed to prove that
the subject lot was the same parcel of land sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to
Alfredo Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner contends. Even
assuming it was the same lot, there is no explanation for the sale thereof by
Juan Peralta, Jr., who was only the son of Damasa Timtiman. According to
the trial court, "there is no question that before 1934 the land in question
belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly
conveyed title to property that did not belong to him unless he had
appropriate authorization from the owner. No such authorization has been
presented.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as
we have held in many cases.1wphi1However, that rule is also not absolute
and yields to the accepted and well-known exception. In the case at bar, it is
not even disputed that the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the disputed property since even before World War II. In light of
this uncontroverted fact, the tax declarations in their name become weighty
and compelling evidence of the petitioner's ownership. As this Court has
held:
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property. 9
It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual
possession of the land covered by the tax declaration that such
circumstance may be material in supporting a claim of ownership. 10
The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession
of the subject parcels of land by the respondents and their parents
before them for more than 30 years qualify them to register title to
the said subject parcels of land. 11
The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the
property and magnanimously allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain there, he
did not at least require her to pay the realty taxes in his name, not hers. The
explanation given by the trial court is that he was not much concerned with
the property, being a bachelor and fond only of the three dogs he had bought
from America. That is specious reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture. If he
were really that unconcerned, it is curious that he should have acquired the
property in the first place, even as dacion en pago. He would have
demanded another form of payment if he did not have the intention at all of
living on the land. On the other hand, if he were really interested in the
property, we do not see why he did not have it declared in his name when the
realty taxes thereon were paid by Damasa Timtiman or why he did not object
when the payments were made in her own name.
In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate
that they were the owners of the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and
her forebears had been in possession thereof for more than fifty years and,
indeed, she herself stayed there until she died. 12 She paid the realty taxes
thereon in her own name. 13 Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials
on the lot. 14 He even mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the
Philippines and to two private persons who acknowledged him as the
owner. 15 These acts denote ownership and are not consistent with the
private respondent's claim that the petitioner was only an overseer with mere
possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.
It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings
of the courts below and even to regard them as conclusive where there is no
showing that they have been reached arbitrarily. The exception is where such
findings do not conform to the evidence on record and appear indeed to have
no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.
The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and
"C", which had not been formally offered as evidence and therefore should
have been totally disregarded, conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial
court also erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No.
1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the
petitioner, in violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings
here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and should not
have been sustained by the respondent court.
Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court,
failed to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed property with
evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there
Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area,
bordering Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and
covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558. Shortly after
liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises
without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class
materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the
necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to
the present.
In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been
discovered, defendants Felicidad Miranda (Emigdio Egipto), Modesta C.
Parayno, Benedicto Diaz, Laureano Dizo, Jose Barrientos, Elena Ramos,
Estefania Nepacina, Modesta Sanchez, Honorio Berio, Gloria Velasco, Ana
Dequis Alunan and Benedicto Ofiaza (predecessor of defendant Carandang)
were given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits each labeled
"lease contract" to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions
therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo Obaob and Gerardo Garcia (in the
name of Marta A. Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la
Fuente on January 29 and March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of
the 23 defendants exhibited none.
For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.1wph1.t
Following are the rentals due as of February, 1962:
NAME
Area
Monthly
in sq.m. Rental
1. Gerardo Garcia
66.00
P7.92
P1,628.97
2. Modesta C. Parayno
87.75
10.53
379.08
3. Juan Asperas
39.00
4.68
9.36
4. Maria Tabia
35.20
5.76
570.24
5. Aquilino Barrios
(Leonora Ruiz)
54.00
4.32
99.36
6. Laureano Dizo
35.00
2.80
22.40
7. Bernabe Ayuda
39.60
3.17
323.34
8. Isabelo Obaob
75.52
9.06
208.38
9. Jose Barrientos
39.53
4.74
744.18
46.65
5.60
Paid up to
Feb. 1962.
34.80
2.78
186.26
41.80
3.34
504.34
33.48
2.68
444.88
22.40
1.79
688.32
25.80
2.06
255.44
24.00
1.92
188.16
32.40
2.59
56.98
45.83
3.67
739.68
40.20
4.82
Paid up to
March 1962.
64.26
7.71
30.84
45.03
5.40
437.40
25.52
3.06
30.60
48.02
5.76
132.48
P7,580.69
their monthly rentals from March, 1962, until they vacate the said premises,
and the costs. Defendants appealed.
1. We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the
trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school
purposes.
The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That
document recites that the amount of P100,000.00 had been set
aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the
construction of an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos
Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say that the court below, at
the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in
the decision under review, the trial judge obviously revised his views.
He there declared that there was need for defendants to vacate the
premises for school expansion; he cited the very document, Exhibit
E, aforesaid.
It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the
case is within its power, to make it conformable to law and
justice.3 Such was done here. Defendants' remedy was to bring to
the attention of the court its contradictory stance. Not having done
so, this Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose. 4
Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would
not profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could
well have taken because the was duty bound to take judicial
notice5 of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of
Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all
ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.6 And,
Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an
appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of
additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a
third direction. Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the
premises. The excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at
best flimsy. The permits to occupy are recoverable on thirty days'
notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in
this factual background that we say that the city's need for the
premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of
the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession
10
is paramount. If error there was in the finding that the city needs the
land, such error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the
judgment below.7
2. But defendants insist that they have acquired the legal status of
tenants. They are wrong.
They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials
thereon without the knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes
were erected without city permits.
These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all,
defendants are squatters:
Since the last global war, squatting on another's property in this
country has become a widespread vice. It was and is a blight.
Squatters' areas pose problems of health, sanitation. They are
breeding places for crime. They constitute proof that respect for the
law and the rights of others, even those of the government, are being
flouted. Knowingly, squatters have embarked on the pernicious act of
occupying property whenever and wherever convenient to their
interests without as much as leave, and even against the will, of
the owner. They are emboldened seemingly because of their belief
that they could violate the law with impunity. The pugnaciousness of
some of them has tied up the hands of legitimate owners. The latter
are thus prevented from recovering possession by peaceful means.
Government lands have not been spared by them. They know, of
course, that intrusion into property, government or private, is wrong.
But, then, the mills of justice grind slow, mainly because of lawyers
who, by means, fair or foul, are quite often successful in procuring
delay of the day of reckoning. Rampancy of forcible entry into
government lands particularly, is abetted by the apathy of some
public officials to enforce the government's rights. Obstinacy of these
squatters is difficult to explain unless it is spawned by official
tolerance, if not outright encouragement or protection. Said squatters
have become insensible to the difference between right and wrong.
To them, violation of law means nothing. With the result that
squatting still exists, much to the detriment of public interest. It is
high time that, in this aspect, sanity and the rule of law be restored. It
is in this environment that we look into the validity of the permits
granted defendants herein.
11
that they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly
needed school building, to the prejudice of the education of the youth
of the land.11 They shackle the hands of the government and thus
obstruct performance of its constitutionally ordained obligation to
establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public
education, and more, to "provide at least free public primary
instruction".12
The Antecedents
Upon the premises, we vote to affirm the judgment under review. Costs
against defendants-appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
12
of the said resolution. The trial court granted the motion. Atty. Aguinaldo
subsequently filed other similar motions, which the trial court granted.
Finally, KAL submitted on March 6, 2000 an Affidavit 3 of even date, executed
by its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging that the board of directors
conducted a special teleconference on June 25, 1999, which he and Atty.
Aguinaldo attended. It was also averred that in that same teleconference, the
board of directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to
execute the certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the complaint. Suk
Kyoo Kim also alleged, however, that the corporation had no written copy of
the aforesaid resolution.
4
On April 12, 2000, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion to
dismiss, giving credence to the claims of Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim
that the KAL Board of Directors indeed conducted a teleconference on June
25, 1999, during which it approved a resolution as quoted in the submitted
affidavit.
ETI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order, contending that it was
inappropriate for the court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference
without any prior hearing. The trial court denied the motion in its Order 5dated
August 8, 2000.
ETI then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the orders of
the RTC. In its comment on the petition, KAL appended a certificate signed
by Atty. Aguinaldo dated January 10, 2000, worded as follows:
SECRETARYS/RESIDENT AGENTS CERTIFICATE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, Mario A. Aguinaldo, of legal age, Filipino, and duly elected and
appointed Corporate Secretary and Resident Agent of KOREAN
AIRLINES, a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of Korea and also duly
registered and authorized to do business in the Philippines, with
office address at Ground Floor, LPL Plaza Building, 124 Alfaro St.,
Salcedo Village, Makati City, HEREBY CERTIFY that during a
special meeting of the Board of Directors of the Corporation held on
June 25, 1999 at which a quorum was present, the said Board
unanimously passed, voted upon and approved the following
resolution which is now in full force and effect, to wit:
(Sgd.)
ATTY. HENRY D. ADASA
Notary Public
Until December 31, 2000
PTR #889583/MLA 1/3/20006
13
14
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
was
15
(Sgd.)
ATTY. HENRY D. ADASA
Notary Public
Until December 31, 2000
PTR No. 320501 Mla. 1/4/9913
and in behalf of the foreign corporation, services and other legal processes in
all actions and other legal proceedings against such corporation, thus:
SEC. 127. Who may be a resident agent. A resident agent may
either be an individual residing in the Philippines or a domestic
corporation lawfully transacting business in the Philippines: Provided,
That in the case of an individual, he must be of good moral character
and of sound financial standing.
SEC. 128. Resident agent; service of process. The Securities and
Exchange Commission shall require as a condition precedent to the
issuance of the license to transact business in the Philippines by any
foreign corporation that such corporation file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission a written power of attorney designating some
persons who must be a resident of the Philippines, on whom any
summons and other legal processes may be served in all actions or
other legal proceedings against such corporation, and consenting
that service upon such resident agent shall be admitted and held as
valid as if served upon the duly-authorized officers of the foreign
corporation as its home office.14
Under the law, Atty. Aguinaldo was not specifically authorized to execute a
certificate of non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court. This is because while a resident agent may be aware of
actions filed against his principal (a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines), such resident may not be aware of actions initiated by its
principal, whether in the Philippines against a domestic corporation or private
individual, or in the country where such corporation was organized and
registered, against a Philippine registered corporation or a Filipino citizen.
The respondent knew that its counsel, Atty. Aguinaldo, as its resident agent,
was not specifically authorized to execute the said certification. It attempted
to show its compliance with the rule subsequent to the filing of its complaint
by submitting, on March 6, 2000, a resolution purporting to have been
approved by its Board of Directors during a teleconference held on June 25,
1999, allegedly with Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim in attendance.
However, such attempt of the respondent casts veritable doubt not only on its
claim that such a teleconference was held, but also on the approval by the
Board of Directors of the resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the
certificate of non-forum shopping.
In its April 12, 2000 Order, the RTC took judicial notice that because of the
onset of modern technology, persons in one location may confer with other
16
persons in other places, and, based on the said premise, concluded that Suk
Kyoo Kim and Atty. Aguinaldo had a teleconference with the respondents
Board of Directors in South Korea on June 25, 1999. The CA, likewise, gave
credence to the respondents claim that such a teleconference took place, as
contained in the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim, as well as Atty. Aguinaldos
certification.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be
well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must
be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. [15] Moreover, a
judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that
it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable. 16
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that
business transactions may be made by individuals through teleconferencing.
Teleconferencing is interactive group communication (three or more people in
two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms,
teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they
are separated by hundreds of miles.18 This type of group communication may
be used in a number of ways, and have three basic types: (1) video
conferencing - television-like communication augmented with sound; (2)
computer conferencing - printed communication through keyboard terminals,
4. Some routine meetings are more effective since one can audioconference from any location equipped with a telephone.
5. Communication between the home office and field staffs is
maximized.
6. Severe climate and/or unreliable transportation may necessitate
teleconferencing.
17
The records show that the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the respondent failed to comply with Section 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court. The respondent opposed the motion on December 1,
1999, on its contention that Atty. Aguinaldo, its resident agent, was duly
authorized to sue in its behalf. The respondent, however, failed to establish
its claim that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent in the Philippines. Even
the identification card25 of Atty. Aguinaldo which the respondent appended to
its pleading merely showed that he is the company lawyer of the
respondents Manila Regional Office.
The respondent, through Atty. Aguinaldo, announced the holding of the
teleconference only during the hearing of January 28, 2000; Atty. Aguinaldo
then prayed for ten days, or until February 8, 2000, within which to submit the
board resolution purportedly authorizing him to file the complaint and execute
the required certification against forum shopping. The court granted the
motion.26 The respondent, however, failed to comply, and instead prayed for
15 more days to submit the said resolution, contending that it was with its
main office in Korea. The court granted the motion per its Order 27 dated
February 11, 2000. The respondent again prayed for an extension within
which to submit the said resolution, until March 6, 2000. 28 It was on the said
date that the respondent submitted an affidavit of its general manager Suk
Kyoo Kim, stating, inter alia, that he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended the said
teleconference on June 25, 1999, where the Board of Directors supposedly
approved the following resolution:
RESOLVED, that Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A. Aguinaldo
& Associates or any of its lawyers are hereby appointed and
authorized to take with whatever legal action necessary to effect the
collection of the unpaid account of Expert Travel & Tours. They are
hereby specifically authorized to prosecute, litigate, defend, sign and
execute any document or paper necessary to the filing and
prosecution of said claim in Court, attend the Pre-trial Proceedings
and enter into a compromise agreement relative to the abovementioned claim.29
But then, in the same affidavit, Suk Kyoo Kim declared that the respondent
"do[es] not keep a written copy of the aforesaid Resolution" because no
records of board resolutions approved during teleconferences were kept.
This belied the respondents earlier allegation in its February 10, 2000 motion
for extension of time to submit the questioned resolution that it was in the
custody of its main office in Korea. The respondent gave the trial court the
impression that it needed time to secure a copy of the resolution kept in
Korea, only to allege later (via the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim) that it had no
18
such written copy. Moreover, Suk Kyoo Kim stated in his affidavit that the
resolution was embodied in the Secretarys/Resident Agents Certificate
signed by Atty. Aguinaldo. However, no such resolution was appended to the
said certificate.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., out of the country.
19
xxx
xxx
20
21
classified as an industrial zone.28 Among its early industrial settlers were the
oil companies. Shell established its installation there on January 30,
1914.29 Caltex (now Chevron) followed suit in 1917 when the company began
marketing its products in the country.30 In 1922, it built a warehouse depot
which was later converted into a key distribution terminal. 31 The corporate
presence in the Philippines of Esso (Petrons predecessor) became more
keenly felt when it won a concession to build and operate a refinery in
Bataan in 1957.32 It then went on to operate a state-of-the-art lube oil
blending plant in the Pandacan Terminals where it manufactures lubes and
greases.33
On December 8, 1941, the Second World War reached the shores of the
Philippine Islands. Although Manila was declared an open city, the Americans
had no interest in welcoming the Japanese. In fact, in their zealous attempt
to fend off the Japanese Imperial Army, the United States Army took control
of the Pandacan Terminals and hastily made plans to destroy the storage
facilities to deprive the advancing Japanese Army of a valuable logistics
weapon.34 The U.S. Army burned unused petroleum, causing a frightening
conflagration. Historian Nick Joaquin recounted the events as follows:
After the USAFFE evacuated the City late in December 1941, all
army fuel storage dumps were set on fire. The flames spread,
enveloping the City in smoke, setting even the rivers ablaze,
endangering bridges and all riverside buildings. For one week
longer, the "open city" blazeda cloud of smoke by day, a pillar of
fire by night.35
The fire consequently destroyed the Pandacan Terminals and rendered its
network of depots and service stations inoperative. 36
After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. Pandacan changed as
Manila rebuilt itself. The three major oil companies resumed the operation of
their depots.37 But the district was no longer a sparsely populated industrial
zone; it had evolved into a bustling, hodgepodge community. Today,
Pandacan has become a densely populated area inhabited by about 84,000
people, majority of whom are urban poor who call it home. 38 Aside from
numerous industrial installations, there are also small businesses, churches,
restaurants, schools, daycare centers and residences situated
there.39 Malacaang Palace, the official residence of the President of the
Philippines and the seat of governmental power, is just two kilometers
away.40 There is a private school near the Petron depot. Along the walls of
the Shell facility are shanties of informal settlers. 41 More than 15,000
students are enrolled in elementary and high schools situated near these
22
23
We now proceed to the issue of whether the injunctive writs are legal
impediments to the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:
First, we note that while Chevron and Shell still have in their favor the writs of
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction, the status quo
order in favor of Petron is no longer in effect since the court granted the joint
motion of the parties to withdraw the complaint and counterclaim. 60
Second, the original parties failed to inform the Court about these injunctive
writs. Respondent (who was also impleaded as a party in the RTC cases)
defends himself by saying that he informed the court of the pendency of the
civil cases and that a TRO was issued by the RTC in the consolidated cases
filed by Chevron and Shell. It is true that had the oil companies only
intervened much earlier, the Court would not have been left in the dark about
these facts. Nevertheless, respondent should have updated the Court, by
way of manifestation, on such a relevant matter.
In his memorandum, respondent mentioned the issuance of a TRO. Under
Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a TRO issued by the RTC is
effective only for a period of 20 days. This is why, in our March 7, 2007
decision, we presumed with certainty that this had already
lapsed.61 Respondent also mentioned the grant of injunctive writs in his
rejoinder which the Court, however, expunged for being a prohibited
pleading. The parties and their counsels were clearly remiss in their duties to
this Court.
In resolving controversies, courts can only consider facts and issues pleaded
by the parties.62 Courts, as well as magistrates presiding over them are not
omniscient. They can only act on the facts and issues presented before them
in appropriate pleadings. They may not even substitute their own personal
knowledge for evidence. Nor may they take notice of matters except those
expressly provided as subjects of mandatory judicial notice.
24
Judge Reynaldo G. Ros, in his order dated May 19, 2003, stated his basis for
issuing the injunctive writs:
The Court, in resolving whether or not a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction should be issued, is guided by
the following requirements: (1) a clear legal right of the complainant;
(2) a violation of that right; and (3) a permanent and urgent necessity
for the Writ to prevent serious damage. The Court believes that these
requisites are present in these cases.
There is no doubt that the plaintiff/petitioners have been legitimately
operating their business in the Pandacan Terminal for many years
and they have made substantial capital investment therein. Every
year they were issued Business Permits by the City of Manila. Its
operations have not been declared illegal or contrary to law or
morals. In fact, because of its vital importance to the national
economy, it was included in the Investment Priorities Plan as
mandated under the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of
1988 (R.A. 8479). As a lawful business, the plaintiff/petitioners have
a right, therefore, to continue their operation in the Pandacan
Terminal and the right to protect their investments. This is a clear and
unmistakable right of the plaintiff/petitioners.
The enactment, therefore, of City Ordinance No. 8027 passed by the
City Council of Manila reclassifying the area where the Pandacan
Terminal is located from Industrial II to Commercial I and requiring
the plaintiff/petitioners to cease and desist from the operation of their
business has certainly violated the rights of the plaintiff/petitioners to
continue their legitimate business in the Pandacan Terminal and
deprived them of their huge investments they put up therein. Thus,
before the Court, therefore, determines whether the Ordinance in
question is valid or not, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and a Writ of
Mandatory Injunction be issued to prevent serious and irreparable
damage to plaintiff/petitioners.65
Nowhere in the judges discussion can we see that, in addition to a
showing of a clear legal right of Chevron and Shell to the remedy
sought, he was convinced that they had made out a case of
unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough to overcome the
presumption of validity of the ordinance. Statutes and ordinances are
presumed valid unless and until the courts declare the contrary in clear and
unequivocal terms.66 The mere fact that the ordinance is alleged to be
unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its enforcement
enjoined.67 The presumption is all in favor of validity. The reason for this is
obvious:
The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be
lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be
familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with
all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and
necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well being of the people . . . The Judiciary should not
lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion
of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. 68
Xxx
...[Courts] accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide
by the Constitution but also because the judiciary[,] in the
determination of actual cases and controversies[,] must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.69
The oil companies argue that this presumption must be set aside when the
invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance
itself.70 We see no reason to set aside the presumption. The ordinance, on its
face, does not at all appear to be unconstitutional. It reclassified the subject
area from industrial to commercial. Prima facie, this power is within the
power of municipal corporations:
The power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into
industrial, commercial and residential zones is recognized in almost
all jurisdictions inasmuch as it is derived from the police power itself
and is exercised for the protection and benefit of their inhabitants. 71
Xxx
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to divide
its territory into residential and industrial zones, and to prescribe that
offensive and unwholesome trades and occupations are to be
established exclusively in the latter zone.
25
xxx
xxx
xxx
Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of
municipal ordinances, a court is not required to take judicial notice of
ordinances that are not before it and to which it does not have access. The
party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court
with the full text of the rules the party desires it to have notice of. 75 Counsel
should take the initiative in requesting that a trial court take judicial notice of
an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to take judicial notice of
local ordinances.76
The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local
ordinance is to remove any discretion a court might have in determining
whether or not to take notice of an ordinance. Such a statute does not direct
the court to act on its own in obtaining evidence for the record and a party
must make the ordinance available to the court for it to take notice. 77
In its defense, respondent claimed that he did not inform the Court about the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8119 because he believed that it was different
from Ordinance No. 8027 and that the two were not inconsistent with each
other.78
In the same way that we deem the intervenors late intervention in this case
unjustified, we find the failure of respondent, who was an original party here,
inexcusable.
The Rule On Judicial Admissions Is Not Applicable Against Respondent
The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance
No. 8027 was repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379
(where Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027) when the
parties in their joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated
that "the issue ...has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the
passage of [Ordinance No. 8119]."79 They contend that such admission
worked as an estoppel against the respondent.
Respondent countered that this stipulation simply meant that Petron was
recognizing the validity and legality of Ordinance No. 8027 and that it had
conceded the issue of said ordinances constitutionality, opting instead to
question the validity of Ordinance No. 8119.80 The oil companies deny this
and further argue that respondent, in his answer in civil case no. 06-115334
(where Chevron and Shell are asking for the nullification of Ordinance No.
8119), expressly stated that Ordinance No. 8119 replaced Ordinance No.
8027:81
26
... Under Ordinance No. 8027, businesses whose uses are not in
accord with the reclassification were given six months to cease [their]
operation. Ordinance No. 8119, which in effect, replaced
Ordinance [No.] 8027, merely took note of the time frame provided
for in Ordinance No. 8119.... Ordinance No. 8119 thus provided for
an even longer term, that is[,] seven years; 82 (Emphasis supplied)
Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written,
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case,
does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. (Emphasis supplied)
Zone (R-3/MXD)"87 whereas Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the same area
from Industrial II to Commercial I:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and
ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of
Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those]
portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track
in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and
Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area,
Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr.
M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the
Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are
herebyreclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Ordinance No. 8119 provides for a phase-out of seven years:
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
27
Ordinance No. 8119 also designated the Pandacan oil depot area as a
"Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD)":
SEC. 23. Use Regulations in Planned Unit Development/Overlay
Zone (O-PUD). O-PUD Zones are identified specific sites in the
City of Manila wherein the project site is comprehensively planned as
an entity via unitary site plan which permits flexibility in planning/
design, building siting, complementarily of building types and land
uses, usable open spaces and the preservation of significant natural
land features, pursuant to regulations specified for each particular
PUD. Enumerated below are identified PUD:
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
iyon lang po ang ni-lift eithe at inilagay eith. At eith eith ordinansang
iyong naipasa ng huling Konseho, niri-classify [ninyo] from
Industrial II to Commercial C-1 ang area ng Pandacan kung nasaan
ang oil depot. So ini-lift lang po [eithe] iyong definition, density, at
saka po yon pong ng noong ordinansa ninyo na siya eith
naming inilagay eith, iniba lang po naming iyong title. So wala po
kaming binago na taliwas o nailagay na taliwas doon sa
ordinansang ipinasa ninyo, ni-lift lang po [eithe] from Ordinance
No. 8027."90 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with respondent.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later
date clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on
the subject, that intention must be given effect.91
There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the provisions in the
two acts on the same subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, the
latter act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one.92 The second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the
earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the
earlier law.93 The oil companies argue that the situation here falls under the
first category.
Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent
of the legislators is manifest.94 As statutes and ordinances are presumed to
be passed only after careful deliberation and with knowledge of all existing
ones on the subject, it follows that, in passing a law, the legislature did not
intend to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject
matter.95 If the intent to repeal is not clear, the later act should be construed
as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the earlier act. 96
These standards are deeply enshrined in our jurisprudence. We disagree
that, in enacting Ordinance No. 8119, there was any indication of the
legislative purpose to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. 97 The excerpt quoted
above is proof that there was never such an intent. While it is true that both
ordinances relate to the same subject matter,i.e. classification of the land use
of the area where Pandacan oil depot is located, if there is no intent to repeal
the earlier enactment, every effort at reasonable construction must be made
to reconcile the ordinances so that both can be given effect:
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter
as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an
28
implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely be
cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What is necessary is a
manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal. 98
For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable conflict
between the two ordinances. There is no conflict between the two
ordinances. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the Pandacan area from
Industrial II to Commercial I. Ordinance No. 8119, in Section 23, designated it
as a "Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD)." In its Annex C
which defined the zone boundaries,99 the Pandacan area was shown to be
within the "High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD)." These
zone classifications in Ordinance No. 8119 are not inconsistent with the
reclassification of the Pandacan area from Industrial to Commercial in
Ordinance No. 8027. The "O-PUD" classification merely made Pandacan a
"project site ... comprehensively planned as an entity via unitary site plan
which permits flexibility in planning/design, building siting, complementarity of
building types and land uses, usable open spaces and the preservation of
significant natural land features...."100 Its classification as "R-3/MXD" means
that it should "be used primarily for high-rise housing/dwelling purposes and
limited complementary/supplementary trade, services and business
activities."101 There is no conflict since both ordinances actually have a
common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification from industrial to
commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential/commercial
(Ordinance No. 8119).
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that a subsequent
general law does not repeal a prior special law on the same subject unless it
clearly appears that the legislature has intended by the latter general act to
modify or repeal the earlier special law. Generalia specialibus non
derogant (a general law does not nullify a specific or special law). 102 This is
so even if the provisions of the general law are sufficiently comprehensive to
include what was set forth in the special act.103 The special act and the
general law must stand together, one as the law of the particular subject and
the other as the law of general application.104 The special law must be taken
as intended to constitute an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act
or provision.105
The reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a law of special
character, considers and makes special provisions for the particular
circumstances dealt with by the special law. This being so, the
legislature, by adopting a general law containing provisions
repugnant to those of the special law and without making any
mention of its intention to amend or modify such special law, cannot
29
The City of Manila Has The Power To Enact Ordinance No. 8027
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
in the exercise of its police power. Police power is the plenary power vested
in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people.116 This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est
suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). 117 While police
power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may be
delegated.118 Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause,
encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments: 119
Section 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for
its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential
to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to
a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies, in this case, theSangguniang Panlungsod or the city
council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the general
welfare of the city:
Section. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a)
The sangguniang panglungsod, as the legislative branch of the city,
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code xxxx
This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila:
Section 18. Legislative powers. The [City Council] shall have the
following legislative powers:
30
xxx
xxx
xxx
(g) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others
as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred by this chapter xxxx 120
Specifically, the Sanggunian has the power to "reclassify land within the
jurisdiction of the city."121
The Enactment Of Ordinance No. 8027 Is A Legitimate Exercise Of
Police Power
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly
exercised their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject
and a lawful method.122
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted "for the purpose of promoting sound urban
planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare" 123 of the
residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to
protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective,
the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial
to commercial.
The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement
and Urban Development of the City of Manila which recommended the
approval of the ordinance:
(1) the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and
highly volatile products which include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas,
aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among others;
(2) the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;
31
operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will
no longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial,
commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is
exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a
locality.132 Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the
power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any
resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust:
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to divide
its territory into residential and industrial zones, and to prescribe that
offensive and unwholesome trades and occupations are to be
established exclusively in the latter zone.
"The benefits to be derived by cities adopting such regulations
(zoning) may be summarized as follows: They attract a desirable and
assure a permanent citizenship; they foster pride in and attachment
to the city; they promote happiness and contentment; they stabilize
the use and value of property and promote the peace, [tranquility],
and good order of the city. We do not hesitate to say that the
attainment of these objects affords a legitimate field for the exercise
of the police power. He who owns property in such a district is not
deprived of its use by such regulations. He may use it for the
purposes to which the section in which it is located is dedicated. That
he shall not be permitted to use it to the desecration of the
community constitutes no unreasonable or permanent hardship and
results in no unjust burden."
xxx
xxx
xxx
not accurate since the ordinance merely prohibits the oil companies from
operating their businesses in the Pandacan area.
Indeed, the ordinance expressly delineated in its title and in Section 1 what it
pertained to. Therefore, the oil companies contention is not supported by the
text of the ordinance. Respondent succinctly stated that:
The oil companies are not forbidden to do business in the City of
Manila. They may still very well do so, except that their oil storage
facilities are no longer allowed in the Pandacan area. Certainly, there
are other places in the City of Manila where they can conduct this
specific kind of business. Ordinance No. 8027 did not render the oil
companies illegal. The assailed ordinance affects the oil companies
business only in so far as the Pandacan area is concerned. 134
The oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in other
appropriate zones in Manila. The City of Manila merely exercised its power to
regulate the businesses and industries in the zones it established:
As to the contention that the power to regulate does not include the
power to prohibit, it will be seen that the ordinance copied above
does not prohibit the installation of motor engines within the
municipality of Cabanatuan but only within the zone therein fixed. If
the municipal council of Cabanatuan is authorized to establish said
zone, it is also authorized to provide what kind of engines may be
installed therein. In banning the installation in said zone of all
engines not excepted in the ordinance, the municipal council of
Cabanatuan did no more than regulate their installation by means of
zonification.135
The oil companies aver that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive because
they have invested billions of pesos in the depot.136 Its forced closure will
result in huge losses in income and tremendous costs in constructing new
facilities.
Their contention has no merit. In the exercise of police power, there is a
limitation on or restriction of property interests to promote public welfare
which involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary only
when the states power of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain,
property is appropriated and applied to some public purpose. Property
condemned under the exercise of police power, on the other hand, is noxious
or intended for a noxious or forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not
compensable.137 The restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and
32
33
34
xxx
xxx
35
xxx
xxx
(g) Urban renewal, zoning, and land use planning, and shelter
services which include the formulation, adoption and implementation
of policies, standards, rules and regulations, programs and projects
to rationalize and optimize urban land use and provide direction to
urban growth and expansion, the rehabilitation and development of
slum and blighted areas, the development of shelter and housing
facilities and the provision of necessary social services thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)
Reference was also made to Section 15 of its implementing rules:
36
Section 15. Linkages with HUDCC, HLURB, NHA, LGUs and Other
National Government Agencies Concerned on Urban Renewal,
Zoning and Land Use Planning and Shelter Services. Within the
context of the National Housing and Urban Development Framework,
and pursuant to the national standards, guidelines and regulations
formulated by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB]
on land use planning and zoning, the [MMDA] shall prepare a
metropolitan physical framework plan and regulations which shall
complement and translate the socio-economic development plan for
Metro Manila into physical or spatial terms, and provide the basis for
the preparation, review, integration and implementation of local land
use plans and zoning, ordinance of cities and municipalities in the
area.
Said framework plan and regulations shall contain, among others,
planning and zoning policies and procedures that shall be observed
by local government units in the preparation of their own plans and
ordinances pursuant to Section 447 and 458 of RA 7160, as well as
the identification of sites and projects that are considered to be of
national or metropolitan significance.
Cities and municipalities shall prepare their respective land use
plans and zoning ordinances and submit the same for review
and integration by the [MMDA] and indorsement to HLURB in
accordance with Executive Order No. 72 and other pertinent
laws.
In the preparation of a Metropolitan Manila physical framework plan
and regulations, the [MMDA] shall coordinate with the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council, HLURB, the National
Housing Authority, Intramuros Administration, and all other agencies
of the national government which are concerned with land use and
zoning, urban renewal and shelter services. (Emphasis supplied)
They also claim that EO 72169 provides that zoning ordinances of cities and
municipalities of Metro Manila are subject to review by the HLURB to ensure
compliance with national standards and guidelines. They cite Section 1,
paragraphs I, (e), (f) and (g):
SECTION 1. Plan formulation or updating.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
37
Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA review and HLURB ratification are
necessary, the oil companies did not present any evidence to show that
these were not complied with. In accordance with the presumption of validity
in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in
the absence of proof showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not
observed. The burden of proof is on the oil companies which already had
notice that this Court was inclined to dispose of all the issues in this case. Yet
aside from their bare assertion, they did not present any certification from the
MMDA or the HLURB nor did they append these to their pleadings. Clearly,
they failed to rebut the presumption of validity of Ordinance No. 8027. 170
Conclusion
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They
allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However,
based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life
enjoys precedence over the right to property.171 The reason is obvious: life is
irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGUs exercise of police
power clashes with a few individuals right to property, the former should
prevail.172
Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of
Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt, there are no impediments to its
enforcement and implementation. Any delay is unfair to the inhabitants of the
City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically expressed their desire
for the relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and control their own
destiny and preserve their lives and safety should not be curtailed by the
intervenors warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of economic
disorder if the ordinance is enforced.
Secondary to the legal reasons supporting the immediate implementation of
Ordinance No. 8027 are the policy considerations which drove Manilas
government to come up with such a measure:
... [The] oil companies still were not able to allay the apprehensions
of the city regarding the security threat in the area in general. No
specific action plan or security measures were presented that would
prevent a possible large-scale terrorist or malicious attack especially
an attack aimed at Malacaang. The measures that were installed
were more directed towards their internal security and did not include
the prevention of an external attack even on a bilateral level of
cooperation between these companies and the police and military.
xxx
xxx
xxx
38
Qualified By
Sections 24-25, Rule 132
A Final Word
On Wednesday, January 23, 2008, a defective tanker containing 2,000 liters
of gasoline and 14,000 liters of diesel exploded in the middle of the street a
short distance from the exit gate of the Pandacan Terminals, causing death,
extensive damage and a frightening conflagration in the vicinity of the
incident. Need we say anthing about what will happen if it is the estimated
162 to 211 million liters175 of petroleum products in the terminal complex
which blow up?
WHEREFORE, the motions for leave to intervene of Chevron Philippines
Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, and the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Energy, are
hereby GRANTED. Their respective motions for reconsideration are
hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 39
is ORDERED to DISMISS the consolidated cases of Civil Case No. 03106377 and Civil Case No. 03-106380.
RULE 132
Presentation of Evidence
Section 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a)
39
Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d)
they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy
Yun Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he
married on January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the
legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is
the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the
administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p.
107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp.
12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the
legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp.
28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
40
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and
Sze Chun Yen, the acknowledged natural children of the
deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known
as Yui Yip, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy
Mat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to
the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on
December 7, 1976 in favor of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1",
English translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue Tractor and
Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and accordingly, said
property should be excluded from the estate of the deceased
Sy Kiat; and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook
Wah as judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased.
[CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 36- 37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was
however denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective
appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No.
56045 entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and
Rodolfo Sy v. Court of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and
Sy Chun Yen" questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court however resolved to deny
the petition and the motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry
of judgment was made in G.R. No. 56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of
the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition
was initially denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of
the petitioners the Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981
reconsidered the denial and decided to give due course to this petition.
Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO
YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
41
42
competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law
or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with
said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not
duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof
had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil.
137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the
principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
They must be alleged and proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector
of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the
foreign marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that
matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute
the essential requisite for a marriage to be considered duly solemnized in
China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the Court is uniformly
corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese marriage, what was left to
be decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in
accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy
Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed
taken judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case,
petitioners however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or
custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in
1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took
place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633
(1916)] as being applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial
pronouncement in the Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the
contracting parties is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds
true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said
case did not concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or
not the oral testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of
marriage in a complaint for adultery.
43
44
45
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting
rulings on the same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215,
July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63] but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of
suits. Accordingly, this Court finds no reversible error committed by
respondent court.
EN BANC
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur
G.R. No. L-8200
Section 46, Rule 130
RULE 130
Pedro Guevara for appellants.
Ramon Diokno for appellee.
Rules of Admissibility
Section 46. Learned treatises. A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet
on a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove
the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a
witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the
treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as
expert in the subject. (40a)
Judicial Admissions
Section 4, Rule 129
RULE 129
What Need Not Be Proved
Section 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by
the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
TRENT, J.:
In this case it appears that some chattels and real estate belonging to the
plaintiff, Lucido, were regularly sold at an execution sale on February 10,
1903, to one Rosales, who the text day transferred a one-half interest in the
property of Zolaivar. On March 30, 1903, a public document was executed
and signed by all of the above parties and the defendant, Gelasio Calupitan,
wherein it was stated that Rosales and Zolaivar, with the consent of Lucido,
sold all their rights had obligation pertaining to the property in question to
Calupitan for the amount of the purchase price together with 1 per cent per
month interest thereon up to the time of redemption, or 1,687 Mexican
dollars, plus 33.74 Mexican dollars, the amount of the interest. It will be
observed that the computation of the transfer price is in accordance with
section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the same day Lucido and
Calupitan executed the following document:
I, Gelasio Calupitan y Agarao, married, certify that I have delivered
this statement to Leonardo Lucido y Vidal to witness that his lands,
which appear in the instrument I hold from the deputy sheriff and for
46
which he has accepted money from me, I have ceded to him all the
irrigated lands until such time as he may repurchase all said lands
from me (not only he irrigated ones), as also the Vienna chairs, the
five-lamp chandelier, a lamp stand, two wall tables, and a marble
table; no coconut tree on said irrigated land is included. Apart from
this, our real agreement is to permit three (3) whole year to elapse,
reckoned from the date of this instrument, which has been drawn up
n duplicate, before he may redeem or repurchase them from me.
The lower court held that this document constituted a sale with the right to
conventional redemption set forth in articles 1507 et seq. of the Civil Code.
The present action not having been instituted until February 17, 1910, the fur
the question arose as to whether the redemption period had expired, which
the lower court decided in the negative. The lower court further found as a
fact that Lucido had prior to the institution of the action offered the
redemption price to the defendant, who refused it, and that this offer was a
sufficient compliance with article 1518 of the Civil Code. The decision of the
lower court was that the property in question should be returned to the
plaintiff. From this judgment the defendant appealed, and all three of the
above rulings of the court are assigned as errors.
1. Considerable doubt might arise as to the correctness of the ruling of the
lower court upon the first question, if the document executed by the
execution purchasers and the parties to this action stood alone. In that
document it appears that Calupitan acquired the rights and obligations of the
execution purchasers pertaining to the property in question. These rights and
obligations are defined in the Code of Civil Procedure to be the ownership of
the property sold, subject only to the right of redemption on the part of the
judgment debtor or a redemptioner, within one year from the date of the sale.
(Secs. 463-465, Code Civ. Proc.) Were this the nature of the transaction
between the parties, however, the intervention of Lucido in the transfer would
be wholly unnecessary. Hence, the fact that he intervened as an interested
party is at least some indication that the parties intended something more or
different by the document in question than a simple assignment of the rights
and obligations of the execution purchasers to a third person.
Any doubt, however, as to the character of this transaction is removed by the
agreement entered into between Lucido and calupitan on the same day. In
this document it is distinctly stipulated that the right to redeem the property is
preserved to Lucido, to be exercised after the expiration of three years. The
right to repurchase must necessary imply a former ownership of the property.
47
this amount the plaintiff furnished $120 Mexican, and Calupitan the balance
of $1,600.74 Mexican. No amount is fixed in the document of purchase and
sale above set forth, but the amount borrowed from Calupitan to redeem the
land from the execution sale being thus clearly established no objection can
be or is made to the plaintiff's paying this amount. In ordering the payment of
this amount to the defendant the lower court failed to reduce it to Philippine
currency. On this appeal plaintiff alleges that this amount in Mexican currency
exceeds the amount he actually owes to the defendant by about P100, but
that rather than spend the time and incur the expense attendant to new trial
for the purpose of determining the equivalent of his amount in Philippine
currency he is agreeable to pay the defendant P1,600.74 Philippine currency,
as the redemption price of the property. In view of this offer and in case it is
accepted by the defendant it will be unnecessary to go through formality of a
new trial for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of the fact that it is
claimed that Calupitan has sold the land in question to his codefendant,
Macario Dorado, and it not clearly appearing to whom the plaintiff should pay
the P1.600.74, we think this amount should be turned over to the clerk of the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna to be held by him until it is
determined in the proper manner who is the owner of this amount, Calupitan
for Dorado.
For the foregoing reasons, judgment will be entered directing the defendants
Calupitan and Dorado to deliver the possession of the land in question to the
plaintiff upon the plaintiff's depositing with the clerk of the court the sum of
P1,600.74, to be disposed of in the manner above set forth. In all other
respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the
appellants Calupitan and Dorado.
Arellano, C.J., Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
48
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, treated as a special civil
action. 1 prays that the judgment rendered by the then Court of Appeals in
the consolidated cases, CA-G.R. NO. 34998-R entitled "Macaria A. Torres,
plaintiff-appellee vs. Vicente Santillan, et al., defendants-appellants", and
CA-G.R. No. 34999-R entitled "Vicente Santillan, et al., plaintiffs-appellants
vs. Macaria A. Bautista, et al., defendants-appellees and the Resolution
denying the Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for New Trial, be set
aside; and that, instead, The Order of the Court of First Instance of August 7,
1963 be affirmed, or, in the alternative, that the case be remanded to it for
new trial.
Involved in this controversy are the respective claims of petitioner and private
respondents over Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate (part of the
friar lands) in Tanza, Cavite, with an area of approximately 1,622 square
meters. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804 issued in the
name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres.
The facts of the case cover three generations. The propositus, Margarita
Torres, during the Spanish regime, was married to Claro Santillan. Vicente
and Antonina were begotten of this union. Claro died leaving Margarita a
widow. Antonina married and had six children, namely: Alfredo, Salud
49
50
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta Cruz de Malabon
Estate is a conjugal partnership property of the spouses
Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres; and
(3) Adjudicating one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de
Malabon Estate to Macaria Torres, and the other half (1/2) in
equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud, Demetria
and Adelina, an surnamed Narciso, legitimate children and
heirs of Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already
dead. The parties may make the partition among themselves
by proper instruments of conveyance, subject to confirmation
by the Court. In fairness, however, to the parties, each party
should be alloted that portion of the lot where his or her
house has been constructed, as far as this is possible. In
case the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the
Court shall appoint three commissioners to make the
partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 8
The Appellate Court was of the opinion that:
Under Article 121 of the old Civil Code, the governing law on
the matter, children shall be considered legitimated by
subsequent marriage only when they have been
acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration
thereof, and Article 131 of the same code provides that the
acknowledgement of a natural child must be in the record of
birth, in a will or in some public document. Article 131 then
prescribed the form in which the acknowledgment of a
natural child should be made. The certificate of baptism of
51
(Thumbmarked) (Thumbmarked)
LEON ARVISU MARGARITA TORRES
T.
Public,
Not.
Reg.
P.
Book No. III Series of 1930. 11
Cavite
No.
No.
VELASCO
Province
56
2
The reason given for the non-production of the notarial document during trial
was that the same was only found by petitioner's daughter, Nemensia A.
Bautista, among the personal belongings of private respondent, Vicente
Santillan, an adverse party, after his death and who may have attempted to
suppress it. Private respondents, for their part, argued against new trial, and
contended that it is not newly discovered evidence which could not have
been produced during the trial by the exercise of due diligence.
The Decision of the Appellate Court was rendered by a Division of three,
composed of Justices Jesus Y. Perez, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B.
Reyes, ponente. When the Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial was
considered, there was disagreement, possibly as to whether or not new trial
52
procedural due process, a new trial would resolve such vital considerations
as (1) whether or not said Sworn Statement qualifies as the public document
prescribed in Article 131 of the old Civil Code; 15 (2) whether or not it
conforms to an act of acknowledgment by the parents after the celebration of
their marriage as required by Article 121 of the same code; 16 and (3)
whether or not petitioner's signature as a witness to said document was the
equivalent of the consent necessary for acknowledgment of an adult person
under Article 133 of that Code. 17 Affirmative answers would confer upon
petitioner the status of a legitimated child of her parents, and would entitle
her to enjoy hereditary rights to her mother's estate.
Private respondents stress that since petitioner signed as a witness to the
document she should be chargeable with knowledge of its existence, and,
therefore, the Sworn Statement was not newly discovered evidence. In our
view, the document can reasonably qualify as newly discovered evidence,
which could not have been produced during the trial even with the exercise of
due diligence; specially if it really had been in the possession of Vicente
Santillan, an adverse party who, it was alleged, suppressed the document.
In the interest of judicial expediency, the new trial can be conducted by
respondent Appellate Court, now empowered to do so under Section 9 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The second error attributed to the Appellate Court has been pleaded as
follows:
SO ORDERED.
Qualified By
Section 7, Rule 18
RULE 18
Pre-Trial
53
FRANCISCO, J.:p
Accused-appellant Cristina Hernandez was charged with the crime of
illegal recruitment committed in large scale in violating of Article 38
(a) and (b) in relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) of the New Labor
Code 1, committed as follows:
That in or about and during the period comprised between
December 14, 1988 to December 24, 1988, inclusive in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused representing
herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport
Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there
willfully and unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to the following persons
to wit: ROGELIO N. LEGASPI, ULDARICO P. LEGASPI,
SONNY P. BERNABE, ARNEL B. MENDOZA, BENITO L.
BERNABE, ARNOLD P. VALENZUELA, ARMANDO P.
PAGULAYAN, GREGORIO P. MENDOZA, JR., RONALD T.
CORREA, DANILO PALAD and ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ
(herein known as private complainants) without first having
secured the required license or authority from the
POEA. 2 (Emphasis supplied.)
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the
merits ensued. Of the fourteen (14) private complainants, four (4)
were presented as witnesses for the prosecution, namely: Benito L.
Bernabe, Robert P. Velasquez, Gregorio P. Mendoza and Arnel
Mendoza. They testified to the following essential facts: Private
complainants' first encounter with the appellant was on December
12, 1988 when one Josefa Cinco accompanied them to the office of
the Philippine Thai Association, Inc. (Philippine-Thai) in Ermita,
Manila to meet the appellant. Introducing herself as the general
manager of Philippine-Thai, appellant asserted that her company
recruited workers for placement abroad and asked private
complainants if they wanted to work as factory workers in Taipeh.
Enticed by the assurance of immediate employment and an $800 per
month salary, private complainants applied. Appellant required
54
55
56
consistent ruling of this Court on the matter. Thus, as held in the case
of U.S. vs. Donato: 14
The above ruling was reiterated in a subsequent case where the accused
was convicted solely on the basis of an agreement between the fiscal and
the counsel for the accused that certain witnesses would testify confirming
the complaint in all its parts. In reversing the judgment of conviction, this
Court held that:
57
58
The foregoing find basis in the general rule that a client is bound by the acts
of his counsel who represents him. 26For all intents and purposes, the acts of
a lawyer in the defense of a case are the acts of his client. The rule extends
even to the mistakes and negligence committed by the lawyer except only
when such mistakes would result in serious injustice to the client. 27 No
cogent reason exists to make such exception in this case. It is worth noting
that Atty. Ulep, appellant's counsel in the lower court, agreed to the
stipulation of facts proposed by the prosecution not out of mistake nor
inadvertence, but obviously because the said stipulation of facts was also in
conformity of defense's theory of the case. It may be recalled that throughout
the entire duration of the trial, appellant staunchly denied ever having
engaged in the recruitment business either in her personal capacity or
through Philippine-Thai. Therefore, it was but logical to admit that the POEA
records show that neither she nor Philippine-Thai was licensed or authorized
to recruit workers.
It is true that the rights of an accused during trial are given paramount
importance in our laws on criminal procedure. Among the fundamental rights
of the accused is the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against
him. 28 But the right of confrontation guaranteed and secured to the accused
is a personal privilege which may be waived. 29Thus, in the case
of U.S. vs. Anastasio, 30 this Court deemed as a waiver of the right of
confrontation, the admission by the accused that witnesses if present would
testify to certain facts stated in the affidavit of the prosecution. 31
In the same vein, it may be said that such an admission is a waiver of the
right of an accused to present evidence on his behalf. Although the right to
present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself for the
protection of the accused, this right may be waived expressly or
impliedly. 32 This is in consonance with the doctrine of waiver which
recognizes that ". . . everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the
advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the
individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished
without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community
at large." 33
The abovementioned doctrine is squarely applicable to the case at bar.
Appellant was never prevented from presenting evidence contrary to the
stipulation of facts. If appellant believed that the testimony of the Chief
Licensing Officer of the POEA would be beneficial to her case, then it is the
defense who should have presented him. Her continuous failure to do so
during trial was a waiver of her right to present the pertinent evidence to
contradict the stipulation of facts and establish her defense.
In view of the foregoing, the stipulation of facts proposed during trial by
prosecution and admitted by defense counsel is tantamount to a judicial
admission by the appellant of the facts stipulated on. Controlling, therefore, is
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made.
We now go to appellant's second and third assignment of errors. In her
second assignment of error, appellant makes much ado of the "judicial
notice" taken by the lower court of the fact that appellant had been charged
with another illegal recruitment case, 34 and in considering the pendency
thereof as evidence of the scheme and strategy adopted by the accused.
Appellant cites a violation of Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
which provides that before the court may take judicial notice of any matter,
the parties shall be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material
issue in the case. It is claimed that the lower court never announced its
intention to take judicial notice of the pendency of the other illegal recruitment
case nor did it allow the accused to be heard thereon.
It is true that as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the
fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the
same judge. 35 However, this rule is subject to the exception that:
. . . in the absence of objection and as a matter of
convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or
any part of the original record of the case filed in its archives
as read into the records of a case pending before it,
when with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is
made to it, by name and number or in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated, . . . 36 (emphasis supplied.)
The judicial notice taken by the lower court of the pendency of another illegal
recruitment case against the appellant falls squarely under the above
59
exception in view of the fact that it was the appellant herself who introduced
evidence on the matter when she testified in open court as follows:
Q: You mean to say . . . by the way, where
(sic) were you at the NBI when Mrs. Cinco
inquired from you about placement abroad?
A: I was just invited by the personnel of the
NBI and I was not allowed to go home.
Q: Whey were you invited by the NBI?
A: They told me that there was a complaint
against me.
Q: Complaint about what?
A: The same case.
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You made mention that an illegal
recruitment case which was supposed to be
the cause of your detention at the NBI . . .
I am not referring to this case, Mrs.
Hernandez what happened to that case,
what is the status of that case?
A: It is also in this sala.
is
already
submitted
Anent the last assignment of error, suffice it to say that we do not find any
compelling reason to reverse the findings of the lower court that appellant's
bare denials cannot overthrow the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses against her.
Well established is the rule that denials if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence are negative, self-serving evidence which deserve no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 38 That she
did not merely deny, but likewise raised as an affirmative defense her
appointment as mere nominee-president of Philippine-Thai is a futile attempt
at exculpating herself and is of no consequence whatsoever when weighed
against the positive declarations of witnesses that it was the appellant who
executed the acts of illegal recruitment as complained of.
Finally, under Article 39 of the New Labor Code, the penalty for illegal
recruitment committed in large scale is life imprisonment and a fine of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00). As previously held by this
Court, life imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua. 39 The
lower court erred in imposing "the penalty of life imprisonment
(reclusion perpetua) with the accessory penalties provided for by
law; . . . 40 (Emphasis supplied)
COURT: It
decision. 37
conviction was not based on the existence of another illegal recruitment case
filed against appellant by a different group of complainants, but on the
overwhelming evidence against her in the instant case.
for
Even assuming, however, that the lower court improperly took judicial notice
of the pendency of another illegal recruitment case against the appellant, the
error would not be fatal to the prosecution's cause. The judgment of
60
III. Kinds
Object / Real
Section 1, Rule 130
RULE 130
Rules of Admissibility
Section 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed
to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it
may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court. (1a)
September 8, 1920
The facts are not dispute. In a criminal case pending before the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are
charged with the crime of adultery. On this case coming on for trial before the
Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petitioner of the
assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered the defendant
Emeteria Villaflor, nor become the petitioner herein, to submit her body to the
examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was
pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that
such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision
relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court
and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the
medical examination required by the court.
The sole legal issue from the admitted facts is whether the compelling of a
woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she
is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that
portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure which find their origin in the
Constitution of the United States and practically all state constitutions and in
the common law rules of evidence, providing that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. (President's
Instructions to the Philippine Commission; Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
section 5, paragraph 3; Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, section 3;
paragraph 3; Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 [4]; United States
Constitution, fifth amendment.) Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily
exhibition is an infringement of the constitutional provision; the representative
of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of the constitutional
provision. The trial judge in the instant case has held with the fiscal; while it is
brought to our notice that a judge of the same court has held on an identical
question as contended for by the attorney for the accused and petitioner.
The authorities are abundant but conflicting. What may be termed the
conservative courts emphasize greatly the humanitarianism of the
constitutional provisions and are pleased to extend the privilege in order that
its mantle may cover any fact by which the accused is compelled to make
evidence against himself. (Compare State vs. Jacobs [1858], 50 N. C., 259
with State vs. Ah Chuey [1879], 14 Nev., 79. See further State vs. Ah
Nordstrom [1893], 7 Wash., 506; State vs. Height [1902]. 117 Iowa., 650;
Thornton vs. State [1903], 117 Wis., 338.) A case concordant with this view
and almost directly in point is People vs. McCoy ([1873], 45 How. Pr., 216). A
woman was charged with the crime of infanticide. The corner directed two
physicians to go to the jail and examine her private parts to determine
whether she had recently been delivered of a child. She objected to the
examination, but being threatened with force, yielded, and the examination
was had. The evidence of these physicians was offered at the trial and ruled
61
out. The court said that the proceeding was in violation of the spirit and
meaning of the Constitution, which declares that "no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Continuing,
the court said: "They might as well have sworn the prisoner, and compelled
her, by threats, to testify that she had been pregnant, and had been delivered
of a child, as to have compelled her, by threats, to allow them to look into her
person, with the aid of a speculum, to ascertain whether she had been
pregnant and been delivered of a child. . . . Has this court the right to compel
the prisoner now to submit to an examination they are of the opinion she is
not a virgin, and has had a child? It is not possible that this court has that
right; and it is too clear to admit of argument that evidence thus obtained
would be inadmissible against the prisoner."
It may be revealing a judicial secret, but nevertheless we cannot refrain from
saying that, greatly impressed with the weight of these decisions, especially
the one written by Mr. Justice McClain, in State vs. Height, supra, the instant
case was reported by the writer with the tentative recommendation that the
court should lay down the general rule that a defendant can be compelled to
disclose only those parts of the body which are not usually covered. Buth
having disabused our minds of a too sensitive appreciation of the rights of
accused persons, and having been able, as we think, to penetrate through
the maze of law reports to the policy which lies behind the constitutional
guaranty and the common law principle, we have come finally to take our
stand with what we believe to be the reason of the case.
In contradistinction to the cases above-mentioned are others which seem to
us more progressive in nature. Among these can be prominently mentioned
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of
these Islands. Thus, the always forward looking jurist, Mr. Justice Holmes, in
the late case of Holt vs. United States ([1910], 218 U. S., 245), in resolving
an objection based upon what he termed "an extravagant extension of the
Fifth Amendment," said: "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence when it may be material." (See also, of same general
tenor, decision of Mr. Justice Day in Adams vs. New York [1903], 192 U. S.,
585.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, in two decisions, has
seemed to limit the protection to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial
self-incrimination. The constitutional limitation was said to be "simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips,
against his will, an admission of his guilt." (U. S. vs. Tan Teng [1912], 23
Phil., 145; U. S. vs. Ong Siu Hong [1917], 36 Phil., 735, and the derivatory
principle announced in 16 Corpus Juris, 567, 568, citing the United States
62
63
PUNO, J.:
The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the
aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. This was the time when the newlyinstalled government of President Corazon C. Aquino was being openly
challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by "Marcos
loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension
and animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes broke into violence. On
July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known
"Coryista."
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court
against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the
murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No. 86-47322 was filed against Raul
Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon; Criminal Case No. 86-47617
against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero;
Criminal Case No. 86-47790 against Richard de los Santos y Arambulo;
Criminal Case No. 86-48538 against Joselito Tamayo y Ortia; and Criminal
Case No. 86-48931 against Rolando Fernandez y Mandapat. Also filed were
Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008 against Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega as well as Annie Ferrer charging them as accomplices to
the murder of Salcedo.
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLIX, Manila. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial
ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented twelve witnesses, including
two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the police
officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their
testimonies, the prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence
consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs
taken during the mauling.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to
be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a
permit to hold the rally but their application was denied by the authorities.
Despite this setback, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal
Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led
by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both members of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the loyalists started an impromptu singing contest, recited
prayers and delivered speeches in between. Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then
Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and asked the
leaders for their permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres
thereupon gave them ten minutes to disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for
thirty minutes but this was refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group
and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty. Nuega
added "Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd, and
used tear gas and truncheons to disperse them. The loyalists scampered
away but some of them fought back and threw stones at the police.
Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the situation later
stabilized. 1
At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese
Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular
movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos, jogging around the
fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and Annie
Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then
she continued jogging around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin, Marcos
pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, Bugbugin ang mga
nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie
Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang
gumanti, tayo ngayon!" A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a
cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of
the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt. 2 He then saw a man wearing
a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting "Iyan, habulin
iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers
appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked
and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they
64
again pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting
him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an
electrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the
maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued
Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave
Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They
backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from
them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another
man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed
Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was already
fallen. 3 Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left
side of his head and ear. 4 Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his
nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!" 5Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar
but the latter lunged at the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed
Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more fell. Banculo saw
accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he
tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed him. 6 Sumilang saw accused Gerry
Neri approach the victim but did not notice what he did. 7
Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right knee.
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the
blood from his face. He sat on some cement steps 8 and then tried to flee
towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but
accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the
process. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin.
Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?" 9
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas
Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged
down a van and with the help of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to the
Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him to
the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various
contusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds and skull fractures as revealed in
the following post-mortem findings:
Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.
Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm., frontal
region, right side; 6.8 x 4.2 cm., frontal region, left side; 5.0 x
4.0 cm., right cheek; 5.0 x 3.5 cm., face, left side; 3.5 x 2.0
cm., nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear, pinna; 5.0 x 4.0 cm. left
suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right elbow.
Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm.,
upper lip.
Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal
region; right temporal region; occipital region, right side.
Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior
cranial fossa; right anterior cranial fossa.
Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, about 1/2 filled with grayish brown food materials
and fluid. 10
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the
mauling of the victim and offered their respective alibis. Accused Joselito
Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the photographs presented by the
prosecution 12 because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in Quezon
City. 13 Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of
the
incident. 14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his
office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures to be developed at that
time. 15 He claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility; he cannot
run normally nor do things forcefully. 16 Richard de los Santos admits he was
at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. 17 He said
that he merely watched the mauling which explains why his face appeared in
65
some of the photographs.18 Unlike the other accused, Nilo Pacadar admits
that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of the Ako'y Pilipino Movement
and that he attended the rally on that fateful day. According to him, he saw
Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los Santos, merely viewed the
incident. 19 His face was in the pictures because he shouted to the maulers to
stop hitting Salcedo. 20 Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the
maulers because he pitied Salcedo. The maulers however ignored him. 21
The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer
opted not to testify in their defense.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo
Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo
guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery and
sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was
likewise convicted as an accomplice. The court, however, found that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other accused and thus acquitted
Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin
Nuega. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered in the
aforementioned cases as follows:
1. In "People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery," Criminal
Case No. 86-47322, the Court finds that the Prosecution
failed to prove the guilt of the two (2) Accused beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits
them of said charge;
2. In "People versus Romeo Sison, et al.," Criminal Case
No. 86-47617, the Court finds the Accused Romeo Sison,
Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
as principals for the crime of Murder, defined in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, and, there being no other
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby imposes on
each of them an indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN
(14)YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS,
of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) DAYS,
of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20)
YEARS ofReclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
66
67
68
undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the whole, his testimony
was correctly given credence by the trial court despite his evasiveness at
some instances. Except for compelling reasons, we cannot disturb the way
trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses considering their visual view
of the demeanor of witnesses when on the witness stand. As trial courts, they
can best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal dimensions of a witness'
testimony.
Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does
not make him an entirely untrustworthy witness. 33 It does not make his whole
testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful
testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with
imperfect senses. In the court's discretion, therefore, the testimony of a
witness can be believed as to some facts but disbelieved with respect to the
others. 34
We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses'
testimonies corroborate each other on all important and relevant details of
the principal occurrence. Their positive identification of all petitioners jibe with
each other and their narration of the events are supported by the medical
and documentary evidence on record.
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, testified that the victim had various wounds on his body which
could have been inflicted by pressure from more than one hard object. 35 The
contusions and abrasions found could have been caused by punches, kicks
and blows from rough stones. 36 The fatal injury of intracranial hemorrhage
was a result of fractures in Salcedo's skull which may have been caused by
contact with a hard and blunt object such as fistblows, kicks and a blunt
wooden instrument. 37
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched.
Sumilang in fact testified that Salcedo was pummeled by his assailants with
stones in their hands. 38
Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly
disregarded Exhibits "D," "G," and "P," it erroneously gave evidentiary weight
to Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to "W-13." 39 Exhibit "O" is the
Joint Affidavit of Pat. Flores and Pat. Bautista, the police intelligenceoperatives who witnessed the rally and subsequent dispersal operation. Pat.
Flores properly identified Exhibit "O" as his sworn statement and in fact gave
testimony corroborating the contents thereof. 40 Besides, the Joint Affidavit
merely reiterates what the other prosecution witnesses testified to.
69
70
71
That, on or about the 11th day of April, 1994, in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
deliberate and malicious intent of maligning, impeaching and discrediting the
honesty, integrity, reputation, prestige and honor of late CFI Judge Agapito Y.
Hontanosas, who was during his [lifetime] a CFI Judge of Cebu and a man of
good reputation and social standing in the community and for the purpose of
exposing him to public hatred, contempt, disrespect and ridicule, in his radio
program "TUG-ANI AND LUNGSOD" (TELL THE PEOPLE) over radio station
DYFX, openly, publicly and repeatedly announce[d] the following: "KINING
MGA
HONTANOSAS,
AGAPITO
HONTANOSAS
UG
CASTOR
HONTANOSAS, MGA COLLABORATOR SA PANAHON SA GUERRA. SA
ATO PA, TRAYDOR SA YUTANG NATAWHAN." X X X. "DUNAY DUGO
NGA
PAGKATRAYDOR
ANG
AMAHAN
NI
MANOLING
HONTANOSAS," which in English means: "THESE HONTANOSAS,
City Prosecutor4
72
In its order dated 25 May 1998, 7 the motion for consolidation filed by
petitioner Torralba was granted by the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City.
During the trial on the merits of the consolidated cases, the prosecution
presented as witnesses Segundo Lim, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas,
and Gabriel Sarmiento.
Lim testified that he was one of the incorporators of the Tagbilaran Maritime
Services, Inc. (TMSI) and was at that time the assigned manager of the port
in Tagbilaran City. According to him, sometime during the Marcos
administration, petitioner Torralba sought TMSIs sponsorship of his radio
program. This request was approved by private complainant Atty.
Hontanosas who was then the president of TMSI. During the existence of
said sponsorship agreement, the management of TMSI noticed that
petitioner Torralba was persistently attacking former Bureau of Internal
Revenue Deputy Director Tomas Toledo and his brother Boy Toledo who was
a customs collector. Fearing that the Toledos would think that TMSI was
behind the incessant criticisms hurled at them, the management of TMSI
decided to cease sponsoring petitioner Torralbas radio show. In effect, the
TMSI sponsored"Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" for only a month at the cost
of P500.00.
Soon thereafter, petitioner Torralba took on the management of TMSI. Lim
testified that petitioner Torralba accused TMSI of not observing the minimum
wage law and that said corporation was charging higher handling rates than
what it was supposed to collect.
On 17 December 1993, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas went on-air in
petitioner Torralbas radio program to explain the side of TMSI. The day after
said incident, however, petitioner Torralba resumed his assault on TMSI and
its management. It was petitioner Torralbas relentless badgering of TMSI
which allegedly prompted Lim to tape record petitioner Torralbas radio
broadcasts. Three of the tape recordings were introduced in evidence by the
prosecution, to wit:
Exhibit B - tape recording of 19 January 19948
Exhibit C - tape recording of 25 January 19949
Exhibit D - tape recording of 11 April 199410
During his testimony, Lim admitted that he did not know how to operate a
tape recorder and that he asked either his adopted daughter, Shirly Lim, or
his housemaid to record petitioner Torralbas radio program. He maintained,
however, that he was near the radio whenever the recording took place and
had actually heard petitioner Torralbas radio program while it was being
taped. This prompted petitioner Torralba to pose a continuing objection to the
admission of the said tape recordings for lack of proper authentication by the
person who actually made the recordings. In the case of the subject tape
recordings, Lim admitted that they were recorded by Shirly Lim. The trial
court provisionally admitted the tape recordings subject to the presentation
by the prosecution of Shirly Lim for the proper authentication of said pieces
of evidence. Despite petitioner Torralbas objection to the formal offer of
these pieces of evidence, the court a quo eventually admitted the three tape
recordings into evidence.11
It was revealed during Lims cross-examination 12 that petitioner Torralba
previously instituted a criminal action for libel 13 against the former arising
from an article published in the Sunday Post, a newspaper of general
circulation in the provinces of Cebu and Bohol. In said case, Lim was found
guilty as charged by the trial court14 and this decision was subsequently
affirmed, with modification, by the Court of Appeals in its decision
promulgated on 29 July 1996 in CA-G.R. CR No. 16413 entitled, "People of
the Philippines v. Segundo Lim and Boy Guingguing." 15 In our resolution of
04 December 1996, we denied Lims petition for review on certiorari.16
For his part, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas testified that he was at
that time the chairman and manager of TMSI; that on 20 January 1994, Lim
presented to him a tape recording of petitioner Torralbas radio program aired
on 18 January 1994 during which petitioner Torralba allegedly criticized him
and stated that he was a person who could not be trusted; that in his radio
show on 25 January 1994, petitioner Torralba mentioned that "he was now
[wary] to interview any one because he had a sad experience with someone
who betrayed him and this someone was like his father who was a
collaborator"; that on 12 April 1994, Lim brought to his office a tape recording
of petitioner Torralbas radio program of 11 April 1994 during which petitioner
Torralba averred that the Hontanosas were traitors to the land of their birth;
that Judge Agapito Hontanosas and Castor Hontanosas were collaborators
during the Japanese occupation; and that after he informed his siblings
regarding this, they asked him to institute a case against petitioner Torralba. 17
When he was cross-examined by petitioner Torralbas counsel, private
complainant Atty. Hontanosas disclosed that he did not actually hear
73
However, the Court finds the same accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt in Crim. Case No. 9107 for his unwarranted blackening of the memory
of the late Hon. CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas through the air lanes in his
radio program resulting to the dishonor and wounded feelings of his children,
grandchildren, relatives, friends, and close associates. For this, the Court
hereby sentences the accused to imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of FOUR MONTHS of Arresto Mayor to THREE YEARS of Prision
Correccional medium period pursuant to Art. 353 in relation to Art. 354 and
Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code under which the instant case falls.
Furthermore, he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Judge Agapito Y.
Hontanosas for moral damages suffered in the amount of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as prayed for, considering their good reputation
and high social standing in the community and the gravity of the dishonor
and public humiliation caused.21
Petitioner Torralba seasonably filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals
which, in the challenged decision before us, affirmed, with modification, the
findings of the court a quo, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with
the modification that accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, eleven
(11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional and to pay moral
damages in the amount of P100,000.00.22
Hence, the present recourse where petitioner Torralba raises the following
issues:
I
74
(1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony;
(2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent;
(3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording;
(4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made;
(5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording;
(6) identification of the speakers; and
(7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any
kind of inducement.26
In one case, it was held that the testimony of the operator of the recording
device as regards its operation, his method of operating it, the accuracy of
the recordings, and the identities of the persons speaking laid a sufficient
foundation for the admission of the recordings. 27 Likewise, a witness
declaration that the sound recording represents a true portrayal of the voices
contained therein satisfies the requirement of authentication. 28 The party
seeking the introduction in evidence of a tape recording bears the burden of
going forth with sufficient evidence to show that the recording is an accurate
reproduction of the conversation recorded.29
This Court deems it proper to first resolve the issue of the propriety of the
lower courts admission in evidence of the 11 April 1994 tape recording.
Oddly, this matter was not addressed head-on by the Office of the Solicitor
General in its comment.
Petitioner Torralba vigorously argues that the court a quo should not have
given considerable weight on the tape recording in question as it was not
duly authenticated by Lims adopted daughter, Shirly Lim. Without said
authentication, petitioner Torralba continues, the tape recording is
incompetent and inadmissible evidence. We agree.
In the case at bar, one can easily discern that the proper foundation for the
admissibility of the tape recording was not adhered to. It bears stressing that
Lim categorically admitted in the witness stand that he was not familiar at all
with the process of tape recording31 and that he had to instruct his adopted
daughter to record petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts, thus:
ATTY. HONTANOSAS:
q Was this radio program of the accused recorded on April 11, 1994?
75
a Yes, sir.
q Who recorded the same radio program of April 11, 1994?
a It was my adopted daughter whom I ordered to tape recorded the radio
program of Choy Torralba.32
Clearly, Shirly Lim, the person who actually recorded petitioner Torralbas
radio show on 11 April 1994, should have been presented by the prosecution
in order to lay the proper foundation for the admission of the purported tape
recording for said date. Without the requisite authentication, there was no
basis for the trial court to admit the tape recording Exhibit "D" in
evidence.
In view of our disallowance of the 11 April 1994 tape recording, we are
constrained to examine the records of this case in order to determine the
sufficiency of evidence stacked against petitioner Torralba, bearing in mind
that in criminal cases, the guilt of the accused can only be sustained upon
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In his comprehensive book on evidence, our former colleague, Justice
Ricardo Francisco, wrote that "[e]vidence of a message or a speech by
means of radio broadcast is admissible as evidence when the identity of the
speaker is established either by the testimony of a witness who saw him
broadcast his message or speech, or by the witness recognition of the voice
of the speaker."33
The records of this case are bereft of any proof that a witness saw petitioner
Torralba broadcast the alleged libelous remarks on 11 April 1994. Lim,
however, stated that while petitioner Torralbas radio program on that date
was being tape recorded by his adopted daughter, he was so near the radio
that he could even touch the same. 34In effect, Lim was implying that he was
listening to "Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" at that time. In our view, such bare
assertion on the part of Lim, uncorroborated as it was by any other evidence,
fails to meet the standard that a witness must be able to "recognize the voice
of the speaker." Being near the radio is one thing; actually listening to the
radio broadcast and recognizing the voice of the speaker is another. Indeed,
a person may be in close proximity to said device without necessarily
listening to the contents of a radio broadcast or to what a radio commentator
is saying over the airwaves.
by the latter with the crime of libel and for which he was found guilty as
charged by the court. Surely then, Lim could not present himself as an
"uninterested witness" whose testimony merits significance from this Court.
Nor is this Court inclined to confer probative value on the testimony of private
complainant Atty. Hontanosas particularly in the light of his declaration that
he did not listen to petitioner Torralbas radio show subject of this petition. He
simply relied on the tape recording handed over to him by Lim.
Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given effect to the
constitutional presumption of innocence which can only be overcome by
contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt -- one which requires moral
certainty, a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience
of those who are to act upon it.35 As we have so stated in the past
Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with
guilt, the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this standard, there is need
for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the State, both oral and
documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused.
Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion
that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under
such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus
required that every circumstance favoring innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.36
Confronted with what the State was able to present as evidence against
petitioner Torralba, this Court is compelled to overturn the decision of the
Court of Appeals due to insufficiency of evidence meriting a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision promulgated on 22
May 2002 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the omnibus decision dated 24
August 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City, is
hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Instead, a
new
one
is
entered ACQUITTING petitioner Cirse Francisco "Choy" Torralba of the
crime of libel. The cash bond posted by said petitioner is ordered released to
him subject to the usual auditing and accounting procedures. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
What further undermines the credibility of Lims testimony is the fact that he
had an ax to grind against petitioner Torralba as he was previously accused
76
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the following terms
shall be defined as follows:
77
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court
order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before
a suit or proceeding is commenced.
Sec. 5. DNA Testing Order. If the court finds that the requirements in
Section 4 hereof have been complied with, the court shall
a. Order, where appropriate, that biological samples be taken from any
person or crime scene evidence;
b. Impose reasonable conditions on DNA testing designed to protect
the integrity of the biological sample, the testing process and the
reliability of the test results, including the condition that the DNA test
results shall be simultaneously disclosed to parties involved in the
case; and
c. If the biological sample taken is of such an amount that prevents the
conduct of confirmatory testing by the other or the adverse party and
where additional biological samples of the same kind can no longer
be obtained, issue an order requiring all parties to the case or
proceedings to witness the DNA testing to be conducted.
An order granting the DNA testing shall be immediately executory and shall
not be appealable. Any petition for certiorari initiated therefrom shall not, in
any way, stay the implementation thereof, unless a higher court issues an
injunctive order. The grant of DNA testing application shall not be construed
as an automatic admission into evidence of any component of the DNA
evidence that may be obtained as a result thereof.
Sec. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. Post-conviction DNA testing may
be available, without need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any
person convicted by final and executory judgment provided that (a) a
biological sample exists, (b) such sample is relevant to the case, and (c) the
testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the judgment
of conviction.
Sec. 7. Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence. In assessing
the probative value of the DNA evidence presented, the court shall consider
the following:
a. The chair of custody, including how the biological samples were
collected, how they were handled, and the possibility of
contamination of the samples;
b. The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the
78
i.
ii.
a. In all other cases, until such time as the decision in the case where
the DNA evidence was introduced has become final and executory.
The court may allow the physical destruction of a biological sample before
the expiration of the periods set forth above, provided that:
a. A court order to that effect has been secured; or
b. The person from whom the DNA sample was obtained has
consented in writing to the disposal of the DNA evidence.
Sec. 13. Applicability to Pending Cases. Except as provided in Section 6
and 10 hereof, this Rule shall apply to cases pending at the time of its
effectivity.
Sec. 14. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on October 15, 2007,
following publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
for not less than the period of time that any person is
under trial for an offense; or
in case the accused is serving sentence, until such
time as the accused has served his sentence;
a. In criminal cases:
79
80
Rule 3
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Section 1. Electronic documents as functional equivalent of paper-based
documents. Whenever a rule of evidence refers to the term writing,
document, record, instrument, memorandum or any other form of writing,
such term shall be deemed to include an electronic document as defined in
these Rules.
Section 2. Admissibility. An electronic document is admissible in evidence
if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court
and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these
Rules.
Section 3. Privileged communication. The confidential character of a
privileged communication is not lost solely on the ground that it is in the form
of an electronic document.
Rule 4
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Section 1. Original of an electronic document. An electronic document
shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means,
shown to reflect the data accurately.
Section 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. When a document is in
two or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical
contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the
original, or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording,
or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which
accurately reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall be
regarded as the equivalent of the original.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not be admissible to
the same extent as the original if:
(a) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original;
or
(b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or inequitable to admit the
copy in lieu of the original.
81
Rule 5
AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. The person seeking to introduce
an electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its
authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. Before any private electronic
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must
be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person
purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices
as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for
authentication of electronic documents were applied to the
document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the
satisfaction of the judge.
(b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of
a certificate;
(c) No cause exists to render a certificate invalid or revocable;
(d) The message associated with a digital signature has not been
altered from the time it was signed; and,
(e) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority
indicated therein.
Rule 7
EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Section 1. Factors for assessing evidentiary weight. In assessing the
evidentiary weight of an electronic document, the following factors may be
considered:
82
to the proceedings and who did not act under the control of the party
using it.
Rule
BUSINESS RECORDS AS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE
(e) The nature and quality of the information which went into the
communication and information system upon which the electronic
data message or electronic document was based; or
(f) Other factors which the court may consider as affecting the
accuracy or integrity of the electronic document or electronic data
message.
Rule 9
METHOD OF PROOF
Rule 10
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Section 1. Electronic testimony. After summarily hearing the parties
pursuant to Rule 9 of these Rules, the court may authorize the presentation
of testimonial evidence by electronic means. Before so authorizing, the court
shall determine the necessity for such presentation and prescribe terms and
83
Section 2. Effectivity. These Rules shall take effect on the first day of
August 2001 following their publication before the 20th of July 2001 in two
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Documentary
Section 2, Rule 130
RULE 130
Rules of Admissibility
B. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
11
RULE 132
Presentation of Evidence
B. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
Section 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills
and testaments; and
84
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Damian Orera (alias Kim Cuan) was convicted by the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila, of the crime charged in the complaint, namely, of having
falsified, to the damages of a Chinese theatrical company of the Philippine
Islands, called Eng Ning, "a Chinese theater ticket which entitled the bearer
thereof to admission to a performance held in the theater of the above
company at Manila, on the 7th of October, 1906, by counterfeiting and
simulating the signature and rubric of Eng Ning on the ticket the same
figures, letters, dragons, ornaments and signatures, as placed by Eng Ning
and the above mentioned Chinese theatrical company . . ." The accused was
sentenced to be imprisoned at the Insular Prison of Bilibid for the period of
six months and one day, to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, Philippine currency,
and the costs of the suit, from which the judgment the accused appealed.
Testimonial
Section 20, Rule 130
85
RULE 130
Rules of Admissibility
C. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
1. Qualification of Witnesses
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
their known perception to others, may be witnesses.
RULE 132
Presentation of Evidence
C. OFFER AND OBJECTION
Section 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified. (35)
Section 39. Striking out answer. Should a witness answer the question
before the adverse party had the opportunity to voice fully its objection to the
same, and such objection is found to be meritorious, the court shall sustain
the objection and order the answer given to be stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers which
are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. (n)
86
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9181
COURT:
That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the
Court that you cannot prove a confession unless you prove first
conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and
circumstances as required by law. Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9
The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of
exclusion, but again the motion was denied. Wherefore, this petition for
certiorari was brought before this Court by the Solicitor General, for the
review and annulment of the lower Court's order completely excluding any
evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and
Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.
We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged
confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial when the
ruling was made.
Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confession of an accused, freely and voluntarily made, as
evidence against him.
SEC. 14. Confession. The declaration of an accused expressly
acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense charged, may
be given in evidence against him.
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's
confession may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban,
being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without
the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of
Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own
guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil. 41; People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People vs.
Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and should have been admitted as such.
The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered
evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123, providing that:
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.
87
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the
pendency of the unlawful enterprises("during its existence") and in
furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long
after the conspiracy had been brought to an end (U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9
Phil., 613; U. S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil.,
718; People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985).
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove
conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence against both of them.
In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had
not yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for
the purpose of identifying the confessions), much less formally offered in
evidence. For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other
proof of conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their
confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that
section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question, it was
premature for the respondent Court to exclude them completely on the
ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy.
It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions
was not made on the basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban's
counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court
issuedmotu proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession
as evidence of the guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on the ground that
it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this
objection, put up its own objection to the confessions that it could not be
admitted to prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without
prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions,
circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the confessions on that ground.
By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege
which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not
reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no
power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marcella vs. Reyes, 12
Phil., 1).
We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of
the individual extrajudicial confessions of two or more accused for the
purpose of establishing conspiracy between them through the identity of the
confessions in essential details. After all, the confessions are not before us
and have not even been formally offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice
it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be
given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit
the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the
prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its
disposal to prove the charges. At any rate, in the final determination and
consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to distinguish the
admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of
evidence, should be excluded.
Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case
of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817:
In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is
most effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts where
trial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor.
The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its
materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should
be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of
first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to
know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and
where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney
offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the
testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered
will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the
heat of the battle over which the presides, a judge of first instance
may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where
a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake
is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court,
upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to
correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new
trial, a step which this Court is always very loath to take. On the
other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if
the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can
never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is
supposed to know the law; and it is duty, upon final consideration of
the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant
and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted
to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this Court then has all the
material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where
questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the
unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no
longer appeal.
88
cover the same, which checks upon presentment for payment were
dishonored by the drawee bank. 2
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, petitioner Concepcion M.
Catuira filed a Motion to Dismiss (by way of Demurrer to Evidence) under
Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. 3Petitioner contended that the testimony of private respondent
Ocampo was inadmissible in evidence since it was not properly introduced
when she was called to testify as mandated in Sec. 35, Rule 132, of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. Petitioner also argued that even if the testimony
of private respondent was considered, the evidence of the prosecution still
failed to prove that the checks were issued in payment of an obligation.
On 26 July 1991, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
On 18 October 1991, it likewise denied the motion to reconsider its denial of
the motion to dismiss.
FIRST DIVISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Is the testimony of a witness inadmissible in evidence if not formally offered
at the time the witness is called to testify, as required in Sec. 35, in relation to
Sec. 34, Rule 132, of the Revised Rules on Evidence? 1
On 8 June 1990, two (2) Informations for estafa were filed against petitioner
Concepcion M. Catuira with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, for
having issued two (2) checks in payment of her obligation to private
complainant Maxima Ocampo when petitioner had no sufficient funds to
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred when it accepted the
testimony of private respondent despite the undisputed fact that it was not
offered at the time she was called to testify; her testimony should have been
stricken off the record pursuant to Sec. 34, Rule 132, which prohibits the
court from considering evidence which has not been formally offered; and, it
was error for respondent appellate court to declare that petitioner's objection
was not done at the proper time since under Sec. 36, Rule 132, 5 objection to
evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Evidently, petitioner could not have waived her right to object to the
admissibility of the testimony of private respondent since the rule requires
that it must be done only at the time such testimony is presented and the
records plainly show that the opportunity for petitioner to object only came
when the prosecution attempted, albeit belatedly, to offer the testimony after
it has rested its case. 6
The petition is devoid of merit. The reason for requiring that evidence be
formally introduced is to enable the court to rule intelligently upon the
objection to the questions which have been asked. 7 As a general rule, the
proponent must show its relevancy, materiality and competency. Where the
89
dismissed. 11 But even assuming that petitioner's objection was timely, it was
at best pointless and superfluous. For there is no debating the fact that the
testimony of complaining witness is relevant and material in the criminal
prosecution of petitioner for estafa. It is inconceivable that a situation could
exist wherein an offended party's testimony is immaterial in a criminal
proceeding. Consequently, even if the offer was belatedly made by the
prosecution, there is no reason for the testimony to be expunged from the
record. On the contrary, the unoffered oral evidence must be admitted if only
to satisfy the court's sense of justice and fairness and to stress that
substantial justice may not be denied merely on the ground of technicality. 12
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the order of
the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Br. 35, denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss (by way of demurrer to evidence) is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.
Indeed, the rationale behind Sec. 34, Rule 132, is manifest in the minutes of
the Revision of Rules Committee. 10Thus
The new rule would require the testimony of a witness to
offer it at the time the witness is called to testify. This is the
best time to offer the testimony so that the court's time will
not be wasted. Since it can right away rule on whether the
testimony is not necessary because it is irrelevant or
immaterial.
If petitioner was genuinely concerned with the ends of justice being served,
her actuations should have been otherwise. Instead, she attempted to
capitalize on a mere technicality to have the estafa case against her
90
CRUZ, J.:
This case hinges on the proper interpretation and application of the rules on
the admissibility of documentary evidence and the viability. of a civil action for
damages arising from the same acts imputed to the defendant in a criminal
action where he has been acquitted.
In the information filed against Rufo and Josephine Aviles, the private
respondents herein, it was alleged that being then sub-agents of Interpacific
Transit, Inc. and as such enjoying its trust and confidence, they collected
from its various clients payments for airway bills in the amount of
P204,030.66 which, instead of remitting it to their principal, they unlawfully
converted to their own personal use and benefit. 1
At the trial, the prosecution introduced photocopies of the airway bills
supposedly received by the accused for which they had not rendered proper
accounting. This was done in, the course of the direct examination of one of
the prosecution witnesses. 2 The defense objected to their presentation,
invoking the best evidence rule. The prosecution said it would submit the
original airway bills in due time. Upon such undertaking, the trial court
allowed the marking of the said documents a s Exhibits "B" to "OO." The e
prosecution n did submit the original airway bills nor did it prove their loss to
justify their substitution with secondary evidence. Nevertheless, when the
certified photocopies of the said bills formally were offered, 3 in evidence, the
defense interposed no objection.
In acquitting the accused, Judge Herminio I. Benito of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati rejected the agency theory of the prosecution and held that
the relationship between the petitioner and Rufo Aviles was that of creditor
and debtor only. "Under such relationship,' it declared, "the outstanding
account, if any, of the accused in favor of ITI would be in the nature of an
indebtedness, the non- payment of which does not Constitute estafa." 4
The court' also held that the certified photocopies of the airway by were not
admissible under the rule that "there can be no evidence of a writing the
content of which is the subject of inquiry other' than the writing itself." Loss of
the originals had not been proved to justify the exception to the rule as one of
the prosecution witness had testified that they were still in the ITI bodega.
Neither had it been shown that the originals had been "recorded in an
existing record a certified copy of which is made evidence by law."
In its order denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court declared
that it "had resolved the issue of whether the accused has civil obligation to
ITI on the basis of the admissibility in evidence of the xerox copies of the
airway bills." 5
Right or wrong, the acquittal on the merits of the accused can no longer be
the subject of an appeal under the double jeopardy rule. However, the
petitioner seeks to press the civil liability of the private respondents, on the
ground that the dismissal of the criminal action did not abate the civil claim
for the recovery of the amount. More to the point, ITI argues that the
evidence of the airways bills should not have been rejected and that it had
sufficiently established the indebtedness of the private respondents to it.
The Court of Appeals 6 affirmed, the decision of the trial court in toto, adding
that the existing record spoken of in Section 2 (e) and (d) of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court must be in the custody, of a public officer only. It also declared
that:
Since no evidence of civil liability was presented, no
necessity existed on the part of the private respondents to
present evidence of payment of an obligation which was not
shown to exist.
The petitioner now asks this Court to annul that judgment as contrary to law
and the facts established at the As in the courts below, it is insisting on the
admissibility of its evidence to prove the civil liability of the private
respondents.
We agree with the petitioner. The certified photocopies of the airway bills
should have been considered.
In assessing this evidence, the lower courts confined themselves to the best
evidence rule and the nature of the documents being presented, which they
held did not come under any of the exceptions to the rule. There is no
question that the photocopies were secondary evidence and as such were
not admissible unless there was ample proof of the loss of the originals; and
neither were the other exceptions allowed by the Rules applicable. The
trouble is that in rejecting these copies under Rule 130, Section 2, the
respondent court disregarded an equally important principle long observed in
our trial courts and amply supported by jurisprudence.
91
This is the rule that objection to documentary evidence must be made at the
time it is formally offered. as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that
time is premature.
It is instructive at this paint to make a distinction between Identification of
documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in
the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence an
an exhibit. The second is done only when the party rests its case and not
before. The mere fact that a particular document is Identified and marked as
an exhibit does not mean it will be or has been offered as part of the
evidence of the party. The party may decide to formally offer it if it believes
this will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In
the latter event, the trial court is, under Rule 132, Section 35, not authorized
to consider it.
Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is
formally offered, not earlier. The Identification of the document before it is
marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the document as
evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the Identification and
marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the document when
it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to the
document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.
In the case at bar, the photocopies of the airway bills were objected to by the
private respondents as secondary evidence only when they, were being
Identified for marking by the prosecution. They were nevertheless marked as
exhibits upon the promise that the original airway bills would be submitted
later. it is true that the originals were never produced. Yet, notwithstanding
this omission, the defense did not object when the exhibits as previously
marked were formally offered in evidence. And these were subsequently
admitted by the trial court. 7
In People v. Teodoro, 8 a document being Identified by a prosecution witness
was objected to as merely secondary, whereupon the trial judge ordered the
testimony stricken out. This Court, in holding the objection to be premature,
said:
It must be noted that the Fiscal was only Identifying the
official records of service of the defendant preparatory to
introducing them as evidence. ... The time for the
presentation of the records had not yet come; presentation
was to be made after their Identification. For what purpose
and to what end the Fiscal would introduce them as
92
By the same token, we find that remand of this case to, the trial court for
further hearings would be a needless waste of time and effort to the prejudice
of the speedy administration of justice. Applying the above ruling, we hereby
declare therefore, on the basis of the evidence submitted at the trial as
reflected in the records before us, that the private respondents are liable to
the petitioner in the sum of P204,030.66, representing the cost of the airway
bills.
With the admission of such exhibits pursuant to the ruling above made, we
find that there is concrete proof of the defendant's accountability. More than
this, we also disbelieve the evidence of the private respondents that the said
airway bills had been paid for. The evidence consists only of check stubs
corresponding to payments allegedly made by the accused to the ITI, and we
find this insufficient.
As it is Aviles who has alleged payment, it is for him to prove that allegation.
He did not produce any receipt of such payment. He said that the cancelled
payment checks had been lost and relied merely on the check stubs, which
are self-serving. The prosecution correctly stressed in its motion for
reconsideration that the accused could have easily secured a certification
from the bank that the checks allegedly issued to ITI had been honored. No
such certification was presented. In short, the private respondents failed to
establish their allegation that payment for the airway bills delivered to them
had been duly remitted to ITI.
SO ORDERED.
Qualified By
Dizon v. CTA, G.R. No. 140944, 30 April
2008
93
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 140944
COMPUTATION OF TAX
Conjugal Real Property (Sch. 1)
Conjugal Personal Property (Sch.2)
P10,855,020.00
3,460,591.34
14,315,611.34
187,822,576.06
NIL
NIL.
NIL
xxx
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision2 dated April 30, 1999 which affirmed the Decision3 of the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) dated June 17, 1997.4
The Facts
On November 7, 1987, Jose P. Fernandez (Jose) died. Thereafter, a petition
for the probate of his will 5 was filed with Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila (probate court).[6] The probate court then appointed retired
Supreme Court Justice Arsenio P. Dizon (Justice Dizon) and petitioner, Atty.
Rafael Arsenio P. Dizon (petitioner) as Special and Assistant Special
Administrator, respectively, of the Estate of Jose (Estate). In a letter 7dated
October 13, 1988, Justice Dizon informed respondent Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of the special proceedings for the Estate.
Petitioner alleged that several requests for extension of the period to file the
required estate tax return were granted by the BIR since the assets of the
estate, as well as the claims against it, had yet to be collated, determined
and identified. Thus, in a letter8 dated March 14, 1990, Justice Dizon
authorized Atty. Jesus M. Gonzales (Atty. Gonzales) to sign and file on behalf
of the Estate the required estate tax return and to represent the same in
securing a Certificate of Tax Clearance. Eventually, on April 17, 1990, Atty.
NIL.
NIL.11
On April 27, 1990, BIR Regional Director for San Pablo City, Osmundo G.
Umali issued Certification Nos. 2052[12]and 2053[13] stating that the taxes due
on the transfer of real and personal properties[14] of Jose had been fully paid
and said properties may be transferred to his heirs. Sometime in August
1990, Justice Dizon passed away. Thus, on October 22, 1990, the probate
court appointed petitioner as the administrator of the Estate. 15
Petitioner requested the probate court's authority to sell several properties
forming part of the Estate, for the purpose of paying its creditors, namely:
Equitable Banking Corporation (P19,756,428.31), Banque de L'Indochine et.
de Suez (US$4,828,905.90 as of January 31, 1988), Manila Banking
Corporation (P84,199,160.46 as of February 28, 1989) and State Investment
House, Inc. (P6,280,006.21). Petitioner manifested that Manila Bank, a major
creditor of the Estate was not included, as it did not file a claim with the
probate court since it had security over several real estate properties forming
part of the Estate.16
However, on November 26, 1991, the Assistant Commissioner for Collection
of the BIR, Themistocles Montalban, issued Estate Tax Assessment Notice
No. FAS-E-87-91-003269,17 demanding the payment of P66,973,985.40 as
deficiency estate tax, itemized as follows:
94
7,967,103.62
late payment
7,967,103.62
Interest
25,000.00
non payment
25,000.00
no notice of death
15.00
no CPA Certificate
300.00
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
P66,973,985.4018
In his letter19 dated December 12, 1991, Atty. Gonzales moved for the
reconsideration of the said estate tax assessment. However, in her
letter20 dated April 12, 1994, the BIR Commissioner denied the request and
reiterated that the estate is liable for the payment of P66,973,985.40 as
deficiency estate tax. On May 3, 1994, petitioner received the letter of denial.
On June 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for review 21 before respondent
CTA. Trial on the merits ensued.
As found by the CTA, the respective parties presented the following pieces of
evidence, to wit:
In the hearings conducted, petitioner did not present testimonial
evidence but merely documentary evidence consisting of the
following:
Nature of Document (sic)
3.
5.
19,121,048.68
Compromise-non filing
2.
P31,868,414.48
1.
4.
95
2.
3.
4.
5.
On June 17, 1997, the CTA denied the said petition for review. Citing this
Court's ruling in Vda. de Oate v. Court of Appeals,23 the CTA opined that the
aforementioned pieces of evidence introduced by the BIR were admissible in
evidence. The CTA ratiocinated:
Although the above-mentioned documents were not formally offered as
evidence for respondent, considering that respondent has been declared to
have waived the presentation thereof during the hearing on March 20, 1996,
still they could be considered as evidence for respondent since they were
properly identified during the presentation of respondent's witness, whose
testimony was duly recorded as part of the records of this case. Besides, the
documents marked as respondent's exhibits formed part of the BIR records
of the case.24
Nevertheless, the CTA did not fully adopt the assessment made by the BIR
and it came up with its own computation of the deficiency estate tax, to wit:
Conjugal Real Property
P 5,062,016.00
6.
33,021,999.93
7.
38,084,015.93
Less: Deductions
26,250,000.00
8.
9.
10.
Add: Capital/Paraphernal
11.
12.
13.
P 11,834,015.93
5,917,007.96
P 5,917,007.96
Properties P44,652,813.66
Less: Capital/Paraphernal
Deductions
Net Taxable Estate
44,652,813.66
P 50,569,821.62
============
96
7,483,835.74
15.00
No CPA certificate
Total deficiency estate tax
300.00
P 37,419,493.71
============
exclusive of 20% interest from due date of its payment until full
payment thereof
[Sec. 283 (b), Tax Code of 1987].25
Thus, the CTA disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, viewed from all the foregoing, the Court finds the
petition unmeritorious and denies the same. Petitioner and/or the
heirs of Jose P. Fernandez are hereby ordered to pay to respondent
the amount of P37,419,493.71 plus 20% interest from the due date
of its payment until full payment thereof as estate tax liability of the
estate of Jose P. Fernandez who died on November 7, 1987.
SO ORDERED.26
Aggrieved, petitioner, on March 2, 1998, went to the CA via a petition for
review.27
The CA's Ruling
On April 30, 1999, the CA affirmed the CTA's ruling. Adopting in full the CTA's
findings, the CA ruled that the petitioner's act of filing an estate tax return with
the BIR and the issuance of BIR Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053 did not
deprive the BIR Commissioner of her authority to re-examine or re-assess
the said return filed on behalf of the Estate. 28
On May 31, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 29 which the
CA denied in its Resolution30 dated November 3, 1999.
Hence, the instant Petition raising the following issues:
97
was filed by the judicial administrator and the issuance of said BIR
Certifications and not at the time the aforementioned Compromise
Agreements were entered into with the Estate's creditors. 32
On the other hand, respondent counters that the documents, being part of
the records of the case and duly identified in a duly recorded testimony are
considered evidence even if the same were not formally offered; that the
filing of the estate tax return by the Estate and the issuance of BIR
Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053 did not deprive the BIR of its authority to
examine the return and assess the estate tax; and that the factual findings of
the CTA as affirmed by the CA may no longer be reviewed by this Court via a
petition for review.33
The Issues
There are two ultimate issues which require resolution in this case:
First. Whether or not the CTA and the CA gravely erred in allowing the
admission of the pieces of evidence which were not formally offered by the
BIR; and
Second. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the CTA in the latter's
determination of the deficiency estate tax imposed against the Estate.
The Courts Ruling
98
In this case, we find that these requirements have not been satisfied. The
assailed pieces of evidence were presented and marked during the trial
particularly when Alberto took the witness stand. Alberto identified these
pieces of evidence in his direct testimony.41 He was also subjected to crossexamination and re-cross examination by petitioner.42 But Albertos account
and the exchanges between Alberto and petitioner did not sufficiently
describe the contents of the said pieces of evidence presented by the BIR. In
fact, petitioner sought that the lead examiner, one Ma. Anabella A. Abuloc, be
summoned to testify, inasmuch as Alberto was incompetent to answer
questions relative to the working papers.43 The lead examiner never testified.
Moreover, while Alberto's testimony identifying the BIR's evidence was duly
recorded, the BIR documents themselves were not incorporated in the
records of the case.
A common fact threads through Vda. de Oate and Ramos that does not
exist at all in the instant case. In the aforementioned cases, the exhibits were
marked at the pre-trial proceedings to warrant the pronouncement that the
same were duly incorporated in the records of the case. Thus, we held
in Ramos:
In this case, we find and so rule that these requirements have been
satisfied. The exhibits in question were presented and marked
during the pre-trial of the case thus, they have been
incorporated into the records. Further, Elpidio himself explained
the contents of these exhibits when he was interrogated by
respondents' counsel...
xxxx
But what further defeats petitioner's cause on this issue is that
respondents' exhibits were marked and admitted during the pre-trial
stage as shown by the Pre-Trial Order quoted earlier.44
While the CTA is not governed strictly by technical rules of evidence, 45 as
rules of procedure are not ends in themselves and are primarily intended as
tools in the administration of justice, the presentation of the BIR's evidence is
not a mere procedural technicality which may be disregarded considering
that it is the only means by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the truth
of BIR's claims against the Estate.46 The BIR's failure to formally offer these
pieces of evidence, despite CTA's directives, is fatal to its cause. 47 Such
failure is aggravated by the fact that not even a single reason was advanced
by the BIR to justify such fatal omission. This, we take against the BIR.
Per the records of this case, the BIR was directed to present its evidence 48 in
the hearing of February 21, 1996, but BIR's counsel failed to appear.49 The
CTA denied petitioner's motion to consider BIR's presentation of evidence as
waived, with a warning to BIR that such presentation would be considered
waived if BIR's evidence would not be presented at the next hearing. Again,
in the hearing of March 20, 1996, BIR's counsel failed to appear.50 Thus, in its
Resolution51 dated March 21, 1996, the CTA considered the BIR to have
waived presentation of its evidence. In the same Resolution, the parties were
directed to file their respective memorandum. Petitioner complied but BIR
failed to do so.52 In all of these proceedings, BIR was duly notified. Hence, in
this case, we are constrained to apply our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v.
Parocha:53
A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest
their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable
the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the
proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows
opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will
not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by
the trial court.
Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court
in Constantino v. Court of Appeals ruled that the formal offer of
one's evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within
a considerable period of time. It explained that the court cannot
admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three (3)
months because to do so would "condone an inexcusable laxity
if not non-compliance with a court order which, in effect, would
encourage needless delays and derail the speedy
administration of justice."
Applying the aforementioned principle in this case, we find that the
trial court had reasonable ground to consider that petitioners had
waived their right to make a formal offer of documentary or object
evidence. Despite several extensions of time to make their formal
offer, petitioners failed to comply with their commitment and allowed
almost five months to lapse before finally submitting it. Petitioners'
failure to comply with the rule on admissibility of evidence is
anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious
dispensation of justice.
99
100
October 6, 2010
101
102
the
Motion
for
(b) Are exhibits (Exhibits "7", "8" and "13") not formally offered as
evidence by the defendants in the trial court subject to judicial notice
by the Court of Appeals for the purpose of utilizing the same as basis
for the reversal of the trial courts decision?
Petitioners also put into issue the failure of the Court of Appeals to consider
respondent Enriquita Chaves-Abella (hereinafter "Abella") a purchaser and
registrant in bad faith9 and the reasonableness of its declaration that, even if
petitioners are indeed co-owners of Lot No. 382, they are already barred due
to the equitable principle of estoppel by laches in asserting their rights over
the same.10
We find the instant petition to be without merit.
The first three issues propounded by petitioners can be summed up into the
question of whether or not the Court of Appeals can consider evidence not
formally offered in the trial court as basis for the herein assailed Court of
Appeals ruling.
Petitioners draw attention to the fact that respondents did not formally offer
Exhibits "7," "8" and "13" at the trial court proceedings. In accordance with
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, 11 the trial court did not
consider them as evidence. Despite this, the Court of Appeals allegedly
utilized the same as basis for reversing and setting aside the trial courts
decision.
It is a basic procedural rule that the court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified.12 A formal offer is necessary because judges are
mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable
the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is
presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to
examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates
review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not
previously scrutinized by the trial court.13
103
104
Lastly, petitioners present objection to Exhibit "8" hardly deserves any credit.
Exhibit "8" is a rather innocuous document which has no bearing on any of
the significant issues in this case. Its existence was only referred to in the
second paragraph of page 7 of the RTC Decision wherein it is identified as
an "Order of the Hon. Court dated May 11, 1948." 26 Though it never formed
part of the records of this case upon appeal, a careful perusal of the assailed
Court of Appeals Decision would reveal that Exhibit "8" was not in any way
used or referred to by the Court of Appeals in arriving at the aforementioned
ruling.
Anent the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in failing to
consider that respondent Abella is a purchaser in bad faith, petitioner insists
that "for failing to exercise prudent (sic) and caution in buying the property in
question,"27 respondent Abella is a buyer in bad faith. She did not investigate
closely the basis of the ownership of Gaudencia Valencia, her grandmother,
over Lot No. 382 which a buyer in good faith should have done under the
circumstances. She did not even bother to know the persons from whom her
grandmother acquired the parcel in question. 28
Respondents argue that the issue of good faith or bad faith of Enriquita
Chaves-Abella was not raised in the Complaint filed by petitioners in the
RTC. Petitioners original theory of the case is that the sale by Gaudencia
Valencia to Enriquita Chaves-Abella was fictitious because the latter was
only nine years old at the time of the sale. However, during trial, it was clearly
established by common evidence that Enriquita was already married to
Charles Abella when she bought the lot in 1961, and, as a matter of fact, the
purchase money was provided by her husband, Charles. Confronted with the
above situation which completely destroyed their theory of the case,
petitioners switched from their "fictitious sale to a 9-year old" theory to an
entirely different theory, to wit: that Enriquita Chaves-Abella is a purchaser in
bad faith.29
Despite this, the RTC declared that respondent Abella is a purchaser in bad
faith because "[s]he did not investigated (sic) closely the basis of the
ownership of Gaudencia Valencia over Lot No. 382 which a buyer in good
faith should have done under the circumstances."30
The Court of Appeals reversed the above finding and ruled that respondent
Abella is an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith because the
"[r]ecords reveal that appellant derived her title of Lot No. 382 from the title of
Gaudencia Valencia, who sold the entire property to the former. Appellant
relied on the face of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 148 in the name of
105
Gaudencia Valencia,
annotation."31
which
was
free
from
any
encumbrances
or
that Abella had no participation in the execution of Exhibits "G" and "H" which
were signed by the parties thereto when she was very young. Like any
stranger to the said transactions, it was reasonable for Abella to assume that
these public documents were what they purport to be on their face in the
absence of any circumstance to lead her to believe otherwise.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays its fair price
before he has notice of the adverse claims and interest of another person in
the same property.36 Clearly, the factual circumstances surrounding
respondent Abellas acquisition of Lot No. 382 makes her an innocent
purchaser for value or a purchaser in good faith.
Finally, on the issue of whether or not petitioners, in the remote possibility
that they are co-owners of Lot No. 382, are barred from asserting their claims
over the same because of estoppel by laches, petitioners argue that they are
not guilty of unreasonable and unexplained delay in asserting their rights,
considering that they filed the action within a reasonable time after their
discovery of the allegedly fictitious deeds of sale, which evinced Lot No.
382s transfer of ownership to Valencia, in 1980. They maintain that the delay
in the discovery of the simulated and fictitious deeds was due to the fact that
Escolastico Saves with spouse Valencia committed the acts surreptitiously by
taking advantage of the lack of education of plaintiffs ascendants. 37
Respondents counter petitioners claims by underscoring the fact that, since
the 1940s when their predecessors-in-interest sold their shares in and over
Lot No. 382 up to the filing of this case in 1981, petitioners had never taken
possession of Lot No. 382 nor did they file any claim adverse to the
ownership of Gaudencia Valencia. Since the sale of Lot No. 382 by Valencia
to respondent Abella in 1961 up to 1981 when this case was filed, petitioners
had continued to sleep on their professed rights. As found by the Court of
Appeals, "[p]laintiffs were never in possession of the property from the very
start, nor did they have any inkling that they were entitled to the fruits of the
property, not until one of the plaintiffs wrote her relatives about the possibility
of being heirs to the property."38
On this issue, we again hold in favor of respondents.
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. 39 In the case at bar,
plaintiffs, assuming that they or their predecessors-in-interest had rights over
the land in question, obviously neglected to exercise these rights by failing to
106
assert any adverse claim over the property or demand any share of its fruits
for many years. Not unlike their predecessors, petitioners never interposed
any challenge to Valencias continued possession under title of ownership
over Lot No. 382 ever since the entire property was sold to her in 1947 which
led to the issuance of TCT No. 148 in her name. Likewise, petitioners and
their predecessors-in-interest did not mount any opposition to the sale of Lot
No. 382 by Valencia to respondent Abella in 1961 which prompted the
issuance of TCT No. 110. It was not only until 1981, or 34 years from
Valencias acquisition of the entire lot and 20 years from the transfer of
ownership over the same to respondent Abella, that petitioners decided to
assert their alleged rights over the property in a proper action in court.
Petitioners contend that the delay is attributable to the surreptitious manner
by which Valencia acquired Lot No. 382 from their predecessors-in-interest
but, on this point, petitioners evidence gravely lacks credibility and weight as
shown by the records. Instead, the evidence thus presented by both parties,
as found by the Court of Appeals, would lean towards the conclusion that
petitioners inaction for the past so many years belies any present conviction
on their part that they have any existing interest over the property at all.
Thus, even if we grant that petitioners are co-owners of the property at issue,
it is only fair and reasonable for this Court to apply the equitable principle of
estoppel by laches against them in order to avoid an injustice to respondent
Abella who is the innocent purchaser for value in this case. 40
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated June 28, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 51058, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed with said court by appellant seeking to set aside a
formal ruling issued by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur during
the course of the trial of the ejectment case below sustaining the adverse
party's objection of evidence preferred * by appellant as defendant therein
and indicating the nature of evidence that would be deemed admissible and
competent against the adverse party's torrens title.
As narrated in the petition itself, a complaint for ejectment and damages was
filed on September 12, 1963 by respondent Cosme O. Follosco as plaintiff
against petitioner Toribia Lamagan and her husband Ambrosio Leonor (now
deceased) as defendants in the lower court presided by respondent
judge. 1 Follosco prayed of the lower court that it order defendants to vacate
the 48-hectare portion of his land "illegally occupied" by them and to restore
possession thereof to him. The disputed portion of land is part of several lots
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totaling over 500 hectares, of which Follosco is the registered owner by virtue
of original certificate of title No. 178 issued by the Camarines Sur register of
deeds in April, 1950.
In answer to Follosco's complaint, petitioner Lamagan and her late husband
as defendants claimed that they and their predecessors-in-interest were in
open and adverse possession of the property since 1890; that Follosco's title
was acquired through fraud and deceit, and that the land should be deemed
held in trust by Follosco for them, and that the suit was brought by Follosco
"only after many years since he obtained his title thereto to hide from
defendants' knowledge that the latter's land was in fact covered by
(Follosco's) title." 2 As counterclaim, defendants prayed for the reconveyance
of the disputed land to them on the theory that the same should be deemed
as held in trust by Follosco for them.
The issues having been joined, Follosco as plaintiff presented through
counsel his evidence, oral and documentary, and closed his case.
Defendants then presented as their first witness petitioner's late husband in
support of their defense and counterclaim for reconveyance. In the course of
his direct examination by petitioner's counsel, Follosco's counsel objected to
a question dealing with the ownership of the land and manifested a
continuing objection to all similar questions which would elicit evidence of
alleged ownership of defendants, on the ground that Follosco's title was
already indefeasible and beyond judicial review.
The question was apparently extensively argued and respondent court
adjourned the trial at noon and issued his three-page written resolution of
August 15, 1966, ruling that any claims of defendants based on an alleged
pre-existing right prior to the alleged fraudulent issuance of the title in favor of
Follosco was already barred under section 38 of Act 496 and that since no
petition to reopen and review the decree of registration on the ground of
fraud had been filed within one year from issuance of the decree, Follosco's
title had become indefeasible and could no longer be attacked collaterally.
Respondent court therefore ruled that "the court so resolves that all
questions tending to elicit proof of ownership other than those which will
prove a better and earlier issued Torrens Title duly registered in favor of the
defendants or any of the defendants shall be barred and be not heard" and
sustained Follosco's objection to defendants' line of questioning, holding that
"(T)his court, without attempting to decide the case at its present stage, will,
therefore, entertain from the defendants proofs and evidence which will
indomitably (sic) show a better and earlier Torrens Title issued to the
defendants, if there is any."
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The appellate court's dismissal of the petition was in full accord with the rules
and applicable jurisprudence of the Court and must be affirmed.
3. Petitioner may have reason in law to complain against the trial court's
ruling that it would admit from her only evidence of "a better and earlier
issued torrens title duly registered in favor of the defendants or any of
(them)", since it merely held petitioner's one-year period to reopen the
decree in favor of respondent Follosco on the ground of fraud to have
already lapsed, but did not take into account petitioner's action in equity (by
way of her counterclaim) for the reconveyance of the land on the principle of
constructive trust. Such an action precisely concedes that the adverse party
wrongfully succeeded in obtaining a torrens title but prays that such title
should be ordered canceled and reconveyed in favor of the claimant as the
true beneficiary rightfully entitled thereto.
2. Neither has petitioner made out a case for her claim that she should be
permitted the special recourse of seeking a review of the trial court's ruling
by certiorari, since it virtually ruled out all her evidence in support of her
defense to the ejectment and of her counterclaim for reconveyance, and
hence, appeal in due course was not an adequate remedy.
The true and special function of writ of certiorari was defined by the Court
in Fernando vs. Vasquez 4 thus: "A line must be drawn between errors of
judgment and errors of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction
renders an order or judgment void or voidable. Errors of jurisdiction are
reviewable on certiorari; errors of judgment, only by appeal. Let us not lose
sight of the true function of the writ of certiorari "to keep an inferior court
within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." And, abuse of
discretion must be so grave and patent to justify the issuance of the writ."
The Court likewise cited therein the exceptional cases where certiorari had
been entertained despite the existence of the remedy of an appeal. "But in
those cases, either public welfare and the advancement of public policy so
dictate, or the broader interests of justice so require, or the orders
complained of were found to be completely null and void, or appeal was not
considered the appropriate remedy, such as in appeals from orders of
preliminary attachment or appointment of receiver." 5 Thus, in People vs.
Abalos, 6 the Court granted as an exception a writ ofcertiorari against the trial
court's ruling rejecting rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, pointing out that
"once the accused has been acquitted, there is no means to secure a review
by appeal, no matter how erroneous the action of the lower court may have
Assuming that the trial court erred in rejecting petitioner's proferred (sic)
evidence, petitioner's recourse is clear under the long established rules, to
wit, to make a formal offer of the evidence under Rule 132, section 35,
stating on the record what a party or witness would have testified to were his
testimony not excluded, as well as attaching to the record any rejected
exhibits. The Court has long noted that "it is the better practice to unite with
the record exhibits ... which have been rejected," 7 and that such rejected or
excluded exhibits "should have been permitted by the judge a quo to be
attached to the record even if not admitted in evidence, so that in case of an
appeal ... the court ad quem may thus be able to examine said exhibits and
to judge whether or not their rejection was erroneous." 8
4. The validity of the cited rule, i.e. to bring up to the appellate court the
rejected exhibits upon a proper appeal from a decision on the merits of the
case, enabling the appellate court to examine all the exhibits and evidence of
record and judge accordingly whether the trial court erred in rejecting the
excluded exhibits was evident in the very case at bar. Here, petitioner sought
to attach to the records here the exhibits which she intended to present to the
trial court but were ruled out by it. Since there has been no decision rendered
as yet by the trial court and respondent has denounced the proferred (sic)
documents as "gross and careless forgery" 9 which should be passed upon
by the trial court in the first instance, the Court had to order said documents
expunged from the records of the case at bar. 10
Again, respondent has cited the 1953 case of Follosco vs. Director of
Lands, 11 wherein the appeal of petitioner Lamagan and her other coappellants (as homestead claimants) from the lower court's order denying
their petition to set aside its judgment of August 27, 1948 declaring
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In any event, should the trial court exclude evidence that it deems clearly
irrelevant and inadmissible, it should not in the absence of an injunction
order from the appellate courts or of strong compelling reasons above
indicated - order the suspension of the trial pending the outcome of any
recourse sought by the affected party from the higher courts but should
continue with the trial and render in due course its judgment, which may then
be properly appealed from. Needless delay in the trial and determination of
the case would thus be avoided, unlike in the case at bar where the trial court
erroneously acceded to suspending the trial below pending the outcome of
this proceeding. It should be sufficient in such cases that the trial court afford
the affected party a reasonable period and opportunity to secure from the
higher courts a preliminary injunction order against the continuation of the
trial, and thereafter proceed with the trial and judgment of the case upon the
party's failure to secure such injunctive order.
ACCORDINGLY, the resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed and the
petition is dismissed. With costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo,
Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Dizon and Castro, JJ., are on leave.
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