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Carl Von Clausewitz: Childhood & Early Life

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Carl von Clausewitz

Childhood & Early Life


 Carl Von Clausewitz was born as Carl Philipp Gottfriedvon Clausewitz in a middle-
class family in Burg bei Magdeburg, Prussia. He was the youngest child of the family
and had three elder siblings.
 His father served as the Lieutenant in the Prussian Army and later on took to working
at the Prussian internal revenue service.

Life and military career


On 10 December 1810 he married the socially prominent Countess Marie von Brühl,
whom he had first met in 1803. She was a member of the noble German von
Brühl family originating in Thuringia. The couple moved in the highest circles,
socialising with Berlin's political, literary and intellectual élite. Marie was well-
educated and politically well-connected—she played an important role in her
husband's career progress and intellectual evolution. She also edited, published, and
introduced his collected work.
Clausewitz served in the Rhine Campaigns (1793–1794) including the Siege of
Mainz, when the Prussian army invaded France during the French Revolution, and
fought in the Napoleonic Wars from 1806 to 1815. He entered
the Kriegsakademie (also cited as "The German War School", the "Military Academy
in Berlin", and the "Prussian Military Academy," later the "War College") in Berlin in
1801 (aged 21), probably studied the writings of the philosophers Immanuel
Kant and/or Fichte and Schleiermacher and won the regard of General Gerhard von
Scharnhorst, the future first chief-of-staff of the newly reformed Prussian Army
(appointed 1809). Clausewitz, Hermann von Boyen (1771–1848) and Karl von
Grolman (1777–1843) were among Scharnhorst's primary allies in his efforts to
reform the Prussian army between 1807 and 1814.
 He began his military career at the age of 12. He started off by serving as the Lanco-
Corporal and soon moved up the ladder to serve as a Major General in the army.
 From 1793 to 1794, he served in the Rhine Campaigns, including the Siege of Mainz
at the time when the Prussian army invaded France in the French Revolution.
 In 1801, he enrolled at the Kriegsakademie or German War School. Thereafter, he
studied at the Military Academy in Berlin and the Brussian Military Academy. It was
there that he studied the works of philosopher Immanuel Kant.
 His deep acumen and intelligence won him the regard of General Gerhard von
Scharnhorst. Along with Hermann von Boyen and Karl von Grolman, he became a
close associate of Scharnhorst and helped the latter in the reform of the Prussian army
from 1807 to 1814.
 Meanwhile, from 1806, he took to serving in the Napoleonic Wars which he
continued until 1815. In the Jena Campaign, he served as an aide-de-camp to Prince
August. During the battle, Napolean invaded Prussia and defeated the Prussian-Saxon
army commanded by Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick.
 He was captured by the Napoleon army and became a prisoner of war held in France
from 1807 to 1808. After serving his sentence, he returned to Prussia to assist
Scharnhorst, who was the Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army and state.
 With Prussia forming an alliance with Napoleon I, he left the Prussian army and
instead took to serving the Russian armed forces. From 1812 to 1813, he served in the
Russian campaign fighting in the Battle of Borodino.
 In 1813, he joined the Russian-German Legion along with other Prussian officers
serving the Russian Army. It was during his service with the Russian army that he
helped negotiate the Convention of Tauroggen, thus accentuating the coalition of
Prussia, Russia and United Kingdom. The alliance eventually helped to defeat the
Napoleon and bring down his rule.
 With the Russo-German Legion being integrated into the Prussian Army, he left his
service at the Russian Army and instead joined hands with the Prussian Empire.
Immediately thereafter, he was appointed to the seat of chief of staff of Johann von
Thielmann's III Corps.
 In the new position, he served in the Battle of Ligny and the Battle of Wavre in the
Waterloo Campaign in 1815. Though his army lost the Battle of Ligny, they revived
and later attacked the Napoleon-led forces in the Battle of Waterloo successfully.
 The success in the Battle of Waterloo helped him to rise to the position of major
General. Furthermore, he was appointed as the director of his alma mater
Kriegsakademie, where he served until 1830.
 Though his contribution as a soldier is unquestionable, what gained him much
popularity was his works which he released as a military theorist. With a careful,
systematic and philosophical examination of war, he came up with his book, ‘On
War’ that highlighted his principle ideas and philosophies of war
 Despite being unfinished at the time of his death, the book was very valuable as it
introduced systematic philosophical contemplation into Western military thinking.
The content of the book comprised of powerful implications which are beneficial not
only for historical and analytical writing but also for practical policy, military
instruction, and operational planning.
 It was his wife who published his magnum opus posthumously in 1832. She penned
the preface of the book and by 1834, published several of his works.

major work
 Clausewitz was a professional combat soldier who was involved in numerous military
campaigns, but he is famous primarily as a military theorist interested in the
examination of war.
  He wrote a careful, systematic, philosophical examination of war in all its aspects.
  The result was his principal book, On War, a major work on the philosophy of war.
 He wrote on the theory of warfare and strategy that stressed the moral and political
aspects of war.
•His theories attract the interest of many.

 Pure War: Elimination or Complete Subjugation of the Enemy by Force.•

 Real War: All conditions and factors that impede or block the realization of “Pure
War”.
 The political objectives of using force by the state is typically the principal constraint
or limit to “Pure War”.
 “Pure War” as such is politically and morally without sense or meaning because all
other human values, interests, or preferences are excluded.
 War of all against all” is projected by Clausewitz from an individual or group level to
state relations and conflict

Six Lessons for the Modern Strategist


To excel at strategy, we must first
understand what is it
The talent of the strategist is to identify the decisive point and
to concentrate everything on it, removing forces from
secondary fronts and ignoring lesser objectives.
Carl von Clausewitz
Clausewitz lays out here a powerful definition of strategy. Let’s unpack
Clausewitz’s definition by examining its key words:
Identify: Good strategy always starts with a situation analysis to create a
Deep understanding of the competitive environment and our own
realities. The military mantra is, “intelligence precedes operations.”
The decisive point: Here he refers to what I call the winning
Proposition  — the central animating idea around which we must
Organize all our decisions and activities in order to outperform our
competitors. Once we have identified this, it’s all about focus and
determination.
Concentrate: Note here the words “concentrate everything” — not only
our physical resources, but also the hearts and minds of our people. To
quote Basil Hart, the military historian: “All the lessons of war can be
reduced to a single word: concentration.”
Remove: Every new thing we choose to do subtracts effort from
everything else we do. Making choices therefore means deciding what
we will not do. These subtractions are the toughest decisions of all, but
ducking them can be fatal. The most dangerous choice of all is not
choosing.
Ignore:  A winning strategy requires a disciplined mind and a steadfast
character. No distractions; no sideshows. We must always keep the main
thing the main thing.

Strategy and planning are not the same


thing.
Tactics are the use of armed forces in a particular battle, while strategy is the doctrine of the use of
individual battles for the purposes of war.
Carl von Clausewitz

The strength of any strategy lies in its


simplicity
Simplicity in planning fosters energy in execution. Strong determination in carrying through a simple
idea is the surest route to success. The winning simplicity we seek, the simplicity of genius, is the
result of intense mental engagement.
Carl von Clausewitz

Competition is interactive, not static


Some generals consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of a continuous interaction of
opposites … no strategy ever survives the first engagement with the enemy.
Carl von Clausewitz

Morale makes all the difference


War is a trial of moral and physical forces by means of the latter. . . In the last analysis it is at moral,
not physical strength that all military action is directed … Moral factors, then, are the ultimate
determinants in war.
Carl von Clausewitz

Strategy requires a dynamic process


We need a philosophy of strategy that contains the seeds of its constant rejuvenation — a way to
chart strategy in an unstable environment.
Carl von Clausewitz

ANALYSIS
 Clausewitz is a very talented leader.

 He has came out with a great philosophy that


is being used until today.
 Clausewitz ideas have been widely influential
in military theory.
 The state is the principal until of political
organization of the worlds diverse and divided
population.

Comparison between Sun Tzu and


Clausewitz
CONCEPT OF WAR:

According to sun Tzu:

 WAR IS A RECURRENT CONSCIOUS ACT


 REQUIRE A RATIONAL ANALYSIS
 NOT TO BE FOUGHT THOUGHTLESSLY OR RECKLESSLY
According to Clausewitz:

WAR AND VIOLENCE : A COROLLARY

WAR IS AN ACT OF VIOLENCE TO COMPEL THE ENEMY TO FULFIL OUR WILL.

According to sun Tzu:

 WAR DECISION TO REST WITH SOVEREIGN


 NO INTERFERENCE BY THE SOVEREIGN AFTER DECLARATION OF WAR

According to clausewitz:

 WAR IS TO REGARDED AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT

TACTICS:
ACCORDING TO SUN TZU:

DO NOT REPEAT THE TACTICS WHICH HAVE GAINED YOU ONE VICTORY BUT LET YOUR METHODS BE REGULATED BY

THE INFINITE VARIETY OF CIRCUMSTANCES

A CCORDING TO C LAUSEWITZ :

DOES NOT DWELL MUCH ON THE FORMS AND METHODS OF WAR

SURPRISE AND DECEPTION:

ACCORDING TO SUN TZU:

ALL WARFARE IS BASE ON DECEPTION

WHEN CAPABLE FEIGN INCAPACITY

WHEN ACTIVE , INACTIVITY

WHEN NEAR MAKE IT APPEAR YOU ARE FAR

ACCORDING TO CLAUSEWITZ:

SURPRISE LIES AT THE FOUNDATION OF ALL UNDERTAKING


TERRAIN:
ACCORDING TO SUN TZU:

A GENERAL WHO IS UNABLE TO USE GROUND PROPERLY IS UNFIT FOR COMMAND

ACCORDING TO CLAUSEWITZ:

GEOGRAPHY AND THE CHARACTER OF GROUND BEAR A CLOSE RELATION TO WARFARE.

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